Vol 98362

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the

Eastern District of Louisiana
Jonathan P. Robicheaux
Plaintiff/Petitioner
v. Civil Action No. 13-CV-05090

James D. Caldwell in his official capacity as the Louisiana Attorney General
Defendant/Respondent

c/w

Civil Action No. 14-cv-00097

District Judge: Martin Leach-Cross Feldman

Magistrate Judge: Alma L. Chasez

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR DELARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come
JONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
Orleans Parish, residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas
district,
DEREK PENTON, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of Orleans Parish,
residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas district,
COURTNEY BLANCHARD, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
Lafourche Parish, residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas
district, and
Case 2:13-cv-05090-MLCF-ALC Document 61-3 Filed 02/05/14 Page 1 of 20

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DELARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIE - Robicheaux et al v.
George et al
Page 2
NADINE BLANCHARD, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
district,
ROBERT WELLES, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of Orleans
Parish, residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas district,
GARTH BEAUREGARD, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
district,
and respectfully represent:
THE PARTIES

1.
Made defendants herein are:
Devin George in his official capacity as State Registrar and Center Director at Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals;
Tim Barfield in his official capacity as Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue; and
Kathy Kliebert in her official capacity as Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals.
2.
The Plaintiff, Jon Robicheaux, is a man residing in Louisiana who was legally married to
his Husband, Plaintiff, Derek Robicheaux in Clayton County, Iowa on September 23, 2012 after
having been in a committed relationship together since 2005 commingling funds, living together
and holding themselves out as monogamous partners that are living together as one union.

George et al
Page 3
3.
The Plaintiff, Courtney Blanchard, is a woman residing in Louisiana who was legally
married to her Wife, Plaintiff, Nadine Blanchard in Clinton County, Iowa on August 30, 2013
after having been in a committed relationship with a child, C.B., commingling funds, living
together and holding themselves out as monogamous partners that are living together as one
union.
4.
The Plaintiffs, Robert Welles and Garth Beauregard are men who currently reside in
Orleans Parish and have been in a committed relationship, commingling funds, owning property
together, living together and holding themselves out as monogamous partners that are living
together as one union of partners for twenty-four years.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343
because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the United States Constitution,
including without limitation the Fourteenth Amendment.
6.

Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) because the Defendants perform their official duties in this district,
as well as throughout the State of Louisiana, and this is the judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated and the location where plaintiffs, Robert Welles and

George et al
Page 4
Garth Beauregard went to the Orleans Parish Marriage License Application office on January 22,
2014 and their application was refused because they are a same-sex couple.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7.
The State of Louisiana prevents any official or court of the State of Louisiana from
recognizing a valid marriage from another State or Country that is between a same-sex couple
and prevents a same-sex couple from securing a marriage license and marrying in Louisiana,
thus depriving a legally married same-sex couple who were married in another state and
depriving a same-sex couple that wishes to be married in Louisiana from securing any benefits of
marriage within the State of Louisiana and stripping the legally married same-sex couple of any
rights to which the same-sex couple was vested prior to residing in the State of Louisiana or that
they enjoy in other states that recognize their marriage.
The State Laws at Issue
8.
On September 18, 2004 by popular vote, an amendment was made to the Louisiana
Constitution that reads as follows:
Article XII, Section 15. Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana
shall construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union other than the
union of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or substantially similar
to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No
official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted
in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman.


George et al
Page 5
9.

Article 3520 of the Louisiana Civil Code reads as follows:
Art. 3520. Marriage

A. A marriage that is valid in the state where contracted, or in the state where the
parties were first domiciled as husband and wife, shall be treated as a valid
marriage unless to do so would violate a strong public policy of the state whose
law is applicable to the particular issue under Article 3519.

B. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public
policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in another state
shall not be recognized in this state for any purpose, including the assertion of any
right or claim as a result of the purported marriage.

Acts 1991, No. 923, 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1999, No. 890, 1.

Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples Are
Similarly Situated for Purposes of Marriage Benefits

10.
The United State Supreme Court has called marriage the most important relation in life,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), and an
expression of emotional support and public commitment. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95
(1987). It is "a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two
people...." United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, Slip Op., at 20 (U.S. June 26, 2013). This is as
true for same-sex couples as it is for opposite-sex couples.
11.

Same-sex couples such as Plaintiffs are identical to opposite-sex couples in all of the
characteristics relevant to marriage.


George et al
Page 6
12.
Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as opposite-sex couples.
Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples build their lives together, plan their futures together
and hope to grow old together. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples support one another
emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically when faced with injury or
illness.
13.
Same-sex couples who marry are just as willing and able as opposite-sex couples to
assume the obligations of marriage.
14.
The Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples in Louisiana, if they were allowed to marry or
if their marriages in other states in which marriage is legal were recognized, would benefit no
less than opposite-sex couples from the many legal protections and the social recognition
afforded to married couples.
15.
There was a time when an individual's sex was relevant to his or her legal rights and
duties within the marital relationship. For example, husbands had a duty to support their wives
but not vice versa and husbands had legal ownership of all property belonging to their wives.
But these legal distinctions have all been removed such that the legal rights and duties of
husbands and wives are now identical.


George et al
Page 7
16.
The exclusion from marriage undermines the Plaintiffs abilities to achieve the life goals
and dreams with their spouses; threatens their mutual economic stability; and denies them "a
dignity and status of immense import." United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, Slip Op., at 18
(U.S. June 26, 2013).
The Exclusion of Same-Sex Couples from the Recognition of Marriage
and the Benefits of Marriage Causes Substantial Harm to Couples and Their Families

17.
By refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry and refusing to recognize same-sex
marriage marriages from others states, the States laws deprive the plaintiffs of numerous legal
protections that are available to opposite-sex couples in Louisiana by virtue of their marriages.
By way of example only: The State provides that a living spouse is entitled to benefits upon the
death of his or her spouse should the decedent die intestate. Louisiana Civil Code Art. 890.
There is no protection for the widow or widower for same-sex spouses married in another State
in which they were legally and properly married. There is no protection for the surviving partner
of a same-sex couple that is committed, monogamous and in a loving legal relationship together.
18.
Same-sex married couples and same-sex couples who are not allowed to marry in the
state are excluded from this and many other legal protections provided for married couples under
Louisiana law.


George et al
Page 8
19.
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage also denies them eligibility for
numerous federal protections afforded to married couples including in the areas of immigration
and citizenship, taxes, and social security. Some of the federal protections for married couples
are only available to couples if their marriages are legally recognized in the state in which they
live. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (marriage for eligibility for social security benefits
based on law of state where couple resides at time of application); 29 C.F.R. 825.122(b) (same
for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus, even Plaintiffs, who are already married, cannot access
such federal protections as long as Louisiana refuses to recognize their existing marriage.
20.
The exclusion from marriage also harms same-sex couples and their families in less
tangible ways.
21.
Although the Plaintiffs are in long-term committed relationships, they and other same-sex
couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during
times of crisis or conflict.
22.
Excluding same-sex married couples from recognizing their marriages and preventing
same-sex couples from marrying also harms couples and their children by denying them the
social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for
the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The

George et al
Page 9
terms "married" and "spouse" have universally understood meanings that command respect for a
couple's relationship and the commitment they have made.
23.
The exclusion from the esteemed institution of marriage also demeans and stigmatizes
lesbian and gay couples and their children by sending the message that they are less worthy and
valued than families headed by opposite-sex couples.

24.

The impact of the exclusion from marriage on same-sex couples and their families is
extensive and real. The denial of the right to marry causes these couples and their families to
suffer significant emotional, physical, and economic hardships.
25.
The plaintiffs recognize that marriage entails both benefits to and obligations on the
partners and welcomes both.
Excluding Same-Sex Couples from the Recognition and Benefits of Marriage Is Not
Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest -
Let Alone Able to Withstand Heightened Scrutiny

26.
As the evidence will show, the prohibition against marriage for same-sex couples in
Louisiana is not closely tailored to serve an important government interest or substantially
related to an exceedingly persuasive justification. In fact, as the evidence also will show, the
prohibition fails any level of constitutional scrutiny. It is not even rationally related to any
legitimate justifications that were offered in support of it when the Constitution was amended in

George et al
Page 10
2004 or to any legitimate interest of the State that Defendants might now offer as a basis for
denying same-sex married couples recognition in Louisiana.
27.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give effect
to private biases and has expressly rejected moral disapproval of marriage for same-sex couples
as a legitimate basis for discriminatory treatment of lesbian and gay couples. Windsor, Slip Op.,
at 21 (an "interest in protecting traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only
marriage laws" was not a legitimate justification for federal Defense of Marriage Act).
The State of Louisiana Is Not Entitled to Ignore the Constitution of the United States
by Amending its Constitution and Enacting Laws to Enshrine
Its Prejudices That Have No Legitimate State Interest

28.

As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316:
This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The
principle that it can exercise only the powers granted to it would seem too
apparent to have required to be enforced by all those arguments which its
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary
to urge; that principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the
extent of the powers actually granted is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise so long as our system shall exist. In discussing these questions,
the conflicting powers of the General and State Governments must be brought
into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in
opposition, must be settled.

If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might
expect it would be this -- that the Government of the Union, though limited in its
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result
necessarily from its nature. It is the Government of all; its powers are delegated
by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though any one State may be willing to
control its operations, no State is willing to allow others to control them. The
nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its component

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Page 11
parts. But this question is not left to mere reason; the people have, in express
terms, decided it by saying, [p406] "this Constitution, and the laws of the United
States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of
the land," and by requiring that the members of the State legislatures and the
officers of the executive and judicial departments of the States shall take the oath
of fidelity to it. The Government of the United States, then, though limited in its
powers, is supreme, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
form the supreme law of the land, "anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding."

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I:
Deprivation of the Fundamental Right to Marry in
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(42 U.S.C. 1983)

29.
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as
though fully set forth herein.
30.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes any State from
"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only
upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental
interest.
31.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a fundamental right and that
choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects of family, are a central part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.

George et al
Page 12
32.
Louisiana law denies the Plaintiffs and other individuals in same-sex marriages and
relationship this fundamental right by denying them access to the state-recognized institution of
marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they entered into in other states and countries.
33.
The State can demonstrate no important interest to justify denying the Plaintiffs this
fundamental right. Indeed, it cannot demonstrate that the denial is tailored to any legitimate
interest at all.
34.
The State's refusal to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in other
jurisdictions, refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry, and prohibition for the courts and
officials of the State from doing so violates the Due Process Clause.
35.
The Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.
COUNT II:
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
(42 U.S.C. 1983)

36.

George et al
Page 13
37.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.
38.
By denying the Plaintiffs and other lesbian and gay couples the ability to marry within
the State or to have their out-of-state marriages recognized, the State, through Defendants,
disadvantages lesbian and gay people on the basis of their sexual orientation. It denies them
significant legal protections. And it "degrade[s] [and] demean[s]" them by "instruct[ing] ...all
persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children," that their
relationship is "less worthy" than the relationships of others. Windsor, Slip Op., at 25.
39.

Same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are similarly situated for purposes of
marriage.
40.
The evidence will show that classifications based on sexual orientation demand
heightened scrutiny.
41.
Lesbians and gay men are members of a discrete and insular minority that has suffered a
history of discrimination in the State and across the United States.


George et al
Page 14
42.
Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to
society.
43.
Sexual orientation is a core, defining trait that is so fundamental to one's identity that a
person may not legitimately be required to abandon it (even if that were possible) as a condition
of equal treatment. Sexual orientation generally is fixed at an early age and highly resistant to
change through intervention. Efforts to change a person's sexual orientation through
interventions by medical professionals have not been shown to be effective. No mainstream
mental health professional organization approves interventions that attempt to change sexual
orientation, and many including the American Psychological Association and the American
Psychiatric Association have adopted policy statements cautioning professionals and the
public about these treatments.
44.
Prejudice against lesbians and gay men continues to seriously curtail the operation of the
political process preventing this group from obtaining redress through legislative means.
Lesbians and gay men lack statutory protection against discrimination in employment, public
accommodations, and housing at the federal level and in more than half of the states, including
Louisiana. Lesbians and gay men have far fewer civil rights protections at the state and federal
level than women and racial minorities had when sex and race classifications-were declared to be
suspect or quasi suspect.


George et al
Page 15
45.
For all these reasons, classification based on sexual orientation should be reviewed under
heightened scrutiny, but this one cannot survive under any level of constitutional scrutiny The
State's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is not rationally related to any legitimate
governmental interest. All it does it disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their
children.
46.
The State's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize the
marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause.
46.
Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT III:
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in
(42 U.S.C. 1983)

48.
49.
protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.

George et al
Page 16
50.
State law defines marriage as ". . . the union of one man and one woman and No
official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other
jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman. Article XII, Section 15 of the
Louisiana Constitution.
51.
By defining marriage in this way, the State discriminates on the basis of sex. The only
reason that the legal marriage is prohibited is the sex of the partners.
52.
The marriages of Plaintiffs, for example, are denied recognition solely because they are
both men and both women, respectively.
53.
The Supreme Court has made clear that perpetuation of traditional gender roles is not a
legitimate government interest.
54.
Given that there are no longer legal distinctions between the duties of husbands and
wives, there is no basis for the sex-based eligibility requirements for the recognition of a legal
marriage performed in another state.
55.
The Defendants can demonstrate no exceedingly persuasive justification for this
discrimination based on sex.


George et al
Page 17
56.
State law prohibiting marriage and recognition of marriage for same-sex couples thus
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
57.
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT IV:
Deprivation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution

58.
59.
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.

60.
28 USC 1738 reads:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.


George et al
Page 18
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.

61.
62.
By prohibiting the courts and officials of the State of Louisiana from recognizing
marriage contracted in another state, the State is violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution.
63.
Plaintiffs herein have been denied requests to file as married couples filing jointly
pursuant to Louisiana Department of Revenue policy as stated in Internal Revenue Service
Revenue Ruling 2013-17, as shown in Revenue Information Bulletin No. 13- 024, dated
September 13, 2013 for Individual Income Tax, attached hereto as Exhibit A.


George et al
Page 19
64.
Plaintiffs Nadine Blanchard and Courtney Blanchard have been denied requests to file for
joint adoptions of their son, CB, although Courtney Blanchard is the biological mother and
Nadine Blanchard is the birth mother, because they are a same sex married couple by the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
1. Enter a declaratory judgment that Article XII, Section 18 of the Louisiana Constitution
and Louisiana Civil Code Article 3520 B (1) violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and Louisiana Civil Code Article 3520 B (1) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
and Louisiana Civil Code Article 3520 B (1) violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution.
4. Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from denying the Plaintiffs and all
other same-sex couples the benefits of marriage and to recognize marriages validly
entered into by the Plaintiff and his Husband and other same-sex couples outside of the
State of Louisiana;
5. Enter all further relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.


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Page 20
Respectfully submitted:

SCOTT J. SPIVEY (#25257)
815 Dauphine St, Ste D
New Orleans, LA 70116
(504) 684-4904 (office phone)
(888) 502-3935 (office fax)
Scott@SpiveyESQ.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Jon Robicheaux,
Derek Penton, Courtney Blanchard and
Nadine Blanchard


for the



c/w Civil Action No. 14-CV-00097

ORDER TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Considering the foregoing motion and finding that the verified application demonstrates
that the Movant is entitled to the relief sought and finding that the relief sought is authorized
under the law and in the best interest of justice,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Movant/Petitioners, Jonathan P. Robicheaux,
Derek Penton, Nadine Blanchard and Courtney Blanchard be and are hereby granted leave to file
the First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
Thus read, done and signed in New Orleans, Louisiana on this ____ day of February,
2014.

