Civil Procedure DIGESTED CASES University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law

CIVIL PROCEDURE Jurisdiction 2 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION NAVALES V. ABAYA FACTS: Petitioners consisting of m
ore than three hundred junior officers and enl isted men, mostly from the elite
units of the AFP who all took part in a failed coup attempt in Oakwood Suites, M
akati, filed a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court questioning the ju
risdiction of the Judge Advocate General in fil ing charges against them for vio
lations of the Articles of War Sections 67, 96, and 97. The Regional Trial Court
acquitted 290 of the original 331 soldiers who participated in the mutiny. Peti
tioners contend that the Judge Advocate General due to the fact that their parti
cipation in the mutiny was not service connected . The present petitions for pro
hibition and for habeas corpus were then filed wi th the Supreme Court. Acting o
n the prayer for the issuance of temporary restrai ning order in the petition fo
r prohibition, the Supreme Court directed the parti es to observe the status quo
prevailing before the filing of the petition. Wheth er or not the Regional Tria
l Court can divest the military courts of jurisdictio n. ISSUE: HELD: RA 7055 pr
ovides that "Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons su
bject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographic
al Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Pe nal Code,
other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless o f whethe
r or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which ma y be na
tural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, exc ept wh
en the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is se rvice
-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Prov ided
, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, ord er
or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tri
ed by the proper civil courts." As used in this Section, service-connected cr im
es or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Article s
72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. In im
posing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other s
pecial laws, or local government ordinances. The second paragraph of the above
p rovision explicitly specifies what are considered service-connected crimes or o
ff enses under Commonwealth Act 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the Artic
les of War. Section 1 of RA 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction o
ver the foregoing offenses. In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055, the Regiona
l T rial Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over
thos e charged with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97 of the Articles
of W ar, as these are specifically included as service-connected offenses or cri
mes und er Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military
courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. There was no factual an
d legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to rule that violations of said artic
les of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d'etat and, as su
ch, abs orbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigat
ion, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d'etat against Nava
les, et al., and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial c
ourt app roved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against Navales et a
l. There is, as yet, no evidence on record that the Navale et al., committed the
violatio ns of Articles 63, 64, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtheranc
e of coup d'etat. In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges w
ere not se rvice-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime
of coup d'eta t, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Such declara tion is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does
not exist.
3 Page
CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION EMILIO La'o v. Republic FACTS: Government Service Ins
urance System GSIS is the registered owner of three parcels of land with a five-
storey building and other improvements thereon. GSI S entered into a lease-purch
ase agreement with the Republic through the office o f the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC). The lease was vitiated by force as th e term was clearly in adva
ntage of the OGCC. GSIS filed for nullification of the contract contending the f
ormer President Marcos used his influence to perfect t he lease agreement. The O
GCC contended, among other things that the Regional Tri al Court did not have ju
risdiction as the alleged transactions were under the ju risdiction of the Sandi
ganbayan pursuant to Executive Order No. 9. ISSUE: HELD: While it is true that j
urisdiction over the subject matter of a case maybe raise d at any stage of the
proceedings. It is nevertheless settled that a party may b e barred from raising
it on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encounte
ring an adverse decision it is improper and too late for a party to question the
jurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked jurisdi ction to secure affi
rmative relief cannot be permitted afterwards to deny the sa me jurisdiction to
escape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from questionin g the jurisdiction
of the courts below. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 4 P
age
CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY FACTS: Petitioner filed for r
ecovery of a sum of money from respondent Sibongaha noy. Defendants filed a coun
ter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgmen t was in favor of the plain
tiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the def endant. Defendants moved f
or writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the
writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising t he issue on lack of juris
diction. CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivit
y of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recover
y. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferi or courts all civil acti
ons for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interes t. CA set aside its ear
lier decision and referred the case to SC since it has ex clusive jurisdiction o
ver "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior c ourt is in issue. ISS
UE: Whether or not surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the trial court for the first time upon appeal. HELD: The C ourt believes that t
hat the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this pl ea after almost fif
teen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss rais ing the question o
f lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be esto pped or barred fr
om raising a question in different ways and for different reaso ns. Thus we spea
k of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by lach
es. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily su bmitting a caus
e and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too l ate for the lo
ser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirab le practice"
of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, onl
y if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adv erse. : Othe
r merits on the appeal. The surety insists that the lower court shou ld have gra
nted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was i ssued with
out the summary hearing. In the case at bar, the surety had been notif ied of th
e plaintiffs motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitt
ed for consideration. In fact, the surety s counsel was present in cou rt when t
he motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him
a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed th at perio
d to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefo
re, complain that it was deprived of its day in court The orders appeale d from
are affirmed. 5 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI vs. HON. PEDRO
A. RAMIREZ and FRANCISCO RAM OS Judgment for a sum of money and a writ of execu
tion was rendered in favor of Ind ependent Mercantile Corporation against a cert
ain Manuel Magali. The Notice of L evy made on a parcel of land registered in th
e name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said
levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of
the defendant Manuel Magali over t he parcel of land described in this title."
However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously stat
ed therein that the sale was with re spect to "the parcel of land described in t
his title" and not only over the righ ts and interest of Manuel Magali in the sa
me. The execution of the said final De ed of Sale was annotated at the back of s
aid title. Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, file
d a petition with the respondent Court praying for the cancellation of the TCT.
An opposition to the said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile Corporati
on. After the parties submitted their r espective Memoranda, the respondent Cour
t issued an Order dismissing the petitio n. The herein petitioners did not appea
l the dismissal of the petition as they f iled for the cancellation of the TCT.
Instead, they filed a complaint praying fo r the cancellation of the conveyances
and sales that had been made on the proper ty previously registered in the name
of Domingo Magali, herein private responden t Francisco Ramos who claimed to ha
ve bought the property from Independent Merca ntile Corporation. Private respond
ent Francisco Ramos failed to obtain a title o ver the property in his name in v
iew of the existence of an adverse claim annota ted on the title thereof at the
instance of the herein petitioners. Private resp ondent Francisco Ramos filed a
Motion to dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion , the respondent Court, dismis
sed Civil Case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. A Motion for reconsi
deration filed by the petitioners was denied by th e respondent Judge. A second
Motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. IS SUE: HELD: Whether or not th
e dismissal of civil case can be annulled and set as ide. FACTS: It is neither f
air nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceedi ng which was t
aken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the sa me irrespecti
ve of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppe l requires k
nowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The s ame thing i
s true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, amo
ng others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the fac
ts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter
. The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their righ t over the
ir property in the Civil Case is rendered more acute in the face of th e undispu
ted fact that the property in question admittedly belonged to the petit ioners,
and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result of an er
ror committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in t he exec
ution proceeding. The 6 Page
Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent shall be deemed denied and the
respondent Court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case. 7 Page
CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION EUSTACIO ATWEL Vs CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE ASSOC., IN
C Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association. As
CP AI president, he bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The pr
ope rty was later on converted into a wet market where agricultural, livestock a
nd o ther farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for vari
ous f orms of amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals
from t he wet market, was paid to CPAI. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, pet
itioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPAI president and administrator of the
proper ty. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPAI
vice-pr esident and treasurer, respectively. Other elected officers and members
formed t heir own group and registered themselves in the Securities and Exchang
e Commissi on as officers and members of respondent CPAI. However, petitioners n
ot listed a s members. CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and pe
titioners, w ithout authority, were collecting rentals from the wet market vendo
rs. Petitione rs filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction where they con
tended that si nce the property was purchased using the money of petitioner Manu
el Melgazo s fa ther, it belonged to the deceased and it was impossible for the
CPAI to have acq uired ownership over the property in 1968 when it was only in 1
997 that it was i ncorporated and registered with the SEC. It ruled that CPA to
be one and the sam e as CPAI, CPA as the owner of poperty and not Melgazo. It ru
led in favor of CPA I. Petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction
of the SEC special commercial court over the case. CA affirmed the decision. IS
SUE: Whether or not the petitioners are estopped from questioning jurisdiction a
fter participating i n the proceeding. The Court agreed with the petitioners tha
t estoppel cannot app ly because a court s jurisdiction is conferred exclusively
by the Constitution o r by law, not by the parties agreement or by estoppel. Th
e jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases enu
merated in Section 5 o f PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general juris
diction. In the case at bar, the elements of an intra-corporate controversy are
not present. The record s reveal that petitioners were never officers nor member
s of CPAI. CPAI itself a dmitted this in its pleadings. In fact, petitioners wer
e the only remaining memb ers of CPA which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was
registered in the SEC. Th e determination as to who is the true owner of the di
sputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature an
d should be threshed out in a regular court - conflict among the parties here wa
s outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court The rule remains that
estoppel does not confer j urisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cau
se of action or subject matt er of the case. Unfortunately for CPAI, no exceptio
nal circumstance appears in t his case to warrant divergence from the rule. Juri
sdiction by estoppel is not av ailable here. HELD: FACTS: 8 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE JURISDICTION DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO Vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, and FRANCISCO TESORERO FACTS: Davao Light & Power C
o., filed a complaint for damages against private re spondent Francisco Tesorero
before the RTC praying for damages in the amount of P11,OOO,OOO.OO. Instead of
filing its answer, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that: (
a) the complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiff s claim has
been extinguished or otherwise rendered moot and acad emic; (c) there was non-jo
inder of indispensable parties; and (d) venue was impr operly laid. Of these fou
r grounds, the last mentioned is most material in the c ase at bar. The trial co
urt issue a Resolution dismissing petitioner s complaint on the ground of improp
er venue. The plaintiff being a private corporation, und oubtedly Banilad, Cebu
City is the plaintiff s principal place of business as al leged in the complaint
, and which for purposes of venue, is deemed as its reside nce. Conversely, in t
he defendant s motion to dismiss, it alleged and submitted that the plaintiff's pr
incipal office is in Davao City, as stated in the Contract of Lease and another
Contract of Lease of Generating Equipment executed by the p laintiff with the NA
POCOR. The motion on the ground of improper venue was grante d and petitioner s
motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals r endered the assail
ed judgment, denied due course and dismissed the petition. The petitioner filed
the instant petition. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the venue wa s proper. It is p
rivate respondent s contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and n ot Ceb
u City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is estopped from claiming that
its residence is in Cebu City, in view of contradictory statements made by petit
ioner prior to the filing of the action for damages. It cannot be disputed that
petitioner s principal office is in Cebu City, per its amended articles of incor
poration and by-laws. Private respondent is not a party to any of the cont racts
presented. He is a complete stranger to the covenants executed between pet itio
ner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rath
er flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the ele ctr
ic generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are
likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or representation ma
de by petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in several civi l
cases that its residence is in Davao City, should estop it from filing the dam a
ge suit before the Cebu courts. Moreover, there is no showing that private resp
ondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representation
by petitioner. 9 Page

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS 10 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA vs. MARIANO T. TIANO FACTS: hei
rs. Since at the time of the sales his daughters Josefina and Crecencia did n ot
know about the sale, they did not object to it. Crecencia and Josefina filed an
action for recovery of property against the ventee, Mariano Tiano. He was the n
served his summons and contended a special defense of prescription. He contend
ed that it was not from the date of filing of the complaint but from the time of
service of the summons that the prescription period interrupts. ISSUE: HELD: Wh
ether or not the prescription period stops at the time of the filing of the com
p laint. Ciriaco Potestas, father of respondent sold a parcel of land without th
e consent of 3 of his Civil actions are deemed commenced from date of the filing
and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of Court, without taking into acc
ount the issuance and service of summons. Commencement of the suit prior to the
expiration of the pres criptive period, interrupts the prescription period. Pres
cription period commenc es at the time when the suit is filed. The established r
ule is that the commence ment of a suit prior to expiration period interrupts th
e running of the statute as to parties to the action. The contention that the pe
riod was not interrupted until after the defendant received the summons legal ba
sis. 11 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 LOURDES DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS The petition for re
view seeks to nullify Resolution of the Court of Appeals, whi ch reversed the De
cision of the Regional Trial Court reinstated the Decision of the Manila Metropo
litan Trial Court (MeTC), which ordered petitioner Dela Cruz t o vacate the subj
ect lot in favor of respondent. Petitioner Lourdes dela Cruz, w as one of the le
ssees of the house of the Reyes family. After a fire ravaged the house, the Reye
s demanded all the lessees to vacate the premises. Dela Cruz ref used and subseq
uently, the lot was sold by the Reyes to Tan. Tan sent eviction n otice to dela
Cruz and then finally filed an ejection case against them. The cas e was filed i
n the MeTC after 1 year of the instance of forcible entry. Dela Cru z contended
that the MeTC have no jurisdiction over the complaint. ISSUE: Whethe r or not th
e MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. RULING: The original juri sdiction o
ver ejectment cases lies in first level courts. Section 1 of Rule 70 o f the rul
es of court defines 2 kinds of procedure that is under the jurisdiction of Summa
ry Procedure which is cognizance by first level courts. In action of fo rcible e
ntry, 3 requisites must concur 1) Plaintiffs must allege prior physical possessi
on of the property 2) Deprivation of possession 3) Must be files within 1 year.
The other kind of ejectment is unlawful detainer were one unlawfully wit hholds
a property after an expiration or termination of the right to possess. Th e cour
t finds that the ejectment case falls within the latter. In unlawful detai ner c
ases, jurisdiction is conferred by allegation in the pleadings. FACTS: 12 P a g
e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 REPUBLIC V. KENRICH DEVELOPMENT CORP FACTS: This case ste
mmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a co
ncrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located b ehind the Civil Avi
ation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office. Parce ls of land were al
legedly registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion. The Soli citor General fil
ed a complaint of cancellation of the TCT's against Kenrich Corpo ration. After nu
merous pretrial conferences the OSG moved to declare the defenda nt in default.
Kenrich contended that it filed an answer through Atty. Garlitos, its counsel wh
ich was denied by the lawyer. It was found that another person si gned for Atty.
Garlitos. ISSUE: Whether or not an answer can be admitted despite the lack of s
ignature by the counsel. HELD: Only the signature of either the pa rty himself o
r his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned t
o one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. Procedural requ irements whi
ch have been labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid rai son d' eitre.
Procedural rules are promulgated into law designed to facilitate the adjudicati
on of cases and while the court related the rules from time to time, it must not
let it be the last bastion for erring litigants. 13 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGO
L AND TIBAYAN FACTS: Respondents filed cases in the Securities and Exchange Comm
ission against petitioner praying for the full accounting of earnings with regar
ds to a sale o f a client's property. The SEC initially heard the cases but they w
ere later trans ferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to RA 8799, which tr
ansferred jurisd iction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the c
ourts. After obta ining an unfavorable decision, Petitioner filed an appeal to t
he CA. The respond ents opposed the motion contending that the proper mode is a
certiorari under Ru le 43. They also filed for the motion for execution contendi
ng that the judgment was immediately executor and unless stayed by the proper mo
de of appeal after t he expiration of the 15 day period certiorari. Petitioner c
ontends that he was l ate for filing the appeal because he resorted to a wrong m
ode. He prays that his petition for certiorari be granted and that Rule 1 Sec 5
provides for liberalit y of application of the rules. ISSUE: Whether or not a pe
tition for certiorari i s proper. HELD: No compelling reason exists to relax the
stringent of applicatio n of the rules set on this case. Petitioner had known a
bout the rules but did no t file the proper mode of appeal until it expired. Tim
e and again, the court hav e filed dismissals of incorrect appeals. While litiga
tion is not a game of techn icalities, still, it does not follow that the rules
of court may be ignored at w ill and at random to prejudice of the orderly prese
ntation and resolution of the issues. Procedural rules should not be belittled o
r dismissed simply because th ey may have resulted in prejudice to a party's subst
antial rights. 14 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT C ORPORATION, FACTS: This was originally a case of an acti
on for torts and damages and specifi c performance with a prayer for temporary r
estraining order. The damages were no t specifically stated in the prayer but th
e body of the complaint assessed a P 7 8.75M. damages suffered by the petitioner
. The amount of docket fee paid was onl y P41O.OO. The petitioner then amended t
he complaint and reduced the damages to P1O M only. ISSUES: When does a court ac
quire jurisdiction. Whether or not an am ended complaint vests jurisdiction in t
he court. The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading wi
ll not vest jurisdiction in the court, mu ch less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. All complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being p
rayed for. Damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in a
ny case. HELD: 15 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 PROTON PILIPINAS CORP. V. BANQUE NATIONAL DE PARIS Petiti
oner Proton availed of the credit facilities of herein respondent National e de
Paris (BNP) to guarantee the payment of its obligation to Automotive Corpor atio
n Philippines, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group). Under the terms of the
trust agreement, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold
them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the
condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be appl ied
to its obligations to it. A few weeks after, Proton failed to deliver the pr oc
eeds of the sale. Pursuant to the agreement, Proton was issued a letter of dem a
nd by BNP. The BNP filed for an action for recovery and damages in the Makati R
TC. Proton filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the co
rrect docket fees and that BNP failed to send additional letters. ISSUE: HELD:
W hether or not jurisdiction was acquired over the complaint by BNP. FACTS: In t
he case at bar, jurisdiction was not acquired. Respondent merely relied on t he
assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under th
e circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing wha t
respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complain t
merits dismissal. BNP must be reassessed of the proper docket fees. It is not s
imply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the pa
yment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction ov
er the subject matter or nature on the action. Although the payment of the prop
e r docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the p
la intiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time within the expir
ati on of applicable prescription or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails
to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of
jur isdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. 16 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 SUN INSURANCE OFFICE V. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presi
ding Judge and MANUEL C HUA UY PO TIONG. Petitioner Sun Insurance Office filed a
complaint for the consignation of a prem ium refund on a fire insurance policy
with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respon
dent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private responden t was declared in default for failure
to file the required answer within the reg lementary period. On the other hand,
private respondent filed a complaint for th e refund of premiums and the issuan
ce of a writ of preliminary attachment agains t petitioner. Although the prayer
in the complaint did not quantify the amount o f damages sought said amount may
be inferred from the body of the complaint to b e about Fifty Million Pesos. Onl
y the amount of P21O.OO was paid by private resp ondent as docket fee which prom
pted petitioners counsel to raise his objection, which was disregarded by respon
dent Judge. The Court thereafter returned the sa id records to the trial court w
ith the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the exclusion o
f Judge Castro. The Court issued a Resolution dir ecting the judges to reassess
the docket fees and requires all clerks of court t o issue certificates of re-as
sessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewis e required to specify in the
ir pleadings the amount sought to be recovered. Judg e Maximiano Asuncion, to wh
om Civil Case was thereafter assigned, issued an Orde r requiring the parties in
the case to comment on the Clerk of Court s letter-re port. Petitioners then fi
led a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said ord
er of Judge Asuncion. Court of Appeals rendered a decis ion ruling, among others
, Denying due course to the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and pr
oper docket fee has not been paid. It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of t he prescribed docket fe
e, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the su bject matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleadin g is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment o f the fee within a r
easonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescrip tive or reglementar
y period. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Cour t or his duly auth
orized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Th
e petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo
is instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should b
e paid by private respondent considering the total amount of t he claim sought i
n the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from t
he allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private re spondent to pay
the deficiency. HELD: ISSUE: FACTS: 17 P a g e

18
P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA V
s FIDELA DEL ROSARIO FACTS: A complaint for rescission of a deed of sale was fil
ed by herein responde nts, heirs of Fidela del Rosario, which was signed by the
deceased, which was fr audulently executed. They averred that Fidela signed the
deed wherein facts demo nstrate that she intended to sign a deed of mortgage. Pe
titioner contends that t he trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the ca
se since that the proper docket fee was not properly assessed and paid. Responde
nts contend that they did not know that they paid the incorrect amount and fault
the clerk of court. ISSU E: HELD: Whether or not jurisdiction was properly acqu
ired. This Court has ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initi
atory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court w
ith ju risdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount
of doc ket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the c
lerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the
responsi bility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case wil
l be requ ired to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost
. it is be yond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court. If petitioners believed that the assessment was
incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petit
ioners bela tedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this
petition, at tempting to support their position with the opinion and certificati
on of the Cle rk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such ce
rtification ha s no bearing on the instant case. 19 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1 Neypes v Court of Appeals FACTS: Neypes filed an action f
or annulment of judgment and titles of land and/o r reconveyance and/or reversio
n with preliminary injunction before the RTC again st the private respondents. L
ater, in an order, the trial court dismissed petiti oners' complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy o
f the order of dismissal and, on the 15th day therea fter filed a motion for rec
onsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing t
he motion for reconsideration which petitioners recei ved on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a not ice of appeal and paid th
e appeal fees on August 3, 1998. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, ho
lding that it was filed eight days late. This was recei ved by petitioners on Ju
ly 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsiderat ion but this too was de
nied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mand
amus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal b
efore the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonab
ly filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15day reglementary period
to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since thi s was the day they rece
ived the final order of the trial court denying their mot ion for reconsideratio
n. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 , only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period f or appeal. On Septem
ber 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that t he 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the d ay they received t
he February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. Accordi ng to the appella
te court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rule s. Whether or no
t it is proper to allow a fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dismissal of
the Motion for Reconsideraiton. To standardize the appeal perio ds provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal thei r cases, the C
ourt deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh peri
od rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule a
ims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted f rom receipt o
f the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsider ation (wheth
er full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The SC thus he ld that pet
itioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh per iod of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denyin g their m
otion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken wit hin 15 d
ays from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunc
tive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from a nother.
It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily i mplies
. 20 P a g e HELD: ISSUE :
Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may
be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from noti
ce of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 o
r der denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this n
ew rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the ap
pe al period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The ori
gin al period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirem
ent for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes sig
nifi cant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for re
consi deration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed deci
sion i s given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minim
ize and /or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with di
spatch a nd to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we l
ikewise a spire to deliver justice fairly. 21 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTION 22 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 HEIRS OF DOLLETON V. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC. Petitione
rs Heirs filed for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and p ossessio
n with preliminary injunction/restraining order and damages against resp ondents
Fil-Estate Management Inc. They claimed that they have been in open, exc lusive
, and notorious possession of parcels of land for more than 90 years until Fil-E
state forcibly ousted them. Fil-Estate contended that that have in their p osses
sion numerous certificates covering the parcels of land and can only be att acke
d collaterally pursuant to PD 1529. The respondents also filed a motion to d ism
iss on the grounds that the petitioners do not have a cause of action the RTC di
smissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. ISSUE: HELD: The elementary te st
for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts w
hich if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the suffic i
ency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the c
omplaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not b
e dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant. T
his Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficie
ntly stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the
o wners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof
, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties an
d, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. The petitioners are in open,
co ntinuous and notorious possession of the disputed parcels of land for more th
an 90 years. The rule of civil procedure provides the elements of a cause of act
ion ; 1) a right in favor of a plaintiff. 2) An obligation on the part of the de
fend ant to violate such right. 3) an act or omission on the part of defendant o
f the right of the plaintiff which constitutes such right. Whether or not there
is a sufficient cause of action. FACTS: 23 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 SPOUSES JUAN J. DIAZ and ELIZABETH L. DIAZ vs. JOSE DIAZ
Action for a sum of money was filed before the Regional Trial Court of by privat
e respondent Jose Diaz against petitioners Juan and Elizabeth Diaz. The complai
n t stemmed from a property bought in Greenhills by Elizabeth Diaz. It was bough
t with money of a previous sale of lot both co-owned by Jose and Elizabeth. The
Gr eenhills property was effectively and partly held in trust by Elizabeth for J
ose . Jose demands P2 million for his part of the lot taking into account the cu
rren t value of the lot. Elizabeth Diaz filed a motion to dismiss for lack of ca
use o f action. Petitioners maintain that private respondent s Complaint failed
to sta te a cause of action as it contained mere averments of facts and conclusi
ons of law that neither establish any right or claim on the part of private resp
ondent nor constitute wrongful acts or omissions violative of his right. ISSUE:
HELD: W hether or not there constitutes a sufficient cause of action. FACTS: It
has been consistently ruled that a complaint states a cause of action when it co
ntains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the corr el
ative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendan t
in violation of said legal right. In the case at bar, the connection which pet
itioners seek can readily be found by an examination of the Complaint in its ent
irety. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that he was entitled to rec
e ive P15,000.00 as his share in the sales proceeds of the Mandaluyong property.
H e thereafter claimed that, with his knowledge and without his objection, the
sam e P15,000.00 was used by his brother in paying for the Greenhills property.
Havi ng allowed his brother to use his money, private respondent demanded the re
turn of the present equivalent of his contribution following the sale of the Gre
enhil ls property but the said demand was rejected. Hypothetically admitting the
se all egations, private respondent s Complaint satisfies all the elements of a
cause o f action. 24 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 Zepeda Vs China Banking Spouses Zepeda obtained a loan fr
om respondent China Bank and subsequently faile d to uphold their obligations wi
th said loan. Allegedly they approached the bank and negotiated a restructuring
of the loan, which was said to have been granted . However; there were no docume
nts to prove this. Respondent bank then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose t
heir property where itself emerged as the highest bidder. The petitioners failed
to redeem the property. Petitioners argued the f oreclosure proceedings should
have been annulled due to the bank failing to comp ly with the posting and publi
cation requirements of the law. Additionally, they claimed the real estate mortg
age and promissory note was signed in blank, with n o copy furnished to them. Re
spondent's motion for dismissal was denied. Hence it f iled a special answer with
affirmative defenses, including a set of 20 questions , which were never answere
d by the Petitioners. The Trial Court denied China Ban ks affirmative defenses a
s well as its motion to expunge the complaint for being premature. The CA ruled
in favor of respondent on the reasons of Zepedas acting in bad faith when ignori
ng the hearings of the court, and China Bank's affirmativ e defenses, failed to an
swer the 20 questions, and that the complaint failed to show cause of action. IS
SUE: HELD: Whether or not spouses' complaint contained the sufficient cause of act
ion. FACTS: An action is formal statement of the operative facts which gives ris
e to a remed ial right. Thus upon only the concurrence of the 3 requisites is th
eir sufficien t cause of action. We find allegations of the complaint sufficient
to establish a cause of action. Thus, the Spouses have sufficient cause of acti
on. 25 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 GERONIMO QUADRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Quadra, the C
hief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepsta kes Office (PCSO) w
hen he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Chari
ty Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the ra
nk and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Associatio n of Sweepstakes S
taff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). He was administratively
charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law
and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct pr ejudicial to the
interest of the service. The CSC found Quadra guilty and summar ily dismissed hi
m. Quadra filed a petition for reinstatement together with damag es to the Court
of Industrial Relations. The PCSO moved to dismiss the case on t he grounds tha
t it has no jurisdiction over PCSO and that the complaint lacked a valid cause o
f action. The case remained in the CIR until it was established. S ubsequent the
NLRC labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Quadra. The PCS O contended
that the filing of the case with CIR tantamount to splitting cause o f action. I
SSUE: HELD: Whether or not there was a splitting of the cause of acti on. The co
urt agrees with the petitioner that the filing of a petition for damages b efore
CIR did not constitute a splitting of a cause of action under the Rules of Cour
t. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of act ion,
claim or demand into two parts, and bringing such suit for one of such part s o
nly, only intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purp os
e of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation of the defendant and the mul t
iplicity of suits. Thus, Quadra did not split the cause of action when it filed
the case in CIR. 26 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 ROGELIO MARISCAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS Private respondent
Bella Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner Rogelio Ma riscal before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for the annulment of their marr iage contracted o
n the ground that it was void ab initio for having been solemni zed without a va
lid marriage license and being bigamous. She also sought to reco ver from Marisc
al a sum of money she allegedly sent to him while she was working as a nurse ove
r the course of their marriage. She also filed another criminal c ase on a separ
ate RTC for bigamy and perjury. Mariscal moved to dismiss the acti on for damage
s contending a splitting of action along with annulment and equival ent damages.
Whether or not the separate criminal case files constitutes on spli tting a cau
se of action and litis pendentia. To interpose a cause of action in a countercla
im and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or part y would be
splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules. The filing o f the cri
minal complaint and civil action for damages does not constitute litis pendentia
. In litis pendentia, what is essential is the identity and similarity of the is
sues under construction. Interpose a cause of action is a counter claim and agai
n to invoke it in a complaint with the same person is tantamount with t he split
ting of a cause of action. HELD: ISSUE: FACTS: 27 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR FACTS: Private respondents own a
parcel of land. They allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said proper
ty for a period of ten years and construct there on a small house. After the exp
iration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion
and removal of the house constructed thereon but Hinog refused and instead clai
med ownership. Private respondents filed a compla int for Recovery of Ownership a
nd Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages against Hinog. Trial ensued bu
t Hinog died without completing his evidence. New counsel appeared for the decea
sed and filed a motion to expunge the complaint fr om the record and nullify all
court proceedings on the ground that private respo ndents failed to specify the
amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees and further alle
ged that the private respondents failed to pay the c orrect docket fee since the
main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ow
nership, possession and removal of construction. Priv ate respondents opposed. T
he trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged fr om the records. The petit
ioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this p
etition. ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretio n was committed by the t
rial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fe
es. It must be clarified that the said order is but a re solution on an incident
al matter. The remedy against an interlocutory order is t o continue with the ca
se in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is hande d down, to take an ap
peal in the manner authorized by law.Only when the court is sued such order with
out or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of disc retion and when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the r emedy of appeal wo
uld not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. Such spec ial circumstances
are absolutely wanting in the present case. Nonpayment at the time of filing do
es not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long a s the fee is pai
d within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, mor e so when the p
arty involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules. T hus, when insu
fficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and the re was no int
ention to defraud the government HELD: 28 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 Flores v. Mallare-Philipps FACTS: Respondent Binongcal fi
led a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of j urisdiction since the amount
of the demand was only P11,643.00 and refused to pa y representing cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit. Fernando Calion allegedly indebted to petit
ioner joined in moving for the dismissal of the comp laint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. The tria
l court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdict ion. Petitioner appealed b
y certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps who dismissed his complai
nt for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: HELD: In cases of permissive joinder of part
ies, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Sec tion 6 of Rule 3, the tot
al of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdiction al test. Needless to sta
te, if the causes of action are separate and independent , their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amo
unt of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separ
ate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal tria l court. In the case a
t bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictio nal test is subject t
o the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful s crutiny of the compl
aint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for t he reason that the
claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and ne
ither of which falls within its jurisdiction. No. order appea led from is affirm
ed Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jur isdiction 29 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS 30 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE SALONGA Rule 3 vs. WARNER BARNES FACTS: Westchester Fire Insuran
ce Company of New York entered into a contract with Tina J. Gamboa for the shipm
ent of one case of rayon yardage. U pon arrival, it was discovered that there we
re a shortage of 1,723.12 pesos on t he shipment from San Francisco, California,
on steamer Clovis Victory, to Manila . Consignee, Jovito Salonga, demanded from
American President Lines agents of th e ship Clovis Victory, demanding settleme
nt, and when apparently no action was t aken on this claim, plaintiff demanded p
ayment thereof from Warner, Barnes and C o., Ltd., as agent of the insurance com
pany in the Philippines to pay him the ex cess amount. In the meantime, American
President Lines agreed to pay to the plai ntiff the amount under its liability
in the bill of lading, and when this offer was rejected, the claim was finally s
ettled. As a result, the amount claimed in the complaint as the ultimate liabili
ty of the defendant under the insurance con tract was reduced. The trial court h
eld that defendant, as agent of Westchester Fire Insurance is responsible upon t
he insurance claim subject to the suit. ISSU E: HELD: It is claimed that this ac
tion should have been filed against its princ ipal, the Westchester Fire Insuran
ce. This point is also well taken. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requi
res that "every action must be prosecuted in t he name of the real party in inte
rest." A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought ag
ainst the real party in interest, or against a party which may be bound by the j
udgment to be rendered therein. The real party in interest is the party who woul
d be benefited or injured by the judgment, or t he "party entitled to the avails
of the suit" In the case at bar, the defendant issued upon in its capacity as a
gent of Westchester Fire Insurance in spite of t he fact that the insurance cont
ract has not been signed by it. As we have said, the defendant did not assume an
y obligation thereunder either as agent or as a p rincipal. It cannot, therefore
, be made liable under said contract, and hence it can be said that this case wa
s filed against one who is not the real party in i nterest Whether or not the de
fendant is the real party in interest. 31 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 EDUARDO RAYO v. METROBANK FACTS: Midas Diversified Export
obtained loans from Metrobank. To secure the pay ment OF the loan, a mortgage w
as executed in favor of Metrobank over three parce ls of land When Midas failed
to pay, Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the re al estate mortgage. At the b
idding, Metrobank acquired the property. Metrobank p osted a bondrecquired for t
he issuance of a writ of possession. Rayo, a coassign ee of the property filed a
n action for nullification of the sale. Metrobank oppo sed for the motion conten
ding that he is not a real party in interest. ISSUE: HE LD: Initially, it is rec
ognized herein petitioner as the co-assignee of the subj ect real properties. Ho
wever, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, the petit
ioner has no present substantial interest to institute th e annulment of judgmen
t proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of p ossession. Rayo would
not be injured by the judgment. An ex-parte application fo r a writ of possessi
on not a strictly judicial process contemplated in Article 4 43 of the New Civil
Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possessio
n. Whether or not petitioner has a legal personality in the s uit. 32 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 Hon. Carlos Fortich Vs Hon Renato Corona FACTS: This case
concerns the motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution dated November
17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. In p revious case, t
he Court voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideratio n as a result
of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolutio n dated Janua
ry 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redr ess before t
he Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that th e motion to
refer the case to the Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited.
In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed that the cas e be refer
red to the Court en banc inasmuch as their earlier MR was resolved by a vote of
two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the Constitutio n was not
met. ISSUE: Whether or not the referral to the court en banc partakes of the na
ture of a second motion for reconsideration. HELD: It is affirmative. T he conte
ntion, therefore, that the Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispo se of t
he earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequentl y, the
present MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reco nside
ration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, S ecti
on 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedur e,
is prohibited. True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertai n
a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily p e
rsuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed w
ith express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fa
il to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable
to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their s
e cond motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of th
is incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are not
hi ng more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denie
d i n the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained
the rein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the s
aid R esolution. 33 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RAMON P. ARON vs. Heirs of Alfredo REALON Rule 3 Roman Realon wa
s the owner of two parcels of land which was inherited by Alfredo Realon and his
siblings. Sometime in 1979, Alfredo executed a contract to sell his undivided p
ortion of the lot to petitioner. He also obliged himself to execu te a deed of f
inal sale. However Alfredo failed to register the sale. To secure the balance of
the purchase price Aaron, mortgaged the property to the remaining heir. Alfredo
Realon died and his successors were unaware about the sale. Engr. Ilaban filed,
the attorney-infact of Aron, filed a case for consignation agains t the heirs o
f Realon. The Realon's countered by contending that undue influence w as present a
t the execution of the sale and that the balance of the price due in the contrac
t to sell was not paid. Aaron contended that the contract to sell wa s supersede
d by the deeds of the sale with mortgage. In respond the Realon's conte nded that
even the other heirs did not receive the proceeds from the contract to sell alle
gedly executed by Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court held that there wa s fraud p
resent. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the other heirs of Alfredo are the real part
ies in interest. FACTS: The settled rule is that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the nam e of the real party in a fiduciary capacity. The benefi
ciary must be deemed as t he real party in interest. Thus the presence of all th
e indispensible party is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial p
ower. The plaintiff is man dated to implead all indispensable party and in the a
bsence of one render all su bsequent judgment voids. Failure to include the othe
r heirs as indispensible par ties in the complaint to nullify the contract to se
ll is fatal to the complaint. 34 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN Paciencia Rega
la owns a fishpond, which her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Mercado le ased to Eduar
do Lapid for a three years. Lessee in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lop
ez during the last seven months of the original lease. Ernesto Sale nga was hire
d by Eduardo Lapid as fishpond watchman. In the sub-lease, Rafael Lo pez rehired
respondent Salenga. Ernesto Salenga sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez and
Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the share in the harvest. S
alenga file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudic ation Boar
d (PARAB). Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case w as instit
uted by petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Merc ado, thr
ough a Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents before the Office of the
Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, J
r. had no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P filed by responde
nt Salenga as there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga a nd Rafa
el L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was dismissible on its face. ISSUES: Whethe
r or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition . Whet
her or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution. FACTS:
The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Th
e Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no que
s tion on his authority and legal standing. Faustino Mercado, is an agent himsel
f and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot del
eg ate to another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimen
tal to the principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the for
mer . In the instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia
Rega la, owner of the fishpond and principal of Faustino Mercado. The nature of
the c ase is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject m
atter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Respondent Salenga's comp
laint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that
he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ej
ected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming ju
risdic tion as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. A defense
asserte d in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving
the iss ue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations
of the de fendant. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit, and the Ord
er and Mem orandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor are affirmed. HELD: 3
5 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 MACLARING LUCMAN vs. ALIMATAR MALAWI et al. FACTS: After
the failure of elections, respondents remained in office in a holdo ver capacity
pursuant to the provisions of sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6676 and COMELEC r esolution n
o. 2888. Respondents attempted to open their respective barangay s IR A s bank a
ccount, eventually, they allowed to open but not allowed to withdraw o wing to t
he absence of the requisite Accountant s advise. They filed a special c ivil act
ion for mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction t o compe
l petitioner to allow them to open and maintain deposit accounts and to w ithdra
w. Respondents Pangcoga, Sarip, Cadar, Macarambon and Usman testified duri ng th
e trial that they were duly elected chairpersons and testified further the refus
al of the petitioner to allow the withdrawal despite of documents presented . RT
C rendered a decision commanding petitioner to pay respondents except Alimat ar
Malawi who failed to testify, the IRA s of their respective barangays even wi th
out accountant s advice. CA affirmed the decisions. ISSUES: Whether or not res p
ondents have the causes of actions against the petitioner. Whether or not respo
ndents have the legal personality to institute the petition for mandamus. HELD:
The relationship being contractual in nature, mandamus is therefore not an avail
able remedy since mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractu
a l obligations. Furtheremore, respondents have no legal personality to institut
e petition since the funds for which the bank accounts were created belong to th
e barangay headed by respondents. The case at bar was not initiated by the baran
ga ys themselves. Neither did the barangay chairmen file the suit in representat
ion of their respective barangays. Only the barangays are the only lawful recipi
ent s of these funds 36 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ELPIDIO S. UY Vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner and P

