Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93059 June 3, 1991
EDMUNDO SAMANIEGO, ANTONIO L. ACOSTA, JAIME L. DIAZ and PABLO MANAHAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SANDVIK PHILIPPINES, INC., KRISTER BROBECK and AKE
FRIBERG, respondents.
Herras Law Office for petitioners.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
The post-employment status of certain managerial employees is in issue in this special civil action for certiorari. The
employees contend that the termination of their employment with the company was illegally undertaken. On the
other hand, the company maintains that the said employees voluntarily resigned. Thus put, the Court is tasked to
resolve the controversy.
The facts are not disputed.
The herein petitioners Edmundo Samaniego, Antonio L. Acosta, Jaime L. Diaz and Pablo Manahan used to be
managerial employees of the private respondent company, Sandvik Philippines, Inc. The other private respondents,
Krister Brobeck and Ake Friberg, are ranking officials of the said company.
Sometime before 1987, the management was of the view that a serious financial crisis was confronting the company.
For this reason, the management resolved to reorganize the company by streamlining its operations and eliminating
middle management positions, including those of the petitioners. The management eventually decided that the
managerial employees so affected by the reorganization should be given the option of either facing termination of
their employment and receiving separation pay, or resigning voluntarily from the company under terms more
financially advantageous than those as regards the first option.
Meanwhile, as early as April 1987, three of the petitioners filed a labor case against the company for the purpose of
seeking the payment of certain money claims, and for the purpose of calling public attention to some alleged
anomalous activities of private respondent Krister Brobeck. The matter, however, remained unresolved.
On August 24, 1987, representatives of the company held a meeting with the petitioners at the Hotel Intercontinental
Manila for the purpose of discussing the company reorganization. In time, the petitioners were given the following
options.
(1) Termination of employment on account of the company reorganization, with payment of
separation benefits; or
(2) Voluntary resignation from the company, with more benefits fits.
It appears that the petitioners negotiated with the company representatives for an improvement of the benefits under
the voluntary resignation option. By the end of the day, no agreement was reached by the parties.
Negotiations were resumed the next day, August 25, 1987. The company representatives eventually offered better
benefits under the voluntary resignation option. Three of the petitioners found the proposal satisfactory and thus
accepted the same. The fourth employee, petitioner Diaz, at first decided to take the first option but he eventually
changed his mind and opted to resign from the company under the improved terms. The petitioners signed company-
prepared resignation letters. They acknowledged therein that they have received the benefits agreed upon and that
they have no legal claim against the company or its officers and representatives. On the same day, the petitioners
received the checks corresponding to their benefits under the voluntary resignation option.
It appears, however, that sometime later in the day, the petitioners sent a letter to the company, through registered
mail, informing the latter that they received their benefits under protest. Later on, the petitioners deposited their
checks in their respective bank accounts. Petitioners Diaz and Samaniego eventually received documents effectively
transferring in their favor the ownership rights over the company vehicles assigned to them in the course of their
employment, pursuant to their corresponding benefits. In time, the petitioners received all the benefits appertaining
to the voluntary resignation option.
On September 2, 1987, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, discrimination and damage against the
private respondents before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-09-03062-87 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana. A formal trial on the merits ensued and
upon the conclusion thereof, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. As stated earlier, the petitioners
contended that the termination of their employment was illegally undertaken. The private respondents maintained
that this case is one of voluntary resignation.
On November 28, 1989, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The labor arbiter opined that
the reorganization of the company was merely a scheme to dismiss the petitioners inasmuch as the same was
haphazardly carried out and considering the haste attending the termination of the employment of the petitioners.
The labor arbiter also opined that the termination of the employment of the petitioners was in retaliation against
them for the complaint they filed against the private respondents earlier. In sum, the labor arbiter concluded that the
petitioners did not voluntarily sign their resignation letters.
1

The private respondents brought an appeal to the NLRC. On April 24, 1990, the NLRC promulgated a resolution setting
aside the decision of the labor arbiter and entering a new one dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners.
