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POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL MEASURES:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING
AND IMPLEMENTATION

by

Vance J . Klosinski

December 2009

Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons
Second Reader: Doowan Lee
i
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Population and Resource Control Measures: A Conceptual Framework for
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6. AUTHOR(S) Vance J . Klosinski
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
An important component of any counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is the successful use of population and
resource control measures. If utilized correctly, PRCMs are powerful operational tools that can be used to break the
cycle of insurgent violence and establish the security necessary for all other COIN campaign initiatives.
This thesis draws from literatures on social movement theory and COIN to develop a framework that would assist
COIN force commanders to better select and implement the appropriate PRCMs for success in their areas of
operations. The thesis argues for developing a comprehensive PRCM plan across the U.S. militarys operational
spectrum (strategic/operational/tactical) and for factoring in the nature of the local environment and local concepts of
legitimacy before proceeding.

15. NUMBER OF
PAGES
71
14. SUBJECT TERMS

Population and resource control measures, Population control, Counterinsurgency, COIN, Population-
centric COIN, Social control, Social movement theory
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ABSTRACT

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POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL MEASURES: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Vance J . Klosinski
Major, United States Army
B.S., University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 20009

Author: Vance J . Klosinski

Approved by: Anna Simons
Thesis Advisor

Doowan Lee
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

iv
v
ABSTRACT
An important component of any counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is the
successful use of population and resource control measures. If utilized correctly, PRCMs
are powerful operational tools that can be used to break the cycle of insurgent violence
and establish the security necessary for all other COIN campaign initiatives.
This thesis draws from literatures on social movement theory and COIN to
develop a framework that would assist COIN force commanders to better select and
implement the appropriate PRCMs for success in their areas of operations. The thesis
argues for developing a comprehensive PRCM plan across the U.S. militarys operational
spectrum (strategic/operational/tactical) and for factoring in the nature of the local
environment and local concepts of legitimacy before proceeding.

vi
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
A. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................6
II. PRCM BACKGROUND.............................................................................................7
III. PRCM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK................................................................15
A. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.................................................................15
B. LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, HISTORY, AND POLITICS............................16
C. CULTURAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CALIBRATION...........................20
D. LEGITIMACY FACTORS...........................................................................22
E. ACTOR...........................................................................................................23
F. GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY...........................................................24
G. COIN FORCE LEGITIMACY ....................................................................25
H. RISKS INVOLVED WITH THE USE OF PRCMS...................................28
I. INTERACTION OF VARIABLES AND PRESCRIPTIVE
RECOMMENDATION.................................................................................29
J. PRESCRIPTIVE RECOMMENDATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A PRCM PLAN AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.........31
IV. PUTTING PRCMS INTO PRACTICE...................................................................35
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................49
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................51
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.........................................................................................55

viii
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Population and resource control measures menu.............................................10
Figure 2. Summary of findings........................................................................................40
Figure 3. Reassessment of findings and results...............................................................45

x
xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
1
st
SFG Handbook 1
st
Special Forces Group (Airborne) Population and Resource
Control Handbook
AO Area of Operations
COIN Counterinsurgency
COP Combat Outpost
CPT Captain
FM Field Manual
IA Iraqi Army
IP Iraqi Police
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
LTC Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ Major
MEDCAP Medical Civil Action Program
ODA Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
PDSS Pre-Deployment site Survey
PMT Pre-Mission Training
PRCs Population and Resource Controls
PRCMs Population and Resource Control Measures
SMT Social Movement Theory
xii
xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Anna Simons for all of her advice and support
during the entire thesis process. Her counsel, insightful commentary, and unique
perspectives were essential to the completion of this paper. Thanks for all of your hard
work.
I would also like to thank Professor Doowan Lee for introducing me to the
concepts of social movement theory. These ideas greatly contributed to my increased
understanding of population and resource control measures.
It is also necessary to acknowledge COL Kirk Nilsson for providing me with
guidance and direction at the beginning of my research. Also, I would be remiss if I did
not mention the officers, warrants, and non-commissioned officers of the 1
st
Special
Forces Group (Airborne) who introduced me to the concepts of population and resource
control measures.
Finally, I owe a large debt of gratitude to my wife. She acted as a sounding board
for my ideas and the editor of all my drafts. Thanks, Abigail, for your tremendous
assistanceand patience!