_______________________________
JUDGE

7th
Case 2:13-cv-05090-MLCF-ALC Document 62 Filed 02/07/14 Page 1 of 1
for the



c/w

Civil Action No. 14-cv-00097

District Judge: Martin Leach-Cross Feldman

Magistrate Judge: Alma L. Chasez

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR DELARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, come
JONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
Orleans Parish, residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas
district,
DEREK PENTON, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of Orleans Parish,
residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas district,
COURTNEY BLANCHARD, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
district, and

George et al
Page 2
NADINE BLANCHARD, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
district,
ROBERT WELLES, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of Orleans
Parish, residing in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisianas district,
GARTH BEAUREGARD, a person of full age and majority who is a resident of
district,
and respectfully represent:
THE PARTIES

1.
Made defendants herein are:
Devin George in his official capacity as State Registrar and Center Director at Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals;
Tim Barfield in his official capacity as Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue; and
Kathy Kliebert in her official capacity as Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals.
2.
The Plaintiff, Jon Robicheaux, is a man residing in Louisiana who was legally married to
his Husband, Plaintiff, Derek Robicheaux in Clayton County, Iowa on September 23, 2012 after
having been in a committed relationship together since 2005 commingling funds, living together
and holding themselves out as monogamous partners that are living together as one union.

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Page 3
3.
The Plaintiff, Courtney Blanchard, is a woman residing in Louisiana who was legally
married to her Wife, Plaintiff, Nadine Blanchard in Clinton County, Iowa on August 30, 2013
after having been in a committed relationship with a child, C.B., commingling funds, living
together and holding themselves out as monogamous partners that are living together as one
union.
4.
The Plaintiffs, Robert Welles and Garth Beauregard are men who currently reside in
Orleans Parish and have been in a committed relationship, commingling funds, owning property
together, living together and holding themselves out as monogamous partners that are living
together as one union of partners for twenty-four years.
5.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343
because the suit raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the United States Constitution,
including without limitation the Fourteenth Amendment.
6.

Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) because the Defendants perform their official duties in this district,
as well as throughout the State of Louisiana, and this is the judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated and the location where plaintiffs, Robert Welles and

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Page 4
Garth Beauregard went to the Orleans Parish Marriage License Application office on January 22,
2014 and their application was refused because they are a same-sex couple.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7.
The State of Louisiana prevents any official or court of the State of Louisiana from
recognizing a valid marriage from another State or Country that is between a same-sex couple
and prevents a same-sex couple from securing a marriage license and marrying in Louisiana,
thus depriving a legally married same-sex couple who were married in another state and
depriving a same-sex couple that wishes to be married in Louisiana from securing any benefits of
marriage within the State of Louisiana and stripping the legally married same-sex couple of any
rights to which the same-sex couple was vested prior to residing in the State of Louisiana or that
they enjoy in other states that recognize their marriage.
The State Laws at Issue
8.
On September 18, 2004 by popular vote, an amendment was made to the Louisiana
Constitution that reads as follows:
Article XII, Section 15. Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana
shall construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union other than the
union of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or substantially similar
to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No
official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted
in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman.


George et al
Page 5
9.

Article 3520 of the Louisiana Civil Code reads as follows:
Art. 3520. Marriage

A. A marriage that is valid in the state where contracted, or in the state where the
parties were first domiciled as husband and wife, shall be treated as a valid
marriage unless to do so would violate a strong public policy of the state whose
law is applicable to the particular issue under Article 3519.

B. A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public

Acts 1991, No. 923, 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1999, No. 890, 1.

Same-Sex and Opposite-Sex Couples Are
Similarly Situated for Purposes of Marriage Benefits

10.
The United State Supreme Court has called marriage the most important relation in life,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), and an
expression of emotional support and public commitment. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95
(1987). It is "a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two
people...." United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, Slip Op., at 20 (U.S. June 26, 2013). This is as
true for same-sex couples as it is for opposite-sex couples.
11.

Same-sex couples such as Plaintiffs are identical to opposite-sex couples in all of the
characteristics relevant to marriage.


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Page 6
12.
Same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as opposite-sex couples.
Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples build their lives together, plan their futures together
and hope to grow old together. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples support one another
emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically when faced with injury or
illness.
13.
Same-sex couples who marry are just as willing and able as opposite-sex couples to
assume the obligations of marriage.
14.
The Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples in Louisiana, if they were allowed to marry or
if their marriages in other states in which marriage is legal were recognized, would benefit no
less than opposite-sex couples from the many legal protections and the social recognition
afforded to married couples.
15.
There was a time when an individual's sex was relevant to his or her legal rights and
duties within the marital relationship. For example, husbands had a duty to support their wives
but not vice versa and husbands had legal ownership of all property belonging to their wives.
But these legal distinctions have all been removed such that the legal rights and duties of
husbands and wives are now identical.


George et al
Page 7
16.
The exclusion from marriage undermines the Plaintiffs abilities to achieve the life goals
and dreams with their spouses; threatens their mutual economic stability; and denies them "a
dignity and status of immense import." United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, Slip Op., at 18
(U.S. June 26, 2013).
The Exclusion of Same-Sex Couples from the Recognition of Marriage
and the Benefits of Marriage Causes Substantial Harm to Couples and Their Families

17.
By refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry and refusing to recognize same-sex
marriage marriages from others states, the States laws deprive the plaintiffs of numerous legal
protections that are available to opposite-sex couples in Louisiana by virtue of their marriages.
By way of example only: The State provides that a living spouse is entitled to benefits upon the
death of his or her spouse should the decedent die intestate. Louisiana Civil Code Art. 890.
There is no protection for the widow or widower for same-sex spouses married in another State
in which they were legally and properly married. There is no protection for the surviving partner
of a same-sex couple that is committed, monogamous and in a loving legal relationship together.
18.
Same-sex married couples and same-sex couples who are not allowed to marry in the
state are excluded from this and many other legal protections provided for married couples under
Louisiana law.


George et al
Page 8
19.
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage also denies them eligibility for
numerous federal protections afforded to married couples including in the areas of immigration
and citizenship, taxes, and social security. Some of the federal protections for married couples
are only available to couples if their marriages are legally recognized in the state in which they
live. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (marriage for eligibility for social security benefits
based on law of state where couple resides at time of application); 29 C.F.R. 825.122(b) (same
for Family Medical Leave Act). Thus, even Plaintiffs, who are already married, cannot access
such federal protections as long as Louisiana refuses to recognize their existing marriage.
20.
The exclusion from marriage also harms same-sex couples and their families in less
tangible ways.
21.
Although the Plaintiffs are in long-term committed relationships, they and other same-sex
couples are denied the stabilizing effects of marriage, which helps keep couples together during
times of crisis or conflict.
22.
Excluding same-sex married couples from recognizing their marriages and preventing
same-sex couples from marrying also harms couples and their children by denying them the
social recognition that comes with marriage. Marriage has profound social significance both for
the couple that gets married and the family, friends and community that surround them. The

George et al
Page 9
terms "married" and "spouse" have universally understood meanings that command respect for a
couple's relationship and the commitment they have made.
23.
The exclusion from the esteemed institution of marriage also demeans and stigmatizes
lesbian and gay couples and their children by sending the message that they are less worthy and
valued than families headed by opposite-sex couples.

24.

The impact of the exclusion from marriage on same-sex couples and their families is
extensive and real. The denial of the right to marry causes these couples and their families to
suffer significant emotional, physical, and economic hardships.
25.
The plaintiffs recognize that marriage entails both benefits to and obligations on the
partners and welcomes both.
Excluding Same-Sex Couples from the Recognition and Benefits of Marriage Is Not
Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Interest -
Let Alone Able to Withstand Heightened Scrutiny

26.
As the evidence will show, the prohibition against marriage for same-sex couples in
Louisiana is not closely tailored to serve an important government interest or substantially
related to an exceedingly persuasive justification. In fact, as the evidence also will show, the
prohibition fails any level of constitutional scrutiny. It is not even rationally related to any
legitimate justifications that were offered in support of it when the Constitution was amended in

George et al
Page 10
2004 or to any legitimate interest of the State that Defendants might now offer as a basis for
denying same-sex married couples recognition in Louisiana.
27.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give effect
to private biases and has expressly rejected moral disapproval of marriage for same-sex couples
as a legitimate basis for discriminatory treatment of lesbian and gay couples. Windsor, Slip Op.,
at 21 (an "interest in protecting traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only
marriage laws" was not a legitimate justification for federal Defense of Marriage Act).
The State of Louisiana Is Not Entitled to Ignore the Constitution of the United States
by Amending its Constitution and Enacting Laws to Enshrine
Its Prejudices That Have No Legitimate State Interest

28.

As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316:
This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The
principle that it can exercise only the powers granted to it would seem too
apparent to have required to be enforced by all those arguments which its
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary
to urge; that principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the
extent of the powers actually granted is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise so long as our system shall exist. In discussing these questions,
the conflicting powers of the General and State Governments must be brought
into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in
opposition, must be settled.

If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might
expect it would be this -- that the Government of the Union, though limited in its
powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result
necessarily from its nature. It is the Government of all; its powers are delegated
by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though any one State may be willing to
control its operations, no State is willing to allow others to control them. The
nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its component

George et al
Page 11
parts. But this question is not left to mere reason; the people have, in express
terms, decided it by saying, [p406] "this Constitution, and the laws of the United
States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of
the land," and by requiring that the members of the State legislatures and the
officers of the executive and judicial departments of the States shall take the oath
of fidelity to it. The Government of the United States, then, though limited in its
powers, is supreme, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
form the supreme law of the land, "anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding."

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I:
Deprivation of the Fundamental Right to Marry in
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the
(42 U.S.C. 1983)

29.
30.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes any State from
"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, 1. Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only
upon a showing that the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental
interest.
31.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is a fundamental right and that
choices about marriage, like choices about other aspects of family, are a central part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.

George et al
Page 12
32.
Louisiana law denies the Plaintiffs and other individuals in same-sex marriages and
relationship this fundamental right by denying them access to the state-recognized institution of
marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they entered into in other states and countries.
33.
The State can demonstrate no important interest to justify denying the Plaintiffs this
fundamental right. Indeed, it cannot demonstrate that the denial is tailored to any legitimate
interest at all.
34.
The State's refusal to recognize marriages entered into by same-sex couples in other
jurisdictions, refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry, and prohibition for the courts and
officials of the State from doing so violates the Due Process Clause.
35.
The Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
COUNT II:
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in
(42 U.S.C. 1983)

36.

George et al
Page 13
37.
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.
38.
By denying the Plaintiffs and other lesbian and gay couples the ability to marry within
the State or to have their out-of-state marriages recognized, the State, through Defendants,
disadvantages lesbian and gay people on the basis of their sexual orientation. It denies them
significant legal protections. And it "degrade[s] [and] demean[s]" them by "instruct[ing] ...all
persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children," that their
relationship is "less worthy" than the relationships of others. Windsor, Slip Op., at 25.
39.

Same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are similarly situated for purposes of
marriage.
40.
The evidence will show that classifications based on sexual orientation demand
41.
Lesbians and gay men are members of a discrete and insular minority that has suffered a
history of discrimination in the State and across the United States.


George et al
Page 14
42.
Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to
society.
43.
Sexual orientation is a core, defining trait that is so fundamental to one's identity that a
person may not legitimately be required to abandon it (even if that were possible) as a condition
of equal treatment. Sexual orientation generally is fixed at an early age and highly resistant to
change through intervention. Efforts to change a person's sexual orientation through
interventions by medical professionals have not been shown to be effective. No mainstream
mental health professional organization approves interventions that attempt to change sexual
orientation, and many including the American Psychological Association and the American
Psychiatric Association have adopted policy statements cautioning professionals and the
public about these treatments.
44.
Prejudice against lesbians and gay men continues to seriously curtail the operation of the
political process preventing this group from obtaining redress through legislative means.
Lesbians and gay men lack statutory protection against discrimination in employment, public
accommodations, and housing at the federal level and in more than half of the states, including
Louisiana. Lesbians and gay men have far fewer civil rights protections at the state and federal
level than women and racial minorities had when sex and race classifications-were declared to be
suspect or quasi suspect.


George et al
Page 15
45.
For all these reasons, classification based on sexual orientation should be reviewed under
heightened scrutiny, but this one cannot survive under any level of constitutional scrutiny The
State's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is not rationally related to any legitimate
governmental interest. All it does it disparage and injure lesbian and gay couples and their
children.
46.
The State's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize the
marriages of same-sex couples entered into elsewhere violates the Equal Protection Clause.
46.
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT III:
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in
(42 U.S.C. 1983)

48.
49.
protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1.

George et al
Page 16
50.
51.
By defining marriage in this way, the State discriminates on the basis of sex. The only
reason that the legal marriage is prohibited is the sex of the partners.
52.
The marriages of Plaintiffs, for example, are denied recognition solely because they are
both men and both women, respectively.
53.
The Supreme Court has made clear that perpetuation of traditional gender roles is not a
legitimate government interest.
54.
Given that there are no longer legal distinctions between the duties of husbands and
wives, there is no basis for the sex-based eligibility requirements for the recognition of a legal
marriage performed in another state.
55.
The Defendants can demonstrate no exceedingly persuasive justification for this
discrimination based on sex.


George et al
Page 17
56.
State law prohibiting marriage and recognition of marriage for same-sex couples thus
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
57.
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT IV:
Deprivation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution

58.
59.
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.

60.
28 USC 1738 reads:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory or Possession thereto.


George et al
Page 18
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk
and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge
of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.

61.
62.
By prohibiting the courts and officials of the State of Louisiana from recognizing
marriage contracted in another state, the State is violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution.
63.
Plaintiffs herein have been denied requests to file as married couples filing jointly
pursuant to Louisiana Department of Revenue policy as stated in Internal Revenue Service
Revenue Ruling 2013-17, as shown in Revenue Information Bulletin No. 13- 024, dated
September 13, 2013 for Individual Income Tax, attached hereto as Exhibit A.


George et al
Page 19
64.
Plaintiffs Nadine Blanchard and Courtney Blanchard have been denied requests to file for
joint adoptions of their son, CB, although Courtney Blanchard is the biological mother and
Nadine Blanchard is the birth mother, because they are a same sex married couple by the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
and Louisiana Civil Code Article 3520 B (1) violate the Due Process Clause of the
and Louisiana Civil Code Article 3520 B (1) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
and Louisiana Civil Code Article 3520 B (1) violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution.
4. Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from denying the Plaintiffs and all
other same-sex couples the benefits of marriage and to recognize marriages validly
entered into by the Plaintiff and his Husband and other same-sex couples outside of the
State of Louisiana;
5. Enter all further relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.


George et al
Page 20
Respectfully submitted:

SCOTT J. SPIVEY (#25257)
815 Dauphine St, Ste D
(504) 684-4904 (office phone)
(888) 502-3935 (office fax)
Scott@SpiveyESQ.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Jon Robicheaux,
Derek Penton, Courtney Blanchard and
Nadine Blanchard

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action
for the
__________ District of __________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff(s)
v. Civil Action No.
Defendant(s)
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendants name and address)
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached amended complaint or a motion under
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney,
whose name and address are:
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
JONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, ET AL.
13-5090 F(5) c/w 14-0097
DEVIN GEORGE ET AL.
Kathy Kliebert
Secratary of Health and Hospitals
628 N. 4th Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
Feb 07 2014
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)
was received by me on (date) .
u I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)
on (date) ; or
u I left the summons at the individuals residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individuals last known address; or
u I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date) ; or
u I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
u Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Servers signature
Printed name and title
Servers address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:
13-5090 F(5) c/w 14-0097
0.00
for the
__________ District of __________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff(s)
v. Civil Action No.
Defendant(s)
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
13-5090 F(5) c/w 14-0097
DEVIN GEORGE ET AL.
Tim Barfield
Secratary of Revenue
617 N. 3rd Street, Ste. B
Baton Rouge, LA

Feb 07 2014
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
on (date) ; or
on (date) ; or
u Other (specify):
.
Date:
Servers signature
Servers address
13-5090 F(5) c/w 14-0097
0.00

for the
__________ District of __________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff(s)
v. Civil Action No.
Defendant(s)
CLERK OF COURT
Date:
13-5090 F(5) c/w 14-0097
DEVIN GEORGE ET AL.
Devin George
State Registrar
1450 Poydras St., Suite 400

Feb 07 2014
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
on (date) ; or
on (date) ; or
u Other (specify):
.
Date:
Servers signature
Servers address
13-5090 F(5) c/w 14-0097
0.00

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, et al.,

Plaintiffs

v.