2
The
NLRC stressed that the issue to be resolved is not whether the company reorganization was valid, but whether or not
the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the company. All told, the NLRC held that the petitioners voluntarily
resigned from the company. The pertinent portions of the said resolution are quoted herein
The issue in this case is not whether the company's reorganization announced to the complainants
(the herein petitioners) on August 24, 1987 is valid. Rather, the pivotal issue is whether or not the
complainants voluntarily resigned from the . . . company.
The appeal is impressed with merit. Contrary to the findings of the Arbiter a quo, there is nothing on
record which will support her conclusions that the complainants were terminated in due haste, much
less under the guise of a reorganization. Perhaps because of this mistaken impression, the issues
were diverted to whether or not there was an honest-to-goodness reorganization. This particular
issue, however, is material only if the complainants were indeed dismissed from employment due to
said ground. The facts of the case do not show that this is the controversy.
Although it is true that in the morning of August 24, 1987, the complainants were notified that their
positions would be abolished due to the company's reorganization program and hence, their services
will no longer be needed, it is equally true that their termination from employment did not
materialize. There is no dispute that notwithstanding the announced reorganization plan of the
company, the respondents offered the complainants an alternative avenue for exit which is voluntary
resignation. We see nothing illegal with this applicable approach. Indeed, the practice of allowing an
employee to resign instead of being terminated for just cause so as not to smear his employment
record is commonly practiced in some companies. . . .
In the present case, the propriety of the choice given to the complainants by the company is even
reinforced by the fact that the separation benefits due to resignation offered to them were much
higher than what they would receive under termination due to the reorganization. A more attractive
scheme, therefore, was merely tendered to the complainants. It was not imposed upon them. In fact,
two of the complainants, . . ., admitted in their testimonies that they were made to choose between
the two (2) options . . . And if they eventually chose the alternative of resigning from the company
with greater benefits, as in this case, the complainants cannot subsequently repudiate their choice
nor be heard to say later on that they were terminated without just cause. It is inconsistent with
dismissal (where the concerned employee is left with no option). In termination cases, the employer
decides for the employee and not the other way around. In the instant case, the complainants decided
to resign.
. . . In their resignation letters, they all acknowledged receipt of substantial amounts of money plus
the transfer of the company car assigned to them as part of their compensation package. There is also
no dispute that this package is greater than that provided by law or the separation pay that may be
due on account of the reorganization. These benefits, in turn, were obtained by the complainants
through negotiations and haggling with the company . . . Under the circumstances, it is difficult to
believe that the complainants were really forced to resign so as to render their act nugatory. It must
be noted that it took the complainants at least one day before they signed their resignation letters. In
the interim, complainant Manahan even admitted that he had already consulted his lawyer before he
signed his resignation letter the following day . . . Considering the lapse of time, it is evident that the
complainants had the opportunity to carefully deliberate on their choices and evaluate the
consequence thereof. In short, there intervened a sufficient period of time that enabled the
complainants to meditate and decide on their action . . . Moreover, the absence of force or compulsion
is also evident from the fact that complainants did not sign their resignation letters on that meeting
of August 24, 1987 but rather, they stalled and executed the said documents only the following day . .
. We take note that the complainants were not ordinary laborers who may not be able to fully
appreciate the consequences of their acts. They were all admittedly managerial employees holding
responsible positions. Well-educated and experienced in various business dealings on account of
their high positions, complainants very well know that their resignation constituted a bar against any
charge of unlawful dismissal and they cannot now be allowed to conveniently invalidate or disregard
the same . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, we also doubt the accuracy of the impression of the Labor Arbiter a quo that the
company's act was in retaliation to the actions taken by the complainants against Mr. Brobeck. . . . . . .,
had the respondent company really wanted to retaliate against the complainants, then they should
have been terminated outrightly by virtue of the reorganization, rather than being given the
opportunity to voluntarily resign and receive higher financial compensation packages. Certainly, this
act of the respondent company negates any allegation of vindictiveness or retaliatory attitude.
All told, it is evident that the surrounding circumstances of the case indubitably point to the
conclusion that complainant's resignation from the company was valid and hence, operated to
effectively sever the employment relationship. . . .