xiv

1
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Vietnam War, an entire generation of U.S. military officers said that
they had learned their lessons and would not make the same mistakes again. But did they
learn the right lessons? The post-Vietnam U.S. military focused on conventional warfare
and created, quite possibly, the best conventional military ever. But at the same time, it
did not think about, train on, or resource counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine or practice.
Following Desert Storm in 1991, many military thinkers and pundits declared that
the U.S. military had finally vanquished the ghosts of the Vietnam War. The lopsided
victory against Saddam Husseins Army was seen as a vindication of the U.S. militarys
post-Vietnam doctrine. But they were comparing apples (conventional warfare) to
oranges (counterinsurgent warfare). The conventional war fought in Desert Storm played
to the U.S. militarys strengths and had little relevance to the military situation or our
performance in Vietnam. It took the monumental terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Global
War on Terrorism for the U.S. military to revisit the COIN question and the ghosts of
Vietnam.
Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. swiftly toppled the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom was a relatively easy mission that led to the
rapid downfall of an unpopular regime.
The U.S. quickly changed its focus and, a little over a year later, invaded and
occupied Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom was also an easy conventional victory that
initially enjoyed a degree of popular support, particularly by the Shiite majority
population.
In each case, but particularly in Iraq, the U.S. militarys conventional capabilities
proved to be unmatched. But soon after these impressive victories, insurgencies
developed in both countries, which completely changed the face of the battlefield. Both
wars became insurgencies with the enemy living, fighting, and hiding among the
population. The U.S. military struggled to refit its conventional paradigm for the rigors
of counterinsurgency operations. In both countries, we failed. We conducted kinetic
2
operations that were of limited value and, in some cases, caused more damage to our
COIN effort than the raids helped to solve. This modus operandi had a cascading effect
and we soon found ourselves losing two counterinsurgent wars.
The poor performances in Afghanistan and Iraq caused many to seriously
reexamine the efficacy of U.S. strategies. The year 2006 saw a renaissance of COIN
thought among many senior U.S. military and governmental officials. They turned the
focus of our COIN efforts from enemy-centric to population-centric. The result of this
renaissance was the publication of the U.S. Armys Field Manual (FM) 3-24
Counterinsurgency in December 2006. In FM 3-24, population-centric COIN is codified
as U.S. military COIN doctrine.
Population-centric COIN broadly defines the populations support as the key to
victory. In other words, it is the population, not killing enemy combatants, that wins an
insurgency. Further, FM 3-24 defines the relationship between the insurgent and the
counterinsurgent as a mainly political struggle wherein each side aims to get the people
to accept its governance or authority as legitimate (p. 11).
Gaining the populations support is accomplished mainly by strengthening the
governments legitimacy. Securing the populations support is a zero-sum game in which
the segment of the population that supports the insurgency does not support the
government, and vice versa. Therefore, the effective counterinsurgent needs to increase
the governments legitimacy while simultaneously delegitimizing the insurgents as much
as possible. This battle for legitimacy sets the stage for how a revolutionary war should
be fought.
Many factors determine how legitimacy is either won or lost. The single biggest
factor determining a governments legitimacy is its ability to protect its population
against the violence that occurs during a revolutionary war. Therefore, the first and most
important step a successful counterinsurgent must take is to ensure the populations
security. Once security is established, other factors important to the population and to
legitimacy can be addressed, such as ensuring the provision of essential services and
responding to the populations legitimate grievances.
3
The insurgent, on the other hand, will try to destroy the governments legitimacy
by using violence to create chaos and then offer himself as a legitimate alternative who
can succeed where the government has failed. Insurgents will play to popular grievances
and any other issues they can leverage to further erode the governments legitimacy.
This process increases the insurgencys support from, and its ties to, the population.
Respected French military officer, COIN strategist, and author David Galula
points out that the government must play to its strengths and work with the population.
In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, he observes that the
people are static and relatively easy to access, whereas the insurgent is hard to find and
identify (Galula, 1964, p. 58). Galula gained these insights from his extensive studies of
insurgencies in China, Indochina, and his own experiences fighting in Algeria. It is easy
to see his significant influence on U.S. military doctrinehis book is listed as one of the
classics of COIN theory in the FM 3-24 bibliography, and he is considered to be one of
the premier COIN intellectuals by population-centric COIN enthusiasts.
The idea of population-centric COIN is not new. Galula published his book in
1964. Similarly, Sir Robert Thompson, a British military officer and COIN expert with
experience in Burma, Malaya, and Vietnam, wrote specifically about the utility of
population-centric COIN in Vietnam during the early phases of that war. Recently, a new
crop of military officers and pundits has championed the principles of population-centric
COIN. These COIN thinkers include retired military officers Dr. David Kilcullen
(Australia), J ohn Nagl (U.S.), and the Pulitzer Prize-winning author Thomas Ricks. Each
has penned influential books that promote population-centric COIN arguments, complete
with contemporary battlefield examples drawn from around the world.
Also listed in the FM 3-24 bibliography is the Chinese Communist revolutionary
leader Mao Zedongs book, On Guerrilla Warfare. Mao emphasizes the centrality of the
population to revolutionary warfare, though he writes from the perspective of the
guerrilla. He likens the people to water and the insurgents to fish, and says that the