JAMES D. BUDDY CALDWELL, in his
official capacity as the Louisiana
Attorney General, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
c/w
NO. 14-CV-0097

JUDGE MARTIN L.C. FELDMAN
MAGISTRATE KAREN WELLS ROBY

SECTION F

MOTION TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
Stuart Kyle Duncan, an attorney admitted to practice before this Court and in
good standing, respectfully moves to appear as counsel for all Defendants in these
consolidated matters. A proposed order is attached.
Respectfully submitted,
/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan, T.A.
Louisiana Bar No. 25038
Special Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
P.O. Box 94005
Phone: (202) 714-9492
Fax: (225) 326-6098
kyleduncan40@gmail.com
Attorney for Defendants


2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 27, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of
electronic filing to the following:

Scott J. Spivey
Scott J Spivey, Esq
A Professional Law Corporation
815 Dauphine Street
Suite D
504-684-4904
Fax: 888-502-3935
scott@spiveyesq.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan


Plaintiffs

v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
c/w
NO. 14-CV-0097


SECTION F

ORDER
Considering the motion of Stuart Kyle Duncan to appear in these
consolidated matters on behalf of the Defendants;
It is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
New Orleans, LA, this ________ day of _______________, 2014.

___________________________________
United States District Judge

MINUTE ENTRY
FELDMAN, J .
February 27, 2014
J ONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, ET AL * CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS * NO. 13-5090 c/w 14-97
DEVIN GEORGE, ET AL * SECTION "F"
* REF: 14-97
IT IS ORDERED:
A status conference is hereby scheduled for March 14, 2014 at 10:30 a.m.


Plaintiffs

v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
c/w
NO. 14-CV-0097


SECTION F

ORDER
Considering the motion of Stuart Kyle Duncan to appear in these
consolidated matters on behalf of the Defendants;
It is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
New Orleans, LA, this ________ day of _______________, 2014.

___________________________________
United States District Judge

28th
Hello This is a Test
February
MINUTE ENTRY
FELDMAN, J .
March 14, 2014
J ONATHAN P. ROBICHEAUX, ET AL * CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS * NO. 13-5090 c/w 14-97
DEVIN GEORGE, ET AL * SECTION "F"
FORUM FOR EQUALITY LOUISIANA, INC., ET AL * CIVIL ACTON
VERSUS * NO. 14-327
TIM BARFIELD, ET AL * SECTION "F"
IT IS ORDERED:
A status conference in the above captioned cases was held this day.
Present:
S. Kyle Duncan, Esquire
Dalton Courson, Esquire
Lesli Harris, Esquire
Scott Spivey, Esquire
J S10: 45 min.



Plaintiffs
v.

JAMES D. CALDWELL, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)

MAGISTRATE MICHAEL NORTH

REF: ALL CASES

JOINT MOTION FOR BRIEFING AND ARGUMENT SCHEDULE
All parties in these consolidated actions jointly move for a briefing and argument
schedule for Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss
as set forth in the proposed order. In support of this motion, the parties state as
follows:
(1). The plaintiffs and defendants in cases No. 14-97 and 14-327 plan to file
dispositive motions at an early stage of these cases. The parties request the entry of
a briefing schedule for the purpose of adjudication of those motions.
(2). By agreement of the parties, the proposed briefing and argument schedule
will address only those claims common to cases No. 14-97 and 14-327. Those
common claims are whether the Equal Protection and/or the Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution require defendants to
recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into by the plaintiffs in other
jurisdictions.
(3). The parties agree that any discovery and motion practice relating to

2
plaintiffs other claims will be suspended until the parties dispositive motions are
adjudicated, including the issuance of a final decision in any appeals from this
Courts ruling on the dispositive motions. At that time, if no final judgment has
been entered, the parties will propose a schedule with respect to resolution of all
remaining claims.
(4). The parties respectfully suggest that the Court delay the selection of a
trial date until after the dispositive motions are adjudicated.
s/ Scott J. Spivey
Scott J. Spivey, 25257
Scott J. Spivey, Esq.
A Professional Law Corporation
815 Dauphine Street
Suite D
504-684-4904
Fax: 888-502-3935
scott@spiveyesq.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs Jonathan
Robicheaux, et al.
s/ J. Dalton Courson
J. Dalton Courson, 28542, T.A.
Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLC
546 Carondelet St.
New Orleans, LA 70130-3588
(504) 581-3200
dcourson@stonepigman.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs Forum for
Equality Louisiana, et al.

s/ S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan, 25038, T.A.
P.O. Box 94005
Phone: (202) 714-9492
Fax: (225) 326-6098
kduncan@duncanpllc.com


3

I hereby certify that on March 20, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will be electronically served
on all counsel of record.

/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan



Plaintiffs
v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)


REF: ALL CASES

ORDER
Having considered the parties joint motion for briefing and argument schedule,
it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. The schedule is as follows:
(1). Cross-motions for summary judgment or Rule 12 motions to dismiss
are due by Thursday, April 17, 2014. Memoranda in support are
limited to 25 pages, not including the separate statement of
undisputed material facts required by Local Rule 56.1. The plaintiffs in
Case Nos. 14-97 and 14-327 shall file a joint memorandum in support
of their summary judgment motions. Likewise, the defendants in Case
Nos. 14-97 and 14-327 shall file a joint memorandum in support of
their summary judgment motions and/or motions to dismiss.
(2). Amicus briefs supporting either side are due by Monday, May 12, 2014.
(3). Cross-responses to the motions, limited to 25 pages, are due on
Monday, May 19, 2014.
(4). Any replies, not to exceed 10 pages, are due by Monday, June 2, 2014.
(5). The Court will hear oral argument on the motions on Wednesday, June
25, 2014.

This schedule pertains only to dispositive motions relating to claims common to
Case Nos. 14-97 and 14-327. Those common claims are whether the Equal
Protection and/or the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

"
United States Constitution require defendants to recognize same-sex marriages
validly entered into by the plaintiffs in other jurisdictions. Discovery and motion
practice relating to plaintiffs other claims will be suspended until the parties
dispositive motions are adjudicated, including the issuance of a final decision in any
appeals from this Courts ruling on the dispositive motions. At that time, the parties
will propose a schedule with respect to resolution of all remaining claims.

Entered this ____ day of ___________, 2014, in New Orleans, Louisiana.

________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



Plaintiffs
v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)


REF: ALL CASES

ORDER
Having considered the parties joint motion for briefing and argument schedule,
it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. The schedule is as follows:
(1). Cross-motions for summary judgment or Rule 12 motions to dismiss
are due by Thursday, April 17, 2014. Memoranda in support are
limited to 25 pages, not including the separate statement of
undisputed material facts required by Local Rule 56.1. The plaintiffs in
Case Nos. 14-97 and 14-327 shall file a joint memorandum in support
of their summary judgment motions. Likewise, the defendants in Case
Nos. 14-97 and 14-327 shall file a joint memorandum in support of
their summary judgment motions and/or motions to dismiss.
(2). Amicus briefs supporting either side are due by Monday, May 12, 2014.
(3). Cross-responses to the motions, limited to 25 pages, are due on
Monday, May 19, 2014.
(4). Any replies, not to exceed 10 pages, are due by Monday, June 2, 2014.
(5). The Court will hear oral argument on the motions on Wednesday, June
25, 2014.

This schedule pertains only to dispositive motions relating to claims common to
Case Nos. 14-97 and 14-327. Those common claims are whether the Equal
Protection and/or the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

"
United States Constitution require defendants to recognize same-sex marriages
validly entered into by the plaintiffs in other jurisdictions. Discovery and motion
practice relating to plaintiffs other claims will be suspended until the parties
dispositive motions are adjudicated, including the issuance of a final decision in any
appeals from this Courts ruling on the dispositive motions. At that time, the parties
will propose a schedule with respect to resolution of all remaining claims.

Entered this ____ day of ___________, 2014, in New Orleans, Louisiana.

________________________________________

March


Plaintiffs
v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)


REF: 14-327

DEFENDANTS ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN NO. 14-327

TO THE HONORABLE MARTIN L.C. FELDMAN:
Defendants Tim Barfield, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue,
and Devin George, Louisiana State Registrar, in their official capacities only, make
this Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in No. 14-
327, Forum for Equality, Inc., et al. v. Tim Barfield, et al. (Doc. 1).
ANSWER
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b), Defendants Barfield and
George in their official capacities only deny each and every allegation contained in
Plaintiffs Complaint except for those expressly admitted herein.
INTRODUCTION
1. No response required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b). To the
extent a response is required, Defendants deny all allegations in this paragraph.
2. Defendants admit that Louisiana law prohibits Louisiana courts and public
officials from recognizing for any purpose a purported marriage between persons of

2
the same sex contracted in another jurisdiction. LA. CONST. art. XII, 15; LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 3520(B). Defendant deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
3. Deny.
4. Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about
the truth of the allegations regarding Plaintiffs marital status or the activities of
the Plaintiff organization.
5. Deny.
CODE art. 3520(B). Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this
paragraph.
7. Deny.
PARTIES
the truth of the allegations regarding the Plaintiff organization.
the truth of the allegations regarding the Plaintiff organization and its members.
the truth of the allegations regarding the Plaintiff organization and its claims.

3
the truth of the allegations regarding the residence or marital status of any of the
Plaintiffs or any of their alleged backgrounds.
the truth of the allegations regarding marital status of any of the Plaintiffs or any
of their alleged backgrounds.
the truth of the allegations in this paragraph.
the truth of the allegations in this paragraph. Defendants admit that Louisiana law
prohibits Louisiana courts and public officials from recognizing for any purpose a
purported marriage between persons of the same sex contracted in another
jurisdiction. LA. CONST. art. XII, 15; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3520(B).
16. Admit.
CODE art. 3520(B). Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief about the truth of the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.

4
the truth of the allegations regarding the alleged backgrounds of any of the
Plaintiffs.
CODE art. 3520(B). Defendants also admit that Louisiana law prohibits unmarried
couples from jointly adopting. LA. CHILD. CODE arts. 1198, 1221, 1243. Defendants
lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the
balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
23. Defendants admit that a mandate of provisional custody shall not exceed
one year from date of execution (La. R.S. 9:952(A)), and that the mandate shall
terminate [f]ifteen days after the death of either parent, natural tutor or tutrix,
natural cotutor, or grandparent awarded custody (id. 952(B)(3)). Defendants lack
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the balance of
the allegations in this paragraph.

5

6
34. Defendants admit that Tim Barfield is the Secretary of the Louisiana
Department of Revenue whose authority and duties are set forth in Louisiana
Revised Statutes Title 36, Section 453. Defendants lack knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the balance of the allegations in this
paragraph.
35. Defendants admit that IRS Revenue Ruling 2013-17 states that the
[Internal Revenue] Service adopts a general rule recognizing a marriage of same-
sex individuals that was validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize the
marriage of two individuals of the same sex even if the married couple is domiciled
in a state that does not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages. IRS Rev.
Ruling 2013-17, at 13. Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief about the truth of the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.

7
CODE art. 3520(B). Defendants also admit that, in compliance with these Louisiana
laws, the Louisiana Department of Revenue Defendant shall not recognize same-
sex marriages when determining filing status, regardless of the taxpayers federal
filing status. La. Dept of Rev. Information Bulletin 13-024 (Sept. 13, 2013).
Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
37. Defendants admit that that block-quoted language in this paragraph
accurately quotes the Louisiana Department of Revenue Information Bulletin 13-
024. Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
39. Admit.
40. Admit.
41. Deny.
laws, the Louisiana Department of Revenue Defendant shall not recognize same-
sex marriages when determining filing status, regardless of the taxpayers federal

8
Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
43. Deny.
44. Defendants admit that Devin George is the Louisiana State Registrar, whose
authority and duties are set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 40, sections
33 et seq. Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about
the truth of the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
46. Defendants admit that the appearance of a presumed or biological fathers
name on a Louisiana birth certificate is governed by the provisions of Louisiana
Revised Statutes Title 40, section 34, along with the relevant provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Defendants also admit that, under Louisiana law, [t]he
husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the
marriage or within three hundred days from the date of the termination of the
marriage (LA. CIV. CODE art. 185), and that [t]he husband of the mother may not
disavow a child born to his wife as a result of an assisted conception to which he
consented (LA. CIV. CODE art. 188). Defendants lack knowledge or information

9
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the balance of the allegations in this
paragraph.
47. Deny.
48. Admit.
49. Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
concerning the truth of the allegations concerning where the events giving rise to
Plaintiffs claims occurred. Defendants admit that Registrar George resides in this
District and that all Defendants are Louisiana residents.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
paragraph.
51. Defendants admit that Louisiana law applies the doctrine of favor
matrimonii. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3520 cmt. (b) (Based on the universally
espoused policy of favoring the validity of marriages if there is any reasonable basis
for doing so (favor matrimonii), this Article authorizes the validation of marriages
that are valid either in the state where contracted or in the state where the spouses
were first domiciled as husband and wife.). Defendants also admit that, under
Louisiana law, [a] purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a

10
strong public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in
another state shall not be recognized in this state for any purpose, including the
assertion of any right or claim as a result of the purported marriage. Id. art.
3520(B). Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
paragraph.
53. Admit.
paragraph.
55. Deny.
56. Deny.
57. Defendants deny that the principles articulated in the quoted Supreme Court
decisions constitutionally require Louisiana to recognize same-sex marriages
contracted in other jurisdictions.
decision constitutionally require Louisiana to recognize same-sex marriages

11
contracted in other jurisdictions. Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in
this paragraph.
59. Defendants admit that Louisiana reserves the legal benefits, responsibilities,
incidents, and effects of marriage only to those persons qualified to contract a valid
marriage in Louisiana and to those persons who have contracted out-of-state
marriages which do not violate a strong public policy of Louisiana. Defendants also
admit that Louisiana law prohibits Louisiana courts and public officials from
recognizing for any purpose a purported marriage between persons of the same sex
contracted in another jurisdiction. LA. CONST. art. XII, 15; LA. CIVIL CODE art.
60. Deny.
62. Deny.
decision apply to the Louisiana laws challenged in this matter, and they also deny

12
that those principles constitutionally require Louisiana to recognize same-sex
marriages contracted in other jurisdictions.
64. Deny.
65. Deny.
decision apply to the Louisiana laws challenged in this matter, and they also deny
that those principles constitutionally require Louisiana to recognize same-sex
marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. Defendants deny the balance of the
allegations in this paragraph.
67. Deny.
68. Deny.
69. Defendants admit that Article XII, section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution
was approved by Louisiana voters on September 18, 2004. See Forum for Equality
PAC v. McKeithen, 2004-2477, p. 3 (La. 1/19/05); 893 So.2d 715, 718. Defendants
also admit that Article 3520(B) of the Louisiana Civil Code was enacted in 1999. See
1999 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 890 (approved July 2, 1999). Defendants deny that the
public policy confirmed by these enactments is of relatively recent origin.
70. Defendants deny that the quoted comments of one legislator are relevant to
ascertaining the intent of Louisiana voters in approving the constitutional provision
at issue. See, e.g., State v. Chinn, 2011-2043, pp. 6-7 (La. 2/10/12); 92 So.2d 324, 329
(explaining that [t]he role of the court in construing a constitutional provision is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the people who adopted the provision); see

13
also Forum for Equality PAC, 2004-2477 at 26-27; 92 So.2d at 733-34 (examining
legislative history of Article XII, section 15). Defendants deny the balance of the
the truth of the allegation contained in the quoted judicial opinion and also deny
that the allegation constitutionally requires Louisiana to recognize same-sex
marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. Defendants deny the balance of the
the truth of the allegations regarding the personal circumstances of any of the
Plaintiffs. Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
73. Deny.
CAUSES OF ACTION
Count 1: Equal Protection / Sexual Orientation
74. Defendants incorporate their prior responses.
75. Admit.
paragraph.
77. Deny.

