UNITED

MG James C. Smith
COMMANDER
U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER
A major activity of the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
COL Keith J. Rynott
COMMANDER
U S ~ ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETY
A major activity of the
Inspector General and Auditor General
of the U.S. Army
Richard K. Tierney
EDITOR
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ABOUT THE COVER
We thank Joseph M. Watson Jr., for of-
fering his person.al photographs for use
on the cover and in the 'story beginning
on page 2
28
48
ARMY AVIATION
'1GESJ
JUNE 1977 VOLUME 23 NUMBER
Officers' Roadmap To EPMS, MG Charles K. Heiden
Army Organic Light Aviation: The Founding Fathers,
Dr. Laurence B. Epstein
Beware Of The Summer Thunderbumper,
Larry Collins ........................................................................ .
OPMS Corner: Aviation Materiel Management -
OPMS Specialty 71, MAJ Thomas M. Walker ...................... ..
Army Aviation Center At A Glance ................................ 2
EPMS Corner, SFC Douglas E. Allen ....................................... 2
Around The World, CPT Brendan P. Blackwell ....................... 2
Human-Error Accidents And Character Assurance,
Gerard M. Bruggink .............................................................. 3
A Little Less Realism ....................................................... 3
Break Time ........................................................................ 3
Fatigue - A Consideration In Mission Planning,
CPT Ronald A. Huether .........................................................
Pearl ................................................................................. 4
A Comparison Of The AH-1 S And The AAH,
CPT Mortin R. Karig .............................................................
A TC Action Line ............................................... Back COV4
The mission of the U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operational or
functional natlll'e concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention. training. maintenance. operations .
research and development. aviation medicine and other related data.
The DIGEST is an offical Department of the Army periodical published monthly under the supervision of
the Commanding General. U.S. Army Aviation Center. Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of
the Department of the Army nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise
specified. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the DIGEST and to the author. unless
otherwise indicated.
Articles. photos. and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communication is authorized
to : Editor . U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST. Fort Rucker. AL 36362.
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General. Headquarters . Departmentof the Army. 23
December 1975. in accordance with AR 310-1.
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined in AR 310-1.
Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AG Publications Center. 2800 Eastern Boulevard.
Baltimore. MD 21220. For any change in distribution requirements. initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.
ational Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should submit DA Form 12-5.
Other ational Guard units should submit requests through their state adjutant general.
Those not eligible for officiai distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST can order the
magazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington. DC 20402.
Annual subscription rates are $15.70 domestic and $19.65 overseas.
What every A rmy officer
should know about EPMS
IF SOMEONE WERE to ask
you what you know about the new
Enlisted Personnel Management
System (EPMS) what would your
answer be? Do you really under-
stand what EPMS is all about?
This question has been asked of
many of your fellow officers. Most
have been well informed, but
some still are confused about
EPMS. Either they lack sufficient
knowledge of the subject or they
perceive EPMS as strictly an en-
listed matter. They don' t under-
stand where they fit into the pic-
ture. This situation is a matter of
concern.
Years have been spent develop-
ing a system which benefits the
individual Soldier and at the same
time enhances the professional
status of the entire Army. EPMS
is a good program, but its success
is largely dependent on the active
participation of the officer corps .
Below, I cover what every officer
should know about EPMS.
June 1977
Major General Chartes K. Heiden
Commander
Military Personnel Center
200 Stovoll Street
Alexandria, VA
The old ystem served us well
for a number of years. But , time
have changed and the Army had
to change with them. It was rec-
ognized early that to have a truly
professional force we would have
to develop a different system for
the management , training and
evaluation of our enlisted Sol-
diers.
The EPMS task force was
formed at Military Personnel
Center (MILPERCEN ) and
Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) to work on this prob-
lem. Its members spent 18 months
seeking counsel , ideas and opin-
ions from about 20,000 Soldiers to
develop the framework for
EPMS.
During group interviews state-
ments like these frequently were
heard:
I'm in a dead end Military Oc-
cupational Specialty (MOS )'
I'm an E9 - been in the Army
27 years. Advanced Individual
Training ( AIT) was the last for-
mal school that I had the opportun-
ity to attend.
I can' t get promoted as long as
I stay in my MOS, and the Army
won' t let me reclassify into a new
MOS.
I m a deep sea diver and the
Army sent me to Noncommis-
sioned Officers Education System
( NCOE S ) in a transportation
MOS. It just doesn' t make sense.
My job is boring , and I ' ll
probably get out after this (first )
hitch.
Last month I graduated tops
in my advanced NCOES course.
My current job has nothing to do
with my MOS.
The green machine has had
me. I can't get there ( grade E8)
from here ( grade E6 ) .
Unfortunately many of the
above were valid comments.
They describe some factual Sol-
Continued on page 18
1
T ODA Y' S ARMY aviation
program, with its proven air-
mobile/air assault doctrine, began
prior to World War II as an effort
by individual members of the
Field Artillery to obtain adeq uate
aerial observation to adjust Artil-
lery fire . The vehicles they judged
best for their purposes were un-
armed, unarmored, single en-
gined, tandem two-seater aircraft
which cruised at about 70 miles
per hour and could be found any
Sunday buzzing local civilian air-
ports. They were powered by 65-
horsepower engines. Their flight
instrumentation consisted of
airspeed indicators, nonsensitive
altimeters and magnetic com-
passes - but with no turn-and-
bank indicators, lights (they were
not flown after dark) or naviga-
tional radios .
Observation always has been
essential to the successful
employment of an army in the
field. Wellington wore at Water-
loo that he would give up half his
army to know what was happening
on the other side of the hill . The
U.S. Army' s first experience with
aerial observation came during
the Civil War through the use of
balloons.
Professor Thaddeus S.C. Lowe,
Director of the Balloon Corp of
the Army of the Potomac from
1861 to 1863, was the most success-
ful balloonist. Using telegraph and
a balloon over Fort Corcoran, out-
side Washington, DC, he directed
Artillery fire in 1861 against Con-
federate positions across the
Potomac River in Virginia. Dur-
ing the Spanish-American War , a
balloon was instrumental in the
American success in 1893 at the
Battle of San Juan Hill.
During World War I , airplanes
joined balloons to provide ground
commanders with critically
needed information. [Balloons,
due to their vulnerability to
airplane attacks and lack of mobil-
ity, were abandoned almost en-
tirely by 1940. ]
The role of air observation and
the adj ustment of Artillery fire
was of critical importance to the
Field Artillery during World War
I. The increa ed range of its field
guns added to the difficulties of
locating, adjus ting and hitting
targets quickly on a rapidly mov-
ing battlefield. Corps aviation
squadrons were assigned to corps
headquarters exclusively to per-
form Artillery spotting mi ions .
All requests were made through
corps headquarters.
The as igned aircraft , stationed
at an airdrome in the rear , flew to
the front where it contacted the
requesting division' Artillery by
radio. The gunners never knew or
met the observers and, upon com-
pletion of the mission, the pilot
returned to their airfield for
another assignment.
Since the Air Service observers
were not responsible to the Artil-
lery commanders whom they
served the latter s acrificed a vital
element of command. The Field
Artillery found these aircraft few
in number , rarely available when
wanted, and unfamiliar with the
needs of Artillery.
The Growing Artillery/ Avia-
tion Rift. The experience of World
War I led Artillery and the Army' s
air segment to conclude divergent
doctrines . The rift widened during
the interwar years. Major General
Robert M. Danford, Chief of Field
Artillery, was convinced that air
observation was essential to the
effective use of Artillery. He or-
dered a thorough study of the Field
Artillery' s experience with bal-
loons and aircraft during the pre-
vious war .
The study concluded that to be
effective the airborne observer
should be Artillery, familiar to
and with the gunners being di -
rected , and that the aircraft
should be organic to the Artillery
A my Organic
Lig ht Aviation:
The Founding Fathers
2
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
As part of Army aviation's 35th anniversary the DIGEST is
carrying the following story. It features the first published
interviews with Joseph McCord Watson Jr., who played an
unprecedented role in bringing about the birth of Army
aviation on 6 June 1942. In photo at left an Army Cub takes
oH from a temporary forward landing strip in North Africa
units they served. This meant they
should be owned, operated and
maintained in the same manner as
the unit's field guns and trucks.
The pilots and observers should be
members of the Field Artillery
and regularly assigned to their
parent Artillery units.
During the 1920s and 1930s, avia-
tion made rapid technological ad-
vances. However, as aircr aft be-
came capable of flying higher , fas-
ter and farther , they became less
suited to the air observation needs
of the Field Artillery. Army ob-
servation aircraft became so
heavy that they were limited to
flying from permanent airfields
with prepared runways. They also
required elaborate repair and
maintenance facilities . Tied to
operating from these sophisti -
cated airfields, they became less
mobile while field armies were
becoming more mobile.
The split in doctrine was more
complex from the Army Air Corps
side, which was established as a
separate combat arm by Congress
in 1926. It was complicated by
psychological growing pains. Air
observation and the adjustment of
Artillery fire were only two of the
roles the Air Corps had to perform.
And, the Air Corps did not consider
these to be its primary roles. Many
aviators emerged from World War
I convinced that military aviation
should be an autonomous service
coequal with the Army and Navy.
They strongly felt it should not be
chained to the ground combat
forces in the observation, recon-
naissance and Artillery spotting
roles.
Development and devotion to
Camouflaged Piper Cub loaded on 2V2-ton
truck for movement forward after dark
June 1977
the doctrine of strategic air bom-
bardment led the Air Corps -
short on funds and struggling to-
ward autonomy - to weaken all
elements of its ground support
program. These suffered as the
Air Corps battled to achieve the
autonomy it considered essential
to fully develop military airpower.
Rallying around their leader ,
Brigadier General William
" Billy" Mitchell , most of those
developing the Army' s air power
advocated the doctrine of
strategic bombing. This concept
would mass aviation resources in
long-range, heavy bomber air-
craft groups capable of hitting
strategic industrial and military
targets deep within the enemy's
homeland. They were convinced
the enemy would capitulate
quickly, long before the armies
could become decisive and naval
blockades effective . While sincere
in their desire to prevent future
wars of attrition deadlocked in
trench warfare, they also were
aware that their claims for au-
tonomy depended upon a weapons
system and strategy distinct from
either service.
The development in 1937 of the
B-17 Flying Fortress, a fast , high
altitude four-engine heavy
bomber, finally gave the Air Corps
a weapons system capable of
translating its theories into real-
ity.
The Air Corps was suspicious of
any effort to place aircr aft under
the control of ground force com-
manders. It had long fought any
such move and was enjoying some
success. The Artillery observers
were to be members of the Air
Corps. The reasoning was that
furnishing a pilot and airplane to
only transport an observer from
Artillery about the battlefield de-
moted the Air Corps from the
status of a combat arm to that of a
taxi service.
The Air Corps was being af-
fected by a rapidly expanding
technology. It was involved in an
interservice " war" with both the
U.S. Navy and its parent [U. S.
Army] service of which it was but
a small component. And, it was
suffering from limited appropria-
tions that an extremel y frugal
Congress was doling out to the
military with the approval of an
isolationist American public .
These conditions all helped div rt
the Air Corps ' inter t from it
ground support role. But the crux
of the matter was that within the
Army only the Air Corp had the
authorization to purchase or use
an airplane.
The Origins Of Organic Army
Aviation. Charles Lindbergh cap-
tured the imagination of the world
in 1927 when he b came the first to
fly the Atlantic alone. Aviation be-
came the dream of youth as its
technological advances continued
to rapidly supersede one another .
Many Americans believed that
within their lifetimes the private
airplane would become almo t as
common as the automobile. FI -
ing was the way of the future. The
ownership of a light airplane was
expected to be within the capabil-
ity of every middleclass American
family .
One una suming young man
who played a key role in making
Army Cub lands on grovel strip constructed by
the 34th Division Air Operations in Italy . The
grovel was collected from Italian roods . The
strip was 10 feet wide and 150 yards long. The
grovel enabled the Cubs to operate in any type
weather. At right , on aerial view of the some
runway
4
organic Army aviation a reality
was Joseph McCord Watson Jr.
Returning from the Univ rsity of
Alabama to his home in San An-
tonio, TX, in 1928 he went to work
in his father ' s prosperou retail
shoe company. He believed in the
future of aviation and was deter-
mined to learn to fly . He arranged
to take lessons from two friends
who held instructor ratings in civi-
lian light aircraft. The next year,
with 50 hours flying time , Mr .
Watson became the 6 619th person
to receive his private pilot licen
from the CAA (Civil Aeronautic
Authority) .
Convinced that another war was
probable, Mr. Watson and several
of his friends in 1930 enlisted in the
U.S. Army Reserves. Following
completion of the necessary
courses at Ft. Sam Houston, TX,
he was commissioned a econd
lieutenant in the Field Artillery
Reserve . He became a first
lieutenant 3 years later, all this
time continuing to fl y as a hobby.
Lieutenant Watson transferred
out of the Reserves to 36th Infan-
try Division , Texas National
Guard, commanded by Brigadier
General Claude Birkead. The
young offic r served as S4 on the
staff of the 61st Field Artillery
Brigade. He began to develop his
concept of Artillery spotting from
the air in 1936. Confident that good
air-ground communications could
be e tablished from a commercial
light aircraft , Lieutenant Watson
enlisted the support of Captain
John K. Burr, the headquarters
battery commander and a
nonflyer .
From 1936 to 1938, Lieutenant
Watson rented airplanes at Stin-
son Field. The rental fee came out
of his pocket , with Captain Burr
sometimes chipping in. The two
men experimented with establish-
ing air-ground radio communica-
tions between the airplane and
trucks or jeeps on the ground.
They would strap various types of
Field Artillery radios on the shelf
behind the second seat of a Taylor
Cub (it became the Piper Cub in
1937) and dangle a 10 to 12-foot
chain out the window to serve as
an antenna. Satisfactory com-
munications were achieved at dis-
tance up to 15 miles with line of
sight being mandatory between
the airplane and the radio vehicle
on the ground. They also tried
their hand at directing vehicles on
the " march.'
The 36th Division was assem-
bled at Camp Beauregard, LA, for
maneuvers during its annual
summer encampment in August
1939. The recently promoted Cap-
tain Watson rented a Piper Cub on
several occasions to practice the
adjustment of Artillery fire. He
was the only man in the division
who had a pilot s license.
In 1940 Captain Watson pro-
posed to Brigadier General Robert
O. Whiteaker , commander of the
61st Field Artillery Brigade that
the Piper Aircraft Corporation be
asked if it would furnish a couple
of its airplanes to experiment with
the adjustment of Artillery fire. In
July of that year, Captain Watson
tel phoned Mr. William T. Piper
Sr. , who promised to have Mr.
Thomas A. Ca e his district sales
manager for the Ea tern United
States who was working with the
Piper dealers in New Orleans ,
participate in the maneuvers .
The Piper Aircraft Corporation,
located in Lock Haven, PA, for -
merly wa known as the Taylor
Aircraft Company. It marketed
the Taylor Cub (the forerunner of
the modern popular-priced
American light airplane ), de -
veloped by its president , C.G.
Taylor. Mr . Piper was the trea-
surer until 1937 when he bought out
Mr. Taylor , thereby becoming
both president and general man-
ager.
Mr. Taylor moved to Alliance,
OH, where he started a new air-
craft company named Taylor-
craft .
During its fir t full year of pro-
duction in 1938, Mr. Piper sold 737
Cubs. Most were painted bright
yellow for better visibility in the
air. The factory produced 1,806 the
next year and 3,016 the year after .
The 10,000th Cub rolled out the
doors before the end of 1941.
As Mr . Piper promised, Tom
Case flew a radioless J-4, a side-
by-side two seater Piper Cub
coupe, to Camp Beauregard on 12
August 1940 for a 2-day stay. Mr .
Case thought the demonstrations
went well . But he found the loud
rendition of " Stars and Stripes"
by the division band at reveille ob-
June 1977
noxious. On the first day he flew
Captain Watson and other Artil-
lery officers in slow eirel s above
the batteries on the Artillery
range while they practiced adjust-
ing Artillery fire. Due to the air-
borne observers' ability to see the
explosions beyond the vision of th
gunners , the latter were able to
accurately hit the targets more
quickly and with fewer shells than
before.
On the second day, Mr. Case ob-
served and controlled the
brigade's long column on it 93-
mile return march from the Artil-
lery ranges near Camp Beau-
regard to its base camp near Ca-
vens , LA. Following the dem-
onstrations, Tom Case flew back
to the factory to discuss the details
of the exerei e with Mr . Piper .
Captain Watson and Mr. Ca e con-
tinued their dialogue on the prob-
lems encountered and possible
solutions during the following
months.
The 36th Division, a veteran of
the Meuse-Argonne Campaign in
1918, again was activated on 25
November 1940. It was assembled
at Camp Bowie near Brownwood,
TX. When the Artillery ranges
were completed, General Whit-
eaker wrote to Mr. Piper request-
ing more extensive tests in light of
the favorable results achieved the
previous summer. He wanted to
compile the factual data neces-
sary for a formal recommenda-
tion for organic aviation.
Recounting the experience of
the first demonstration the gen-
eral noted that the Cub' s ability to
maneuver at low speeds and ex-
tremely low altitudes allowed the
airborne observer to give com-
mands directly to the battery
commanders either by voice or by
dropping messages attached to
orange or red streamers . This
avoided the delays encountered
using Air Corps aircraft.
The target could be hit quickly
and with fewer rounds of ammuni-
tion. In fact , General Whiteaker
wrote that the savings of 40 rounds
of 155 mm or 200 rounds of 75 mm
shells would exceed the retail
purchase price of a Piper Cub
($1,700) .
Use of the Cub for column con-
trol during the long road march
from the Artillery range con-
vinced General Whiteaker of the
light aircraft ' s value for these
functions. Other merits of th Cub
were:
Its ability to land and takeoff
from unprepared fields near the
batteries or on any country road
without obstructions within 500
feet.
The small consumption of fuel
and lubricants which limited the
burden upon the supply system.
The ease with which a pilot
with limited training could suc-
cessfully fly the aircraft.
General Whiteaker suggested
that a built -in radio would be
superior to the Field Artillery' s
SCR 178 and 194 sets whose bulk
interfered with the freedom of
movement of the pilot and ob-
server . Folding or detachable
wings would enable the airplanes
to be transported by truck when
not needed - or when grounded by
weather.
Captain Watson' s initiative in
contacting the Piper Aircraft Cor-
Continued on page 10
5
6
You don't have to penetrate a 'ine system or dodge around
a sing'e cell to have a bout with nature at its worst. The
dangers can exist as far as 5 mi'es awayl
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
W
ITH THE HAZARDS of
winter fl ying for gotten for
another ye ar , pilot s
everywhere breathe a sigh of re-
lief and look forward to easy-going
summer flying . But many are the
pilots who have flown into the se-
renit y of summer onl y to be
sucked up, pelted with hail , co-
vered with ice , shaken by
windsheers, and, if lucky, blown
out of a summer thunderstorm.
Make no mistake - weather is a
year-round hazard, and the sum-
mer thunderstorm is a most
deadl y adversary.
