G.R. No.

L-15149 December 13, 1920

DOLORES RUSTIA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MAXIMIANO FRANCO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Francisco A. Delgado for appellant.
Marcelino Aguas for appellees.

STREET, J .:
The plaintiff, Dolores Rustia, brought this action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga to secure an injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting bamboo from certain
land alleged to belong to the plaintiff and to recover damages for the plants already cut. In
accordance with the prayer of the complaint, a preliminary injunction was issued ex parte upon
the giving of a bond. Some of the defendants answered, denying participation in the alleged
trespasses and disclaiming all interest in the land from which the bamboo in question had been
cut, while three, to wit, Cecilio Franco, Benito Laren, and Mariano Manalili, admitted that
bamboo had been cut by them from the land described in the complaint or in that vicinity but
asserted that said land belonged to Benito Laren, Mariano Manalili, and Gregoria Dizon, wife of
the defendant Cecilio Franco.
It appears in evidence, and was found by the trial judge, that the defendants have at various
times, not only in 1917 but in several previous years, cut bamboo from a caaveral lying on both
sides of the estero Macabucod, but the proof does not show with any certainty how many
bamboo had been cut by them on either side of the estero. The plaintiff claims that the land of
which she is the owner comprises an area of nearly 24 hectares, lying on the north side of the
estero Macabucod, which said estero forms the southern boundary of part of the property. We
consider the title of the plaintiff to the parcel in question to be fully proved by the documents
introduced in evidence as well as by oral evidence. In this connection it appears that the plaintiff
is a grand daughter of Doa Eulalia Bartolome, who died testate on August 12, 1899, at the age
of 84. The aforesaid Doa Eulalia is said to have acquired the property from Potenciano Eugenio
y Camacho, a resident of Malabon, who had obtained a composition title thereto in the year
1888. The document accrediting the ownership of Potenciano Eugenio y Camacho was presented
in evidence by the plaintiff as Exhibit A. The introduction of said document was objected to by
the attorney for the defendants, but this objection was overruled. In December of the year 1904,
the descendants of Eulalia Bartolome entered into a partition agreement by which the property of
their said ancestor was divided, upon which occasion the low in question was assigned to the
plaintiff. No document was introduced to show how the title to said parcel had passed from
Potenciano Eugenio to Eulalia Bartolome; but in view of the long continued possession of
Dolores Rustia, as heir and successor of Eulalia Bartolome, it is unnecessary to trace the title
further back than to Eulalia Bartolome. The Exhibit B, which is the deed by which the heirs of
Eulalia Bartolome partitioned her property among themselves, must be considered properly
before the court in relation with, and as explanatory of the testimony of the plaintiff, Dolores
Rustia. Upon the statements made by her, corroborated by the testimony of witnesses introduced
in her behalf, it is clear that she has maintained actual possession from the date of the partition,
subject only to the occasional wrongful intrusion thereon of the defendants. The result is that the
defendants in cutting bamboo under claim of ownership on the north side of the estero
Macabucod have unjustifiably invaded the plaintiff's rights, and the question now is, whether the
defendants can be permanently enjoined from the repetition of these acts.
The trial judge was of the opinion that an injunction suit could not be maintained; and he
accordingly dismissed the case, relying upon the authority of the decision of this court in
Liongson vs. Martinez (36 Phil., 948). The case was accordingly brought to his court upon appeal
by the plaintiff, Dolores Rustia.
It must be admitted that some of the language used in the case cited seems to support the position
of the trial judge, but that was a case where the plaintiff sought by means of a preliminary
injunction to oust the defendants from possession. The practice there reprobated by this court
was the granting of preliminary injunction with a view of disturbing a person in possession who
is claiming title as owner.
As appears from numerous decision of this court, of which Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil., 273), is an
example, it is considered inexpedient to allow the actual possessor of land to be disturbed or
ejected by means of a preliminary injunction while the title remains undecided. The plaintiff,
being out of possession, should not be given the benefit of the extraordinary remedy of
injunction until his title, or right to possession, is adjudicated. The person in actual possession
must be presumed prima facie to have the better right.lawphi1.net
It must be remembered, that to invoke successfully the doctrine of those cases the defendant
must have possession. The situation is quite different where the person is possession, claiming in
the character of owner, seeks protection from the wrongful acts of a mere intruder. As was said