14
78. Deny.
79. Deny.
of their alleged backgrounds. Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this
paragraph.
the truth of the allegations regarding the personal circumstances of any of the
Plaintiffs. Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
82. Deny.
83. Deny.
84. Deny.
85. Defendants deny that the allegation supports requiring Louisiana to
recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. More generally,
Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth
of the allegation.
of the allegation.

15
of the allegation.
88. Deny.
89. Deny.
90. Deny.
91. Deny.
92. Deny.
Count 2: Equal Protection / Sex
94. Deny.
95. Deny.
paragraph.
97. Deny.
98. Deny.
99. Deny.
100. Deny.
101. Deny.

16
Count 3: Due Process / Fundamental Right to Marry
103. Admit.
104. Defendants admit that the Due Process Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nations history and tradition. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendants deny that the Due Process
Clause requires Louisiana to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other
jurisdictions. Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
105. Deny.
106. Deny.
107. Deny.
108. Deny.
Count 4: Due Process / Family Integrity, etc.
Clause requires Louisiana to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other
111. Deny.

17
112. Deny.
113. Deny.
114. Deny.
115. Deny.
Count 5: Equal Protection / Fundamental Rights
116. Defendants incorporate their previous responses.
117. Defendants admit that the Supreme Court has recognized that classifications
involving certain fundamental rights are subject to closer scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320 (1993) (explaining
that a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along
suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity in equal protection
analysis). Defendants deny that the Equal Protection Clause requires Louisiana to
recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. Defendants deny
the balance of the allegations in this paragraph.
118. Deny.
119. Deny.
120. Deny.
121. Deny.
122. Deny.
Count 6: Free Speech

18
124. Defendants admit that the First Amendments protection of freedom of
speech applies to the States. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
243 (1936) (explaining that the states are precluded from abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press by force of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Defendants deny that any of the principles articulated in this
paragraph apply to Louisianas refusal to recognize same-sex marriages contracted
in other jurisdictions for purposes of Louisianas tax system.
125. Defendants admit the substance of the allegation but deny the allegation has
any application to this case.
126. Defendants admit that Louisiana Department of Revenue Information
Bulletin Number 13-024 provides in relevant part:
In compliance with the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Department of
Revenue shall not recognize same-sex marriages when determining filing
status. If a taxpayers federal filing status of married filing jointly, married
filing separately or qualifying widow is pursuant to IRS Revenue Ruling
2013-17, the taxpayer must file a separate Louisiana return as single, head of
household or qualifying widow, as applicable. The taxpayer(s) who filed a
federal return pursuant to IRS Revenue Ruling 2013-17 may not file a
Louisiana state income tax return as married filing jointly, married filing
separately or qualifying widow. The taxpayer must provide the same federal
income tax information on the Louisiana State Return that would have been
provided prior to the issuance of Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling
2013-17.
127. Deny.
128. Deny.
129. Deny.
130. Deny.
131. Deny.

19
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
1. Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief as stated in
this paragraph.
2. Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief as stated in
this paragraph.
this paragraph.
this paragraph.
5. Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any costs, expenses, or
attorneys fees as stated in this paragraph.
6. Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any further relief as stated in
this paragraph.
/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan, T.A.
Louisiana Bar No. 25038
P.O. Box 94005
Phone: (202) 714-9492
Fax: (225) 326-6098


20

I hereby certify that on March 26 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of

J. Dalton Courson, T.A.
Brooke C. Tigchelaar
btigchelaar@stonepigman.com
John M. Landis
jlandis@stonepigman.com
Lesli Harris
lharris@stonepigman.com
Maurine Wall
mwall@stonepigman.com
Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann, LLC
546 Carondelet St.
(504) 581-3200
Fax: (504) 596-0892

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan


Plaintiffs

v.

JAMES D. BUDDY CALDWELL, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
SECTION F(5)


ALL CONSOLIDATES CASES

MOTION TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

Richard G. Perque, an attorney admitted to practice before this Court and in good
standing, respectfully moves to appear as counsel for plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek
Penton, Nadine Blanchard, and Courtney Blanchard; in these consolidated matters. A proposed
order is attached.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Richard G. Perque
_______________________________________
Richard G. Perque (La. Bar No. 30669)
Law Office of Richard G. Perque, LLC
700 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
richard@perquelaw.com
Telephone: (504) 681-2003
Facsimile: (504) 681-2004


I hereby certify that on April 4, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send notice of filing to all counsel of record.


_______________________________________
700 Camp Street
Telephone: (504) 681-2003
Facsimile: (504) 681-2004



Plaintiffs

v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
SECTION F(5)



ORDER

Considering the motion of Richard G. Perque to appear in these consolidated matters on
behalf of the plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek Penton, Nadine Blanchard, and Courtney
Blanchard;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
THUS SIGNED, in New Orleans, LA, this ________ day of April, 2014.

___________________________________



Plaintiffs

v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
SECTION F(5)



MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS

Richard G. Perque, an attorney admitted to practice before this Court and in good
standing, respectfully moves to remove Scott Spivey as counsel and enroll Richard G. Perque to
appear as counsel for plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek Penton, Nadine Blanchard, and
Courtney Blanchard; in these consolidated matters. A proposed order is attached.


_______________________________________
700 Camp Street
Telephone: (504) 681-2003
Facsimile: (504) 681-2004


I hereby certify that on April 4, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send notice of filing to all counsel of record.


_______________________________________
700 Camp Street
Telephone: (504) 681-2003
Facsimile: (504) 681-2004



Plaintiffs

v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
SECTION F(5)



ORDER

Considering the motion of Richard G. Perque to substitute counsel and appear in these
consolidated matters on behalf of the plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek Penton, Nadine
Blanchard, and Courtney Blanchard;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Scott Spivey be removed as counsel and Richard G.
Perque be substituted to appear as counsel for plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek Penton,
Nadine Blanchard, and Courtney Blanchard.

___________________________________



Plaintiffs

v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-CV-5090
SECTION F(5)



ORDER

Considering the motion of Richard G. Perque to substitute counsel and appear in these
consolidated matters on behalf of the plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek Penton, Nadine
Blanchard, and Courtney Blanchard;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Scott Spivey be removed as counsel and Richard G.
Perque be substituted to appear as counsel for plaintiffs, Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek Penton,
Nadine Blanchard, and Courtney Blanchard.

___________________________________

*
*No delays will be permitted by the entry of new counsel, who will be subject
to the existing scheduling order.


Plaintiffs
v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)


REF: NO. 14-97

DEFENDANTS ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN NO. 13-5090

TO THE HONORABLE MARTIN L.C. FELDMAN:
Defendants Devin George, Louisiana State Registrar, Tim Barfield, Secretary of
the Louisiana Department of Revenue, and Kathy Kliebert, Secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, in their official capacities only,
make this Answer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief herein (Doc. 63).
ANSWER
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b), Defendants George, Barfield
and Kliebert in their official capacities deny each and every allegation contained in
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint except for those expressly admitted herein.
Regarding the six non-numbered introductory paragraphs of the First Amended
Complaint listing each Plaintiff by name, Defendants lack knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations regarding

2
the residence or marital status of any of the Plaintiffs.
THE PARTIES
1. Defendants admit that they are sued in their respective official capacities
only. To the extent any further response is required, Defendants deny all
the truth of the allegations regarding the residence, marital status and/or alleged
backgrounds of any of the Plaintiffs.
5. Admit.
6. Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
concerning the truth of the allegations concerning where the events giving rise to
Plaintiffs claims occurred, and whether and how those events occurred. Defendants
admit that they perform their official duties in this judicial district as well as
statewide.

3
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7. Defendants admit that Louisiana law: defines marriage only as the union of
one man and one woman; prohibits Louisiana courts and public officials from
construing any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and one
woman; denies the validity of, and recognition to, a legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals; and prohibits
Louisiana courts and public officials from recognizing any marriage contracted in
any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman. LA. CONST.
art. XII, 15; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3520(B). Defendants deny the balance of the
8. Admit.
9. Admit.
decisions constitutionally or in any way require Louisiana to adopt same-sex
marriage in Louisiana or to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other
11. Deny.
the truth of the allegations. Additionally, in an abundance of caution, Defendants
incorporate their statement regarding Louisiana law from paragraph 7.

4
decision constitutionally or in any way require Louisiana to adopt same-sex
3520(B). Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph, and

5
further aver that the Louisiana Supreme Court has unanimously explained that
Article XII, section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution
would not prohibit an unmarried couple (either a same-sex couple or
opposite-sex couple) from contracting to be co-owners of certain specific
property they purchase together or from contracting with each other to
designate each other his/her agent for making critical life or medical
decisions for him/her in cases of medical emergencies where he/she might not
be conscious or contracting as to ones power of attorney; nor does this
[section] prohibit an unmarried couple from making wills leaving their
estates to one another.

Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 2004-2477, at p. 31 n.31 (La.1/19/2005); 893
So.2d 715, 737 n.31 (brackets added).
3520(B). Defendants deny the balance of the allegations in this paragraph, and
further aver that the Louisiana Supreme Court has unanimously explained that
Article XII, section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution
would not prohibit an unmarried couple (either a same-sex couple or
opposite-sex couple) from contracting to be co-owners of certain specific
property they purchase together or from contracting with each other to
designate each other his/her agent for making critical life or medical
decisions for him/her in cases of medical emergencies where he/she might not

6
be conscious or contracting as to ones power of attorney; nor does this
[section] prohibit an unmarried couple from making wills leaving their
estates to one another.

Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 2004-2477, at p. 31 n.31 (La.1/19/2005); 893
So.2d 715, 737 n.31 (brackets added).
22. Defendants admit that the marriage contract creates a social status that
affects not only the contracting parties, but also their posterity and the good order
of society. LA. CIV. CODE art. 86, rev. cmt. c. Louisiana reserves the legal benefits,
responsibilities, incidents, and effects of marriage only to those persons qualified to
contract a valid marriage in Louisiana and to those persons who have contracted
out-of-state marriages which do not violate a strong public policy of Louisiana.

7
Defendants also admit that Louisiana law prohibits Louisiana courts and public
paragraph.
23. Deny.
marriages which do not violate a strong public policy of Louisiana. Defendants lack
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief about the truth of the balance of
the allegations in this paragraph.
26. Deny.
decision constitutionally or in any way require Louisiana to adopt same-sex
28. The block quoted language requires no response by Defendants; however, in
an abundance of caution, Defendants deny that the principles articulated in the
quoted Supreme Court decision constitutionally or in any way require Louisiana to

8
adopt same-sex marriage in Louisiana or to recognize same-sex marriages
contracted in other jurisdictions.
CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I: Due Process / Fundamental Right to Marry
30. Admit.
Clause requires Louisiana to adopt same-sex marriage in Louisiana or to recognize
same-sex marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. Defendants deny the balance
of the allegations in this paragraph as written.
32. Deny.
33. Deny.
34. Deny.
35. Deny.
Count II: Equal Protection /Sexual Orientation
37. Admit.
38. Deny.
39. Deny.

9
40. Deny.
41. Defendants deny that they and/or the State of Louisiana have engaged in any
unconstitutional or illegal discrimination based upon the sexual orientation of
Plaintiffs or anyone else. Defendants further deny that the allegation supports
requiring Louisiana to adopt same-sex marriage in Louisiana or to recognize same-
sex marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. More generally, Defendants lack
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the
allegation.
42. Defendants and the State of Louisiana respect the inherent dignity and value
of all persons. Defendants deny that the allegation supports requiring Louisiana to
adopt same-sex marriage in Louisiana or to recognize same-sex marriages
contracted in other jurisdictions. More generally, Defendants lack knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation.
43. Defendants deny that the allegations support requiring Louisiana adopt
same-sex marriage in Louisiana or to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in
other jurisdictions. More generally, Defendants lack knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegation.
44. Deny.
45. Deny.
46. Deny.
47. [Incorrectly numbered paragraph 46.] Deny.

10
Count III: Equal Protection / Sex
49. Admit.
50. Admit.
51. Deny.
paragraph.
53. Deny.
54. Deny.
55. Deny.
56. Deny.
57. Deny.
Count IV: Full Faith and Credit
59. Admit.
60. Admit.
61. Admit.
62. Deny.

11
laws, the Louisiana Department of Revenue shall not recognize same-sex
marriages when determining filing status, regardless of the taxpayers federal
of the balance of the allegations.
CODE art. 3520(B). Defendants also admit that, based solely on Louisiana law,
neither the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, nor any division or
office within that department, may authorize or recognize under any provision of
the Louisiana Childrens Code or other Louisiana law the joint or intrafamily
adoption of a child by two persons of the same sex based on their out-of-state same-
sex marriage. Defendants lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
about the truth of the balance of the allegations.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
this paragraph.

12
this paragraph.
this paragraph.
this paragraph.
5. Defendants deny that Plaintiffs are entitled to any further relief as stated in
this paragraph.
/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan, T.A., # 25038
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
P.O. Box 94005
Phone: (202) 714-9492
Fax: (225) 326-6098


13

I hereby certify that on April 14, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of

Richard G. Perque, T.A.
700 Camp St.
(504) 681-2003
Fax: (504) 681-2004

Attorney for Plaintiffs in No. 14-97

John M. Landis
Lesli Harris
Maurine Wall
546 Carondelet St.
(504) 581-3200
Fax: (504) 596-0892