insurgent, like a fish, cannot live out of the water (Mao, 1961, p. 93).
4
To be sure, there are detractors who do not believe in the theories and practice of
population-centric COIN. They consider COIN operations to be like any other military
operation and that an enemy-centric approach can solve the military problems posed by
an insurgency. Over 100 years ago, Colonel C. E. Callwell, a veteran of many of the
British Empires small wars, prescribed an enemy-centric approach for defeating
insurgencies in his book, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. He believed that
the best way to wage war against irregulars was by conducting a strategy he called
counter-strokes (Callwell, 1906, p. 128). This strategy was to be executed by highly
mobile columns that endeavored to kill them [the insurgents] or wound them, or at
least hunt them from their homes (Callwell, 1906, p. 146). Callwell cites as successful
examples the French in Algeria in 1841, the U.S. struggle against the western Indian
tribes, and the British in South Africa during the Second Boer War (Callwell, 1906, p.
128137).
Another enemy-centric COIN advocate, retired U.S. Army Colonel Harry
Summers J r., dismisses much of the population-centric approach in his book, On
Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. In it, he claims that the Vietnam War
was lost not because we used a conventional strategy, but because we did not use enough
of the right conventional strategy.
There are even some current critics who claim that the U.S. military has gone
overboard and become too narrowly focused on population-centric COIN. Chief among
these critics is U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile who is the current director of the Military
History Program at the United States Military Academy and was a battalion commander
in Iraq during 2006. He argues that from both a theoretical and historical standpoint
the population does not need to be the center of gravity (Gentile, 2009). Further, he
claims that this doctrine has taken over how the army should perceive and respond to
security problems around the world (Gentile, 2009).
Colonel Gentile believes that this narrow focus has caused the atrophy of
conventional skills, which could lead to a significant strategic failure in the future. He
points to Israel in southern Lebanon in 2006 and the British Army between the World
5
Wars as examples of this phenomenon (Gentile, 2009). But thinkers such as Summers
and Gentile are definitely in the minority at the moment.
The current high tide of belief in population-centric COIN is based primarily on
assessments of the successful implementation by Coalition forces in Iraq from mid-2007
of something somewhat incorrectly called the Surge. The Surge is said to have marked
the replacement of an enemy-centric strategy by a population-centric model.
Key to facilitating the governments attempts to build legitimacy and separate the
insurgents from the population in any population-centric approach is the implementation
of population and resource controls measures (PRCM). PRCMs are broadly defined as
measures used to physically separate the population from the insurgents in order to
protect citizens and allow the government to regain popular support. If done correctly,
PRCMs should have the added benefit of producing intelligence that will help
government forces identify and eliminate the insurgents who remain embedded in the
population. I will expand upon the definition and objectives of PRCMs in the next
chapter. For now, I will note that Galula considered population control to be the most
critical step in the process because it allowed for the transition of emphasis on military
operations to emphasis on political ones (Galula, 1964, p. 81).
This thesis focuses on the population-centric COIN approach because it is current
U.S. Army doctrine, employed in both Afghanistan and Iraq. But, regardless of the
COIN doctrine that you subscribe to, PRCMs are equally useful and relevant actions that
help to increase the governments success while reducing the insurgencys effectiveness.
The argument to be made here is that since PRCMs are vital to the very basis of
any COIN effort, it is important that we understand how to properly select and implement
the correct PRCMs to achieve the intended outcome without negative unintended
consequences. Currently, there is a lot of COIN literature that extols the virtues of
PRCMs, to include the U.S. Army COIN manual, COIN strategy articles, and even daily
blogs. The theme they all have in common is that, when done correctly, PRCMs can
drive a wedge between the insurgents and the population, giving the counterinsurgent the
necessary tools to defeat the insurgency. What needs greater clarification is how exactly
6
this can be accomplished. There is little written to explain how a commander should
select, implement, and execute PRCMs. A gap exists between the objectives that COIN
theorists claim PRCMs can produce and the published literature on the actual tactics
necessary to pursue those objectives. To more effectively utilize PRCMs, we must
bridge this gap. That, in turn, requires a close look at the complex and interrelated
variables that dictate the success or failure of PRCMs.
A. METHODOLOGY
This thesis offers a framework that takes into account the significance of both
environmental factors and legitimacy concerns. I believe that taking these into account is
essential in the implementation of a successful PRCM plan. I have come to these
conclusions based on my research, military training, and firsthand experiences.
Chapter II details PRCM background information. Here, I draw on my research
into the relevant literature about the theory and history of COIN, PRCMs, and social
movement theory (SMT). Chapter III explains the importance of the interactive nature of
what I call PRCM factors.
Chapter IV is a fictional narrative that illustrates how a U.S. Army unit could
develop and implement a comprehensive PRCM plan. The goal of this chapter is to
demonstrate to COIN practitioners a contemporary and practical example of how PRCMs
can be used effectively.
In her book, Narratives in Social Science Research, Barbara Czarniawska details
the power of a narrative as an educational tool. Following that logic, Chapter IVs
narrative will allow the reader to envision, in a practical and easily understandable
context, the fundamentals of my argument.
This narrative draws on research done for this thesis and events I witnessed in
Iraq during 2006. This narrative is written specifically with the tactical level leader at the
battalion level and below in mind.
Chapter V concludes with recommendations for future study and research.

