University of Petroleum and Energy Studies College of Legal Studies Dehradun Interpretation of Statutes
University of Petroleum and Energy Studies College of Legal Studies Dehradun Interpretation of Statutes
University of Petroleum and Energy Studies College of Legal Studies Dehradun Interpretation of Statutes
CASE ANALYSIS
separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word "person" occurring in Section 50 of the Act The scope and ambit of Section 50 of the Act was examined in considerable detail by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999 (6) SCC 172)and para 12 of the reports is being reproduced below : "12. On its plain reading, Section 50 would come into play only in the case of a search of a person as distinguished from search of any premises etc. However, if the empowered officer, without any prior information as contemplated by Section 42 of the Act makes a search or causes arrest of a person during the normal course of investigation into an offence or suspected offence and on completion of that search, a contraband under the NDPS Act is also recovered, the requirements of Section 50 of the Act are not attracted." The Bench recorded its conclusion in para 57 of the reports and sub-paras (1), (2), (3) and (6) are being reproduced below : "57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following conclusions arise: (1) That when an empowered officer or a duly authorized officer acting on prior information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the person concerned of his right under Sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such information may not necessarily be in writing. (2) That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused. (3) That a search made by an empowered officer, on prior information, without informing the person of his right that if he so requires, he shall be taken before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where
the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from his person, during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. (6) That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the person intended to be searched, we do not express any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to inform the person concerned of his right as emanating from Sub-section (1) of Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law."
Olga Tellis and ors Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and ors2 'Pavement dwellers case'
Facts: In 1981, the State of Maharashta and the Bombay Municipal Council decided to evict all pavement and slum dwellers from the city of Bombay. The residents claimed such action would violate the right to life, since a home in the city allowed them to attain a livelihood and demanded that adequate resettlement be provided if the evictions proceeded. Issue Whether Right to life include right to livelihood ? Court held :- The Court declined to provide the remedies requested by the applicants but found that the right to a hearing had been violated at the time of the planned eviction. The Court held that the right to life, in Article 21 of the Constitution, encompassed means of livelihood since, if there is an obligation upon the State to secure to citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to lie. However, the right to a livelihood was not absolute and deprivation of the right to livelihood could occur if there was a just and fair procedure undertaken according to law. The government's action must be reasonable and any person affected must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as to why that action should not be taken. In the present case, the Court found that the residents had been rendered the opportunity of being heard by virtue of the Supreme Court proceedings. While the residents were clearly not intending to trespass, they found it was reasonable for the government to evict those living on public pavements, footpaths and public roads. The evictions were to be delayed until one month after the monsoon season (31 October 1985). The Court
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MANU/SC/0039/1985
declined to hold that evicted dwellers had a right to an alternative site but instead made orders that: (i) sites should be provided to residents presented with census cards in 1976; (ii) slums in existence for 20 years or more were not to be removed unless land was required for public purposes and, in that case, alternative sites must be provided; (iii) high priority should be given to resettlement My analysis : If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right conferred under the Article 21.
They should not be left free to hike the fees to any extent to meet their expenses. In absence of this the standard of legal education and the free legal scheme would become a farce. This should not be allowed to happen. The Court therefore directed the State to afford grant-in-aid to them in order to ensure that they should function effectively and turn out sufficient number of law graduates in all branches every year
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which will in turn enable the State to provide free legal aid and ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen on account of any disability. Article 21 read with Art. 39A casts a duty on the State to afford grants-in-aid to recognized private law colleges in the State of Maharashtra, similar to the faculties, viz. Art, Science, Commerce, etc. The words used in Art. 39A are of very wide importance. The need for a continuing and well organized legal education is absolutely essential for the purpose. The State of Maharashtra had denied grants-in-aid of the private recognized Law Colleges on the ground of paucity of funds. The Court held that this could not the reasonable ground for denial of grant-in-aid to such colleges.