ublic Estates Authority, as a single proprietorship doing busine ss in the name
of Edison Development executed a landscaping and construction agr eement in Heri
tage Park, Taguig. A few months after, alleging a huge discrepancy between the r
eport and actual progress of the site terminated the project,Uy fi led a complai
nt for recovery of the spent funds which was granted by the Regiona l Trial Cour
t against PEA. Heritage filed a petition for injunction against Uy c ontending t
hat the Regional Trial Court did not acquirejurisdiction over the cas e since He
ritage was not impleaded ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not Heritage is an in dispensib
le party. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the c
ourt s act ion in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the
case can b e had. The party s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in
the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that h
is legal pr esence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Throug
h a deed of assignment, PEA ceased to be the project manager and assigned its ri
ghts to Heri tage. Thus PEA is no longer a party-in-interest. Instead, it is now
private resp ondent HPMC, as the assignee, who stands to be benefited or injure
d by the judgm ent in the suit. In its absence, there cannot be a resolution of
the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete or equi
table. We thus reiterate that HPMC is an indispensable party. 37 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SC
HEER Respondent was granted a permanent resident status card by the Bureau of Im
migra tion and Deportation. The BID received information that Scheer was wanted
by the German Federal Policeand that a warrant of arrest had been issued against
him. The BID obtained custody of Scheer for deportation proceeding. Scheer has
filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the legal standing of the Immigrati
on Com missioner. He contends that the commissioner has no authority to decide w
hether an alien may stay or not. The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment an
nulling the summary deportation proceedings. Domingo, the commissioner of Immigr
ation c ontends that the judgment is void because the Board of Commissioners wer
e not im pleaded in the complaint filed. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the Board o
f Commiss ioners is an indispensible party. FACTS: The respondent was arrested a
nd detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petiti
oner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedien ce to the said Deportation O
rder. Thus, the BOC is an indispensible party. Secti on 7 of Rule 3 requires ind
ispensible parties to be joined as plaintiffs and def endants. The joinder of in
dispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties
to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain r eal finality. The However
, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a gro und for the dismissal of
an action. Parties may be added by order of the court o n motion of the party o
r on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just
. 38 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 VICTORIANA BORLASA vs. VICENTED POLISTICO FACTS: An actio
n was instituted by petitioner against respond ent in the Court of First Instanc
e for the purpose of securing the dissolution o f a voluntary association named
Turuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the defen dants to account for and surren
der the money and property of the association in order that its affairs may be l
iquidated and its assets applied according to law . The trial judge having susta
ined a demurrer for defect of parties and the plai ntiffs electing not to amend,
the cause was dismissed, and from this order an ap peal was taken by the plaint
iffs to this court. ISSUE: HELD: To require all memb ers to appear would be quit
e impossible. Hence, some members must be made to sue but only in behalf of all
the members who are not around and it is impracticabl e to bring them all to the
court. A number of them may sue for the benefit of al l. Whether or not a suit
in behalf of some members proper. 39 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 MARIBETH CORDOVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. JUDGE RICA
RDO TORNILLA FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract and dama
ges, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the Regio
nal Trial Cou rt against private respondents, spouses Romeo and Marietta Laguard
ia, and Judge Ricardo F. Tornilla, along with the Sheriff and his deputies. Cord
ova failed to include a certificate of forum shopping. The complaint, however, d
id not include the certification against forum shopping required. It was only su
bsequently tha t petitioner submitted the certification in compliance with the c
ircular and thu s, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The RTC di
smissed the comp laint for lack of merit and for failure to prosecute. ISSUE: Wh
ether or not ther e was substantial compliance in the requirements. HELD: the re
quirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with this requirem ent does no
t excuse a party's failure to comply therewith in the first instance. I n those ca
ses where the Court excused non-compliance with the certificate requir ement, sp
ecial circumstances or compelling reasons existed, which made the stric t applic
ation of the circular clearly inequitable. In this case, however, petiti oner's ac
tion hardly justifies a deviation from the mandatory nature of the aforequoted p
rovision. Hence, petitioner's complaint was clearly dismissible on the gro und of
forum shopping. 40 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR. vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ FACTS: Lor
eto San Juan executed a last will and testament naming Oscar Casa as one of t he
devisees. Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Teodorcio Aquino petitioned for a probate in
the will. On the pendency of the proceeding, Oscar Casa died intestate. Aquin o
substituted Casa in the proceeding. The probate court denied the substitution c
ontending that Aquino was not an executor or administrator of Casa's estate. Peti
tioner heir emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administ
rator that the heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased par
t y. He averred that the purported heirs simply agreed among themselves to appoi
nt a representative to be substituted for the deceased, which is contrary to the
r equirement of a prior hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful hei
rs are. Petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. I
SSU E: HELD: Whether or not substitution is permitted in the proceedings. The he
irs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointmen t of
an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they
stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the de ceas
ed Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executo r o
f the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal ca pa
city to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may design a
te one or some of them as their representative before the trial court. The seco
nd paragraph of Section 17 Rule 3 is explicit. The heirs may be allowed to be su
bstituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
a dministrator. The pronouncement in Law v. Court of Appeals is an exception whe
re a legal representative after unreasonable delay. Thus, Aquino cannot substitu
te Casa. Proper parties for substitution are the heirs. 41 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 GLICERIO R. BRIOSO vs. SALVADORA RILI-MARIANO Spouses Sal
vadora Rili-Mariano and Leonardo C. Mariano repurchased a property th rough the
Land Bank of the Philippines hey previously sold to Glicerio Brioso un der a pac
to de retro sale. Despite repeated demands, however, Glicerio refused t o delive
r the entire property to the Spouses Mariano. The spouses filed a case f or reco
very against Brioso. The occupants of the land, heirs of Brioso, contende d that
the Mariano's lost their standing on the property since Glicerio Brioso, as signe
d the deed of the house to his son. Brioso's also contended that Land Bank sh ould
be impleaded. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substitution of deceased Gli cer
io Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders t he
proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired n
o jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs o n
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. In other words, a party s ri
ght to due process is at stake. In the instant case, it is true that the trial c
ourt, after receiving a notice of Glicerio s death, failed to order the appeara
n ce of his legal representative or heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Or
de r merely admitting respondents motion for substitution. There was no court or
de r for Glicerio s legal representative to appear, nor did any such legal repre
sen tative ever appear in court to be substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the
resp ondents ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did
Glice rio s heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial co
urt fa iled to observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a resul
t, cont rary to the Court of Appeals decision, no valid substitution transpired
in the present case. HELD: FACTS: 42 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ISMAEL MATHAY vs. CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY FAC
TS: Petitioners filed a case for a class suit against Consolidated Mines Inc. .
They were former stock holders of the company. Consolidated Mines sent a board r
esolution requiring stockholders to signify to a special subscription which au t
horized a loan of the company to Metrobank. The parties in the suit contended t
hat the consolidated mines fraudulently filed a certification to the loan. Conso
lidated mines questions Mathay et al's capacity to institute a class suit. ISSUE:
HELD: Whether or not petitioners have the capacity to institute a class suit. T
he necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) t
hat the subject matter of the controversy be one of common or general interest t
o many persons, and (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracti
cable to bring them all to the court. An action does not become a class suit mer
ely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or i
s not a class quit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other
pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessa
r y facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the
e xistence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, 3 in orde
r t hat the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class
are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and
to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the
sub ject matter of general or common interest By the phrase subject matter pertai
ns to the physical facts. The thing real or personal and not the delict committe
d. Th us, petitioners do not have the capacity to institute a class suit. 43 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. HON. VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ FACTS: Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent parce
ls of la nd. Pedro del Rosario filed a class suit on behalf of 104 other residen
ts seekin g the titles of petitioner to be held null and void. Inocencio Bernard
o et al al so filed a classs suit against the same petitioner s construction of
fences and high walls, roads, streets and canals on the land in dispute. ISSUE:
HELD: Wheth er or not the class suits were proper. A class suit is not proper in
this case as such presupposes a common and general interest by several plaintif
fs in a single specific thing under Section 12, Rul e 3 of the Rules of Court. C
onsequently, it cannot be maintained when each of th ose impleaded as alleged pl
aintiffs "has only a special or particular interest i n the specific thing compl
etely different from another thing in which the defend ants have a like interest
." It is not a case where one or more may sue for the b enefit of all or where t
he representation of class interest affected by the judg ment or decree is indis
pensable to make each member of the class an actual party In the case at bar, a
class suit would not lie because each of the defendants h as an interest only in
the particular portion of the land he is actually occupyi ng, and not in the po
rtions individually occupied by the other defendants. They do not have a common
or general interest in the subject matter of the controvers y 44 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 3 NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLAT
E COURT, FACTS: Private respondents, incorporated sugarcane planters in Negros O
ccidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters,
filed Civ il Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf
of all su garcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petiti
oner and tw o of petitioners non-resident Newsweek correspondents Fred Bruning a
nd Barry Ca me. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants c
ommitted lib el against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fea
r" in the Feb ruary 23, 1981 issue of petitioner s weekly news magazine Newsweek
. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a
place dominat ed by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverish ed and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized
and killed them with impunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article,
taken as a whole , showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted p
resentation and/o r misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane p
lanters) in bad li ght, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliatio
n here in the Phili ppines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt
and hostility of th eir agricultural workers and of the public in general. ISSU
E: HELD: Whether or n ot a class suit is proper. The class suit is not proper. I
n the case of Corpuz and Cuaderno, the court has ruled that in order to maintain
a libel suit, it is essential that the victim mu st be identifiable. For a defa
mation to be directed at a particular class, it is essential that the allegation
must be so sweeping and all embracing that an ind ividual can prove that a defa
matory statement is directed to him. The disputed p ortion not the articles whic
h he claims to be libelous was never pointed out. 45 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE OPOSA Rule 3 vs. FACTORAN FACTS: A Civil Case was filed before R
egional Trial Court. The principal plainti ffs therein, now the principal petiti
oners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. T
he original defendant was the Honorable Ful gencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Enviro
nment and Natural Resources Secretary. His s ubstitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala , was subsequently ordered upon pr
oper motion. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit and alleges
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpay
ers, and entitled to the full benefit, use an d enjoyment of the natural resourc
e treasure that is the country s virgin tropic al rainforests." The same was fil
ed for themselves and others who are equally co ncerned about the preservation o
f said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their gene
ration as well as generations yet unborn." Conse quently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to cance l all existing timber license
agreements in the country. Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint stat
ing the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and the issue is a politi
cal question which properly pertains to the legisl ative or executive branches.
Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order gran ting the motion to dismiss.
The respondent Judge ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would imp
air contracts. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant spe cial civil action for certi
orari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court asking for rescission and setting asid
e the dismissal order since the respondent Judge grav ely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not a class suit was the prope
r course of action taken. The civil case is indeed a class suit. The case howeve
r has a special and novel element. The personality of the minors to sue for the
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibili
ty insofar as a balanced a nd healthful ecology is concerned. Every generation h
as a responsibility to pres erve the ecology. The minors' right to a sound environ
ment constitutes at the same time the performance of the obligation to ensure th
e protection of the rights o r the generations to come. The subject matter of th
e complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all ci
tizens of the Philippines. Co nsequently, since the parties are so numerous, it
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before th
e court. We likewise declare t hat the plaintiffs therein are numerous and repre
sentative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence
, all the requisites for the fi ling of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rul
e 3 of the Revised Rules of Cour t are present both in the said civil case and i
n the instant petition, the latte r being but an incident to the former. 46 P a
g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS 47 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Rule 4 v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FACTS: Pe
titioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance for the condemn ation of
certain real estate. Petitioner alleged in its complaint that it was au thorize
d by law to construct a railroad line from Paniqui to Tayug in the Provin ce of
Tarlac, and that it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the constru ction
for such line that the action was brought. After filing and duly serving t he c
omplaint on the defendants, who were persons having interest in the land in ques
tion, Petitioner, pending determination of the action, took possession of an d o
ccupied the lands described in the complaint, built its line, and put the sam e
in operation. A week before the date set for hearing of the case, Petitioner g a
ve notice to the defendants that it would move for a dismissal of the action on
the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, since it
had just ascertained that the lands actually were situated in Nueva Ecija, inst
ead of the Province of Tarlac. The trial court dismissed the action upon such gr
ound presented by Petitioner. From such pronouncement, this appeal was taken. I
S SUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over lands HELD: It was t
he intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First Instanc
e the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters m
en tioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon
loc ality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal.
The law provides simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be bro
ught in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The pro
hibi tion here is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lay
s the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with e
ither . The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section begin t
o oper ate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor
a limit ation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It i
s not to take something from the court but to grant something to the defendant.
Its word ing clearly deprives the court of nothing which it had, but gives the d
efendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he did not have. It est
ablishes a relation not between the court and the subject, after, but between th
e plainti ff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It
touches co nvenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant the unqualifie
d right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and
where, prob ably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a co
nvenient tri al. 48 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ v. HONESTO DE CASTRO FACTS: Two sepa
rate actions for registration were lodged over the same parcel of land. The firs
t action was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Ca vite in 1956 b
y Pedro Lopez, et al. The second action, meanwhile, was filed befo re the then C
ourt of First Instance of Cavite in Tagaytay City sometime in 1967 by Honest de
Castro, et al. The first case encountered a lot of opposition first from the Mun
icipality of Silang, Cavite, since it alleges that a portion of the land sought
to be registered had been leased to private persons, and was in fac t the former's
patrimonial property, to which the applicants answered that the who le of the l
and passed to them by inheritance. The municipality sought for a dism issal of t
he application for registration, which the court denied. The court rea soned tha
t even if the land was the property of the Municipality of Silang, by v irtue of
its incorporation into the city of Tagaytay, it became property of the latter.
Thus, according to the court, the municipality of Silang has no personal ity to
appear in the proceedings. In 1971, after due investigation regarding the applic
ation, the court accordingly rendered a decision approving the applicatio n and
ordering the issuance of a corresponding decree of registration to Lopez, et al.
In the second case, meanwhile, although the application for registration was fi
led only in 1967, or 11 years after the filing of the first action, the co urt o
f Tagaytay City promulgated a decision in 1968 adjudicating the land in fav or o
f de Castro, et al. De Castro, et al. claim that pursuant to Republic Act 37 49,
the Tagaytay court held jurisdiction now over the case, and as such, was the pr
oper venue for any action involving registration of lands covered by its juri sd
iction. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the trial court was divested of its jurisd i
ction. It has been submitted that a court having territorial jurisdiction over t
he prop erty should take cognizance of its registration, upon the creation of th
e Tagayt ay City branch, Pedro Lopez, et al.'s application for registration should
have bee n transferred to that court inasmuch as the property involved is locat
ed in that city. It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch remained the v
enue of pe titioners application for registration, according to RA 3749. Notably
, the law is not clear on whether or not the phrase "in the same place" refers t
o the judi cial district/province or the place where a branch of the court is st
ationed. He nce, considering the general rule that once a court acquires jurisdi
ction over a case it remains with that court until its full termination, the phr
ase "in the same place" should be interpreted as referring to the province of Ca
vite. The Ca vite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus correctly retained juris
diction over the application for registration because there was no jurisdictiona
l question in volved in the proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 299. What
was in questio n was whether the Cavite City branch of the Cavite CFI was the pr
oper venue for said case upon the creation of the Tagaytay City branch. Venue is
procedural, no t jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provid
e convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as
it relates to t he place of trial. 49 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECT
ION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. FA CTS: Petitioner filed a c
omplaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for civi l forfeiture of assets w
ith urgent plea for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preli minary injunction again
st the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow Credit and Col lection Servicesin Cit
ystate Savings Bank, Inc.. Acting on the plea for the issu ance of a TRO, the RT
C Manila issued a 72-hour TRO, and the case was raffled for hearing. The summons
intended for Glasgow remained unserved, as it could no lon ger be found at its
last address, and left no forwarding address. Subsequently, the OSG received a c
opy of Glasgow's Motion to Dismiss by Way of Special Appearanc e, alleging that th
e court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had no t been duly served
upon it, among others. The Republic opposed such motion, cont ending that the a
ction is quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was no
t a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The tri al court dismiss
ed the case on the ground of improper venue as it should have be en filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the complai nt was correct
ly dismissed due to improper venue. HELD: The Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 05-1
1-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture. The o rder dismissi
ng the Republic's complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow's account i n CSBI has n
ot yet attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal. Thus, the Ru
le of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies to the Republic's complaint.
Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule of Proced ure in Case
s of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case." Section 3, Title II (
Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedur e in Cases
of Civil Forfeiture provides that a petition for civil forfeiture sha ll be fil
ed in any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetar y instru
ment, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an un lawful
activity or to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that w
here all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds is loca
ted outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional tr ial co
urt in Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instru
ment, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner. U nder
Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, there
fore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region wher
e the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or rela
ting to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig
City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, i s wi
thin the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civ
il forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC
Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic's com
plaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow's account. 50 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 POLYTRADE CORPORATION v. VICTORIANO BLANCO FACTS: Petitio
ner initiated a suit for collection of money against Victoriano Bl anco, in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan of the place where the latter re sided. Blanc
o filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of improper ven ue since, h
e claims, according to the contract, suit may be lodged in the courts of Manila.
This Motion was denied by the CFI of Bulacan and rendered judgment a gainst Vic
toriano. ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid in Bulacan HELD : Accordi
ng to Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions t
riable by courts of first instance and this is one provides that such " actions
may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides , at th
e election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of t he sam
e Rule which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement "By writte
n agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transf erred
from one province to another." No such stipulation appears in the contract s co
vering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (
b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly lai
d in Bulacan, the province of defendant s residence. The stipulation adverte d t
o is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes of act io
n. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue a
nd be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in th
e residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties m e
rely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which woul
d indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefro
m. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselve
s to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or ex
c lusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It s
im ply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as t
rib unals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue rem
edy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio
non praesumitur. 51 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION v. ALBERT LIM FACTS: Petitio
ner corporation sold to Albert Lim grocery products in the totalin g more than P
800 thousand pesos. After tendering partial payments, Lim refused t o settle his
obligation despite repeated demands from Universal Robina. This pro mpted the l
atter to file with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a complai nt against
Lim for a sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC i ssued an
Order dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of juris diction
and improper venue. Universal Robina accordingly filed an amended compla int all
eging that the parties agreed that the proper venue for any dispute relat ive to
the transaction is Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion and ad mitte
d the amended complaint. Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latt
er failed to file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, upon
motion of Universal Robina, declared Lim in default and allowed the former to pr
esent evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still unsure whether ven ue w
as properly laid, issued an Order directing Universal Robina to file memoran dum
of authorities on whether it can file a complaint in Quezon City. Still unde ci
ded concerning the venue of actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint o n
the ground of improper venue. ISSUE: Whether or not improper venue is a proper
ground for dismissal. HELD: Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial cour
t to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint
on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in
the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy an
d expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance
. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to t
h e rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as we
ll , the right to be heard on his cause. Rules of Court explicitly provide that
imp roper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deeme
d wa ived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of
impr oper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss a
n acti on motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial court may not motu
propri o dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, thus: Dismissing
the comp laint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inf
erior cou rts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waive
d expressl y or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the ven
ue in a mot ion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Co
urt, and all ows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot o
n appeal or i n a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong v
enue, which is deemed waived. 52 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. v. KLAUS SCH
ONFELD FACTS: Private respondent was hired as a Sector Manager of Pacicon Philip
pines, Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International in the Philippine
s, to c onsult in services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. Pacific
Consulta nts transmitted a Letter of Employment to respondent, who accepted the
same whil e making a few minor modifications. Contract states that in case of an
y question or dispute arising between parties, the proper venue for such action
would be t he Court of Arbitration in London. Respondent was issued an Alien Emp
loyment Per mit by the Department of Labor and Employment, which permit was appl
ied for by P PI, and went on to serve for over a year. Upon notice of terminatio
n from Pacifi c, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Pa cific argued that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
case, as respon dent was an alien, and that according to the contract of employm
ent, the London Court would be the proper venue, or the Court in Tokyo, Japan wh
ere Pacific Cons ultants held office, or even in Canada, which was respondent's ho
me state. The Lab or Arbiter, as well as the NLRC gave due course to the petitio
n to dismiss filed by Pacific Consultants and dismissed the complaint. On appeal
, the Court of App eals reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not a clause in a contract c
an validly limit th e venue of an action. In the instant case, no restrictive wo
rds like were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitr
ation in London is a n exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out
of the employment con tract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venueis
that while they are co nsidered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a c
ontract do not, as a ru le, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of th
e Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They
should be considered me rely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiti
ng venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
If the intention of the p arties were to restrict venue, there must be accompany
ing language clearly and c ategorically expressing their purpose and design that
actions between them be li tigated only at the place named by them. Pacific Con
sultants contend that Schonf eld should have filed his Complaint in his place of
permanent residence, or wher e Pacific Consultant holds its principal office, a
t the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in
their contract. By enumerating possible venues where Schonfeld could have filed
his complaint, however, Pacifi c Consultants itself admitted that the provision
on venue in the employment cont ract is indeed merely permissive. HELD: 53 P a g
e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 6 KINDS OF PLEADINGS 54 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 PRO-LINE SPORTS CENTER v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. FACTS:
Petitioner instituted a criminal case against Universal Athletics and Ind ustri
al Products, Inc. for Unfair Competition, claiming that the latter was manu fact
uring fake Spalding balls. A search warrant was issued after having been duly appl
ied for, and during the search, machineries and equipment used in the manufa ctu
re of said fake balls were placed under judicial custody. However, the case w as
dismissed with finality since the element of actual sale to the public of suc h
goods was not proven by Pro-Line. After dismissal, Universal filed a civil sui
t for damages against Pro-Line for alleged malicious and baseless prosecution, c
iting the application for the search warrant, the actual search, and the seizur
e of the equipment of Universal, among other grounds. Pro-Line naturally denied
a ll allegations in the complaint. Further, it also filed a counterclaim for dam
ag es based mainly on the unauthorized and illegal manufacture by Universal of f
ake Spalding balls. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered a decis
ion in favor of the claim of Universal, while dismissing at the same time Pro-Li
ne's counter claim. ISSUE: Whether or not the counterclaim should be sustained. HE
LD: Counterclaim for damages by the Pro-Line based on the illegal and unauthoriz
ed manufacture of "Spalding" balls certainly constitutes an independent cause of
ac tion which can be the subject of a separate complaint for damages against Un
iver sal. However, this separate civil action cannot anymore be pursued as it is
alre ady barred by res judicata, the judgment in the criminal case (against Uni
versal ) involving both the criminal and civil aspects of the case for unfair co
mpetiti on. To recall, petitioner ProLine, upon whose initiative the criminal ac
tion for unfair competition against respondent Universal was filed, did not inst
itute a separate civil action for damages nor reserve its right to do so. Thus t
he civil aspect for damages was deemed instituted in the criminal case. No bette
r manife station of the intent of petitioner to recover damages in the criminal
case can be expressed than their active participation in the prosecution of the
civil asp ect of the criminal case through the intervention of their private pro
secutor. O bviously, such intervention could only be for the purpose of recoveri
ng damages or indemnity because the offended party is not entitled to represent
the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of a public offense. A counterc
laim partak es of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the
plaintiffs. It is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that
when proper ly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the matter
stated by him , an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between
the same part ies, where each is at the same time both a plaintiff and defendan
t. A countercla im stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same ru
les, as if it we re an independent action. 55 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 FELIPE YULIENCO v. COURT OF APPEALS and ADVANCE CAPITAL C
ORPORATION FACT: An action for collection of a sum of money based on promissory
notes was f iled by private respondent against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court. Petit ioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia si
nce another c ase between the same parties was then being tried in the RTC of Ma
kati. Private respondent claims that the two cases are not the same, in that the
y involve diff erent causes of action, i.e. different promissory notes. The tria
l court agreed with private respondent. On petition for certiorari, prohibition
and/or injuncti on, Yulienco claimed private respondent is barred from instituti
ng the case file d with the Quezon City RTC since it should have been filed as a
compulsory count erclaim in the Makati case. Private respondent, for its part,
maintains that the two cases are distinct and separate from each other since the
Quezon City case is an ordinary collection suit, while the Makati case is for i
njunction, and tha t the two cases involve different promissory notes. The Court
of Appeals denied said petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court. I
SSUE: HELD: Whether or not the suit for collection of money was proper. A counte
rclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defendi ng part
y may have against an opposing party. The Makati case is basically an inj unctio
n suit, a petition for prohibition. On the other hand, the Quezon City sui t is
an ordinary action for collection of sums of money. In the former, Yulienco esse
ntially seeks to prohibit or enjoin the disposition and/or sale of his prop erty
, the proceeds of which will answer for his unpaid obligations to ACC. Promi sso
ry notes are also involved in that case but they are specifically identified as
different, and are intimately related to or secured by the real estate mortga ge
s. In the Quezon City case, ACC simply seeks to collect from YULIENCO his unpa i
d monetary obligations covered by specific but unsecured Promissory Notes. Need
less to say, they are not the promissory notes subject of the first action. Neit
her are they substantially, intimately and reasonably relevant to nor even remo
t ely connected with the promissory notes and the cause of action in the injunct
io n suit. Simply put, the promissory notes in both cases differ from and are no
t r elated to each other. There is, therefore, a dissimilarity in the subject ma
tter of both cases arising from separate and distinct transactions and necessari
ly r equiring different evidence to support the divergent claims. More important
ly, t he "one compelling test of compulsoriness" i.e., the logical relationship
betwee n the claim and counterclaim, does not apply here. To reiterate, there is
no log ical relationship between Yulienco s petition for injunctive relief and
ACC s co llection suit, hence separate trials of the respective claims of the pa
rties wil l not entail a substantial duplication of effort and time as the factu
al and/or legal issues involved, as already explained, are dissimilar and distin
ct. 56 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 CONSUELO V. CALO v. AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED Peti

tioner ordered from Ajax International, Inc. several feet of John Shaw wire rope
. Upon delivery of the wire rope, petitioner found out that it was short of 30 f
eet, which prompted her to communicate with Ajax for either completion of de liv
ery or account adjustment in view of the undelivered wire rope. Petitioner di d
not receive any response from Ajax, and instead, a complaint was filed for col l
ection of sum of money was against her by one Adolfo Benavides (Benavides), who
claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of petitioner from Ajax
. Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of execution was i
ssued against petitioner. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus w
a s applied for which was granted and the case was remanded for further proceedi
ng s. Petitioner then filed a complaint against Ajax asking for completion of de
liv ery or that she be relieved from paying for the 300 feet of wire rope which
rema ined undelivered, which complaint included a prayer for damages. Ajax moved
for dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject of the present suit wa
s int imately related to the case between Benavides and petitioner, which motion
was g ranted by the court, which found Calo's claim to be a compulsory counter-cl
aim, wh ich should be filed in the Benavides case. ISSUE: Whether or not the cla
im is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim The dismissal of the complaint
by the c ourt because of the pendency of the Benavides case is based on the supp
osition t hat former's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in
the latte r case. There is no question that it arises out of the same transacti
on which is the basis of Benavides' complaint and does not require the presence of
third part ies over whom the municipal court could not acquire jurisdiction. Ho
wever, Calo s claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in the Benavides case for t
he simple re ason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the munici
pal court. Th e rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when a
pplied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount involved is within th
e said court s jurisdiction. As noted, it would come to the absurd situation whe
re a claim mus t be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from t
aking cognizanc e of, being beyond its jurisdiction. Besides, the reason underly
ing the rule, wh ich is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only,
does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizab
le by the inferio r court is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive relief
. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recoveri
ng from him. This means that should the court find both plaintiff s complaint an
d defendant s coun terclaim (for an amount exceeding said court s jurisdiction)
meritorious, it wil l simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant
has a bigger credit. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action fo
r the remaining bala nce of his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not re
ally settle all relat ed controversies. HELD: FACTS: 57 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 ALBERTO T. REYES v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO KALA
W, JR. Petitioners were the lessees of a building owned by Teodoro Kalaw. Petiti
oners r eceived notices to vacate the premises to give way for the demolition of
the bui lding in order that a new one may be erected thereon. A total of three
notices w ere sent out by Kalaw to remind his tenants of the impending demolitio
n. The las t notice gave Petitioners 24 hours within which to leave the premises
. As schedu led, Kalaw began the demolition of the building, and fenced the area
around it. The tenants, who were still occupying the premises, filed a complain
t for forcib le entry and detainer with the City Court, praying for a writ of pr
eliminary inj unction, and damages. Kalaw counterclaimed for ejectment and damag
es for alleged loss of the use of the premises. The City Court rendered a decisi
on in favor Pe titioners which Kalaw appealed to the then Court of First Instanc
e. The CFI reve rsed the decision of the City Court and ordered Petitioners to v
acate the premis es, and to pay the rentals which fell due during the suit. Such
decision was aff irmed by the Court of Appeals with an additional award of temp
erate damages in f avor of Kalaw. Petitioners contest the award of such damages,
arguing that since such damages were not raised during the trial at the City Co
urt, the same may n ot be awarded by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not
the failure to clai m temperate damages level prohibits a claim for the same in
a separate action. H ELD: Since temperate damages are neither "rents" nor "reas
onable compensation fo r the use and occupation of the premises," nor "fair rent
al value" as above-stat ed, and since the agreed rental itself was adjudged in f
avor of Kalaw, the Supre me Court is constrained to deny the temperate damages a
warded by the Court of Ap peals.The Rules expressly provide that upon appeal fro
m the judgment of a justic e of the peace to the court of first instance, the ea
se shall stand for trial de novo (Section 9, Rule 40). This provision has been i
nterpreted to mean that par ties are prevented from raising issues in the court
of first instance which were not raised in the justice of the peace court. While
said damages arose out of, or are necessarily connected with, the same transact
ion or occurrence which was the wrongful withholding of possession, they are not
a compulsory counterclaim b ecause they exceed the jurisdiction of the inferior
court. A compulsory counterc laim is barred if not set up, when applied to muni
cipal courts presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court s jur
isdiction. The reason for the rule relating to counterclaims is to avoid multipl
icity of suits and to dispose of the whole matter in controversy in one action.
This reason, however, does not obtain where the amount exceeds the jurisdiction
of the inferior court. FACTS: 58 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 6 ALICE A.I. SANDEJAS v. SPS. ARTURO IGNACIO, JR. and EVELY
N IGNACIO A blank check was left by Arturo Igmacio in the possession of his sist
ers, Rosit a and Alice Sandejas intended for the payment of the lease of a prope
rty, for th e benefit of his nephew, Benjamin Espiritu. The amount and the date
of the check were left blank because Arturo did not know the details of the rene
wal of the a foresaid lease. The sisters, believing that Rosita was entitled to
Three Million Pesos from Arturo, by virtue of the sale of a property which they
allegedly coowned, went to the Security Bank and Trust Company to open a joint a
ccount, in w hich they deposited the said blank check, which they filled in by w
riting the am ount of Three Million Pesos. In this transaction, Alice got her dr
iver, Kudera, to stand in as Dr. Borja, the payee of the check. No ID was requir
ed of Kudera p ursuant to the standing policy of the bank, and the check was the
reafter validly cleared. When the time came that Arturo questioned such transact
ion, the whole amount of Three Million had already been withdrawn by Rosita and
Alice. Subseque ntly, a complaint was filed by Arturo and his wife for recovery
of a sum of mone y, against SBTC and its officers, and Alice, Rosita, and Benjam
in. Alice and Ros ita filed their respective answers, in which Rosita interposed
a counterclaim in hers, owing to the alleged Three Million that Arturo did not
give her, but shou ld have, in light of the sale of the property they co-owned.
ISSUE: Whether or n ot the counterclaim is merely permissive. HELD: The Supreme
Court has laid down the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is c
ompulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim
and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent s
uit on defendants' cla ims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will subs
tantially the same ev idence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the d
efendants counterclaim ? And, (4) Is there any logical relation between the clai
m and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respecti
ve claims of the partie s would entail a substantial duplication of effort and t
ime by the parties and t he court? Court agrees with the view of the RTC that Ro
sita s counterclaim for t he recovery of her alleged share in the sale of the pr
operty is permissive in na ture. The evidence needed to prove respondents claim
to recover the amount of T hree Million Pesos from petitioners is different from
that required to establish Rosita s demands for the recovery of her alleged sha
re in the sale of the subje ct property. The recovery of respondents claim is no
t contingent or dependent u pon the establishment of Rosita s counterclaim such
that conducting separate tri als will not result in the substantial duplication
of the time and effort of the court and the parties. FACTS: 59 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 7 PARTS OF A PLEADINGS 60 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 SOLID HOMES, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EVELYN VER
GEL DE DIOS FACTS: Respondents applied with the Department of Environment and Na
tural Resour ces, a Small Scale Mining Permit, over a parcel of land, which belo
nged to Solid Homes, Inc.. Thus, Solid Homes, filed a protest with the DENR rega
rding such pe rmit. Upon the lapse of the permit, or after two years, the case s
till had not b een settled by the DENR. While its protest was under consideratio
n, Solid Homes also filed an application for a Small Scale Mining Permit of its
own. However, s uch application was not accepter due to the pending protest it h
ad filed. The sa me year, the protest was dismissed by the DENR, which was prope
rly appealed by S olid Homes. While the appeal was pending, Solid Homes filed a
complaint for quie ting of title with the Regional Trial Court. Among its prayer
s, Solid Homes soug ht for the issuance of a TRO, and after due hearing, for a w
rit of preliminary i njunction against Evelyn. The trial court dismissed the app
lication for a writ o f preliminary injunction on the ground of forum shopping.
The Court of Appeals a ffirmed such finding. ISSUE: HELD: It is not the caption
of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the act
ion and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof
even if no such relief is prayed for. When petitioner filed a complaint for quie
ting of title with the Regional Trial Court, it still had a pending appeal with
the DENR regarding the denial of its protest over the grant of a mining permit t
o private respondent ov er the subject property. There is forum-shopping wheneve
r, as a result of an adv erse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable op
inion other than by appea l or certiorari in another. The principle applies not
only with respect to suits filed in courts but also in connection with litigatio
ns commenced in the courts while an administrative processes and in anticipation
of an unfavorable adminis trative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is
specially so, as in this ca se, where the court in which the second suit was bro
ught, has no jurisdiction. f orum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pe
ndentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res jud
icata in the other. Consequen tly, where a litigant sues the same party against
whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and t
he enforcement of the same rel ief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pe
dentia in one case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would co
nstitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. In either
case, forum-shopping could be c ited by the other party as a ground to ask for s
ummary dismissal of the two or m ore complaints or petitions, and for the imposi
tion of the other sanctions, whic h are direct contempt of court, criminal prose
cution, and disciplinary action ag ainst the erring lawyer. Whether or not forum
shopping is present in the case. 61 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 REYNALDO DE CASTRO v. HON. MANUEL B. FERNANDEZ, JR. FACTS
: Petitioner was charged with and convicted of the crime of rape of a minor . Fr
om the decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, praying that the
trial court direct the Office of the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary in ves
tigation in accordance with the Rules of Court. Reynaldo also asked that the cha
rge filed against him be amended to acts of lasciviousness, instead of rape, cla
iming that under Republic Act 8353, the act of complained of is not covered a s
one of the instances of rape. The trial court denied the Motion for Reinvestig a
tion, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. By virtue of such denial, peti
tioner brought a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, under Rule 65 o
f the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal taken is the proper acti
o n. HELD: Reynaldo availed of the wrong remedy in assailing the trial court's Ord
er s. Reynaldo filed before the Court a petition captioned "Petition for Certior
ari " and specifically stated that the petition is based on Rule 65. However, pe
titi oner also stated that the issues raised are pure questions of law, which pr
operl y fall under Rule 45. Under Rule 65, a special civil action for certiorari
lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, Reynaldo failed to allege an
y circ umstance which would show that in issuing the assailed Orders, the trial
court a cted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discret
ion. Mor eover, following the hierarchy of courts, a special civil action for ce
rtiorari assailing an order of the Regional Trial Court should be filed with the
Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme Court. He did not raise any special r
eason or compelling circumstance that would justify direct recourse to this Cour
t. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review
under Rul e 45, the petition would fail because only judgments or final orders t
hat comple tely dispose of the case can be the subject of a petition for review.
In this ca se, the assailed Orders are only interlocutory orders. Reynaldo shou
ld have proc eeded with the trial of the case and if the trial court renders an
unfavorable v erdict, he should assail the Orders as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment to be rendered in this case. Additio
nally, the pet ition will not prosper because Reynaldo failed to comply with the
requirements u nder Rule 45 as to the documents, and their contents, which shou
ld accompany the petition. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the rem
edy sought by pe titioner, this petition must fail. 62 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 NELSIE CAETE v. GENUINO ICE COMPANY A complaint for cancel
lation of title was filed by petitioners against Genuino I ce Company regarding
several parcels of land. In the complaint, petitioners alle ged that Genuino Ice
, as well as its predecessors-in-interest were never in actu al, adverse, and ph
ysical possession of the subject properties. The petitioners alleged that this b
eing the fact of the matter, they are ineligible to have acqu ired the propertie
s pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. Genuino Ice moved to dismis s the complaint,
which motion was denied by the trial court. Petitioners filed a Second Amended C
omplaint, which sought to annul, in addition to the titles alre ady alleged in t
he complaint, several more titles which Genuino Ice holds. Genui no Ice once aga
in moved for dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint for, among others, lack o
f a valid cause of action. The trial court denied this second mot ion to dismiss
, which prompted Genuino Ice to file a petition for certiorari wit h the Court o
f Appeals. The CA granted Genuino Ice's petition for certiorari, and dismissed the
second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. I SSUE: Whethe
r or not the complaint properly stated a cause of action HELD: It is axiomatic t
hat the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the actio n, and cons
equently, the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the complai nt must co
ntain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plain tiff s ca
use of action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better est ablished
than that which requires the complaint to contain a statement of all th e facts
constituting the plaintiff s cause of action.The basic rules of proper p leadin
g and procedure require that every pleading shall contain in a methodical and lo
gical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, o mitti
ng the statement of mere evidentiary facts. A pleading should state the ult imat
e facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguis hed
from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations th at
a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere concl u
sions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid,
illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing i
ts invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. In the resolution of a motion to dis
miss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint as well as its annexes must be considered. The test in such case is w
h ether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the fact
s alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. FACTS: 63 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS BANK Rule 7 v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Wh
en petitioner Banco Filipino reached the allowable lim it in branch site holding
s, pursuant to the General Banking Act, it conceived an d organized Tala Realty
as a transferee corporation in order to effectively cont inue to expand its busi
ness. Petitioner then sold to Tala Realty some of the for mer's branch sites, whic
h it then leased thereafter from Tala Realty. All was goin g well, until Tala Re
alty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and go odwill from petition
er, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply with such demands. H
owever, petitioner alleged that a trust was created by virtu e of the transactio
ns it had with Tala Realty, and that the latter was establish ed only to serve a
s a corporate medium to warehouse the legal titles of the subj ect properties fo
r the beneficial interest of petitioner. Petitioner failed to c omply prompting
Tala Realty filed numerous ejectment suits against the former, a nd compelled pe
titioner to file seventeen actions for recovery of real propertie s, all of whic
h were uniformly worded in their material allegations. Tala Realty filed separat
e motions to dismiss, which were granted by the trial court. Petit ioner moved f
or reconsideration, but the trail court denied such motion. Instead of filing an
appeal, however, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the same, on the ground that such recourse
to Rule 65 is patently malapropos. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorar
i is the proper action. HELD: The proper remedy from the adverse re solutions of
the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a peti tion for re
view under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. T he availab
ility to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from th e decisio
n of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petiti
on for certiorari. a\ special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies onl
y when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails t o appeal
a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of app eal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the cas
e at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any valid reason why the issu es rai
sed in its petition for certiorari could not have been raised on appeal. T o jus
tify its resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it erron
eously claims that an appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy because fu rthe
r delay in the disposition of this case would effectively deprive Banco Fili pin
o of the full use and enjoyment of its properties. However, the further delay th
at would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is o ne
purely of Banco Filipino s own doing. The Supreme Court cannot countenance an i
ntentional departure from established rules of procedure simply to accommodate a
case that has long been pending in the courts of law because of the party s o w
n fault or negligence. 64 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 GLICERIA SARMIENTO v. EMERITA ZARATAN Petitioner filed an

ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in which judgment was render
ed in favor of Sarmiento by the trial court. Respondent accor dingly filed her n
otice of appeal, and pursuant to such, the Regional Trial Cour t directed Respon
dent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the Rules of C ourt. On the las
t day for filing such memorandum, Respondent's counsel filed a mot ion for extensi
on of time within which to file said memorandum, which was not ac ted upon in du
e time. Nevertheless, six days after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary p
eriod, Respondent filed her memorandum. The trial court dismissed the appeal on
the ground of the filing of the requisite memorandum after the lap se of the reg
lementary period for perfecting an appeal. Respondent moved for rec onsideration
of such dismissal, which motion was denied by the RTC. Aggrieved, R espondent f
iled a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was g ranted, an
d in effect nullified and set aside the Orders of the RTC, and the rei nstatemen
t of Respondent's appeal. From this pronouncement, Sarmiento filed a moti on for r
econsideration, alleging that in terms of procedure, there was a fatal e rror co
mmitted by Respondent when the latter, in the verification, stated that R espond
ent was the respondent, when in fact, she was the petitioner, thus implyin g tha
t Respondent did not understand what she was signing. According to Sarmient o, t
his defect of the verification renders the petition without legal effect. IS SUE
: Whether or not such defect in the verification is a fatal defect which meri ts
outright dismissal of the case A verification is required to secure an assura n
ce that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are tr
ue and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition a
ffecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not necessaril
y render it fatally defective. Perusal of the verification in question shows the
r e was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the alleged
d efects are not so material as to justify the dismissal of the petition in the
Co urt of Appeals. The defects are mere typographical errors. There appears to
be n o intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certificatio
n, wh ich are intended to assure the truthfulness and correctness of the allegat
ions i n the petition and to discourage forum shopping. HELD: FACTS: 65 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Rule 7 v. and TF KO DEVELOPMENT C
ORPORATION Private respondents secured several loans and credit accommodations f
rom various banks after being granted by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boa
rd the nece ssary license to construct and sell low-cost housing units. One of t
he creditor banks was the Far East Bank and Trust Company, which was the predece
ssor-in-inte rest of the Bank of the Philippine Isalnds, herein petitioner. Priv
ate responden ts averred, in its petition for declaration in the state of suspen
sion of paymen ts with approval of the proposed rehabilitation plan, that some o
f its creditor banks, including BPI, had already commenced foreclosure proceedin
gs on the prope rties given to secure its loans. Such foreclosure proceedings we
re pending at th e time Private respondents filed its above-mentioned petition.
The trial court i ssued a Stay Order to prohibit the enforcement of all claims a
gainst Private res pondents, upon finding that the latter's petition was sufficien
t in form and in su bstance. It also appointed one Pedro Suson as rehabilitation
receiver. BPI filed its Verified Comment on Private respondents's petition, and,
after due trial and hearing, the trial court decided in favor of Private respond
ents. BPI then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which deni
ed the same on the g round of a number of procedural errors, one of them being t
he lack of signature of the authorized person in the verification and certificat
ion against forum-sho pping. ISSUE: Whether or not such defect grants an outrigh
t denial of the petiti on for review HELD: The requirement regarding verificatio
n of a pleading is form al, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a con
dition affecting the for m of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not n
ecessarily render the ple ading fatally defective. Verification is simply intend
ed to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and corr
ect and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in g ood faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not ve
rified, if the attending ci rcumstances are such that strict compliance with the
rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be se
rved. While petitioner attac hed to the petition for review the requisite verifi
cation and certification agai nst forum shopping, the same did not show that the
signatory therein was duly au thorized by petitioner. However, the lapse was re
ctified when petitioner submitt ed the necessary board resolution and special po
wer of attorney upon the filing of the motion for reconsideration. A perusal of
the petition for review before t he Court of Appeals reveals that the case shoul
d have been properly determined o n the merits instead of being dismissed outrig
ht. As abovementioned, the "proced ural lapses" cited by the appellate court wer
e either not supported by the recor ds of the case or would not have warranted t
he outright dismissal of the case. I n denying due course to the petition, the a
ppellate court gave premium to form a nd failed to consider the important rights
of the parties in the case at bar. At the very least, petitioner substantially
complied with the procedural requireme nts for appeal, hence, it is best to give
due course to the petition. 66 P a g e FACTS: COURT OF APPEALS
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN
and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION Respondent National Power Corporation sought to e
xpropriate a parcel of land bel onging to petitioner. Such property forms part o
f a low-cost housing project in Davao City. NPC then filed a Complaint for Emine
nt Domain against petitioner Rob ern Development, and instead of filing an answe
r, petitioner countered with a Mo tion to Dismiss, alleging, among others, that
Nemesio Caete, the person who signe d the verification and certification in the C
omplaint, was not the president, th e general manager, or an officer specificall
y authorized under the NPC charter t o sign the same. Before the Motion could be
resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession upon deposi
ting a downpayment with the Philippin e National Bank, which Writ was granted by
the trial court. Upon such issuance, NPC proceeded to occupy the property. Robe
rn Development then filed a Petition f or Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
assailing the patent defect of the Moti on for Expropriation which, according to
petitioner, called for a dismissal of t he same. ISSUE: Whether or not a defect
warrants a dismissal of the Motion for E xpropriation HELD: The disputed verifi
cation and certification are sufficient in form. Verification is intended to ass
ure that the allegations therein have been prepared in good faith or are true an
d correct, not mere speculations. Generall y, lack of verification is merely a f
ormal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not dive
st the trial court of jurisdiction. The tri al court may order the correction of
the pleading or act on the unverified plead ing, if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the rul e may be dispensed with in order t
o serve the ends of justice.In this case, the questioned verification stated tha
t Atty. Caete was the acting regional legal cou nsel of NPC at the Mindanao Regio
nal Center in Iligan City. He was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-ho
use counsel and officer, whose basic function w as to prepare legal pleadings an
d to represent NPCMindanao in legal cases. As re gional legal counsel for the Mi
ndanao area, he was the officer who was in the be st position to verify the trut
hfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for expropriati
on in Davao City. As internal legal counsel, he wa s also in the best position t
o know and to certify if an action for expropriatio n had already been filed and
pending with the courts. FACTS: 67 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 VERONIQUE HUIBONHOA v. ANGEL CONCEPCION and HON. RAYMUNDO
Z. ANNANG Respondent Angel Concepcion filed a complaint against petitioner Vero
nique Huibo nhoa for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and preliminary ma
ndatory inju nction to immideiately restrain the latter from performing her job
as manager of Poulex Supermarket, among others. On the same day the complaint wa
s filed, Judg e Annang issued a temporary restraining order effective for 72 hou
rs. Three days after such issuance, petitioner, along with other stockholders of
Poulex, filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or w rit of preliminary injunction to prevent Concepcion from interfer
ing with the ma nagement and operations of Poulex. Petitioner filed a Motion, se
eking the issuan ce of an order certifying the expiration of the TRO issued in f
avor of Concepcio n. Judge Annang then declared such expiration, but also direct
ed the continued c losure of Poulex. From this decision, petitioner filed a peti
tion for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the previous orders of Ju
dge Annang for havi ng been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to l
ack and/or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition
on the ground of for um-shopping, among others, since the petition for certiorar
i was filed when the Civil Case filed against Concepcion was pending with the tr
ial court. ISSUE: HEL D: forum shopping exists when a party seeks a favorable op
inion, other than by a ppeal or certiorari in another. The rationale against for
um shopping is that a p arty should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedi
es in two different fora . Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes a
buse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, w
reaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the h
eavily burdened dockets o f the courts. To determine whether a party violated th
e rule against forum shopp ing, the most important question to ask is whether th
e elements of litis pendent ia are present or whether a final judgment in one ca
se will result to res judica ta in another. Otherwise stated, to determine forum
shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The relief
s sought in the two actions a re also different. In the civil case, aside from t
he main action for a permanent injunction, complainants therein also claimed dam
ages. In the petition for cert iorari, Huibonhoa sought the prevention of the im
plementation of the assailed or ders of Judge Annang. The only common thread bet
ween the two actions is with res pect to the TRO sought to prevent respondent Co
ncepcion from interfering with th e operations of the supermarket, but said reli
ef is only incidental and does not constitute the main cause of action in both c
ases. Whether or not forum-shoppin g is present in this case. FACTS: 68 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and NSC-HD
CTC EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-FFW Disagreement between petitioner National Steel Co
rporation and the respondent NS C-HDTC Monthly/Daily Employees Organization-FFW
(Union) arose regarding the givi ng of year-end incentives and Productivity and
Quality Bonus to the employees of NSC. Having agreed on the submission of the ca
se for voluntary arbitration, the parties appeared before the voluntary arbitrat
or, Rene Ofreneo, who found no me rit in the demand of the Union for a productiv
ity and quality bonus, but ordered NSC to distribute the year-end award, as acco
rding to the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such practice having been done
for four years by petitioner. Upon this decision, petitioner filed a Partial Mot
ion for Reconsideration regarding the award of the year-end incentive, which Mot
ion was denied by Ofreneo. Petitio ner filed a petition for review with the Cour
t of Appeals. The CA, for its part, dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground
of failure to comply with the requi rements of law regarding the law on forum-sh
opping. It held that Atty. Padilla, one of the counsels of record of petitioner
was a mere retained counsel, who had no direct interest with the outcome of the
suit. As such, said the CA, Atty. Pa dilla had no authority under the law to sig
n the certification in behalf of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the petit
ion for review should be denied. HELD : In the instant case, the certification w
as signed by NSC's counsel. NSC argues t hat contrary to the findings of the Court
of Appeals, NSC's counsel of record was duly authorized to represent them not onl
y before the Voluntary Arbitrator but a lso to prepare the petition for review f
iled before the Court of Appeals. To sup port this claim, petitioner attached to
its petition before this Court a Secreta ry's Certificate. Counsel of petitioner,
Atty. Padilla also submitted a Verificati on cum Certification where he stated
that he prepared the petition upon the expl icit instructions of the VP-Marketin
g & Resident Manager of petitioner corporati on. While it is admitted that the a
uthorization of petitioner's counsel was submit ted to the appellate court only af
ter the issuance of its Resolution dismissing the petition based on non-complian
ce with the Circular regarding forum-shopping, the Supreme Court holds that in v
iew of the peculiar circumstances of the prese nt case and in the interest of su
bstantial justice, the procedural defect may be set aside, pro hac vice. As held
by the Court: "Technical rules of procedure sh ould be used to promote, not fru
strate, justice. While the swift unclogging of c ourt dockets is a laudable obje
ctive, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal." By rec
ognizing the signature of the authorized counsel in the certification, no circum
vention of the rationale, that is to prevent the ills of forum shopping, is comm
itted. FACTS: 69 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 8 MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS 70 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNES
TO D. SANTIAGO FACTS: Petitioner Ceroferr Realty Corporation filed a suit agains
t private respo ndent Ernesto Santiago for damages and injunction from dispute o
ver the ownershi p of a land located in Quezon City. The complaint alleged that
Santiago was occu pying, without any right, a portion of a parcel of land belong
ing to Petitioner, which was being used by the former as a jeepney terminal. Pri
vate respondent, f or his part, countered that he had the legal title to the lan
d, thus, he had the right to utilize the land as such. During the trial, it was
found out that the main issue of the case revolved around the actual bounds of t
he land owned by Pe titioner. It appears that the title held by Petitioner merel
y referred to the la nd by its lot number, while the title held by private respo
ndent was replete wit h technical descriptions and the accompanying metes and bo
unds of the lot. Priva te respondent then filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's c
omplaint, on the ground that the trial court cannot pass upon the issue of damag
es without first determ ining the true ownership of the lot in question. The tri
al court then issued an order denying Petitioner's complaint for lack of cause of
action and lack of juris diction, holding that a Torrens certificate of title ca
nnot be the subject of a collateral attack. Petitioner appealed then to the Cour
t of Appeals, insisting t hat the complaint stated a cause of action which was d
eterminable on its face. S uch appeal was dismissed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or
not the complaint states a cause of action HELD: The Rules of Court require tha
t the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the esse
ntial facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A comp laint states a c
ause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements , namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under what ever law it ar
ises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named def endant to res
pect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on th e part of su
ch defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a b reach of th
e obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may m aintain an
action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a c
ause of action. These elements are present in the case at bar. A defen dant who
moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action , as in
this case, hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficie
ncy of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is wheth
er or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgm ent upo
n the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admiss ion ex
tends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and infer
ences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complai nt fu
rnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same s houl
d not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the def end
ants. 71 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, e
t al. In the case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damag
es fil ed by the Republic of the Philippines against Benjamin Romualdez, Ferdina
nd Marc os, and Imelda Marcos, herein petitioner Francisco Tantuico was impleade
d as def endant, the theory that he acted in unlawful concert with Romualdez, et
al. in t he misappropriation and theft of public funds, among others. After Tan
tuico's moti on for production and inspection of documents was denied by the Sandi
ganbayan, h e filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging that the compla
int filed ag ainst him was couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars
that would i nform him of the factual and legal bases thereof. The Sandiganbaya
n thereafter d enied Tantuico's motion on the ground that the particulars sought b
y the latter ar e evidentiary in nature, thus not necessary in the filing of the
complaint. From such order of the Sandiganbayan, Tantuico moved for reconsidera
tion, which moti on was also denied by the aforesaid court. This prompted Tantui
co to file a peti tion for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition against the San
diganbayn, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, when such court denied hi
s motion for a bil l of particulars, even though the complaint of the Republic o
f the Philippines f ailed to properly provide a concise statement of the facts n
ecessary for him to prepare his defense. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint pro
perly provided a sta tement of the facts. HELD: A complaint is defined as a conc
ise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff s cause or causes
of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complain
t shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct sta
tement of the ultimat e facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitt
ing the statement of m ere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is
to inform the defendan t clearly and definitely of the claims made against him
so that he may be prepar ed to meet the issues at the trial. The complaint shoul
d inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies t
o support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action which form
s the bases of the plaint iff s claim of liability. Where the complaint states u
ltimate facts that constit ute the three essential elements of a cause of action
, the complaint states a ca use of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb
to a motion to dismiss on t hat ground of failure to state a cause of action. H
owever, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the
form of conclusions, the prop er recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but
a motion for a bill of partic ulars. Anent the contention of the Solicitor Gene
ral that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars because the ult
imate facts constituting the th ree essential elements of a cause of action for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth ha ve been sufficiently alleged in the complaint,
it would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only q
uestion to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint are av
erred with sufficient definitenes s or particularity to enable the movant proper
ly to prepare his responsive plead ing and to prepare for trial. As already disc
ussed, the allegations of the compl aint pertaining to the herein petitioner are
deficient because the averments the rein are mere conclusions of law or presump
tions, unsupported by factual premise s. FACTS: v. 72 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE SOLEDAD DY Rule 8 v. COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO LAUSA FA
CTS: Task Force Kalikasan of Butuan C ity confiscated two trucks carrying variou
s sized lumber products, owned by Sole dad Dy. Task Force Kalikasan was created
pursuant to an Executive Order issued b y the Mayor of Butuan City, which had th
e end purpose of combatting illegal logg ing, and the transportation of illegall
y procured lumber. Upon seizure, Odel Lau sa, head of the Task Force applied for
, and was granted a temporary seizure orde r with the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources. Upon submission of a proper memorandum-report regarding t
he trucks and the lumber, the Community Env ironment and Natural Resources Offic
er (CENRO) of Butuan City issued a notice co nfiscation which was duly posted fo
r three days. More than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, Dy filed
a suit for replevin in the RTC, wherein the same court issued a temporary order
of replevin. Lausa, for his part, filed a mo tion for the approval of a counter
bond, as well as for a motion to dismiss the w rit of execution, on the ground t
hat Dy should have gone before the DENR, since according to the Revised Forrestr
y Code, resort should first be made to it. CA r eversed the decision of the tria
l court, on the ground that the court has no jur isdiction to act on the case, s
ince the administrative remedies provided for by law have not yet been exhausted
by Dy, thus, the petition for replevin lacks a v alid cause of action. ISSUE: W
hether or not the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is tantamount to lac
k of cause of action upon the filing of a suit in court HELD: A party must exhau
st all administrative remedies before he can resor t to the courts. In a long li
ne of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to see
k the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condit ion that he should have avai
led himself of all the means afforded by the adminis trative processes. Hence, i
f a remedy within the administrative machinery can st ill be resorted to by givi
ng the administrative officer concerned even opportuni ty to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy sho uld be exhausted first b
efore a court s judicial power can be sought. The premat ure invocation is fatal
to one s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any findin g of waiver or estoppe
l, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. Dismissal o
f the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private responden
ts failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper cause
of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdic tion over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of t
he remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to on
e s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private res
pondents rights of action is too significant to be waylai d by the lower court.
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administ rative remedies, the
Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court gran
ting petitioner s application for a replevin writ and denyi ng private responden
t s motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D . No. 705, as amend
ed, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR an d all actions seek
ing to recover possession thereof should be directed to that a gency. 73 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 LA MALLORCA v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRA

N, et al. Private respondent Mariano Beltran, along with his wife and three chil
dren, Mila gros, Racquel and Fe, were the passengers of a bus owned and operated
by La Mall orca. Upon reaching their destination, they all alighted from the bu
s towards a shaded part of the side of the road. Respondent returned to the bus
to retrieve their belongings, and unknown to him, his daughter, followed him. Re
spondent sta yed on the running board of the bus, waiting for the conductor to h
and him his b ag, when the driver accelerated, without any signal coming from th
e conductor, w hich prompted respondent to jump from the bus, which had moved ab
out ten feet. U pon his return to the place where he left his family, he went ov
er to where a nu mber of people were gathered, looking down at the body of a gir
l who had her hea d crushed, and was lifeless. The girl turned out to be his dau
ghter, Racquel. Su its were initiated, first, for breach of contract of carriage
against La Mallorc a, and second, for quasidelict. La Mallorca, in its answer,
stated that the two actions were incompatible, and this moved for dismissal of t
he case. This motion filed by La Mallorca was denied by the trial court, as well
as the Court of App eals, which both found La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict,
although the contrac t of carriage was found to have already been terminated. I
SSUE: Whether or not t here is incompatibility between the two actions. HELD: Th
e plaintiffs sufficient ly pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim
was predicated when it w as alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel B
eltran, plaintiffs daugh ter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise
of the utmost diligence o f a very cautious person on the part of the defendants
and their agent." This al legation was also proved when it was established duri
ng the trial that the drive r, even before receiving the proper signal from the
conductor, and while there w ere still persons on the running board of the bus a
nd near it, started to run of f the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the ne
gligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employe
r did not exercise the diligen ce of a good father of the family in the selectio
n and supervision of its employ ees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appea
ls found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Even assuming arguendo that the con
tract of carriage has already te rminated, herein petitioner can be held liable
for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. F ACTS: 74 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. v. LYRIC FILM EXCHANGE, INC. After
respondent Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. discovered damage to the walls of a b uild
ing it was leasing from petitioner Gregorio Araneta Inc., it demanded that t he
latter, pursuant to the contract of lease, repair the same. Petitioner procee de
d on complying with the demand, hired a contractor, and set to work on the dam a
ge. During this time, respondent moved all its equipment out of the premises. I
t did this, because it treated the contract of lease as terminated upon the disc
overy of the damage. Respondent communicated this to petitioner through an espe
c ial director's meeting of the same. The trial court held that respondent had no
ri ght to cancel the contract of lease, and instead, gave judgment for the payme
nt of the lease for the unexpired portion of seven months. Lyric interposes this
ap peal, claiming that the trial court did not allow it to present evidence to
prov e its case, through certain documents, which it asserts will prove its case
. ISS UE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not allowing Lyric Film to pre
sent d ocuments as evidence HELD: Araneta, in its complaint recited three letter
s essen tially complying with the contract and when the defendant tendered testi
mony to show that the party who signed those letters was not authorized by defen
dant, th e trial court refused to receive the testimony on the ground that the l
etters ha ving been set out in the complaint and not denied in the answer, secti
on 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure controlled. In this, the trial court was i
n error. A raneta was suing on the written contract of lease, not on these lette
rs. They mi ght have some evidential value, but evidence, even in writing, does
not necessar ily have a proper place in the pleadings. However, even granting th
at such rulin g of the trial court was incorrect, plaintiff has not been harmed
thereby becaus e of our view of the case it is immaterial whether or not such le
tters were auth orized. FACTS: 75 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEODIGARIO SARABIA This ca
se involves the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to respondent Leodig
ario Sarabia to be used as an extension of the Kalibo Airport. The Air Tr anspor
tation Office took possession of the property without paying just compensa tion
therefore. In time, the property was used as a parking area, the site for t he c
ontrol tower, the crash fire rescue station, and the headquarters of the PNP Avi
ation Security Group. A number of stalls were also erected thereon to be sue d b
y retailers in selling their wares. Almost half a decade after the taking of the
lot, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the RTC an action for exprop ri
ation of the lot. Three commissioners were duly tasked to ascertain the just c o
mpensation for the subject property, and after investigation, it was found that
a portion of the lot was not actually and physically occupied by ATO. During th
e hearing, the trial court directed the Republic to present evidence to prove th
at the unoccupied portion of the lot is still needed for public use. The Republ
i c answered that there is no need to present evidence by virtue of the fact tha
t more than half of the lot is already being utilized for the Kalibo Airport. Fr
om this, the trial court rendered a decision stating that the occupied portion i
s to be expropriated, but the unoccupied portion should be returned to the owner
s thereof. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic should have presented evi
de nce to prove its occupation of the entire lot HELD: Respondents' admissions in
the ir Answer and Pre-Trial Brief are judicial admissions which render the takin
g of the lot in 1956 conclusive or even immutable. And well-settled is the rule
that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proce
edin gs in the same case, does not require proof. A judicial admission is an adm
issio n made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for p
urpose s of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter d
isprove . Indeed, an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by th
e party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs
submitte d by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored w
hether ob jection is interposed by a party or not. FACTS: 76 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 FELIX CAMITAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE FIDELITY INVEST
MENT CORPORATION Spouses Mateo and Lorenza Camitan conveyed by way of sale, a pa
rcel of land belo nging to them, in favor of private respondent Fidelity Investm
ent Corporation. T he Original Certificate of Title was then given to private re
spondent, without h owever, transferring it by name. Upon the spouses' death, thei
r heirs, Felix, Fran cisco, Severo and Victoria, without the knowledge of privat
e respondent, filed a petition for the issuance of a new Owner's copy, alleging th
at the original had b een lost, which petition was granted by the trial court, w
hich at the same time declared void the first Owner's copy. When Fidelity Investme
nt learned of the peti tion and order for the first time, it caused the annotati
on of a notice of sale on the title of the property. It then filed a Notice of A
dverse Claim with the R egister of Deeds thereafter. Fidelity Investment argued
that the Order issued by the court is null and void for having issued the same w
ithout jurisdiction sinc e the original copy of the title exists and has been in
the former's possession. M oreover, the heirs of the spouses Camitan had no stand
ing to file the petition, since the spouses had already conveyed all their inter
ests in the property prior to their deaths. A decision was rendered in favor of
Fidelity Investment. Upon appeal, the heirs of the spouses argued that the court
erred in finding that the Owner's Copy was not lost since there was no documentar
y evidence to prove such c onclusion. According to the heirs, Fidelity Investmen
t was not even able to prov ide a photocopy of the title to prove its possession
thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding in favor
of private respondent. HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that peti
tioners never questioned res pondent's possession of the Owner's Copy, its actual an
d physical possession and occ upation of the property, as well as its payment of
real estate taxes due on the property. Although petitioners put their unmistaka
bly sparse denial of responden t's allegations relative to the execution of the de
ed of sale in its favor and its possession of the Owner's Copy under the heading "
SPECIFIC DENIALS" and antecedin g it with the adverb "specifically,' the same cann
ot function as an operative deni al within the purview of the Rules. A denial is
not specific simply because it i s so qualified by the defendant. A general den
ial does not become specific by th e use of the word "specifically." When the ma
tters of whether the defendant alle ges having no knowledge or information suffi
cient to form a belief, are plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowled
ge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered as a spe
cific denial. In one case, it was he ld that when a respondent makes a "specific
denial" of a material allegation of the petition without setting forth the subs
tance of the matters relied upon to s upport its general denial, when such matte
rs were plainly within its knowledge a nd the defendant could not logically pret
end ignorance as to the same, said defe ndant fails to properly tender an issue.
Petitioners' "specific denial" in this ca se is ineffective and amounts to an adm
ission pursuant to Rule 8, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court. 77 P a g e FACTS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 9 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD 78 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS v. HON. JUDGE MANUEL V. ROMILLO, J
R. Samir Beiruty and Mohammed Al-Sulain were passengers of a Plane owned and ope
rat ed by petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways. Upon landing in Manila, they were b
oth denied entry for lack of visas, and they had to return to Hongkong. However,
pet itioner's employees gave their claim tags to someone else, thus, they lost so
me of their baggages, and this led to a filing of a complaint for damages agains
t pet itioner. Summons was served on petitioner, and it filed two motions for ex
tensio n to file its answer, which motions were not acted upon by the trial cour
t. Befo re the expiration of the second extension filed, petitioner filed its an
swer. Af ter the answer had been filed, Beiruty and Al-Sulain filed a motion to
declare p etitioner in default. Upon receiving a copy, the latter filed an oppos
ition to t he motion. However, before petitioner filed its opposition, the court
issued the order of default, which was received by petitioner four months after
. Beiruty a nd Al-Sulain then presented their evidence ex-parte, and a decision
was rendered against petitioner. Upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed
a motion to lift the order of default and set aside the default judgment. Said m
otion was de nied on the ground that it was filed out of time, when the decision
had already become final and executory. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for c
ertiorari, pr ohibition and mandamus. ISSUE: Whether or not the default order pr
oper. HELD: It should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have eve
ry litigated c ase tried on the merits as much as possible. It is for this reaso
n that judgment s by default are frowned upon. The needless delay and trouble sp
awned by the unf ortunate order of default and judgment by default assailed in t
he instant case w arrant calling attention once more to a previous reminder made
by this Court thr ough Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee: Time and again the Court
has enjoined trial judges to act with circumspection and not to precipitately de
clare parties in de fault, needlessly compelling the aggrieved party to undergo
the additional expen se, anxiety and delay of seeking the intervention of the ap
peciate courts and de priving them of the much needed time and attention that co
uld instead have well been devoted to the study and disposition of more complex
and complicated cases and issues. FACTS: 79 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 GUILLERMA S. SABLAS v. ESTERLITA S. SABLAS and RODULFO S.
SABLAS FACTS: Respondents Esterlita and Rodulfo Sablas filed a complaint for ju
dicial p artition, inventory and accounting was filed by against spouses Pascual
Lumanas and Guillerma Sablas. After the respondents were served with summons an
d a copy of the complaint, they filed a motion for extension within which to fil
e their a nswer. However, the answer was filed after the extension asked for by
the spouse s themselves. Since there was no motion to declare the spouses Sablas
in default , the trial court admitted the answer filed. The day after the answe
r was filed, Esterlita and Rodulfo filed a motion to declare the spouses Sablas
in default. This motion was denied by the trial court. Their motion for reconsid
eration havi ng been denied as well, respondents elevated the matter to the Cour
t of Appeals, which ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discreti
on in admitti ng the answer of the spouses Sablas, although the same was filed o
ut of time. IS SUE: Whether or not respondents were in default. HELD: The rule o
n default requi res the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defe
nding party. It is not enough that the defendant fails to answer the complaint w
ithin the reglem entary period. The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a de
fendant in defaul t as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect hi
s or its interests . The trial court should not under any circumstances act as c
ounsel of the claim ing party. It is within the sound discretion of the trial co
urt to permit the de fendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits ev
en after the reglemen tary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of Co
urt provides for discr etion on the part of the trial court not only to extend t
he time for filing an a nswer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the
reglementary period. The rule is that the defendants answer should be admitted w
here it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to t
he plaintiff. Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but befor
e the defendant is decla red in default and there is no showing that defendant i
ntends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted. Therefore, the trial co
urt correctly admitted th e answer of petitioner spouses even if it was filed ou
t of time because, at the time of its filing, they were not yet declared in defa
ult nor was a motion to de clare them in default ever filed. Neither was there a
showing that petitioner sp ouses intended to delay the case. 80 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 MONARCH INSURANCE CO., INC., ALLIED GUARANTEE INSURANCE C
OMPANY, and EQUITABLE I NSURANCE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A ship o
wned and operated by Aboitiz Shipping sank at sea due to a typhoo n during its v
oyage from Hong Kong to Manila. All plaintiffs, Monarch Insurance Co., Inc., Tab
acalera Insurance Company. Allied Guarantee Insurance Company (All ied), and Equ
itable Insurance Corporation, are insurance companies of the shippe rs of goods
on board the ship. Aboitiz claims that it is not liable for the loss of the good
s by virtue of the limited liability rule under maritime law. Accord ing to Aboi
tiz, the ship sank by reason of force majeure, without any negligence on the par
t of the master of the vessel. The court granted Monarch and Tabacale ra's motion
to declare Aboitiz in default since the latter had repeatedly failed t o appear.
The trial court then rendered judgment against Aboitiz, ordering it to pay dama
ges to the plaintiffs. Aboitiz filed a motion for reconsideration of th e decisi
on and/or for new trial to lift the order of default. The Court of Appea ls affi
rmed the decision of the trial court regarding the order of default, and allowed
Aboitiz to present its evidence, thus prompting the plaintiffs to file a petiti
on for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not presentation of evidence before the CA
can be allowed. HELD: Aboitiz was precluded from presenting evidence to p rove i
ts defenses in the court a quo for having been declared in default. The co urt d
isagrees with petitioners that this circumstance prevents the respondent Co urt
of Appeals from taking cognizance of Aboitiz defenses on appeal. It should be no
ted that Aboitiz was declared as in default not for its failure to file an answe
r but for its absence during pre-trial and the trial proper. In Aboitiz an swer
with counterclaim, it claimed that the sinking of the M/V P. Aboitiz was du e to
an act of God or unforeseen event and that the said ship had been seaworthy and
fit for the voyage. Aboitiz also alleged that it exercised the due diligenc e r
equired by law, and that considering the real and hypothecary nature of marit im
e trade, the sinking justified the extinguishment of its liability for the los t
shipment. A judgment of default does not imply a waiver of rights except that o
f being heard and presenting evidence in defendant s favor nor could it be inte
rpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff s causes of action f
ind support in the law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for.
This is especially true with respect to a defendant who had filed his answer bu
t had been subsequently declared in default for failing to appear at the trial s
i nce he has had an opportunity to traverse, via his answer, the material averme
nt s contained in the complaint. Such defendant has a better standing than a def
end ant who has neither answered nor appeared at trial. The former should be all
owed to reiterate all affirmative defenses pleaded in his answer before the Cour
t of Appeals. Likewise, the Court of Appeals may review the correctness of the e
valu ation of the plaintiffs' evidence by the lower court. 81 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 9 PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP. v. A.C. ORDOEZ CORP. and FRANKLI
N SUSPINE A vehicular accident involving a Honda City sedan owned by Maximo Mata
, the pred ecessor-ininterest of petitioner Paramount Insurance Corp., and a tru
ck mixer ow ner by respondent A.C. Ordoez Corporation occurred. Petitioner filed
a claim for damages against A.C. Ordoez and Franklin Suspine, the driver at the t
ime of the a ccident. According to the Sheriff's Return of Service, summons remain
ed unserved o n Suspine, while it was served on respondent and received by Samue
l Marcoleta of its Receiving Section. Upon the lapse of the period within which
to file an ans wer, petitioner lodged a Motion to Declare respondent in default.
The latter fil ed an Omnibus Motion alleging that summons was improperly served
on it, thus ask ing for an extension of 15 days to file its answer. Pending its
motion to declar e the other party in default, Paramount filed a Second Motion
to Declare Defenda nts in Default. In its answer, respondent alleged honest mist
ake and business re verses that prevented it from hiring a lawyer, as well as ju
stice and equity. Th e answer with counterclaim specifically denied liability, a
verred competency on the part of Suspine, and due selection and supervision of e
mployees on the part of respondent. The trial court admitted the answer and deni
ed petitioner's motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the answer was p
roperly admitted. HEL D: On its face, the return shows that the summons was rece
ived by an employee wh o is not among the responsible officers enumerated by law
. Such being invalid, p etitioner should have sought the issuance and proper ser
vice of new summons inst ead of moving for a declaration of default. Thus, there
was no grave abuse of di scretion when the Metropolitan Trial Court admitted re
spondent corporation's Answe r. Although it was filed beyond the extension period
requested by respondent cor poration, however, Sec. 11, Rule 11 grants discretio
n to the trial court to allo w an answer or other pleading to be filed after the
reglementary period, upon mo tion and on such terms as may be just. An answer s
hould be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared in d
efault and no prejudice is cau sed to plaintiff. The hornbook rule is that defau
lt judgments are generally disf avored. There is likewise no merit in petitioner's
claim that respondent corporati on lacks legal personality to file an appeal. A
lthough the cancellation of a cor poration's certificate of registration puts an e
nd to its juridical personality, S ec. 122 of the Corporation Code, however prov
ides that a corporation whose corpo rate existence is terminated in any manner c
ontinues to be a body corporate for three years after its dissolution for purpos
es of prosecuting and defending suit s by and against it and to enable it to set
tle and close its affairs. Moreover, the rights of a corporation, which is disso
lved pending litigation, are accorded protection by law pursuant to Sec. 145 of
the Corporation Code. FACTS: 82 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 10 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 83 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 RAFAEL BAUTISTA And LIGAYA ROSEL v. MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES,
INC. FACTS: A complaint was filed for cancellation of title and damages by respo
ndent Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. against spouses Rafael and Ligaya Bautista. Respo
ndent asserts that the spouses Bautista, through dubios means, were able to secu
re an Original Certificate of Title over a parcel of land. The spouses Bautista
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a c
ause of action, which the trial court granted. Respondent this then filed a moti
on fo r reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for q
uietin g of title, since the technical description in the spouses' title does not
cover t he disputed lot. The spouses filed their opposition, contending that the
amended complaint, if admitted would substantially modify respondent's theory. Re
spondent's motion for leave to file an amended complaint was granted. This prompte
d the sp ouses to file a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition wit
h the Cou rt of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admittin
g the amen ded complaint. HELD: A party may amend his pleading once as a matter
of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten days after it is served. The above provision clea
rly shows t hat before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the ab
solute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action
or change in theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not
the respons ive pleading contemplated by the Rule. Records show that petitioner
s had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Cas
e No. 371. Wh at they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that respondent,
as a plaintif f, may file an amended complaint even after the original complain
t was ordered d ismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final,
as in this case . Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in issuing t
he assailed Order admitting the amended complaint, the trial court did not grave
ly abuse its disc retion. Hence, neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie. 8
4 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 ALPINE LENDING INVESTORS and ROGELIO L. ONG v. ESTRELLA
CORPUZ A replevin complaint against Alpine Lending Investors and Zenaida Lipata
was fil ed by respondent. It appears that Lipata told respondent that she would
help the latter apply for a garage franchise from the Land Transportation Office
. Howeve r, after Corpuz gave respondent the original registration papers for he
r vehicle , Lipata took off with the same, represented herself to be the owner t
hereof, an d mortgaged the same to Alpine. Instead of filing an answer, Alpine s
ubmitted a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that it was not a juridical person,
hence not a proper party to the case. This motion was denied by the court. Respo
ndent then filed motion to Admit Amended Complaint with the trial court two days
late, but the court admitted it anyway. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respon
dent's motion on the ground that it was not accompanied by a notice of hearing, to
which resp ondent answered that a notice of hearing was unnecessary, as it is a
non-litigat ed motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting
respondent's a mended complaint. HELD: Pleadings may be amended by adding or stri
king an allega tion or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the
name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any oth
er respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determi
ned, without re gard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpens
ive manner. A pa rty may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any tim
e before a respon sive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any tim
e within ten days after it is served. As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpi
ne filed was a mot ion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule that a mot
ion to dismiss is n ot a responsive pleading for purposes of Section 2, Rule 10.
As no responsive pl eading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint
as a matter of right . It is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept
the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words,
the trial court s dut y to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial.
In fact, respondent sho uld not have filed a motion to admit her amended complai
nt. It has always been t he policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing amend
ments to pleadings in ord er that the real controversies between or among the pa
rties may be presented and cases be decided on the merits without delay. FACTS:
85 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEA

LS and BRITISH STEEL ASIA, LTD. FACTS: Respondent Remington Industrial Sales fil
ed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract agai
nst British Steel. The latter mo ved for dismissal of the complaint on the groun
d that it failed to state a cause of action. The Regional Trial Court denied the
motion to dismiss, as well as th e motion for reconsideration filed thereafter.
Meanwhile, British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of Appeals, claiming th at the complaint did not contain a single ave
rment that British Steel had in fac t committed any act or is guilty of any omis
sion in violation of respondent's righ ts. Around the same time, respondent sought
to amend its complaint by incorporat ing therein additional factual allegations
which constitute its cause of action against British Steel. Remington also pray
ed that the proceedings in the special civil action be suspended by reason of it
s motion to admit the amended complain t. The trial court thereafter admitted th
e amended complaint, while the Court of Appeals issued an order directing the tr
ial court to dismiss respondent's suit ag ainst British Steel. ISSUE: Whether or n
ot the Court of Appeals erred in orderin g the dismissal of the complaint despit
e the amended complaint. HELD: A pleading may be amended as a matter of right be
fore a responsive pleading is served. Thi s only means that prior to the filing
of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolu te right to amend the complaint wheth
er a new cause of action or change in theor y is introduced. The reason for this
rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, s
ubstantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court afte
r an answer has been served, because any mat erial change in the allegations con
tained in the complaint could prejudice the r ights of the defendant who has alr
eady set up his defense in the answer. Convers ely, it cannot be said that the d
efendants rights have been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has y
et to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not presented
any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defe ndant still retains the unqualif
ied opportunity to address the allegations again st him by properly setting up h
is defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to
amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, p rior to the filing of an answe
r by the defendant. The right granted to the plain tiff under procedural law to
amend the complaint before an answer has been serve d is not precluded by the fi
ling of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and shou ld be liberally allowed in
the furtherance of justice in order to determine ever y case as far as possible
on its merits without regard to technicalities. This p rinciple is generally rec
ognized to speed up trial and save party litigants from incurring unnecessary ex
pense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every ca se may be had and multip
licity of suits avoided. 86 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. WILLIAM GOTHONG & ABOITIZ
INC. Respondent William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc. entered into a contract of lease
with the Philippine Ports Authority for docking space in the North Harbor for a
peri od of time. PPA, believing that the period for the lease had already expir
ed, se nt a letter to respondent asking the latter to vacate the premises and to
turn o ver the improvements thereon, pursuant to the lease contract. Respondent
filed a n injunction suit against PPA, when the latter refused respondent's reque
st to rec onsider the demand. Before PPA filed its answer, respondent amended it
s complain t for the first time to which PPA filed its answer. Respondent amende
d its compl aint for the second time, and this was met by strong opposition from
PPA. The tr ial court denied the admittance of this second amended complaint. R
espondent the reafter filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court found the trial court to have committed grave abuse of disc
retion and dir ected the trial court to admit respondent's second amended complain
t. ISSUE: Wheth er or not trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion. HELD
: Section 3, Rul e 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former ru
le in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is sub
stantially altere d" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The cle
ar import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "
the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." Thi
s should only be t rue, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration
in the cause of ac tion or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serv
e the higher interes ts of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally pr
omote the laudable ob jective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive dispositi on of every action and proceeding. The application of the
old Rules by the RTC a lmost five years after its amendment by the 1997 Rules o
f Civil Procedure patent ly constitutes grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: 87 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS and
NEAL B. CHRISTIAN FACTS: The president and vice-president of petitioner Swagman
Hotels and Travel, Inc. procured a loan from Neal Christian to be secured by thr
ee promissory note s. The loan would be payable after three years. However, befo
re the three years lapsed, Christian informed petitioner that he was terminating
the loans and dema nded for payment of the total amount of the loan. He then co
mmenced action in th e Regional Trial Court for collection of sum of money and d
amages against Swagma n Hotels. The latter, for its part, stated that there exis
ts no cause of action since the loans have not yet become due and demandable. Si
nce the three promisso ry notes were given on different dates, during the penden
cy of the case, two of the three notes matured. By virtue of such occurrence, th
e trial court ruled tha t these two promissory notes are already litigable, and
thus ordered Swagman Hot els to pay Christian the sum secured by such notes. Cou
rt of Appeals, who affirm ed the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not lac
k a cause of action may be cured by subsequent accrual of a cause of action. Ame
ndments of pleadings are a llowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Proce
dure. Section 5 thereof app lies to situations wherein evidence not within the i
ssues raised in the pleading s is presented by the parties during the trial, and
to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of
a party. Thus, a complaint w hich fails to state a cause of action may be cured
by evidence presented during the trial. However, the curing effect under Sectio
n 5, Rule 10 is applicable onl y if a cause of action in fact exists at the time
the complaint is filed, but th e complaint is defective for failure to allege t
he essential facts. HELD: 88 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 ADOLFO GASPAR v. LEOPOLDO DORADO FACTS: An execution sal
e was effected over a parcel of land to satisfy the debt of Vicente Alamodin in
favor of C.N. Hodges. The property was made subject of th e sale because Alamodi
n owned an undivided half portion of the lot. However, it appears that prior to
the execution sale, Alamodin conveyed, by way of sale, his share of the lot to t
he his co-owner, petitioner Adolfo Gaspar. Thus, after lea rning of such executi
on sale, Gaspar went to court to ask for the award of damag es against C.N. Hodg
es. After C.N. Hodges had filed its answer, but before trial was commenced, Gasp
ar was allowed by the trial court to amend his complaint, wh erein he prayed for
the annulment of the execution sale. After due hearing, the trial court rendere
d judgment in favor of petitioner, and declared the execution sale to be null an
d void. C.N. Hodges argued on appeal that the trial court nev er acquired jurisd
iction over the original complaint since it only prayed for da mages, the amount
of which was not cognizable by the trial court. It also argued that since the c
ourt did not have jurisdiction, it had no authority to allow Ga spar to amend hi
s complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admi tting the amend
ed complaint HELD: Amendment of a defective pleading should be al lowed, but "wh
en it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the perso n and the sub
ject matter, that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible
of amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alte r the theory
and the nature of the action, then the court may refuse the amendme nt of the d
efective pleading and order the dismissal of the case." The rule is a lways in f
avor of liberality in construction so that the real matter in dispute may be sub
mitted to the judgment of the Court. Imperfections of form and technic alities o
f procedure should be disregarded unless substantial rights would other wise be
prejudiced. In testing the sufficiency of a complaint neither its captio n nor i
ts prayer is decisive. The allegations as a whole must be considered. In the ins
tant case we find that in his original complaint Gaspar put in issue the validit
y of the sheriff s sale in favor of defendant Hodges and claimed exclusiv e and
absolute ownership of the property in question by virtue of the prior sale in hi
s favor and of its registration in the land registry of Capiz. The resolut ion o
f this question, on which his prayer for damages was predicated and without whic
h no decision could be rendered, was within the jurisdiction of the trial c ourt
. The amendment of the complaint, therefore, was merely a matter of form and not
of substance 89 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 12 BILL OF PARTICULARS 90 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN and FERDINA
ND MARCOS, JR. Roman Cruz is impleaded as an alleged crony of President Ferdinan
d Marcos.When t he Presidential Commission on Good Governance went after the cro
nies, in hopes o f recovering the wealth he and his family and cronies amassed d
uring his reign, an alias summons was served upon him in Hawaii, his place of ex
ile. Since he was not able to file a responsive pleading, he was then declared i
n default, upon m otion by the Republic of the Philippines. When the order of ex
ile was lifted aft er the death of the fallen President, his wife, Imelda Marcos
moved to set aside the order of default, which motion was granted by the Sandig
anbayan. Respondent Sandiganbayan found that a myriad of events, such as their e
xile, President Mar cos' ill health and numerous other civil and criminal suits ag
ainst the latter was reasonable cause to lift the order of default. The Presiden
t's son, Ferdinand Mar cos, Jr. (BongBong), as the executor of his father's estate,
petitioned the court for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, which
the court granted. Ho wever, instead of filing an answer, Bong-Bong filed a Moti
on For Bill of Particu lars, praying for clearer statements of the allegations w
hich he called mere conc lusions of law, too vague and general to enable defendan
ts to intelligently answ er. Such motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan. The Re
public argued that since Bong-Bong filed a motion for extension of time to file
an answer, the Sandiganba yan should not have accepted the former's motion for bil
l of particulars. It argue d that the charges were clear, and that other parties
, such as Cruz, also linked to the controversy of ill-gotten wealth, have alread
y filed their own answers, thus proving that the complaint was not in fact couch
ed in too general terms. IS SUE: Whether or not the granting of a Bill of Partic
ulars is warranted in this c ase HELD: Considering that a motion for extension o
f time to plead is not a liti gated motion but an ex parte one, the granting of
which is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court; that in some c
ases we have allowed defendant s to file their answers even after the time fixed
for their presentation; that w e have set aside orders of default where defenda
nts' failure to answer on time was excusable; that the pendency of the motion for
a bill of particulars interrupts the period to file a responsive pleading; and c
onsidering that no real injury w ould result to the interests of petitioner with
the granting of the motion for a bill of particular. The only objection to the
action of said court would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation,
it would be erroneous to sacrific e the substantial rights of a litigant. While
it is true that there was no posit ive act on the part of the court to lift the
default order because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-gra
ft court's act of granting respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleadin
g meant the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper in the
interest of justice. It was the op erative act lifting the default order and th
ereby reinstating the position of th e original defendant whom respondent is rep
resenting, founded on the court's discr etionary power to set aside orders of defa
ult. 91 P a g e FACTS:
As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we
find for respondent as the allegations against former President Marcos appear ob
viously couched in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show h
o w the Marcoses acted in unlawful concert with Cruz in illegally amassing assets,
p roperty and funds in amounts disproportionate to Cruz's lawful income, except t
hat the former President Marcos was the president at the time. That the late pre
sid ent's co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complain
t do es not necessarily mean that his estate's executor will be able to file an eq
ually intelligent answer, since the answering defendants' defense might be persona
l to them. 92 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAP
ERS 93 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 HEIRS OF BENJAMIN MENDOZA v. COURT OF APPEALS and J.A. D
EVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Private respondent J.A. Development Corporation filed a
complaint against Benjamin Mendoza for unlawful detainer. Respondent asserted it
purchased the pr operty subject of the suit, however the title of the same is s
till in the name o f tis predecessor-in-interest. Sometime after the purchase, r
espondent found out that Mendoza and his heirs have been occupying the premises
with the tolerance of its predecessor-in-interest. Respondent thereafter notifie
d Mendoza and his h eirs that it was the new owner of the property and asked tha
t they vacate the sa me. Mendoza went to respondent and asked that he and his he
irs be allowed to sta y on the property until such time that it would be needed.
A kasunduan was made by the parties to this effect. However, when respondent on
ce again asked Mendoza's heirs to vacate the property when the former decided to m
ake some improvements thereon, the heirs told respondent that they were no longe
r honoring the kasundu an. Respondent went to court to enforce its rights. The h
eirs alleged that they were the owners of the property by virtue of their occupa
tion of the same. The t rial court rendered a decision to the effect that since
the question of ownershi p is yet to be answered, a suit for ejectment cannot pr
osper. On appeal, the Cou rt of Appeals reversed the decision and ordered remand
ed. The heirs moved for re consideration on the ground that they were not furnis
hed a copy of the petition for review, nor of the appellate court's decision. ISSU
E: Whether or not the heirs are bound by the decision. HELD: The conclusion that
petitioners were deprived of due process is inescapable. If any party has appea
red by counsel, service upo n him shall be made upon his counsel unless service
upon the party himself is or dered by the court. Notice or service made upon a p
arty who is represented by co unsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not t
o his counsel of record is not notice in law. While this rule admits of exceptio
ns, such as when the court or tribunal orders service upon the party or when the
technical defect is waived, n one applies in this case. The proceedings in the
appellate court, which culminat ed in the promulgation of the assailed decision,
were obviously flawed. Despite the Entry of Judgment, the assailed decision cou
ld not have become final and exe cutory on that date. In fact, in an apparent su
spension of its own rules, the Co urt of Appeals entertained petitioners motion
for reconsideration although it ul timately denied the same. Be that as it may,
we find that the disposition of thi s case on the merits will best serve the end
s of justice. The lack of notice to petitioners counsel deprived them of the opp
ortunity to participate in the proce edings before the Court of Appeals particul
arly on the issue of whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the unlawful detaine
r case filed by respondent. A remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceed
ings, giving the parties the opportun ity to ventilate their claims on this issu
e, is therefore appropriate. 94 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 CHARLES N. UY v. JUDGE NELIDA S. MEDINA FACTS: Petitione
r Charles Uy filed a complaint against his parents, spouses Carl os and Nelia Uy
for recovery of personal property with prayer for replevin of the owner's duplicat
e copy of the title of a parcel of land, which he alleges to be h is. The spouse
s Uy, for their part, claim that they were, in fact, the owners of the land, whi
ch was currently being occupied by petitioner. They allege that th ere is anothe
r case involving the same parcel of land, instituted by them agains t Charles, f
or the latter to reconvey the property to them. After the preliminar y conferenc
e, the spouses Uy served a copy of their Position Paper upon petition er by regi
stered mail, and filed its original copy with the trial court. An Affi davit of
Service/Filing was attached to the Position Paper with an explanation t hat pers
onal service was not resorted to because of time constraint, lack of man power,
and in order to minimize expenses. Because of the method of service, peti tioner
filed a Motion to Consider Defendant's Position Paper as Not Filed for fail ure t
o comply with the Rules of Court. Judge Nelida Medina, denied this motion. ISSUE
: Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross negligence for not finding th e Po
sition Paper as improper HELD: It has been submitted that personal service a nd
filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite actio n
or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if
not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by m a
il, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal serv
ice will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever
, resort to the following less than ethical practices. If only to underscore th
e mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring pe
r sonal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
t he discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes
of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to
wh y personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discreti
on m ust, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Sect
ion 1 1 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".We thus take this o
pportu nity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
proced ure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to othe
r modes of service or filing, the exception. 95 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 MARINDUQUE MINING v. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION Private respondent NAPOCOR instituted an action for expropriation a
gainst Marind uque Mining for the construction of a Transmission Line Project. R
espondent soug ht to expropriate only a portion of the property owned by Marindu
que Mining. Mar induque, in its answer, countered that respondent should expropr
iate the whole o f the property since the remaining portion would be useless to
it anyway, if onl y the desired portion would be taken by respondent. The trial
court rendered a d ecision in favor of Marinduque Mining, and denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsid eration. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial
court by registered mail. Marinduque Mining claimed that respondent had enough r
esources and manpowe r to effectuate personal delivery. The trial court granted
the petition, and den ied respondent's Notice of Appeal. Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the t rial court and ordered the trial court to give due course
to the Notice of Appea l. ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for NAPOCOR to fi
le its Notice of Appeal by registered mail HELD: Personal service of pleadings a
nd other papers is the g eneral rule while resort to the other modes of service
and filing is the excepti on. When recourse is made to the other modes, a writte
n explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensabl
e. If no explanation is of fered to justify resorting to the other modes, the di
scretionary power of the co urt to expunge the pleading comes into play. In this
case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCOR s notice of appeal sufficiently
explained why the notice of appeal was served and filed by registered mail - due
to lack of manpower to effe ct personal service. This explanation is acceptable
for it satisfactorily shows why personal service was not practicable. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals correct ly considered the importance of the issue involved
in the case. Therefore, the C ourt of Appeals did not err when it ruled that th
e trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its Orders
. FACTS: 96 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 14 SUMMONS 97 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 13 MARIA VICTORIA CANO-GUTIERREZ v. FACTS: HERMINIO GUTIERR
EZ Maria Victoria Cano and Herminio Gutierrez were married with two children, Je
ric o and James Marlon. Some years after the celebration of their marriage, Vict
oria left the conjugal home due to maltreatment brought about by extreme jealous
y by Herminio. Three years after Victoria left the conjugal dwelling, she learne
d th at Herminio had already remarried and that a petition for declaration of nu
llity of marriage had been filed by the latter. She alleged that she did not rec
eive a copy of the summons, as well as the petition for annulment. This was beca
use, according to Victoria, the summons was delivered to her old residence, that
Herm inio knew that she was no longer living there, and that worse, the person
with w hom the summons was left was not a resident of said address. ISSUE: Wheth
er or n ot there was a valid service of summons. HELD: In the case at bar, the O
fficer s Return issued by Process Server Bartolome A. Alunan shows that the summ
ons was served "thru Ms. Susan B. Gutierrez (sister-in-law), who claimed to be a
uthorize d to receive the same and acknowledge the receipt hereof appearing on t
he origin al copy of summons in behalf of said respondent." Summons is a writ by
which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of s
uch writ i s the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his pers
on. Under R ule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whenever pra
cticable, th e summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendan
t in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to hi
m. Under this rule, service is made only on the defendant himself. However, Sect
ion 7 of the same rule provides that, if, for justifiable reasons, the defendant
cannot be se rved in person, within a reasonable time, service may be effected
a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant s residence with some perso
n of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b) by leaving the cop
ies at defenda nt s office or regular place of business with some competent pers
on in charge th ereof. 98 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 Umandap vs. Sabio Jr. FACTS: Respondent Domingo Estomo f
iled against petitioner Joel Umandap an action for damages based on breach of co
ntract. Process Server Marmolejo effected subs tituted service of the summons an
d copy of the Complaint upon petitioner, by lea ving a copy thereof at petitione
r s home and office address to a certain Joseph David who refused to receive and
acknowledge the same. Petitioner failed to file his Answer and, on motion of pr
ivate respondent, was declared in default. There after, private respondent was a
llowed to adduce his evidence ex parte. On May 8, 1998, the trial court rendered
a judgment against petitioner. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Pet
ition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules o f Court assailing the resoluti
ons of the trial court dated October 2, 1998 and J anuary 18, 1999. Petitioner a
rgued before the Court of Appeals that the trial co urt never acquired jurisdict
ion over his person because there has been no valid service of summons; that the
substituted service of summons was improper and inv alid since the process serv
er s return failed to show on its face the impossibil ity of personal service. W
hether or not that the substituted service of summons was improper and invalid d
ue to failure to show the impossibility of personal se rvice. Petitioner s alleg
ation, as it turns out, that the process server went to his home and office addr
ess only once is, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "unsubstanti
ated and self-serving assertion of the petitioner." We have no reason to disbeli
eve or disregard the statement in the return that perso nal service of summons w
as attempted on several occasions. It is likewise not de nied that the address s
tated therein is both the residence and office address of petitioner at the time
the summons was served. Thus, the place of service is no t in issue. Significan
tly, petitioner admitted receipt by a nephew of his wife o f the summons and the
complaint. He claims; however, that his nephew misplaced t he same and ultimate
ly failed to inform him. The return indicates that the nephe w was a person of s
ufficient age and discretion residing therein. In any event, petitioner never al
leged in any of his pleadings that the nephew was incompetent to receive the sum
mons and that he was not a resident therein. The presumption that the process se
rver left or tendered the summons upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
stands unrebutted. In light of these facts, the requirements of substituted ser
vice were all complied with. The appellate court s reliance o n the process serv
er s return that summons was validly served in consonance with the principle of
presumption in favor of regularity of performance of official functions of a pub
lic officer rests on a firm basis. HELD: ISSUE: 99 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 VICENTA PANTALEO v. HONORATO ASUNCION FACTS: Plaintiff V

icenta Pantaleon, instituted an action to recover from Asuncio n a sum of money.
The summons originally issued was returned by the sheriff of N ueva Ecija unser
ved, with the statement according to reliable information, Asunc ion was residin
g in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was issu ed for service
in the place mentioned. However, the provincial sheriff of Rizal returned it un
served, with information that Asuncion had left the Tala Estate si nce February
18, 1952, and that diligent efforts to locate him proved to no avai l. On plaint
iff's motion, the court ordered, defendant be summoned by publication, and the sum
mons was published to a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ec ija. Defend
ants failed to appear or answer and were then declared in default. Af ter a hear
ing in the absence of the defendant and without notice to him, the cou rt render
ed judgment for the plaintiff. After a month, the defendant filed a pet ition fo
r relief from said order upon the ground of mistake and excusable neglig ence. A
suncion stated that he received notice of a registered letter at the Post Office
in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his old family residence; that he proceeded im mediat
ely to the latter municipality to claim said letter, which he received tha t the
letter contained copy of said order and of the judgment of he was surprise d fo
r he had not been summoned or notified of the hearing. His failure to appear bef
ore the court is excusable due to the mistake of the authorities concerned i n n
ot complying with the provisions of Rule 7, section 21, of the Rules of Court .
Upon denial of the petition for relief, defendant appealed. ISSUE: HELD: Wheth e
r or not summons by publication vest the court jurisdiction. Strict compliance w
ith the terms of the statute is necessary to confer jurisdict ion through servic
e by publication. The lower court had no authority to issue or der and declare t
he defendant in default. Such decision is null and void. Consti tutional Law sta
tes that personal service of summons, within the forum, is essen tial to the acq
uisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who do es not volunta
rily submit himself to the authority of the court. Summons by publ ication canno
t consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights co nfer upon th
e court jurisdiction over said defendant. 100 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 CITIZENS' SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. HON. JUDGE M
ELENCIO-HERRERA FACTS: Surety bonds in favor of Gregorio Fajardo were issued by
petitioner's to gu arantee payment of a promissory note executed by Dacanay and in
favor of Manufac turers Bank and Trust Co., to guarantee payment of another pro
missory note. Sant iago and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements, bind
ing to jointly and several indemnify plaintiff for any losses, cost and expenses
and an additional security, Dacanays mortgaged to plaintiff of a parcel of land
in Baguio City cov ered by Certificate of Title. The promissory notes were unpa
id and as a result p laintiff Surety was compelled to pay Fajardo and the Manufa
cturer's Bank. The Daca nays failed to reimburse the Surety for such payments. The
Surety caused the ext rajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim.
At the petitioner's reque st, respondent judge caused summons to be made by public
ation in the newspaper, but despite publication defendants did not appear within
the 60 days from last p ublication as required by the summons. Plaintiff seeks
that the defendants be de clared in default. Respondent judge dismissed the case
despite plaintiff Surety's argument that summons by publication was sufficient an
d valid under Rule 14, Sec tion 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE: HELD: W
hether or not the court acq uired jurisdiction through service of summons by pub
lication Personal service is required by due process of law to support a persona
l judgmen t, and when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determin
e the pers onal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within t
he state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition o
f jurisdict ion so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requireme
nt of due pr ocess. The proceedings are ordered suspended and held pending until
the plaintif f petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the whereabouts of the defen
dants or locat ing the properties to enable proper summons to be issued conforma
bly. 101 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., v. RENE NIETO and HELEN GARCIA,
FACTS: Defendants bought from the plaintiff a parcel of land. However, the defen
dants had not fully paid the consideration for the said lot, by special arrange
m ent with the plaintiff, the former were able to have the title to said lot tra
ns ferred in their names. They had made partial payments only and the balance of
th eir account was secured by a promissory note which they executed with terms
and conditions that the defendants shall pay plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00, wi
th i nterest thereon, said amount to be payable without demand in monthly instal
lment s and in case of failure to pay any installment due, the total obligation
or the balance automatically becomes due. A letter of demand was made by plainti
ff abo ut the installments, defendants did not comply with their obligation. Pla
intiff's legal counsel sent a letter of demand which was received by the defendant
s. Desp ite receipt of said letter, defendants did not comply and even failed to
make a reply. Plaintiff presented a statement of account stating the amount owi
ng to it inclusive of interest. There was an ex-parte reception of evidence beca
use the defendants appellants had been declared in default, plaintiff having com
plied wi th the court's order allowing service of summons and copy of the complain
t upon th e defendants-appellants through publication in a newspaper of general
circulatio n. Plaintiff claims that summons could not be served personally upon
the defenda nts because they concealed themselves and when the sheriff went to C
ebu City whe re defendant-appellant Nieto holds office, could not be found but w
hen the decis ion was served at the same address, the defendants appellants were
able to recei ve it. Defendant-appellants appealed. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not
service of sum mons by publication vest the lower court jurisdiction The lower
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants-a ppellants
. The Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing d efendant
, absent a personal service of summons within the forum.The proper recou rse for
a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or
personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and caus e them
to be attached under Rule 57, Section 1 (f), the attachment converts the action
into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication m ay th
en accordingly be deemed valid and effective. 102 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND R
OMEO BOYON FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance against
respondent s to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel
of land sub ject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondent
s. As per ret urn of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the pro
cess server al legedly because efforts to serve personally to respondents failed
. Meanwhile, pe titioners filed an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect
summons by publi cation and the judge issued an order granting the same. The res
pondents were dec lared in default and petitioners were thereafter allowed to su
bmit their evidenc e ex parte. Helen Boyon, who was then out of the country, was
surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Respo
ndents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of th
e service of summon s effected by the court a quo. The court issued an order den
ying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of s
tanding in court. On ce again, the respondents raised the issue of the jurisdict
ion of the trial cour t via a motion for reconsideration and the same was denied
. The petitioners move d for the execution of the controverted judgment which th
e judge granted. Therea fter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for cer
tiorari which held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned
resolution and orders. ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication can validly
be served. HELD: Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant b
y the service of summons , such service may be done personal or substituted serv
ice, where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. Ho
wever, extraterritorial s ervice of summons or summons by publication applies on
ly when the action is in r em or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the t
hing itself instead of agai nst the defendant's person if the action is in rem or
an individual is named as de fendant and the purpose is to subject the individua
l's interest in a piece of prop erty to the obligation or loan burdening it if qua
si in rem. In the instant case , what was filed before the trial court was an ac
tion for specific performance d irected against respondents. While the suit inci
dentally involved a piece of lan d, the ownership or possession thereof was not
put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for speci
fic performance is an action in p ersonam. Hence, summons by publication cannot
be validly served. 103 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 14 MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and AGAPITA TRA JANO In the case of Trajano vs. Manotoc for wrongful de
ath of the deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by Military Intelligence under
the command of Ma. Imelda M. M anotoc. Based upon the complaint, the Regional Tr
ial Court issued a summons at t he house of Manotoc. The said Mackey dela Cruz,
as caretaker, received the summo ns. Manotoc was declared in default for failure
to answer. Whether or not a vali d jurisdiction was acquired for the service of
summons over the petitioner. HELD : ISSUE: FACTS: The Regional Trial Court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner, becau se the substituted service o
f summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first place. The main fact t
hat the summons was not sent in the petitioner s dwe lling. The said caretaker w
as not a person of suitable age and discretion and wa s not resided in the said
address. Hence the requisites of substituted summons w as not followed, therefor
e the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitio ner at the first place.
104 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 15 MOTIONS 105 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES v. SUI SOAN S. CHENG et al. A com
plaint for specific performance was filed by Cheng Sui Soan against Vette I ndus
trial Sales Co., Inc., et al. based on unpaid obligations arising from his t ran
sfer of his interest in the stocks of Vette Industrial. Vette, et al. filed t he
ir answer, and after the issues were joined, Sui filed a Motion to Set Pretria l
. Vette, et al. received the motion, but did not attend, since there was no not
ice from the trial court setting the pre-trial date. A pre-trial hearing was sub
sequently set for January 15, 2004, but was postponed and moved to May 21, 2004
. Sui and his counsel, however, on the date of the pre-trial failed to appear, a
n d the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case. Atty. Ferrer, Sui's counsel
, filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, which was granted, expla
in ing that he arrived late since he came from South Cotabato, as he served in t
he Provincial Board of Canvassers. Vette, et al. opposed said motion, asserting
tha t Sui did not comply with the three-day notice rule which is mandatory under
the Rules of Court, and that Sui failed to submit proof of receipt by Vette, et
al. of the manifestation and motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erre
d in not dismissing the case HELD: The Court has consistently held that a motion
whi ch does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rul
es of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court h
as no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. However
, the re are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. When the trial c
ourt r eceived Sui's Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not imme
diately resolve the motion, but allowed petitioners to file their comment and al
so leav e to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply. These circumstances justify
a depart ure from the literal application of the rule because petitioners were g
iven the opportunity to study and answer the arguments in the motion. It is the
policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable
them to h ave their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of techni
calities.4 1 It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools desig
ned to faci litate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application o
f the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Cour
t is empower ed to suspend their operation. FACTS: 106 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 15 MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT v. HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO FA
CTS: A complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land was instituted by Jose R e
yes Sytangco against Marikina Valley Development Corporation and Milagros Liamz
on. It appears that Sytangco gave funds to Liamzon to purchase the property for
him and his wife, but Liamzon, in evident bad faith, used the funds to procure t
he property for herself, and afterwards, transferred the same to Marikina Valle
y , which was a closed corporation owned by the Liamzon family. Liamzon and Mari
ki na Valley denied the allegations of Sytangco, and after due hearing, the tria
l c ourt rendered a decision, directing Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of Con
veya nce covering the property in favor of Sytangco. Marikina Valley filed for r
econs ideration, which was denied by the trial court, and the court also dismiss
ed the notice of appeal filed by the former for being pro forma. Upon elevation
to the Court of Appeals, the latter court also dismissed the same based on the s
ame gr ound. The CA reasoned that since the motion for reconsideration merely su
bmitted , reiterated, repleaded, repeated or reaffirmed the same arguments that
had been previously been considered and resolved in the decision, the motion is
pro form a. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion filed by is merely pro forma. HELD:
A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance that is, wh
en it sat isfies the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court interrupts th
e cunning of the period to perfect an appeal. A motion for reconsideration that
does not c omply with those requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated a
s pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings and as such, the motion wil
l not stay or suspend the reglementary period. The net result will be dismissal
of the appe al for having been unseasonably filed. In their motion, petitioners
claimed that the evidence submitted was insufficient to show that the downpaymen
t for the pu rchase of the property had in fact come from private respondents pr
edecessor-in -interest Jose Reyes Sytangco. In effect, petitioners here aver tha
t the presump tion of regularity of private transactions carried out in the ordi
nary course of business had not been overturned by the testimony of Jose Reyes S
ytangco himsel f. This reflected petitioners appraisal of the trial court s conc
lusion that Jo se and Aurelia Reyes Sytangco had handed over to Milagros Liamzon
the amount of P41,000.00 to complete the downpayment of the Reyes Sytangco spou
ses on the Espaa lot. The trial court had not discussed the presumption of regula
rity of private transactions invoked by petitioners. The Court is, therefore, un
able to charact erize the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners as sim
ply pro forma. T hat motion for reconsideration, it may be noted, had been filed
no more than ten days after receipt of the trial court s decision by petitioner
Marikina Valley. 107 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS 108 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., et al V COURT OF APPEALS, et al
. FACTS: Alejandro Q. Rey (Rey) and Juan B. Araujo (Araujo) applied for a free p
at ent over a parcel of land, which they had been occupying and cultivating for
man y years. However, such free patent application was held in abeyance due to t
he e xistence of a title covering the land in the name of Peltan Development Inc
. (Pe ltan). Rey and Araujo conducted investigation regarding said title and fou
nd tha t the Original Certificate of Title, from which Peltan's title came from wa
s ficti tious and spurious. Thus, they filed an action for the cancellation of P
eltan's ti tle, along with others like it. Peltan alleged that Rey and Araujo were
not real parties-interest, as they had no existing legal right over the subject
land, th us were was a lack of cause of action. The trial court ruled in favor
of Peltan, thereby dismissing the complaint filed by Rey and Araujo. Upon appeal
, the Cour t of Appeals reversed the decision, on the basis of a subsequent deci
sion of the Supreme Court involving the same issue. Hence, Peltan filed a petiti
on for revi ew. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in reversing the de
cision of th e trial court HELD: The Court holds that private respondents are no
t the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it
did for the c ancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners o
n the ground t hat they were derived from a "spurious" OCT, assailed in effect t
he validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the revers
ion of the land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer
in the complai nt will have the same result of reverting the land to the govern
ment under the R egalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the govern
ment is entitled to this relief. The Court in that case held:The present motion
to dismiss is act ually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules
of Court, i.e., f ailure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it al
leges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to
demand the cancella tion or amendment of the defendant s title, because, even if
the said title were canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced the
rein, or of the port ion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the
public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all t
hat any part of the l and covered by the defendant s title was privately owned b
y him or by his predec essors-ininterest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that th
e said land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964
, when the government i ssued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if th
ere is any person or ent ity to relief, it can only be the government. 109 P a g
e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 ALFREDO VERGEL DE DIOS and EMILY B. VERGEL DE DIOS v. RI
STOL LABORATORIES (PHILS.), INC., and P.P. LAGDAMEO Petitioner had been working
as a detailman, in charge of promoting products for Bristol Laboratories. After
some years of service, Bristol sent a letter to Alfr edo, terminating his employ
ment on grounds attached to the notice of termination . Bristol, it appears, thi
s letter to its employees, leaving Alfredo ostracized. Alfredo then filed with t
he Court of First Instance an action for damages for t he alleged libelous comme
nts and insults directed at him by Bristol. Bristol, on the other hand, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stat es no cause of action. T
he trial court rendered judgment in favor of Bristol. On appeal, Alfredo reasons
that he was not asking for damages based on the Labor L aw, but based on the Ci
vil Code, for quasi-delict. ISSUE: Whether or not the com plaint does not state
a cause of action. HELD: In order to sustain a dismissal o n the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action m
ust appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of th e sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of act ion is whether or n
ot, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a val id judgment upon t
he same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For th e purpose, the mo
tion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the fact s alleged in the
complaint. 5 The admission, however, is limited only to all mat erial and relev
ant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint. The admission of the truth of
material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to rend er a demurrer
an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in th
e pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stat ed; nor concl
usions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irreleva nt matter.Th
e admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not ex
tend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn theref
rom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclus ions from f
acts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage
and irrelevant matter. FACTS: 110 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 FLORENTINO PINEDA v. HEIRS OF ELISEO GUEVARRA FACTS: The
heirs of Eliseo Guevara instituted an action for the nullification of the certi
ficates of title of a parcel of land, which they claim belonged to the ir parent
s, and are covered by titles in the names of Florentino Pineda and othe r person
s. According to the heirs, the land was purchased by their father, and t hat suc
h sale was annotated at the back of the Original Title of the land. Pined a file
d an answer with counterclaim, raising the defense of lack of cause of act ion,
averring that he was a buyer in good faith, and laches. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of laches, but the Court of Appeals rever
sed the decision of the trial court, stating that laches is not one of the groun
ds enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not a compl
aint may be dismissed on the ground of laches HELD: In the case at bar, whi le t
he trial court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to dism iss
had been filed, the records do not reveal that it extended to the parties th e
opportunity to present evidence. For instance, counsel for the heirs of Guevar a
filed and served written interrogatories on one of the defendants but the tria
l court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to order the defendant to
submit answers to the written interrogatories. The trial court likewise denied t
he Ex Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the heirs of Guevara. These were the i
n stances which would have enabled the trial court to receive evidence on which
to anchor its factual findings. Although the trial court heard oral arguments an
d required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, the presentation of
e vidence on the defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss was not hel
d a t all. Otherwise, the oral arguments and memoranda submitted by the parties
woul d have enabled this Court to review the trial court's factual finding of lach
es in stead of remanding the case for trial on the merits. A perusal of the reco
rds pr ecludes this Court from making a categorical declaration on whether the h
eirs of Guevara were guilty of laches. In reversing the RTC's order of dismissal,
the Cou rt of Appeals held that "laches could not be a ground to dismiss the com
plaint a s it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is not entirely
correct. Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the p
laintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, t
he same m ay be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particu
larly on t he relation of the words "abandoned" and "otherwise extinguished" to
the phrase "claim or demand deemed set forth in the plaintiff's pleading" is broad
enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches. However, when
a party mov es for the dismissal of the complaint based on laches, the trial cou
rt must set a hearing on the motion where the parties shall submit not only thei
r arguments on the questions of law but also their evidence on the questions of
fact involve d. Thus, being factual in nature, the elements of laches must be pr
oved or dispr oved through the presentation of evidence by the parties. As discu
ssed above, an apparent delay in the filing of a complaint as shown in a pleadin
g does not aut omatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint on the ground o
f laches. 111 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 18 PRE-TRIAL 112 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE ANDRES C. SARMIENTO Rule 18 v. HON. CELESTINO C. JUAN and BELFAS
T SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC. Belfast Surety a nd Insurance Co. Inc. filed an a
ction against Andres Sarmiento (Andres) and his father, Benjamin Sarmiento, Sr.
for indemnification under a prior indemnity agre ement executed by them in conne
ction with a bail bond. After Andres filed an ans wer with compulsory countercla
im, Belfast filed a motion to dismiss the case aga inst Benjamin and to schedule
the case for pre-trial. The motion was granted by Judge Celestino Juan (Judge J
uan) and a pre-trial date was set. However, during pre-trial, nobody appeared ex
cept Atty. Castillo, counsel for Belfast. Andres, m eanwhile, sent a motion on t
he same day to the court asking for the postponement of the hearing on the groun
d of stomach pains. This motion was denied by the tr ial court and Belfast was a
llowed to present evidence ex parte. It is not clear whether the ex parte presen
tation of evidence had already been done, nor that a decision had been rendered,
but Andres filed a petition with the Supreme Court t o annul the aforementioned
orders of Judge Juan. The petition was remanded to th e Court of Appeals, who d
enied the same. In this petition for review, Andres con tends that pre-trial was
premature inasmuch as there was still no answer filed b y Belfast to his counte
rclaim, thus the last pleading had not yet been filed so as to authorize a pretr
ial under the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the p re-trial was valid HEL
D: The requirement that the pre-trial shall be scheduled " after the last pleadi
ng has been filed" is intended to fully apprise the court a nd the parties of al
l the issues in the case before the pre-trial is conducted. It must be remembere
d that the issues may only be ascertained from the allegatio ns contained in the
pleadings filed by the parties. The last permissible pleadin g that a party may
file would be the reply to the answer to the last pleading of claim that had be
en filed in the case, which may either be the complaint, a cro ss-claim, a count
erclaim or a third party complaint, etc. Any pleading asserting a claim must be
answered, and the failure to do so by the party against whom th e claim is asser
ted renders him liable to be declared in default in respect of s uch claim. Ther
e are, however, recognized exceptions to the rule, making the fai lure to answer
a pleading of claim as a ground for a default declaration, such a s the failure
to answer a complaint in intervention, or a compulsory counterclai m so intimat
ely related to the complaint such that to answer to same would merel y require a
repetition of the allegations contained in the complaint In the case presently
considered, the nature of the counterclaim in the petitioner s answer has not be
en made clear, except to categorize it as a compulsory counterclaim. Such being
the case, it is likely to be one where the answering thereof is not n ecessary,
and the failure to do so would not be a ground to be declared in defau lt. In an
y event, the private respondent s failure to answer the petitioner s co untercla
im after the period to file the answer had lapsed is no obstacle to hold ing a p
re-trial.1wph1.t The requirement that the last pleading must have been filed before
a pre-trial may be scheduled should more appropriately be construed to me an not
only if the last pleading had been actually filed, but also if the period for f
iling the same had expired. FACTS: 113 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 18 ROLANDO AGULTO, et al. v. WILLIAM Z. TECSON William Tecs
on filed an action for damages against Rolando Agulto, et al. (Agult o, et al.)
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Agulto, et al. filed thei r answer,
claiming that Tecson has no cause of action against them and prayed fo r the dis
missal of the case. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to p rosecute
, but the action was subsequently revived upon Tecson's motion. The RTC th en requ
ired the parties to appear during the pre-trial conference. On the date o f the
pre-trial conference, Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the
RTC that the judge was on leave. The counsel for the petitioners suggeste d an
alternative date for pre-trial, and the RTC employee said that such suggest ion
was not yet official as the date would depend on the calendar of the court a nd
the Tecson's counsel. On the suggested date, however, the pre-trial conference did
push through, and since Agulto, et al. were not apprised thereof, they faile d
to appear, and the RTC allowed Tecson to present his evidence ex parte. Agulto ,
et al. then filed a petition for certiorari claiming that the RTC gravely abus
ed its discretion, and that they were robbed of their day in court, thus the pre
-trial conference was not valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the pre-trial conference
was proper according to the Rules of Court HELD: Under the present Section 3, R
u le 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of pre-trial should be
se rved on counsel. The counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of n
oti fying the party he represents. It is only when a party has no counsel that t
he n otice of pre-trial is required to be served personally on him. Thus, the pr
esent rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pretrial is serv
ed on counsel, and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. It does
not, however, dispense with notice of pre-trial. The failure of a party to appe
ar at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plainti
ff, t hen he may be declared non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the def
endant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evi
dence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, send
ing a notice of pretrial stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandat
ory. I ts absence will render the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings void. Thi
s must be so as part of a party s right to due process. Here, no notice of pre-t
rial wa s served on counsel of petitioners in connection with the pre-trial held
. Hence, the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued its order
allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte. If no notice of pre-trial
is serve d, all the proceedings at the pre-trial et seq. are null and void. Henc
e, the ab sence of the requisite notice of pre-trial to the defendant s counsel
(or to the defendant himself, in case he has no counsel) nullifies the order all
owing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte. The fact that the responde
nt was all owed to present his evidence ex parte not only because the petitioner
s failed to appear at the pre-trial but also because they failed to file their p
re-trial br ief is of no moment. Although the failure of the defendant to file a
pre-trial b rief has the same effect as his failure to appear at the pre-trial
(this is, the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the
court shall r ender judgment on the basis thereof), a condition precedent is FAC
TS: 114 P a g e

the service of notice of pre-trial. Otherwise, the defendant will be groping in

the dark as to when exactly he is supposed to file his pre-trial brief. More spe
cifically, under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the p
a rties are required to file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in s
uc h manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three days before the
da te of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs. Clearly, the date of
the pre-trial is the reckoning point for the filing of the pre-trial brief. But
wit hout prior notice of pre-trial, the parties cannot reasonably be expected t
o kno w the date of the pre-trial. Therefore, it is imperative for the trial cou
rt to serve notice of pre-trial on counsel. It is only after being notified of t
he pre -trial that the twin duties to file the pre-trial brief and to appear at
the pre -trial arise. Without such notice, a party cannot be faulted for and mad
e to suf fer the adverse consequences of his failure either to file the pre-tria
l brief o r to appear at the pre-trial. 115 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 19 INTERVENTION 116 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 19 FIRST PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION SANDIGANBAYAN, et
al. The Presidential Commission on Good Governance instituted an action for reco
nvey ance, accounting and restitution of certain funds and properties allegedly
acqui red by Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al. though abuse of right and power and
unjust enrichment. The funds and properties subject of the case are sequestered
shares of stock in the Philippines Commercial International Bank (PCIBank), alle
gedly acquired by Romualdez, et al. in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt P
ractic es Act, and therefore subject to forfeiture in favor of the government. F
irst Ph ilippine Holdings Corporation filed its own Motion for Leave to Interven
e and to Admit Complaint in Intervention pending before the Sandiganbayan. It av
erred th at Trans Middle East Equities, another Romualdez front borrowed the amo
unt used to buy said shares of stock from another corporation, which in turn, us
ed PCIBan k funds. FPHC therefore asked in its Complaint in Intervention that th
e said pro perties be returned to it. The Sandiganbayan dismissed FPHC's complaint
in interve ntion because according to such court, the right sought to be enforc
ed by the la tter is personal between it and Equities, and also intra-corporate
in nature, th us the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the same. On elevati
on to the Supr eme Court, Equities argued that the Sandiganbayan was correct in
dismissing FPHC's complaint in intervention since the latter did not own any share
s of stock of P CIBank, and will only become such owner if the sales document of
the shares in f avor of its present owners is annulled. ISSUE: Whether or not F
PHC has a legal i nterest to allow it to intervene in the case Intervention is a
remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in a proceeding, become
s a litigant there in to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest w
hich may be affecte d by such proceeding. Its purpose, according to Francisco, i
s "to settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole controversy (among
) the persons involv ed".The Court has no doubt that petitioner has a legal inte
rest in the shares wh ich are the subject of the controversy. At the very least,
it is "so situated as to be adversely affectted by a distribution or dispositio
n of the (sequestered shares) in the custody of the court". The PCGG prays that,
among other propertie s, the shares in question should be returned and reconvey
ed to it. On the other hand, FPHC claims that said shares belong to it, not to r
espondent Romualdez or Equities. Clearly, therefore, petitioner would be adverse
ly affected by any judg ment therein distributing or disposing of the property,
whether to PCGG or to Eq uities. Unquestionably, the shares are sequestered and
thus are "in the custody of the court", because by sequestration properties are
placed in the control of a court to preserve them and/or to prevent their sale,
encumbrance or dispositio n pending the determination of the legality or illegal
ity of their acquisition a nd their true ownership. No such final determination
is possible unless the part ies who have legitimate but conflicting claims are m
ade parties or, as in this c ase, allowed to intervene in the main action. HELD:
FACTS: v. 117 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE ESTEBAN YAU Rule 19 v. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION THE MANILA
BANKING CORPORATION v. ESTEBAN YAU, et al. FACTS: Petitioner Esteban Yau, a jud
gment creditor of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. , applied for, and was granted a writ of
execution to satisfy the judgment. It a ppears, however, that the only property
of Silverio that could be found is his p roprietary membership share in the Man
ila Golf and Country Club. Accordingly, th e sheriff levied upon such share, and
during the public auction sale, Yau emerge d as the highest bidder, and a corre
sponding Certificate of Sale was issued in h is name. However, at the time of th
e execution sale, the shares Silverio were ap parently subject to a prior levy p
ursuant to separate writs of preliminary attac hment by the Manila Banking Corpo
ration (Manila Bank). Yau then filed separate m otions to intervene in the cases
involving said shares, and one trial court gran ted said motion, but the second
motion was denied by the other. Accordingly, the shares were transferred to Yau's
name. Manila Bank thereafter filed a petition fo r certiorari before the CA, wh
ich was granted. The Court of Appeals found that s ince the shares were in custo
dia legis, the order was null and void. ISSUE: Whet her or not the intervention,
which led to the transfer to Yau of the shares is v alid HELD: The contention o
f Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in the ma tter in litigation lacks b
uoyancy. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the g
overning law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and the
appellate court, a person may, before or during trial , be permitted by the Cou
rt in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he h as legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of th e parties, or an intere
st against both, or when he is so situated as to be adver sely affected by a dis
tribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof. Yau falls under the last instance. It is recognized that a judg
ment creditor who has reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene
and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon which an attachment ha
s been levied may intervene in the underlying action in wh ich the writ of attac
hment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachm ent. Clearly, Yau, b
eing the judgment creditor of Silverio and the purchaser at the public auction s
ale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected by th e disposition of th
e Silverio share, subject of the writ of attachment should a decision be rendere
d in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has standing to interv ene to protect his
interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect his
interests where the Silverio share is under custodia legis. I f we follow the c
ontention of Manilabank, this would result in a violation of th e aforementioned
principle of judicial stability or non-interference. Lastly, on the matter of a
llowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that t he rules now al
low intervention before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After trial an
d decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. Th e permissive t
enor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the R ules to give
to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disall owing the sa
me. The rule on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and economize in
litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or anything
related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suit s. 118 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 23 DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION 119 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANT
OCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO FACTS: Rule 23 A claim for reconveyance was
filed against respondents by petitioner Presidentia l Commission on Good Governm
ent. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for lea ve to file interrogatories.
Petitioner then filed a motion to strike out the int errogatory for being queer,
weird and procedurally bizarre as it is improper and i rrelevant. The Sandiganba
yan refuted such motion for leave to file interrogatori es and impelled Tantoco
and Santiago to amend their interrogatories such that it primarily required fact
ual details relative to the specific assertions of PCGG's amended complaint. Sandi
ganbayan admitted such amendment, which PCGG opposed mai nly on the ground that
the interrogatories dig into evidentiary matters. ISSUE: Whether or not evidenti
ary issues may be delved into in interrogatories. HELD: I f the ultimate facts a
re alleged in general terms or "not averred with sufficien t definiteness trial,
a bill of particulars seeking a more definite statement may be ordered by the co
urt upon motion. A bill of particulars is, however, limited to creating more par
ticular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. Its f unction is not to su
pply evidentiary matters. Such matters may be inquired into before the trial. It
is the purpose of the law that the parties before the trial should discover for
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not onl y those known to th
em individually, but also those known to adversaries; and the Rules of Court mak
e this ideal possible through depositions. 120 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE FORTUNE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and INTER-MERCHANTS CORP
ORATION FACTS: Rule 23 Petitioner Fortune filed an action for breach of contrac
t against Respondent. Up on the filing by Respondent of its answer, Petitioner s
erved written interrogato ries which were answered by Respondent. Consequently,
a notice to take depositio n upon oral examination of a certain Juanito Teope wa
s sent by Petitioner, which was opposed by Respondent stating that it had previo
usly availed of one mode of discovery and that Teope has no intention to abscond
or leave the country and i s very much willing to testify in open court. The tr
ial court prohibited the Dep osition. ISSUE: mode. HELD: The liberty of a party
to make discovery is practica lly unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not pri vileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith an
d within the bounds of law. The court could not thereby observe the behavior of
the deponent does not justify t he denial of the right to take deposition. In th
e absence of proof, the allegati on that petitioner merely intended to annoy, ha
rass or oppress the proposed depo nent cannot ably support the setting aside of
a notice to take deposition. Petit ion was granted. Whether or not a party, afte
r availing of one mode of discovery may once more avail of another 121 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE AYALA LAND, INC. v. HON. JUDGE LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ASB REALTY COR
P. and E.M. RAMOS & SONS, INC. FACTS: Rule 23 ASB Realty, Inc. and E.M. Ramos &
Sons, Inc., Respondents in this case, filed an action for nullification of a Co
ntract to Sell against Petitioner Ayala Land. R espondent, afterwards, filed a M
otion for leave to take Testimony by Deposition upon Oral Examination of Emerito
Ramos, Sr. Although still of sound mind, he was already 87 years old and the po
ssibility of him not being able to testify on it s behalf is more than likely in
the course of the trial. Motion was granted and the parties scheduled a date fo
r cross-examination of Ramos. Petitioner, objecte d to the propriety and admissi
bility of the deposition. The trial court ordered the cross-examination be taken
. Ramos subsequently died hence Respondents sought the admission of the depositi
on. Deposition of Ramos was admitted. Petitioner o bjected to its admissibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition is admissible . HELD: The rules on discove
ry should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the p erceived advantage of a lib
eral discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth an d expediting the disposal
of litigation would be defeated. The admissibility of evidence depends on its re
levance and competence while the weight of evidence pe rtains to evidence alread
y admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. I n this case, the trial c
ourt permitted the taking of Ramos' deposition chiefly bec ause of his advance age
which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court. 122 P
a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC. v. SPOUSES SUHARTO MANG
UDADATU and MIRIAM SANGKI MANGUNDADATU FACTS: Rule 23 A complaint for damages a
gainst Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., I nc. who was declared in
default and consequently a decision in favor of Responde nts was rendered. Motio
n for New Trial was filed by petitioner, which was eventu ally denied by the tri
al court and afterwards a writ of execution was issued. Pe titioner filed a moti
on to quash said writ and also filed a Petition for Prohibi tion before the Cour
t of Appeals seeking to enjoin the implementation of the wri t. Notice to take D
eposition upon Oral Examination of Atty. Peligro and Atty. Ma rio was served by
Respondents intending to prove that Petitioner had not receive d a decision from
the trial court denying its Motion for New Trial. Deposition p roceeded and sub
sequently, the trial court denied Petitioner's Motion to Quash Wri t. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Petitioner may no longer avail of a depositio n due to the t
ermination of the trial. ISSUE: Whether or not an oral deposition can no longer
be availed of. HELD: No existing rule limits the taking of deposit ion. Depositi
ons may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, w henever nece
ssary or convenient. Depositions are allowed, provided they are take n in accord
ance with the provisions of the Rules of Court and provided, further, that a cir
cumstance for their admissibility exists. In the instant case, Sectio n 4(c)(2)
of Rule 23 governs the circumstances where the witnesses of petitioner resided b
eyond 100 kilometers from the place of hearing. Further, notwithstandi ng the fa
ct that a trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly
initiated. 123 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP. and YU HE CHING v. LEY CONS
TRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Rule 23 D
ue to failure to transfer shares in a real property and to develop the same, a c
omplaint for specific performance was commenced by Respondent Ley Construction a
gainst Petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing despite full payment of the pu
rchase price. Princeton Development Corp. was also impleaded due to its purchase
of the subject property was bought by it. Both Hyatt and Ley sought to avail of
taking depositions. However, Petitioner contended that such taking of depositio
ns will delay the proceedings. The scheduled depositions were consequently call
e d off by the trial court and thereafter set the date for pre-trial. Ley refuse
d to enter into pre-trial and upon motion by Hyatt and Ching as well as Responde
nt Princeton, the complaint was subsequently dismissed. A petition for Certiorar
i was filed by Respondent Ley relating to the order of the trial court declining
t o suspend the pre-trial. The Court of Appeals ordered the taking of the depos
iti on. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper grant of taking a deposition. H
ELD: The trial court, before dismissing Ley's complaint, gave two options which ar
e ei ther to enter into a pre-trial or terminate the pre-trial conference and ap
ply f or deposition later on. The trial court erred in forcing Ley to choose onl
y from these options and in dismissing its complaint upon its refusal to choose
either of the two. The taking of deposition is permissible without any showing t
hat pr ejudice to any party might result provided it is taken in accordance with
the pr ovisions of the Rules of Court. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC directs trial courts
to issu e orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under
Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or make use of
depositi ons under Rule 23. 124 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE JOWEL SALES v. CYRIL SABINO FACTS: Rule 23 In view of the vehicu
lar accident which caused the death of respondent Cyril Sab ino's son, a complaint
for damages was initiated against Petitioner Jowel Sales. A deposition and cros
s-examination of a certain Bueneres Corral was commenced by the respondent in th
e presence of Petitioner's counsel. Due to the fact that Corra l has absconded and
left the country, a Formal Offer of Exhibit was made, offeri ng as evidence sai
d deposition, which was opposed by Petitioner for the reason t hat the requireme
nts for the admission of such under Rule 23 of the Rules of Cou rt has not been
complied with. The said evidence was admitted, which the Court o f Appeals uphel
d. ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition is permissible. HELD: Whi le depositions
may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to b
e a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party o r witness. Ho
wever, the Petitioner has not asserted and presented evidence that deponent Corr
al has undeniably returned to the country but only offered such as a possibility
. The petition was therefore denied. 125 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE JONATHAN D. CARIAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPIN
ES and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO. FACTS: Rule 23 Respondent Davao Light and Power
Co. sought the arrest of petitioner for the cla ndestine sale of Respondent's supp
lies and he sought the. A certain Ricardo was ap prehended and he executed a swo
rn statement stating therein that the pilfered it ems came from Petitioner Caria
ga. The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as a witness since personal se
rvice of a subpoena could not be effected for the reason that he was in Sultan K
udarat. Petitioner Cariaga was convicted of qualif ied theft, relying upon the s
worn statement. The Court of Appeals affirmed said conviction. ISSUE: Whether or
not the sworn statement was admissible. HELD: It h as been previously ruled tha
t " unable to testify or for that matter unavailab ility , does not cover the ca
se of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not app ear. Admission of testimony
given by witness out of court must be strictly compl ied with. The witness canno
t be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable
or unable to testify. The Court must exercise its coe rcive power to arrest." On
this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cari aga should not have been
admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the
other aspects of this rule. The decision of the Court o f Appeals is hereby reve
rsed. 126 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE PFEGER R. DULAY v. RODRIGO S. DULAY FACTS: Rule 23 Petitioner ha