7
II. PRCM BACKGROUND
Control is defined as directing influence over or to have power over
(Control, 2009). Throughout history, leaders have struggled with how to best control
their populations and lands. The exercise of control usually has two broad goals: to
ensure a social group or society prospers, and to maintain or gain more power. As people
began to formalize this process, they also began to study the science of social control.
The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology defines social control as practices
developed by social groups of all kinds that enforce or encourage conformity and deal
with behavior that violates accepted norms (Social Control, 1991). The dictionary
further distinguishes the two basic processes of social control as the internalization of
norms and values and the use of sanctions with regards to rule-breakers and
nonconforming acts (Social Control, 1991).
As mentioned in the introduction, current U.S. Army doctrine views the
population as the center of gravity in COIN operations. Therefore, the ability to
influence and control the population is essential. In The Logic of Violence in Civil War,
Yale University political science professor Stathis Kalyvas has shown that there is a very
strong and positive correlation between control and a populations level of collaboration
(Kalyvas, 2006, p. 111). He further hypothesizes that the higher the level of control
exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with
this political actor will be (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 111). This directly relates back to social
control in the case of COIN because the collaborating population helps the government
achieve conformity through its own conformity and information sharing about non-
conformers.
Through COIN operations, the U.S. military seeks to encourage conformity and
identify non-conformists via the use of PRCMs. Though PRCMs are essential to
COIN, there is a limited amount of theory or literature related to them to review.
8
I divide the existing PRCM related literature into four categories: sociological
theory; COIN theory; U.S. military doctrine; and, finally, narrative accounts in which
writers describe PRCM efforts in the course of describing COIN operations.
Important to this study is Ted Robert Gurrs book Why Men Rebel. In it, Gurr
seeks to understand the dynamics of political violence in order to gauge what he calls the
revolutionary potential of a nation. With this understanding, Gurr hopes to be able to
estimate the effects of various actions on that potential (Gurr, 1970, p. X). Of
particular interest to the study of PRCMs are Gurrs insights on the importance of the
close correlation between governmental legitimacy and population compliance (Gurr,
1970, p. 186).
Gurrs work is critical in SMT, which seeks, at least in part, to understand the
complex social interactions that occur during collective action events such as protests,
counter-government or counter-policy political movements, and revolutionary
insurgencies. Those who study the effects of repression on collective action, for instance,
try to determine the consequences, both intended and unintended, of repression. SMT
greatly enhances our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of PRCM use.
Much of the COIN theory literature focuses on tactical measures and avoids
discussing repression dynamics. If one examines the writings of C. E. Callwell, David
Galula, J ohn Nagl, and Robert Thompson, their views range from near scorched-earth
measures such as Callwells recommendations to destroy the enemys herds and villages
(Callwell, 1906, p. 145), which have limited contemporary applicability, to Nagl, Galula,
and Thompsons ideas of working with and within the populations that counterinsurgents
are attempting to control. Though COIN theorists views on tactics vary greatly, they all
agree with the general premise that one must control populations and resources to
effectively starve the insurgency of its manpower and material requirements.
U.S. Army population and resource control doctrine is encapsulated in three
instructional books or field manuals (FM) which seem to be especially influenced by
Thompsons writings, judging from the generous use of some of his terminology. These
are FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, and finally
9
FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations. Collectively, they offer a broad overview
of PRCMs. They focus on the objectives of PRCMs and then quickly move on to the
measures themselves, with little discussion about PRCM plan development or
implementation. FMI 3-07.22, an expired FM, actually does the best job of laying out
a guideline for PRCM planning, but the updated versions (FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2)
dropped most of this material.
In my opinion, the most complete source of information available on PRCMs is
the 1
st
Special Forces Group (Airborne) Population and Resource Control (PRC)
Handbook (1
st
SFG Handbook). This was written by a U.S. Army unit with the express
intention of training its soldiers on the planning and execution of PRCMs. It includes
PRCM background information, theoretical concepts, planning considerations, a list of
common PRCM tasks, and the guidance needed to successfully conduct them.
The 1
st
SFG Handbook defines population and resource control as:
a wide range of activities conducted to control the populace and
designated material resources in order to facilitate three objectives: 1.
Deny human and material resources to the insurgents; 2. Isolate the
insurgent physically and psychologically from the populace; 3. Identify
and neutralize insurgent infrastructure (1
st
SFG Handbook, p. 5).
As mentioned previously, there is now an extensive literature detailing U.S. COIN
practices. If read closely, one can find descriptions of PRCMs in these writings. Of
particular note, David Killcullens The Accidental Guerrilla and Thomas Ricks The
Gamble illustrate, through multiple contemporary examples, the extensive use of PRCMs
in current COIN campaigns. Both of these authors, through their narratives, describe the
benefits that can occur when PRCMs are used correctly.
To better illustrate these control measures, I have collected a list of common
PRCMs and developed the following menu. To the extent possible, I have tried to
organize this according to the military operational level (strategic/operational/tactical)
into which the specific approaches best fit. What is important to keep in mind is that
oftentimes these measures can be utilized across all or none of the three operational levels
depending on the complex variables that are specific to each different COIN campaign.
10