A local weather phenomenon,
the summer thunderstorm de -
velops from a cumulus cell and is
modified by its immediate sur-
roundings . It ' s the ultimate
growth form of cumulus activity
and must be considered highl y
dangerous because of its heavy
rain, icing conditions, hail , light-
ning, strong windsheers , and se-
vere turbulence . Thus the
nickname, ' Thunderbumper ."
Obviously these packets of vio-
lence must be avoided, but that is
not always easily done . With a
good working knowledge of this
weather phenomenon and using
tried flying techniques associated
with it , your chances of survival
are vastly improved.
Generally, thunderstorms are
common from late winter to early
fall , with June, July, and August
being the months having the high-
est frequency of storms. Although
the Pacific coast has an occasional
summer thunderstorm, the South-
east , especially Florida, has the
highest number of instances per
day, per year, over a specific re-
gion. Stretching from the Dakotas
to parts of Texas is a region called
" Tornado Alley," and it lives up to
its name. Summer thunderstorms
June 1977
< 3 ~ ~
UBAAAVB
Larry Collier
Reprinted by permission of ROTOR & WING, July/August 1976
mass in a line and march across
the plains, causing much crop and
material damage.
There are four basic require-
ments for a thunderstorm to build.
These ingredients are:
Unstable air
Lifting action
High moisture content
Sufficient condensation nuclei
When the actual lapse rate of an
air layer is higher than that of the
dry adiabatic lapse rate , the air
layer is said to be unstable. An air
mass lifted in this condition will be
warmer than the surrounding air,
and like a hot-air balloon, will be
forced even higher . Air of this na-
ture, if forced to rise , will become
more unstable and can cause se-
vere turbulence. The greater the
lapse rate difference, the more
unstable the air.
Lifting action may be the result
of any type of weather front ,
mountainous or rough terrain ,
heating from below, or air con-
vergence. If warm air from the
surface region is thus carried to
the free convection level , the po-
tential for moisture condensation
increases.
If the air does not contain
enough moisture , cloud buildup
cannot take place. In this instance,
clear air turbulence (CAT) may
be experienced. When adeq uate
moisture for cell building does
exist , the heat produced from the
moisture condensation process
tends to make the air even more
unstable.
Condensation nuclei may be
anything from particles of dust
carried aloft by lifting action, to
artificial condensation nuclei such
as sodium iodide used in cloud
modification. Iron, salt , and even
other ice particles are often a part
of the process. Anything that
moisture can condense and build
on is considered nuclei .
A thunderstorm cell must
breathe and feed itself to li ve . The
breathing takes place in the form
of updrafts and downdrafts , and
the feeding occurs when conden-
sation nuclei and moisture are
carried into the cell on updrafts.
Drafts are nothing more than
large, vertical air currents that
are continuous through thousands
of feet in height and may cover the
entire length of an individual cell.
Drafts should not be confused with
gusts , which are short in duration.
Although updrafts and
downdrafts may occur throughout
any cloud cell , there are two gen-
eral guidelines for finding these
major feeders. In a single cell , the
major inflow feeder is found on the
rear portion of the cell (rear in re-
lation to its movement) , while the
outflow is forward. On a linetype
system, which may be hundreds of
miles in length, this inflow/outflow
process is reversed, with the in-
flow now located along the leading
edge and the outflow to the rear .
These areas of inflow or outflow
are usually indicated by scud
clouds, which are caused by mois-
ture condensing at a lower level
due to fast-moving air currents
going in and out of the cloud base.
These scud clouds often appear to
be an extension of the cloud edge,
hanging down and out.
In the beginning or building
stage of a thunderstorm cell , up-
drafts may move as fast as 3000
fpm. There is no rain falling, as it
is suspended or being carried
aloft , and no lightning is present.
It is the mature part of the cycle
that contains hazards in the ex-
treme ; therefore , it is here the
emphasis is put.
Continued on page 44
7
Officer
Personnel
Management
System
Major Thomas M. Walker
A viation Management Branch
Professional Development Division
Officer Personnel Management Directorate
A VIATION MATERIEL Management (Spe-
cialty 71 ) is an Officer Personnel Management Sys-
tem (OPMS) specialty encompassing operational
and nonoperational fl ying positions relating to the
life cycle management of aviation materiel. This
includes aircraft engines ; airframes; components ;
accessories ; instruments ; rotor blades; power
trains ; or hydraulic , mechanical and electrical fuel
systems.
Officer aviators designated this specialty may
perform a variety of functions concerned with re-
search and development ; test and evaluation ; pro-
curement and production control ; inventory con-
trol ; storage ; distribution ; maintenance ; supply;
and transportation. The D partment of the Army
(DA) taff proponent for Aviation Materiel Man-
agement is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
(DCSLOG) , while the Training and Doctrine Com-
mand (TRADOC) school proponency rests with the
U.S. Army Transportation School at Ft. Eustis, VA.
Specialty 71 is designated a primary specialty for
commissioned officer aviators assigned to the
Transportation Corps or an alternate specialty for
officers assigned to other Officer Personnel Man-
agement Directorate (OPMD) branches. Transpor-
tation Corps second lieutenants designated specialty
71 attend Army flight training following completion
of the officer basic course. Upon completion of flight
training specialty 71 officers attend the Aviation
Maintenance Officer Course (AMOC) at Ft. Eustis.
The length of AMOC is 13 weeks and it provides the
aviator the technical knowledge required to ac-
complish maintenance test flights and quality
assurance on Army aircraft. Flight school and
AMOC represent the basic schooling qualifications
for specialty 71.
Utilization. As with all graduates of flight train-
ing, specialty 71 aviators receive DA directed opera-
tional flying as ignments for utilization of both their
aviation and aviation maintenance officer training.
Normally, the length of these assignments is 3 years.
8
AVIATION MATERIEL
MANAGEMENT-
OPMS
SPECIALTY 71
The assignments are designed to provide the officer
with a solid foundation in Aviation Materiel Man-
agement. Additionally, early utilization ensures a
high probability of successfull y passing the 12-year
Aviation Career Incentive Act (ACIA) gate - that
is , 72 months operational flying experience during
the first 12 years of aviation service.
Upon completion of initial utilization specialty 71
aviators usuall y are assigned to duties which in-
crease their expertise in their primary or alternate
specialty. Ideally, whenever possible, the assigned
duties support t he officer' s primary or alternate
specialtie . Although OPMS has accomplished great
strides in d veloping the right number of qualified
offic r s for the Aviation Materiel Management spe-
cialty, om assignment out id an officer ' s desig-
nated specialtie will continue in upport of Army
requirements .
Along with the various functions previously ad-
dressed, an Aviation Materiel Management officer
may serve in key positions both as commander and
staff officer . For example the officer may serve as
commander of a section, platoon, detachment, com-
pany, battalion or group engaged in aviation unit
maintenance (A VUM) , aviation intermediate
maintenance (A VIM) or depot support level
maintenance and supply. As a staff officer, duties
may be performed at battalion and higher troop
command, commodity command or high level staff.
Additionally, specialty 71 officers may serve as a
project manager (PM) for an aviation system that
has entered the production/deployment or operation
and support phase of its life cycle management.
Considering the increased complexity of new and
emerging aviation systems the challenges as -
sociated with duties a a PM are evident. Factors
which influence utilization/assignment to these posi-
tions are :
Army requirements .
Professional development needs of the officer.
The officer s manner of performance and poten-
tial.
The officer 's desires.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""';
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
#
,
,
#
#
#
#
,
,
,
Transition/Saved Pay Provision Terminated 31 May 1977
The January 1977 edition of the AVIATION DIGEST carried an article in
the OPMS Corner with this title. The article states that warrant officers
with 30 years or more Total Federal Officer Service (fFOS) cannot
receive flight pay. Since that time it has been determined that the Avia-
tion Career Incentive Act does not place a service limit on flight pay for
warrant officers. Accordingly, MILPERCEN has initiated action to
change AR 37-104-3 and to have the Finance Center continue flight pay
for warrant officers with 30 years or more TFOS.
,


















""""""""""""""""."""""""""'""""""
Availability of officers with required qualifica-
tion.
The grade, specialty, education and experience
of the officer.
Policy considerations such as stability of as-
signments and short tour equity.
Personal factors.
The type of assignments available to officers in the
Aviation Materiel Management specialty are as var-
ied as any specialty within OPMS. Current position
requirements by command stated authorization
(CSA) for members of specialty 71 are 136 lieuten-
ants , 348 captains, 90 majors, 66 lieutenant colonels
and 22 colonels. These figures represent both opera-
tional and nonoperational flying positions. Commis-
sioned aviators designated specialty 71 as a primary
or alternate specialty are 266 lieutenants , 677 cap-
tains, 234 majors, 272 lieutenant colonels and 20 col-
onels. In comparing assets with requirements it is
evident that utilization rates at the company grade
level are higher than at field grade. Aviation
Materiel Management officers, when not assigned to
71 positions, may serve in their alternate or another
logistics specialty - depending on Army require-
ments.
Professional Developmen t. Officer professional
development under OPMS is defined as " the de-
velopment of the professional attributes and
capabilities of Army officers to meet the needs of the
Army through planned assignments and schooling."
The basic elements which impact on the professional
development of specialty 71 officers are:
Planned and progressive rotation of duties
which mayor may not mean assignment changes.
Officer professional education, to include resi-
dent and nonresident instruction, on-the-job train-
ing, individual study, and, when appropriate, civi-
lian education.
Officer evaluation system.
Officer promotion system.
Individual participation in professional de-
velopment. The importance of officers participating
in their professional development planning cannot
be overemphasized. Each officer, specialty 71 in-
cluded, must be familiar with OPMS professional
development policies and the impact that will be
made on an individual's career. In layman' s terms,
June 1977
the individual officer continues to represent the key
link in the personnel management chain.
Professional development counseling.
Alternate specialty designation also is an essential
part of officer professional development. Aviation
Materiel Management officers may be designated
an alternate specialty from any of the OPMS
specialties with the exception of the Infantry, Ar-
mor , Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery
specialties.
Restrictions in the choice of an alternate specialty
are few. In determining OPMS specialty combina-
tions for specialty 71 , two basic factors are
evaluated: (1) utilization rates of specialties, and
(2) compatibility of specialties. Numerous OPMS
specialties satisfy utilization and compatibility
goals for designation with specialty 71. Some exam-
ples are Procurement (97); Research and Develop-
ment (51); Transportation Management (95); Sup-
ply Management (92); Traffic Management (86);
and Maintenance Management(91).
As discussed earlier, successful completion of ini-
tial flight training and the Aviation Maintenance Of-
ficer Course are fundamental qualifications for spe-
cialty 71 . Other specialty related military courses
supportive of Aviation Materiel Management officer
professional development include:
Aircraft qualification courses
Defense procurement
Defense inventory management
Transportation Officer Advanced Course
(TOAC)
Army provisioning management
Defense international logistics
Logistics management development
Logistics Executive Development Course
(LEDC)
Professional development guidance, educational
opportunities - both military and civilian - and
assignment opportunities for the Aviation Materiel
Management specialty are addressed in DA Pam-
phlet 600-3, "The Officer Personnel Management
System. " This pamphlet currently is under revision
and should be ready for distribution to the field by
the fourth quarter fiscal year 1977.
Command. Command opportunity is and will con-
Continued on pase 27
9
' "
The Founding Fathers
tion was Major William W. Ford, a
career Soldier in the Field Artil-
lery. Major Ford began flying as a
hobby in 1934 and by 1941 accrued
more than 500 hours as a pilot. He
wrote an "explosive" article,
"Wings For Santa Barbara, " for
the April 1941 issue of The Field
Artillery Journal (see June 1974
DIGE ST for a reprint of the arti-
cle). In it, he noted that not once
during the 4 months of maneuvers
with the Third Army during 1940
were actual air observers availa-
ble to adjust fire of their Artillery
battalions . More importantly,
Major Ford believed the flat ter-
rain at the Artillery School at Ft.
Sill , OK, misled gunners into
thinking that observed fire and
good maps were the rule - not the
exception. Major Ford's article
greatly impressed Major General
Robert M. Danford, the Chief of
Field Artillery, who also played an
instrumental role in bringing
about the birth of Army aviation.
Continued from page 5
poration was the catalyst that led
to the establishment of organic
Army aviation. Many thought the
commercial light airplane was
superior to the standard Air Corps
observation aircraft, and the
value of air observation to the
Field Artillery was undisputed.
But Captain Watson was the first
to undertake actual experiments
with light aircraft - and at his in-
itiative and expense. He ap-
proached Piper because he could
fly the Cub and he knew it was
suitable for the role. Aeronca and
Taylorcraft produced similar
airplanes.
It was an uphill struggle for or-
ganic Army aviation, but Captain
Watson could not have enlisted the
support of a more vigorous advo-
cate than William T. Piper Sr. He
already was a successful busi-
nessman in 1929 when C.G. Taylor
asked him to invest $600 in his
fledgling aircraft company.
Mr. Piper believed in the future
of light aviation in America. The
practical, affordable and depend-
able little airplanes he sold were
an exponent of his philosophy. He
believed that only by getting a
large number of Americans to fly
could the future of light aviation be
secured. It was only common
sense that some of these pilots
were going to want to buy their
own airplanes . The young
Lieutenant Watson' s unusual re-
quest did not seem unreasonable
to a man who often traveled long
distances to demonstrate the
capabilities of one of his airplanes
to anyone who showed the
slightest interest.
Concerned that light aviation
might be overlooked in the confu-
sion surrounding the Nation' s rush
to rearm, Mr. Piper sent a letter to
Secretary of War Henry L. Stim-
son suggesting a number of mili-
tary and semimilitary uses of light
10
aviation. Surprisingly, the ad-
justment of Artillery fire was not
among them. Included were con-
trol of columns from the air,
liaison, evacuation of the
wounded, and their use as radio-
controlled flying bombs.
Although a commercial ven-
ture, Mr. Piper pointed out that his
company represented 50 percent
of the country's light aircraft in-
dustry and wished to contribute to
the Nation's defense. He informed
Secretary Stimson that the bearer
of the letter had his authority to
act for the company.
The bearer of the letter was
banker John Edwards Parsons
Morgan, who had known little
about aviation when he was voted
onto the board of directors at
Piper. A man of great energy, Mr.
Morgan founded the National Ski
Patrol. It was intended to both
rescue skiers in distress and also
serve as a model for American ski
troop training during World War
II . He also was responsible for
building the first ski lift, which
was located at Sun Valley, ID.
Equally important, he knew many
of the Nation' s prominent citizens,
including Robert A. Lovett from
college days at Yale.
Mr. Lovett was a former U.S.
Naval Reserve pilot who had
taken up flying in light airplanes
as a hobby when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed
him Special Assistant to the Sec-
retary of War and later Assistant
Secretary of War for Air.
Mr. Morgan remained in
Washington where he became an
effective lobbyist for the Piper
company. He also later served as a
spokesman for the Aeronca and
Taylorcraft aircraft companies
whom he asked to join in a biparti-
san campaign to sell light aircraft
to the Army.
Another who played a large role
in the development of Army avia-
Never during the Third Army
exercises did the terrain allow for
observed fire. And, the maps used
were inadequate. The airplane
was the solution, but Major Ford
wrote in his article, " The trouble
is that we do not have an adequate
number of planes or observers for
this purpose; nor are they on or-
der; nor are the types of planes we
contemplate the best suited to the
job." He advocated a pilot and
"flivver" type commercial
airplane organic to each Artillery
battalion to carry a trained Field
Artillery observer. There " were
thousands of commercial light
planes in this country, available
upon requisition" and "thousands
of civilian pilots holding CAA cer-
tificates of competency to fly
them." An inadequate number of
observers and aircraft were
available and Major Ford saw lit-
tle hope of improving the situation
without such a program.
Ford noted in his article that the
"flivver" airplane had a low
horsepower engine and a slow
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
cruising and landing speed. It
could land on roads, cow pastures
and lightly plowed fields (al-
though the editor noted that recent
tests showed " repeated" landings
on " cow pastures" caused the
landing gear to break).
Major Ford thought the " fliv-
ver" would be more survivable
than the standard heavy Air Corps
observation airplane due to its
maneuverability, ability to fly
below tree level, and its need to be
in the air only during the few min-
utes required for the fire mission.
Air observation would be availa-
ble whenever the battalion com-
mander needed it. And, the close
teamwork essential to effective
Artillery fire would result from
" belonging" to the unit it served.
The light " fli vver" airplane cost
about $1,500, whereas the stand-
ard Air Corps observation
airplanes cost 20 to 30 times more
and required large ground crews
and sophisticated facilities far
removed from the battlefield. The
standard commercial airplanes
were available , meaning the
money and resources needed to
procure the Air Corps observation
aircraft could be used to purchase
more needed combat aircraft.
The Piper Flying Circus. While
Mr . Morgan was conducting his
" assault " on the War Depart-
ment, the Piper company was con-
tacting other Army commands
with an offer to demonstrate the
usefulness of their airplanes. As a
result , Tom Case made several
short trips to Ft. Sill.
W.T. Piper responded to
Brigadier General Whiteaker' s
request to return for more exten-
sive testing. Tom Case joined Mr.
Piper and three other company
pilots - all in radio-equipped Cubs
- at Camp Bowie, where they
lived in the field from 9 to 23 May
1941. Captain Watson was in
charge of running all the tests and
seeing to the needs of the guests
and their airplanes.
Mr. Piper and the general were
of similar personalities and
formed an amiable relationship.
Tom Case was impressed most
with the accuracy of the gunners.
With practice, the air observers
would get on target after firing two
to four rounds. The gunners would
lay their sights on the airplane fly-
ing above the target. Using fence
line intersections as targets, they
could place a shell in each of the
four quadrants within 10 feet of the
intersection. The brigade' s three
Artillery regiments were using 37
mm guns in place of their 75 mm
guns which had been sent to the
British fighting in North Africa.
In addition to taking Artillery of-
ficers aloft to adjust Artillery fire ,
the Cub pilots also tested air-to-
ground communications, camou-
flage effectiveness and observa-
tion. They practiced column con-
trol during a 6%-hour road march
from Barkley, TX, back to Camp
Bowie . The pilots landed their
Cubson roads and refueled at local
filling stations.
Large-scale maneuvers con-
tinued as the Army continued to
absorb the influx of draftees and
work out flaws in organization,
doctrine, tactics and equipment.
The war in Europe was nearing
the end of its second year. The
maneuvers were not games, but a
race .against time. American war-
ships were engaging German
submarines as convoys crossed
the Atlantic to Britain - a weary
survivor of the air battle over its
home islands. England faced the
threat of invasion from German
armies which also were slashing
deep into Russia , routing the
Soviets as they went.
As war clouds threatened, the
United States scheduled an impor-
tant series of maneuvers for the
summer and fall of 1941. Second
Army maneuvers around Camp
Forrest, TN (2 to 28 June) were
followed by those of Third Army at
Ft. Bliss near EI Paso, TX (14 to 26
July) and at Ft. Beauregard (11 to
30 August). The Second Army
joined the Third in combined
maneuvers at Ft. Beauregard for
the entire month of September .