ving taken care of Respondent, opened a trust account with the bank of Boston ma
king the former as trustee of said account. Rodrigo discovered that Petitioner h
ad emptied the account. Respondent, in seeking to recover his bank deposit, file
d a complaint against Petitioner. Respondent Rodrigo then filed for the issuance
of Letters Rogatory to get the deposition of several witnesses res iding abroad
where Petitioner lived. Dulay, moved for the filing of cross-examin ation quest
ions which was granted. The trial court ordered that the Clerk of Cou rt in Bost
on, Massachusetts conduct the examination. The deposition was, however , actuall
y taken before a Notary Public. The answer to interrogatories and cross -interro
gatories were submitted by the Respondent to the court and was admitted over the
objections of Petitioners. The Court of Appeals also held it proper to admit su
ch. ISSUE: Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements upo n submi
ssion of the documents. HELD: Respondent cannot be faulted for the delay neither
can the trial court be blamed for allowing the admission of the depositi ons ta
ken not in strict adherence to its original directive. It was not within t he tr
ial court's power, much less the respondent's, to compel the Clerk of Court of Bosto
n to have the deposition taken before it. Respondent Rodrigo substantially compl
ied with the requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries. The a uthe
ntication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the nota ry
public who took the questioned depositions. With such ratification, there is no
more impediment to their admissibility. This petition is thus denied. 127 P a g
e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, LUCIO TAN
FACTS: Presidential Commission for Good Government, sought for reversion, reconv
eyance, and restitution before Respondent Sandiganbayan against Respondents Luc
i o Tan. PCGG alleged that Respondent had an agreement with then President Ferdi
na nd E. Marcos whereby the former President would appropriate 60% of Shareholdi
ngs , Inc. owned by Respondent Tan. It was averred that Respondent Tan made brib
es i n consideration of the government's continued support for his business endeav
ors. Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to take Deposition of Rolando Gapud upo
n Ora l Examination being the former financial adviser of the President and his
testim ony can only be taken upon oral examination due to personal risks. Due to
failur e of service of summons upon all defendants and their failure to answer,
said mo tion was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of deposition was pro
per. HELD : Allusion to any fact other than Gapud s cooperation was not offered
by PCGG th at would support the deponent s claim of fear for his safety. No proo
f or any al legation has been presented to show that a real threat to Gapud s li
fe exists up on his return to the Philippines, and that adequate security cannot
be provided by petitioner for such a vital witness. Petitioner PCGG s reasons d
o not amount to an "exceptional" or "unusual" case for us to grant leave and rev
erse responde nt court. 128 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG v. SPOUSES LORENZO and FLORENTINA P
AROCHA FACTS: An action for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title and Re
covery of Possession and Ownership was filed by petitioners against Spouses Lore
nza and Florentina Parocha. Petitioners, during trial, were given 10 days to sub
mit the ir formal offer of documentary exhibits and having failed to do so, the
trial co urt considered such as a waiver of their right to make a formal offer o
f evidenc e. Court of Appeals affirmed ISSUE: Whether or not there was a waiver
of the rig ht to make their formal offer of evidence. HELD: Emphasis must be had
on the nec essity of a formal offer of evidence to enable judges to support the
ir findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offe
red by the p arties at the trial. Failure to submit within a considerable period
of time is a considered a waiver. There is a considerable difference between id
entification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in
the course o f the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the ev
idence as an e xhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its ca
se. 129 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 25 INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES 130 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 25 ELENA S. ONG v. HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO V. MAZO, ELVIRA C.
LANUEVO and CHARITO A. T OMILLOSO FACTS: Elvira C. Lanueva and Charito A. Tomill
oso, respondents in this case, fil ed an action for damages against Petitioner E
lena S. Ong stemming from a vehicul ar accident between a bus owned by Petitione
r which bumped into a jeepney owned by Lanueva with Tomilloso as passenger. Peti
tioner served written interrogatorie s upon Respondents along with a Manifestati
on and Omnibus Motion seeking that th e court directs them to answer the interro
gatories. Denial by the trial court on the ground that it constituted a fishing e
xpedition which would be more appropria tely ventilated in a pre-trial conference
. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial corre ctly issued such denial. HELD: It was bl
atantly erroneous for the trial court to disallow petitioner's written interrogato
ries. The time-honored cry of `fishing exp edition' is no longer a valid reason to p
revent a party from inquiring into the fa cts underlying the opposing party's case
through discovery procedures. Therefore, the remedy of certiorari is necessary.
. 131 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 25 EDWARD T. MARCELO, MARCELO FIBERGLASS CORPORATION v. SAN
DIGANBAYAN and PRESIDENT IAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT FACTS: Respondent Pre
sidential Commission on Good Government filed a complaint a gainst Petitioners f
or the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Respondent PCGG served a Request for Admis
sion upon Petitioner Edward and the latter filed a response including a counterc
laim also seeking the admission on matter stated therein. PC GG subsequently fil
ed a Pre-trial Brief and Petitioner also filed with Written I nterrogatories, Fi
rst Set and Request for Admission. Other Petitioner Corporatio ns likewise filed
their trial Briefs with Written Interrogatories, First Set and some included a
Request for Admission. PCGG answered only the written interroga tories and reque
st for admission prompting the Petitioner Corporations to file a Motion for Summ
ary Judgment on the ground that the matters set forth in their w ritten interrog
atories are deemed established for Respondent PCGG's failure to ans wer such. Sand
iganbayan denied the motion for summary judgment. ISSUE: Whether o r not denial
of the motion for summary judgment was proper. HELD: Summary judgme nt is found
to be in order. Summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law even if the
pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, when the affidavit s, depositi
ons and admissions illustrate that such issues are not genuine. Respo ndent Repu
blic cannot plausibly evade the consequences of its failure to answer written in
terrogatories and requests for admission. If the plaintiff fails or re fuses to
answer the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his comp
laint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or refusal. The l aw impos
es serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismiss
ing the action or proceeding or part thereof. 132 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 26 ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY 133 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 FORTUNATA DUQUE v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ENRICO BONI
FACIO and DRA. EDNA BONI FACIO FACTS: A complaint was filed by petitioner agains
t Respondents contending that t he latter negotiated to her several checks claim
ing that they were the holders i n due course and that such were properly funded
. The checks were, however, disho nored and the spouses continue to refuse any r
eplacement or to pay in cash. Peti tioner Duque filed and served a Request for A
dmission requesting that Respondent s admit that they negotiated the check for v
aluable consideration and that they are indebted to Petitioner. The trial court
deemed the failure to respond as an implied admission of the matters set forth i
n the request. On the ground of defe ctive service of the Request for Admission,
the Court of Appeals reversed the ju dgment. ISSUES: Whether or not there was p
roper personal service upon the respon dent. HELD: Petitioners failed to comply
with the requirements under Section 1 o f Rule 26 which provides that a party ma
y serve upon any other party a written r equest for the admission by the latter
of the genuineness of any material and re levant document described in and exhib
ited with the request; and that copies of the documents should be delivered with
the request unless copies have already be en furnished. Records show that only
the counsel of the Respondents Spouses was furnished copies of the requests. Und
er Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court , all notices must be served upon co
unsel and not upon the party. However, the g eneral rule cannot apply where the
law expressly provides that notice must be se rved upon a definite person. In su
ch cases, service must be made directly upon t he person mentioned in the law an
d upon no other in order that the notice be val id. 134 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B.
MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA FACTS: A complaint was filed
by petitioner for annulment of a sale made by the p etitioner's wife to Respondent
without Petitioner's consent. Petitioner Salvador ser ved a Request for Admission
which was answered by Respondent alleging that most of the matters in the reque
st had been admitted, denied or clarified in their ve rified answer and that all
other matters were irrelevant. ISSUE: Whether or not the material facts in the
request for admission are relevant. HELD: Section 1, R ule 26 of the Rules of Co
urt provides that a request for admission must be serve d directly upon the part
y; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have
admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in an d exhibited with the re
quest or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on a ccount of failure to a
nswer the request for admission. The instant case shows th at the request for ad
mission was not served to the respondent but only upon her counsel. Therefore, R
espondent cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and d ocuments for having
failed to file her answer within the period fixed in the req uest. 135 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 PRISCILLA SUSAN PO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE
JULIAN LUSTRE and JOSE P . MANANZAN FACTS: Petitioner Priscilla Susan Po (Po) fi
led a complaint for damages against Respondent Jose P. Mananzan (Mananzan), the
operator of a banca service at Pagsa njan Falls, for the accidental capsizing of
the banca Petitioner Po and her frie nd was riding on the way back to town. Upo
n the filing of Respondent Mananzan's an swer, Petitioner Po served a Request for
Admission and upon delay in answering s uch, the latter moved for summary judgme
nt. Respondent Mananzan opposed the summ ary judgment and subsequently answered
the Request for Admission. The trial cour t denied the Motion for Summary Judgme
nt on the ground that the interrogatories are reiterations of the allegations in
the complaint which were already answered and denied by Respondent Mananzan, he
nce, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holdin
g that Respondent Mananzan need not answer the Request for Admission served upon
him by Petitioner Po HELD: Petition DENIE D. An examination of Petitioner Po s
complaint and her request for admission con firms the trial court s finding (whi
ch the Court of Appeals upheld) that the "fa ct" set forth in the request for ad
mission, including the amount of damages clai med, are the same factual allegati
ons set forth in her complaint which the defen dant either admitted or denied in
his answer. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already ad
mitted by his pleading and concerning which the re is no issue, nor should he be
required to make a second denial of those alrea dy denied in his answer to the
complaint. A request for admission is not intende d to merely reproduce or reite
rate the allegations of the requesting party s ple ading but should set forth re
levant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents de scribed in and exhibited wit
h the request, whose purpose is to establish said pa rty s cause of action or de
fense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as corre ctly observed by the Court
of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redunda ncy." 136 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 ROGER MANZANO v. LUZ DESPABILADERAS FACTS: An action for
the recovery of a sum of money against Respondent was filed by petitioner. The
court, after pre-trial, acknowledged a mutual agreement ente red into by the par
ties and that Petitioner shall present an offer to stipulate. The petitioner ins
tead filed a Request for Admission which was not replied by R espondent. For suc
h failure to respond to the Request for Admission, Petitioner moved for Partial
Judgment alleging an implied admission by Respondent. An order by the trial cour
t stated that matters not answered under oath are deemed admit ted and rendered
a decision in favor of Petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not there is implied admiss
ion upon failure to answer a Request for Admission. HELD: After having failed to
discharge what is incumbent upon the respondent under Rule 26, to deny under oa
th the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the "Reques t for Admission,
" respondent was deemed to have admitted that she received the c onstruction mat
erials, the cost of which was indicated in the request. 137 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 BAY VIEW HOTEL, INC. v. KER & CO.and PHOENIX ASSURANCE C
O. FACTS: A cash shortage and unremitted collection of a substantial amount was
dis covered upon a cashier and Petitioner Bay View filed a claim upon a fidelity
gua rantee bond from Respondent Ker & Co. secured by Petitioner Bay View Hotel
again st acts of fraud and dishonesty of its accountable employees. Respondent r
efused payment and Petitioner subsequently instituted a complaint for collection
of a sum of money. Respondent filed a Request for Admission furnished upon Peti
tioner's counsel. Respondent Ker moved for the dismissal of the complaint for fail
ure to answer said request as well as on the ground of implied admission of the
facts contained therein. Also, the proper party for collection is Petitioner's pri
ncipal , Respondent Phoenix Assurance Co. Petitioner opposed the motion contendi
ng that the proper action is not for the dismissal but for amendment of the comp
laint i n order to bring the necessary or indispensable parties to the suit. Ame
nded was made, impleading Phoenix. The trial court dismissed the case. ISSUE: Wh
ether or not admissions made prior to impleading additional parties extend to su
ch parti es. HELD: An admission is in the nature of evidence and form part of th
e records of the case and therefore could be availed of by any party even by one
subseque ntly impleaded. Amendments per se cannot set aside the legal effects o
f a reques t for admission for its significance has not been affected by the ame
ndment. Pet itioner s failure to answer the request for admission should have be
en corrected by filing a motion to be relieved of the consequences of the implie
d admission with respect to respondent Phoenix. 138 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 27 PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS 139 P a

g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 27 SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
FACTS: Gateway obtained a loan from Solidbank. As a security for said loan, Res
p ondent Gateway assigned to Petitioner Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end S
er vices Agreement with Alliance Semiconductor. Respondent failed to pay, thus,
pet itioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money. A motion for pro
duct ion and Inspection of Documents was filed on the basis of information recei
ved f rom Alliance that Respondent had already received from Alliance payment fo
r the Back-end Agreement. The motion was granted. Unsatisfied with the documents
produ ced by Respondent, Petitioner filed a motion to cite the former in contem
pt for refusal to produce documents. Motion was denied. However, the court repri
manded the Respondent for not exerting diligent efforts to produce the documents
and th ereafter, pronounced as established, documents not produced by Responden
t. The C ourt of Appeals nullified the ruling of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether
or not a Motion for Production and Inspection complies with the Rules of Court.
HELD: Th e purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover mat
erial info rmation which, by reason of an opponent s control, would otherwise be
unavailabl e for judicial scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary met
hod of obtai ning material and competent documentary evidence in the custody or
under the con trol of an adversary. It is a further extension of the concept of
pretrial. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits fishing for evidence, the
only limitatio n being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced a
re not privileg ed, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to prod
uce them and tha t they are material to any matter involved in the action. Mutua
l knowledge of al l relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to prop
er litigation. A m otion for production and inspection of documents should not,
however, demand a r oving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The ins
pection should be li mited to those documents designated with sufficient particu
larity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the docume
nts he is required to produce. 140 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 27 SECURITY BANK CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES A

GUSTIN P. UY and PACITA TANG SIOC TEN FACTS: An extra-judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage over their property was sough t to be enjoined by respondents against P
etitioner Security Bank. Petitioner fil ed an answer with compulsory counterclai
m and cross-claim. However, instead of f iling an answer to the cross-claim, Res
pondent Spouses filed two Motions for pro duction of documents and suspension an
d/or extension of time to file answer to c rossclaim. Respondent Spouses averred
the documents, papers and instruments were made and executed by petitioner in p
rocessing and approving the loans and mortg age must first be produced in order
that they can prepare and file an answer to the cross-claim. The motion was deni
ed by the trial court which was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. I
SSUE: Whether or not the granting of the mot ions was proper. HELD: A party may
only be compelled to produce or allow the ins pection of documents if six proced
ural requisites are complied with. Petitioner contends a requisite has not been
satisfied, arguing that Respondents Spouses ha ve not shown the relevancy or mat
eriality of the documents in the present case w hich was for the declaration of
the nullity of the Real Estate Mortgages between Jackivi and Petitioner SBC. The
existence or the absence of other mortgages exe cuted by Jackivi, Petitioner in
sists, has absolutely no bearing on the said case , for the reason that it does
not in any way determine the validity or the inval idity of the subject Real Est
ate Mortgages. In the present case, the CA did not err in affirming the trial co
urt ruling that there was "good cause" for the gran t of the Motions for inspect
ion of documents. The latter s holding that the docu ments were not indispensabl
e to the preparation of the answer of Respondent Spou ses to the cross-claim did
not militate against Respondent availment of this imp ortant mode of discovery.
141 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 27 AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. PENNSWELL, INC. FACTS: Su

ndry goods were sold by respondent Pennswell to Petitioner Air Philippi nes Corp
oration. For Petitioner's failure to comply with its obligations under sai d contr
act, a complaint for sum of money was filed by Respondent. After filing a n answ
er, Petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent to give a detailed list of th
e ingredients and chemical components of several products. Said motion was grant
ed by the trial court and reversed on reconsideration on the ground that t he in
formation sought constituted a trade secret. Court of Appeals affirmed said ruli
ng. ISSUE: Whether or not trade secrets cannot be the subject of compulsory disc
losure. HELD: Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discover y, b
ecause they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readi ly
ascertainable by the public. Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the doc um
ents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible thing s
that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. Section 24 of Rul
e 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130
. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound k
n own only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to co
nf ide it. 142 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 30 TRIAL 143 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 30 ARTURO H. TROCIO v. JORGE LABAYO FACTS: An action was lo
dged by Petitioner seeking to set aside his dismissal fro m the position of Muni
cipal Treasurer. Notices for Hearing were sent to the part ies, however, Petitio
ner failed to appear. Respondent moved for the conduct of t he trial proper sinc
e no pre-trial can be conducted due to Petitioner's absence an d his witness came
all the way from Manila. Petitioner's counsel insisted that the Notice of Hearing
was null and void since it was not stated therein that the he aring set was for
purposes of pre-trial. The lower court dismissed the case for lack of interest t
o prosecute since Petitioner had 1month from the sending of th e notice to advic
e the court of the defect, which Petitioner Trocio did not do. ISSUE: Whether or
not the Notice of Hearing was defective. HELD: Hearings are not confined to a t
rial but embrace several stages of litigat ion. It does not preclude pre-trial.
A hearing "does not necessarily mean presen tation of evidence." It could cover
the determination of a motion to dismiss, or any motion for that matter. Pre-tri
al is primarily intended to make certain tha t all issues necessary to the dispo
sition of a cause are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise,
parties are expected to disclose at a pre-tr ial conference all issues of law a
nd fact which they intend to raise at the tria l, except such as may involve pri
vilege or impeaching matter." The suspicion ent ertained by the lower court as t
o its being resorted to as a dilatory tactic by Petitioner was not without basis
. He had more than a month to seek clarification of the nature of the scheduled
hearing. What was even more revealing as to his lack of good faith was his absen
ce on the day of hearing. 144 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 30 NIC V. GARCES and INES GARCIA-GARCES v. HON. JUDGE VICEN
TE P. VALENZUELA and HER NAN MAGLUPAY FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint agains
t Petitioners claiming that he was for cibly ejected from the land belonging to
the latter and his house therein was il legally demolished. Petitioner's lawyer wa
s able to commence the cross-examination of Respondent's witness but was unable to
finish, thus, the parties scheduled the resumption of trial on three dates. Pri
or to the first of three scheduled heari ngs, however, Petitioner's counsel filed
for the postponement for the reason that he was required to give his expert test
imony before another court on the same da te. The motion was denied for being a
dilatory tactic and the two other schedule d trial dates were also cancelled. IS
SUE: Whether or not the denial on the motio n for postponement was proper. HELD:
No circumstances could reasonably justify t he conclusion that the Petitioner's m
otion for postponement was "manifestly dilato ry," and was not occasioned by ove
rsight, as claimed. In any case, even concedin g that His Honor was correct in d
enying the application for cancellation of the first of the three prearranged he
aring dates, it was grave abuse of discretion f or him to cancel the other dates
of trial and thereby shut the door to the defen dants presentation of their pro
ofs. It is of paramount importance that as much as possible each party be accord
ed full opportunity to ventilate his claims and defenses to the end that all the
facts may be laid before the Court and the case decided completely on its merit
s, even if in the process some delay may take pl ace. This is especially true wh
ere the delay will not work any substantial preju dice to the other party, as in
this case, where there were still have two other hearing dates left, and there
was absolutely no reason to suppose that the defen dants would not appear on sai
d dates. 145

P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 32 TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER 146 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 32 JUAN A. GOCHANGCO v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS O
CCIDENTAL SY HO and MILAGROS MINORIA FACTS: C.N. Hodges lodged an action for unl
awful detainer against Respondents. F or Respondent Sy's failure to file an Answer
, he was declared in default. The lots subject of the action, were sold to petit
ioner Juan A. Gochangco. Petitioner Ju an informed Respondents of his acquisitio
n and he was allowed by the court to pr esent evidence ex-parte as regards Respo
ndent Sy who was declared in default. Re spondent Sy then filed a motion to set
aside order of default. The trial court r endered a judgment against Respondents
to vacate the premises which prompted res pondents to file a petition for certi
orari seeking to nullify the proceedings an d judgment was rendered in their fav
or the court holding that the Clerk of Court is not legally authorized to receiv
e evidence ex-parte. ISSUE: Whether or not t he Clerk of Court is not authorized
t receive evidence ex-parte. HELD: No provis ion of law or principle of public
policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evid
ence of a party litigant. After all, the recep tion of evidence by the clerk of
court constitutes but a ministerial task. The d eclaration that reception of evi
dence ex parte is null and void does not reflect long observed and established j
udicial practice with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too,
with the several explicitly authorized instance s under the Rules where the fun
ction of receiving evidence may be delegated to c ommissioners, inclusive of the
Clerk of Court in particular situations. Rule 136 empowers the clerk of court,
when directed by the judge inter alia to receive e vidence relating to the accou
nts of executors, administrators, guardians, truste es and receivers, or relativ
e to the settlement of the estates of deceased perso ns, or to guardianships, tr
usteeships, or receiverships. In some instances, the competence of the clerk of
court is assumed. 147 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 33 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE 148 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 33 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN C. TUVERA, VICTOR P.
TUVERA and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: Respondent Twin Peaks Deve
lopment Corporation was granted the award of th e Timber License Agreement (TLA)
to operate logging operations on forest land. P etitioner Republic filed a comp
laint for restitution and damages and had Preside ntial Commission on Good Gover
nment issue a Writ of Sequestration on all assets Respondent Twin Peaks on the g
round that all assets are ill-gotten wealth for ha ving been acquired through fr
audulent means. Petitioner Republic alleged that at the time the TLA was issued,
Respondent lacks the qualification to be a grantee for lack of sufficient loggi
ng equipment and that it was incorporated to engage in a real estate business, n
ot logging operations. Petitioner Republic presente d on trial three witnesses.
Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the case of Ysmael v. S
ecretary of Environment effectively bars Petitioner from pursuing. Petitioner op
posed claiming that a demurrer is not based on the i nsufficiency of its evidenc
e but on the strength of evidence of respondents as s hown by their own exhibits
. Sandiganbayan sustained the Demurrer on the basis of Res judicata. ISSUE: Whet
her or not the Sandiganbayan dismissal due to the demu rrer was proper. HELD: Re
s judicata is an inappropriate ground for sustaining a demurrer to evidence, eve
n as it stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismi ss. A demurrer may be gr
anted if, after the presentation of plaintiff's evidence, it appears upon the fact
s and the law that the plaintiff has shown no right to r elief. In contrast, the
grounds for res judicata present themselves even before the presentation of evi
dence, and it should be at that stage that the defense of res judicata should be
invoked as a ground for dismissal. A motion to dismiss b ased on lack of cause
of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff ha s presented his evide
nce on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While
a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can
be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion t o dismiss under Rule
33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rest ed his case. The Sa
ndiganbayan's Resolution shows that dismissal of the case on de murrer to evidence
was principally anchored on the Republic's failure to show its right to relief be
cause of the existence of a prior judgment which consequently barred the relitig
ation of the same issue. Therefore, Sandiganbayan based its di smissal on the ex
istence of the Ysmael case which, according to it, would render the case barred
by res judicata. 149 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 33 RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. DEL ROSARIO FACTS: Spous
es Vicente & Maria Del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and d eliv
ered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a promissory note. Thereafter, resp
ondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, the y f
ailed to pay their obligation. Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for
the whole amount of their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulte d
on the monthly installments. Respondents counter that the installments were no t
yet due and demandable. They theorize that the action for immediate enforcemen
t of their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is dependent on the s
ole will of the debtor. Hence, they consider that the proper court should first
fix a period for payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installments had already became due and demandable. H
E LD: The installments had already become due and demandable is bolstered by the
f act that respondents started paying installments on the promissory note. The
obl igation of the respondents had matured & they clearly defaulted when their c
heck s bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month
afte r the date of the note because the check representing their first installm
ent bo unced. 150 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 33 MANILA BANKING CORPORATION v. UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO, INC.
FACTS: Petitioner granted a credit line secured by promissory notes and continu
i ng suretyship agreements in favor of Respondent for construction of additional
b uildings and purchase of new equipment. The loan was not paid and it was subs
equ ently discovered that the proceeds of the loan were diverted to Respondent G
roup Developers. Hence, a complaint was lodged for sum of money. Respondent Univ
ersi ty prayed by way of cross-claim that Respondent GDI be ordered to pay the a
mount it would have to pay Petitioner. Respondent GDI subsequently executed a da
cion en pago deed by transferring to Petitioner MBC a parcel of land to settle t
he lo an. Respondent University filed a Motion to Dismiss since there was no mor
e caus e of action as the loan had already been settled. However, said motion wa
s denie d and it was ruled that due to the execution of the dacion en pago deed,
the ban k had no cause of action against Respondent University for the claim fo
r the sum of money had already been satisfied. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismiss
al of the case without trial was proper. HELD: Respondent University's motion to d
ismiss th e amended complaint was improper since it was filed after it filed its
answer. I t can also be noted that such motion cannot be sustained based solely
on the all egations of the initiatory pleading since the motion was based on th
e deed of da cion en pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint. A motion
to dismiss b ased on lack of cause of action is filed after the plaintiff has p
resented his e vidence on the ground plaintiff has shown no right to the relief
sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objectio
ns which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismis
s under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insu
fficiency of ev idence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his
case. 151 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 34 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 152 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 34 ANACLETO R. MENESES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORMS FAC
TS: Anacleto Meneses, et al. co-owned of a parcel of rice land, which was dis tr
ibuted to farmerbeneficiaries through the government's land reform program. Peti t
ioners then lodged a claim for payment of just compensation rentals had not bee
n paid since the distribution to the farmerbeneficiaries.. Respondent Department
of Agrarian Reform contends that the filing of the case is premature because va
luation has to be determined before any resort to the court. Farmer-beneficiari
e s claimed that they had no unpaid rents and the jurisdiction over the case bel
on gs to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The parti
es during the hearing agreed that the sole issue to be resolved is whether or no
t P etitioners were entitled to just compensation. Thus, the trial court issued
an o rder giving the parties a period within which to file their respective moti
ons f or judgment on the pleadings or comments, after which the case shall be de
emed s ubmitted for resolution. The trial court dismissed the complaint while Co
urt of Appeals affirmed the said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for
judgmen t on pleadings was appropriate. HELD: Judgment on the pleadings is prope
r when a n answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material alle
gations o f the adverse party s pleading according to Section 1 Rule 34 of the R
ules of Co urt. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by
the pleadin gs. A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, wh
o is the par ty seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or
to obtain a declaratory relief. Respondents filed separate answers which by the
mselves tende red issues, as it made specific denials of the material allegation
s in the compl aint and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar recovery
by petitioners. Furthermore, it was erroneous for the trial court to require a m
otion for judgm ent on the pleadings filed by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform s
ince it has no l egal standing. It was clearly meant by the trial court that a m
otion for summary judgment was the more proper recourse, which is designed for t
he prompt disposi tion of actions and may be rendered if the pleadings on file s
how that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding any mater
ial fact. The movi ng party is thus entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 1
53 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 35 SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 154 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 35 LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. UNION BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: A suit for collection of sum of money against Petitioners
Ley Constructio n et al. was lodged by Respondent Union Bank on several promiss
ory notes. The am ount incurred was admitted by Petitioners in its answer. Howev
er, they averred t hat an additional time was given them to pay their obligation
s and further claim ed that the promissory notes were in fact renewals of the pr
evious promissory no tes. Respondent Bank filed a motion for partial summary jud
gment on the ground t hat Petitioner's Answer failed to raise a genuine issue, whi
ch necessitates a tria l on the merits. A summary judgment was granted. ISSUE: W
hether or not the order for summary judgment is proper HELD: Petitioners asserte
d that no hearing was c arried out prior to the granting of said judgment. In su
mmary judgment proceedin g, the court is simply likely to act on the basis of wh
at is in the records of t he case and that the hearing contemplated by the Rules
has for its purpose a det ermination of whether there is a genuine issue, not t
o receive evidence.In the i nstant case, Answer to Respondent Bank s Complaint h
ad no verification and no af fidavit to support its allegation that Petitioners
were given an extension of ti me to settle their obligation. Having admitted tha
t they incurred the obligation , a hearing cannot serve any relevant objective.
The records already provide suf ficient basis for the court to decide on Respond
ent's motion. Thus, this Court fin ds that even if the trial court did not conduct
a hearing, this fact would not a ffect the validity of the summary judgment. Th
e Rule 35 requirement of furnishin g a copy of the motion 10 days before the hea
ring applies to a motion for summar y judgment and not to a motion to resolve su
ch motion. Quite notably, Petitioner s already filed its opposition to Responden
t s motion for summary judgment. Twic e did they seek reconsideration of the res
olution or summary judgment, which wer e denied by the court. That they were dep
rived of the opportunity to question th e motion could not be said in this case.
155 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 35 RAY VELASCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRMWOOD DEVELOPMENT an