Figure 1. Population and resource control measures menu
In order to clarify the distinctions I draw by placing certain PRCMs in a particular
operation level, I offer the following justification for my rationale. This example should
help to illustrate the thought process I went through when deciding where each PRCM
should be placed. I take tactical-level PRCM #10; paying reparations for damages and
aid coerced by insurgents should be conducted at the lowest level possible. Numerous
benefits should flow from granting tactical units the responsibility and authority to
distribute these reparations. First, tactical level units should have the knowledge of how
to best distribute the reparations locally.
Second, by paying the reparations, the tactical unit will build rapport with the
local population. This will reduce the populations frustration level with the government
and could lead to an increase in legitimacy.

11
Finally, tactical level units may gain important intelligence during the reparations
payment process. It would only be natural that the people receiving these reparations
would offer, at a minimum, information about planned future attacks that may be used in
offensive operations against the insurgents.
There may be further debate as to where a certain PRCM fits in the operational
spectrum but, as mentioned above, this is a general guideline, and these measures often
fit within and work at multiple levels. A measure listed as a strategic PRCM that cannot
be implemented across the entire theater may make sense at the tactical level and should
be employed there.
One interesting model for how to categorize PRCMs was introduced by Brigadier
General J oseph Anderson and Colonel Gary Volesky, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq
Chief of Staff and his Deputy, in their article A Synchronized Approach to Population
Control. In it, they argue that PRCMs cannot be effectively utilized at the tactical level
alone. Instead, strategic and operational-level leaders must plan, coordinate, and
execute activities that set the conditions for success at the tactical level (Anderson &
Volesky, p. 102).
Anderson and Volesky break down their synchronized plan to correspond with the
U.S. militarys doctrinal levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic
level focuses on PRCMs that only a strategic level commander has the ability and
resources to accomplish. These tactics include a nationwide census, national
identification cards, international border control, and long-term economic prosperity
programs (Anderson & Volesky, p. 102). The authors believe that these steps are
necessary precursors to a comprehensive PRCM plan. These large-scope PRCMs create
a foundation that allows for operational and tactical PRCMs to have a real impact.
Undertaking national-level programs also generates immense amounts of intelligence and
lays the foundation for law enforcement and dispute resolution by establishing property
ownership records and business licenses.
At the operational level, Anderson and Volesky emphasize senior-leader
engagement with influential social and political leaders (sheiks, imams, mayors) in
12
order to gain [their] support or produce a desired effect (Anderson & Volesky, p. 102).
Additionally, COIN force leaders must allocate and distribute the necessary assets (civil
affairs, public affairs, engineering) to support tactical operations. By doing this,
operational commanders build legitimacy by developing buy-in support from the local
social/political leaders. Then, they can prioritize and allocate their assets at the tactical
level to ensure synchronization across the battlefield.
Finally, at the tactical level, the authors propose that COIN forces use offensive
operations (cordon and searches, raids) combined with other PRCMs to provide security
for the population. This security should help break the cycle of violence, fostering the
governments ability to build legitimacy across all governmental sectors and making
improvements in security permanent.
The authors conclude their article with a discussion about the risks of PRCM use.
They warn that tactical level commanders must consider how the population perceives
the PRCMs. The population may, after time, start to see the PRCMs as an
inconvenience, especially if violence is reduced. Popular opinion may turn against their
use, which could give the insurgency new ammunition to use against the government. To
avoid this problem, the authors suggest that the government and COIN forces define the
conditions that must be met before the population control measures are reduced, though
in the end they believe that the population will understand that increased security trumps
inconvenience (Anderson & Volesky, p.103).
In essence, Anderson and Volesky have developed a good concept for the
synchronization of PRCMs throughout a given theater of operations. Additionally, their
article advocates strong, strategic-level PRCMs, something that is largely missing from
the U.S.s COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the wars there are eight
and six years old respectively, neither country has a national identification card, reliable
census figures, or a weapons registration program to speak of. These measures could
prove helpful at the tactical level where, coupled with simple checkpoints, they might
enable the capture of insurgent leaders. At the very least, these measures could greatly
restrict the insurgents ability to move, which in the long term affects their ability to
conduct counter-government operations.
13
What Anderson and Voleskys argument lacks, however, is a rubric by which
commanders can select and implement the PRCMs appropriate to accomplish their
tactical-level goals. In not addressing the selection and implementation of PRCMs,
Anderson and Volesky avoid having to work through the complex variables that
determine where PRCMs will be successful and how PRCMs can either complement the
COIN campaign or aggravate and turn citizens into active supporters of the insurgency.
Through research and experience, I believe that there are some key factors which
commanders can focus on to guide them in their selection and correct implementation of
the proper PRCMs. That is what I offer in the next chapter.
14
15
III. PRCM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The prescriptions in this chapter are not meant to serve as a checklist or a cookie
cutter solution, but rather as a conceptual guide to help the COIN campaign planner or
commander work through the complicated process of determining when, how, and which
PRCMs to use.
There are two sets of factors that will always need to be taken into account:
environmental givens and legitimacy concerns or what grants an entity legitimacy in the
eyes of the population. Environmental factors include: the local history and politics of an
area; culturally and sociologically calibrated measures tied to local norms; and the
identification and cooption of the influential personalities in the area. A successful
PRCM plan must take all of these into account so as to not create more insurgents than it
helps to eliminate.
The other categoryattention to legitimacyfocuses broadly on the populations
support for the governments COIN campaign. This can further be broken down into
considerations about the legitimacy of the actor (government and COIN force) and the
legitimacy of the governments actions. Central to population-centric COIN theory, the
battle for legitimacy is important in PRCM success as well. The degree of legitimacy the
government has will determine, to at least some extent, how much or how little resistance
it encounters from the population when it implements its COIN campaign.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
J ust as one size rarely fits all, the environment must be examined based on the
specific area of operations. For example, in Iraq areas that are geographically close
together may have wildly different make-ups/characteristics based on the presence and
number of religious sects, specific tribal affiliations, presence or absence of historic ties
to the Saddam regime, or any of a plethora of other identity-related variables. Therefore,
it is important that a commander conduct a detailed study of his units areas of operations
in order to understand and be able to operate effectively when encountering these.
16
In their article All Counterinsurgency is Local, Afghanistan experts Thomas
J ohnson and M. Chris Mason, claim that the U.S.s approach in Afghanistan has been a
failure because we have ignored the environmental specifics and history of Afghan
politics by focusing our efforts on building a strong central Afghan government. They
claim that Afghan social and political identity is rooted in the woleswali: the districts
within each province that are typically home to a single clan or tribe (J ohnson & Mason,
p. 2). The Taliban, on the other hand, understand this and treat the rural Pasthun areas as
Afghanistans true center of gravity (J ohnson & Mason, p. 2).
As of the fall of 2009, positive changes are being implemented in Afghanistan.
General Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), acknowledges this in his ISAF Commanders Counterinsurgency Guidance
which directs his subordinates to become an expert on the local situation and to get to
know the neighborhood (McChrystal, p. 5).
This is vital for PRCMs. A commander must ensure that PRCMs do not
inadvertently advantage one political, social, or ethnic group over another. A commander
must also use the least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect (1
st

SFG, p. 10). In order to accomplish this, a commander must have a firm understanding
of the environment in which he is operating.
B. LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, HISTORY, AND POLITICS
There is a series of popular travel books that claim to allow you to travel and live
in a specific area as if you were a local. This alludes to the idea that there is certain
knowledge that only a local knows, and based on his extensive experience, the traveler
who learns this knowledge will have a leg up on others who do not know this
information. This is also true in PRCM application. As Clifford Geertz, the preeminent
cultural anthropologist, states in his book Local Knowledge: Further Essays in
Interpretive Anthropology, the shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local,
indivisible from their instrument and their encasements (Geertz, 1983, p. 4).

17
Presumably, something is lost when one makes broad characterizations and tries to
generalize about people. In other words, when dealing with people one must have local
knowledge and perspective to be effective.
The places in the world where insurgencies typically occur usually have weak
central governments that are unable to gain the loyalty and support of their respective
populations. Seth J ones, a political analyst at RAND, found this to be true in Afghanistan
based on his interviews with tribal leaders. J ones was told by one tribal elder that my
allegiance is to my family first and then to my village, sub-tribe, and tribe (J ones,
WSJ , p. 2). This villager could not care less about the government in Kabul.
Past U.S. policies in Afghanistan have ignored these allegiances by adopting a top
down approach to nation building, focusing on the development of a strong central
government when most Afghans live and operate at the local level.
There are many factors specific to the local arena that must be learned in order to
operate effectively. These include knowledge about local history, local politics,
information about tribal affiliations and feuds, and commercial interests and business
influences. FM 324s Chapter Three, Intelligence in Counterinsurgency, does a good
job of listing these and other relevant factors.
Aside from information about the enemy that most military commanders focus on
during combat operations, it is important to gain an appreciation for and about locals
lives in order to be effective. This information should include ethnic and religious
demographics, basic information about the economic infrastructure, and an initial
understanding of the populations grievances.
This information can be gathered from a census or area assessment if one has
been conducted. In more mature theaters, much of this information is supplied by
previous units. Obviously, if this information does not exist, it is incumbent upon the
current commander or existing governmental structures to collect and analyze it. Not
only is this information of great use to PRC, but even the process of collecting it can be a
useful tool.