The First Army held two series of
maneuvers (6 October to 1
November and 3 to 30 November)
in the Carolina maneuver area.
Robert Lovett , recalling Piper
had provided some light airplanes
for tests with the Field Artillery at
Ft. Sill, wrote to Mr . Morgan early
Army jeep and motorcycle on flight line prior to Oran, North Africa conference which Generals
Eisenhower, Clark and Rider, among others, attended during the summer of 1943
in June, "It might be a useful ex-
periment to have 10 or 12 of these
light planes, piloted by men you
might select, attached to an Artil-
lery unit. " Mr. Morgan replied
that Piper would be happy to sup-
ply 10 or 12 airplanes and also
would ask Aeronca and Taylor-
craft each to send aircraft to make
it an industry test.
General Henry "Hap" Arnold,
Chief of the Air Corps, approved
the arrangements. The manufac-
turers supplied the radios for their
airplanes, while the Army pro-
vided ground radios and the ob-
servers, and also housed and fed
the men and furnished gasoline.
Two Air Corps squadrons of 0-49
observation aircraft also were as-
signed. General Arnold directed
that all ground units make com-
plete reports on the value or use of
the light airplanes in the maneuv-
ers. The tests were to be official!
Tennessee Maneuvers. On 18
June 1941, Henry Wann, Tom
Case, James M. Helbert and Jules
Parmentier flew their Piper Cubs
to Manchester in eastern Tennes-
see where the Second Army was to
conduct its war games around
Camp Forrest. They were joined
by four additional Cubs and two
airplanes each from the Aeronca
and Taylorcraft companies. All
were equipped with RCA two-way
radios.
It was not an unqualified suc-
cess because someone had failed
to get the word to all involved. The
"brass" was puzzled by the ap-
pearance of civilians flying
puddle-jumpers. Consequently,
the volunteer squadron received
few orders and it was not until the
fourth (and last) week that the
umpires discovered that the only
way to find out what was going on
was from the backseat of the little
civilian airplanes. The squadron
pilots slept under the wings of
their airplanes and had to
scrounge for their food.
Operating from a landing strip
298 paces long on a heavily wooded
12
Army Piper Cub on reconnaissance mission over North Africa in 1943
mountainside, the Cub pilots ob-
served 155 mm gunfire by flying at
1,000 feet above and behind the
guns. The excellent visibility they
enjoyed, their slow speed, and the
ease with which one man was able
to handle the aircraft favorably
impressed the officers with whom
they worked. Besides the adjust-
ment of Artillery fire, the provi-
sional squadron performed scout-
ing missions, delivered messages,
and transported commanders and
staff officers about the battlefield
as they performed their duties.
They also worked with the regular
Air Corps observation squadrons.
The unique ability of the light
aircraft to land almost anywhere
was demonstrated in 102 landings
upon dirt roads, fields and pas-
tures. When the exercises were
completed, they dropped flares in
front of some hard-charging tank
units to inform them so. When one
commander failed to com-
prehend, a Cub landed in a nearby
field and taxied up the road to the
startled tankers.
The rapidly expanding Army
was suffering growing pains as it
was forced to take half-trained
cadres to staff newly formed divi-
sions.1t lacked adequate numbers
of modern equipment (civilian
trucks posed as tanks and wooden
guns as antiaircraft weapons) but
found the volunteer squadron to be
one of the highlights of the ma-
neuvers.
Ft. Bliss Manuevers. The volun-
teer squadron, composed of the
same airplanes and pilots from
Piper, Aeronca and Taylorcraft ,
and joined by two additional Cubs,
flew to Ft. Bliss. This was in re-
sponse to an invitation to partici-
pate in the desert maneuvers from
11 to 26 July 1941, among the sand,
cacti and clumps of grass.
General Arnold cut orders for
them to be based at Biggs Field,
outside EI Paso, TX. The post
commander, a National Guards-
man called to active duty, told
them, "I know nothing about you
or why you are here. " He refused
to allow the motley gang of civi-
lians with their Sunday-flying
airplanes onto the airfield. After
several frustrating days at the
civilian airport in EI Paso, Mr.
Morgan telephoned Secretary
Lovett ~ o quickly got the com-
mander straightened out.
The nickname "grasshopper"
was bestowed upon the light air-
craft during these maneuvers.
Major General Innis P. Swift,
commanding general of the 1st
Cavalry Division, was startled to
see a Piper Cub land on the desert
beside his headquarters, 50 miles
outside EI Paso. He invited the
pilot, Henry Wann, to share his
lunch with him, telling him that he
looked like a "damned grasshop-
per" as he bounced along the
ground during the landing.
Forty-five minutes later a radio
message arrived to inform the
general that Mr. Wann's airplane
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
was being dispatched to assist him
and was then leaving Biggs Field.
The general sent Wann with his
aide back to Biggs Field to get
some fresh hams for the head-
quarters mess. Meanwhile ,
angered at the delays in getting
radio messages through, General
Swift decided to send for Mr. Wann
and the Cub and told an officer to
send a message, " SEND GRASS-
HOPPER. SWIFT. " When the of-
ficer asked , " What ' s a grass-
hopper? " the general replied ,
" They ' ll know when you tell
them." They did , and the
nickname was born.
Members of the squadron
quickly fashioned a Grasshopper
emblem which they painted on the
sides of their ubiquitous little
airplanes . Mr . Morgan sent a
Grasshopper lapel pin to Secret-
ary Lovett.
The biggest desert operations
yet undertaken by the Army took
place in temperatures up to 115
degrees and at elevations from
4,000 to 6,000 feet. Dry lake beds
were used as landing fields. In one
instance, three Cubs landed on an
unprepared field where the first
two damaged their landing gear.
They radioed for repair parts and
both were flying again within 80
minutes . On the other hand, the
Air Corps ' 0-49 aircraft
cr ashlanded so often that orders
finally were issued that no Air
Corps airplanes were to use a
newly prepared airfield until the
Grasshopper Squadron had used it
for 48 hours. Damaged Air Corps
aircraft had to be trucked 50 miles
or more to Biggs Field to be re-
paired.
Louisiana Maneuvers. The
Grasshopper Squadron flew to Ft.
Beauregard for the Second Army
maneuvers from 11 to 30 August
1941. On the way, Mr. Case stopped
off at Camp Bowie to brief Captain
Watson and Brigadier General
Whiteaker on the results of the Ft.
Bliss Maneuvers. Meanwhile,
General Danford, enthusiastic
over the performance of the light
aircraft in the summer maneu-
vers , had flown to the United
Kingdom to visit the Royal Artil-
lery School at Larkhill. Impressed
with the British use of light spotter
airplanes with their Artillery, he
requested War Department per-
mission to officially test organic
light aviation.
The Grasshopper Squadron flew
12 to 14 hours a day during August.
Secretary Lovett wrote to Mr.
Morgan , then at Third Army
headquarters , Camp Polk, LA,
that the Third Army had re-
quested the use of the Squadron in
the combined Second and Third
Army maneuvers scheduled for
the same area in September. Sec-
retary Lovett suggested that the
Third Army rent the airplanes. Up
until this time the airplane com-
panies were paying their expenses
and providing the airplanes free of
charge.
Colonel Eisenhower. Back in
April 1941, Henry Wann, in his
capacity as western district sales
manager for the Piper company,
was trying to drum up some busi-
ness with the Army. He telephoned
Ft. Lewis , WA, where, being un-
familiar with Army organization,
he talked with various desk
sergeants and junior officers. Fi-
nally he was put in touch with a
lieutenant colonel. The officer was
pleasant and told Mr. Wann that
he himself had a pilot' s license,
General Eisenhower (then a junior officer)
had served on General Douglas MacArthur's
staff in the Phillippine Islands during the mid-
1930s. As they worked to build up an in-
d.enous army, they realized the need for a
small "air force" to reach their 90 training
camps. They needed lilht airplanes that could
takeoff and land on short airstrips in order to
reach the camps, since the 7,100 islands of the
Phillippine archipelago had only a primitive
roadnet, except for the island of Luzon.
An airfield was informally established outside
Manila in 1936 and Colonel Eisenhower, at age
46, began pilot instruction. He passed his
license examination on 19 July 1939. By the
time of the Louisiana Maneuvers he had lolled
more than 600 hours in light airplanes.
General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of
Staff, was so pleased by Colonel Eisenhower's
work in the LOUisiana Maneuvers that he
promoted him to brigadier general in late
September. On 26 July 1942, General
Eisenhower replied to a letter from a .... adler
General Ralph W. Coane, commandlnl .the 41st
Infantry Division's Artillery in Australia.
General Eisenhower knew General Coane from
Ft. Lewis a nd had been a student of the 41 at
Division's commander, Major General Horace
H. Fuller, in 1926 at the Command and Gener.'
Staff Collele, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He asked,
"By the way, he (Fuller) and I were alw.,.
interested In gettlne so e little puddle-Jumper
airplanes for each Infantry division. - to be
flown and maintained by the division
organization itself, entirely separate from the
Air Corps. The idea was that they were merely
flying motorcycles and were to be for command,
,liaison and limited observation missions. The
use of the plane was to be limited strictly to the
June 1977
divisional area and to the rear." General
Eisenhower wanted to know If the 41st Division
had ever received any.
13
but that Ft. Lewis had no authority colonel was on the friendliest of J. McCloy. Mr. Morgan drew up
to purchase any airplanes . terms with members of the squad- the contract and General Gregory
The officer that Henry Wann ron since he often went out to their signed it. Mr. Morgan had drawn
talked with was Dwight David field and borrowed an airplane to up the contract with no authority
Eisenhower, who soon was pro- escape the heat of the hot, humid whatsoever from either the Piper ,
moted to colonel and was chief of August evenings, with J.M. Hel- Aeronca or Taylorcraft com-
staff to Lieutenant General bert of Piper. Colonel Eisenhower panies. It was never questioned
Walter Krueger , commander of told Mr. Morgan to get a figure. and the Army promptly paid the
the Third Army. While the Grass- Mr . Morgan talked with W. T. bills upon presentation.
hopper Squadron was participat- Piper who had just arrived for the Grasshoppers' Indian Summer.
ing in maneuvers with the Third maneuvers and who told Mr. Mor- Following the monthlong ma-
Army in Louisiana, Colonel gan, " If we don' t get it, let 's not get neuvers in Louisiana with the Sec-
Eisenhower came to inspect them hasty and pullout our planes. The ond and Third Armies, the volun-
with the chief of the Third Army Army needs the planes more than teer Grasshopper Squadron flew
Air Corps, Lieutenant Colonel we need the money. " to the Carolinas. There it partici-
Sam Davis. Colonel Eisenhower Colonel Eisenhower gave Mr. pated during October and into
later returned to the football field Morgan a " maneuver order" for November in First Army ma-
which the Grasshoppers were $24,000 and sent him to the quar- neuvers . Two airplanes each from
using as an airstrip and flew with termaster general , Major General the Rearwin and Interstate air-
one of the Grasshopper pilots. Edmund B. Gregory, who told him craft companies joined the Gras-
Secretary Lovett' s suggestion to to " draw up a contract " and shopper Squadron for these ma-
General Krueger that the Third " make it short and simple. " Mr. neuvers.
Army rent the Grasshoppers was Morgan already had telephoned Through the summer the Grass-
turned over to Colonel Eisenhower Secretary Lovett and his Army hopper Squadron flew more than
to implement as chief of staff. The Ground Forces counterpart , John 400,000 miles and completed more
Another Armored Force officer who ap- The 2d Armored Division moved West in early
preclated ,.,ht aviation's potential was Georle 1942 to test tank doctrine and train for desert
S. Patton Jr ... then actinl and later commandinl warfare. In a report to General McNair on 20
lenera' of the 2d Armored Division. Durinl May 1942, General Patton wrote, II ... since it is
1940. he incorporated I"ht planes in all his the first time to my knowledge that a fairly larle
exercises, usinl them to transmit orders to Iroup of Armored vehicles were successfully
subordinates In the field, to locate and Identify commanded from the air by voice radio, the
units. and to fly himself and his staff officers report may be of interest ... " When he wrote the
quickly to their destinations. He experimented lessons learned in "Notes On Tactics And
with light airplanes that could use open fields Techniques Of Desert Warfare (Provisional),
unsuitable for other military aircraft and came 30 July 1942," General Patton concluded that
to prefer the Piper Cub. the comma nder should exercise comma nd from
On 12 December 1940. General Patton sent the liaison plane by two-way radio until contact
the 2d Armored Division on a 400-mile round was made with the enemy. Then a staff officer
trip from Columbus, GA. to Panama City, FL. should replace the commander in the airplane
The 4-day trip, the lonlest march yet un while the latter leads the attack from the
dertaken by an American Armored division, grou nd.
used I"ht airplanes to control the columns The officers and men of the 2d Armored
composed of 1,100 vehic1es. Division never knew when or where General
General Patton wrote to his friend, Patton would show up to witness their
Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Crane, then on progress. He used jeeps, sedans, tanks, half
General LesHe McNair's staff at Army General tracks and light airplanes to move about amonl
Headquarters. in the sprin. of 1941: ". am his dispersed units. General Patton nearly lost
personally lettlnl so air-minded that I own an his life while landinl his Cub near his
aeroplane and expect shortly to have a pilot's headquarters, narrowly missing some nearby
Ucenle. Next time you come down here (Ft. telephone poles. Upon their initiative, his
8ennlnl), I may be able to take you for a ride if troops cut down the offendinl poles and buried
you have sufficient Insurance." the wires underlround.
14 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
than 3,000 missions. Not one
airplane was lost in the line of
duty. There were not any engine
failures or aircraft grounded for
more than 24 hours for repairs.
During the same period, the Air
Corps had to write off 11 0-49s at a
cost of $25,419 each (the Cub, with
radio, cost $2,432).
The 0-49 was three times
heavier than the Piper Cub, and its
55-foot wingspan was 20 feet
longer. It took 6,000 manhours to
build and, unlike the Cub - which
took 300 manhours and could land
on the highway and taxi up to the
local filling station - it required
100 octane aviation fuel. On 12 Sep-
tember, Third Army Air Opera-
tions showed nine 0-49s in service
and 12 out of commission, while all
11 Grasshoppers were available.
One Cub used as a spare was lost
when a sudden wind squall at
Camp Polk tossed an 0-49 up in the
air and dropped it on top of the
Cub.
The Grasshoppers proved to be
indispensable wherever they
went. Even General Krueger used
a Cub to untangle an Armored col-
umn enmeshed in a huge traffic
jam. Flying at 200 feet, the general
used a megaphone and straight-
ened out the mess in 20 minutes.
The Air Corps' problems were
not due simply to the superiority of
the Grasshoppers to the 0-49s. As
with other components of the
Army, it was having difficulties
reorganizing and mobilizing for a
wartime footing. Major General
Lewis H. Brereton, commander of
the Third Air Force, had set up and
operated the two Air Corps
maintenance commands for the
opposing armies in the east Texas
and Louisiana maneuvers. He
found that he lacked sufficient
trained staff to handle the maze of
organization and detail. "We sim-
ply could not put supplies in the
places where they should be and in
the quantities required, " he said.
Tanks, Horses and Cubs. The
Armored Force was established
June 1977
on 10 July 1940. Brigadier General
Adna R. Chaffee was assigned as
chief of the Armored Forces and
commander of the I Armored
Corps. General Chaffee was
aware of the implications of air-
power to Armored warfare. The
Nazi blitzkrieg, unleashed against
France in May 1940, married the
dive bomber to the fast moving
German Panzer units. This led to
the rapid collapse of what most
people considered the finest army
in the world.
General Chaffee telephoned Wil -
liam Piper Sr., on 9 February 1941,
and asked if he would send an
airplane to the U.S. Army Armor
School, Ft. Knox, KY. The general
wanted to test his ideas on direct-
ing Armored columns and
methods of adjusting tank gunfire
from the air. He believed that light
aviation should be organic to all
branches of the combat arms. Mr.
Pjper agreed and Tom Case flew
the now veteran (Cub), still with-
out a radio, to Ft. Knox. He worked
closely with General Chaffee and
his staff from 10 to 15 February.
After further tests at Camp
Bowie, Mr. Case flew to Lock Ha-
ven, PA, where the Piper factory
installed a standard radio. Al-
though not designed for the air-
craft, the radio did provide
adequate two-way, air-ground
voice communications. Four days
later (on 23 April) Mr. Case re-
turned to Ft. Knox to continue the
tests .
Ft. Riley Demonstrations.
Piper Cub demonstrated the ad-
vantages of light aviation to
Cavalry officers from 12 to 14 June
1941, at Ft. Riley, KS. Convinced
that light airplanes and horses
were compatible, the enthusiastic
officers arranged for a more ex-
tensive demonstration. This took
place from 1 to 8 July 1941 when
four pilots, with a mechanic, re-
turned in Piper Cubs. They di -
rected Cavalry operations while
living in the field with the troop-
ers. Official reports evaluating the
success of these experiments were
forwarded to Washington.
Organic Aviation Becomes A
Reality. Eleven Air Corps and 21
federalized National Guard
squadrons were assigned in 1940 to
the ground units . They were sub-
ject to periodic withdrawal for Air
Corps training. When this system
proved unsatisfactory, General
McNair (General George C. Mar-
shall' s chief of staff and in charge
of all field training) ordered field
exercises for the observation
squadrons in conjunction with the
field force maneuvers in July and
August 1941.
Air Corps ground support avia-
tion was reorganized on 25 June
1941 into five air support com-
mands, one for each of the four
field armies and one for the Ar-
mored Force. They included pur-
suit, bombardment, dive bomber
and observation squadrons. The
last included a mixture of recon-
naissance, observation and liaison
airplanes.
General Danford made another
official request (the first had been
in July 1940) for organic aviation
manned and maintained by the
Field Artillery. This again was re-
jected by G3, War Department
General Staff. General McNair
concurred in the rejection because
he wanted to give the new air sup-
port commands a chance for a fair
trial.
The new commands, however ,
failed to provide adequate support
during the test period. General
Danford renewed his request for
organic aviation on 8 October 1941,
stating, "The only uniformly
satisfactory report of air observa-
tion during the recent maneuvers
comes from those Artillery units
where ... light commercial
airplanes (Piper Cubs), operated
by civilian pilots, were used. "
In again rejecting General Dan-
ford's proposal, General McNair
replied on 21 October 1941, "There
is a grave question in my mind
whether it is feasible or desirable
that a ground arm attempt to op-
erate aviation. The ground arms
can and must learn to cooperate
with aviation, and the process
may as well begin with observa-
tion. "
General McNair' s refusal was
based upon an unresolved di-
lemma between centralization
and decentralization of aviation
assets. He agreed with the Army
Air Forces' planners because the
battlefield reports indicated that
ground support aviation worked
best when it was flexible enough to
be promptly concentrated at the
decisive points. Decentralization,
on the other hand, led to mis-
employment, ineffectiveness, and
violated the principle of economy
of force. Both the British and
French found that observation
aviation could not survive without
control of the air.