d STA. CLARA HOUSING INDUSTRIES FACTS: A complaint for accounting with prelimina
ry injunction and enjoining the disposal of partnership properties filed by Peti
tioners against Respondent Sta. Clara Housing Industries and several of the its
former partners. Injunction was issued against Respondent who allegedly violated
such order. Respondent Firmwood subsequently filed a complaint for the delivery
of personal property and damage s against Petitioners contending that it owned
such seized crates and it had the right to the possession thereof. The Supreme C
ourt then set aside the restraini ng order. Petitioners, in its answer, claimed
that Respondent Firmwood is not th e owner of the crates but Respondent Sta. Cla
ra. Petitioners, by virtue of the r estraining order, asserted their authority t
o seize the crates. A complaint in i ntervention was filed by Respondent Sta. Cl
ara alleging that it has a legal inte rest since it is answerable to Respondent
Firmwood for damages arising from a wa rranty to deliver the crates which belong
s to the latter. Both respondents there after filed a motion for summary judgmen
t. The trial court and the Court of Appe als upheld the propriety of the summary
judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment is proper. HELD: A relief by s
ummary judgment expedites or promptly dis poses of cases where the facts appear
undisputed and certain from the pleadings, admissions and affidavits. This rule
does not vest in the court summary jurisdi ction to try the issues on pleadings
and affidavits, but gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment
only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact. In t
he answer to the complaint in intervention, petitioners had deemed admitted the
ownership and right of possession of Sta. C lara over the property taken by them
and the fact that the temporary restraining order by this Court by virtue of wh
ich the seizure was effected had already bee n lifted. The remaining issue raise
d by petitioners in objecting to the reliefs prayed for in the complaints of pri
vate respondents is whether petitioners posse ssed the authority to seize and ho
ld under their custody the crates of plywood b y virtue of the temporary restrai
ning order of this Court which undisputedly had been lifted and of no more force
and effect. There is therefore absent in this case any genuine issue of fact bu
t a question purely of law. 156 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 39 EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS 157 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 39 PAQUITO BUAYA vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO. FACTS: Respon
dent filed a complaint against petitioner, a manager of their Cebu branch for th
e collection of a sum of money, which is allegedly his unremitted p remium colle
ctions owing to the Stronghold. For failure of petitioner and his co unsel to ap
pear at the pre-trial, he was defaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present hi
s evidences, without the other party. On the basis of Stronghold's evid ence, the
court decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of Stronghold. petitione r appeale
d to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in favor of petitioner, ann ulling t
he decision and remanding the case to the lower court for further procee dings.
The lower court therefore set a hearing on December 13, 1990 but petition er fil
ed a `Motion of Postponement' of the hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion
and gave several reasons to postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991, Stro nghol
d opposed the motion, but the court granted petitioner's motion provided that the
next time he does it, it will be considered a waiver of his right to presen t ev
idence. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate its previous decision dated, Sept
ember 17, 1987. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied . H
e files a `Petition for Certiorari' assailing the orders of the court but was dis mi
ssed for lack of merit. The court's decision has became final and executory. ISS U
E: HELD: Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to p
rolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of jud
icial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final a
n d executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify the ent
ir e proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional evi
den ce, not to conduct a trial de novo. Once a judgment becomes final and execut
ory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, it is axiom
atic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regar
dles s of any claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of com
peten t jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be
altere d even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may conta
in. Lit igations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective an
d effici ent administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become
final, th e prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict
by subseq uent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Whether or n
ot the deci sion become final and executory. 158 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 40 APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT 159 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 40 Republic V Luriz FACTS Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a
complaint for ejectment against respondents, Ma rcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera
Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court. The re spondents alleged that they are
the owners of the land as they are in continuous possession of relevant documen
ts the petitioner do not have. The MTC dismissed the complaint summarily for lac
k of merit. The petitioner argued that he had suf ficiently established his owne
rship of the subject properties and presented copi es of Transfer Certificate of
Title and Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Esta te (Residential Building) wi
th Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. Consequently, he asserted the right to rec
over possession thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents of Carbonilla is en
ough to prove ownership o f the property. HELD: The only question that the court
s resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possessio
n of the premises; that is, to the possess ion de facto and not to the possessio
n de jure. It does not even matter if a par ty's title to the property is question
able.15For this reason, an ejectment case wi ll not necessarily be decided in fa
vor of one who has presented proof of ownersh ip of the subject property. Key ju
risdictional facts constitutive of the particu lar ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently prove n. 160 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Provost V Court of Appeals FACTS: Rule 40 Respondents Victor and
Fe Ramos are the owners of a parcel of land in Putingbala s, Tupsan Grande. Som
etime in May 1992, the Provosts, the petitioners, construct ed a fence separatin
g the two lots. In 1994, the respondents demanded the return of the area of thei
r lot that they believe the petitioners encroached on, but t he latter refused.
The respondents thus had a relocation survey, which showed th at the fence was i
ndeed on their land. The petitioners disagreed, arguing that t he cadastral surv
ey plan used had been disapproved as defective. The Ramos coupl e anchor their c
laim on the deed of donation and an old survey plan, while the P rovosts base th
eirs on the deed of absolute sale and the corrected survey plan. The MTC dismiss
ed the respondents' complaint and held that they failed to prove th eir ownership
and possession of the disputed area. Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decis
ion, stating that the claim by the Ramoses over the property was b ased on a dis
approved survey plan. In reversing the RTC decision, the Court of A ppeals reaso
ned that the petitioners had no right to move the common boundary su ch that the
area of the adjoining lot was reduced to 3,552 square meters. ISSUE: Whether or
not the Provosts encroached on the property of the Ramoses. HELD: Ru les on Civ
il Procedure allow the RTC, which have the jurisdiction over complaint s for rec
overy of ownership, to decide on cases brought on appeal from the MTC w hich, ev
en without jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide the case on its meri
ts. In this case, the MTC of Mambajao should have dismissed the complain t outri
ght for lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RT
C rendered a decision based on the findings of the MTC. 161 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Encarnacion Rule 40 V Amigo FACTS: Respondent Amigo allegedly en
tered and took posession of a portion of a property sometime in 1985 without the
permission of the owner. In 1995, petitioner Encar nacion was the registered ow
ner of the property by virtue of the waiver of right s executed by his mother-in
-law. In 2001, a letter demanding the respondent to v acate the property was sen
t by the petitioner. The demand remained unheeded, whi ch caused the petitioner
to file a complaint for ejectment. The Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the Regional Tr ial Court dismissed the
case on the grounds that the MTC had no jurisdiction ove r the case. Aggrieved,
the petitioner filed a petition for review. Based on the allegations in this com
plaint. the Court of Appeals held that the proper action is accion publiciana an
d not unlawful detainer. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC ha s properly acquired ju
risdiction of the case HELD: While it is true that the demand letter was receive
d by the respondent on February 12, 2001, thereby making the filing of the compl
aint for ejectment fall within the requisite one year from last demand for compl
aints for unlawful deta iner, it is also true that petitioner became the owner o
f the lot in 1995 and ha s been since deprived possession of a portion thereof.
Almost six years have ela psed from the date of the petitioner s dispossession i
n 1995 up to his filing of complaint for ejectment in 2001. The length of time t
hat the petitioner was dis possessed of his property made his cause of action be
yond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion p
ubliciana. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in
the RTC.The respondent s a ctual entry on the land of the petitioner was in 198
5 but it was only sixteen ye ars after that the petitioner filed his ejectment c
ase. The respondent should ha ve filed an accion publiciana case which is under
the jurisdiction of the RTC. H owever, the RTC should have not dismissed the cas
e; it should have taken cogniza nce of the case. If the case is tried on the mer
its by the Municipal Court witho ut jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RT
C on appeal may no longer dismiss the case. Moreover, the RTC shall decide the c
ase on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice
to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence. 162 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 41 APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS 163 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 Five Star Marketing Corp V Booc FACTS: Petitioner Five S
tar constructed a four-storey building financed mainly b y a loan and using the
subject property as collateral. The third floor of said b uilding was rented to
the father of.James Booc, the respondent herein, who in th e late 1980s was allo
wed to use half of the ground floor for his business rent-f ree. Years later, pe
titioner and respondent entered into an Agreement12 wherein the latter became th
e lessee of the other spaces in the building. Respondent rai sed several defense
s, among them that petitioner has no cause of action for ejec tment against him:
that petitioner has no legal personality to sue; that the cou rt has no jurisdi
ction over the subject matter; and that the premises in questio n have been occu
pied by the respondent for free since the erection of the buildi ng; and that re
spondent and his father filed a case in the Securities and Exchan ge Commission
against petitioner and the president of the latter's corporation. Se veral years l
ater, the petitioner notified all the occupants that it had withdra wn all free-
rental privileges granted to them, as had been resolved by the petit ioner's board
of directors. It likewise notified them of the rental rates of the u nits conce
rned and further required any interested occupant to negotiate and ent er into a
lease agreement with petitioner. Petitioner filed an action for unlawf ul detai
ner against respondent before the MTCC, Iligan City, who in turn contend ed that
petitioner did not send a demand for them to vacate or pay rent. ISSUE: Whether
or not demand for rentals is necessary for the MTC to acquire jurisdicti on ove
r the unlawful detainer case. HELD The Court had the occasion to clarify t he th
ree modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: a) ordinary appeal o r ap
peal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal ac tio
n by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The first mode of app
eal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and la w;
b) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercis e
of its appellate jurisdiction. The second mode is brought to the CA on questio
ns of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; and c) petition for revi
ew to this Court. This mode is elevated to this Court only on questions of law.
T he instant case arose from an ejectment case commenced by the petitioner befor
e the MTCC which was later elevated to the RTC on appeal. Aggrieved by the RTC s
r eversal of the MTCC decision, petitioner directly elevated the case to this C
our t on pure questions of law.Clearly, petitioner raises only questions of law
that require the interpretation and application of the rules of procedure laid d
own by the Rules of Court. However, considering that the assailed decision was r
ende red by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as it was brou
ght b efore it from the MTCC, petitioner should have elevated the case to the CA
, inst ead of appealing directly before this Court. 164 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 Fernandez V Court of Appeals FACTS: After acquiring owne
rship of a lot in Bacolod City through his predecesso rs, Prudencio Fernandez tr
ied to eject Jesus Ciocon and other occupants off the property. Allegedly, Cioco
n asked Fernandez that he be given a last chance to repu rchase the lot, to which
Fernandez refused. After this rejection, Ciocon institu ted against Fernandez fo
r reconveyance of the land or what remains of it after d educting portions alrea
dy sold to others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the ful l reconveyance price t
o Fernandez, for which Fernandez signed a receipt. The cas e was tried in the sa
la of Judge Jocson, who noted that the parties were indiffe rent about submittin
g to a decision based on extant. Incomplete records proceede d to render judgmen
t that dismissed both complaints and ordered private responde nt Ciocon and the
intervenors to deliver immediate possession off to the heirs o f Fernandez. Cioc
on filed an appeal. Judge Jocson, upon motion for reconsiderati on subsequently
rendered a second decision that set aside the first judgment. In this second dec
ision, the judge explained that the Court of Appeals, after rece iving the notic
es of appeal and the incomplete records, remanded the case and orde red the re-tak
ing of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and Tolentino. The seco nd decision w
as a complete reversal of the first decision and directed the retur n of the dis
puted lot to Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being litigated. I
t also ordered the cancellation of the new title issued to Fernandez and the iss
uance of a new title in the name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors. IS SUE: Whethe
r or not the second decision was proper. HELD: The trial court no lon ger had ju
risdiction to render or reverse the decision. The records show that th e notices
of appeal from the first decision of the trial court were filed within the regl
ementary period and were duly approved. At such time, the appeals were perfected
. There is abundant jurisprudence stating that after perfection of an a ppeal, t
he trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a decision, and also to issue orders
for execution pending appeal. The perfection of an appeal divests the tr ial cou
rt of jurisdiction over a case and the trial court may issue orders only if in t
he exercise of its residual functions. No amount of rationalization, even a decl
aration that a new decision is being made in the best interest of justice , can
confer on the trial court the jurisdiction it had lost. Jurisdiction canno t be
acquired, waived, enlarged, diminished or extended by any act or omission o f th
e parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. 165 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Neypes Rule 41 v Court of Appeals FACTS: Neypes filed an action
for annulment of judgment and t itles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversi
on with preliminary injunction b efore the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial cou rt dismissed petitioners' complaint on the groun
ds that the action had already bee n prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received
a copy of the order of dismissal in March 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter,
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court dismissed in July. Fiv
e days after receiving the court's de cision, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed
a notice of appeal and paid the appe al fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 199
8, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late, which was received by the petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners f
iled a motion for reconsideration but this, too, was denied in September 3, 1998
. The petitioners assailed the dismis sal of the notice of appeal before the CA,
where the petitioners claimed that th ey had seasonably filed their notice of a
ppeal. They argued that the 15-day regl ementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was th e day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only f ive days had elapsed and they were wel
l within the reglementary period for appea l. On September 16, 1999, the CA dism
issed the petition. It ruled that the 15-da y period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to th e appellate court, the order was th
e final order appealable under the Rules. Wheth er or not it is proper to allow a
fresh period to file an appeal in lieu of dism issal of the Motion for Reconside
raiton. To standardize the appeal periods and t o afford litigants fair opportun
ity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it pr actical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of ap peal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconside
ration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall als o apply to Rule 40, Rule 42,
Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uni
form, to be counted from receipt of the order denyi ng the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial ) or any final order or res
olution. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appe
al within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from J uly 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsidera tion). This pronouncement
is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rul es which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of jud gment or final order ap
pealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies d isassociation and inde
pendence of one 166 P a g e HELD: ISSUE :
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or with
in 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer t
o the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
N either does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 wh
ic h shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the dispositi
on of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remai
ns and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new tria
l o r motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered
the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in t
he p rocess, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to reso
lve c ases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some de
finite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. 167 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 42 PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS TO TH
E COURT OF APPEALS 168 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rosa Rica Sales V Ong Rule 42 FACTS: Atty. Joseph M. Baduel wrot
e Ong of the intent of Mandaue Prime Estate Re alty, which the former was repres
enting, to use the lots the latter was occupyin g and asked the latter to vacate
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the let ter. The latter refused to vaca
te, prompting Prime Estate Realty to file a case of Unlawful detainer against hi
m. During the case, Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. had acquired the lands through
a sale from Prime Estate Realty. Meanwhile, the M TC resolved the ejectment case
, ordering Ong to vacate the premises in question and peacefully turn over posse
ssion thereof to Rosa Rica Sales. On appeal, the R TC rendered a judgment affirm
ing the MTC's decision in its entirety. Ong filed a m otion for reconsideration, a
n appeal and a motion for extension with the RTC, wh ich issued an order that co
ncurrently gave due course to Ong's notice of appeal, d enied their motion for rec
onsideration, and granted petitioners' motion for immedi ate execution pending app
eal. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC decision has already become final and executo
ry at the time the petition for review was filed. HELD: Since the unlawful detai
ner case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC , petitioners should hav
e filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appe
al with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely f
iling of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day, which may be deeme
d as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the pe
riod of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsiderat ion and started to run
again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion fo r Reconsideration. A M
otion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewis e filed with the Cour
t of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of th e denial of the Moti
on for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for addi tional period, it i
s clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on t ime. 169 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 43 APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
AGENCIES 170 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 43 St. Martin Funeral Homes V NLRC FACTS Private respondent
alleges that he started working as Operations Manager o f petitioner St. Martin
Funeral Home. However, there was no contract of employme nt executed between hi
m and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-mon thly payroll. He was
dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriatin g P38,000.00, which
was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added ta x (VAT). Petitioner
claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Ameli
ta Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin s Funeral Home . When private res
pondent took over the management of the business after Amelita's mother died, Amel
ita discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other governm
ent fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid
. She made some changes in the business operation, to which pr ivate respondent
was no longer allowed to participate. Responded filed a complai nt charging the
petitioner of illegally terminated his employment and appealed t o the NLRC, whi
ch rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision an d remanding th
e case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner th
en filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC for lack of m
erit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC should entertain the pre sent petition
HELD: The case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals, which is granted exc
lusive appellate jurisdiction over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial
Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies. This would necessarily contradict what
has bee n ruled and said all along that the appeal does not lie from decisions o
f the NL RC. However, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appea
l from th e NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary implication. The same exceptive clause declares that the Court of App
eals has n o appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate
jurisdictio n of the Supreme Court. These cases can be properly excluded from th
e exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of
the aforemen tioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cas
es falling wi thin the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Labo r Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could n
ot have intende d that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor C
ode the decision s, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appella
te jurisdiction o f the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. 171
P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Golangco V Fung FACTS: FACTS: Rule 43 In a Resolution, GIO II Ce

lso R. Dao found Fung guilty of the administrative cha rges against the latter f
or oppression, abuse of authority, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty, an
d grave misconduct all arising from the same incidentan d and recommended his di
smissal from service. This Resolution was disapproved by Assistant Ombudsman Abe
lardo L. Aportadera, Jr., who recommended the reassignme nt of the case to anoth
er graft investigating officer so that the administrative and criminal aspects o
f the case can be reconciled. On assuming the Office of t he Ombudsman, Aniano A
. Desierto disapproved GIO Onos' Resolution recommending the dismissal of the admi
nistrative complaint against respondent, which had already been approved by Assi
stant Ombudsman Aportadera by authority of then-Acting Omb udsman Villa. Fung fi
led a Motion for Reconsideration of GIO Dao's Resolution and was denied. Aggrieved
, Fung filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court impugning the v
alidity of Desierto's Resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not a pet ition for review is
proper for questioning internal resolutions of the Ombudsman HELD: The Court of
Appeals cannot review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the O
mbudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases because it has jurisdiction onl
y over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in admini
strative disciplinary cases only. The appellate court correc tly ruled that its
jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the O mbudsman in admini
strative cases. 172 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 45 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 173 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 45 BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES MANALO FACTS:
Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI for brevity) sold to The Overseas Bank of M anila
(OBM for brevity) some residential lots in Xavierville Subdivision. Nevert heles
s, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision. Carlos Ma nalo
, Jr.(Carlos for brevity) offered downpayment. In a letter to Perla Manalo, wife
of Carlos, (Perla for brevity) Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. In
the letter he also pegged the price of the lots. The corresponding Contract of C
onditional Sale would then be signed. Perla conformed to the letter agreemen t.
Thereafter, Spouses constructed a house. They were notified of XEI's resumption of
selling operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment as
they did not receive a Contract of Conditional Sale. Commercial Bank of Mani la
(CBM) acquired Xavierville from OBM. CBM requested Perla to stop any on-going c
onstruction on the property since it was the owner of the lot and she had no p e
rmission for such construction. Perla informed them that her husband had a cont
ract with OBM. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she failed to do
so. Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, but later on, CBM withdr
ew its complaint. CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. Consequen
t ly, Spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the
C BM. They alleged that they had always been ready and willing to pay the insta
llm ents but no contract was forthcoming and further alleged that upon their par
tial payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Spou ses adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale executed
betw een XEI and three other buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residen
tial l ot. RTC ordered the herein Petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favo r of the spouses upon the payment of the balance of the purchase price.
It ruled that under the letter agreement, the parties had a "complete contract t
o sell" and that they had already partially consummated the same. The Court of A
ppeals s ustained. ISSUE: Whether or not the factual issues raised by the Petiti
oner are proper. HELD: The rule is that only legal issues may be raised in a Pet
ition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. The reason is that it is not a
trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the evidence on record. Gene
rally, th e findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the C
ourt of Ap peals, are conclusive on this Court, unless, the case falls under any
of the exc eptions. We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the
Ruling of th e appellate court dismissing Petitioner's MR is contrary to law and i
s not support ed by evidence. 174 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 45 NATIVIDAD v. MTRCB FACTS: Petitioner is a movie producer
and a director, filed with the MTRCB an ap plication for a permit to exhibit a
movie apparently based on the Chiongs' rape ca se. Relatives of the famous rape-sl
ay victims Chiong sisters requested the Board to disapprove the showing of the f
ilm from screening. Regional Trial Court ex-p arte issued a Temporary Restrainin
g Order enjoining petitioner from exhibiting t he film for 72 hours and set for
summary hearing the extended duration of the sa id TRO. After three days, the RT
C issued another Order extending the life of the TRO to its full duration of twe
nty days. An Omnibus Motion was filed by petitio ner praying for the dismissal o
f the main petition and the lifting of the TRO an d cited as grounds the alleged
failure of the Chiong relatives to exhaust availa ble administrative remedies;
the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subj ect matter of the petition;
and the failure of the petition itself to state a ca use of action. Furthermore,
petitioner requests for a retrial of the facts on wh at he claims errors of the
CA. ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of the Sub Judice Rule. HELD: Que
stion s of fact are not proper subjects for this Court unless there is clear and
convi ncing proof that the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of
facts; or when the CA failed to give notice and to appreciate certain relevant f
acts of substance which if properly considered would justify a different conclus
ion; an d when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts i
n the li ght of the evidence on record. Petitioner failed to convince this Court
to depar t from this well-established doctrine. 175 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 47 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND 176 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 GRANDE v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitione
r filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment which seeks the ann ulment of the D
ecision of the Court of Appeals in a case for reconveyance of lan d owned by the
University of the Philippines(UP for brevity). The Court of Appea ls dismissed
the appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC for b revity) dism
issing their complaint for recovery of ownership and reconveyance of the subject
property on the ground of lack of cause of action. RTC concluded th at the subj
ect property was covered by a Torrens title as early as 1914 but it w as only in
1984 or 70 years after the issuance of the title, that Petitioners fi led their
action for recovery of ownership and reconveyance. During the interreg num, own
ership of the property was acquired by Respondent UP as an innocent purc haser f
or value. Consequently, RTC rendered a Decision in favor of UP which was likewis
e upheld by the appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for ann ulment
of judgment is proper. HELD: The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, i s equ
itable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as where there is n o av
ailable or other adequate remedy. It is generally governed by Rule 47 of the 199
7 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 thereof expressly states that the Rule sha
ll govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity)of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil action of Regional Trial Courts(RTCs f or
brevity)for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for re li
ef or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of t h
e petitioner." Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification
of judgments rendered by RTCs filed with the CA. It does not pertain to the nul
lification of decisions of the CA. Rule 47 applies only to petitions for nullifi
cation of judgments rendered by RTCs filed with the CA it does not pertain to t
h e nullification of decisions of the CA. Petitions for annulment of judgment ar
e not among the cases originally cognizable by the SC. It is totally inappropria
te to extend Rule 47 to the review of decisions of the CA. 177 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 FRAGINAL v. PARAAL FACTS: The heirs of Toribia Belmonte P
araal filed with the Office of the Provinci al Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD
) of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adju dication Board (DARAB) a Complaint f
or Termination of Tenancy Relationship, Ejec tment, and Collection of Arrear Ren
tals and Damages against Faringal. Fraginalfi led an Answer questioning the juri
sdiction of the PARAD on the ground that they are not tenants of the Heirs of To
ribia Paraal, for the land they are tilling is a public agricultural land within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department o f Environment and Natural Resourc
es. PARAD issued a Decision ordering the ejectm ent of Fraginal. Faringal filed
an action for annulment of judgment against PARA D on the ground of extrinsic fr
aud. ISSUE: Whether or not an action for annulment of judgment is proper. HELD:
The r emedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character and will not
so eas ily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgme
nts. Ru le 47, Sec 1 clearly limits the subject matter of petitioners for annulm
ent to f inal judgments and orders rendered by RTC in civil actions. Final judgm
ents or O rders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies such as the
NLRC, the Ombudsman, the CSC, the OP, and, in this case, the PARAD, are not sus
ceptible t o petitions for Annulment under Rule 47. Direct recourse to a petitio
n for annul ment of judgment not allowed if other appropriate remedies are avail
able such as a petition for new trial and a petition for relief from judgment or
an appeal. 178 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 ALABAN v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Private respondent Fra
ncisco Provido filed a Petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament o
f the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent for brevity).Respondent alleg
ed that he was the heir of the decedent and the exe cutor of said will. Regional
Trial Court rendered its Decision allowing the prob ate of the will of the dece
dent and directing the issuance of letters testamenta ry to Respondent. More tha
n four months later or on 4 October 2001, Alaban and r elatives (Petitioners for
brevity) filed a motion for the reopening of the proba te proceedings. Likewise
, they filed an Opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent as well
as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. T hey claimed that they a
re the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claim ed that the RTC did no
t acquire jurisdiction over the Petition due to non-paymen t of the correct dock
et fees, defective publication and lack of notice to the ot her heirs. ISSUE: Wh
ether or not an exclusion in the probate proceedings annuls a final and executor
y judgment. HELD: It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will i
s one in rem . Thus, it is binding upon the whole world. Any executor, devisee o
r legatee nam ed in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at
any time afte r the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdicti
on to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will m
ust be publishe d in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well
as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator. Co nsequently, with the corresponding publication of the Petition,
the court s juri sdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Moreover, an action for annulment
of judgment is a r emedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sough
t to be annulled wa s rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final
and executory judgme nt set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.
However, it is resor ted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of are no long
er available through n o fault of the Petitioner; and based on only extrinsic fr
aud or lack of jurisdic tion or denial of due process. In the case at bar, the p
robate proceedings exten d to Petitioners and they cannot file for an action of
annulment of judgment whi ch became final and executory because they slept on th
eir rights. 179 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 REPUBLIC v. ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST FACTS: National In

vestment and Development Corporation (NIDC for brevity) and Ka wasaki Heavy Indu
stries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) in a shipyard bu
siness named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40 respectively . NIDC's interest
was later transferred to the National Government. Pursuant to Pr esident Aquino's
Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatizati on and Asset
Privatization Trust (Respondent for brevity) which allowed for the disposition o
f the government's non-performing assets, Respondent allowed Kawasaki Heavy Indust
ries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings in order to top the winni
ng bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested all eging that s
uch act would effectively increase Kawasaki's interest in PHILSECOa shi pyard is a
public utility--and thus violative of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Re
spondents' act is valid. HELD: A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility
as provided by law, Sec tion 11 Article XII of the Constitution applies. Notably
, JVA accorded the parti es the right of first refusal under the same terms. This
phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal, they
can only do so to the ex tent allowed them by the JVA or under the proportion o
f 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares o
f stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusa
l to the extent that its t otal shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the enti
re shares of stock of SNS o r PHILSECO. NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase ev
en beyond 60% of the total s hares. As a government corporation and necessarily
a 100% Filipino-owned corpora tion, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of
stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits
only foreign capitalization. 180 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT 181 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO. Vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HO
N. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, and FRANCISCO TESORERO FACTS: Petitioner filed a compla
int for damages against private respondent Franc isco Tesorero. Instead of filin
g its answer, private respondent filed a motion t o dismiss claiming that the co
mplaint did not state a cause of action, there was non-joinder of indispensable
parties, and venue was improperly laid. The trial court dismissed petitioner s c
omplaint on the ground of improper venue. The plai ntiff being a private corpora
tion, undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plainti ff s principal place of busi
ness as alleged in the complaint, and which for purp oses of venue, is deemed as
its residence. Conversely, in the defendant s motion to dismiss, it alleged and
submitted that the plaintiff's principal office is in Davao City, as stated in th
e Contract of Lease and another Contract of Lease of Generating Equipment execut
ed by the plaintiff with the NAPOCOR. The motion on t he ground of improper venu
e was granted and petitioner s motion for reconsiderat ion was denied. The Court
of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment, denied due course and dismissed the
petition. The petitioner filed the instant petition. IS SUE: Whether or not the
venue was proper. It is private respondent s contention that the proper venue is
Davao City, and not Cebu City. Private respondent argue that petitioner is esto
pped from claiming that its residence is in Cebu City, i n view of contradictory
statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the action for damages. It
cannot be disputed that petitioner s principal office is in Cebu City, per its
amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. Private re spondent is not a part
y to any of the contracts presented. He is a complete stra nger to the covenants
executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his prote stations that he is
privy thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a memb er of the public fo
r whose benefit the electric generating equipment subject of the contracts were
leased or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his argu ment that the alle
gation or representation made by petitioner in either the comp laints or answers
it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City, should est
op it from filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Moreo ver, there is no
showing that private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he reli
ed on such representation by petitioner. HELD: 182 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 CONSOLIDATED PLYWOOD INDUSTRIES, INC vs. HON. AUGUSTO B.
BREVA and MINDANAO HEMP EXPORT CORPORATION The case involves the claim of one o
f two co-owners for reim bursement from the other of expenses incurred for the r
epair and preservation of the common property which consists of a parcel of land
with a warehouse and off ice building standing thereon. One of the registered c
o-owners is the petitioner , Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. who had purch
ased an undivided one-half portion from the Consolidated Bank & Trust Company. T
he other registered co-owne r is the Mindanao Hemp Export Corporation. CPII occu
pied the property, using the warehouse to store its products. It made repairs an
d improvements on the proper ty. For such, it sought to recover expenses from MH
EC. Extra-judicial demands pr oduced no result and thereafter filed suit for col
lection. Summons was issued bu t went unserved for the reason that defendant is
no longer doing business at sai d address and nobody around the place knows its
present whereabouts. The Trial C ourt sought to ascertain from the Securities an
d Exchange Commission, but it sim ply furnished the same address. CPII moved for
service of summons by publication , which was effected in a newspaper of genera
l circulation. Copy of the alias su mmons was also sent by registered mail addre
ssed to MHEC. No answer being filed, MHEC was declared in default and CPII prese
nted its evidence ex parte. The Tria l Court conducted an ocular inspection and
found that CPII was using the entire warehouse as well as the office building st
anding on the property. The Trial Cou rt denied said plaintiff reimbursement and
instead dismissed the complaint "for lack of merit." The court declared that a
co-owner cannot put the property to hi s sole use and benefit gratis without the
express agreement of the other co-owne rs. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial cour
t acquired jurisdiction over the defenda nt. HELD: Petitioner s suit is for the
collection of a sum of money, a personal action, as distinguished from a real ac
tion. It is, too, an action strictly in personam, a s to which personal service
of summons is essential to the acquisition of jurisd iction over the person of t
he defendant. In other words, summons by publication cannot confer upon the Cour
t jurisdiction over said defendant and that the prope r recourse for a creditor
in the same situation as petitioner is to locate prope rties of the resident def
endant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57,
section 1(f). In which case, the attachment converts th e action into a proceedi
ng in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be
deemed valid and effective. Since MHEC can no longer be found at its address an
d due to a failure to effect proper service of summons, the Trial Court never ac
quired jurisdiction over the person of said defendant an d therefore could not l
awfully render a valid judgment. A service of summons by publication not having
been preceded by attachment of property does not confer j urisdiction over the p
erson of the defendant. Petitioner s action dismissed. The Court also directs th
at, in a second action, efforts be exerted to cause person al service on respond
ent corporation on its president, manager, secretary, or an y of its directors a
s may become known from the records of the Securities and Ex change Commission o
r such others as may become available prior to effecting serv ice of summons by
publication. FACTS: 183 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE P
ACIFICO P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION In a civil c
ase entitled "Badoc Planters versus Philippine Virginia Tobacco Admi nistration,
" which was an action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an P artial Jud
gment Order was issued ordering the defendant PVTA to pay jointly and severally,
the plaintiff Badoc. BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of Execut
ion which was granted. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court, issued a Writ of
Execution addressed to the Special Sheriff, who then issued a Notice o f Garnish
ment addressed to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)reques ting a r
eply within five days to said garnishment as to any property which the P VTA mig
ht have in its possession or control. Upon receipt of such Notice, RCBC n otifie
d PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the necessary steps for the prot ectio
n of its own interest. Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by BADOC, the r espo
ndent Judge granted the motion and directed the petitioner to deliver in che ck
the amount garnished to the Sheriff and is ordered to cash the check and deli ve
r the amount to the plaintiff. In compliance with said Order, RCBC delivered t o
the Sheriff a certified check. PVTA thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsiderat
ion which was granted by the court, setting aside the Orders of Execution and of
Payment and the Writ of Execution, and ordering petitioner and BADOC to restore
, jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same con
d ition and state it was before by reimbursement. PVTA claims that the manner in
w hich the bank complied with the Sheriffs Notice of Garnishment indicated brea
ch of trust and dereliction of duty as custodian of government funds as it prema
tur ely delivered the garnished to the special sheriff. That due to its lack of
prud ence makes it answerable jointly and severally with BADOC for the wrongful
relea se of the money from the deposit of the PVTA. The respondent Judge sustain
ed suc h contention and blamed RCBC for the supposed hasty release of the amount
. A Mot ion for Reconsideration of the said Order filed by RCBC was denied ISSUE
Whether or not there is solidary liability for reimbursement of garnished funds
. Petiti oner cannot be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaint
iff BADOC . Plaintiff was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution
and Order of Payment and so, it alone should bear the consequences of a subseque
nt annulme nt of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to
restore the account of the PVTA. PVTA has been endowed with a personality distin
ct and sepa rate from the government. Accordingly, it is declared that the funds
of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public corporation which can sue a
nd be sued a re not exempt from garnishment." RCBC cannot be charged with lack o
f prudence fo r immediately complying with the order to deliver the garnished am
ount. Since th e funds in its custody are precisely meant for the payment of law
fullyincurred o bligations, RCBC cannot rightfully resist a court order to enfor
ce payment of su ch obligations. That such court order subsequently turned out t
o have been erron eously issued should not operate to the detriment of one who c
omplied with its c lear order. HELD: FACTS: 184 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 INSULAR BANK OF ASIA & AMERICA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF AP
PEALS, and COMMERCIAL CR EDIT CORPORATION Petitioner IBAA made a money market pl
acement with respondent and in considerati on of such, respondent executed a Non
-Negotiable Repurchase Agreement whereby it conveyed to petitioner securities is
sued by International Corporate Bank. Petit ioner and respondent also executed a
resale agreement which bound IBAA to re-sel l to CCC the securities. On the due
date of the securities, CCC caused to be iss ued a cashier s check to IBAA whic
h was, however, dishonored upon presentment fo r being drawn against uncollected
deposits. IBAA then advised CCC of the dishono r and demanded cash payment. CCC
admitted difficulty in replacing the dishonored check and proposed payment on a
staggered basis, attaching a copy of a Central Bank letter approving its (CCC s
) request for additional standby credit facility to meet its maturing placements
. Due to respondent s failure, IBAA filed an act ion for recovery of sum of mone
y with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of pre liminary attachment claiming t
hat defendant, in its fiduciary capacity, embezzle d and fraudulently misapplied
or converted to his own use the money, has been gu ilty of fraud in contracting
the debt , and has removed or disposed of his prope rty, or is about to do so,
with intent to defraud his creditors. The trial court issued an order granting t
he preliminary attachment against real and personal p roperties of CCC. Responde
nt filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of A ppeals. Despite the issua
nce of a status quo order from the Court of Appeals, de posits of CCC were garni
shed and properties were attached. Petitioner reiterated its apprehension over C
CC s financial viability and ability to pay and claimed that CCC never had any s
erious intention to pay such that the intention to defra ud IBAA was very appare
nt. The circumstances in the case at bar fall, according to IBAA, under Rule 57,
Section 1 (d), of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appea ls set aside the RTC o
rder of attachment. ISSUE: HELD: FACTS Whether or not the petitioner was perform
ing acts to defraud its creditors. There is no reversible error in the questione
d Court of Appeals decision and the Court finds it to be in accordance with law.
The contention that at the time th e obligation was incurred by CCC, it already
had the fraudulent intent not to pa y the obligation or indebtedness is not bor
ne out by the records. Upon the other hand, CCC has not denied that it was under
going financial difficulties and had in fact called a creditor s meeting to make
full disclosure of its business cond ition and negotiate for payment of its out
standing obligations. The Court of App eals found, on the other hand, that there
was no dissipation of assets, in fact, respondent s withdrawal of money from Fa
r East Bank and Trust Co. was intended to finance its operations. Inability to p
ay, we rule, is not necessarily synonym ous with fraudulent intent not to honor
an admitted obligation. The purpose of a ttachment is to secure a contingent lie
n on defendant s property until plaintiff can obtain a judgment and have such pr
operty applied to its satisfaction in suc h cases where the means of satisfactio
n thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction or improperly dispose
d of (by fraud or otherwise) or placed bey ond the reach of creditors. 185 P a g
e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 ABOITIZ & COMPANY, HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI JR., and th
e PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO DEL SUR vs. COTABATO BUS COMPANY The instant petit
ion stemmed from a Civil Case in which a writ of preliminary at tachment was iss
ued ex-parte by the Court on the strength of an affidavit of mer it attached to
the verified complaint filed by petitioner Aboitiz & Co., Inc. as plaintiff in s
aid case, for the collection of money, which defendant therein, t he respondent
in the instant case, Cotabato Bus Co., owed the said petitioner. B y virtue of t
he writ of preliminary attachment, the provincial sheriff attached personal prop
erties of the defendant. The ground for the issuance of the writ is , as alleged
in the complaint, that the defendant "has removed or disposed of it s propertie
s or assets, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud its credito rs." The p
etitioner made reference to respondent company s "nil" bank account, a s if to s
how removal of company s funds, and cited as well the alleged non-payme nt of it
s other creditors, including secured creditors like the Development Bank of the
Philippines to which all its buses have been mortgaged, despite its dail y incom
e averaging P12,000.00, and the removal of five attached buses. Responden t comp
any filed an "Urgent Motion to Dissolve or Quash Writ of Attachment" alleg ing a
mong other things that the defendant has not been selling or disposing of i ts p
roperties, neither does it intend to do so, much less to defraud its credito rs
and that it has also been acquiring and buying more assets. The lower court d en
ied the motion. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. H
ence, the defendant went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari al
leging grave abuse of discretion on the part of herein respondent Judge. The C o
urt of Appeals issued a restraining order upon the trial court from enforcing f
urther the writ of attachment and from proceeding with the hearing of the Civil
Case. It declared "null and void the order/writ of attachment, ordered the relea
se of the attached properties, and made the restraining order originally issued
permanent. ISSUE HELD Whether or not removal was effected in fraud of creditors
. FACTS We find that the respondent Court of Appeals has not committed any rever
sible er ror, much less grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the instant peti
tion is h ereby denied, but the trial court is hereby ordered to immediately pro
ceed with the hearing of Civil Case. The respondent Court of Appeals correctly t
ook its po sition in the negative on the question of whether insolvency, which p
etitioners in effect claims to have been proven particularly by company s bank a
ccount whic h has been reduced to nil, may be a ground for the issuance of a wri
t of attachm ent. The dwindling of respondent s bank account is easily explained
by it having to meet heavy operating expenses. Moreover, as the buses were mort
gaged, their removal, as alleged, to provide the basis of the writ should be ver
y remote. The removal for repairs cannot be the removal intended as ground for t
he issuance o f a writ of attachment under section 1 (e), Rule 57, of the Rules
of Court. The repairs were for interest of the riding public, clearly not to def
raud its credi tors, as there is no showing that they were not put on the run af
ter their repai rs. 186 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE BEN
JAMIN RELOVA and ERNESTO SALAZAR FACTS: Filinvest Credit Corporation filed a com
plaint in the lower court against defend ants Rallye Motor Co., Inc. and Emesto
Salazar for the collection of a sum of mo ney with damages and preliminary writ
of attachment. From the allegations, it ap pears that in payment of a motor vehi
cle, Salazar executed a promissory note in favor of Rallye and to secure the not
e, Salazar also executed in favor of Rallye a deed of chattel mortgage. Rallye,
for valuable consideration, assigned all it s rights, title and interest to the
note and mortgage to Filinvest. Petitioner, thereafter, came to know that Rallye
had not delivered the motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage to Salazar.
Salazar defaulted in complying with the ter ms and conditions of the promissory
note and chattel mortgage. Rallye also faile d and refused to pay Filinvest des
pite demand.According to Petitioner, the defen dants intentionally, fraudulently
and with malice concealed from it the fact tha t there was no vehicle delivered
, otherwise, it would not have accepted the nego tiation and assignment of the r
ights and interest covered by the promissory note and chattel mortgage. A prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment was granted . Petitioner submitted with it
s complaint the affidavit of one Gil Mananghaya, w ho is the Collection Manager
of Filinvest. More than a year later, defendant Sal azar moved that the writ of
preliminary attachment issued ex parte quashed and a rgued that when he signed t
he promissory note and chattel mortgage, Filinvest wa s not his creditor. Theref
ore, he could not be said to have committed fraud when he contracted the obligat
ion. Respondent added that as the motor vehicle and th e consideration for the p
romissory note had admittedly not been delivered to him , his repudiation of the
loan and mortgage is more justifiable. The court a quo, ordered the dissolution
and setting aside of the writ and the return to defenda nt Salazar of all his p
roperties attached. Petitioner in its memorandum contends that respondent Judge
erred In dissolving the writ already enforced without Sal azar s posting a count
er-replevin bond as required by Rule 57, Section 12; and i n finding that there
was no fraud on the part of Salazar, despite evidence in ab undance to show frau
d. ISSUE: Whether or not there was concealment to defraud cr editors. HELD: Cons
idering the claim of respondent Salazar that Rallye did not deliver the moto r v
ehicle to him, it follows that the invoice and receipt of the sale of the mot or
vehicle both signed by him was fictitious. It also follows that the Promissor y
Note was without consideration and therefore fake; the Chattel Mortgage over t
he non-existent vehicle was likewise a fraud; the registration of the vehicle in
the name of Salazar was a falsity; and the assignment by Rallye with the confor
me of respondent Salazar in favor of petitioner was fraudulent. Petitioner, in
t he ordinary course of business, relied on the regularity and validity of the t
ra nsaction. The Court ruled that the failure of respondent Salazar to disclose
the material fact of non-delivery of the motor vehicle, there being a duty on hi
s p art to reveal them, constitutes fraud and that the court a quo committed gra
ve a buse of discretion in dissolving and setting aside the writ of preliminary
attac hment. 187

P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 WILLIAM ALAIN MIALHE v. ELAINE MIALHE DE LENCQUESAING an
d HERVE DE LENCQUESAING FACTS: Petitioner was the administrator of real properti
es co-owned by him, his sisters respondent Elaine, Monique, and their mother. Pe
titioner along with his mother and the other sister filed an Action for Partitio
n. Among the issues offe red was the matter of petitioner s account as said admi
nistrator. Therein, respo ndent sued petitioner for estafa alleging that he had
misappropriated respondent s share in rentals of the common properties. Coverage
of the suit thereafter ap peared in a major newspaper. Feeling that his reputat
ion was tainted, petitioner filed a verified complaint for damages. Petitioner a
lso prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment of respondent s
1/6 undivided interest in t he properties alleging that respondent is a non-resi
dent of the Philippines. The trial court granted such writ. Respondent thereafte
r filed a motion to lift the writ on the ground that the complaint did not compl
y with Section 3 of Rule 57 and that petitioner s claim was for unliquidated dam
ages. The motion was denied. It was declared that the writ null and void. ISSUE:
HELD: While it is rather pr oper that attachment may issue in an action against
a party who resides out of t he Philippines, irrespective of the nature of the
action or suit, and while each of the grounds under Section 1 (f) of Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court is independ ent of the others, it is still imperative that th
e amount sought must be certain and liquidated, which is one of the indispensabl
e requirements for the issuance of a writ of attachment. The writ was therefore
null and void. Whether or not s ummons may be served by publication. 188 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 MERCEDES GRUENBERG and ALBERT GRUENBERG v. COURT OF APPE
ALS FACTS: Private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the la
te W illiam Gruenberg filed for annulment of sale and recovery of ownership and
posse ssion of a house and lot, having been allegedly sold in fraud of creditors
. She then filed a motion for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment on the
proper ties of petitioners, asserting that the latter are indebted to her. Petit
ioners opposed stating that the case was an action for annulment of sale and rec
overy o f the properties, and not for recovery of sum of money, further contendi
ng that a writ of preliminary attachment is not the proper remedy to protect the
rights of the estate. Issuance the writ was effected wherein the trial court st
ated tha t no opposition had been filed to the motion. Notice of garnishment was
thereupo n served. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
and a moti on to recall the writ and notice of garnishment on the ground that it
was not tr ue that petitioners did not oppose the motion of private respondent
upon discove ring that the their opposition was not attached to the record, the
same having b een forwarded to another branch to which the civil case was origin
ally assigned. Petitioners motions were denied. A petition for certiorari was ho
wever dismiss ed Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the wri
t of attachmen t and garnishment es was proper. HELD: The writ of preliminary at
tachment was he ld to be improvidently issued. It was held that the issuance mer
ely recited the grounds alleged in the private respondent s motion without any s
pecific details as to the supposed fraud committed by the petitioners whey they
contracted the d ebt and the alleged disposition or concealment by the petitione
rs of the propert ies. The rules on such issuance must be construed strictly in
favor of the defen dant. It further explained that attachment must be issued on
concrete and specif ic grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the w
ords of the pertinen t rules. Therefore, the validity of the claim of the respon
dent will have to be threshed out in special proceedings, not in the case for an
nulment of the deed o f sale, as what private respondent seeks to be secured is
not the judgment in th e main case but a mere claim against the estate which is
still to be considered and adjudicated by the court. The Court hereby grants the
petition. 189 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 57 VICENTE CHUIDIAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: PCGG sequestere

d petitioner s assets as he was allegedly a dummy President Ferdi nand Marcos in
several companies said to have been illegally acquired by the for mer. A frozen
the Letter of Credit was ordered which was issued to the petitione r by the Phi
lippine National Bank. Consequently, petitioner filed an action agai nst PNB bef
ore the District Court of California seeking to compel PNB to pay the proceeds o
f the Letter of Credit. PNB opposed and averred that it has no liabil ity whatso
ever for a breach of contract under the principles of illegality, inte rnational
comity and act of state. Philguarantee thereafter intervened, alleging that PNB
was excused from making payments since the settlement was void due to illegalit
y, duress and fraud. Judgment in favour of PNB was rendered by the Fede ral Cour
t exempting PNB from making such payments and denied Philguarantee s act ion to
set aside the settlement agreement. A complaint was brought before the Sa ndigan
bayan against the known cronies of the Marcoses including the petitioner, seekin
g for the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all forms of we
alth allegedly procured illegally and stashed away by the defendants. The Republ
ic filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the Letter of Credit
, citing as one of the grounds that petitioner disposed of his property wi th th
e intent of defrauding plaintiff Republic under Section 1(c) of Rule 57. Pe titi
oner contended that Section 1(c) is not applicable because no fiduciary rela tio
nship exists between plaintiff and petitioner. Sandiganbayan thereafter issue d
the writ of attachment against the Letter of Credit. on grounds of res judicat a
, petitioner subsequently filed a motion to lift order of attachment and that t
he government is estopped from pursuing the case for failing to prosecute him af
ter a long period of time. Improvident. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of w
r it of attachment was proper. HELD: Improvident issuance of the writ of attachm
en t was not effectively shown. The Court held that for a writ to be discharged,
th e defect, as contemplated in Rule 57, must be in the very issuance of the at
tach ment writ and when it is proven that the allegations of the complaint were
decep tively framed, or when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The
groun ds offered by herein petitioner have nothing to do with the issuance of t
he writ of attachment. Supervening events which may or may not justify the disch
arge of the writ are not within the purview Rule 57. The Court, moreover, reiter
ated th at only two ways can a writ of attachment be nullified, either by filing
a count erbond immediately or by moving to quash on the ground of improper and
irregular issuance. The motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infi
rmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment, and neither did petit
ioner fil e any counterbond. To question the propriety of such issuance was bela
tedly done by herein petitioner. 190 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 58 TRIAL 191 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 DUNGOG V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A complaint was filed
by private respondent Gothong Lines due to non-deli very of parcels of land in b
reach of the contract between herein respondent and petitioner. The petitioner t
herefore questioned the propriety of the grant by th e trial court of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Upon elevation of the case, t he Court of Appeals dismis
sed petitioner s appeal for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of th
e writ of preliminary injunction was proper. HELD: A p reliminary injunction may
be granted at any stage of a proceeding, prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party, court, or agency to perform or refra in from performing a par
ticular act or acts. The issuance rests entirely within the court's sound discreti
on and cannot be interfered with except in cases of pate nt abuse. It is merely
temporary, subject to final disposition of the principal action. Its purpose is
to preserve the status quo of the matter subject of the a ction to protect the r
ights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. It is provided by Rule 5
8 Section 3 of the Rules of Court that preliminary injunct ion may be had when i
t appears that plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. The issuance of the w
rit preliminary injunction would no doubt preserve the stat us quo between petit
ioners and private respondent that existed prior to the comm encement of the cas
e. Until the issue on the parties respective rights and obli gations have been d
etermined after the trial such situation must be maintained. 192 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. RIVERA VILLAGE