18
Knowing and understanding the local history helps the outsider develop a sense
for why a particular village or tribe has the characteristics and relations with others it
does. Taking the time with a village chief or tribal elder to learn the local history should
never be considered a waste. Even if the history is not completely accurate, local
perceptions are local realities. In the long run, these perceptions are more important than
the truth.
A commander must identify the influential leaders in his area of operations.
There are two different types of power holders in society: formal and informal (FM 3-24,
p. 3-9). Formal power holders usually lead the government, governmental agencies,
political parties, and unions. Informal power brokers are much harder to identify. They
are not necessarily public in their leadership, but are often more important than the
formal power brokers (FM 3-24, p. 39). The examples that come to mind range from
the corrupt cattle baron who controls the local sheriff in a western movie to the popular
leader of a large religious congregation.
If it is important to quickly identify these formal and informal leaders, how do we
accomplish that? The formal leaders are typically easy to find. One need only visit
governmental and official offices, if they exist. Beyond that, one may employ the
following steps or observe the following: ask locals; observe who has the biggest and
grandest house in the neighborhood; identify who has a lot of employees, or who feels the
need to employ a personal security force.
In The Gamble, Thomas Ricks describes how Colonel Sean MacFarland wrestled
with the problem of sorting through all the real and pretend sheiks in Ramadi.
MacFarland was able to determine which sheiks had real wasta (Iraqi-Arabic word for
influence) by observing them interacting with each other. He could tell who had wasta
by following who moderated the conversation (Ricks, 2009, p. 64).
Once leaders are identified, it is important to regularly engage them. This will
help to build personal relationships, which can often trump official responsibilities when
working through contentious issues. Excellent examples of tactical leaders successfully

19
engaging local leaders can also be found in Ricks book. Ricks details how Colonel H.R.
McMaster in Tall Afar and Colonel MacFarland conducted leader engagement to great
effect (Ricks, 2009, p. 6064).
With regard to PRCMs, local leaders can be used in many ways. During
planning, the input of local leaders is invaluable. They may have easier and more locally
sensible suggestions for accomplishing your objectives. Gaining their support for control
measures will increase the likelihood that the PRCMs will succeed and prove legitimate
in the eyes of the population. Finally, one can negotiate with local leaders the terms
under which these PRCMs will be removed.
By engaging these local leaders, you provide them an outlet for redress and the
ability to offer input, which can help diffuse major problems that may arise in the future.
Local politics have a long history of importance in insurgencies. Mao Zedongs
Chinese national united front was able to successfully dominate local politics which
led to his eventual victory in 1949 (Metz, p. 29). Contrary to the typical American
military view that there is (and should be) a separation between politics and war, Mao
believed that political activities are the life of both the guerrilla armies and of
revolutionary warfare (Mao, p. 88).
Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, has noted that
insurgents have the edge in local political expertise and will continue to engage us at this
level to avoid our conventional military strengths (Cordesman, 2005). Their advantages
stem from their better understanding and manipulation of the complex inner workings of
the local societies they attempt to influence. A good example of this is al Qaedas tactic
of marrying into and enmeshing themselves in the local population (Meyer, 2008).
To outdo the insurgents in this regard means we have to take the time to become
experts ourselves on local politics, to the extent that we can. In Afghanistan, that means
getting involved in the local jirgas which are the legitimate governing institution in
Pashtun areas (J ones, WSJ , p. 4). Iraq has a similar mechanism called a qada, where
leaders get together to make local level decisions. These local leaders can become
powerful allies in effective PRCM implementation.
20
Next, we must have an aggressive policy of leader engagement in order to be able
to influence local politics. Here we can use a carrot and stick approach, rewarding
productive behavior and punishing disruptive behavior. If properly managed, this
process can also help to increase governmental and COIN force legitimacy.
In terms of PRCMs, local gatherings like jirgas, qadas, etc. can be used as forums
through which to inform the locals about particular PRCMs, and explain the rationale
behind them to try and garner the populaces support, and describe the circumstances for
their removal. This process can help to significantly mitigate the inconvenience the
population experiences from the PRCMs and can help build legitimacy for them.
A final note about politics: We must also take into consideration local business
interests. We must, to the extent possible, avoid disrupting both legal and illegal business
(so long as it is not connected to the insurgency) because that is one of the surest ways to
turn the local power brokers against us. Al Qaeda in Iraq made this mistake and paid
dearly for it. One of the biggest reasons why many of the Sunni tribes turned against al
Qaeda during the Anbar Awakening was that their activities had disrupted tribal
business ventures, including smuggling and construction enterprises (Bruno, 2009).
When planning PRCMs, a smart commander must accommodate business
dealings because the areas long-term financial success is in his best interests.
C. CULTURAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CALIBRATION
COIN operations differ significantly from conventional warfare in their emphasis
on the population. In conventional warfare, military commanders focus on maneuvering
forces across the terrain in order to gain an advantage over the enemy. In this paradigm,
commanders have traditionally placed little emphasis on the population short of planning
considerations for dealing with refugees and other civilians on the battlefield. But in
COIN, the population takes on a whole new significance, which makes knowing and
understanding the local cultural and sociological dynamics critical.