Confusion In Doctrine. Much of
the confusion resulted from a fail-
ure in the prewar period to estab-
lish a doctrine on air-ground sup-
port that conformed to modern
war. Observation aviation, which
was only a part of air-ground sup-
port, was divided into three func-
tions: (1) reconnaissance, (2) ob-
servation and (3) liaison. A major
part of the problem was the result
of trying to develop a single
airplane to perform all three func-
tions.
Battlefield experience showed
combat air reconnaissance more
related to the Army Air Forces
than the Army Ground Forces.
Concerned with the deep penetra-
tion of enemy territory, survival
depended upon using fast fighter
and bomber aircraft equipped for
the purpose with special cameras.
Observation was concerned with
the battlezone and the enemy' s
immediate rear areas. It needed
fast fighter aircraft armed with
cameras. Liaison was conducted
in friendly rear areas up to the
battleline.
Although the Grasshoppers flew
into enemy territory during ma-
neuvers (umpires counted them
destroyed if they saw them) and
later in battle, they did so when
friendly air superiority was
achieved. The functional differen-
tial between observation and
liaison made the selection of a
single type of aircraft almost im-
possible.
The 1941 maneuvers revealed
commercial light airplanes to be
superior in many ways to the 0-49
airplane. The confusion evapo-
rated and the 0 (bservation des-
ignation was changed to L (iaison)
for the commercial light airplane
types by War Department direc-
tive in April 1941.
Those in the Army Air Forces
were strained to the limit in 1941.
They were trying to build an air
force of 3,000,000 with 90,000 air-
craft and to establish a production
rate of 3,000 airplanes a month.
(The Army and Navy together
purchased only 921 aircraft in
1939.) Thus it became apparent
that the Army Air Forces could
not provide the support needed by
the Field Artillery. General
McNair recognized this and reluc-
tantly ordered a test of General
Danford's twice rejected pro-
posal. Delayed by the confusion
following the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, the test was re-
The remains of a German armored column 4 miles inland trom the Fifth Army beachhead and 5
miles south of Salerno. The column, enroute to the beach to help thwart the initial Allied landing,
was spotted by a Cub and subsequently stopped and destroyed by Allied artillery fire
scheduled for March 1942.
The favorable results of the tests
caused the Army Ground Forces
to recommend that "the program
be expanded without delay to in-
clude all Field Artillery units. "
The War Department, acting in
General McNair ' s absence to
meet a deadline, approved the
recommendation . At the same
time it was made clear that Army
Air Forces observation units still
were to share responsibility for
adjusting Artillery fire. General
McNair did not think the tests
were conclusive, but he soon be-
came convinced of the program's
value. Thereafter he gave it his
full support.
The Class Before One. The War
Department authorized the Chief
of Field Artillery to organize and
equip the Artillery components of
one Infantry division and one
corps Artillery brigade with
airplanes, pilot-mechanics and
maintenance crews. The purpose
was to test the concept of organic
air observation for Field Artillery.
General Danford appointed
Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Ford,
who while a major authored
"Wings For Santa Barbara," to
command the training. The Army
Air Forces loaned Colonel Ford 24
YO-59s, its designation for the
[LA] Piper Cubs. it had purchased
after the Ft. Bliss maneuvers . Mr.
Henry Wann and Thomas F.
"Tony" Piper, W.T. Piper's son,
were among the nine civilian in-
structors. A couple of first lieuten-
ants, both with civil pilot licenses,
who had been working on behalf of
the program for a year, together
with a reserve major named Gor-
don J. Wolf, aided Colonel Ford in
setting up the program at Ft. Sill.
The lieutenants were Robert R.
Williams and Delbert L. Bristol,
both destined to play key and con-
tinuing roles in the development of
Army aviation. The Class Before
One was composed of 14 officers
and 21 enlisted men with civilian
pilot licenses - all from Field Ar-
June 1977
tillery. Training was at Ft. Sill
from 15 January to 28 February
1942. Twenty members of this
unique class w ~ graduated.
The Class Before One was di -
vided in Flights A and B. Flight A
joined the 13th Field Artillery
Brigade at Ft. Bragg, NC. Flight B
was assigned to the 2d Infantry
Division at Ft. Sam Houston. Each
group contained 10 pilot -
mechanics, an engineering officer
and three mechanics.
From 1 March to 16 April the 10
LAs with the 2d Division logged
607 hours. Nearly everyone of
their 3,400 takeoffs and landings
were on dirt roads and open fields.
Even in the rocky, wooded hills of
the Leon Springs Military Reser-
vation, suitable landing areas al-
ways were found. Despite difficult
terrain, there were no injuries ,
aircraft damage or engine fail-
ures. In fact, the engines were
found after the tests to be in
superior condition.
The series of tests included: (1)
adjustment of Artillery fire; (2)
general and road reconnaissance;
(3) column control; (4) selection
of possible battalion areas; (5) lo-
cation of enemy batteries; (6)
spotting of targets on the map for
prearranged fires; (7) surveil-
lance of fire; and (8) battery
camouflage checks. The slow
speed of the LAs allowed the pilots
to read messages off a blackboard
without difficulty.
Some limited tests were con-
ducted in competition with an
Army Air Forces observation
airplane stationed at nearby
Brooks Field. The Army Air
Forces airplane averaged 30 min-
utes to receive and complete a fire
mission while the L-4 averaged 10
minutes.
The LAs did not fare as well in a
2-day "survival" exercise, when
several were "destroyed" in the
air and one on the ground by the
camera guns of P-40s. But unoffi-
cial Army Air Forces observers
were of the opinion that the P-40s ,
fl ying at treetop level , would have
themselves been destroyed by
ground fire. An Army Air Forces
pilot from the 22d Observation
Squadron remarked in his report
that , due to its maneuverability
and in the presence of friendly an-
tiaircraft support, the L-4 was
safer in the air than on the ground
against the P-40.
Objective Achieved. The test
board concluded that short-range
air observation should be provided
for all Field Artillery units without
delay . Subsequently, on 6 June
1942, Army aviation was born! The
War Department directed that a
team of two liaison airplanes, with
two pilots and a mechan ic , be
made organic to each Field Artil-
lery battalion plus two in each
brigade and corps Artillery head-
quarters. This meant 10 airplanes
for each Infantry division and six,
later eight , for each Armored divi-
sion. The number for each Artil-
lery brigade varied with the
number of battalions it contained.
The Army Air Forces were to buy
the airplanes for the Field Artil -
lery , as well as furnish spare
parts, repair materials, auxiliary
flying equipment , and provide
basic flight training for the pilots.
The Grasshoppers went into ac-
tion in North Africa in November
1942 and soon were flying in com-
bat in every theater. The Army Air
Forces made an attempt later in
the war to regain control of the
program. But General McNair
would not allow it because the
Army Air Forces could not per-
form the Army aviation duties it
had relinquished by default.
During the war the LAs became
as useful as the jeep and within
minutes could direct massive Ar-
tillery barrages on enemy posi-
tions. Indeed, they became indis-
pensable to the Army Ground
Forces. In a short while they
proved the concept of Army avia-
tion and laid the foundations of the
U.S. Army' s current airmobile/air
assault doctrine. ~
17
EPMS-

HOADMAP
Continued from page 1
dier problems with the old en-
listed personnel and education
system. Clearly, a better system
was needed if the Army hoped to
maintain a volunteer Army of
qualified, professional Soldiers. A
system that was not people
oriented as well as mission
oriented was just not going to do
the job.
The causes of much dissatisfac-
tion and many problems were
found in what is known as the per-
sonnel management subsystems.
These subsystems (training,
evaluation, classification and
promotion) tended to operate in-
dependently and were not sup-
porting one another. Soldiers
were promoted to higher grades
and then evaluated to determine
their abilities to perform in those
grades. In other instances , Sol-
diers, who had been performing
well in jobs for several years ,
were sent to school to learn the
same respective jobs. After re-
viewing situations like these the
objectives of EPMS started to
come into focus.
Every Soldier needed logical
job progression from grade E1
through grade E9.
.A system of career-long train-
ing that prepared the Soldier to
assume duties at the next higher
grade had to be developed.
Fair and reasonable promo-
tion opportunity had to be de-
veloped.
Soldiers needed a meaningful ,
challenging job at every level of
their careers.
In general, the attitude of the
enlisted corps was that officers
already had those elements built
into their personnel system. Why
18
MOS 67N Job Progression
E7 -Aircraft Maintenance Senior Sergeant (67Z)
E6 -M aintenance Supervisor/Technical Inspector
ES -Utility Helicopter Repairer/Crewchief
E4 -U tility Helicopter Repairer
Figure 1
wasn't there the same concern for
enlisted personnel?
Getting There From Here. In
1972 the Army adopted a system
to group military occupational
specialties that were related,
manageable from a personnel and
manpower standpoint, and pro-
vided vis able and logical progres-
sion from grade E1 to E9. These
groupings are called career man-
agement fields (CMF) .
It was a good step but only the
first. The next move was to
further refine the career man-
agement fields to achieve the ob-
jectives of EPMS and provide a
total system for enlisted profes-
sional development. Understand-
ing how this is done in each CMF
will assist later in understanding
why specific changes were made.
It usually takes at least a year
to develop a prototype career
management field . First, infor-
mation found in the automated
data banks and surveys filled out
by Soldiers are studied. Tasks and
duties performed at each grade in
an MOS are analyzed . Soldiers
who serve in the MOS are inter-
viewed to gain further insight into
the tasks they perform, their
problems, attitudes and recom-
mendations. Do meaningful jobs
exist at each grade level ? Should
the MOS be consolidated with
another MOS or merged with
another at the grade where the
problem exists? What effect will
new equipment have on the Sol-
dier ' s job? Is the reenlistment
rate low? If so, why?
In this probing manner each
MOS is carefully examined. This
results in the development of sev-
eral prototype career fields . The
prototypes are then analyzed by
career managers, trainers, doc-
trine developers and users. The
most feasible receive further
study: Logical job progression?
MOS in the proper career field?
Can it be supported with a realis-
tic career-long training program?
Job challenge? Are promotion
opportunities reasonable?
Let' s pause at this point to dis-
cuss promotion opportunity be-
cause promotions are a prime
motivator in career development.
Soldiers tend to avoid an MOS in
which there is little chance for
advancement. What causes
promotion bottlenecks, and how
can they be resolved? MOS 67N,
Utility Helicopter Repairer , is a
good example. Job progression
was logical and visible (figure 1)
but there was a promotion
bottleneck going from grade E5 to
E6. This caused many Soldiers to
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
move to another MOS to get pro-
moted. To see this clearly one had
to look at the job positions found
in the authorization modification
table of organization/tables of dis-
tribution and allowances
(MTOE/TDA) documents. The
number of positions available
(authorizations) impact on how
many Soldiers can be promoted in
a specific MOS.
The left column of figure 2
shows the worldwide profile of job
positions at grades El through E6
within the MOS. There were not
enough 67N positions at grade El
through E4 to support adequate
promotion opportunity within the
MOS. The underlying cause was
the basic organization of the avia-
tion company.
Solving the problem involved
reconfiguring company organiza-
tion, evaluating job positions and
realigning positions to allow for
sufficient personnel in each grade
to support promotion to the next
higher grade . The MOS
bottleneck was broken as shown
in the right column of the chart.
The advantage of being able to
keep highly qualified utility
helicopter repairers in their jobs
rather than moving them for
promotion purposes is obvious.
Now let ' s return to the de -
velopment of a eMF. The pro-
totype CMF is wargamed by a
group of qualified Soldiers , ex-
perienced in the MOS involved.
The end product of this process is
the EPMS recommended career
management field.
Each career management field
then is formally coordinated with
the training commands, major
field commands and the Depart-
ment of the Army (DA) staff.
When that coordination is com-
pleted and disagreements have
been resolved, the CMF is pre-
sented to a steering committee of
general officers representing the
DA staff, major field commands
and TRADOC. The Sergeant
Major of the Army also is a
June 1977
member of the committee. Dur-
ing this meeting any issues which
may still exist within a CMF are
ironed out , decisions are made
and the CMF is approved or dis-
approved for implementation.
Developing a CMF is a lengthy,
painstaking process involving a
lot of highly qualified, conscienti-
ous people. This is what it takes
for a Soldier to be able to say, " I
can get there from here ."
Consolidating several MOSs
into one and merging others at a
higher grade has been the source
of much discussion. Some believe
that this process causes a loss of
expertise. Others argue that it
provides the Soldier with greater
challenge and more variety in as-
signments . Members of the
EPMS task force had to come to
grips with this problem when they
began to examine the MOS struc-
ture . Some MOSs had few au-
thorized spaces, were extremely
limited in scope and offered little
opportunity for advancement. A
"quick fix" solution would have
been to eliminate or consolidate
any MOSs with fewer than 150
positions. This was ruled out be-
cause a lot of good Soldiers '
careers would have been hurt.
Some MOSs had to be
broadened at the entry level to
provide both challenge and oppor-
tunity so that the Soldier would
want to stay in the service. The
reason was obvious. The Army
cannot afford the cost involved in
training new people to completely
refill an MOS every 2 or 3 years.
Further, it is the reenlistee who
eventually provides the experi-
ence and expertise that every
MOS needs to survive.
It has been asked if there is a
conflict between more generaliza-
tion under EPMS and increased
specialization under the Officer
Personnel Management System
(0 PMS). The answer lies in
perspective . Before EPMS and
OPMS, enlisted Soldiers and of-
ficers were at opposite ends of a
spectrum. Some enlisted Soldiers
were too specialized, and some of-
ficers were overly generalized.
Under EPMS and OPMS, the two
are now moving toward the center
of this spectrum to provide a
more balanced, responsive force.
It should be noted that EPMS was
not an outgrowth of OPMS. The
systems were developed sepa-
rately.
Slower Promotions? Since 1968
all of the Services ha ve been
under increasing pressure from
Congress and Department of De-
fense to halt grade creep and
MOS 67N
Authorizations
lOE/lDA
Before EPMS After EPMS
Figure 2
19
Army Top Six: (E4-E9)- % Total Enlisted
100%
Key:
80%
---Requirement
o 0 0 0 0 Budget Authority
- - - - Actual Strength
00 0
o 0 0 0 - 0 - ~ - - - - - -
o 0 0 0-
60% 0 0 0 00 ./
o 0 0 0 0 0 /- - - _0
o o o ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - ~ / o __ -_I
,..-
,..
40% ,..'"
20%
68 69 10 72
bring the grade structure into
alignment with budgetary con-
straints. Some people interpret
this as a forerunner to slower
promotions and maybe even a
promotion freeze. This is not true.
Grades E4 through E9 com-
monly are referred to as the " top
six" of the enlisted grade struc-
ture. Figure 3 plots the top six as a
percent of the total number of
Soldiers. The solid line represents
the Army' s requirement for com-
bat organization (total authorized
enlisted strength as determined
by totaling all of the TOE and
TDA documents for the entire
Army). This is called the required
force.
The dotted line represents the
congressional budgetary authori-
zation for the top six. In other
words , this is the number of top-
six Soldiers for which Congress
will pay. The dashed line repre-
sents the percentages of Soldiers
73 74 i6 77
Figure 3
who actually have one of the top
six ranks on their sleeves.
When unit commanders look at
their authorization documents
(solid line) , they perceive a Non-
commissioned Officer (NCO)
shortage. In reality the Army
does not have the money to pro-
mote the number of Soldiers
stated in these documents (dotted
line). At first glance it would ap-
pear that this would cause a gen-
eral slowdown or promotion
freeze.
Prior to fiscal year (FY) 75 we
rarely spent all of the money Con-
gress authorized for promotion
into the top six (dashed line). The
EPMS task force was given the
mission to relook at our grade
structure and to bring what the
Army says it needs down to a
level that Congress will fund. At
the same time EPMS is trying to
adjust CMF and MOS so that
every Soldier has a greater oppor-
78 79 80
tunity for promotion. By 1978 the
Army expects these three lines to
be in close alignment.
What does all this mean? To
begin with, no one is going to lose
stripes. On the contrary, as
EPMS is fully implemented and
promotion bottlenecks are re-
duced, more Soldiers will have
better op,?ortunities for promo-
tion. Commanders may not be au-
thorized a grade structure as high
as before, but the Army will be
better able to fill by grade what is
authorized.
Perfection is not promised, but
progress has been made. Com-
manders will have a more realis-
tic picture of their organization
and what they will have available
to complete their mission. The
days of promising champagne on
a beer budget are coming to an
end.
From what has been said it
might appear that EPMS has
20 u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
provided a means of ensuring that
the Army will have a Soldier in
the proper grade for each re-
quirement. This is not entirel y
true. Other factors impact on
promotions and hinder perfection.
We said before that authoriza-
tiOllS drive promotions . This is
true, but authorizations don ' t
stand still for very long. They are
changed to meet requirements.
The authorization for a given
MOS will go up or down as the
Army ' s force structure is
changed. A good example of this
was the decision to go to a 16-
division force. Adjustments had
to be made in a larger number of
MOSs to allow for this expansion.
As a result of such change, com-
manders experienced grade shor-
tages in some MOSs and overages
in others. To correct this Soldiers
were transferred from overage to
shortage MOSs (reclassified).
Since the Army bases promo-
tions on future projections, this
will minimize the shortage prob-
lem. Keep in mind that the suc-
cess of this program is dependent
upon the timely submission of
document ( force structure )
changes. The personnel system
must have time to react!
EPMS - Leaders'/ Comman-
ders' Responsibilities. " He is one
of my best NCOs, and I can' t un-
derstand why he wasn ' t pro-
moted. " Usually we blame the
system when a deserving Soldier
is not promoted on time. Well , it
will continue to happen until offic-
ers learn how to get their Soldiers
promoted. They must understand
EPMS and assume their roles in
managing enlisted careers.
EPMS places more emphasis on
the commanders' roles in the pro-
fessional development of their en-
listed Soldiers.
Skill Level. Skill level , that ' s
the key. It ' s the glue that holds
EPMS together. There are five
skill levels associated with MOSs.
They are found in the fourth
character of the enlisted MOS
June 1977
Skill Levels
Grade
E8/E9
E7
Skill Level
5
4

E5 ::
MOS Qualified
E1E4
Figure 4
code - llB20, 76Y30, 63C40. Fig-
ure 4 depicts the new relationship
between grade and skill level that
is standard for all MOSs.
What is a skill level? Under
EPMS it reflects the skills typi-
cally required for successful per-
formance at the trade with which
the skill level is associated.
What else must commanders
know about the skill level ? A Sol-
dier must possess the skill level of
the next higher grade in order to
compete for promotion to that
grade. As an example, a sergeant
must hold skill level 3 - 67N30 -
to compete for grade E6. This
provides a stimulus for profes-
sional development and pre-
cludes Soldiers from being pro-
moted beyond their current
capabilities.
Getting The Skill Level -
Training. There are two ways to
complete the training require-
ments for the next higher skill
level. The first is by learning the
higher skills while serving on the
job. It is called on-the-job experi-
ence (OJE). The second is to
complete the designated school
course (NCOES). They are equal.
Completing the training require-
ment is what is important, not the
route used. This subject is covered
later.