LESSEE HOMEOWNERS ASSOC IATION INC. FACTS: An injunctive writ was issued involv
ing a piece of property upon motion b y the respondent Rivera Village Homeowners
Association. Prior to the action, the members of said association made a reques
t for sale of portion of subject prope rty by the petitioner in accordance with
the Urban Land Reform Act. Petitioner M IAA denied such request. Hence, responde
nt filed a petition for mandamus and pro hibition with prayer for the issuance o
f a preliminary injunction, which petitio n seeks to restrain the MIAA from impl
ementing its Conceptual Development Plan. MIAA filed its answer alleging that th
e association is not entitled to a writ of mandamus since it does not have a cle
ar legal right to possess the subject prop erty. The trial court denied the peti
tion for lack of merit. The Court of Appeal s annulled such order and issued a w
rit of preliminary injunction restraining re spondent from evicting the members
of Rivera Village Homeowners Association. Pet itioner seeks a review of the Cour
t of Appeals decision in its issuance of such writ . ISSUE: Whether or not issua
nce of preliminary injunction can be availed o f. HELD: A Writ of Preliminary in
junction is regarded as a mere auxiliary remedy which may not independently stan
d of the main case. The determination of the ho meowners association s entitleme
nt to a writ of preliminary injunction is alread y moot and academic since the p
etition filed before the trial court was correctl y dismissed. Writs of certiora
ri, prohibition, and mandamus are prerogative writ s of equity and a grant of su
ch is generally within the discretion of the courts to be exercised on equitable
principles. The respondent homeowners association clearly exhibited failure to
establish any clear legal right to the issuance of the writs of mandamus and pro
hibition. The Court therefore maintained trial cour t's dismissal of the petition
for a writ of preliminary injunction. 193 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 TANDUAY DISTELLERA, INC. v. GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL, INC. FAC
TS: Tanduay Distellera Inc. (Tanduay for brevity) developed a new gin product di
stinguished by its sweet smell, smooth taste and affordable price. The brand nam
e eventually chosen was Ginebra Kapitan which allegedly differs in terms of col or
scheme, size and arrangement of text; other label features; and uses resealab l
e twist cap to distinguish it from Ginebra San Miguel and other local gin product
s which use the crown cap or tansan. Tanduay applied for its patent name which w
as granted. Ginebra San Miguel Inc. (San Miguel for brevity) applied for the is
s uance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop Tanduay from manufacturing s
uc h products. The trial court granted the Writ based on affidavits presented. T
he above-entitled case reached to the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity). The CA
uph eld the trial court's ruling that San Miguel has sufficiently established its
righ t to prior use and registration of the word Ginebra as a dominant feature of
its t rademark. It ruled that based on San Miguel's extensive, continuous and subs
tantia lly exclusive use of the word Ginebra, it has become distinctive of San Mig
uel's gin products, thus, a clear and unmistakable right was shown. ISSUE: HELD: W
hether or not the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was proper. No.
The Writ was not proper. The court held that the issue can only be resolved aft
er a fullblown trial because a doubt exists over San Miguel's exclusive right r el
ating to the word Ginebra. San Miguel's claim to the exclusive use of the word Gine b
ra is clearly still in dispute because of Tanduay's claim that it has, as others h
ave, also registered the word Ginebra for its gin products. It is not evident whet
her San Miguel has the right to prevent other business entities from using the
w ord Ginebra. It is not settled if Ginebra is indeed the dominant feature of the tr
ad emarks, if it is a generic word that as a matter of law cannot be appropriate
d, or if it is merely a descriptive word that may be appropriated based on the f
act that it has acquired a secondary meaning. Moreover, it further held that cou
rt should exercise great caution in issuing injunction. It should be granted onl
y w hen the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency d
eman ds it. There is no also irreparable injury because there is no submission o
f pro of that the damage is irreparable and incapable of pecuniary estimation. S
an Mig uel's claim cannot be the basis for a valid Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Hence, it constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdicti
on on t he part of the CA granting it. 194 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 GUY v. COURT OF APPEALS Northern Islands is a family-own
ed corporation organized by Spouses Francisco an d Simny Guy (Spouses Guy for br
evity). When they incorporated Lincoln Continenta l as a holding company, fifty
percent (50%) shares of stock of Northern Islands was held in trust for their th
ree (3) daughters, to wit: Respondents Geraldine, Gladys and Grace (Respondent s
isters for brevity). Upon instruction of Spouses G uy, Atty. Andres Gatmaitan, P
resident of Lincoln Continental, indorsed the said shares of stocks and delivere
d them to Simny Guy. Later, Spouses Guy found out t hat their son Gilbert Guy (G
uy for brevity) has been disposing of the assets of their corporations without a
uthority. In order to protect the assets of Northern Islands, the said share or
stocks were then registered in the names of Responde nt sisters thus enabling th
em to assume an active role in the management of Nort hern Islands. Due to this,
a disagreement ensued. Lincoln Continental filed with the RTC for the annulment
of shares of stocks, contended that they are the owne r of the said shares of s
tocks which the Respondent sisters have in possession. It prayed for an award of
damages; management of Northern Islands be restored to Gilbert; and Temporary R
estraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory In junction to prohibit Res
pondent sisters from exercising any right of ownership o ver the disputed shares
. On a series of events, trial court granted the Writ of Injunction. Respondent
sisters asked the Court of Appeals to issue a preliminary injunction then a perm
anent injunction from the said order of the trial court. The appellate court gra
nted and ruled in favor of Respondent sisters. Petitioner (Guy) appealed and rai
sed as one of the issues on whether the Respondent sister s are entitled to the
injunctive relief granted. ISSUE: Whether or not the issua nce of the writ of pr
eliminary injunction was proper. HELD: YES. They are entitl ed with the injuncti
ve relief under Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civi l Procedure. They h
ave shown their clear and established right to the disputed s hares of stock bec
ause they have physical possession of the two stock certificat es equivalent to
the said number of shares. Lincoln Continental is a mere truste e of the Guy fam
ily and Respondent sisters. The latter constitute a majority of the board of dir
ectors of Northern Islands, and accordingly have management and control of the c
ompany at the inception of the case. Petitioner Guy failed to es tablish by clea
r and convincing evidence his ownership of the shares of stock in question. Thus
, the Court of Appeals was correct in determining the urgent nece ssity to issue
an injunctive writ in order to prevent serious damage to the righ ts of Respond
ents and Northern Islands. FACTS: 195 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT v. LABAYEN Respondent City f
iled a case for Injunction with a Prayer for Temporary Restrain ing Order and/or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (TRO and/or PMI for brevity) a gainst Petition
er for the implementation of its new rates because it was imposed without public
hearing in violation of due process. At first, the complaint was dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Later, Respondent Cit y filed an Urg
ent Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or PMI praying that the cas e be set for
hearing. The Court granted the TRO. The judge issued a final injunc tion alleged
ly confirming the previous preliminary injunction which is in truth, the judge r
eferring to is the TRO earlier issued. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsidera
tion raising that it issued a final injunction without the petitione r being hea
rd which was denied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review at th e Court of
Appeals but was likewise, denied on the ground that the TRO earlier i ssued has
been elevated to the same level as the preliminary injunction in the p rocedure
, grounds and requirements by Section 4, Rule 58 because the Judge has d elibera
tely omitted to call it as TRO in the latter orders. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not
there is a writ of preliminary injunction issued. FACTS: NONE. It was clear tha
t a TRO was clearly stated in the order. It was only when Petitioner expressed i
ts vehement objection on the latter Order when Respondents just wanted to constr
ue the TRO as a preliminary injunction to justify the vali dity of the final inj
unction. A restraining order, is issued to preserve the sta tus quo until the he
aring of the application for preliminary injunction which ca nnot be issued ex p
arte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restrai
ning order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If no act
ion is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within t
he said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order wou ld automatically v
acated and expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, n o judicial declar
ation to that effect being necessary. The failure of respondent court to fix a p
eriod for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary rest raining order a
breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary inju
nction. The twenty (20) day period provided by the Rules of Cour t should be dee
med incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so . The court he
ld that it is because of this rule on non-extendibility that Respo ndent City wa
s prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a pr eliminary in
junction. Now, they cannot take advantage of this omission by respon dent trial
court. 196 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58 DAVID v. NAVARRO Petitioner was the mother of the busine
ssman Andrew David who was shot by uniden tified men. One of the suspects in thi
s case was her wife. Petitioner filed a se ttlement of estate of her son and she
likewise prayed to be the special administ ratix of such. Meanwhile, the wife s
old to Respondents the lot to which the Peti tioner opposed on the ground that s
he has another prospective buyer. The wife pr oceeded with the sale and did not
give any share to Petitioner. Thereafter, Resp ondents occupied the property. Pe
titioner filed for annulment of sale to which t he Municipal Trial Court (MTC fo
r brevity) rendered a favorable judgment. MTC gr anted execution pending the app
eal of Resondents in the Regiol Trial Court (RTC for brevity) because of failure
of the latter to file supersedeas bond. RTC did not issue any TRO or injunction
then until the writ was implemented. Undaunted, Respondents went to the CA for
injunction to which the latter granted. Later, RT C reversed the decision of the
MTC granting the annulment of the deed of the con ditional sale. ISSUE: HELD: W
hether or not the CA imprudently issued a Writ of P reliminary Injunction. FACTS
: YES. Writ of Preliminary Injunction will not issue if the act sought to be enj
oi ned is a fait accompli. The Writ of Execution had already been enforced and R
esp ondents were evicted from the property, as they were placed in possession of
the property. It was also clear that MTC is mandated to issue the writ of execu
tion under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court for failure of respondents
to f ile supersedeas bond. Respondent also committed a procedural lapse when ins
tead of refilling their petition with injunction to the RTC, they sought recours
e to CA. However, court dismissed the petition on the ground that RTC reversed t
he de cision of the MTC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Court ruled
that t he writ of execution issued by the MTC had, thus, become functus officio.
197 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 59 RECEIVERSHIP 198 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 ARRANZA v. B.F. HOMES INC. Respondent filed with the Sec
urities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) a Petition for Rehabilitation
and a declaration that it was in a state of suspens ion of payments because of t
he closure of Banco Filipino in which Respondent has a huge investment. The SEC
placed Atty. Orendain as a Receiver (Receiver for br evity) who unified all the
homeowner's association which was later called Home Ins urance and Guaranty Corpor
ation (HIGC), as representative of all homeowners. Lat er the Receiver was repla
ced by the new Board. They revoked the authority given to the Receiver and inste
ad recognized BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc., as the representative of
all homeowners; deferred purchase of new pumps; deploy ed its own security guard
s in the subdivision; and took management of clubhouse. Petitioners filed a clas
s suit and later a cease-and-desist/status quo order ra ising issues on the foll
owing basic needs of the homeowners such as water, secur ity and right of way. H
LURB granted but Respondent filed a prohibition to the Co urt of Appeals. Respon
dent asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction over because the SEC
being the appointing authority, should be the one to take cognizance of controve
rsies arising from the performance of the receiver s dutie s based on the contra
cts entered into by the former receiver. Court of Appeals f inds for the respond
ents. Whether or not HLURB will still retain jurisdiction ov er claims by subdiv
ision owners once it has been placed under receivership. YES. The court held bei
ng under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that juris diction. The appoi
ntment of a receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with
the exercise of its corporate rights. In this case, where the re appears to be
no restraints imposed upon Respondent as it undergoes rehabilit ation and receiv
ership, Respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence , continues or
should continue to perform its contractual and statutory responsi bilities to Pe
titioners as homeowners. Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at ma
king more secure, existing rights. It cannot be used as an instrum ent for the d
estruction of those rights. A receiver is a person appointed by the court or qua
si-judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose
of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its possib le destructi
on or dissipation. It is the duty of the receiver to administer the assets of th
e receivership estate and in the management and disposition of the p roperty com
mitted to his possession. He acts in a fiduciary capacity and with im partiality
towards all interested persons. Claims of the Petitioners are basical ly not pe
cuniary in nature and for the ideal community living that respondents p ortrayed
they would have when they bought real estate from it which is under the purpose
s why HLURB was created although it could incidentally involve monetary consider
ations. HELD: ISSUE: FACTS: 199 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60 REPLEVIN 200 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 YANG v. VALDEZ Respondent Spouses Ricardo and Milagros M
orante (Respondents for brevity) applie d for a Writ of Replevin (Writ for brevi
ty) against Petitioner to recover posses sion of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks (tru
cks for brevity). Respondents alleged tha t they had actual use and possession o
f the trucks but the same were illegally d etained by Petitioner and even succee
ded registering it in his favor. Respondent judge granted the Writ and rejected
the counter-bond of Petitioner by being fil ed out of time. Petitioner contended
that the replevin bond was defective for it was merely an undertaking of the Re
spondent's bondsmen to pay the sum of P560,000 .00, and that no tangible security
such as cash, property or surety was placed t hereby at the disposal and custody
of the court. Moreover, Petitioner contended that Respondents are not the regis
tered owners of trucks and thus, the Writ shou ld not have been issued. ISSUE: H
ELD: Whether the judge acted with grave abuse o f discretion in granting the Wri
t. FACTS: NO. The judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. The sufficie
ncy of a b ond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the cour
t which mus t approve the bond. It is not necessary that the obligation of the b
ond be suppo rted by cash or personal property or real property or the obligatio
n of a surety other than the person giving the bond. A sworn declaration as foun
d in this cas e is sufficient. A bond can be merely a written obligation under s
eal, commercia l matter, secured by a mortgage on real property, the mortgagee m
ay be the oblig ee or a third party surety whose personal credit is added to tha
t of the princip al obligor under the bond. This Court finds the Respondents nee
d not be holder o f the legal title over the property because under Rule 60, Sec
tion 2, it suffice s that he is "entitled to the possession thereof. This Court a
lso finds that the counter bond that the Petitioner offered was really filed out
of time. Under Sec tion 5, Petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of t
he property to the p laintiff" require the return of the property; Section 6, he
may do so, "within f ive (5) days after the taking of the property by the offic
er." Both these period s are mandatory in character and command the judge to dis
approve the counter-bon d if not complied. In the instant case, the trucks were
taken into custody by th e Sheriff on January 7, 1985. Petitioner s counter bond
was filed on January 25, 1985. Clearly, the counter bond was filed beyond the m
andated periods to file t he same. 201 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 60 NICANOR. B. PAGKALINAWAN Vs. HON. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ
and NORBERTO L. DAYRIT FACTS: A complaint for replevin was lodged by private res
pondent for the recover y of a vehicle seized by herein Petitioner Nicanor Pagka
linawan, an NBI agent, p ursuant to a search warrant which has been the subject
of a theft. Respondent Ju dge issued an order directing the Sheriff to take unde
r his custody the said veh icle. Upon service of the writ, petitioner was oblige
d to transfer the custody o f the vehicle to the Provincial Sheriff who took ove
r its possession and turned it over to respondent Dayrit. ISSUE: Whether or not
there was grave abuse of discretion upon the issuance of t he writ. HELD: The ve
hicle subject matter of the case, having been properly seiz ed in pursuance of a
search warrant issued by it, was being held in custodia leg is. Such a situatio
n stemmed from the fact that respondent Judge compelled petit ioner, through a r
eplevin action, to deliver the vehicle to the Sheriff for its turnover to privat
e respondent. Such a situation is proper. Upon filing an appro priate pleading t
hat a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, the tri
al court cannot require any proper officer of the Court to take the property sub
ject of the replevin action if theretofore it came into the cus tody of another
public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the trial cou rt that issued
such a search warrant can validly make an order for its release. Confusion can b
e avoided if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are not permitted to interfere wi
th each other s lawful orders. The foremost importance of such is to guarantee f
irm and consistent judicial actions. 202 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE 203 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 61 DAISIE DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON VILLAR Respo
ndent Villar, though married, had an intimate relationship with petitioner who i
s his secretary, which produced several offsprings. During the summer of 19 91,
with the petitioner's consent, the respondent and his family took one of the p eti
tioner's children for a vacation and upon their return, respondent refused to r et
urn the child. This prompted the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corp u
s. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, granting rightful c
ustody to the natural mother. The court further ordered that a temporary monthl
y support to the minor children be given by respondent upon the finality of the
decision. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that c
ustody may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplates a situation where th
e parents are married to each other but are separated. Hence, the Habeas Corpus
w as not proper. ISSUE: HELD: It must be noted that in the instant case, the chi
ld is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, and his father,
p rivate respondent, was married to another woman other than the child's mother.
Whi le it is accepted that the right to custody of minor children is relevant in
cas es where the married parents are for some reason separated from each other,
it d oes not necessarily follow that the same cannot take place in any other si
tuatio n. In accordance with article 176 of the Family Code, the child is deemed
to be under the parental authority of his biological mother, herein petitioner,
who is entitled to have custody of him. As it has been noticed that petitioner
has not been given of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, s
he is e ntitled to the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus. The Family Code ar
ticulate s that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless th e court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The fact that priv
ate respon dent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him
to give sup port to the latter, but certainly not providing him with custody of
the child. W hether or not the remedy of habeas corpus is proper. FACTS: 204 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 61 BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN Vs. HON. Judge MANUEL E. VALENZUEL
A and DOROTEA MEJIA On the ground of a prior and subsisting marriage between pet
itioner and one Isab el Bandin, the marriage between respondent Mejia and petiti
oner San Juan was dec lared null and void. Respondent thereafter lodged an actio
n against petitioner s eeking support for herself and her two minor children, wh
ich was granted to be p aid to the plaintiff each month until final judgment of
the case. Petitioner mov ed for reconsideration stating that the amount is gross
ly disproportionate to pe titioner s means and that the petitioner is not oblige
d to support respondent as their marriage is null and void, and that no evidence
was presented as to petit ioner s present financial capability. ISSUE: HELD: Wh
ether or not the support pe ndent lite was proper. FACTS: The petitioner s willi
ngness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the m anner indicated in hi
s manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have rendered
the petition moot and academic. Also, petitioner sought the reduction of the amo
unt of support pendente lite on the ground that the sum pre viously fixed by res
pondent judge is beyond his means to pay. The amount fixed i n the order is only
provisional, however, not final in character in the sense th at it can be the s
ubject of modification, depending on the changing conditions a ffecting the abil
ity of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support. 205 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 62 INTERPLEADER 206 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 62 LEONARDO OCAMPO vs. LEONORA TIRONA FACTS: A parcel of la
nd was bought by petitioner. Respondent Tirona occupied a p ortion of the land a
s lessee. Petitioner received a letter stating among others, that, in view of th
e fact that the subject premises was declared under area for priority developmen
t, respondent is invoking her right of first refusal. Respon dent further assert
ed that with reference to such, she will temporarily stop pay ing her monthly re
ntals until the National Housing Authority has processed the p ertinent papers c
oncerning the amount due to petitioner by reason of the impleme ntation of the a
bove law. Petitioner demanded payment of the rentals and that re spondent vacate
the premises which the latter refused. Accordingly, a complaint for unlawful de
tainer and damages was filed by petitioner. Respondent asserted i n her answer t
hat the original owners of the land could not transfer ownership t o petitioner
since they had executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in favor of one Maria Lo
urdes Breton-Mendiola making her the lessor. In is further noted th at TCT of sa
id land has not been registered under petitioner's name. Trial court, however, ren
dered judgment in favor of petitioner, which was set aside on appeal to the Cour
t of Appeals. ISSUE: HELD: Quite notably, an interpleader is regarde d as a reme
dy whereby a person who has property in his possession, or an obligat ion to be
rendered, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest wh ich is no
t disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that t he perso
ns who claim such property or who consider themselves entitled to demand complia
nce with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves. In th is case
, an action for interpleader may be proper when the lessee does not know the per
son to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. In order t
o determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is aff
orded to protect a person against a double vexation in respect of one lia bility
. In the case at bar, no action for interpleader was even initiated by res ponde
nt. Her good faith is put in question in respondent's preference for Mendiola . Ti
rona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claiman ts
to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo ag
ainst her before filing for an interpleader. Whether or not the action for in te
rpleader is proper. 207 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES 208 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE FELISA LIM Vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Rule 63 Having
lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to a Chinese national, a petit ion wa
s filed by Lim alleging that she was formerly a citizen of the Philippines , mai
ntaining that she has all the qualifications for repatriation and prays tha t sh
e be permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen. Trial c our
t granted the petition. Solicitor General appealed and maintained that the lo we
r court erred in declaring petitioner repatriated as a Filipino citizen since th
ere can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizen s
hip of an individual. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not declaratory relief can be iss
ued in citizenship cases. No action or proceeding shall be maintained for the ju
dicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Quite notably, courts of
justice settle justiciabl e controversies, which imply a given right, legally d
emandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a rem
edy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only
of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy, the court may
pass upon, and make a pron ouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such
a pronouncement is beyond j udicial power. Repatriation of a female Filipino ci
tizen, having lost her citize nship through marriage to an alien, can be done up
on termination of her marital status by taking an oath of allegiance to the Repu
blic of the Philippines and to register said oath in the proper civil registry.
The prayer in the petition of appellee in the case suggests that she is cognizan
t of applicable legal provisio ns. Moreover, it is noticeable that her purpose i
s to settle her political statu s prior to marriage. By her petition, she hopes
to establish that she was a form er citizen of the Philippines before contractin
g marriage. The result of such, i n effect, is one for a declaratory relief, whi
ch has been repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natura
l persons. 209 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 63 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDAT
ION EDGARDO ISIP, HON. JUDGE MANUEL CALANOG, JR. and HON. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO. R
espondent Philippine Consumers Foundation filed a petition to the Board of Ener
gy against MERALCO, which sought for the immediate refund to MERALCO consumers o
f all the savings it realized under P. D. No. 551. Such law provides for loweri
n g the cost to consumers of electricity by reducing the franchise tax payable b
y electric franchise holders and the tariff on fuel oils for the generation of e
le ctric power by public utilities. MERALCO contended that it is authorized by t
he BOE to retain its savings. PCFI filed and was denied motion for reconsiderati
on hence the instant petition for certiorari which was also denied by the Suprem
e C ourt. Respondents filed with respondent Regional Trial Court a petition for
decl aratory relief and prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the sav
ings realized by MERALCO under P.D. No. 551. They insisted that pursuant to Sect
ion 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the consumers. ISSUE: HELD: FACTS:
Whether or not an action for declaratory relief can be availed of. An action for
declaratory relief may only be considered only before the breach o r violation
of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. It secures an authoritativ
e statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a sta tute, deed,
or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compli ance there
with, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. The petit
ion gives a practical remedy in ending controversies, which have not r eached th
e stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the ne ed for a
form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiat
ion of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. He re, pri
vate respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after t he all
eged violation of P.D. No. 551. 210 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE ANTONIO DELUMEN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Rule 63 A petitio
n was filed by petitioners Delumen alleging that they are the legitimat e childr
en of Pacencia Pua, a Filipino woman, and Mariano Delumen who was declar ed a Fi
lipino citizen by the trial court in an order. It prayed for determinatio n of t
heir citizenship and to declare their corresponding rights and duties. It is fur
ther alleged in the petition that the petitioners have continuously reside d in
the Philippines since their birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos, had
exercised the right to vote in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were
registered voters for the elections in 1951. The Solicitor General filed an answ
er alleging that the petition states no cause of action, there being no adv erse
party against whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controvers y.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision decla ri
ng the appellees to be Filipinos by birth and blood. From this decision the So l
icitor General has appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory
relief filed is proper.. HELD: Theappealed decision is reversed and the petitio
n dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. The appellant s contention is ten
able, since there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alle
g ed status of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in any instance been quest
io ned or denied by any specific person or authority. and it is not pretended th
at on any occasion their citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say
, a s appellees do, that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Sol
icit or General of an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause
of ac tion must be made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, wit
hout t he aid of the answer. As a matter of fact, the answer herein alleges that
the pe tition states no cause of action. An action for declaratory judgment, ho
wever, c annot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a mo
ot, abstr act or theoretical question, or decide claims which are uncertain or h
ypothetica l. "Own doubts, or by fears of others does not confer a cause of acti
on." In vie w of what had been said, it becomes unnecessary to discuss either th
e second con tention of the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in hold
ing that the petition for declaratory relief may be utilized to obtain a judicia
l pronounceme nt as to appellees citizenship. HELD: FACTS: 211 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 63 FELIPE OLLADA v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES On grou
nds that it was an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Account
ancy, in excess of the powers of the Central Bank and unconstitutional in that i
t unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of one s trade, for himsel f and
allegedly on behalf of numerous other CPAs assailed the requirement of the Impor
t-Export Department of the Central Bank that CPAs such as him must submit to an
accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their
clients applying for import dollar allocations. Accordingly, a petition f or De
claratory Relief was filed to nullify said accreditation requirement. Centr al B
ank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for Declaratory Relief for lack o f c
ause of action and contended that the Central Bank has the responsibility of adm
inistering the Monetary Banking System of the Republic and is authorized to p re
pare and issue, through its Monetary Board, rules and regulations to make effe c
tive the discharge of such responsibility; that the accreditation requirement a
lleged in the petition was issued in the exercise of such power and authority; t
hat the purpose of such requirement is not to regulate the practice of accounta
n cy in the Philippines but only the manner in which certified public accountant
s should transact business with the Central Bank. Complaint was dismissed. ISSUE
: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief was proper. HELD: An action
f or declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a con
tra ct, statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that th
ere had been a breach which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is t
hat an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not av
aila ble through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding. Peti
tione r commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one for Declarat
ory Re lief under the provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. On the questi
on of w hen a special civil action of this nature would prosper, we have already
held th at the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after
a contra ct, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the present cas
e such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition
for decla ratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, responden
t had alrea dy invaded or violated his right and caused him injury all these giv
ing him a co mplete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil
action or pr oceeding. FACTS: 212 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 63 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Chur ch of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Cipriano's wife left for t he Un
ited States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Ciprian o di
scovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano lea
rned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then marri ed
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him lived in Califo rn
ia, USA. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authori t
y to remarry invoking Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. F
inding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through t
he Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied. IS
S UE: HELD: A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
hi m or her to remarry. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
ow n courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonst
rate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also b
e pr oved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any ot
her f act, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must al
so sho w that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifical
ly requ ired in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. However, the pres
ent peti tion submits no sufficient evidence and on record, the Court is unable
to declar e, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was natural
ized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be ma de properly upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor. Whether or not the allegations were accordance with the rules of evid
ence. 213 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS 214 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 EMELINDA ABEDES v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS RELIA QUIZON AR
CIGA and SHERIFF RONBERTO VALINO FACTS: Respondent Relia Arciga filed an action
against Wilfredo Abedes, husband of herein petitioner, seeking support for her d
aughter. A decision was rendered declaring Abedes the natural father and was ord
ered to support the child. The ju dgment became final and executory but unfortun
ately, no personal property of Wil fredo could be levied upon to satisfy the jud
gment. Later, a property was discov ered to be allegedly registered in the name
of Wilfredo and was levied. Petition er filed a Notice of Third Party Claim alle
ging that said property belongs exclu sively to her, and Wilfredo had no present
and existing right thereto. Trial cou rt issued the ruling in Emelinda's favor. R
espondent filed an appeal with the Cour t of Appeals, which reversed and set asi
de the appealed order. ISSUE: case. HELD : In the instant case, no appeal was ma
de on the resolution of the appellate cou rt. She, instead, filed a petition for
certiorari in an effort to salvage her lo st appeal. Evidently, appeal was avai
lable to petitioner. It was also the speedy and adequate remedy under the circum
stances. Petitioner was, therefore, unsucce ssful in satisfying the rudiments fo
r the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to is sue. Petitioner was unable to show
that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinar
y course of law. A petition for certiorari un der Rule 65 is proper if there exi
sts grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac k or excess of jurisdiction and t
here is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and ade quate remedy in the ordinary cou
rse of law. However, the proper remedy of petiti oner from the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals is an ord inary appeal to this Court via
a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a pet ition for certiorari under Ru
le 65. We have underscored that the remedy of certi orari is not a substitute fo
r lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive. Hence, the special ci vil action for certiorari u
nder Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter r
emedy is available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for failure to timely file
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Pa renthetically, it must be
emphasized that under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Rules of Court, which governs th
e procedure in the Supreme Court, a wrong or inappropr iate mode of appeal, as i
n this case, merits an outright dismissal. Whether or n ot the Court of Appeals
has statutory jurisdiction over the subject matter of th e 215 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 ADAM GARCIA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and L
EGASPI OIL OMPANY Petitioner filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. V, L
egaspi City, a com plaint for illegal suspension, dismissal, and other labor sta
ndard violations ag ainst private respondents. Petitioner worked as the Producti
on Maintenance Forem an of Legaspi Oil Company. e is accused of violating the Co
mpany Rules and Regul ations by encashing the payment for himself and non-paymen
t to the operator of t he amount released for the use of a DPWH grader in one of
the company's projects A ccordingly, petitioner was placed under preventive suspe
nsion for thirty working days without pay and after investigation, was later ter
minated due to dishonest y and loss of trust and confidence. On its decision, Ex
ecutive Labor Arbiter ren dered judgment in favor of pettioner. On appeal, the N
ational Labor Relations Co mmission set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence the petition for review. IS
SUE: Whether or not the out right dismissal of the petition for certiorari was p
roper. HELD: Upon review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for
certiorari, resolution is co nfined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abu
se of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains fr
om reviewing factual assessme nts of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudi
cative functions. Occasionally , however, the Court is constrained to delve into
factual matters where there ar e contradictory findings. In this instance, the
Court may look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findin
gs. Thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination
of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC. A certiorari c
an be properly resorted to where the factual findings complained of are not supp
orted by the evidence on record. In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of t
he Rules of Court, errors of jur isdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounti
ng to excess or lack of jurisdict ion are ascribed to the lower courts or quasij
udicial tribunals. The general rul e is that certiorari does not lie to review e
rrors of judgment of the trial cour t, as well as that of a quasi-judicial tribu
nal. In certiorari proceedings, judi cial review does not go as far as to examin
e and assess the evidence of the part ies and to weigh the probative value there
of. Such questions are proper only in an ordinary appeal either by writ of error
from the judgment or final order of t he trial court, or a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court fro m a decision or final order of a quasi-j
udicial body. Indeed, a certiorari proce eding is limited in scope and narrow in
character. FACTS: 216 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court o
f Iloilo FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of state of susp
ension of payments with approval of proposed rehabilitation plan under the Inter
im Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation upon anticipating that it cann
ot meet i ts obligations with its creditors as they fell due. Respondent Equitab
le PCI Ban k filed opposed with motion to exclude property, alleging that petiti
oner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer operate
because it has no assets left. An Omnibus Order was issued terminating the proce
edings and dismissing the case. Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civi
l action fo r certiorari, which was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that the peti
tion could n ot be corrected because what petitioner filed before the CA was a s
pecial civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead o
f an ordinary appeal. ISSUE: HELD: It is submitted that certiorari is a remedy f
or the correc tion of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an o
riginal and in dependent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted
in the renditi on of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, sin
ce the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed
against an inter locutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the j
udgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A
petition for cert iorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the noti
ce of judgment, or der, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is gener
ally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to affo
rd the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged error. The Omnibus Order i
ssued by the trial court is a final order since it terminated the proceedings an
d dismissed the cas e before the trial court; it leaves nothing more to be done.
As such, petitioner's recourse is to file an appeal from the Omnibus Order. Wheth
er or not the petiti on for certiorari was improper. 217 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 EQUITABLE PCI BANK V. NG SHEURIG NGOR Respondents lodged
an action for annulment and/or reformation of documents and c ontracts against
petitioner. Respondents claimed that petitioner induced them to avail of its pes
o and dollar credit facilities so they accepted petitioner's such proposal and sig
ned the bank s pre-printed promissory notes. Respondents were, however, unaware
of the fact that the documents contained identical escalation c lauses granting
petitioner's authority to increase interest rates without their co nsent. Petition
er, in its answer, asserted that respondents knowingly accepted a ll the terms a
nd conditions contained in the promissory notes. After trial, the validity of th
e promissory notes was upheld. The trial court, however, invalidat ed the escala
tion clause contained therein because it violated the principle of mutuality of
contracts. Notices of appeal were filed by both parties. However, s uch notices
were denied. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration and respondent s, on the o
ther hand, prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution which was t hereafter
issued and properties of petitioner were levied upon. Petitioner filed a petitio
n for relief in the Regional Trial Court but withdrew such and instead filed a p
etition for certiorari with an application for an injunction in the CA to enjoin
the implementation and execution the omnibus order. Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari and found petitioner guilty of forum shopp ing. ISSU
E: Whether or not dismissal of the petition for certiorari was appropri ate. HEL
D: Herein petitioner s petition for relief in the RTC and its petition f or cert
iorari in the Court of Appeals did not have identical causes of action. T he pet
ition for relief from the denial of its notice of appeal was based on the judgme
nt or final order preventing it from taking an appeal by fraud, accident, m istak
e or excusable negligence. On the other hand, its petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals, a special civil action, sought to correct the grave abuse of d
iscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction committed by the Regional Trial Cour
t. It may be noted that in a petition for relief, the judgment or final ord er i
s rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction while a petition for certi ora
ri, the order is rendered by a court without or in excess of its jurisdiction .
FACTS: 218 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 EMELITA DORAN V. HON.JUDGE HENRY LUCZON FACTS: Petitione
r filed an complaint against respondent Judge Campos with grave miscond uct. The
administrative matter was reffered to Executive Judge Jimmy Henry F. Lu czon, J
r. of Regional Trial Court Tuguegarao City, for investigation, report, an d reco
mmendation. After being asked for opinion whether it is procedurally permi ssibl
e to file a demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, Judge answered in the a
ffirmative with the advice that counsel must first seek leave of court. Dem urre
r to evidence was permitted. Petitioner, in an unusual move, challenged Judg e L
uczon s ruling via Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court with pray er
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. She alleged t
hat the Investigating Judge, in allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evid e
nce, committed grave abuse of discretion. Whether or not a petition for certior
ari is the proper remedy. ISSUE: HELD: Respondent judge's act may not be challenge
d by a petition for certiorari under Ru le 65 when it allowed a demurrer to evid
ence or motion to dismiss after the peti tioner had completed the presentation o
f her evidence in support of her affidavi t-complaint. Judge Luczon was designat
ed by this Court merely to investigate and submit a report and the appropriate r
ecommendation relative to the said complai nt. Simply stated, his function is me
rely investigative and recommendatory in na ture. He has no power to pronounce j
udgment on the controversy as such function belongs only to the Supreme Court pu
rsuant to its power of supervision and contr ol over court personnel and officer
s. His designation as investigator, therefore , does not involve the exercise of
judicial or quasi-judicial power. 219 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 ALFREDO Bokingo V. Court Of Appeals FACTS: Petitioner is