Finally, the fact that complainant Samaniego, on September 1987, immediately assumed the position
of Chief Executive Officer of Universal Sales, Inc., a corporation similar to, if not in competition with,
respondent company, is highly indicative of his intention to really leave the company and work
elsewhere. . . . His subsequent employment thereat as one of the highest executives barely a few days
after he tendered his resignation is an unmistakable sign of his decision to relinquish his position at
the company and sever his employment relationship.
3

On May 4, 1990, the petitioners elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant petition.
4
It is alleged therein that
the decision of the NLRC is contrary to law and is not supported by the evidence on record. It is also alleged therein
that the decision of the NLRC will cause grave and irreparable injury to the petitioners and that the NLRC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in resolving the case against the petitioners.
5

The private respondents filed their comment on the petition, reiterating therein their position on the matter.
6
The
Office of the Solicitor General filed its "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying therein that the challenged
resolution be set aside and the decision of the labor arbiter be reinstated. The Solicitor General opines that the
petitioners did not voluntarily resign from the company inasmuch as they were forced to choose between two
extreme choices, and that the receipt of separation benefits does not bar them from contesting the validity of their
dismissal.
7
Considering the position taken by the Solicitor General, the NLRC, through counsel, filed its memorandum
reiterating therein the discussion in the challenged resolution.
8

In due time, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
After a careful evaluation of the entire record of the case, the Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the issue to be resolved is not whether the company reorganization is valid, but
whether or not the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the company.
The discussions relating to the validity of the company reorganization are, therefore, immaterial. This matter is
pertinent only if the petitioners were indeed dismissed from their employment due to such reorganization. The Court
is convinced that this is a case of voluntary resignation on the part of the petitioners.
It should be emphasized that notwithstanding the intended reorganization of the company, the petitioners were given
the option to resign from the company with corresponding benefits attending such option. They opted for resignation
on account of these negotiated benefits. In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the employee is
dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer, assuming of
course that there are valid grounds for doing so. In this particular case, the petitioners were given the option to resign.
It was the option they chose. Thus, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.
The record is devoid of any indication that the petitioners were coerced into resigning from the company. On the
contrary, the record supports the view that the petitioners chose to resign without any element of coercion attending
their option. The petitioners negotiated for an improvement of the resignation package offered to them. The
negotiations lasted for at least two days. As a matter of fact, they managed to obtain a better package under the
voluntary resignation option. Petitioner Manahan even admitted that he consulted his lawyer before he signed his
resignation letter.
9
Some of the petitioners managed to obtain ownership rights over the company vehicles originally
assigned to them. The petitioners admittedly deposited the checks given to them by the company in their respective
bank accounts. If their intention was to receive their benefits in protest, they could have just held on to the checks
instead of depositing the same. Although the resignation letters signed by the petitioners were apparently prepared
by the company, it is important to note that the petitioners signed the same voluntarily.
It must be emphasized as well that the petitioners are not ordinary laborers or rank-and-file personnel who may not
be able to completely comprehend and realize the consequences of their acts. The petitioners are managerial
employees holding responsible positions. They are educated individuals. For his part, petitioner Samaniego
immediately assumed a ranking position in a competing company after his resignation from Sandvik Philippines, Inc.
Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that they were coerced into resigning from the company.
The Solicitor General maintains that receipt of separation pay is not a bar to contesting the legality of dismissal from
employment.
10
The observation is beside the point. As stated earlier, there is no illegal dismissal in the case at bar.
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the company for a valuable
consideration. The quitclaim they executed in favor of the company amounts to a valid and binding compromise
agreement. To allow the petitioners to repudiate the same will be to countenance unjust enrichment on their part. The
Court will not permit such a situation.
At this juncture, We find it appropriate to call attention to Our pronouncement in Periquet v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
11
to wit
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver
was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and
the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as
a valid and binding undertaking . . .
This observation holds true for the case at bar.
Finally, the remedy of certiorari does not lie absent any showing of abuse of power properly vested in the Ministry
(now Department) of Labor and Employment.
12
No such abuse or jurisdictional infirmity on the part of the NLRC has
been demonstrated in this case. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari sought will not issue.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court makes no pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.