Counseling - E PMS. Sergeant
Bill Smith has arrived in his new
unit. The first sergeant has ob-
tained a printout of Sergeant
Smith' s record, and the comman-
der is reviewing it: Single. Second
enlistment. Three years , two
months of service. Grade E5.
Promoted to current grade 6
months ago. Previous comman-
der appointed him to specialist 4;
filled an E5 slot . Must be a front
runner. Nice to get good men.
MOS 67N20. Whoa there! With
maximum waivers on time in
grade and time in service ,
Sergeant Smith could start com-
peting for E6 in about 10 months .
But first he needs the E6 skill
level - 3. I'll discuss that with
him:
" Sergeant Smith," the com-
mander says, near the end of the
interview, " one more thing -
your professional development.
Since the start of EPMS this is one
thing I personally monitor. Your
record looks great, but you need
that next higher skill level within
8 months. Here' s what we can do
to get you there .
" The first step is to locate you,
grade E5, on the EPMS ladder
(figure 5). This EPMS thing is
like a track meet , and you have
two hurdles to cross. First, com-
plete either OJE or the basic NCO
course. I just happen to have a
quota for the basic course that
starts next month, and you' re go-
ing. Your basic course is taught
over at the division NCO
Academy, so there ' s no TDY
problem.
" The second hurdle is the skill
qualification test (SQT). You
21
have to get that higher passing on
SQT 3 in order to be awarded skill
level 3, and we have about 8
months to get you ready for the
test. Do you have the " E6 Soldiers'
Manual " that covers all the criti-
cal skills you must be able to do to
pass the SQT? Good! I'll be getting
reports on your progress through
the chain of command. You' re
going to find that the unit training
program will help you gain profi-
ciency in some of those critical
skills. In others it will take some
effort on your part. "
Training and Evaluation. Let ' s
refer to figure 5 again and review
the significant features of the
EPMS ladder. AIT normally re-
sults in the award of skill level l.
The primary, basic, advance and
senior courses teach the skills of
the next higher grade level.
An SP4 attends the primary
level to learn grade E5 duties ; a
sergeant E5 attends the basic
level to learn grade E6 duties, and
so on. Each Soldier is adminis-
tered the SQT of the next higher
level. The SP4 takes SQT 2; the
sergeant takes SQT 3, and so on
up the ladder.
When the tr aining and SQT re-
quirements are successfully
completed, the higher skill level is
awarded. The U.S. Army
Sergeants Major Academy
(USASMA) will continue to be the
top level of NCO training. Note
that under the old NCOES there
were only basic and advanced
levels and the USASMA. Under
EPMS two additional levels ,
primary and senior, have been
added. These successive levels of
training are the cornerstones for
maintaining and increasing the
proficiency and expertise of the
NCO corps. But don' t forget , OJE
also is an equal and totally ac-
ceptable route to the development
of professional qualifications.
A number of new course names
such as primary technical course,
primary leadership course and
basic technical course are enter-
22
ing our training vocabulary. What
are they, and how do they fit into
the NCOES under EPMS?
Essentially they are new, more
descriptive names for the combat
support NCOES course (figure
6). This figure does not mean that
every support MOS will have a
course available at every level of
training. Availability will depend
on the technical requirements of
each job. For example, MOS 95B,
Military Police will have both a
primary and basic course at the
lower levels and some type of
course at the advanced and senior
levels.
MOS 34H, ADMSE repairman,
will have a primary course, some
type of advanced and senior level
course but no basic course. If a
support MOS requires leadership
duties at grades E5 or E6, a pri-
mary leadership course will be
available as 'appropriate.
Our roadm"ap is almost com-
plete. As mentioned, OJE is the
route to a higher skill level when
there is no school course at a level
of training or if the Soldier does
not attend the school course
(figure 7) .
Successful completion of OJE is
judged by the commander. A
minimum of 6 months service for
award of skill levels 2 and 3 and 12
months service for award of
skill levels 4 and 5 are the pre-
requisites. This service must be in
a job calling for the Soldier ' s
primary MOS at the current or
next higher grade. OJE service
does not have to be continuous.
Part could be completed in one
unit and the remainder in
another .
To ensure that OJE and school
courses are given equal weight ,
promotion boards will be given
very specific guidance on this
point. It is a recognized fact that
the OJE route will require more
individual application and initia-
tive. At the same time Soldiers
usually will contribute a full day
to their unit. OJE will be given
Figure 5
r-
E9
n
SMA
E8
I I \
Skill level 5
SNCOC
UJ
SOT 5
( Skill level 4
A NCOC
ClJ
SOT 4
Skill level 3
COC
f
1
SOT
E5
I
8N
Skill level 2
"'
OC
f
E4
1
SOT
E3
E2
I
2 PNC
Skill level 1
A IT
I
\
E1
U
Classification
U
PromotIon
Training Evaluation
due recognition under the EPMS
promotion system.
On The Way. When all of this
will happen can be an article by
itself, but a broad brush overview
is appropriate . Below is a
chronological list of key events
along the implementation trail:
CMF approved.
Start EPMS NCOES.
Convert Soldiers to new
MOS.
Convert TOE/TDA.
Administer SQT.
Start award of higher skill
level (DA announcement).
Start new promotion system
(DA announcement).
January 1979 is the scheduled
date to start administering the
first SQT to Soldiers in CMF 67,
Aviation Maintenance. That pro-
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Combat Support NCOES Course
level Of Training Combat Arms Combat Support / Combat Service Support
Senior
Senior
NCO
Course
Functional
Course
or
CMF
Course
(
I I
Advanced
NCO
Course
Advanced
NCO
Course
Advanced
Functional
Course
or
I I I
Basic
NCO
Basic
Technical
Basic
Primary
leadership and/or
Course Course Course
I I I
* Primary
NCO
Primary
Technical
Primary
Pri mary
leadership and/or
Course Course Course
*Will become mandatory for MOS 11B, 11C, 110, 11, 12B, 13B, 13E, 16P, 16R in late 1977.
vides a perspective as to where
the overall implementation proj-
ect stands. It is envisioned that
award of the higher skill level will
begin shortly after SQT is ad-
ministered to all Soldiers in an
MOS. Mid-1979 is the projected
test completion date for eMF 67.
Finally, according to the current
schedule , all MOSs should be
under the EPMS promotion sys-
tem by late 1979.
Figure 6
Possible Mission. No one
doubts the complexity of the per-
sonnel management business.
This is especially true in the
Army. In the past , many com-
manders were confused and
somewhat mystified as to where
they fit into the picture. Times
have changed. The success of
EPMS depends upon comman-
ders ' understanding and in-
volvement in the system. Under
Route
A
Skill level Progression
Com lete
Route
B
June 1977
NCOES Course
Complete
OJ(
Figure 7
EPMS the role of commanders
has been well defined.
The key is knowing how to as-
sist the Soldiers in obtaining the
next higher skill level. For the
Soldier this means greater profi-
ciency, job satisfaction and
promotion. For the commander
this means a better Soldier, a bet-
ter unit and increased combat
readiness. That' s what EPMS is
all about. ...,
Pass
SQT
Pass
SQT
Higher
Skill
Level
23
THIS IS THE FIRST in a series 0
to familiarize readers with the U.
The series will include photos ofn
and municipal fields in the Fort B
In addition, each article will cont
aircraft fleet.
Army Avic
AtA
This month our Center " glance"
clockwise: The OV-I Mohawk pr
airport - used by the aircraft flee
performing confined area approac
T-42s, OV-Is, U-Bs, U-21s and for sc
NOE; (6) Bainbridge Municipal A
ing; (7) T-42 Baron out of Cairns;
sites for the TH-55.
)rial articles the DIGEST will publish
ny Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, AL.
le fields, stage fields, tac sites, ranges
flying area used for aviator training.
lotos of the Aviation Center' s current
Center
;Iance
starting at the top 0) and proceeding
ng low level; (2) Dothan Municipal
lstrument training; (3) TH-55 Osage,
Cairns Army Airfield - home for the
'the UH-ls; (5) the venerable UH-l at
: - primarily fixed instrument train-
.lIen stagefield - one of the training
Enlisted Personnel Management System
SFC Douglas E. Allen
Aviation Career Advisor
U.5. Military Personnel Center
Alexandria, VA
Y OU OWE IT To Yourself. Had a change of
military occupational specialty (MOS) lately? Qual-
ied for a skill qualification identifier (SQI) or addi-
tional skill identifier (AS!) which has not been
awarded? Acquired some new stripes on your
sleeve? How about that reenlistment or extension?
What about that foreign service tour you recently
completed? Maybe a higher security clearance?
If the answer to any of these questions is yes , you
owe it to yourself to ensure proper entries are made
on your Department of the Army (DA) Form 2 and
DA Form 2-1. Additionally, proper documentation
for several of these situations should be forwarded to
the Enlisted Records Center, Ft. Benjamin Harri-
son, IN, for entry into your official military person-
nel file.
The importance of keeping your official file up to
date cannot be overstressed. Your official file repre-
sents you when you are considered for promotion by
a DA selection board. It also represents you for
school selection and the qualitative management
program.
That unposted SQI or ASI you may have qualified
for could mean a wider range of assignment oppor-
tunities - perhaps a " choice" assignment you nor-
mally would not expect. Get it posted.
An incorrect date returned from overseas (DE-
ROS) posted on your DA Form 2 or 2-1 could cause
you to be selected for your next overseas assignment
sooner than you should. It also could keep your
commander from assigning you to a certain duty
position you would like. Commanders look for con-
tinuity rather than constantly having a turnover in
key personnel.
How about that correspondence course you just
completed? Are you sure a copy of the course com-
pletion certificate was posted in your file? That addi-
tional training you took the initiative to complete
possibly could place you in the lead when being con-
sidered for assignment to a special project or for
additional formal schooling.
That incorrect or outdated Continental United
States area of preference on your DA Form 2 may
get you an assignment you don' t want upon return
26
from overseas. Wouldn' t you be disappointed to
learn an assignment was available at the location
you' ve wanted since you came into the Army, but
you got assigned to " Camp Swampy" because your
DA Form 2 indicated that as your preference? In
many cases your assignment manager at Military
Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) has the opportun-
ity to satisfy your needs and the needs of the Army as
well . Unfortunately, the assignment manager isn' t a
mind reader.
The data reflected on your DA Form 2 is transmit -
ted through the Standard Installation/Division Per-
sonnel System (SIDPERS) to MILPERCEN where
it is entered in the enlisted master file. If your next
DA Form 2 has incorrect data, ensure your person-
nel staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) is made
aware of it.
Now that you better understand the relationship of
DA Forms 2 and 2-1 to your official military person-
nel file at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, your career man-
agement individual file at MILPERCEN and your
military personnel records file maintained at local
level , you' ll agree youowe it to yourself to keep them
up to date.
Are You Maintaining Proficiency In Your
MOS? Now that the MOS proficiency tests are his-
tory and the skill qualification tests for CMF 67
aren' t projected to be administered until early 1979,
you don't have to worry about failing a test.
Have you considered what you can do to maintain
proficiency in your MOS? You may find it a real
challenge to dig out some subcourses you completed
a couple years ago and work the practice questions
again.
Your maintenance officer or maintenance super-
visor probably would be happy to compile an occa-
sional quiz to be administered within the unit. They
have been known to come up with some good ones.
How about a visit to the quality control office? You
can listen in on some pretty interesting technical
conversations. Most times you can even participate.
They have a good technical library too!
When was the last time you read TM 38-750? How
about those technical manuals for your aircraft ?
They may be a little dull but there is a lot of good
information to be used to your advantage.
You might try conducting some group study ses-
sions in the breakroom on a " weatherday" while
you are waiting for the rain to stop or the fog to lift so
you can launch your bird. Many are the cases of
brown bottles that have been won in a friendly wager
around the break table.
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Those new modification work orders which were
complied with last time your bird was in mainte-
nance must be on your mind. Do you really under-
stand why the changes were made? The troops over
in the field maintenance shop probably would be
glad to help you understand them.
An occasional visit with your unit aviation safety
officer could prove to be very interesting. They have
some good information to pass on to those who want
to learn. And, from time to time you may be able to
assist the unit safety officer.
Keep in mind, your brain is like a muscle - if it
isn' t used and kept in good condition it may get soft .
Keep it in good condition and maintain your profi-
ciency. Early 1979 is not as far away as it may
seem.
Job Descriptions Under EPMS. Have you read
your job description since EPMS was impJemented?
Some changes can be found in most jobs. Duties have
been realigned by skill digit and in some cases duties
have been transferred from one MOS to another.
The new descriptions are in Change 7 to AR 611 -
201. Your first sergeant may have a copy. If not, your
personnel staff NCO or servicing military personnel
office will have a copy available. ~
Continued from page 9 Officer Personnel Management System
tinue to be a major concern to commissioned avi-
ators . Specialty 71 is no exception. Specialty 71 of-
ficers are eligible for command of units at both the
platoon and company level. At battalion level they
are considered by the Combat Service Support
Command Selection Board for command of both
specialty 71 and any other designated specialty sup-
ported logistics unit. Additionally, if requested in
writing, officers will be considered in their alternate
specialty by other Central Command Selection
(CCS) boards; however, if selected will command
only one. Currently there are eight specialty 71 bat-
talion level commands in the force structure. By
type unit and location these units include the 70th,
205th and 394th A VIM Battalions in Europe; 194th
Maintenance Battalion in Korea; 1st Student Battal -
ion, Ft. Eustis; 5th Transportation Battalion, Ft.
Campbell , KY; 34th Support Battalion, Ft.Hood,
TX; and the 42d Transportation Battalion, Ft.
Meade, MD.
Today's advancements in aviation technology
have provided increased challenges for those per-
sonnel in logistical support roles. These challenges
are being met by officers in the Aviation Materiel
Management specialty. The wide range of respon-
sibilities associated with specialty 71 positions re-
quire the highest degree of leadership, trust and
managerial ability. Without question the Aviation
Materiel Management specialty is one of the newest
and most dynamic career fields within the U. S.
Army. Questions regarding specialty 71 should be
directed to the Combat Service Support Division,
OPMD, ATTN: DAPC-OPG-T or AUTOVON 221-
7504/7505. ~
D
AVIATION COMMANDS
EPARTMENT OF the Army recently released the selected for aviation commands, while seven officers
names of officers selected for battalion level command were selected for aviation maintenance units by the
during fiscal year 1978. Selectees will be assigned to Logistics Troop Command Board. In addition, 14 avo
command positions beginning in October 1977. Twenty- iators were selected for nonaviation commands.
nine lieutenant colonels or promotable majors were
Aviation Troop Commands Owen, Dean M.
Callender, William Pratt, James T.
Dexter, Charles E. Reilly, William F .
Dolloff , Theodore J . Robinson, John D.
Golding, Willard Rosser, Terry N.
Hannon, Harold M. Rushatz, Alfred S.
Haselgrove, Leighton Sheaffer, Phillip G.
Hennies, Clyde A. Smith, Billy V.
Herrick, Curtis J . Stiles, Howard
Holcombe, Jerry V. Turecek, Jack L.
Karjala, Lawrence Wilson, Donald E.
Keating, David W. Logistics Troop Commands
Kimes Kenneth (Aviation Maintenance Units)
Lasch,' John A. Archer, C.A.
Mayer, Frank H. Dunnington, Warren
McQuestion, John R. Irby, Dewitt T.
Miller, George R. Johnson, Benjamin F.
Morris, Jimmy Pepe, Michael J .
Ostovich, Rudolph I. Wade. Jerry F.
June 1977
Woodson, William B.
Combat Arms Troop Commands
Bean, Roger Kent
Coleman, Ronald A.
Franklin, Forrest E.
Funk, Paul E .
Helms, Harold J.
Howe, Michael Bruce
Massey, Ronald F.
Newsome, Joseph D.
Noack, Richard R.
Peters, Donald L.
Rittenhouse, William
Schweitzer, William
Combat Support Arms Troop
Commands
Burke, Paul F.
Simerly, Charles S.
27
AROU N D THb WORLD
AROU N D THb WORLD
AROU N D THb WORLD
AROUND THb WORLD
AROU N D THb WORLD
AROU N D THb WORLD
N 0 HELICOPTER has ever circumnavigated
the globe. Helicopter technology has advanced to the
point where it is possible for several production
models to accomplish this feat. It would be a world
aviation first and, if flown to Federation
Aeronautique Internationale Standards, would also
establish a world helicopter speed record for an
around-the-world (ATW) flight record.
The U.S. Army was first to fly airplanes around
the world in 1924. It has demonstrated a willingness
to undertake world record performance demonstra-
tions when an acceptable risk is shown to exist as it
will be below. No record now stands for this dem-
onstration. Whatever average speed is dem-
onstrated would become the world record. This con-
dition permits a " low pressure" schedule and assur-
ance that maximum attention is paid to safety con-
siderations.
A history-making aviation first is waiting to be
achieved by a select team following a well-planned
and fully coordinated program of events. Presented
here is a way to accomplish that feat.
Why would anyone want to fly a helicopter around
the world? It is bound to be somewhat risky, fatigu-
ing, not very stimulating and most importantly, it
would cost money. An analyst might suggest that
from a cost effectiveness point of view, " It only
costs. " But, there are potential payoffs both
monetarily and in terms of public interest. Consider
that:
The feat has never been done.
28
Captain Brendan P. Blackwell
A Company, 5th Transportation Battalion
10 1 st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Fort Campbell , KY
The U.S. Army would claim a history-making
first and a world record.
The world view of U.S. helicopter technology
would be enhanced.
The self development capability of helicopters
would be demonstrated with an emphasis on peace-
ful applications.
The reliability of helicopters and the emphasis
placed by the U.S. Army on reliability and main-
tainability design would be demonstrated.
Foreign sales of U.S. rotary wing aircraft would
probably be stimulated and contribute to a favorable
gold flow.
How then is it to be done? Which aircraft should be
used? What is the route? How will the aircraft be
supported, and what is the risk?
Many nations have the capability to be first to
circumnavigate the globe in rotary wing aircraft.
From among the candidate rotary wing systems, the
OH-6 Cayuse is proposed for the mission because of
its reliability, maintainability and demonstrated
long-range capability. It will be referred to as the
OH-6 (ATW).
The conceptual route shown in figure 1 is one of the
27 legs involving a total computed great circle dis-
tance of 20,350 nautical miles (NM) to be ac-
complished in 45 days in 225-flight hours per helicop-
ter. The actual enroute distance will , of course, be
somewhat greater and has yet to be determined. The
critical leg is considered to be from the Northern
Island of Japan to Shemya AFB in the Aleutian
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Chain, a leg of 1,362 NM over the northern Pacific
Ocean. The OH-6 (ATW) can accomplish the flight as
outlined.
For example, the helicopter could start in mid-
June from beneath the St. Louis Arch (Gateway to
the West) and depart to the east to take advantage of
prevailing westerly winds. The flight would termi-
nate there in late July.
The route as outlined is greater than the distance
around the earth at the Tropic of Cancer and Cap-
ricorn (19,816.006 NM) as is required for the flight to
qualify as a circumnavigation of the globe for world
record purposes. The route represents one that will
allow the helicopters to land at major airfields
(nearly all U.S.) on land and approach the minimum
distance necessary to qualify as a record.