Attorneys for Plaintiffs in No. 14-327

/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan
- 1 -
1156540v2
Plaintiffs
v.
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090 C/W 14-97 &14-327
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the Court's order dated
March 20, 2014 (Rec. Doc. 75), Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases move for partial summary
judgment against Defendant Tim Barfield, the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Revenue, and Defendant Devin George, the Louisiana State Registrar, on the following common
issue: whether the Equal Protection and/or Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution require Defendants to recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into by the
Plaintiffs in other jurisdictions.
Plaintiffs include six Louisiana same-sex couples who are validly married under
the law of another jurisdiction and Forum for Equality Louisiana, Inc., a nonprofit advocacy
organization that asserts claims on behalf of its members who are in same-sex marriages.
Defendants, relying on Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution and Article 3520(B)
of the Louisiana Civil Code, refuse to recognize the Plaintiffs' marriages. For the reasons in the
accompanying memorandum in support, Defendants' refusal violates Plaintiffs' fundamental
liberty interests and their right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- 2 -
1156540v2
Plaintiffs also submit a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts and accompanying exhibits in
support of their motion.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Court grant partial summary judgment in
their favor and:
1. Declare that Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution, Article
3520(B) of the Louisiana Civil Code, and any other Louisiana law that purports to deny
recognition to the marriages of Plaintiffs and other validly married same-sex couples are
unconstitutional because they violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution, and may not be enforced against Plaintiffs or any other same-sex
couple who validly married in another jurisdiction;
2. Enjoin enforcement of Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana
Constitution, Article 3520(B) of the Louisiana Civil Code, and any other Louisiana laws that
purport to deny recognition to the marriages of Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples who are
married under the law of another jurisdiction by Defendants in their official capacities; by their
officers, employees, agents, and all other individuals under Defendants' supervision, direction, or
control; and by all persons acting in concert or participation with any Defendant; and
3. Require Defendants in their official capacities; their officers, employees,
agents, and all other individuals under Defendants' supervision, direction, or control; and all
persons acting in concert or participation with any Defendant to recognize the marriages of
Plaintiffs as valid and enforceable under Louisiana law.
- 3 -
1156540v2
Dated: April 17, 2014 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ J. Dalton Courson
John M. Landis, 7958
Lesli D. Harris, 28070
Brooke C. Tigchelaar, 32029
Maurine M. Wall, 34139
STONE PIGMAN WALTHER
WITTMANN L.L.C.
546 Carondelet Street
Telephone: (504) 581-3200
Attorneys for Forum for Equality Louisiana,
Inc., Jacqueline M. Brettner, M. Lauren
Brettner, Nicholas J. Van Sickels, Andrew S.
Bond, Henry Lambert, R. Carey Bond, L.
Havard Scott, III, and Sergio March Prieto
s/ Richard G. Perque
Richard G. Perque
LESLIE A. BONIN, LLC &
RICHARD G. PERQUE, LLC
700 Camp Street
Phone: 504-524-3306
Fax: 504-529-4179
Attorney for Jonathan P. Robicheaux, Derek
Penton, Nadine Blanchard, and Courtney
Blanchard
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I hereby certify that a copy of the preceding Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment has been served upon all counsel of record by electronic notice via the Court's
CM/ECF system, this 17th day of April 2014.
1155576v6
Plaintiffs
v.
JAMES D. CALDWELL, et, al.,
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090 C/W 14-97 &14-327
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The Undisputed Facts ..........................................................................................................2
A. Plaintiffs Are Validly Married and Suffer Harm Due to the Defendants'
Enforcement of the Anti-Recognition Laws. ...........................................................2
B. Louisiana's Discriminatory Scheme for the Recognition of Marriages. ..................3
1. Louisiana Virtually Always Recognizes Heterosexual Marriages
from Other Jurisdictions. .............................................................................3
2. The Anti-Recognition Laws Single Out Plaintiffs' Marriages for
Nonrecognition. ...........................................................................................5
C. The Louisiana Secretary of Revenue Refuses to Recognize the Plaintiffs'
Marriages. ................................................................................................................5
D. The Louisiana State Registrar Refuses to Recognize Plaintiff Jacqueline
Brettner as the Parent of a Child Born to Her Spouse During Her
Marriage. ..................................................................................................................7
II. Law and Argument ..............................................................................................................9
A. All Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the Anti-Recognition Laws. .................9
B. The Anti-Recognition Laws Violate the Equal Protection Clause. .......................10
1. The Anti-Recognition Laws Are Subject to Heightened Equal-
Protection Scrutiny Because They Target Sexual Orientation. .................10
a. Windsor's "Careful Consideration" Standard Requires the
Application of Heightened Scrutiny. .............................................11
b. The Court Should Apply Heightened Scrutiny Because
Sexual Orientation Should Be Considered a Suspect or
Quasi-Suspect Classification. ........................................................13
2. The Anti-Recognition Laws Discriminate on the Basis of Gender
and Are Subject to Heightened Scrutiny....................................................15
C. The Anti-Recognition Laws Violate Due Process. ................................................17
1. The Fundamental Right to Marry Is a Protected Liberty Interest
that Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals Share in Equally. ...............................17
2. The Anti-Recognition Laws Burden the Fundamental Right to
Remain Married. ........................................................................................20
Parental Authority. .....................................................................................20
4. The Anti-Recognition Laws Are Subject to Heightened Scrutiny
Because They Significantly Burden Fundamental Rights. ........................21
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D. Louisiana Cannot Offer a Rational Basis for Its Discriminatory Statutory
Scheme That Would Satisfy Even the Lowest Tier of Constitutional
Scrutiny. .................................................................................................................21
1. Tradition Is Not a Sufficient Justification..................................................21
2. Moral Objection to Homosexuality Alone Is Not a Permissible
Justification. ...............................................................................................22
3. The Anti-Recognition Laws Have No Rational Relationship to an
Interest in Responsible Procreation and Child-Rearing and Indeed
Cause Harm to the Plaintiffs' Children. .....................................................23
4. Federalism Concerns Should Not Salvage the Unconstitutional
Laws.. .........................................................................................................24
III. Conclusion .........................................................................................................................25
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Cases
Apache Bend Apartments v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556 (5th Cir. 1992).....................................9
Baskin v. Bogan, No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2014) ...................................1
Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939 (E.D. Mich. 2013) ...........................................................15
Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) ..........................1
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) .................................................................................18
Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19110
(E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014)..........................................................................................1, 19, 23
Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17457
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) ..............................................................................................1, 11
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) ........................................................................................13
Brinson v. Brinson, 233 La. 417, 96 So. 2d 653 (1957) ..................................................................4
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) ..................................................................21
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) .....................................10, 13
Concerned Citizens Around Murphy v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 663
(E.D. La. 2010) ....................................................................................................................3
De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) ...........................................................................1, 10, 13, 14, 15
Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37274
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014) ...........................................................................................1, 24
Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. La. 2012) ...........................................................9, 10, 21
Fritsche v. Vermilion Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 2004-1192
(La. App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So. 2d 935 .............................................................................4
Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 2007-1927 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/15/08), 998 So. 2d 731.............................4
Golinski v. OPM, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ..............................................................15
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)..............................................................................18
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1155576v6
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984).......................................................................................9
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ...............................................................................................22
Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-129 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) .....................................1, 2, 8, 19, 24
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)...................................................3
John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2000) .......................................................10
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................11
Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013)..................................................1, 11, 23
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)...................................................14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25
LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).............................................................................12
Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014).......................................................................................................1
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928) ........................................................11
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)......................................................................................18, 25
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) ...........................................................................................13
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).........................................................................13
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012)....................11
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)................................................................................12
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ......................................................................................18
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) ................................................................16
Neville v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2006) ..........................................................................11
Obergefell v. Wymsyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ..............................................1, 20
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).............................................................................................20
Pedersen v. OPM, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012)..............................................................14
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).....................................14, 15, 24
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).....................................18
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) .................................................10
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1155576v6
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................................22
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) .........................................................................19, 20
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)..................................................................................2, 11, 22
Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2000) .........................................................................16
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) ................12, 13
Succession of Caballero v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (La. 1872) ...........................................4, 22
Tanco v. Haslam, No. 13-cv-01159, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014).................................................................................................1
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ....................................................................................2, 20
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) .................................................................................18, 19, 25
United States ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927 (E.D. La. 1925)...........................................4
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) .......................................................................15, 17
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) ...............................1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 24, 25
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ..........................................................................17
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) .....................................................................14
W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) .............................................................17
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975).........................................................................3
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ......................................................................................22
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012)...........................................................10, 14
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)........................................................17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25
Statutes
42 U.S.C. 1983..............................................................................................................................9
La. Civ. Code art. 185......................................................................................................................7
La. Civ. Code art. 188......................................................................................................................7
La. Civ. Code art. 1492....................................................................................................................8
La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1.................................................................................................................8
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La. Civ. Code art. 2315.2.................................................................................................................8
La. Civ. Code art. 3520..................................................................................................1, 3, 4, 5, 16
La. R.S. 14:89 ................................................................................................................................14
La. R.S. 36:453 ................................................................................................................................5
La. R.S. 40:33 ..................................................................................................................................7
La. R.S. 40:34 ..................................................................................................................................7
La. R.S. 47:294 ............................................................................................................................6, 7
Constitutions
U.S. Const. amend. V.....................................................................................................................25
U.S. Const. amend. X.....................................................................................................................25
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1 .....................................................................................1, 2, 10, 17, 25
La. Const. art. XII, 15 ...............................................................................................1, 5, 6, 16, 23
Other Authorities
Rebekah Allen, Metro Council Rejects Anti-Sodomy Law Resolution,
The Advocate, Feb. 13, 2014.............................................................................................14
Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar 3-15 (2013).....................................................14
H.B. 12, 40th Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) ..............................................................................................14
Louisiana Revenue Information Bulletin 13-024 ............................................................................6
Revenue Ruling 2013-17 .............................................................................................................5, 6
Campbell Robertson, After Arrests on Charges of Sodomy, an Apology,
N.Y. Times, July 30, 2013.................................................................................................14
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Plaintiffs move the Court to grant partial summary judgment and hold that Article XII,
Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution (the "Louisiana DOMA Amendment"), Article 3520(B)
of the Louisiana Civil Code, and any other Louisiana laws denying recognition to valid same-sex
marriages celebrated in other jurisdictions (collectively, the "Anti-Recognition Laws") violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013), ten federal district courts have consecutively held that state bans against
same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Several of these courts
have held that States must permit same-sex couples to marry.
1
Others have held that States must
apply the same recognition rules to same-sex marriages from other States that they apply to
heterosexual marriages.
2
Plaintiffs' motion is limited to recognition.
As Judge Heyburn explained in Bourke v. Beshear, these decisions rest on a solid, well-
established body of constitutional precedent. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17457, at *40. Like its
sister States, Louisiana may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

1
Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37274, at *51-52 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014)
(enjoining Michigan's ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); De Leon v.
Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236, at *51, *68, *79-80 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014)
(enjoining Texas's ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014) (holding that
Illinois law prohibiting celebration of same-sex marriages is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Bostic v.
Rainey, No. 2:13-cv-395, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19110, *71-72 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014) (enjoining Virginia's ban
on same-sex marriage on due process and equal protection grounds); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (enjoining enforcement of Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban under the
Equal Protection Clause); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (granting summary
judgment and enjoining enforcement of Utah's same-sex marriage ban on due process and equal protection grounds).
2
Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-cv-129 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (order granting motion for declaratory
judgment and permanent injunction) (holding that Ohio's ban on the recognition of same-sex marriages is facially
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) (attached as Ex. 21); Baskin v. Bogan, No.
1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB (S.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2014) (minute entry issuing a TRO to require Indiana to recognize a
same-sex marriage) (attached as Ex. 22); Tanco v. Haslam, No. 13-cv-01159, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33463, at *25,
*33 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014) (enjoining enforcement of Tennesee's anti-recognition laws under the Equal
Protection Clause); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17457, at *32 (W.D. Ky. Feb.
12, 2014) (enjoining Kentucky's anti-recognition laws under the Equal Protection Clause); Obergefell v. Wymsyslo,
962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 997-98 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (holding in an as-applied challenge that Ohio's recognition ban is
unconstitutional).
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. The States may not violate the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even when exercising their traditional power over family law. See, e.g., Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Yet Louisiana employs an unconstitutional scheme for the
recognition of marriages celebrated out-of-state. Louisiana virtually always honors the validity
of heterosexual marriages, including marriages not permitted by Louisiana law, but categorically
denies recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples. The Anti-Recognition Laws deny equal
protection to same-sex couples because of their sexual orientation and gender without a
constitutionally sufficient justification. The laws also infringe on constitutionally protected
fundamental rights. "A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws." Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). The Court should follow the "growing national judicial
consensus"
3
and hold that Louisiana's refusal to recognize the Plaintiffs' valid marriages is
unconstitutional.
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
A. Plaintiffs Are Validly Married and Suffer Harm Due to the Defendants'
Enforcement of the Anti-Recognition Laws.
Plaintiffs are six same-sex couples and a nonprofit organization, Forum for Equality
Louisiana, Inc. (the "Forum"). Each of the Plaintiff couples resides in Louisiana and is validly
married under the law of another jurisdiction.
4
Three of the couples are raising children.
5
The

3
Henry, Ex. 21 at p. 14.
4
John Paul Robicheaux and Derek Penton reside in New Orleans and were married in Iowa on September
23, 2012. (Robicheaux & Penton Decls., Exs. 1 & 2.) Courtney and Nadine Blanchard reside in Raceland and were
married in Iowa on August 30, 2013. (C. Blanchard & N. Blanchard Decls., Exs. 3 & 4.) Nick Van Sickels and
Andrew Bond reside in New Orleans and were married in the District of Columbia on December 28, 2012. (Van
Sickels & A. Bond Decls., Exs. 5 & 6.) Jacqueline and Lauren Brettner reside in New Orleans and were married in
New York on February 14, 2012. (J. Brettner & L. Brettner Decls., Exs. 7 & 8.) Henry Lambert and Carey Bond
reside in New Orleans and were married in New York on October 29, 2011. (Lambert & C. Bond Decls., Exs. 9 &
10.) Havard Scott and Sergio March Prieto reside in Shreveport and were married in Vermont on July 9, 2010.
(Scott & March Prieto Decls., Exs. 11 & 12.)
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Forum advocates for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender Louisianans and asserts standing on
behalf of its dues-paying members who are in same-sex marriages that Louisiana officials refuse
to recognize.
6
Louisiana's enforcement of the Anti-Recognition Laws deprives Plaintiffs of the benefits
and responsibilities that arise from their marriages. Plaintiffs cannot establish a community
property regime. The Plaintiffs raising children cannot form a legally recognized two-parent
household. Plaintiffs face differing tax burdens from their opposite-sex counterparts. Louisiana
inheritance laws treat the Plaintiff couples as strangers to one another. Plaintiffs must create and
carry a series of documents to ensure the right to make decisions for each other or about their
children in case of emergency.
7
Plaintiffs are relegated to the "unstable position of being in a
second-tier marriage." Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
B. Louisiana's Discriminatory Scheme for the Recognition of Marriages.
1. Louisiana Virtually Always Recognizes Heterosexual
Marriages from Other Jurisdictions.
For heterosexual couples, Louisiana's policy is to uphold the validity of foreign
marriages. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120, 124 (La. 1975). Article 3520(A) of the