21
The U.S. military has a long and mixed history in dealing with anthropological
studies in a COIN environment. Montgomery McFate, a cultural anthropologist, recounts
a version of this history in her article Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange
Story of their Curious Relationship. She cites two interconnected reasons for the U.S.
militarys current lack of cultural awareness. First, she argues that anthropology is
largely and conspicuously absent as a discipline within our national-security enterprise
(McFate, p. 26). Secondly, she blames this lack of anthropological study on the U.S.
militarys failure in Vietnam and its bad experiences with counterinsurgency warfare.
Essentially, the Vietnam War produced a generation of military leaders who decided that
COIN warfare should best be dealt with by avoiding it (McFate, p. 2627).
To fix what McFate has termed a culture knowledge gap (McFate, p. 24) she
has become instrumental in the militarys renaissance of anthropological studies. McFate
wrote parts of the Armys COIN manual, helped plan the surge in Iraq, evaluates
military training programs, and helped establish the militarys Human Terrain Team
program (Stannard, 2007).
This local knowledge gap is particularly pronounced at the tactical level with
regards to PRCMs. The PRCMs instituted by a commander must be calibrated to fit with
the cultural and societal norms of the population they are meant to control. If they are not
in tune with the population, the COIN forces risk further alienating the population,
resulting in completely ineffective population control. All this can add fuel to the
insurgencys fire.
One oft-cited example of this phenomenon in both Afghanistan and Iraq is the
checkpoint that is manned by an infantry platoon with no female soldiers. Muslim
culture prohibits male soldiers from thoroughly inspecting women who come through the
checkpoint. Without a female soldier available, the leader at the checkpoint is left with
two bad choices: to let the woman through without inspecting her, or to inspect her and
inadvertently insult her and her entire family.
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D. LEGITIMACY FACTORS
Current U.S. Army doctrine describes a COIN campaign as a battle for legitimacy
between the government and the insurgents. Therefore, it is important that we understand
the definition of legitimacy with regard to political stability and revolutionary warfare. In
his book Why Men Rebel, Ted Robert Gurr, an expert on political conflict, defines
legitimacy by distilling from the literature three main points. First, according to Gurr
legitimacy requires positive perspectives on politics which makes citizens willing to
support and obey the government. This results in a generalized sense of identification
with and feelings of obligation toward the regime that further encourages compliance.
Finally, Gurr qualifies the definition by stating that regimes are not considered
legitimate if compliance is based primarily on coercion because without that coercion
the compliance will likely not occur (Gurr, 1970, p. 185).
Simplifying this a bit further, we can use the idea of public support. The greater
the level of public support a government receives, the more likely the population is to
follow its rules and the less coercion it will need to effectively govern. The opposite is
also true. The greater the public support for the insurgency the more powerful the
insurgency will become.
This dynamic is reflected in current U.S. Army doctrine. FM 3-24 identifies
legitimacy as the main objective in a COIN campaign and explains that all governments
rule through a combination of consent and coercion (p. 121). This tends to be
particularly true of a government that is facing an insurgency. Since the government
must work to increase its legitimacy in order to increase its support amongst the
population, it must balance this with its use coercive measures to ensure its survival.
These coercive measures can take many forms utilizing varying degrees of force.
They can range from direct military action against armed insurgents or police actions
such as arresting illegal dissidents, to limited coercive measures like press controls and
travel restrictions. Such measures are all designed to control the population and allow the
government to maintain its hold on power. The degree to which these measures are
considered necessary is often proportional to the legitimacy of those conducting these
23
acts, as well as the perceived legitimacy of the actions themselves. The relationship
between legitimacy and compliance is generally a close one, writes Gurr (Gurr, 1970, p.
186).
Often, non-insurgentse.g., the general populationexperience these repressive
measures in the form of PRCMs. In order for the PRCMs to be most effective, it is
important that they be viewed as legitimate by a majority of the population. If they are
not, then as sociology professors Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl argue about the
micromobilization process, the possibility of people joining the insurgency, may be
more likely to occur the more repression is considered illegitimate (Opp & Roehl, p.
526). Legitimacy issues, thus, must be considered among the most important factors in
the effective planning, implementation, and execution of PRCMs.
Clearly, the legitimacy of the actor and actions are tightly linked and cannot be
thought of separately. These legitimacies have interactive and cumulative effects on each
other. For the sake of explanation, I will treat them separately in the section below, but
they should not be thought of as two discrete categories.
E. ACTOR
In keeping with a simplified understanding of legitimacy as the publics support, I
would say that legitimacy of the actor reflects how the population views the government
and the corresponding degree of support the government receives from the people. This
support can be demonstrated by a strong government with large-scale participation in the
governing process. Legitimacy of the actor refers to the actors that exist and operate on
both the macro and micro levels. When examining actor legitimacy at the macro level,
we are talking about the whole of government. This encompasses everything that the
government does or, as is often the case in a regime facing an insurgency, everything the
government fails to do. At the micro level, the focus is on COIN forces, and particularly
the military and police forces that actually implement the coercive elements of the
governments larger COIN campaign.