Figure 2 is a network showing in a gross overview,
without a time line, the parallel efforts required to
assure success.
After designation of the project, three immediate
priorities would be established by the U.S. Army
Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL. A technical/per-
formance study must be done to determine the air-
craft configuration and airspeed/altitude profiles to
optimize range. This also would include an assess-
ment of risk. A long-range full tank would have to be
designed and a long-range navigation capability
would be selected/defined.
The second effort would be a detaiJed cost defini-
tion covering all aspects of the project.
The third study would be a route options and feasi-
bility analysis. At this point a go/no-go decision
would be made ,based on defined aircraft
capabilities, an assessment of risk, a cost analysis of
the project and the most feasible route. Upon ap-
proval of the project, many parallel activities would
be "kicked off" in the execution of the preparation
phase.
It is proposed that the Aviation Center modify/up-
grade the aircraft except for the long-range tank and
the navigation system which would be installed at
cost by a contractor.
The pilots and maintenance team should be
selected from the personnel who were members of
the Silver Eagles flying team because of their dem-
onstrated flying skills and experience in presenting
a strongly positive image of the U.S. Army at public
gatherings.
C-12 Huron aircraft would fly a refined support
package (personnel and equipment) and assure
adequate advance preparation at planned landing
points. This aircraft has the capability to support the
mission and permit the entire project to be solely a
U.S. Army effort.
Other activities to accomplish would include the
following:
National Aeronautics Association/Federation
Figure 1
ATW ROUTE
Start: St. Louis USA Tehran Iran Tokyo Japan
Loring USA Karachi Pakistan Ashabiri Japan
Gander Canada Calcutta India Shemya USA
Sondrestromfjord Greenland Bangkok Thailand Adak USA
Keflavik Iceland Singapore Malaysia Kodiak USA
Alconbury England Brunei Brunei (UK) Juneau USA
Frankfurt Germany Manila Philippines Seattle USA
Naples Italy Taipei Formosa Sal t Lake Ci ty USA
Ankara Turkey Naha Okinawa End: St. Louis USA
~ "JL!
June 1977 29
11--1 'WUI<L LJ

AROUND ll--l{; 'WURt L
Ar.<UUND H-I 'WuRL U
, AI..2UUND ll--l 'WURLD
AI<UUNU 'WOPLU
ARUUND 11--l{; 'WORLU
Aeronautique International arrangements for cer-
tification of the record.
Definition/validation of the route, to be followed
by resolution of any international interface prob-
lems. Following definition, a navigation support
package would be developed .
Pilots would be selected and trained in aircraft
performance, ditching and navigation to incl ude
IFR (instrument flight rules) flight as an
emergency procedure.
The execution phase would be accomplished in 45
days and be followed by a phaseout which would
include restoration of the aircraft to standard con-
figuration and return of the aircraft to the sources
from which they were drawn.
In 1966 Mr. Bob Ferry flew an OH-6 nonstop from
Southern California to Florida and set a record,
which still stands, for straight line distance. He flew
a distance of 1,923 NM in 15 hours and 8 minutes,
averaging (with a tailwind component) more than
125 knots. Gross weight (GW) at takeoff was in ex-
cess of 3,200 pounds (1,860 pounds of fuel) with a
normal alternate gross weight for the OH-6 estab-
lished at 2,700 pounds. During the same period of
time, Mr. J. Schweibold flew the OH-6, under ad-
verse wind conditions, a distance in a closed circuit
of more than 1,500 NM. Both the best and the worst
Figure 2
case exceed the mInimUm performance require-
ment for the ATW flight.
As a departure point, the performance/weights
shown in figure 3 are determined to be achievable
with the OH-6 (ATW) .
For ATW purposes, 3,200 pounds (flight safety re-
lease required) is considered the upper limit for
planning for the max gross weight which assures
adequate survival equipment for extended over-
water flights and/or comfort items to minimize ad-
verse human factors impacts due to the extended
flight times . One also retains the option of having
two pilots on the critical leg. The rates of advance
use can be achieved by flying suitable profiles con-
sidering wind components, aircraft GW with time,
Vne (velocity never to exceed) as a function of al-
titude and gross weight , and fuel flow as it varies
with altitude. Varying combinations of altitude and
airspeed (Vne) can produce near optium long-range
performance while considering topography.
Figure 4 shows the makeup of the support and
flight team. The two C-12 aircraft can provide 1,200
pounds of lift each beyond the weightof the pilots and
can surpass the range requirement of the critical
leg. The makeup of the C-12/0H-6 ATW support
package made up of men and equipment would be
defined after determinations were made regarding
the extent to which pre positioned supplies would be
used and whether or not two pilots would fly the OH-6
ATWs on the critical leg. If it was determined that
the critical leg is to be flown by a single pilot, space
would be required to transport the OH-6 pilots not
participating on the critical leg.
b
6

ATW PROGRAM


DEFINITION
PREPARATION/PLANNING EXECUTION PHASE OUT
--45 DAYS-
PERFORMANCE
UPGRADE CHECK
SYSTEM
A VSCOM SAFETY OF fliGHT
RElEASE FOR 3200# GW
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Figure 3
PERFORMANCE/WEIGHTS
Legs 1,100 N M
Basic Weight = 1,200 pounds
Pilots (2) 350 pounds
Fuel = 1,350 pounds
GW/TO 2,900 pounds
Enroute Time < 10 hours
Reserve > 2 hours
ESTD Min 120 knots
rate of advance
Legs 1,100 NM
(Critical leg)
= 1,200
Pilot ( 1) 180
= 1,620
= 3,000
= 12 hours
= 2 hours
115 knots
Minimum Team Make Up
OH-6 ATW Pilots:;: 10
C-12 Pilots ** 4
CE (OH-6 ATW) 2
Maintenance NCO 1
CE (C-12) i
* Two OH-6 ATW qualified in maintenance
** One pilot acts as advance
18
Five OH-6 ATW aircraft are shown here, but the
number could be adjusted when the study of cost is
completed and the initial go/no-go decision is made.
The risk associated with the ATW program is qual-
itatively assessed as acceptable. To start with, the
aircraft have demonstrated a range capability of
more than 1,900 NM and under adverse (worst case)
Figure 4
June 1977
wind conditions a range in excess of 1,500 NM. A
lightweight, very low frequency navigation system
is available. The OH-6 has an established track rec-
ord of infrequent dynamic systems failures which
would require a forced landing. Repair/replacement
of components under austere conditions can readily
be accomplished. The aircraft is expected to fly
above its normal maximum gross weight limit for
fewer than 15 flight hours and this can be further
reduced by increasing the number of landing points .
It must be remembered that the whole flight is
essentially steady state flying with relatively few
high-low power cycles and virtually no -maneuver-
ing. About 32 percent of the flight is over water which
is considered to be the greatest risk situation.
In total , the probability of completing 225 flight
hours without a critical mishap is high considering
the inherent aircraft reliability, the refined state of
the aircraft at the start , the steady state flight condi-
tions to which the aircraft will be subjected, the
minimum hours flown outside the currently ap-
proved flight envelope, the relatively nonexistent
pressure of schedule constraints and the favorable
weather expected during the critical phases at the
proposed June-July timeframe.
Completion of this world aviation first would add
another chapter to U.S. Army aviation history. This
feat will be accomplished by someone - there are
few aviation firsts left. If the stage can be set, the
U.S. Army should most appropriately claim this
aviation first as its own.
ATW TEAM
31
HUMAN-ERROR ACC DENTS
_ ._ .. tIl . ~ . . .
32
Aircraft accident investigators have been accused of dodging their duty with regard to
cause determination by implicating the pilot without considering the underlying
reasons for his actions or inaction.
< a - ~ ~
USAAAVS
Gerard M. Bruggink
Mr. Bruggink is the deputy
director, Bureau of Accident
Investigation, National
Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, DC. Before join-
ing the NTSB in 1969, Mr.
Bruggink was an air safety in-
vestigator with the U.S. Army
Agency for Aviation Safety,
Fort Rucker . The views ex-
pressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect positions
taken by the National T rans-
portation Safety Board.
&
HUMAN ERROR and Technology. I believe that
complaints about our lack of understanding of the
why of human error are actually expressions of
frustration about the inability to counteract every
human shortcoming with technology. Although ac-
cident rates in all forms of flying made a nose-dive
during the last 25 years, one elusive factor has re-
mained relatively stable: the percentage of acci-
dents attributed to the pilot.
On the surface, this observation suggests that lit-
tle or nothing has been accomplished in the form of
human error research, specifically with regard to
the why of behavioral aspects. However, the fact
that the pilot' s statistical involvement remained the
same seems to have a straightforward explanation:
We never increased the pilot's margin for error. As
soon as we improved cockpit instrumentation and
instrument landing systems, we lowered the ap-
proach minimums. As soon as we developed weather
radar and other aids we expected the pilot to fly
approaches in weather that he might have avoided in
another era. As soon as we improved the handling
characteristics of tactical aircraft and associated
instrumentation, we put the pilot at treetop level.
And so on-
My point is this: As soon as we learned how to
reduce the pilot's error potential we used this knowl-
edge to increase his production, be it from the
economical or military viewpoint.. Consequently, his
margin for error never changed; nor has the nature
June 1977
of his errors and his tendency to make errors
changed. It appears that we are confronted with a
residual accident rate that cannot be lowered unless
we design the human element out of the system by
automation. We may have reached the "last fron-
tier" in the area of human reliability.
Will additional human error research help us to
proceed beyond the last frontier? Specifically, will
an understanding of the why of each error teach us
anything we don' t know already about the be-
havioral role in accident causation?
There are two possible answers to this question,
depending on one's interpretation of the behavioral
role. For reasons that will become evident, I make a
distinction between innate, or true, human error and
system-induced error.
With regard to the system's role, the answer to our
question is: Yes. Continuing human-error research
into the why of system-induced error is essential to
ensure compatibility of man, the constantly chang-
ing technology, and the operational environment.
True Human Error. With regard to true hmnan
error, additional research will teach us little that we
don' t know already. From the moment man stopped
using his legs as his sole means of transportation, he
had an opportunity to observe the cause/effect rela-
tionship between less-than-desirable behavior and
accidents . No adult with average reasoning powers
can claim ignorance of the fact that emotions, dis-
tractions, fatigue, and a variety of other stresses
33
HUMAN-ERROR ACCIDENTS AND CHARACTER ASSURANCE
affect his performance. This acquired knowledge
forms the basis for an individual' s cautiousness and
enables him to perform responsibly under duress.
Unfortunately, our permissive society has adopted
the popular notion that an identifiable stress factor
not only serves to explain, but to exoner ate, behavior
harmful to the subject himself or to others. The next
logical, and legally fashionable, step is to downplay
individual responsibility because, in such a world,
there are only victims. If such an attitude ever pre-
vailed iIi aviation, it would no longer be a viable
transportation or defense system.
One doesn' t have to do something wrong to become
involved in an accident. Often it is the arousal level
of an individual 's anticipatory awareness that de-
termines whether or not he will recognize in time
that something may be wrong. It is the sensitivity
and stability of this triggering mechanism that dif-
ferentiates the professional from the amateur.
Is the accident investigator being criticized be-
cause he does not pry deeply enough into a profes-
sional pilot' s personal life, searching for exonerat-
ing, common stress factors ? If that is the case, he is
being blamed for not reinventing the wheel. What is
the benefit of gaining retrospective insight in the
effect of a promotion that did not materialize, or a
girlfriend's rebuff, on the behavior of an accident-
involved pilot when we don't take the trouble to find
out why a pilot who suffered a truly traumatic loss
performed well in an emergency situation?
Instead of spending our resources trying to
categorize the countless deficiencies in human be-
havior that may invite accidents, we should identify
and play up the human characteristics that lead to
the timely recognition and defusing of potential ac-
cident situations. I realize that this is a very unscien-
tific and unattractive thought because it assumes
that people have a sense of responsibility and that
one can appeal to it. However, the alternative is even
less palatable: We would have to adjust our justifi-
able human performance expectations to the lowest
common denominator.
Overemphasis on the role of human frailty in acci-
dent causation weakens the determination to coun-
teract it. I suggest that we investigate the role of
individual integrity, self-discipline, moral fibre, and
innate intelligence in the avoidance of human-error
accidents. This is not just a pious thought on my part.
In his summary of the Human Factors Conference in
Istanbul, Shaw* stated that we cannot expect acci-
dent rates to resume a downward trend until a
breakthrough is made in the area of human reliabil-
34
ity. He believes that the following qualities of
character are " at the heart of the human reliability
problem" :
A high level of responsibility for the welfare of
others.
A high level of personal integrity.
A high level of self-discipline.
A recent flightcrew publication of one of our major
air carriers contained an article on the role of at-
titudes in traffic accidents. It reiterated the estab-
lished view that " we drive as we live" and amplified
on it with the statement: "If we are a heel at home
we will also be a heel at the wheel. " Is there any
reason to believe that being in a cockpit would
change a man' s nature?
Although the caliber of an individual's character
plays a significant role in accident avoidance, it is no
guarantee for error-free performance. Human error
will persist.
Since accidents are rare occurrences, the identifi-
cation of human error in the causal chain may create
the unhealthy notion that no errors occur on routine
flights. There is no other way to explain the slogan:
" Safety = no accident. " This is a false equation be-
cause it cannot be turned around. For example, a
near-collision is not an accident but that certainly
does not mean there was safety, or that everyone
involved performed flawlessly. We use negative
motivation when we stress correct behavior only to
the extent that it will avoid an accident in a particu-
lar set of circumstances. It is for that reason that a
well-run incident reporting system can be so effec-
tive in producing positive motivation for correct be-
havior under all circumstances.
Reducing Human Error Potential. The need for con-
tinuing human factors research to reduce the
system-induced human-error potential has already
been mentioned. A word of caution may be appro-
priate, however. We should use restraint in our at-
tempts to design human error out of the system by
applied technology. The design of certain warning
systems has already prompted some researchers to
wonder whether the cure may be worse than the
disease. In addition, we have to remind ourselves not
to trade off crew fallibility for maintenance error.
To reduce the true human error potential , I
suggest serious consideration of what could 'be
called a character assurance program. We seem to
have exhausted all practical means to assure the
*R.R. Shaw. Assistant Director General-Technical. lATA: The Last Frontier
- A summary of the 20th lATA Technical Conference .
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
quality of hardware, software, and training. Why not
use the available expertise and experience to assure
the quality of character?
Such a program is already functional to some de-
gree in initial selection. However, in addition to the
well-established disqualifiers, the desirable charac-
ter traits should be used as criteria in the final selec-
tion process.
The assignment to specific flight duties should be
guided by the same concept. The highest caliber
individuals should be selected for the most demand-
ing tasks.
Leadership and unit morale playa decisive role in
Human error research into
the why of system-induced
error is essential to ensure
compatibility of man, the
constantly changing tech-
nology, and the operational
environment.
the maintenance and further development of desir-
able character traits. Following are some of the in-
gredients for effecti ve leadership and good morale:
The behavioral standards of the commander
must be above reproach.
Stability and consistency in leadership.
Progressive but controlled challenges, based on
the unit ' s mission.
Recognition through unit reputation, not through
individual acts of showmanship. (Beware of
daredevils , prima donnas , and good old boys.)
Swift and firm treatment of serious breaches of
behavioral standards, airborne as well as on the
ground.
An esprit de corps that supports an individual in
his on-duty and off-duty activities.
Minimizing the Effect of Human Error. A prerequisite
for minizing t ~ effects of human error -
system-induced as well as true human error - is the
timely recognition of error , or an error-inducing
situation. It might be well to exchange the worn-out
term " safety awareness" for " e:ror awareness. "
June 1977
The pilot is at the receiving end of all the in-
adequacies in the system, including his own. He is
the last line of defense in a system tbat is more
fallible than we like to see it. He has to be trained and
conditioned to recognize potential accident situa-
tions.
The fail-safe concept of a multiple crew is an ex-
cellent deterrent to human error, and its effects, if:
Individual tasks are well-defined and stand-
ardized.
All cockpit talent is involved in all critical phases
of flight.
The monitoring responsibility is expressed in ac-
tive participation in the information-gathering and
interpretation process.
The pilot-in-command maintains an atmosphere
of creative discontent; that is, every crewmember
should feel free to air his misgivings about the safety
of the flight in an appropriate manner.
From time to time, an accident focuses attention
on a question for which there is no universal answer:
When does the second-in-command override the
pilot-in-command? Examples of situations where a
second-in-command may be confronted with this
question include: subtle incapacitation, visual illu-
sions, target fixation, and reckless operation. One
air carrier suggests to its pilots the following pro-
gression of actions: (1) advise, (2) warn, (3) take
over. Although it is difficult to recommend a course
of action for all contingencies, frank discussion of
the critical nature of this issue will promote the be-
havioral response dictated by the circumstances.
To reduce the human error potential and to
minimize the effects of persisting human error, we
have to:
Continue to make use of human engineering
technology to design human error out of the system
within the constraints of practicability and
economy.
Make a deliberate attempt to increase human
reliability through character assurance.
Before you conclude that this is just another re-
vival talk, I submit these thoughts for your consid-
eration:
You cannot have two sets of safety philosophies,
one for peacetime and one for combat.
Whatever peacetime methods you develop to pro-
tect a man against his own errors and those of others
should also protect him in combat.
When all is said and done and the chips are down,
the safety and survival of this nation are governed
by individual character, not by collective wizardry.
~
35
Recent training accidents show the need for
a lot more safety and ...

36 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
t ~ ~
UBAAAVB
W ANT TO PUT realism into
your unit ' s combat training?
Well, then, select a night when
it' s raining and sound the alarm
so there is no time to adequately
brief the pilots, file a flight plan
or crew/passenger manifest, or
obtain a weather forecast. Then
be sure to change the LZ several
times before takeoff, ensuring
that the final LZ selected is one
unfamiliar to the pilots, some of
whom do not even have tactical
maps of the area. It goes without
saying that no lights should be on
the ground. That should do it!
But , if you' re a stickler for
realism, you can add one more
ingredient by stationing " enemy
troops" on the ground to fire at
the approaching aircraft - with
live ammunition, of course.
Farfetched? Not really. Let's
take a look at a recent accident
which incorporated these ingre-
dients.
Ten Hueys were to be used in a
night combat assault training
mission to insert troops into an
unlighted landing zone which had
been previously reconned. Just
before takeoff, the mission was
delayed due to a brief weather
hold. At this time , there was also
a change in the LZ. After a
weather ship reported the
weather looked good enough to
go, the aircraft were run up and
the LZ was again changed.
Shortly after liftoff, the LZ was
changed again.
The aircraft were flown at
3,000 feet msl in tr ail formation to
the new, unreconned LZ. Near-
June 1977
ing the LZ, the pilots descended
to 2,000 feet and the flight leader
made a steep approach to avoid
wires. Due to the steepness and
unknown tailwinds, a stackup
developed and No. 4 and No. 5
aircraft had to make go-arounds.
The pilot of No.7 pulled pitch to
prevent overflying the aircraft
ahead of him. The pilot of No.8
tried to move out of the formation
to avoid a midair but could not
move to the left or right because
the two aircraft to his rear had
moved up on each side of him.