5
Blanchard Decls., Exs. 3 & 4 at 13; Van Sickels Decl., Ex. 5 at 13; A. Bond Decl., Ex. 6 at 13; J.
Brettner Decl., Ex. 7 at 9; L. Brettner Decl., Ex. 8 at 9.
6
The harms sustained by the Forum's membership are exemplified by the declarations from Brandon Robb,
Jared Munster, Jodi Gates, and Marilyn McConnell. The Forum satisfies the three-part test for associational
standing. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Concerned Citizens Around
Murphy v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 (E.D. La. 2010). First, the Forum has members who
would have standing to sue in their own right. (Brady Decl., Ex. 13 (affirming declarants' membership in the
Forum); Robb & Munster Decls., Exs. 14 & 15; Gates & McConnell Decls., Exs. 16 & 17.) Indeed, all married
same-sex couples in Louisiana have or will sustain harm due to Defendant Tim Barfield's refusal to recognize their
marriages for state income tax purposes. Second, the interests that the Forum seeks to protect equality under
Louisiana law for gay and lesbian citizens are germane to its purpose as an association. (Brady Decl. Ex. 13 at
5.) Finally, because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, neither the claims the Forum asserts nor the relief it requests
requires the participation of individual members. See Concerned Citizens Around Murphy, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 678
("Suits for injunctive relief do not involve individualized proof of damages.").
7
See, e.g., Van Sickels Decl., Ex. 5 at 23; J. Brettner Decl., Ex. 7 at 16-17.
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Louisiana Civil Code expresses this policy, providing that Louisiana will recognize a marriage
validly performed in another jurisdiction "unless to do so would violate a strong public policy of
the state." As the commentary to Article 3520(A) explains, it is "[b]ased on the universally
espoused policy of favoring the validity of marriages if there is any reasonable basis for doing
so." La. Civ. Code art. 3520 cmt. (b) (1991). The commentators describe this deferential
recognition policy as "equally important at the multistate level" to support a "policy of avoiding
'limping marriages.'" Id.
Pursuant to the policy expressed in Article 3520(A), Louisiana recognizes virtually all
heterosexual marriages, even if the marriages could not be celebrated on Louisiana soil.
Louisiana recognizes marriages between first cousins entered in another jurisdiction even though
first cousins cannot legally marry in Louisiana. Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 2007-1927, p. 26 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 10/15/08), 998 So. 2d 731, 750. Common-law marriages cannot be created in
Louisiana, but Louisiana upholds common-law marriages validly entered in other states. See,
e.g., Brinson v. Brinson, 233 La. 417, 425, 96 So. 2d 653, 656 (1957); Fritsche v. Vermilion
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, 2004-1192, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So. 2d 935, 937-38.
Applying this policy, this Court recognized a foreign marriage contracted by proxy, even though
the marriage would be absolutely null if contracted in Louisiana. United States ex rel. Modianos
v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927, 929 (E.D. La. 1925). In a Reconstruction-era decision, the Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized a Spanish marriage between a white man and a free woman of color,
even though the marriage violated Louisiana's anti-miscegenation laws. Succession of Caballero
v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573, 575 (La. 1872).
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2. The Anti-Recognition Laws Single Out Plaintiffs' Marriages
for Nonrecognition.
Thus, the Anti-Recognition Laws are a departure from Louisiana's history of recognizing
foreign marriages. The Anti-Recognition Laws categorically deny recognition to the marriages of
Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples solely because the spouses are the same gender.
In 1999, the Louisiana Legislature added paragraph (B) to Article 3520, carving out
same-sex couples from Louisiana's policy favoring marital recognition. Paragraph (B) states:
A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public
La. Civ. Code art. 3520(B). In 2004, the Louisiana legislature passed and Louisiana voters
approved the Louisiana DOMA Amendment, which states:
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and
one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this
constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof
be conferred upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and
one woman. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage
for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized. No official or court of
the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other
jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman.
La. Const. art. XII, 15. As a result of the Anti-Recognition Laws, the Plaintiffs and other
married same-sex couples are singled out for discriminatory treatment and nonrecognition.
C. The Louisiana Secretary of Revenue Refuses to Recognize the Plaintiffs'
Marriages.
Defendant Tim Barfield is the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue. Under
La. R.S. 36:453, Secretary Barfield is the executive officer vested with responsibility for the
policies of the Department of Revenue and for its administration, control, and operation. After
the Supreme Court announced its decision in Windsor and invalidated Section 3 of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17, which stated that the IRS
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1155576v6
would follow the "place-of-celebration" rule and treat validly married same-sex couples as
married for federal tax purposes regardless of where the couple was domiciled. In response,
Secretary Barfield issued Revenue Information Bulletin No. 13-024 ("the Bulletin"), attached as
Exhibit 18. The Bulletin states that in accordance with Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana
Constitution, the Louisiana Department of Revenue would not follow Revenue Ruling 2013-17
and would not recognize same-sex marriages when determining an individual's filing status for
the purpose of Louisiana state income taxes. Further, on or about January 31, 2014, the
Louisiana Department of Revenue issued the individual income tax return form (Form IT-540)
and corresponding instructions for Louisiana taxpayers for tax year 2013 (the "Instructions").
The Instructions are attached as Exhibit 19 and contain the following statement in bold font:
In compliance with the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Department of
Revenue shall not recognize same-sex marriages when determining filing status.
Individuals who entered into a same-sex marriage in another state cannot file a
Louisiana income tax return using a tax status of married filing jointly or married
filing separately.
The Instructions also provide that a spouse in a same-sex marriage must choose a filing status
other than married and that the spouses must allocate their items of income between them.
The Bulletin and the Instructions are contrary to La. R.S. 47:294, which requires a tax
filer to use the same information reported on the filer's federal return for purposes of the
Louisiana state return.
8
Plaintiffs Henry Lambert and Carey Bond claimed the status of married
filing jointly for their federal and Louisiana income tax returns for tax year 2012.
9
Despite their
compliance with La. R.S. 47:294, the Louisiana Department of Revenue rejected their Louisiana
return, citing the Bulletin and the Louisiana Constitution. Exhibit G to Lambert Decl., Exhibit 9.

8
Under La. R.S. 47:294, "Taxpayers are required to use the same filing status and claim the same
exemptions on their [state income tax] return as they used on their federal income tax return."
9
Lambert Decl., Ex. 9, 14; C. Bond Decl., Ex. 10, 14.
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Remarkably, in a letter to Lambert and Bond, Secretary Barfield wrote, "[a]lthough Louisiana
Revised Statutes 47:294 instructs taxpayers to use the same filing status on their return as they
used on their federal tax returns, the Louisiana Constitution preempts this statute." Id. Thus,
Plaintiffs and other married same-sex couples are targeted for negative tax treatment that violates
Louisiana's own tax statutes, specifically La. R.S. 47:294.
D. The Louisiana State Registrar Refuses to Recognize Plaintiff Jacqueline
Brettner as the Parent of a Child Born to Her Spouse During Her Marriage.
Defendant Devin George is the Louisiana State Registrar. Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:33,
Registrar George is vested with the responsibility to enforce Louisiana's vital statistics laws,
including the issuance of birth certificates to the parents of newborns. Due to the
Anti-Recognition Laws, Registrar George refuses to issue birth certificates naming same-sex
spouses as the parents of a child born of their marriage. Thus, Registrar George refused to issue
a birth certificate for the baby of Jackie and Lauren Brettner that identified Jackie as a parent of
the child, even though Jackie and Lauren were married at the time of the child's birth.
10
But for
the fact that Jackie is a woman, Registrar George would have issued a birth certificate identifying
her as a parent of the child. Indeed, the Louisiana vital records laws require Registrar George to
identify the mother's husband as the father on a child's birth certificate, regardless of any
biological connection, unless the husband successfully disavows the child or unless a biological
father other than the husband has acknowledged paternity. See La. R.S. 40:34. Further, the
Louisiana Civil Code affords the mother's husband a presumption of paternity. La. Civ. Code
art. 185. Regardless of whether he has a biological tie to the child, "the husband of the mother
may not disavow a child born to his wife as a result of an assisted conception to which he
consented." La. Civ. Code art. 188. If Jackie were a man, the Registrar would have recognized

10
See J. Brettner Decl., Ex. 7 6, 9.
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her marriage to Lauren, and she would be listed as a parent of their daughter on her birth
certificate, regardless of whether there was a biological link between them.
The State Registrar's refusal to recognize Jackie as a parent on her daughter's birth
certificate harms their family.
11
For example, if Jackie died, her daughter would not be
considered Jackie's forced heir under Louisiana inheritance laws. See La. Civ. Code art. 1492. If
Jackie were killed in a tort, both Lauren and their daughter would be precluded from pursuing a
wrongful death or survival action. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1 & 2315.2. Jackie and Lauren
must carry papers with them at all times when travelling with their daughter in order to prove
that they are both the legal guardians of their child.
12
For example, Jackie and Lauren were
questioned by a security official at New Orleans International Airport when traveling to Panama
to visit family because they could not produce a birth certificate identifying both Lauren and
Jackie as parents of their daughter.
13
The official specifically stated that their daughter "could
not leave without her father's permission."
14
Jackie and Lauren were eventually able to explain
that they were co-parents of their daughter because they travel with copies of the sperm donor
contract in addition to their daughter's birth certificate. But the anecdote exemplifies the day-to-
day harm Jackie and Lauren face due to the Registrar's refusal to recognize their marriage.

11
The importance of an accurate birth certificate was emphasized by the Henry court: "Identification on the
child's birth certificate is the basic currency by which parents can freely exercise [their] parental rights and
responsibilities. It is also the only common governmentally-conferred, uniformly-recognized, readily-accepted
record that establishes identity, parentage and citizenship, and it is required in an array of legal contexts.The
inability to obtain an accurate birth certificate saddles the child with the life-long disability of a government identity
document that does not reflect the child's parentage and burdens the ability of the child's parents to exercise their
parental rights and responsibilities." Ex. 21 at pp. 23-24.
12
J. Brettner Decl., Ex. 7 at 16-17
13
Id. at 17.
14
Id.
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II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
In order to succeed on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, Plaintiffs "must prove a violation of
a right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States and demonstrate that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.
Supp. 2d 995, 1004 (E.D. La. 2012) (Feldman, J.). It is undisputed that Defendants have acted
at all times under color of state law, specifically the Anti-Recogition Laws. Therefore, Plaintiffs
need only demonstrate a violation of a constitutionally protected right.
A. All Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the Anti-Recognition Laws.
All Plaintiffs have standing. To establish standing, Plaintiffs must demonstrate an actual
or threatened injury-in-fact, fairly traceable to action of the defendants that would be redressed
by a favorable court decision. Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. Plaintiffs satisfy these
requirements. Plaintiffs and all other married same-sex couples in Louisiana bear an actual or
imminent injury traceable to Secretary Barfield's refusal to recognize their marriages for state
income tax purposes. The Court need not inquire whether the Plaintiffs actually shouldered an
additional tax burden because the stigmatic injury caused by the Secretary's discrimination
against Plaintiffs as same-sex couples is sufficient. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-
40 (1984) ("[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic notions' or by
stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as 'innately inferior' and therefore as less worthy
participants in the political community, can cause serious noneconomic injuries" that are
sufficient for standing (internal citations omitted)); see also Apache Bend Apartments v. United
States, 964 F.2d 1556, 1560 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring an
equal-protection challenge even though the relief requested "would not directly enlarge their own
pocketbooks"). Jackie Brettner also sustained direct injury due to Defendant George's refusal to
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identify her as a parent on her daughter's birth certificate. There is no doubt that this Court has
the power to redress the constitutional harms that Plaintiffs suffer.
B. The Anti-Recognition Laws Violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Equal Protection Clause
mandates that the States treat all similarly situated persons alike. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573,
577 (5th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. Here, like the federal DOMA that
was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor, the Anti-Recognition Laws "place[]
same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage" and "demean[] the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects." 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694.
"When a state law adversely affects members of a certain class, but does not significantly
interfere with their fundamental rights,
15
courts first determine how closely they should
scrutinize the challenged regulation." De Leon, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16136, at *32. Although
the Anti-Recognition Laws cannot pass any form of constitutional scrutiny, the Court should
apply heightened equal-protection scrutiny because the Anti-Recognition Laws discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation or, alternatively, because they discriminate on the basis of sex.
1. The Anti-Recognition Laws Are Subject to Heightened Equal-
Protection Scrutiny Because They Target Sexual Orientation.
Because the Anti-Recognition Laws target only same-sex couples for nonrecognition, on
their face they discriminate against gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons on the basis of sexual
orientation. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012) (analyzing

15
As discussed in Section II(C), the Anti-Recognition Laws interfere with the Plaintiffs' fundamental rights,
including the fundamental right to marry, and for that reason should alternatively be analyzed under a heightened
scrutiny standard.
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DOMA as sexual-orientation discrimination); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) (same); Bourke, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17457, at *15
("The Kentucky provisions challenged here impose a classification on the basis of sexual
orientation."); Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (Utah same-sex marriage ban "discriminates on
the basis of sexual identity without a rational reason to do so").
a. Windsor's "Careful Consideration" Standard Requires the
Application of Heightened Scrutiny.
In Windsor, the Court reiterated that "[d]is-criminations of an unusual character
especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the
constitutional provision." 133 S. Ct. at 2692. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; Louisville Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)). Just as DOMA was a departure from the
federal government's history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage, id., so too
the Anti-Recognition Laws are a departure from Louisiana's history and tradition of upholding
the validity of out-of-state marriages. Like DOMA, they warrant "careful consideration."
The Fifth Circuit has applied the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny, rational basis,
to sexual-orientation classifications. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citing Romer). But Fifth Circuit "precedent remains binding [only] until the Supreme Court
provides contrary guidance." Neville v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 2006). The
Supreme Court supplied contrary guidance in Windsor. The Fifth Circuit is likely to revisit the
level of scrutiny to be applied to sexual orientation classifications in light of Windsor's holding
that DOMA was subject to "careful consideration." 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Indeed, Justice Scalia
noted in his dissenting opinion that the Court's careful consideration of DOMA was not
traditional rational-basis scrutiny. Id. at 2706 ("But the Court certainly does not apply anything
that resembles that deferential framework." (emphasis in original)).
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In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, the Ninth Circuit held that Windsor
requires the application of heightened scrutiny to sexual-orientation classifications. 740 F.3d
471 (9th Cir. 2014). The appeal centered on a party's use of a peremptory strike to exclude a
juror based on his perceived sexual orientation. Under the Supreme Court's Batson
jurisprudence, a litigant may strike a juror because he belongs to a group or class normally
subject to rational basis review, but a litigant may not strike a juror because he belongs to a
group subject to strict or heightened scrutiny. See id. at 479-80. Thus, the issue before the court
was the level of scrutiny that should be applied to sexual orientation classifications. Because the
Supreme Court did not announce the level of scrutiny that it applied in Windsor, the Ninth
Circuit decided to analyze "what the Court actually did." Id. at 480. The court agreed with
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion that the Supreme Court did not apply traditional rational-basis
review to DOMA. Under traditional rational basis review, a law must be upheld as constitutional
"'if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify' the classifications imposed by the
law." Id. at 481 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)); accord LeClerc v.
Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (under rational basis review, "[t]he key principle is the
deference to legislative policy decisions embodied in courts' reluctance to judge the wisdom,
fairness, logic or desirability of those choices.") In Windsor, "instead of conceiving of
hypothetical justifications for the law, the Court evaluated the 'essence' of the law" and "looked
to DOMA's 'design, purpose, and effect.'" SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481 (quoting Windsor, 133
S.Ct. at 2689, 2693.) Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that Windsor requires courts examining
a law that discriminates based on sexual orientation to look at the law's actual purpose, not
hypothetical purposes. According to the court, "Windsor's 'careful consideration' of DOMA's
actual purpose and its failure to consider other unsupported bases is antithetical to the very
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concept of rational basis review." SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 482. Thus, the court determined that
heightened scrutiny applied:
Windsor requires that when state action discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation, we must examine its actual purposes and carefully consider the
resulting inequality to ensure that our most fundamental institutions neither send
nor reinforce messages of stigma or second-class status. In short, Windsor
requires heightened scrutiny.
740 F.3d at 483. This Court should follow SmithKline's interpretation of Windsor and apply
heightened scrutiny to the Anti-Recognition Laws.
b. The Court Should Apply Heightened Scrutiny Because
Sexual Orientation Should Be Considered a Suspect or
Quasi-Suspect Classification.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning that sexual orientation classifications are subject to
heightened scrutiny is buttressed by an analysis of the traditional factors that courts use to
determine whether a statute employs a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. The Supreme
Court has determined that a class is suspect or quasi-suspect if the targeted group has
experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or has been "subjected to unique
disabilities . . . not truly indicative of their abilities." Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976). Courts may also consider whether the classification bears on group members' ability
to contribute to society. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. Additional factors include
whether the group is a minority or politically powerless, Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602
(1987), and whether the distinguishing characteristic defining the group is immutable or beyond
the group members' control. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); see also De Leon, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236 at *32-33 (outlining factors).
The Anti-Recognition Laws target gay, lesbian, and bisexual Louisianans and their
children, who satisfy all four criteria. The gay and lesbian community in the United States, and
in Louisiana particularly, has experienced and continues to experience invidious discrimination.
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The history of discrimination against homosexuals is well-documented. For many years gay and
lesbian Americans were routinely arrested, prosecuted, and declared unfit for employment. See,
e.g., Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar 3-15 (2013); Pedersen v. OPM, 881 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 314-19 (D. Conn. 2012) (discussing the persecution of gay and lesbian
Americans); De Leon, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 26236, at *35. As of the date of this filing, over
ten years after the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas that declared state anti-
sodomy laws unconstitutional, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003), Louisiana's crimes against nature
statute remains on its books. See La. R.S. 14:89. Incredibly, as recently as 2013 gay men in
Baton Rouge continued to be arrested for sodomy under the law.
16
In February 2014, a symbolic
resolution before the Baton Rouge Metro Council to encourage repeal of the unconstitutional law
failed.
17
On April 15, 2014, by a vote of 27 to 67, the Louisiana House of Representatives
rejected a proposed bill to repeal the portions of the law that criminalized "consensual,
uncompensated activity between persons of the same sex." H.B. 12, 40th Reg. Sess. (La. 2014)
(digest), attached as Exhibit 20 at p. 3.
It cannot reasonably be debated whether gay, lesbian, and bisexual citizens contribute to
society. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d at 182; Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d
699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
The Plaintiffs work in various fields such as medicine, education, business, law, and the arts, and
include a decorated Vietnam veteran. Three of the couples are raising children in stable, two-
parent households. Plaintiffs contribute to society.