by Justice Johnson in Liongson vs. Martinez, supra, "The writ of injunction may be issued to
restrain acts of trespass and the illegal interference with the possession of land, under certain
conditions."
In the American system of procedure, from which the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
relative to injunctions are taken, the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to
protect the owner of land, being in possession, from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a
stranger, as where a person who has no right enters from time to time to cut wood or carry off
other products. The intermittent nature of such acts, and the probability, not to say certainty, of
repetition in the future, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate
and justifies the granting of the equitable remedy. (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Third
Edition, vol. 4, sec. 1357.)
In applying the American authorities at this point, it is desirable to bear in mind in order not
to be completely misled that in the past, under the American and English system of law,
courts of law and equity were entirely separate; and it so happened that originally, while the
courts of law had jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title, only the courts of equity could
administer injunctive relief. The result was that the latter courts in the beginning showed great
diffidence in interfering by the remedy of injunction whenever there appeared to be a bona fide
dispute over the ownership, which ought to be determined in a court of law. It therefore came to
be accepted in common-law States that an injunction to prevent interference with rights in real
property should not be granted until the plaintiff has fully established his title or right by a proper
action brought, for that purpose. This meant, of course, that the plaintiff, in a State where
separate courts of law and equity existed, must, first, resort to an independent action in the court
of law. It seems to have resulted, furthermore, that the rule was accepted in some of these States
that if, in an action for injunction in a court of equity, the defendant claimed ownership in
himself, the preliminary injunction would be dissolved and the plaintiff would be required to go
into the court of law. Some American cases are cited upon both these points in the opinion in
Liongson vs. Martinez (36 Phil., 948). But these cases can have no application in a country like
this, where both the legal and equitable jurisdiction are exercised indiscriminately by every
court, both original and appellate.
In the case before us the plaintiff alleges that the ownership of the questioned land is in herself,
that the defendants by repeated acts of trespass have at different times entered thereon and
unlawfully cut bamboo belonging to her, and that they further threaten to continue such unlawful
acts in the future. In the petitory part of the complaint she asks that a permanent injunction be
granted, prohibiting the defendants from repeating these wrongful acts and that she be granted
whatever other remedy may be appropriate.itc@a1f The defendants (or such of them as seem to
be interested in the matter) answered the complaint, admitting that they have cut the bamboo to
which reference is made, but justify such acts on the ground that they are owners of the land
where the bamboo was cut. Wherefore, the defendants themselves in turn ask that they be
awarded damages against the plaintiff and that they be granted any other appropriate relief. As
the plaintiff did not formally reply to this cross-complaint, she must be taken to have denied the
same generally. (Sec. 104, Code of Civil Procedure.)
In this state of the pleadings, the ownership of the property from which the bamboo was cut was
in issue, and it would have been proper for the trial judge, upon the proof before him to have
declared that the plaintiff is the owner of the land in question and in consequence to have
enjoined the defendants from molesting the plaintiff by cutting bamboo therefrom in the future.
In the view we take of the case, the judgment must be reversed; and judgment will be entered,
declaring the plaintiff; Dolores Rustia, to be entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for in
subsection (b) of the second paragraph of the petitory part of the complaint; and the defendants
will be enjoined from hereafter molesting her by cutting bamboo from the property described in
the complaint, reserving to the defendants or any of them the right to institute any appropriate
action, if so advised, to establish ownership and recover the property.
2
For uncertainty of proof
no award for damages will be made. No special pronouncement will be made as to costs. So
ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Malcolm and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 NOTE BY REPORTER. As the judgment was originally entered, the dispositive
part of the decision contained a declaration of ownership in favor of the plaintiff; but
upon motion to reconsider, the right was reserved to the defendants of instituting an
action to try the title, as above stated, the court observing that considering the manner in
which this case had been tried in the court below, it was to be feared that the proof
relative to ownership had not been fairly ventilated.