Rather than making a go-
around, he dropped below the
formation and decided to use an
abrupt pitch-pull to terminate
the approach. Pulling 59 pounds
of torque, he could not stop the
descent and the aircraft crashed.
Let ' s briefly look at the many
deviations from sound safety
principles which led to this major
accident.
First, the flight commander ,
because of command pressure,
inadequately planned the flight.
Higher commanders convinced
the flight leader that immediate
departure was necessary if tac-
tical training was to be con-
ducted under the most realistic
battle conditions possible.
Therefore , no flight plan or
crew/passenger manifest was
filed and a valid weather fore-
cast was not obtained. Crew-
members had not been properly
briefed and some did not have
maps of the LZ area. Since the LZ
was changed several times im-
mediately before takeoff, it had
not been reconned for obstruc-
tions and other existing hazards
antI there were no lights on the
ground. This alone was enough to
cause apprehension among the
pilots as they were flying over
unfamiliar territory at night in
rain. Due to this inadequate
planning and a lack of weather
information a steep, downwind
approach was made to avoid pos-
sible wire strikes.
Second, because of command
pressure, the pilot of No. 8 air-
craft improperly monitored his
copilot' s performance while the
copilot was at the controls. When
the critical situation developed,
the pilot allowed the copilot to
continue the approach. This
error was probably made be-
cause the pilot was subordinate
in rank, years of aviation experi-
ence, and flight hours. This
weighed heavily on the mind of
the younger, relatively inexperi-
enced pilot, causing him to hesi-
tate in assuming authority for
the technical operation of the
aircraft.
Third, the copilot exercised
poor judgment when the stack-
up developed. He was forced to
move left and was unable to get
back into formation because he
was blocked by aircraft on both
sides. Instead of making a go-
around, he continued his ap-
proach which resulted in a high
sink rate and insufficient power
to terminate safely.
By now, you're probably won-
dering where the live ammuni-
tion ingredient came into play.
37
A LITTLE LESS REALISM
Fortunately, this accident did
not involve the aircraft being
fired upon. But a recent incident
did occur during a simulated
CBR attack training mission.
While the pilot was making sev-
eral passes over an area to dis-
perse the simulated CBR agent,
his helicopter was hit by live
ammunition fired by ground per-
sonnel. One bullet entered the
lower left side of the cabin area,
passed through the left electrical
compartment, and lodged in the
doorframe. The ground soldier
had failed to check the ammo be-
fore loading his weapon. In addi-
tion, supervisory error was a
major factor due to lack of
proper ammunition security
procedures. But , you' ll have to
admit this incident is about as
realistic as you can get to an ac-
tual combat situation.
Now let' s get back to the first
accident and the actions which
could have aided in preventing
this and similar accidents.
Senior commanders should
ensure that overly ambitious unit
commanders do not use tactical
exercises as an excuse to com-
pletely disregard flight regula-
tions and sound aviation princi-
ples. Before tactical exercises,
senior commanders should issue
a directive to all subordinate
units outlining the objective of
the exercise and clearly stating
that deviations from Army regu-
lations and approved SOPs are
not authorized. Any authorized
deviation from F ARs should be
38
clearly stated as to the extent of
the deviation and safety precau-
tions necessary to ensure suc-
cessful mission accomplish-
ment. In addition, senior com-
manders should improve
monitoring of the unit ' s ac -
tivities.
Unit commanders should up-
grade or improve unit training to
ensure that designated pilots-
in-command (PiC) understand
their responsibilties and author-
ity for all aspects of the technical
operation of the aircraft. This
can be checked out by unit IPs as
part of the oral examination on
annual standardization rides.
Unit commanders must en-
sure that the most experienced
aviator aboard each aircraft is
designated as PIC. Also, they
must ensure that personnel are
both physically and psychologi-
cally fit to perform the mission
and observe those individuals
who are prone to make errors in
judgment.
Actually, this unit was fortu-
nate in that only one aircraft was
damaged and no lives were lost.
Because of the environmental
conditions and the type of ap-
proach required to get into the
LZ, several pilots made go-
arounds. However , the other
pilots continued their approach
and most reported an overtorque
or near overtorque.
This accident clearly shows
how commanders can become so
involved in the tactical scenario
they forget that the purpose of
the mission is training. Some
commanders seem to believe
that successful mission ac -
complishment is inhibited by
sound safety principles, so they
throwaway the book. True, we
must conduct realistic training
to maintain our combat readi-
ness, but not to the extent of en-
dangering our aviation re-
sources through unnecessary
risks. Any mission, whether in
combat or tactical training, re-
quires efficient planning and
coordination by commanders,
aviation safety officers, opera-
tions officers, and aviators. Con-
sequently, approved operational
procedures must be rigidly
adhered to. While Army regula-
tions and SOPs provide neces-
sary guidance in the a11 -
important area of safety, the
myriad of accidents on record
clearl y shows that the policies
advocated have not always been
followed. Action must be taken
by all commanders to change the
attitude that " anything goes in a
combat environment. " Once this
attitude is changed we' ll find that
safety equals efficiency which
equals successful mission ac-
complishment.
For more information on unit
training , contact CPT K. N.
Graham, Directorate for Tech-
nical Research and Applications,
USAAAVS , AUTOVON 558-
3495/4812, commercial (205 ) 255-
3493/4812.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
June 1977
ALL TENSED UP? Got a problem? Need to make some important decision? Why
not take a breather and relax. While it won' t be anything like spending a weekend at
the lake, a few minutes devoted to solving this crossword puzzle could prove to be
revitalizing. So have at it , and when you' re through, check page 43.

1. Spinning airfoil
4. Weight unit abbr.
6. Letter in Greek alphabet
9. First engine event
12. Chemical symbol
13. Controls fluid flow
14. Open to view
17. Mark
19. Man's name
20. Packet
22. Lubricant
23. Enlisted person
24. Inspection
25. Used in drilling
27. Escape device
28. Wire
30. Abbr. for Military Police
32. That thing
33. Shelter for engine
36. To fill with pride
38. Officer who is not commissioned
39. Easily stretched
41 . Abbr. for technical 10. Protective covering
42. Type of fitting 11 . Abbr. for knockout
44. Barricade 15. Abbr. for editor
46. Controls aircraft pitch 16. Tail section
50. Place - 18. High temperature
51. Unsatisfactory Report 21 . . Carburetor adjustment
52. Opposite from tip 23. Egress
53. Article 25. Type of bearing
54. Substance 26. Thought
57. Type of engine 29. Abbr. for electric
58. Abbr. for unit of measure 30. Gauge
59. Fled 31. Handtool
60. Abbr. for southern state 34. Abbr. for alternating current
DOWN
1. Abbr . for right
2. Path of rotating propeller
3. Used to metal
4. Army officer
5. Chemical symbol
6. Type of gear
7. Bituminous liquid
8. Indicates height
35. Type of key
37. Abbr. for aircraft commander
40. Electromechanical device
43. Used in aircraft construction
44. Foot covering
45. That is
47. Short for grease
48. Branch of military service
49. Tailless amphibian
55. Chemical symbol
56. Within
39
A '811111RA118111 MIII181 P ~ I I I I I
40
FATIGUE HAS BECOME a
word with vague, multiple, and
often conflicting meanings. It
has a wide range of definitions -
from the discomfort we experi-
ence with relation to our inability
to do work, to the inability of sys-
tems such as rotor blades to func-
tion normally.
Let ' s consider fatigue as a
self-recognized state of an indi-
vidual. It is a condition directly
felt by the individual which has
an inferred connection between
the way he feels and the amount
of effort he will exert toward ac-
complishing a given series of
tasks. It is not the amount of
work being performed, but
rather how the individual feels
himself.
There are two basic types of
fatigue - acute and chronic.
Acute fatigue is caused by short-
term stress. This type of stress
lasts only minutes or hours but is
usually quite intense. Chronic
fatigue , on the other hand, is
caused by long-term stress - the
type of stress that lasts from
days to years. Although not as in-
tense as acute fatigue, chronic
fatigue can be just as dangerous
and just as much a safety hazard.
What then do we look for in our
pilot population as signs of
fatigue? Acute fatigue could
show up as an increase in errors
due to timing, with general loss
of accuracy and control touch.
The pilot will be distracted easily
and will seem to neglect second-
ary tasks, such as performing a
good cross-check of engine in-
struments while flying. Chronic
fatigue will tend to manifest it-
self in the pilot as slower reaction
times, poor judgment, irritabil-
ity, and a general depression in
attitude.
In the aviation business we
often see good pilots overworked
without ever considering that
fatigue might be building up to
the point of hampering their pri-
vate lives or even their profes-
sional lives. We must pay more
attention to the individual pilot
and learn to manage his flight
duties more effectively.
Up until now we have consi-
dered the operations officer' s job
as one of scheduling aircraft. But
little emphasis is placed on
scheduling the pilots. Aircraft
are managed on a day-to-day
basis from day one through each
intermediate and periodic in-
spection. Aircraft are juggled
and managed so that the
"strongest" aircraft is used for
NOE training, the high-hour air-
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
craft goes into periodic inspec-
tion, and so on.
But what about pilots ? Doe
anyone look after them and put
the " strongest " pilots on the
high-risk missions ? Is the
"strongest" pilot always teamed
with the weake t ? Or is crew
selection determined by what-
ever name comes up on a duty
roster ?
Many units look good on paper ,
with a duty roster here and a duty
roster there . This type of man-
agement is usually inflexible at
best and displays a lack of con-
cern at worst. What considera-
tion is given to stress and
fatigue ? How many managers
are fully aware of stressful con-
ditions in their pilot populations
(such as deaths in the family, a
pregnant wife , marital discord
depression, etc. ) and continue to
schedule their pilots like robots ?
What about using the duty ros-
ter as a guide (as it was intended
to be used) and manage the pilots
to ensure that the least fatigued ,
least stressed pilots are fl ying
the high-risk missions? I am
talking about such case as a
pilot being sent on a mis ion in
marginal weather after he has
worked all day or had his leep
interrupted several times during
June 1977
C 3 1 J i ~
USAAAVS
Captain Ronald A. Huether
Captain Huether wrote this article while
attending a recent USAAA VS Aviation Safety Officer Course
the night by a sick child.
All too often a pilot is ent on
the high-ri k night missions sim-
ply because he is the most ex-
perienced . The most experi -
enced pilot is not the best choice
for the mission if he is suffering
from fatigue .
There should be an attitude of
concern in the unit so that indi-
vidual pilots who recognize
ymptoms of fatigue know they
can a void additional stress by
telling the operations officer or
the commander . Unfortunately
this atmosphere, this attitude of
concern, can not be generated in
a day. Pilots are inherently re-
luctant when it comes to admit-
ting a weakness in their nature.
When was the last time you saw a
pilot voluntarily ground himself
because he was too tired or he
had a bad cold and had taken
some medication? Yes, it hQP-
pens occasionally but not as often
as it hould.
Fatigue has often been listed
as a factor in aircraft mishaps
and many times it could have
been detected if the commander
had been alert. Here is just one
such mishap:
An AH-IG pilot, hovering his
aircraft into a confined area ,
misjudged his tail rotor clear-
ance and the aircraft struck a
tree. The pilot had taken a long
automobile trip over the
weekend, had mechanical prob-
lems, and did not get back home
until 0300 hours. He had about 3
hours' sleep and no breakfast be-
fore reporting for the flight. He
had been flying about 3 hours
when the tail rotor strike occur-
red. FATIGUE was the cause.
The irony is that the pilot would
not ask to be relieved of the
routine mission but while waiting
for the mission briefing, he did
tell the operations officer about
his car problems and about what
time he got back home. The op-
erations officer' s only comment
was , " Sounds like some of the
rotten luck I've had. It just spoils
the whole weekend."
O
ne study suggests
that there are seven
main situations
which can cause .
fatigue: (1) the expenditure of
energy, (2) paced performance,
(3) prolonged activity, (4) frus-
trating situations , (5) limiting
conditions, (6) too exacting a
demand, and (7) conditions for
chronic fatigue. Let ' s look atonly
those situations which are more
applicable to the aviation envi-
ronment.
41
FATIGUE-A CONSIDERATION IN MISSION PLANNING
Everyone knows anything re-
quiring a considerable expendi-
ture of energy is naturally fatigu-
ing. In most cases, preparing for
and conducting a flight does not
require a great amount of
energy. But the pilot and opera-
tions officer must stay alert to
the problems of fatigue after a
weekend in which a considerable
amount of work was done fol -
lowed by duty on Monday. The
pilot's reaction time and judg-
ment may not be up to his " nor-
mal " speed after such a weekend
and this fact must be considered
when scheduling high-risk mis-
sions.
What kinds of situations could
produce ' frustration"? The
most likely would be a situation
in which the pilot may find his
way blocked regardless of which
way he turns. He finds that what
he is able to accomplish is slight
and has no relation to the amount
of effort he applies.
" Limiting conditions" are var-
ious external circumstances im-
posed on a pilot which make it
difficult for him to function. An
example would be dealing with
temperature extremes. This can
be fatiguing and may lead to de-
creased levels of performance.
A good example of " demand
42
too exacting" is the fatigue
caused by visual work because
the demands focus primarily
upon a particular body
mechanism. For example, a pilot
who has been doing a lot of office
work and then goes out and flys
may find himself fatigued from
the mere exertion his eyes have
been going through.
Finally, " chronic fatigue " is
the type that crops up day after
day. It may continue over long
periods, perhaps involving little
that can be put into terms as
specific as mentioned previ-
ously. This is the type of fatigue
that we deal with as a " way of
life. "
Chronic fatigue has as its chief
symptom the feeling of inability,
weakness and tiredness. Short
of changing the whole fundamen-
tal life philosophy of the indi-
vidual , the remedy may lie in a
simple change in the pilot' s envi-
ronment , job or work schedule.
Another major consideration
when dealing with fatigue is de-
mand. Demand can be placed
upon the pilot in two ways. De-
mand from the envirohmental
standpoint is the requirement
placed upon the pilot by someone
el e. The second kind of demand
is the requirement the pilot
makes of himself. High degrees
of demand, either from the pilot
or from the environment, can
easily mount up and cause
fatigue.
To summarize, it may be said
that instead of using fatigue as a
single or loose catch-all term, we
had better recognize the in-
volvement of a group of quite dis-
tinguishable elements in the total
situation. They are distraction,
disorganization , discomfort ,
work decrement , and finally
fatigue. Here are some ways to
prevent , or at least minimize,
fatigue:
Adhere to established limita-
tion on daily flying and working
hours.
Avoid scheduling the same
pilots to all stressful missions .
Avoid assigning stressful
missions to a pilot who may be
showing signs of fatigue .
E
inally all pilots
must be given the
opportunity for ade-
quate rest and natural
sleep.
Natural sleep--sleep without the
aid of medicine--is the best de-
terrent to fatigue.
The purpose of imposing limi-
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
t ations on flying and working
hours for aviation crewmembers
will be defeated if the individu-
al ' s off-duty time is not properl y
managed. It is the moral and
militar y respon ibility of each
individual crewmember to get
s uffi cient sleep and proper
nourishment, and avoid off-duty
activities which prevent him
from reporting for duty phys i-
cally sound and mentally alert. It
is also the responsibility of each
crewmember to inform hi s
supervisor or commander when
he has reached or is approaching
t he prescribed flight-time limits.
Pilots can be taught to recog-
nize the symptoms and causes of
fatigue and how to avoid it. Once
the pilot is able to grasp the signs
of fatigue he should be able to de-
ter mine its source.
One authority sums it all up
I when he says " ... the aim is to
maintain the epvironment of the
man and the t a : : . ~ he has to per-
for m wit hin his known limits.
Following this, all that can be
done is to make sure that the man
is capable of performing the
t ask, that he is full y trained to
carry it out with the highest effi-
ciency, and that he will not uffer
from fatigue at any crucial mo-
ment. ~
June 1977
Okay, so it was an easy puzzle; and if you had a
problem to solve or some important decision to
make, you still have that job. But, hopefully, you
can now go about it in a more refreshed state of
mind. Curiously, although this simple puzzle
couldn' t help you in the area of problem-solving or
decision-making, it does have something important
to say - important enough that it could possibly
save your life.
Before you filled in the spaces, the puzzle was full
of " holes" - empty. It was only after you inserted
the correct combination of letters that it developed
any meaning. What about your professional life as
an aviator? Does it, too, contain any blank spaces
that need to be filled? Are you now flying over
moUhtains as opposed to familiar flat land or desert
terrain? Or, perhaps, vice versa? Have you re-
cently transitioned to a new type of aircraft or,
maybe, to a different area of flying such as NOE?
Do you know how to contend with such problems as
gusty wind, blowing dust , and thunderstorms that
may be ushered in by a change in seasons? What
about ARs, SOPs, and emergency procedures? Are
you thoroughly familiar with those that apply to
you?
These are but a few of the questions we need to
answer. However , the message is clear: Now is the
time to check ourselves and fill in any " blank"
spaces that relate to flying - before we run into some
situation that could prove embarrassing, if not
downright unhealthy. So, let' s plan to take a break
for safety right away, and in turn, give safety a
break - our safety ! ~
43
BEWARE OF THE SUMMER THUNDERBUMPER
Continued from page 7
When the cell reaches a point
where rain is falling at ground
level , it is considered as being in
the mature stage. Cloud tops may
be pushing through the tropopau e
and even up to a height of 60,000
feet , and it is in this stage that eve-
rything seems to be coming to a
climax. Updrafts may achieve
6000 fpm, hailstones larger than 6
inches in diameter may be found
at ground level , and there is fre-
quent lightning and severe turbu-
lence.
Aircraft flying as far as 5 miles
from uch monstrosities have
been virtually beaten to the
ground from hail tossed out of a
cell ' s top. Clear-ice buildup is at
the extreme, and prolonged flight
for more than a few minute be-
tween 0
0
C. and -15
0
C. may pro-
duce drastic results.
In the dissipating stage, the
thunderstorm is a broken, dying
creature. Consisting almost en-
tirely of downdrafts , the whole
structure is raining out and
quickly turning into layer of
stratiform cloud . Even these
may soon disappear , or they may
not form at all.
The summer thunderstorm i
one of the awesome forces in na-
ture, and the helicopter is more
susceptible to thunderstorm
punishment than fixed wing air-
craft . Icing, hail , lightning ,
windsheers, and turbulence are all
equally hazardous , and pilots
should realize the disastrous con-
sequences before committing
themselves to such an encounter.
Helicopters are poor at taking
on ice. In the summer thun-
44
derstorm, clear ice can rapidly
build over the bubble or wind-
shield. Ice can cause buffeting
and vibration from rotor-blade
buildup. With such a load, the air-
craft could develop a lateral beat
with retreating blade stall. If one
blade throws ice before the others,
the rotor blade then become un-
balanced. Power may have to be
increased to hold altitude and
airspeed.
Hail presents mainly a struc-
tural problem. Damage will usu-
ally be more to one blade than
another , and unbalanc d rotor
blades present critical problems .