one of the defendants in the complaint for injunction and d amages filed by Ern
esto Campos et al. with the RTC. From the complaint, Campos a nd co-claimants as
sert to have a better right to file a public land application covering the subje
ct land as petitioner's and his co-claimants' application for the titling of the sub
ject land was dismissed by the Provincial Environment and Natu ral Resources Off
icer. Petitioner, lodged with the Regional Trial Court motion t o dismiss allegi
ng that PENRO has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Acting t
hereon, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled in favor of Campos'. Petiti
oner forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for ce rtiorari allegi
ng grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo in de nying his moti
on to dismiss. Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dis missing the s
aid petition for lack of merit, in fact and in law. It ruled that t he remedy of
certiorari is unavailing since the denial of the motion to dismiss is considere
d an interlocutory order. Whether or not an interlocutory order can be the subje
ct of an extraordinary petition for certiorari. HELD: Court of Appea ls properly
sustained that the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsidera
tion of the court a quo's order denying his motion to dismiss was suffi cient caus
e for the outright dismissal of the said petition. No error can theref ore be ha
d in the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's petition for c ertiorar
i filed therewith. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unl ess a m
otion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to a llow i
t an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. Petitioner did not proffer any c
ompelling reason to warrant deviation by the Court of Appeals from this sa lutar
y rule. As further observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to e ven
allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court, a quo in renderin g t
he order denying his motion to dismiss. ISSUE: 220 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 LIBRADO CABRERA V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner was the can
didate filed an election protest against private responden t Michael Montenegro,
the winning candidate. The trial court required the partie s to submit their re
spective preliminary conference briefs. Montenegro moved for the dismissal of th
e protest upon finding fatal defects in petitioner's prelimina ry conference brief
. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and his subseq uent motion for re
consideration. Montenegro subsequently brought the issue to th e COMELEC via a p
etition for certiorari and prohibition. The First Division of t he Commission gr
anted the petition, annulled and set aside the orders of the tri al court denyin
g the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsider ation of the d
ivision ruling which the COMELEC en banc, denied. An instant petit ion for certi
orari before the Supreme Court was thereafter instituted. ISSUE: Wh ether or not
a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy. HELD: It is rather es sential for
a petitioner to aver caprice and arbitrariness characterized the act of the cou
rt or agency whose exercise of discretion is being assailed in an app lication f
or a writ of certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion contemplates a situ ation whe
re the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passio
n or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positi
ve duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all i
n contemplation of, law. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. In the in
stant case, the petitioner has utterly failed to show to the Court that the COME
LEC, in issuing the assailed resolutions, acted capriciously such that its act i
s annullable by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 221 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 VANGIE BARRAZONA vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SAN-AN REALTY
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum
of money with Damages. Petitioner has been leased units in a building owned by S
an-an Realty and Devel opment Corporation for a period of two years. Petitioner
defaulted in the paymen t of the monthly rentals and failed to pay despite deman
ds. Petitioner filed wit h the Regional Trial Court a Motion to Dismiss on the g
round that the trial cour t has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering t
hat the allegations therei n clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectme
nt or illegal detainer whic h is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. Mo
tion to Dismiss was denied f or lack of merit. Petitioner hence filed the instan
t Petition for Certiorari all eging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in t he denial of her motion to dismiss and that such
is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis. Conversely, respondent
contends that the complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as there is
absolutely no allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner from the premis
es; petitioner should have firs t filed a motion for reconsideration before reso
rting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and the assailed order denying pe
titioner's motion to dismiss is in terlocutory and, therefore, cannot be the subje
ct of a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the denial the Motion to
Dismiss was proper. HELD: While t he rule is that before certiorari may be avail
ed of, petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the lower co
urt of the act or order complained of, however, such rule is not without excepti
on. The Court have, in several ins tances, dispensed with the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of a lower cou rt's ruling, such as: where the proceedings in
which the error occurred is a paten t nullity; where the question is purely of
law; when public interest is involved ; where judicial intervention is urgent or
its application may cause great and i rreparable damage; and where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction, as in this cas e. In petitioner s complaint, the allega
tion clearly shows that San-an Realty ma de several demands upon Barrazona to pa
y her overdue rentals and to vacate the p remises; and that the last demand to p
ay and vacate in writing was on March 27, 2002. San-an Realty thus complied with
Section 2, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of C ivil Procedure which provides that th
e lessor may proceed against the lessee onl y after demand to pay and vacate. 22
2 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 MAYON ESTATE CORPORATION vs. MARIETTA ALTURA FACTS: Peti
tioner corporation filed a civil suit for forcible entry and damages with the ag
ainst the President of the Concerned Citizen Farmers Association and Vice-Presid
ent of the Doa Flora Farmer's Association. Trial court rendered judgment in favor o
f the petitioner that the defendants are ordered to vacate the premis es in ques
tion and remove all the improvements they constructed thereon, and to restore th
e possession of the lots to the plaintiff. When the decision became fi nal and e
xecutory, the petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which wa
s granted. Respondents filed a petition for prohibition with writ of pr eliminar
y injunction and damages to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ of Demoli tion is
sued by the Municipal Trial Court, on the ground that the same was issued beyond
the five-year period during which a judgment may be executed by motion. The RTC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order because of which the sheriff was no t able
to fully implement the writ of demolition and rendered a Decision in favo r of
the respondents which gave due course to the instant Petition for Prohibiti on a
nd the issuance of a corresponding Writ of Prohibition to prevent petitioner fro
m enforcing the decision of the respondent Court. The Clerk of Court, howeve r,
failed to issue the said writ. No appeal was taken by the petitioner, thus, t he
decision became final and executory. The respondents filed a Petition for Cer t
iorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Ord
er claiming that the orders setting aside a decision that had long become final
and executory were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: Whether or no
t the petition for certiorari was validly granted. HELD: The decision of the RT
C granting a writ of prohibition had long become final and executory; hence, imm
u table, beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC to amend, modify, or reverse. Nothin
g is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereb
y becomes immutable and unalterable. There is no denying the fact that the decis
io n of the MTC had long become final and executory when the respondents filed t
hei r petition for prohibition with the RTC. What the respondents sought to prev
ent was the enforcement of the MTC decision, on their claim that such decision c
ould be effected only via an action to enforce the decision of the MTC, and not
by m ere motion. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the m odification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous concl
usion of fact or law. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy
and s ound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must beco
me fina l at some definite point in time. The only recognized exceptions are the
correct ions of clerical errors in which case no prejudice to any party, and, o
f course, where the judgment is void. 223 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MICHAEL
DEFENSOR Chairman of th e Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council FA
CTS: Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition for prohibition under R
ule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary rest r
aining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent responde
nts from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
No. 9207, otherwise known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Lan
d Utilization Act of 2003. ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulations of RA
9207 are null and void. HELD: A petition for prohibition is not the proper reme
d y to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Gen
er ally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within th
e l imits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice
in orderly channels. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
pet itioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
prop erly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case
, peti tioners' allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perfor
m funct ions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjo
ined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order. S ince the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the assai led IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislati
ve power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regio
nal Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, proh
ibition, m andamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not g ive the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 22
4 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY vs. PRIMEX COCO PRODUCTS, I
NC. FACTS: The Philippine Coconut Authority adopted a resolution authorizing the
est ablishment and operation of additional PCA plants in view of the increasing
dema nd for desiccated coconuts (DCN) in the world market. The opening of new p
lants was made subject to implementing guidelines and approval of the President.
Prime x Coco Products filed an application for registration with the PCA as a n
ew expo rter, trader, and manufacturer of such products. PCA did not immediately
issue t he certificate of registration. Primex filed thereafter a petition for
mandamus against the PCA. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Primex and ordered t
he PCA to act on the application. A a petition for certiorari and mandamus again
st the PC A was in the Supreme Court to nullify Resolution No. 018-93 which aims
to deregu late the establishment of new coconut processing plants. The PCA late
r renewed t he registration of Primex as a coconut product processor while the c
ase was pend ing. Supreme Court afterwards rendered a decision declaring Resolut
ion No. 018-9 3 and all certificates of registration issued under it null and vo
id for having been issued in excess of the power of PCA. Primex was prompted to
file a petitio n for mandamus against the PCA and a regular certificate of regis
tration was iss ued. PCA appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which it
dismissed ISSUE: Whether or not it is the ministerial duty to issue a certificat
e of registratio n. HELD: Supreme Court finds that the petition has been mooted.
As correctly obs erved by the court a quo, no damage was actually suffered by r
espondent since it has continued to operate for the whole period of 1999 althoug
h under provisiona l certificates of registration. Mandamus is an extraordinary
writ and discretion ary remedy and should not be granted when it will achieve no
beneficial result s uch as when act sought to be compelled has been performed.
In this case, respond ent had no cause of action to compel petitioner to issue a
renewal certificate o f registration for every year from 1999 at the time it fi
led the petition for ma ndamus. At that time, respondent had no right to demand
and the petitioner had n o correlative duty, to issue a renewal certificate for
the years following the f iling of the petition, hence, there could not have bee
n any default on the part of petitioner. Where a person or entity has not yet fa
iled to perform a duty, ac tion for mandamus is premature. 225 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 DARNOC REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. AYALA CORPORAT
ION FACTS: Respondent contracted to sell parcels of land to Western Minolco Corp
orat ion. Subsequently, Western Minolco executed a Deed of Assignment of Right t
o buy land over said lots in favor of Darnoc Realty Development Corporation. Con
seque ntly, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over said lots in favor
of pet itioner. Both lots are subject to restriction annotated at the back of th
eir res pective certificates of title which states the building proper must have
a heigh t of not more than twenty-three meters above the ground directly beneat
h the poi nt in question. Petitioner submitted to the respondent corporation ame
nded build ing plans for the construction of office building. Respondent replied
claiming t hat the height of the building to be constructed by petitioner excee
ds the maxim um limitation and would not approve the same unless further amended
to conform t o the height requirement. Petitioner files a petition to declare t
he height rest riction unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court has
jurisdiction o ver the controversy HELD: Petitioner in this case resorted direc
tly to the Supre me Court without filing any case in the lower court. It further
alleged that the instant case is one that falls within the concurrent jurisdict
ion of this Court and with the Court of First Instance. Such contention is paten
tly erroneous. Ju risdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of
the parties. Thus, there has to be a judgment rendered by an inferior court, whi
ch as stated, is a bsent in the instant case. Neither does this case involve the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, executive agreement, law, ordinanc
e or executive orde r or regulation. While the Supreme Court shall exercise conc
urrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance in petitions for the issuance o
f writs of certiorar i, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, p
etitioner has not sho wn that it is entitled to any of the writs mentioned above
. Petitioner s content ion that any way if the case is filed with the Court of F
irst Instance the case will eventually be appealed to the Supreme Court is not a
justification for fili ng this case directly with the Supreme Court. 226 P a g
e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL REG
ISTRAR GENERAL FACTS: Petitioner, single, gave birth to a baby boy while the pre
sumed father, o ne Eleazar Siriban Calasan, married, signed the birth certificat
e as the informa nt, indicating thereinthe child's first name as Jonathan, middle
name as Mossesgel d, and last name as Calasan. Both the presumed father, and the
mother, accomplis hed the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating
that the informatio n contained therein were true and correct. In addition, lawy
er Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child. Due to the re
fusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing the presumed father's sur
name as the child's su rname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner himself
submitted the certifi cate to the office of the local civil registrar for regist
ration. The municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the office of the local
civil registrar, reje cted the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4 of t
he Civil Registrar Gene ral, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, ill egitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, sha
ll use the surname of the ir mother. Calasan personally went to the Local Civil
Registrar to inquire about the status of the registration of his illegitimate ch
ild's certificate of birth, but was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civ
il Registrar General denyi ng registration of the certificate of live birth usin
g the father's surname, for i t is contrary to law. Calasan filed with the Regiona
l Trial Court a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar to reg
ister the certificate of liv e birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his s
urname. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel registration of a certific
ate of live birth of an illeg itimate child. HELD: Mandamus will not lie to comp
el the local civil registrar t o register the certificate of live birth of an il
legitimate child using the fath er's surname, even with the consent of the latter.
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law. Th
e Family Code of the Philippines provides, under Article 176, that illegitimate c
hildren shall use the surname an d shall be under the parental authority of thei
r mother, and shall be entitled t o support in conformity with this Code. This ru
le is upheld regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. The Famil
y Code has effectively repealed th e provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines giving a natura l child acknowledged by both parents the rig
ht to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classificat
ion of children to legitimate and il legitimate, thereby eliminating the categor
y of acknowledged natural children an d natural children by legal fiction. 227 P
a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 NILO PALOMA vs. DANILO MORA FACTS: Petitioner was appoin
ted General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte Water Dis trict. He was subsequently
terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95, which wa s passed by respondents as
Chairman and members of the Board of the Water Distri ct. The Board, in the sam
e Resolution, designated respondent Valentino Sevilla a s Officer-in-Charge. Pet
itioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for pr eliminary injunction wi
th damages before the RTC to contest his dismissal with t he prayer to be restor
ed to the position of General Manager. ISSUE: Whether or n ot mandamus will lie
to compel reinstatement. HELD: Mandamus does not lie to com pel the Board of Dir
ectors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate pe titioner because th
e Board has the discretionary power to remove him under Secti on 23 of P.D. No.
198, as amended by P.D. No. 768 or the Provincial Water Utilit ies Act. Mandamus
lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to cont
rol or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer wh ere the law impo
ses upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in refe
rence to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his ju dgment that is
to be exercised and not that of the court. 228 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 DOMINGO R. MANALO vs. PAIC SAVINGS BANK and THERESE V. V
ARGAS FACTS: S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc., represented by its president, Ther
ese Va rgas, impleaded as a respondent, obtained a loan from PAIC Savings and Mo
rtgage Bank, also a respondent. As security for the loan, respondents mortgaged
two lot s. However, respondent Vargas failed to pay the loan. Consequently, the
mortgage was foreclosed and the lots were sold at public auction to respondent b
ank, bei ng the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent b
ank and e ventually registered. Seven years later, respondent Vargas filed with
the Region al Trial Court a complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicia
l foreclosu re against respondent bank. In due course, the RTC rendered a Decisi
on dismissin g the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
in a Decisio n dated, affirmed the RTC Decision, sustaining the legality of the
mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings. The Decision of the Appellate Court t
hen became fin al and executory. In the meantime, respondent bank filed with the
Regional Trial Court a petition for issuance of a writ of possession which was
granted and iss ued a writ of possession. Earlier, respondent Vargas sold to Arm
ando Angsico the lots then respondent Vargas leased to Domingo Manalo, petitione
r, a portion of the same lots. Later, Angsico assigned and transferred to petiti
oner all his rig hts to the property. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific
performance and d amages and impleaded as defendants are respondent bank respond
ent Vargas. Petiti oner alleged that he has legal interest in the subject lots a
nd prayed that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent ba
nk to allow him to redeem or repurchase the subject lots. ISSUE: Whether or not
mandamus will lie t o compel redemption or repurchase. HELD: Mandamus is not the
proper recourse to enforce petitioner's alleged right of redemption. To begin wit
h, mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner's right is founded clearly i
n law and not when i t is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed an
d reechoed is that le gal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those right
s are well-defined, cl ear and certain. When respondent Vargas failed to exercis
e her right of redempti on within the one-year redemption period, respondent ban
k ipso facto became the absolute owner of the lots. Surprisingly, however, she s
old the to Angsico, who eventually transferred his rights to petitioner. Not onl
y that, respondent Varga s still leased to petitioner a portion of the subject l
ots. Verily, when respond ent bank became the owner of the lots, respondent Varg
as could no longer legally transfer, cede and convey the property to petitioner.
229 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 HILARION M. HENARES, JR vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHIS
ING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FAC
TS: Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases fo r
their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to us e
CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitu
tion, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 ot
herwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Petitioners attempted to c
o mpel judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environment
al hazards. Petitioners alleged that the particulate matters such as complex mix
tu res of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets emitted into the air from vario
us engine combustions have caused detrimental effects on health. Petitioners ave
r t hat other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and ad
equa te remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ i
n fac t should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rev
ised R ules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes. ISSUE: Whether or not m
andamus lies to compel the use of CNG. HELD: Mandamus will not generally lie fro
m one b ranch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislatio
n and it s implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especia
lly when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and cou
rtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for th
e coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in
this pet ition. The Clean Air Act designates the DENR to set the emission stand
ards for f uel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor ve
hicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandat
e is to ove rsee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the em
ission stand ards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB. Regrettably, however, th
e plain, spee dy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ
of mandamus co mmanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailin
g. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoine
d by law as a d uty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB a
nd the DOTC to o rder owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has
been tasked to gr ant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenie
nce or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.
230 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO vs. COMM
ISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and V ICT
ORINO X. FORNIER FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines and represented hi
mself to be a nat ural-born citizen of the Philippines in his certificate of can
didacy. Victorino Fornier initiated a petition before the Commission on Election
s to disqualify Po e and upon the theory that Poe made a material misrepresentat
ion in his certific ate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino c
itizen when in truth , according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners. His mo
ther was an American and his father was a Spanish national. Granting that the fa
ther was a Filipino c itizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizen
ship to Poe, the latte r being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitio
ner asserted that the f ather contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita G
omez before his marriage to Poe's mother and even if no such prior marriage had ex
isted, Poe's father marrie d Bessie Kelly Poe only a year after the birth of respo
ndent. ISSUE: Whether or not there was material misrepresentation in the certifi
cate of candidacy. HELD: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natu ral-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respo ndent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipi
no citizen and, in the affi rmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putati
ve father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only
be drawn from the presumptio n that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometim e in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Ca rlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his p
lace of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" t hat the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Th
at citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, A
llan F. Poe, father of responden t FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regi
me respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens re gardless of whether such children are legitima
te or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish con
clusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would prepo nderate in his favor enough to hold that he c
annot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certific
ate of candidacy in violation of Se ction 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. 231 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS Rule 65 vs. ATTY. JOSEFIN
A G. BACAL FACTS: Respondent passed the Career Executive Service Ex amination. S
he was appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorney's Office. La ter, she wa
s designated as acting chief Public Attorney. Upon change of administ ration, re
spondent was appointed Regional Director. Respondent argued she was re moved wit
hout cause. Respondent Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Se rvice Ex
aminations. She was conferred CES eligibility and appointed Regional Dir ector o
f the Public Attorney's Office. She was later on appointed by then Presiden t Ramo
s to the rank of CESO III. She was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Act
ing Chief Public Attorney. Her appointment was confirmed by President Ramo s and
took her oath and assumed office. Respondent filed a petition for quo warr anto
questioning her replacement as Chief Public Attorney. The petition, which w as
filed directly with this Court, was dismissed without prejudice to its refili ng
in the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, respondent brought her case in the Cour t
of Appeals whichruled in her favor, finding her to be lawfully entitled to the
Office of Chief Public Attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent's transfer a
mounted to a removal without cause. HELD: What should be emphasized in this cas
e is that respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chie
f Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered perman
e nt, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. Respo
nd ent therefore has no ground to complain. As respondent does not have the requ
ire d Rank, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and
she cannot claim the right to a security of tenure. She may have been considered
for promotion to Rank I to make her appointment as Chief Public Attorney perman
ent. This, however, did not materialize as petitioner Demaisip was appointed in
her place. If respondent was paid a salary equivalent to Salary Grade 30 while h
oldi ng such office, it was only because, under the law, if a CESO is assigned t
o a p osition with a higher salary grade than that corresponding to his/her rank
, he/s he will be allowed the salary of the CES position. Security of tenure in
the car eer executive service is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to p
osition. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not exte
nd to th e particular positions to which they may be appointed. Accordingly, res
pondent d id not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appoin
ted to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequent
ly appoint ed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as
required b y the rules of the CES Board. 232 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO 233 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 66 MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY Respon
dents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court for quo warranto with Damag
es and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuan ce of
Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents allege d th
at they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hosp
ital, Incorporated, but petitioners, who are also among the incorporators an d s
tockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurp ed
the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.Regional Trial Court Bran c
h 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga C
ity. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case
folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not
a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdi
ction. Regional Trial Court Branch 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons
on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioners filed their Answer raisin
g therein the affirmative defenses of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction, and
wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed thei
r Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then
r equired to submit their respective memoranda. Regional Trial Court Branch 58 d
en ied the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the case remanded to the Regional Trial
Co urt Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as specia
l co urt to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. Petion
er th en filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rul
es of Civil Procedure. Whether a branch of the regional trial court which has no
juris diction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to anot
her coequal court Tthe assailed order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a pe
tition under Rule 45. An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocuto
ry and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for rev
iew on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law
by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be follow
ed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adver
se, re iterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. However in the inter
est of justice and to prevent more violence between the parties, the court prece
ded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted by the petiti
oner. E vidently, the Regional Trial Court Branch 58 lacks jurisdiction over res
pondents' petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the
case wa s clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court sho
uld have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrati
ve issuan ces of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commer
cial Court ; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously
cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, Regional Trial Court Branch 58 did n
ot have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to an
other branc h of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could
take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Thus,
the filing o f the petition with the Regional Trial Court Branch 58 which had no
jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous. 234 P a g e HE
LD: ISSUE: FACTS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 67 EXPROPRIATION 235 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON NA
POCOR filled cases of eminent domain against private citizens for the acquisit i
on of a right of way easement over portion of the parcels of land described in t
he complaint for its Negros Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the Bac
olod Tamonton Transmission Line. The complaints uniformly allege that petitioner
urgently needs position of the affected land to enable it to construct its towe
r and transmission line and it had negotiated with the offered to pay defendant
s for the portion affected by the transmission line, but the parties failed to r
e ach an agreement, and be pray that, among others, that the Regional Trial Cour
t fix the provisional value of the portion of the parcels of land sought to be e
xp ropriated pursuant to Sec.2, Rule 67 of the Rules of the Court. The Regional
Tri al Court fixed the provisional values of the subject areas and directed the
NAPO COR to deposit the amounts with the PNB pending decision on the merits. In
compl iance with said Order. NAPOCOR deposited the sum. Two of the defendants ho
wever, filed motions for reconsideration alleged that the provisional value of t
he pro perty has been set much too low, since the expropriation of their areas wo
uld ren der the remaining portion practically at a loss considering that the pre
sence of the transmission lines will pose a danger to the inhabitants in the are
a as wel l as destroy the marketability of the remaining potion after expropriat
ion. More over, the subject areas are located near several posh subdivisions. Th
e RTC gran ted their motion and the NAPOCOR, in compliance, deposited an additio
nal amount with the PNB. Regional Trial Court Judge Enrique Jocson issued anothe
r Order inc reasing the amounts to be received as compensation. NAPOCOR in a res
ponse filled a complaint of grave abuse of discretion against the said judge, sa
ying the inc reases are excessive and unconscionable. Nevertheless, due to the u
rgent need to complete the interconnection project, NAPOCOR deposited the order
additional am ounts. Still despite doing so, NAPOCOR claimed the Judge stubbornl
y refused to i ssue the writ of possession. ISSUE: HELD: FACTS: Whether or not t
he court acted capriciously and therefor in excess of its jurisd iction. A judge
cannot validly withhold the issuance of a writ of possession in expropri ation
while awaiting full payment. The government could immediately take possess ion o
f the property upon deposit of the provisional value with the National or P rovi
ncial Treasurer. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amount ing
to lack of jurisdiction, and is otherwise either unmindful or ignorant of th e
law: when he fixed the provisional values of the properties for the purpose of i
ssuing a writ of possession on the basis of the market value and the daily opp o
rtunity profit petitioner may derive in violation or in disregard of P.D. No. 4
2; in increasing the same without hearing; in directing the defendants to manife
st within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting and withdraw
i ng the amounts, representing the provisional values, deposited by the plaintif
f for each of them as "final and full satisfaction of the value of their respect
iv e property (sic); " in declaring the provisional values as the final values a
nd directing the release of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof,
to the defendants even if not all of them made the manifestation; and in suspen
din g the issuance of the writ of possession until after the suspending the amou
nts shall have been released to and received by defendants. 236 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 REPUBLIC V. GINGOYON The present controversy has its roo
ts with the promulgation of the Court's decisio n in Agan v. PIATCO. This decision
nullified the Concession Agreement for the Bui ld-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangeme
nt of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pa ssenger Terminal III entered into
between the Philippine Government and the Phili ppine International Air Termina
ls Co., Inc. as well as the amendments and supple ments thereto. The agreement h
ad authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as
well as a franchise to operate and maintain the sa id terminal during the conces
sion period of 25 years. The contracts were nullifi ed, among others, that Pairc
argo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not poss ess the requisite financial
capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was con
trary to public policy. At the time of the promulgati on of the 2003 Decision, t
he NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completio
n. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal st atus of the NAIA 3 facili
ties following the nullification of the contracts, as w ell as whatever rights o
f PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the const ruction of the faciliti
es. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NA IA 3 facilities have r
emained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed in tent of the Governmen
t to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATC
O conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAI A 3 facilities. It a
lso appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International Ch
amber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centr
e for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the Go vernment has raised
jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. The Govern ment filed a Compl
aint for expropriation and sought upon the filing of the compl aint the issuance
of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate posse ssion and contro
l over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited
the amount in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, repre senting the NAI
A 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes. ISSUE: FACTS: Whether or not
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the ex propriation pr
oceedings in this case. RULING: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the exprop
riation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the othe
r hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. Rule 67 out
lines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Governmen
t. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through wh
ich the State may expropriate pr ivate property. Quite notably, Section 19 of th
e Local Government Code governs t he exercise by local government units of the p
ower of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. Rep. Act No. 8974, covers
expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projec
ts. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provi des for a procedure eminently more favorable
to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the na
tional government expropriates prop erty for national government infrastructure p
rojects. Thus, if expropriation is en gaged in by the national government for 237
P a g e
purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standar
d and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Under both Rul
e 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings t
h rough the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which
n ecessitate an authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished,
th ere is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorizat
ion before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent doma
in. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns t
he p articular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to
a wri t of possession. 238 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip
is the registered owner of a parcel of land, whi ch the City of Pasig sought to
expropriate a portion thereof for the sports devel opment and recreational activ
ities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This wa s in January 1994. Masikip r
efused. On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought agai n to expropriate said porti
on of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the Mu
nicipal Government to provide land opportunities to d eserving poor sectors of o
ur community. Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig fi led with the trial court
a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss fi led by Masikip was dismi
ssed by the rial court on the ground that there was genu ine necessity to exprop
riate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of App eals, which dismissed
petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Whether or not N there was gen
uine necessity to expropriate the property. ISSUE: HELD: Eminent domain is the ri
ght of a government to take and appropriate private prope rty to the public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be do ne only on condition
of providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the p ower of the State or
its instrumentalities to take private property for public u se and is inseparab
le from sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legi
slative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other
public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional
limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain an d may exercise it
only when expressly authorized by statute. Sec. 19, LGC: LGU m ay, through its c
hief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise th e power of emine
nt domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and lan
dless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provis ions of the Con
stitution and pertinent laws. Provided: (1) power of eminent doma in may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously ma de to the own
er and such offer was not accepted; (2) LGU may immediately take po ssession of
the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon m aking a dep
osit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the p roperty ba
sed on the current tax declaration; and (3) amount to be paid for expr opriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair mar ket valu
e at the time of the taking of the property There is already an establis hed spo
rts development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pa sig Ci
ty. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. T he re
cords show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council w hich
became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the exprop ria
tion, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeo wn
er's Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Canio g
an. 239 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA D
ELA CRUZ METROBANK Petitioner needed to acquire an easement of right-of-way over
portions of land w ithin the areas of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for the constru
ction and maintenanc e of a proposed Transmission Line Project. Petitioner filed
a Complaint for emin ent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-ofway
against respondents a s registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be e
xpropriated. After resp ondents filed their respective answers to petitioner's Com
plaint, petitioner depos ited the sum to cover the provisional value of the land
in accordance with Secti on 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner subseq
uently filed an Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession,
which the trial court gra nted in its Order. The trial court issued a Writ of Po
ssession over the lots own ed by respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent F
errer. The commissioners co nducted an ocular inspection of S.K. Dynamics' propert
y and recommended that the p roperty to be expropriated by petitioner. Upon the
submission of the commissione rs' report, petitioner was not notified of the compl
etion or filing of it nor give n any opportunity to file its objections to it. T
he Trial Court approved the fin dings of the commissioners and granted the Motio
n filed by respondent Reynaldo F errer adopting said valuation report. Petitione
r filed a Motion for Reconsiderat ion of the abovementioned Order, but said moti
on was denied in the trial court's O rder. Unsatisfied with the amount of just com
pensation, petitioner filed an appe al before the CA but was dismissed for lack
of merit. ISSUES: HELD: The legal ba sis for the determination of just compensat
ion was insufficient Just compensatio n is defined as the full and fair equivale
nt of the property sought to be exprop riated. The measure is not the taker's gain
but the owner's loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the
owner but also to the taker. Even as un dervaluation would deprive the owner of
his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor hi
m to the prejudice of the public. To det ermine just compensation, the trial cou
rt should first ascertain the market valu e of the property, to which should be
added the consequential damages after dedu cting therefrom the consequential ben
efits which may arise from the expropriatio n. If the consequential benefits exc
eed the consequential damages, these items s hould be disregarded altogether as
the basic value of the property should be pai d in every case. It is clear that
in this case, the sole basis for the determina tion of just compensation was the
commissioners' ocular inspection of the properti es in question, as gleaned from
the commissioners' report. The trial court's relianc e on the said report is a serio
us error considering that the recommended compens ation was highly speculative a
nd had no strong factual moorings. Clearly, the le gal basis for the determinati
on of just compensation in this case is insufficien t as earlier enunciated. Thi
s being so, the trial court's ruling in this respect s hould be set aside. This ca
se is remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just comp
ensation in conformity with this Decision. No costs. Whether or not the valuatio
n of just compensation was proper. FACTS: 240 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN AND SPS.
JULITO QUIMCOAND GLORIA CAPIN Rule 67 Petitioner expropriated several parcels o
f land, which will be traversed and aff ected by its transmission towers and lin
es. Among the lots affected by the petit ioner s Interconnection Project were th
ose owned by the respondents located. The reafter, petitioner began to construct
on respondents properties its power line s and transmission towers, which were
completed. Upon its completion of the cons truction of the power lines and trans
mission towers, petitioner imposed several restrictions upon the respondents on
the use of their lands, which included the prohibition against planting or build
ing anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by its transmissi
on lines as the high tension electric curre nt passing through said lines pose d
anger to life and limbs. Petitioner then pai d respondents for the portions of t
heir lots affected by the Interconnection Pro ject. Only later did respondents d
iscover that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by petitioner, the
other landowners within their area who resiste d the expropriation of their prop
erties in court or who entered into compromise agreements with the petitioner we
re paid by petitioner as just compensation for the portions of their properties
similarly affected by the petitioner s Intercon nection Project. Accordingly, re
spondents filed a Complaint for Rescission of Ag reement, Recovery of Possession
of Parcels of Land, and Removal of Tower and Tra nsmission Lines against the pe
titioner. Petitioner, in its Answer, countered tha t respondents claim for compe
nsation for the full value of their properties tra versed by its transmission li
nes was contrary to its Charter, according to which , petitioner is obligated on
ly to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as
just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvem ents. The RTC rendered a Re
solution in favor of the respondents and upon appeal by the petitioner, the appe
llate court rendered a Decision affirming the Resolut ion. Petitioner moved for
the reconsideration of the appellate court s Decision, but it was denied. Hence,
petitioner filed the present Petition before this Cou rt. ISSUE: HELD: Whether
or not the determination of the amount of just compensa tion was proper. FACTS:
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its compla
int for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of rec
o very of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of
th e just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. Petitioner herein c
ann ot hide behind the mantle of protection of procedural laws when it has so ar
bitr arily violated respondents right to just compensation for their properties
take n for public use. In this casepetitioner already admitted that it had taken
port ions of respondents lands for the construction of its power lines and tran
smiss ion towers pursuant to its Interconnection Project. However, the parties c
ould n ot agree on the amount of just compensation that petitioner should pay fo
r the l ands taken. Respondents insist that they be paid the full market value,
while pe titioner believed that it was only bound to pay easement fees equivalen
t to 10% of the market value of the respondents lots as indicated in their tax d
eclarati ons, pursuant to petitioner s Charter. Evidently, based on the foregoin
g, what r emained for the determination of the RTC was the proper amount of dama
ges 241 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 67 REPUBLIC V. SARABIA Air Transportation Office took posse
ssion and control of a portion of land at Po ok Kalibo, Aklan covered by an Orig
inal Certificate of Title in the names of the private respondents who are heirs
of the late Segundo De la Cruz. In time, seve ral structures were erected thereo
n, including the control tower, the Kalibo cra sh fire rescue station, the Kalib
o airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. Stor
es and restaurants made of light materials were constructed on the area. Private
respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages. ATO inte
rvened in that case and alleged that the occupa nts of the stores and restaurant
s are its lessees. Petitioner assured private re spondents that they would be pa
id the fair market value of the subject land. How ever, the parties did not agre
e on the amount of compensation. Petitioner Republ ic, represented by the ATO, f
iled an action for the expropriation of the entire Lot. The trial court appointe
d three commissioners to ascertain the just compens ation for the subject proper
ty. Upon conduct of ocular inspection and hearing, t he commissioners submitted
a report to the trial court and recommended that valu ation on the lot. Trial co
urt directed petitioner to present evidence to prove t hat the remaining portion
not actually and physically occupied by the government is still needed for publ
ic purpose. However, petitioner countered that there is no need to present evide
nce thereon considering that almost one-half of the pro perty has already been i
n fact occupied and devoted to public purpose. The trial court asserted that jus
t compensation should be based not at the time of taking but at the time on the
issuance of writ of possession To the trial court, the d ate of the issuance of
the writ has to be considered in fixing the just compensa tion because the same
signified petitioner's proper acquisition and taking of the property which involve
s not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and own the s
ame. Petitioner Republic filed an appeal. The Court of App eals affirmed the app
ealed decision. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not just compensati on should be fixed a
t the time of actual taking of possession. FACTS: Compensation for property expr
opriated must be determined as of the time the exp ropriating authority takes po
ssession thereof and not as of the institution of t he proceedings. The value of
the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date
of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the filin
g of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the publ
ic purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the p laintiff upon the property
may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increa
se in the value of the property from the time it is t aken to the time the compl
aint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property
should be compensated only for what he actually loses ; it is not intended that
his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injur y. And what he loses is
only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only
way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the indi
vidual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay for it. 242 P a
g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 68 FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 243 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 68 PRUDENTIAL BANK V. ALVIAR Respondents, spouses are the r
egistered owners of a parcel of land. They execute d a deed of real estate mortg
age in favor of petitioner Prudential Bank to secur e the payment of a loan. Res
pondents executed a promissory note covering the sai d loan, which provides that
the loan matured on August 1976 and that the note is secured by a real estate m
ortgage as aforementioned. On March 1979, respondents paid petitioner P2,000,000
.00, to be applied to the obligations and for the rel ease of the real estate mo
rtgage for the loan covering the two lots. The payment was acknowledged by petit
ioner who accordingly released the mortgage over the t wo properties. Petitioner
moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgag e on the property covere
d. Per petitioner's computation, respondents had the total obligation of P1,608,25
6.68, covering the three promissory notes plus assessed past due interests and p
enalty charges. The public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set. Respo
ndents filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for t he issuance of a writ o
f preliminary injunction, claiming that they have paid th eir principal loan sec
ured by the mortgaged property, and thus the mortgage shou ld not be foreclosed.
For its part, petitioner averred that the payment made on March 1979 was not a
payment made by respondents, but by G.B. Alviar Realty and Development, which ha
s a separate loan with the bank secured by a separate mortg age. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and ordered the Sheriff to proceed with the extrajudici
al foreclosure. Respondents sought reconsideration of the de cision. The trial c
ourt issued an order setting aside its earlier decision and a warded attorney's fe
es to respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but it was denied
by the latter. FACTS: ISSUES: Whether or not a foreclosure of the mortgaged pro
perty for the non-payme nt of the loans is proper. HELD: It was improper for pet
itioner in this case to seek foreclosure of the mortgaged property because of no
n-payment of all the thr ee promissory notes. While the existence and validity o
f the dragnet clause cannot be denied, there is a need to respect the existence of
the other security given for one of the promissory notes. The foreclosure of th
e mortgaged property shou ld only be for the P250,000.00 loan covered by such pr
omissory note, and for any amount not covered by the security for the second pro
missory note. As held in o ne case, where deeds absolute in form were executed t
o secure any and all kinds of indebtedness that might subsequently become due, a
balance due on a note, aft er exhausting the special security given for the pay
ment of such note, was in th e absence of a special agreement to the contrary, w
ithin the protection of the m ortgage, notwithstanding the giving of the special
security. This is recognition that while the dragnet clause subsists, the securit
y specifically executed for su bsequent loans must first be exhausted before the
mortgaged property can be reso rted to. The mortgage contract, as well as the p
romissory notes subject of this case, is a contract of adhesion, to which respon
dents' only participation was the affixing of their signatures or adhesion thereto.
A contract of adhesion is one in which a party imposes a ready-made form of cont
ract which the other party may a ccept or reject, but which the latter cannot mo
dify. Petition Denied. 244 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 68 NATALIA BUSTAMANTE vs. SPOUSES RODITO ROSEL and NORMA RO
SEL Norma Rosel entered into a loan agreement with petitioner Natalia Bustamante
and her late husband Ismael C. Bustamante and putting as collateral portion of
his parcel of land and in the event that she failed to pay, the lender has the o
ptio n to buy or purchase the collateral. When the loan was about to mature, res
ponde nts proposed to buy the said collateral guarantee. Petitioner, however, re
fused to sell and requested for extension of time to pay the loan and offered to
sell to respondents another residential lot, with the principal loan plus inter
est to be used as down payment. Respondents refused to extend the payment of the
loan and to accept the lot in Road 20 as it was occupied by squatters and petit
ioner and her husband were not the owners thereof but were mere land developers
entitl ed to subdivision shares or commission if and when they developed at leas
t one h alf of the subdivision area. Hence, petitioner tendered payment of the l
oan to r espondents which the latter refused to accept, insisting on petitioner
s signing a prepared deed of absolute sale of the collateral. Respondents filed
with the RTC a complaint for specific performance with consignation against peti
tioner an d her spouse. Respondents sent a demand letter asking petitioner to se
ll the col lateral pursuant to the option to buy embodied in the loan agreement.
On the oth er hand, petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for consignation, an
d deposited the amount with the City Treasurer. When petitioner refused to sell
the collater al and barangay conciliation failed, respondents consigned the amou
nt with the t rial court. Trial court rendered a decision denying the plaintiff
s prayer for t he defendants execution of the Deed of Sale to Convey the collate
ral in plainti ffs favor and ordering the defendant to pay the loan with interes
t thereon. Res pondents appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeal s rendered decision reversing the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this
petition. ISSUE : HELD: Whether or not the stipulation in the loan contract was
valid and enforc eable. FACTS: We note the eagerness of respondents to acquire
the property given as collateral to guarantee the loan. The sale of the collater
al is an obligation with a suspe nsive condition. It is dependent upon the happe
ning of an event, without which t he obligation to sell does not arise. Since th
e event did not occur, respondents do not have the right to demand fulfillment o
f petitioner s obligation, especia lly where the same would not only be disadvan
tageous to petitioner but would als o unjustly enrich respondents considering th
e inadequate consideration for a 70 square meter property. Respondents argue tha
t contracts have the force of law be tween the contracting parties and must be c
omplied with in good faith. There are , however, certain exceptions to the rule,
specifically Article 1306 of the Civi l Code. A scrutiny of the stipulation of
the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire the property g
iven as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum commiss
orium, which is proscribed by law. A si gnificant task in contract interpretatio
n is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties and looking into the word
s used by the parties to project that in tention. In this case, the intent to ap
propriate the property given as collatera l in favor of the creditor appears to
be evident, for the debtor is obliged to d ispose of the collateral at the pre-a
greed consideration amounting to practicall y the same amount as the loan. In ef
fect, the creditor acquires the collateral i n the event of non payment of the l
oan. This is within the concept of pactum com missorium. Such stipulation is voi
d. 245 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE WRIT OF AMPARO 246 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Writ of Amparo SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, CHIEF OF STAFF, AR
MED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V s RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO FACTS: Raym
ond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers in this case were abducted b y military
men on the suspicion that they were members New People's Army. The brot hers mana
ged to escape detention after which they filed a Petition for Prohibiti on, Inju
nction, and Temporary Restraining Order against the military. The Rule o n the W
rit of Amparo took effect while the case was pending and eventually the r espond
ents filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion
as an Amparo petition. The Court of Appeals granted the issuance of the wri t of
Amparo and thereafter ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chi ef
of Staff of the Armed Forces to furnish all unofficial investigation reports as
to the Manalo brothers' custody, to confirm the present places of official assi gn
ment of military officials involved, and produce all records as well as medica l
reports of the Manalo brothers. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the issuance of th
e writ was proper. It was ruled that a continuing violation over the right to se
curity was present and such writ can be considered as the most potent remedy ava
ilable to any perso n whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violat
ed or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public offi
cials or employees a nd by private individuals or entities. Understandably, sinc
e their escape, the M analos have been under concealment and protection by priva
te citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circ
umstances of responden ts' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably sup
port a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abduc
ted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These, as the Court explained, cons
titute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petiti
on for a Writ of Amparo . 247 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE WRIT OF KALIKASAN 248 P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Writ of Kalikasan OPOSA V FACTORAN A Civil Case was filed before
Regional Trial Court. The principal plaintiffs the rein, now the principal peti
tioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Envir
onment and Natural Resources Secretary. His substitu tion in this petition by th
e new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was s ubsequently ordered upon p
roper motion. The complaint was instituted as a taxpay ers class suit and allege
s that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republi c of the Philippines, tax
payers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoy ment of the natural reso
urce treasure that is the country s virgin tropical rain forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation
of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impract icable to bring them a
ll before the Court." The minors further asseverate that t hey "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently , it is prayed for t
hat judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to cancel all e xisting timber lice
nse agreements in the country. Factoran filed a Motion to Dis miss the complaint
stating the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him an d the issue is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative o r executive bran
ches. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order granting th e motion to dis
miss. The respondent Judge ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for wou
ld impair contracts. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special ci vil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court asking for resciss ion and setti
ng aside the dismissal order since the respondent Judge gravely abu sed his disc
retion in dismissing the action. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not a class suit was pr
oper. FACTS: The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general intere
st not just t o several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, s
ince the parti es are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impo
ssible, to brin g all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the pla
intiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protec
tion of all conc erned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are pres
ent both in the s aid civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being b
ut an incident to the former. This case, however, has a special and novel elemen
t. Petitioners min ors assert that they represent their generation as well as ge
nerations yet unbor n. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themse
lves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their pe rsonality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations ca
n only be based on th e concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as t
he right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. 249 P a g e

CIVIL PROCEDURE Writ of Kalikasan METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs.

CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY FACTS: A suit was lodged before the Regional T
rial Court to compel the concerned government agencies to take steps in cleaning
the Manila Bay. According to the Concerned Citizens, the government had not tak
en notice of the present danger to public health and the depletion and contamina
tion of the marine life of Manila Bay due to the minimal SB level standard of wa
ter quality in such a way that swi mming, among others, is no longer permissible
. The Department of Environment and Natural resources testified in behalf of the
petitioners, asserting safe-level bathing of the bay and that appropriate measu
res were already being taken to sig nificantly reduce pollution in those particu
lar waters. The trial court decided in favor of the respondents and held the gov
ernment agencies to be in violation of PD 1152 and further ordered them to facil
itate the rehabilitation. The petiti oners on appeal asserted that PD 1152 merel
y pertains to the cleaning of specifi c pollution incidents and does not cover c
leaning any particular waters in gener al. ISSUES: HELD: As defined by law, obli
gations to perform the duties and on ho w they carry out such duties are two dis
tinct concepts. The former pertains to t he discretionary duties of the petition
ers while the latter is their ministerial duty. What is involved this case is th
e discretion of the petitioners to choose not to perform or to perform their dut
ies. As clearly enunciated in their chart ers that aside from performing their m
ain function as an agency, they are also m andated to perform certain functions
directly or indirectly relating to the clea nup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. It was furt her held that Sections 17 and 20 of
the Environment Code include cleaning in gen eral. The Code provides that in ca
se the water quality has deteriorated, the gov ernment agencies concerned shall
act on it to bring back the standard quality of water and that government agenci
es concerned are to take action in cleaning-up in case the polluters failed to d
o their part. Moreover, it emphasizes that gove rnment agencies should effect cl
eaning for the sake of meeting and maintaining t he right quality standard. This
presupposes that the government agencies concern ed have the duties of cleaning
the water not only in times when the water is pol luted. Moreover, even without
such provisions, it is the inescapable the duty to protect the environment has
always been stressed by the Constitution, that the S tate shall protect and advan
ce the right to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and h
armony of nature as a reasonable need of present and future generations. Whether
or not cleaning the Manila Bay is a ministerial act that can be induced by manda
mus. 250 P a g e