16
Campbell Robertson, After Arrests on Charges of Sodomy, an Apology, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/after-arrests-on-charges-of-sodomy-an-apology.html?_r=1&.
17
Rebekah Allen, Metro Council Rejects Anti-Sodomy Law Resolution, The Advocate, Feb. 13, 2014,
http://theadvocate.com /home/8362443-125/metro-council-rejects-anti-sodomy-law.
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Many courts have also found that sexual orientation is either immutable or so
fundamental to a person's identity that a person should not be required to deny it, even if a person
could make a choice. See, e.g., De Leon, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 26236, at *38 (citing Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 576-77, for the proposition that the freedom for consenting adults to make individual
decisions regarding physical intimacy is "an integral part of human freedom"); Bassett v. Snyder,
951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 960 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Golinski v. OPM, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986 (N.D.
Cal. 2012); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
Finally, gay, lesbian, and bisexual Louisianans are subject to majoritarian political
pressures. As noted by the De Leon court, the history of same-sex marriage bans illustrates their
lack of political power. 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 26236, at *38-39. No federal or Louisiana-wide
law expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment,
education, access to public accommodations, or housing. Considering the ongoing
discrimination that gay, lesbian, and bisexual Louisianans experience, it cannot be reasonably
questioned that they are a disfavored minority.
Thus, heightened scrutiny applies. Under heightened scrutiny, the Defendants bear the
burden of proof to demonstrate that the Anti-Recognition Laws are constitutional. These laws
can only survive if the Defendants present an "exceedingly persuasive justification" that furthers
an important governmental interest. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). The
Anti-Recognition Laws cannot withstand any level of constitutional scrutiny, let alone
2. The Anti-Recognition Laws Discriminate on the Basis of
Gender and Are Subject to Heightened Scrutiny.
Defendants' enforcement of the Anti-Recognition Laws also discriminates against
Plaintiffs on the basis of their sex. Because each Plaintiff is married to a person of the same sex,
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rather than a person of the opposite sex, and only for that reason, Defendants have denied
Plaintiffs the benefits that are afforded to opposite-sex couples, including opposite-sex couples
who could not marry in Louisiana. Sex-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny.
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982).
Sex-based classifications are apparent on the face of the Anti-Recognition Laws. They
limit recognition to marriages comprised of "one man and one woman," La. Const. art XII, 15,
and provide that "a purported marriage between persons of the same sexshall not be
recognized in this state for any purpose," La. Civ. Code art. 3520(B). Because of these sex-
based classifications, Plaintiffs are prevented from having their marriages recognized solely
because of their sex. For example, if Jackie were a man rather than a woman, her marriage to
Lauren, validly celebrated in New York, would be fully respected under Louisiana law. But
because Jackie is a woman, Louisiana categorically denies recognition of her marriage and her
parental rights to the child born of the marriage.
The Anti-Recognition Laws also discriminate based on gender because they are based on
impermissible gender stereotypes. Laws that discriminate based on stereotypes about the proper
or traditional roles of men and women are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729;
Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 913 (5th Cir. 2000) ("State policies that perpetuate antiquated
and outdated gender stereotypes that are derogatory and condescending toward women do not
form the basis for proper discriminatory purpose."). The Anti-Recognition Laws discriminate on
the basis of gender because they are based on the stereotype that gender should determine who
one may love, marry, and form a family with. The laws penalize Plaintiffs and other same-sex
couples who defy gender-based stereotypes by relegating those couples to a second-tier,
nonrecognized marriage.
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The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination based on sex without an
"exceedingly persuasive justification." Virginia, 518 U.S at 523. Defendants lack any
persuasive justification to deny recognition to the Plaintiffs' marriages.
C. The Anti-Recognition Laws Violate Due Process.
A statute is also subject to a higher level of constitutional scrutiny if it burdens a
fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978). The protections of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all citizens and cannot be infringed by
majority vote. Indeed, as the Court noted in W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (emphasis added).
Louisiana submitted the fundamental right to marry of its gay, lesbian, and bisexual
citizens to a vote. Based on majority approval, the Anti-Recognition Laws deprive Plaintiffs,
and all same-sex couples validly married in other jurisdictions, of this fundamental right. No
compelling state interest authorizes this categorical exclusion of citizens from the privileges and
benefits of marriage. Thus, the Anti-Recognition Laws violate due process.
1. The Fundamental Right to Marry Is a Protected Liberty
Interest that Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals Share in Equally.
The Due Process Clause includes a substantive component that "provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). Among these rights is the fundamental
right to marry. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. Marriage is "central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
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existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). "[T]he decision to marry is a
fundamental right" that the Supreme Court has long protected against intrusion by the states.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); see also, Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Due Process
Clause guarantees the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486, the Court
stated that "[m]arriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred." As explained in Loving v. Virginia, "[t]he freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." 388 U.S. at 12. Chief Justice Warren further wrote that "[t]o deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these
statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law." Id.
(emphasis added). States cannot unduly burden this fundamental right. See, e.g., Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (holding that due process requires that States provide a
means for indigents to obtain a divorce because marriage and divorce are fundamental rights).
Lawrence v. Texas emphasized that the protections of the Due Process Clause extend to
gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. 539 U.S. at 574. In striking down Texas's criminal
sodomy statute, the Court found that the Due Process Clause protected gays and lesbians from
state interference into their personal relationships. Id. at 578. The Court declared that "[p]ersons
in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy" in "personal decisions relating to marriage,
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procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education." Id. at 574.
Lawrence also clarified that the right of privacy, which includes the right to marry, Zablocki, 434
U.S. at 384, shields gay and lesbian relationships from state intervention. As another district
court recently held in Bostic:
Gay and lesbian individuals share the same capacity as heterosexual individuals to
form, preserve, and celebrate loving, intimate and lasting relationships. Such
relationships are created through the exercise of sacred, personal choices
choices, like the choices made by every other citizen, that must be free from
unwanted government interference.
Bostic v. Rainey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19110, at *38. Louisiana cannot infringe on its gay,
lesbian, and bisexual citizens' fundamental right to marry. See also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (the Constitution "undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to
control the selection of one's spouse").
Accordingly, the right to privacy found in the Due Process Clause protects the right to
marry of all citizens, including those in same-sex relationships. The Anti-Recognition Laws
impermissibly interfere with this right. The fact that Louisiana has not historically recognized
same-sex marriages does not mean that gay, lesbian, and bisexual Louisianans do not share the
fundamental right to marry. In Henry v. Himes, the court emphasized that "the fundamental right
to marry is available even to those who have not traditionally be eligible to exercise that right."
Ex. 21 at p. 18. The court noted that prisoners are also individuals who were not traditionally
understood to have a fundamental right to marry, yet the Supreme Court held in Turner that a
state may not restrict a prisoner's right to marry without a sufficient justification. Id. (citing
Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-97). Louisiana cannot infringe on the fundamental rights of its gay,
lesbian, and bisexual citizens without adequate justification.
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Remain Married.
The Anti-Recognition laws do not merely "interfere directly and substantially" with
same-sex couples' right to marry, Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87; the laws disrupt and
effectively invalidate previously formed marriages, violating the right to remain married. See
Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 978. The Supreme Court has recognized that the right of
association protects intimate relationships, such as marriage, in order to "safeguard[] the ability
independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty." Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 619. Interpreting these words, the Obergefell court held that "existing marital, family and
intimate relationships" are entitled to constitutional protection under the due process clause. 962
F. Supp. 2d at 978 (emphasis in original) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578). All citizens, including those in same-sex relationships, have a fundamental liberty interest
in the protection of their existing marriages from state intervention. Id. By enacting and
enforcing the Anti-Recognition Laws, Louisiana has violated its citizens' fundamental right to
remain married.
Parental Authority.
The Anti-Recognition Laws also interfere with Plaintiffs' relationship with their children
and violate the Plaintiffs' fundamental right to parental authority. The Supreme Court has long
held that States may not interfere with the rights of parents to care, custody, and control of their
children. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). Yet, by
denying recognition to Plaintiffs' marriages, the Anti-Recognition Laws do just that. For
example, although Jackie and Lauren Bretter were married when Lauren gave birth to their
daughter, Louisiana denies Jackie parental rights to their child. This is an unconstitutional
infringement of her fundamental parental rights.
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4. The Anti-Recognition Laws Are Subject to Heightened
Scrutiny Because They Significantly Burden Fundamental
Rights.
Under the Due Process Clause, a state law burdening a fundamental right must be
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 686 (1977). While "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed," a statute that
"interfere[s] directly and substantially with the right to marry" must pass "rigorous scrutiny."
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87 (1978). The statute must be drawn to address "sufficiently
important state interests" and be "closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Id. at 388.
The Anti-Recognition Laws satisfy neither requirement.
D. Louisiana Cannot Offer a Rational Basis for Its Discriminatory Scheme That
Would Satisfy Even the Lowest Tier of Constitutional Scrutiny.
As discussed above, the Anti-Recognition Laws should be subject to strict or heightened
scrutiny. However, they cannot withstand any level of constitutional scrutiny, even rational
basis. To satisfy rational basis review, Plaintiffs must prove (1) that they have been treated
differently by the state from others similarly situated, and (2) that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment. Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1006. The first requirement is
satisfied because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs are treated differently from similarly-situated
heterosexual couples. Thus, even under the rational basis test, Plaintiffs should prevail because
Louisiana cannot demonstrate a rational basis for the Anti-Recognition Laws.
1. Tradition Is Not a Sufficient Justification.
Louisiana's history of recognition of only opposite-sex marriages, standing alone, cannot
justify the Louisiana Anti-Recognition Laws. "[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact
of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from
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constitutional attack." Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970); see also Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 326 (1993) ("Ancient lineage of a legal concept does not give it immunity from attack
for lacking a rational basis.").
Plaintiffs do not dispute that same-sex marriage is a new concept for many. But the
Plaintiff couples, who are all already married in other jurisdictions, do not request that Louisiana
issue them a marriage license or change the requirements that Louisiana has decided to enforce
for the creation of a marriage within its borders. Rather, Plaintiffs ask that the law be restored to
its status before the Anti-Recognition Laws were enacted in 1999 and 2004. It is the Anti-
Recognition Laws themselves that are the unprecedented departure from longstanding Louisiana
tradition. Louisianas policy of favor matrimonii has been repeatedly enforced and extended to
marriages that Louisiana itself would not sanction. E.g., Succession of Caballero, 24 La. Ann.
573. Like the Colorado amendment that the Supreme Court struck down in Romer v. Evans, it is
the Anti-Recognition Laws that are untraditional: "It is not within our constitutional tradition to
enact laws of this sort." 517 U.S. at 633.
2. Moral Objection to Homosexuality Alone Is Not a Permissible
Justification.
Moral or religious objections to homosexuality and same-sex relationships cannot justify
this departure from Louisiana's rule of liberally recognizing out-of-state marriages. Moral
condemnation of same-sex couples and relationships is not a legitimate constitutional
justification for legislation and indeed reflects an improper aim to demean same-sex couples and
their children. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (2003); accord Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) (public morality is an insufficient basis to uphold a
statute that burdens the fundamental right to private intimate conduct).
- 23 -
1155576v6
Religious and moral objections to same-sex marriage were reflected in the Louisiana
Legislature's debate on the Louisiana DOMA Amendment. For example, one speaker remarked
that the amendment was justified on religious grounds, stating, "God put man to sleep, took a rib
out and performed the first marriage."
18
The same speaker compared opponents of the
amendment to "descendants" of "Judas Iscariot." Some citizens may oppose same-sex marriage
on religious grounds; other religious faiths support it.
19
The relief that Plaintiffs request will not
infringe on any religious freedoms and will, in fact, permit supporters of same-sex marriage "the
freedom to practice their religious beliefs without mandating that other groups must adopt
similar practices." Bostic, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19110, at *80.
3. The Anti-Recognition Laws Have No Rational Relationship to
an Interest in Responsible Procreation and Child-Rearing and
Indeed Cause Harm to the Plaintiffs' Children.
Louisiana cannot justify its refusal to recognize same-sex marriage on the basis of an
interest in promoting responsible procreation within marriage. It would be absurd to suggest that
heterosexual couples make decisions regarding marriage and procreation based on the status or
recognition of same-sex marriages. Further, "[b]oth opposite-sex and same-sex couples model
the formation of committed, exclusive relationships, and both establish families based on mutual
love and support." Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. The Anti-Recognition Laws bear no
rational relationship to the promotion of stable, two-parent households. As demonstrated by
Jackie and Lauren's experience, they only undermine families.
Louisiana also cannot justify the Anti-Recognition Laws by citing a purported goal of
promoting an optimal environment for child-raising. There is no reason to believe that the

18
Video of the debate is available online at http://house.louisiana.gov/ H_Video/2004/May2004.htm.
19
See, e.g., Amicus Briefs of the Bishops of the Episcopal Church, et al., and the American Jewish
Committee, et al., submitted in United States v. Windsor, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/12-307.html.
- 24 -
1155576v6
recognition or nonrecognition of same-sex marriages will have any effect on the decision of
opposite-sex couples whether to have children. Nor would the deterrence of committed same-
sex couples from having children be a permissible justification for the Anti-Recognition Laws.
See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (holding DOMA unconstitutional because "no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage" married same-sex couples). Indeed, as
three of the couples demonstrate, same-sex couples in Louisiana are having and raising children
in loving, stable households despite the Anti-Recognition Laws. The Anti-Recognition Laws
injure these children by denying them and their families the benefits that Louisiana offers to
families headed by a couple whose marriage is recognized. And the courts that have considered
social science evidence on gay parenting have uniformly concluded that the State lacks a
legitimate interest in preventing same-sex couples from becoming parents. See, e.g., Deboer,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37274, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 980; Henry, Exhibit
21 at 35 ("[T]he overwhelming scientific consensus, based on decades of peer-reviewed
scientific research, shows unequivocally that children raised by same-sex couples are just as well
adjusted as those raised by heterosexual couples.").
4. Federalism Concerns Should Not Salvage the Unconstitutional
Laws.
Defendants may argue that this Court should uphold the Anti-Recognition Laws out of
respect for state sovereignty. It is true that in Windsor, the Supreme Court expressed concern
that DOMA intruded on the traditional State prerogative to define marriage within its borders.
See 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92. However, the Court determined it "unnecessary" to decide whether
DOMA "disrupt[ed] the federal balance." Id. Rather, the Courts ruling rested on its holding
that DOMAs withdrawal of federal recognition to legally wed same-sex couples "violates basic
due process and equal protection principles." Id. at 2693. As the ten federal district courts who
- 25 -
1155576v6
have examined state-level marriage bans since Windsor demonstrate, Windsor was an equal-
protection and due-process case, not a federalism case.
In Loving, the Commonwealth of Virginia advanced a federalism argument and urged the
Court to uphold its anti-miscegenation statutes because "marriage has traditionally been subject
state regulation without federal intervention, and consequently, the regulation of marriage should
be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment." 388 U.S. 1, 7. Virginia also argued
that the Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature regarding interracial marriage
because the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt. Id. at 8. Of course, the Court rejected
that argument and held Virginias anti-miscegenation statute to be unconstitutional.
So, too, Louisiana must permit its gay and lesbian citizens to share in the fundamental
freedom to marry. The Defendants may argue that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not envision or intend it to encompass a right to equal recognition of same-sex marriages. But
the fact that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment may not have anticipated the right is not
determinative of whether the right exists. It would be equally true that the drafters did not
envision that the Amendment would protect a right to marry for the incarcerated (Turner) or
parents who failed to pay child support (Zablocki). And as Justice Kennedy wrote in Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume
to have this insight. They knew that times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact only serve
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
539 U.S. at 578-79.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
- 26 -
1155576v6
WITTMANN L.L.C.
Telephone: (504) 581-3200
Richard G. Perque
700 Camp Street
Phone: 504-524-3306
Fax: 504-529-4179
Blanchard
- 27 -
1155576v6
I hereby certify that a copy of the preceding Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment has been served upon all counsel of record by electronic notice
via the Court's CM/ECF system, this 17th day of April 2014.
1156357v1
Plaintiffs
v.
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090 C/W 14-97 &14-327
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, Plaintiffs hereby submit the following Statement of
Uncontested Material Facts.
1. Plaintiffs are six same-sex couples and a nonprofit advocacy organization, Forum
for Equality Louisiana, Inc. (the "Forum").
2. Each of the Plaintiff couples resides in Louisiana and is validly married under the
law of another jurisdiction.
a. John Paul Robicheaux and Derek Penton reside in New Orleans and were
married in Iowa on September 23, 2012.
1

b. Courtney and Nadine Blanchard reside in Raceland, Louisiana and were
married in Iowa on August 30, 2013.
2

c. Nick Van Sickels and Andrew Bond reside in New Orleans and were
married in the District of Columbia on December 28, 2012.
3

d. Jacqueline and Lauren Brettner reside in New Orleans and were married in
New York on February 14, 2012.
4