Lat ral vibrations occur and the
helicopter starts yawing; if not
correct d, components become
overstr ssed. As this condition
progres es, a helicopter can beat
itself to death. Buffeting, vibra-
tions , loss of lift , increa ed drag,
and the need for increased power
to maintain altitude and airspeed
are the main problems.
Hail seldom falls straight down ;
it falls at a lant because of th
wind. If you ' re ever suddenly
caught in a hail shower (shaft ),
you should turn in the direction of
the hail fall and descend with it
until clear.
Lightning strik s on any part of
a rotor blade can have drastic r -
suIts. It is particularly rough to
lose any part of a blade, which is a
real possibility. Again, it will set
up the vibration or beat and start
to overstress (or disintegrate!)
the aircraft completely. If light-
ning strikes a blade or spar, there
is the potential of losing that sec-
tion of blade or the whole blade
itself. If it strikes the airframe,
you may encounter a total electri-
cal failure and have only a partial
panel to work with. Throw in ome
turbulence and there goes even the
partial panel.
As a general rule, most lightning
is found in the upper cell regions,
and almost all is from cloud to
cloud. Operation should be con-
fined to the lower one-third of th
cloud, and if lightning is experi-
enced, you should take the aircraft
lower. If a lightning strike occur ,
find the nearest field and com-
pI tely check the helicopter over
before resuming flight.
Wind sheers and turbulence are
generally synonymous and should
be thought of as such. They can be
encountered anywhere in or near a
thunderstorm and can twist air-
frames, bend rotor blades and
crack bubbles. The most severe
turbulence is generally found in
the upper one-third of the thun-
derstorm, reinforcing the lower
one-third penetration idea.
When approaching a thun-
derstorm, you should be alert for
the first evidence of buffeting at
the outer fringes of more severe
turbulence. You should also know
what airspeed and rpm are re-
commended at your particular
helicopter ' s weight to sustain the
most Gs. If you re put in a position
where penetration is inevitable,
here are some things you can do to
help make it a survivable experi-
ence:
1. Determine the minimum en-
route altitude (MEA) for that par-
ticular area and try to fly as close
to that altitude as possible. This
will reduce the chance of icing,
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
hail lightning, and turbulent con-
ditions. If you'r off the airways
and have no MEA choose an area
determine its highest point, then
add 1,000 feet as a fudge factor.
2. Slow the helicopter to re-
commended turbulence speed and
rpm. Secure all loose gear.
3. Keep a constant check on
your position. Always know if a
lower altitude can be flown to get
out of the system or if a gain in
altitude is possible to clear obsta-
cles.
4. Make sure Center ha radar
contact or a position fix.
5. Penetrate, if you must , the
storm cell as low as possible, tak-
ing a route that offers in-cloud
flight of the shortest duration.
6. If you have a copilot , have
him monitor your flying, watching
for signs of vertigo. He can also
relieve much of the radio and
position'-monitoring workload.
You may not know how large the
system is. Lightning and turbu-
lence may disable barometric in-
struments and navaids when
they' re needed most. You must
decide to continue or to abort -
whether to fly the aircraft down
40
Average number of doys each oreo hos thunderstorms during summer months.
June 1977
while controllable or wait until
forced down .
Terrain can make a difference.
If over mountains , it could be to
your advantage to continue , in
hopes of finding a hqle and setting
the helicopter down. If over flat
land or water, you may choose to
descend gradually, hoping the
situation will improve. However,
r m mber that descending below
minimums in IFR conditions is
just asking for more trouble.
You should always think about
taking a little more time, even if it
means an extra stop en route , to
stay away from a summer thun-
derstorm. If faced with a single
cell , you can usually go around,
since single cells are rarely larger
than 10 miles in diameter. Facing
a line system in the building or late
dissipating stage, you may decide
to go under , given enough cloud-
base-to-ground clearance.
By far the safest tactic is simply
not to get into this position in the
first place, even if it means sitting
on the ground and watching it blow
over . At least you'll be able to fly
on after th battle has raged
through.
45
LSE Program
The article by CW2 Laing enti-
tled " Unit-Level Life Support Sec-
tion," AVIATION DIGEST, June
1976, reports the solutions of an
operational aviation unit to the
lack of an adequate life support
equipment maintenance pro-
gram. The establishment of a life
support equipment section mod-
eled after the USAF system is to
be commended . This action
speaks highly of the profes-
sionalism in this aviation unit .
I must , however , provide the
U.S. Army aviation community
with insight into the critical un-
derlying problem in life support
equipment which this innovative
aviation unit was able to over-
come.
The Army aviation life support
equipment program problem ex-
tends from the absence of a rec-
ognized enlisted MOS specialist
and the unrecognized unit life
support equipment maintenance
and inspection needs to the ab-
sence of a viable centralized life
support equipment effort . In spite
of this unsupported life' support
equipment program, the primary
components of life support equip-
ment are in daily field use.
The comments of CW2 Laing in
reference to the Army A-13A ox-
ygen mask and the Air Force
MBU-5I P oxygen mask must be
PEARL'S
Personal Equipment & Rescue/Survival Lowdown
If you have a question aoout
personal equipment or
rescue / survival gear, write Pearl,
USAAAVS, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
46
t ~
U AAAva
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
clarified. The U.S . Army
AeromedicaL Research Labora-
tory has evaLuated the currentLy
avaiLabLe oxygen masks . Each
mask was evaLuated in terms of
fit , weight , and inspiratory and
expiratory pressures required.
The differences are minimaL with
each mask having specific desira-
bLe and undesirabLe features. *
The A-13A and the MBU-5/P are
both simpListic devices but re-
quire preventive inspection and
maintenance on a continuing
basis . Spare parts must be pro-
vided to a trained technician for
repair to insure a cost effective
and Lifesaving program. CW2
Laing' s comments wouLd impLy
the MBU-5/P mask is superior in
aLL aspects to the A-13A. The
MB U-5/ P mask in the absence of a
Life support equipment program
for maintenance and repair wiLL
perform as poorLy as an A-13A
mask when carried in a helmet
bag without a protective cover ,
used without testing at a bench
test stand, and not cLeaned after
each use.
The Army AeromedicaL Re-
search Laboratory and the Air
Force are awaiting deLivery of a
prototype of a Lightweight mask,
the MBU-12/P, for fieLd testing. If
proven successfuL, this mask will
be the type standard for both the
Army and the Air Force . In the
absence of a recognized Life sup-
port equipment need for Army
aviation, a standardized
*Evaluation of the MBU-5/P at-
tachment was conducted by
USAARL to ensure the noise at-
tenuation capabilities of the SPH-4
helmet were not decreased by the
bayonet suspension. Comparison
of weight comfort and function
also was conducted. The findings
were provided to AVSCOM to sup-
port t he operational units ' re-
quests for use of t he MBU-5/P. The
MBU-5/P is considered to be an
impr ovement in comfort com-
pared to t he A-13A mask.
June 1977
USA/ USAF oxygen mask shouLd
insure spare parts and Life support
equipment maintenance assis-
tance from the USAF.
LTC Frank S. Pettyjohn, M.D.
Chief , CardiovascuLar Medicine
Branch
U. S. Army Aeromedical R e-
search Laboratory
Fort Rucker , AL
HQ, USAA VSCOM, has advised
USAAA VS t hat aircrewmembers
who pe rform high altitude or
fe r ry missions may requis ition
and us e t he MBU-5/ P oxygen
mask. The managing activity is
t he USAF, San Antonio Air
Materiel Area , ATTN : SA-
ALC/ MMIRCB-Z, Kelley AFB,
TX 78241. Requisitions should be
s ubmit t ed in accordance with
USAF T.O. 13A1-1-1-1. Mask fit -
ti ng and helmet attachment will
Gremlins in the mail room
managed to withhold from t he
anxiously awaiting avi ation
community your observations
a bout the Army ' s aviation lif
support equipment program 0
beautifull y worded in your letter
to t he editor dated 4 August 1976.
Your words of wisdom are always
appreciated.
n Mask
be accomplished by a qualified
USAF aviation life support tech-
nician t rained for t his purpose.
I will provide a ' shopping" list
on how to obtain the USAF techni-
cal order (TO) in next month's is-
sue. Not sure that I can obtain a
USAF aviation life support techni-
cian.
The MBU-5/P oxygen masks are
available in four sizes. Unit of is-
s ue , NSN, manufacturer part
number, and nomenclature are :
Unit NSN Mfg . Part No. Nomenclature
1 Ea 1660-00-810-3223 PIN 450-91 Oxygen Mask, MBU-5/P
Size Reg. Narrow
1 E a 1660-00-794-0865 PIN 450-09A Hardshell Reg. Narrow
1 Ea 1660-00-811-5259 PIN 450-192 Oxygen Mask, MBU-5/P
Size Reg. Wide
1 E a 1660-00-794-0869 PIN 450-10 Hardshell Reg. Wide
1 Ea 1660-00-810-3225 PIN 450-193 Oxygen Mask, MBU-5/P
Size Long Narrow
1 Ea 1660-00-794-0870 PIN 450-11A Hardshell Long Narrow
1 E a 1660-00-810-3222 PIN 450-194 Oxygen Mask, MBU-5/P
Size Short Narrow
1 Ea 1660-00-794-0871 PIN 450-12 Hardshell Short Narrow
The following components are required for each MBU-5/P:
1 E a 84 75-00-487 -0903 PIN 450-195 Dust Cover
1 Ea 1660-00-076-9662 MIL-C-38271 Connector CRU-60/P
1 Ea 1660-00-137-5106 PIN 450-485 Suspension Harness
4-Point
2 Ea 1660-00-066-2077 63C4228 Bayonet Straight
2 Ea 1660-00-440-5553 PIN 60C4459 Receiver Assy Bayonet
1 Ea 5965-00-854-0658 MIL-M-27297 Microphone M100 AIC
1 Ea 5995-00-890-8614 CX-4434/U Cord Microphone
1 Ea 5965-00-509-9889 PIN MT-1927/ Mounting Bracket Boom
A/C Microphone
If additional information is required, contact Mr. A.B.C. Davis,
USAAVSCOM, ATTN: DRSAV-WL, P .O. Box 209, St. Louis, MO 63166,
AUTOVON 698-3241/3291.
47
A Comparison
Of The AH-l S
And The AAH
Captain Martin R. Karig
Directorate of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center Fort Rucker, AL
A RMY DOCTRINE relies heavily upon the at-
tack helicopter as an integral and important
member of the combined arms team. To meet the
Army's needs in this area Army aviation is develop-
ing the Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) while
improving its existing fleet of AH-1 HueyCobra air-
craft. Neither aircraft is foreseen as being
independent of the other, nor is one intended to re-
place the other.
As a gunship in Southeast Asia the AH-1G did a
commendable job of providing immediate and ac-
curate fire support in a variety of missions. How-
ever, the Cobra was not designed for employment in
a mid-intensity conflict. Consequently a com-
prehensive modernization program was undertaken
to provide the Cobra with the firepower and surviva-
bility needed on the modern battlefield. These im-
provements generally fell into the following two
areas:
ICAP - the Improved Cobra Armament Prog-
ram
ICAM - the Improved Cobra Agility and Ma-
neuverability Program
The ICAP provides the Cobra with a Helmet
Mounted Sight System (HMSS) and the XM-65 TOW*
Missile System (TMS).
The ICAM program increases the maximum
*tube-Iaunched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
gross weight of the Cobra from 9,500 to 10,000
pounds and adds an improved engine and drive
train. In addition the Army is purchasing a glass
composite improved main rotor blade which is bal-
listically tolerant to 23 mm hits and has an im-
proved aerodynamic design providing an increase in
lift.
The Cobra modernization program is being con-
ducted in phases which can be simplified in a for-
mula format:
AH-IG + ICAP
AH-IQ + ICAM
AH-IQ (Cobra TOW)
AH-IS (Improved
Cobra TOW)
The final phase of the Cobra modernization is the
Enhanced Cobra Armament Program which will
provide the AH-1S with an improved fire control
computer; an external armament stores manage-
ment/remote set fuzing system for the new family
of 70 mm (2.75 inch) rockets; and a universal turret
capable of accepting either the 7.62,20 mm or 30 mm
gun. Army plans are for the entire Cobra fleet to be
in this " full-up S" configuration by fiscal year 1984.
While the Cobra modernization program is a
milestone in providing the Army with an attack
helicopter capable of employment on the modern
battlefield, the AAH represents a major advance-
ment in attack helicopter technology. The AAH has
been designed with emphasis placed on flight per-
formance, firepower , survivability and maintaina-
bility.
It is not the intent of this article to feature oue
system over another , but it is important to recog-
nize that the AAH, because of its design features ,
represents a new generation of attack helicopter .
While AH-1S features have largely been added on,
the same features have been designed and built into
the AAH.
In a Mideast environment, represented by a pres-
sure altitude of 4,000 feet and a temperature of 95
degrees Fahrenheit the AAH will be capabl of
Comparison Of AH-1S And AAH, Hover Out Of Ground Effect Perfor-
mance In European Environmen t 2,000 Feet Pressure Altitude/70 Degrees Fahrenheit
48
Characteris tics
VROC, feet per minute
Airspeed
Payload:
TOW
HELLFIRE
30mm
Endurance
MMH/FH
A vailabili ty
Night Capability
Target Acquisition
AH-1S
45i)
120
8
500
2.4
11/1
70 Percent
NVGl
ALT3; DV04
AAH
700
150
16
1,200
2.5
8/1
75 Percent
PVNS2
ALT3; DV04
TVa; FLIR6
Figure 1
lNVG - Night Vision Goggles
2PNVS - Pilot's Night Vision y tern
3ALT - Airborne Laser Tracker
4DVO - Direct View Optics
' TV - Television Viewing System
6FLIR - Forward Looking Inirared
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
YAH-64 AH-1S
Rotor Diameter
.. S feet 44 feet
Figure 2
Overall Length
57 feet 7 inches 52 feet 11 inches
(Rotor Turning)
Width 17 feet 2 inches 10 feet 8 inches
Height 12 f... 7 inch., 13 feet 5 inches
AAH/AH-1S Size Comparison
carrying 8 HELLFIRE missiles , 320 rounds of 30 mm
ordnance and sufficient fuel for 1.83 hours endur-
ance. At that weight it still will be capable of achiev-
ing a 450-feet per minute vertical rate of climb from
an out-of-ground-effect hover. For the Cobra to
achieve the same endurance and vertical rate of
climb, its armament load would be limited to eight
TOW missiles. A more striking comparison of the
two aircraft , in the European environment , can be
seen in figure 1. Figure 2 provides a size comparison.
The AAH will be equipped with the HELLFIRE
modular missile system, designed to accept a fam-
ily of seeker warheads. Not limited by line of sight
as is the Cobra/TOW system, the AAH will be capa-
ble of engaging targets at extended ranges by either
direct or indirect fire.
The HELLFIRE laser guided missile and the
AAH' s Target Acquisition and Designation System
(TADS) will be compatible with the triservices
family of laser guided munitions. Thus, the AAH
will be capable of engaging targets autonomously
or firing at targets remotely designated by other
ground or airborne laser designators .
The flight performance and standoff ranges of the
AAH inherently provide it with a degree of surviva-
bility not achievable with the Cobra/TOW. Also the
AAH has been engineered to provide 23 mm protec-
tion to the crew compartment and all vital compo-
nents. Although several of the Cobra' s components
have been redesigned to withstand higher caliber
hits, the AH-1S affords only limited 7.62 protection
overall.
The AAH will have redundant flight controls and
independent twin engines . It will have the space and
power available to incorporate active electronic
warfare (EW) countermeasures as well as having
the passive countermeasures now installed on the
AH-1S. The AAH' s detectability also has been re-
duced by minimizing its visual , aural , infrared and
radar signatures. .
The vi sionic package aboard the AH-IS cqnsists
of direct view optics through the TOW telescopic
sight unit. Ni ght capability is achieved by the wear
of night vision goggles by the pilot and gunner . The
AAH will have an integrated Pilot' s Night Vision
System (PNVS) to provide it with a tactical , night-
flight capability.
The PNVS, together with the components of the
TADS-Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) , Televi-
sion Viewing System, and Direct View Optics, will
enable the AAH to operate in adverse conditions
that would render the Cobra ineffective. Both air-
craft have provisions for a laser rangefinder and an
airborne laser tracker (ALT) target cueing system
which will significantl y reduce target -acquisition
time.
The AAH' s modular design with easy access to
components , combined with a 300-hour interval be-
tween periodic inspections, has increased its relia-
bility, availability and maintainability when com-
pared to the Cobra. Current estimates are that the
AAH will have a maintenance manhour to flight
hour (MMH/FH) ratio of 8 to 1 with an availability
rate of 75 percent. Cobra figures indicate an
MMH/FH of 11 to 1 with an availability rate of 70
percent.
The AAH will be able to carry more ordnance,
farther and faster , and remain onstation longer
than the AH-1S. It represents a significant increase
in the capabilities of Army aviation to meet and
defeat an enemy armor threat. The Cobra, with its
improved armament and agility packages, remains
a viabie weapons system complementing the com-
bined arms team on the battlefield. The two aircraft
are interdependent, comprising Army aviation's
Hi-Lo mix of attack helicopters through the 1980s.

VDP SEEMS TO BE going around in aviation circles. Could you shed some light on this subject?
Visual descent point (VDP) is a new term. It is a defined point on the final approach course of a
nonprecision straight-in approach procedure from which normal descent from the mininum
descent altitude (MOA) to the runway touchdown point may be commenced, provided the required
visual reference is established. An approved navigational aid will be used to establsh this point.
A normal 3-degree glidepath angle to the runway touchdown zone (TOZ) usually will result
and special obstruction protection consideration is provided. Distance measuring equipment
(OME) fixes will be used at the onset. As the system grows, crossing VHF omnidirectional range
{VORl radials and marker beacons may be used. The use of the fix is not mandatory
but descent should not be commenced prior to the fix.
The VDP does not constitute the missed approach point in these procedures. The missed approach point
will continue to be published in the same manner as before. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) plans to install visual approach slope indicator (VASI) on those runways served
by nonprecision approaches that incorporate a VOP. This will help assure visual reference at
greater distance from the runway which is considered required for heavy/high performance aircraft.
Normally this category aircraft would not be able to complete a landing if visual reference
with the runway environment is not acquired at the VDP.
Army category aircraft should continue an approach at the MOA when visual reference to the runway is
not acquired at the VDP. The VOP may be as much as 2 or 3 miles from the runway if the height above
touchdown associated with an MOA is about 640 or 960 feet above the respective TDZ elevation.
What is Army Designated Airspace?
It is that portion of the airspace in the National Airspace System (NAS)
that has been designated by FAA for Army use.
Does the Army have complete control of its designated airspace?
Only to the extent for which it was designated. When the airspace originally was
requested, the purpose for which the request was made was stated. Should this purpose change
significantly, then such changes must be cleared with FAA.
Why must I put a desired standard terminal arrival route (STAR) procedure in the route of flight section
of the flight plan and then a note in the remarles?
This is a hang-on from the filing procedures used at the onset of the STAR program.
There is no longer a need for the STAR note in the remarks section of a flight plan. General Planning
instructions have been changed.
Readers are encouraged to send questions to:
Director
USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314