1
Robicheaux & Penton Decls., Exs. 1 & 2.
2
C. Blanchard & N. Blanchard Decls., Exs. 3 &4.
3
Van Sickels & A. Bond Decls., Exs. 5 & 6.
4
J. Brettner & L. Brettner Decls., Exs. 7 & 8.
- 2 -
1156357v1
e. Henry Lambert and Carey Bond reside in New Orleans and were married
in New York on October 29, 2011.
5

f. Havard Scott and Sergio March Prieto reside in Shreveport and were
married in Vermont on July 9, 2010.
6

3. The Forum is a Louisiana nonprofit organization that advocates for gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender Louisianans.
7

4. The Forum has dues-paying members who are in same-sex marriages that
Louisiana officials refuse to recognize.
8

5. In 1999, the Louisiana Legislature added paragraph (B) to Louisiana Civil Code
Article 3520. Paragraph (B) states:
A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a
strong public policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage
contracted in another state shall not be recognized in this state for
any purpose, including the assertion of any right or claim as a
result of the purported marriage.
6. In 2004, the Louisiana Legislature passed and Louisiana voters approved La.
Const. art. XII, 15, which states:
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of
one man and one woman. No official or court of the state of
Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state law to
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and
one woman. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that
of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which
is not the union of one man and one woman.

5
Lambert & C. Bond Decls., Exs. 9 & 10.
6
Scott & March Prieto Decls., Exs. 11 & 12.
7
Brady Decl. Ex. 13.
8
Brady Decl., Ex. 13 (affirming affiants' membership in the Forum); Robb & Munster
Decls., Exs. 14 &15; Gates & McConnell Decls., Exs. 16 & 17.
- 3 -
1156357v1
7. Defendant Tim Barfield is the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Revenue.
Under La. R.S. 36:453, Secretary Barfield is the executive officer vested with responsibility for
the policies of the Department of Revenue and for the administration, control, and operation of
its functions, programs, and affairs. At all relevant times, Secretary Barfield was acting under
color of state law.
8. On September 16, 2013, IRS Revenue Ruling 2013-17 went into effect. The
ruling states that the IRS will follow the "place-of-celebration" rule and treat same-sex couples
legally married in jurisdictions that recognize their marriages as married for federal tax purposes,
regardless of whether the marriage would be legal in the couple's state of domicile.
9. On September 13, 2013, Secretary Barfield issued Revenue Information Bulletin
No. 13-024.
9
The bulletin states that in accordance with Article XII, Section 15 of the Louisiana
Constitution, the Louisiana Department of Revenue will not follow Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and
will not recognize same-sex marriages when determining an individual's filing status for
purposes of Louisiana state income taxes.
10. In October 2013, Plaintiffs Carey Bond ("Carey") and Henry Lambert ("Henry")
filed a federal joint tax return for the 2012 tax year indicating their status as married.
10

a. In accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute 47:294, Carey and Henry
filed the same joint tax return with the state of Louisiana that they filed
with the federal government, indicating their status as married.
11
b. The state of Louisiana rejected Carey and Henry's 2012 joint state tax
return.
12
c. On December 11, 2013, the Department of Revenue for the State of
Louisiana sent a "Notice of Adjustment(s) to Your Tax Return" addressed

9
Revenue Information Bulletin No. 13-024, Ex. 18.
10
Lambert & C. Bond Decls., Exs. 9 & 10.
11
Id.
12
Id.
- 4 -
1156357v1
to Carey and Henry, reflecting a balance of $14,302 due to the department,
including interest and penalties.
13
d. By letter dated February 14, 2014, Defendant Barfield informed Carey and
Henry that he would uphold the Department of Revenue's rejection of their
2012 joint state tax return and decline to issue a refund, citing Revenue
Information Bulletin 13-024 and the Louisiana Constitution.
14
e. On February 28, 2014, the Department of Revenue sent a "Notice of
Proposed Tax Due" addressed to Carey and Henry, demanding payment of
$15,928.01, for taxes, interest, and penalties or written objection to the
Tax Due Notice within 30 days.
15
11. On or about January 31, 2014, the Louisiana Department of Revenue issued the
individual income tax return form and corresponding instructions for Louisiana taxpayers for tax
year 2013.
16
The instructions contain the following statement in bold font:
In compliance with the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana
Department of Revenue shall not recognize same-sex marriages
when determining filing status. Individuals who entered into a
same-sex marriage in another state cannot file a Louisiana income
tax return using a tax status of married filing jointly or married
filing separately.
12. Revenue Information Bulletin 13-024 and the instructions for Louisiana
individual income tax forms are contrary to La. R.S. 47:294, which requires a tax filer to use the
same information reported on the filer's federal return for purposes of the Louisiana state return.
Only same-sex couples who are validly married in other jurisdictions are subject to Revenue
Information Bulletin 13-024.
13. Defendant Devin George is the Louisiana State Registrar. Pursuant to La. R.S.
40:33, Registrar George is vested with the responsibility to enforce Louisiana's vital statistics

13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Instructions, Ex. 19.
- 5 -
1156357v1
laws, including the issuance of birth certificates to the parents of newborns. At all relevant times,
Registrar George was acting under color of state law.
14. On April 12, 2013, Lauren Brettner ("Lauren") gave birth to a baby girl,
conceived through artificial insemination.
17
15. Although Lauren was validly married to Jackie Brettner ("Jackie") at the time of
insemination and at the time of their daughter's birth, a representative of the hospital informed
Lauren and Jackie that Jackie could not be listed as a parent on their daughter's birth certificate.
18
16. In order to secure some minimal legal protections for their family and daughter,
Lauren and Jackie have taken costly and time consuming additional steps, such as executing
powers of attorney, wills, trusts, and other probate documents to ensure Jackie can retain access
to and decision-making power for their child.
19
17. As a precautionary measure, Lauren and Jackie carry copies of notarized
correspondence executed by Lauren identifying Jackie as their daughter's co-parent at all times
while travelling to prove they are both the legal parents of the child.
20
a. Lauren and Jackie began this practice after being questioned by a security
official at New Orleans International Airport when traveling to the
Republic of Panama to visit family because Lauren and Jackie were
unable to produce a copy of their child's birth certificate identifying both
as parents of the child.
21
b. The official specifically stated that Lauren and Jackie's daughter "could
not leave without her father's permission."
22
c. Lauren and Jackie were eventually able to explain that they were co-
parents of their daughter because they traveled with copies of the sperm
donor contract in addition to their daughter's birth certificate.
23

17
J. Brettner & L. Brettner Decls., Exs. 7 & 8.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
- 6 -
1156357v1
18. All of the Plaintiffs have taken steps to protect their relationships by executing
multiple complex legal documents.
24
WITTMANN L.L.C.
Telephone: (504) 581-3200

23
Id.
24
See Plaintiff Declarations, Exs. 1-12 & 14-17.
- 7 -
1156357v1
s/ Richard G. Perque _________________
Richard G. Perque
700 Camp Street
Phone: 504-524-3306
Fax: 504-529-4179
Blanchard
I hereby certify that a copy of the preceding Statement of Uncontested Material
Facts has been served upon all counsel of record by electronic notice via the Courts CM/ECF
system, this 17th day of April 2014.
- 1 -
1156714v1
Plaintiffs
v.
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090 C/W 14-97 &14-327
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
NOTICE OF SUBMISSION
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases, in
accordance with Rule 7.2 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, hereby submit their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for
decision on Wednesday, the 25th day of June, 2014, at 10:00 AM before the Honorable Martin
L. C. Feldman, Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 500
Poydras Street, New Orleans, Louisiana.
- 2 -
1156714v1
WITTMANN L.L.C.
Telephone: (504) 581-3200
Richard G. Perque
700 Camp Street
Phone: 504-524-3306
Fax: 504-529-4179
Blanchard
- 3 -
1156714v1
I hereby certify that a copy of the preceding Notice of Submission has been
served upon all counsel of record by electronic notice via the Court's CM/ECF system, this 17th
day of April 2014.
1156542v2
Plaintiffs
v.
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090 C/W 14-97 &14-327
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CERTAIN EXHIBITS
TO THEIR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER SEAL
Plaintiffs respectfully move for an Order granting them leave to file the birth
certificates of Plaintiffs' minor children under seal. Copies of the birth certificates are attached
as exhibits to the declarations of Jacqueline M. Brettner, M. Lauren Brettner, Nicholas J. Van
Sickels, and Andrew S. Bond, who are Plaintiffs in case No. 14-327, in support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
This request is made pursuant to Rule 5.2(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 5.6 of the Local Civil Rules for the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, as well as for the privacy reasons stated in the accompanying
memorandum of law in support filed herewith.
Counsel for Plaintiffs has spoken with counsel for Defendants, who does not
oppose this motion.
- 2 -
1156542v2
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that they be granted leave to file
the above referenced documents under seal.
Dated: April 17, 2014
WITTMANN L.L.C.
Telephone: (504) 581-3200
Richard G. Perque
700 Camp Street
Phone: 504-524-3306
Fax: 504-529-4179
Blanchard
- 3 -
1156542v2
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Leave to File Certain Exhibits to Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under
Seal has been served upon all counsel of record by the Court's CM/ECF system, this 17th day of
April, 2014.
1156568v2
Plaintiffs
v.
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090 C/W 14-97 &14-327
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE CERTAIN EXHIBITS TO THEIR
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER SEAL
Plaintiffs respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of their motion
for leave to file under seal the birth certificates of their minor children, submitted in support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The exhibits contain confidential information
prohibited from disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 and Local Rule 5.6.
Counsel for the Defendants has been contacted, and Defendants do not oppose this motion.
A. A Non-Confidential Description of What Is To Be Sealed
Plaintiffs seek to file under seal birth certificates of minor children that are
attached to declarations submitted in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. In total, the exhibits consist of four pages and fit in a single folder.
B. Sealing Is Necessary
The certificates contain private, identifying information of some Plaintiffs and
their minor children, namely the child's full name, the birth dates of the children and certain
Plaintiffs, and their home street addresses. Although Rule 5.2 does not require the redaction of
home addresses in civil cases, out of an abundance of caution to promote their families' safety
- 2 -
1156568v2
and privacy, Plaintiffs have redacted the street addresses of their homes from their public
submission. Plaintiffs' street addresses are not relevant to any issue before the Court.
C. Governing Law Authorizes The Court To Enter Documents Under Seal
Plaintiffs' request is made pursuant to Rule 5.2(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 5.6 of the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599
(1978) ("[t]he decision as to access [to court records] is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court").
Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes redaction requirements
to protect private information in Court filings. For example, the Rule requires the redaction of
the month and day of an individual's birth and a minor child's full name. Fed. R. Civ. P.
5.2(a)(2), (3). Rule 5.2(d) provides that a "[t]he court may order that a filing be made under seal
without redaction." Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the birth certificates be filed under seal.
1

While courts will use the power to seal court records sparingly in light of the public's right to
access, courts also recognize that the "common law right to access judicial records and
proceedings [']is not absolute.'" Reichert v. Starring, No. 11-2171, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107051, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2011), quoting Bahwell v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (E.D. La. 2005). Where, as here, documents contain personal data
such as home addresses and dates of births, the court will enter confidential information under
seal. Loup v. Carroll, No. 11-790, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104367, at *8-9 (E.D. La. Sept. 13,
2011). Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court require
that Plaintiffs file documents containing alleged confidential information under seal. See Fed. R.

1
A proposed order is attached and, pursuant to Local Rule 5.6(E), a copy of the exhibits
have been submitted to the Clerk's Office by hand delivery.
- 3 -
1156568v2
Civ. P. 5.2 and LR. 5.6; see also Shattles v. Astrue, No. CV09-0761-A, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
101702, at *1 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2010) (noting that pleadings filed with the court that include
more than a minor's initials do not comply with Local Rule 5.2 and risk being stricken by the
court).
D. The Period Of Time Plaintiffs Seek To Have These Exhibits Under Seal
In view of the confidential and private information contained in the birth
certificates, the Court should permit them to be kept under seal until the conclusion of this
litigation, at which time they should be returned to Plaintiffs' counsel.
- 4 -
1156568v2
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion and
permit the birth certificates of Plaintiffs' children to be filed under seal.
WITTMANN L.L.C.
Telephone: (504) 581-3200
Havard Scott, III, and Sergio March Prieto,
AND
Richard G. Perque
700 Camp Street
Phone: 504-524-3306
Fax: 504-529-4179
Blanchard
- 5 -
1156568v2
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Certain Exhibits to Their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Under Seal has been served upon all counsel of record by the Court's
CM/ECF system, this 17th day of April, 2014.
1156543v1
Plaintiffs
v.
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)
REF: ALL CASES
*************************************** *
ORDER
Considering the foregoing Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Certain
Exhibits to Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under Seal;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted. The birth certificates
attached to the declarations of Jacqueline M. Brettner, M. Lauren Brettner, Nicholas J. Van
Sickels, and Andrew S. Bond submitted in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment shall be filed under seal until the conclusion of this litigation.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ___ day of __________, 2014.



Plaintiffs
v.


Defendants

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-5090
SECTION F(5)


REF: ALL CASES

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and 12(b)(6), Defendants
Thomas Barfield, Kathy Kliebert, and Devin George: (1) move for summary
judgment on Plaintiffs claims seeking recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses (Doc. 1 [No. 14-
327], Cts. 1-5; Doc. 63 [No. 13-5090], Cts. 1-3); and (2) move to dismiss for failure to
state a claim Plaintiffs claims seeking recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (Doc. 63 [No. 13-5090], Ct. 4).
s/ S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan, 25038, T.A.
P.O. Box 94005
Phone: (202) 714-9492
Fax: (225) 326-6098


2

I hereby certify that on April 17, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will be electronically served
on all counsel of record.

Richard G. Perque, T.A.
700 Camp St.
(504) 681-2003
Fax: (504) 681-2004

Attorney for Plaintiffs in No. 14-97

John M. Landis
Lesli Harris
Maurine Wall
546 Carondelet St.
(504) 581-3200
Fax: (504) 596-0892

Attorneys for Plaintiffs in No. 14-327

/s S. Kyle Duncan
S. Kyle Duncan

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