24
According to population-centric COIN theory, it is self-defeating to use coercive
measures that reduce the governments legitimacy because that will force the government
to have to use even more coercive measures to stay in power. This type of behavior leads
a government, through its own incompetence, to grant an insurgency the political
opportunities it needs to grow and prosper.
F. GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY
The idea of governmental legitimacy is central to population-centric COIN
planning, but it is also important to tactical level commanders involved in the COIN
fight. Even though Lieutenants or Captains have a very limited ability to affect the
governments legitimacy, aside from ensuring the professional behavior of their
subordinates, the governments legitimacy effects how they must operate. It should
affect how we select, implement, and execute our PRCMs.
The first step is to determine the governments degree of legitimacy. This can be
gauged in many ways, via public opinion polls, by holding town hall meetings, by
interviewing traditional leaders (tribal, religious, etc.), by reading local newspapers, and
simply by interacting with the population. To aid in this, FM 3-24 lists the following
indicators of legitimate governments: the ability to provide for the populations security;
political leaders who are chosen in a manner that is considered fair and just by a majority;
a high level of participation in the political process; a culturally acceptable level of
corruption; a culturally acceptable level of political, social, and economic development;
and regime acceptance by important social institutions (FM 3-24, p. 121).
The government must then be responsive to the needs of the population. It must
seek to meet the populations basic needs related to security, shelter, food, public
sanitation, etc. There has been considerable attention paid recently to Abraham
Maslows Hierarchy of Needs with the aim of using this to develop a methodology for
determining and prioritizing the populations needs in a COIN environment.
However, while meeting basic needs can alleviate some of the populations initial
problems, in order to ensure longer-term stability the government must also address the
populations legitimate grievances regarding its governance. One approach is to bring
25
political dissidents into the government. Another approach is to create a transparent set
of governmental checks and balances, possibly administered by an outside organization
such as the UN, which is responsive to the population and seen as a forum for redress
against governmental misdeeds or incompetence. However, to work this approach must
be perceived by the population to have the ability to affect change.
Not only will these steps increase legitimacy, they have the added benefit of
improving citizens lives, eliminating issues that insurgents exploit, creating
governmental buy-in from political dissidents and their followers and, most importantly,
reducing the insurgencys appeal. This, in turn, reduces the manpower pool from which
the insurgency can draw. These changes also enable the citizens to go from
actively/passively supporting the insurgency to actively/passively supporting the
government. Essentially, doing this achieves the exact opposite of what the insurgency is
trying to do to the government.
On an international level, as the government gains legitimacy it can attract
support and recognition from abroad. Aid and other types of support often follow as a
government gains or regains its footing. Oftentimes this occurs after an election or when
there is a sustained period of relative stability and only limited episodes of violence. This
reinforces the governments legitimacy and adds to the momentum it needs to secure
public support.
G. COIN FORCE LEGITIMACY
The second actor of relevance is the COIN force. I use the term COIN force to
designate the forces that carry out the military and policing functions in a COIN
campaign. This distinction between the COIN forces and other aspects of the
governments larger COIN campaign allows us to focus on issues that are more relevant
to PRCM implementation. If the force that conducts PRCMs is seen as illegitimate, the
measures themselves will be seen as invalid and the population will resist them.
There are many benefits to the COIN force gaining and maintaining legitimacy.
First, this will build and reinforce the governments legitimacy. Population-centric COIN
theory suggests that with legitimacy comes the support and help of the population. This
26
support and help can best be leveraged through the information the population provides
to the COIN forces. Their willing assistance will take away the insurgents greatest
strength, which is their ability to hide and blend in with the population.
There are some key indicators that reveal the extent of the COIN forces
legitimacy. These include the level of security that it maintains in a given area, the
number of reports of abuses of power, the amount and quality of intelligence which is
generated through citizens voluntarily offering information, and the populations overall
view and assessment of it to name a few. The easiest way to gauge popular perception is
to ask the population and their local leaders for their opinions. Another method is to
watch their interactions with the population. Does the population exchange greetings or
do they avoid contact at all costs?
The single biggest means of improving the COIN forces legitimacy is through
professionalization. Professionalizing the force includes selecting the right personnel,
setting high training standards, instilling the necessary discipline, educating the
leadership, and weeding out the personnel who cannot conform to high ethical standards.
COIN is a manpower intensive task, but it must be conducted by the right people
especially when we speak of increasing a forces legitimacy. As the old saying goes, it
only takes a couple of bad apples to ruin the barrel. A follow up must be to reward the
COIN force members well in order to make them less susceptible to corruption.
Professionalizing an external COIN force, such as foreign troops assisting a
government in putting down the insurgency, presents somewhat different challenges. It is
preferable to have host nation (indigenous) personnel take the lead with PRCMs to lend
the control measures more legitimacy. But that may not always be feasible. In these
circumstances, outsiders need to fully understand and appreciate the local point of view,
be aware of cultural and sociological differences, and maintain discipline. The debacle at
Abu Ghraib shows how the actions of a few undisciplined National Guard soldiers hurt
the legitimacy of the entire U.S. military and, by extension, the U.S. and Iraqi
governments.
27
Hand in hand with professionalism is the necessity for the COIN force to operate
within the guidelines of accepted behavior. The most commonly accepted guide to
appropriate behavior is the law of land warfare. Typically, the COIN force has additional
restrictions imposed on it by higher headquarters in order to control its soldiers actions
with the express goal of bolstering the governments legitimacy. Again, Ricks illustrates
this in his description of Colonel McMasters troops in Tall Afar. Colonel McMaster
focused on the professional manner with which his troops were expected to act. He told
them that every time you treat an Iraqi disrespectfully, you are working for the enemy
and taught them to treat detainees professionally; do not tolerate abusive behavior
(Ricks, 2009, p. 60). As this example suggests, commanders at each level have the
ability to issue more specific (and respectful) commanders guidance to suit the needs of
his specific area.
One theory about how a COIN force should react to insurgent actions has been
developed by Professor Gordon McCormick at the Naval Postgraduate School.
McCormicks theory of equivalent response is designed to help guide a force in
determining the appropriate responses to insurgent actions. He postulates that there is a
spectrum of acceptable responses that reflect the scope and nature of the violence that the
population will not only accept, but will expect. He further explains that if a government
reaction to insurgent action is considered too violent or not strong enough, the COIN
forces (and government by extension) will lose legitimacy (McCormick, 2008).
McCormicks model also helps to illustrate the importance and
interconnectedness of the legitimacy of the actor and the legitimacy of the action. The
actions of the COIN force directly relate to and result in its legitimacy. This is why the
legitimacy of the action can also be thought of as the cumulative effects of understanding
the environment, knowing the local history, being culturally and sociologically well
calibrated, and having legitimacy as the actor.
PRCMs are measures designed to restrict and control the population. Therefore,
these restrictions need to be appreciated as costs (or inconveniences) placed upon the
population. Legitimacy mitigates how burdensome the costs are thought to be by the
28
population. If the people know and understand that the control measures are necessary,
then the population will be much more likely to accept, obey, and support them.
Another way to further mitigate the frustration felt by the population at the
imposition of PRCMs is offered by Anderson and Volesky. They recommend that the
government should publicly define the conditions that must be met before the population
control measures are reduced (Military Review, p. 103). Doing so will give the
population the feeling that they have some control over their future and allow them to
work towards that goal.
H. RISKS INVOLVED WITH THE USE OF PRCMS
PRCMs are a vital part of any COIN strategy. If done correctly they bring many
benefits to a COIN commander, chief among them being the wedge they drive between
the population and insurgency. Ideally, they should help break the cycle of violence, and
generate useful intelligence. But, to be sure, there are also risks involved in the use of
PRCMs. The very nature of PRCMs is to control the population and therefore these
restrictions have a repressive character. Whether it is a checkpoint that disrupts daily
traffic or a curfew that restricts the population to their homes, PRCMs at a minimum are
an inconvenience to the people affected. Initially, when the violence is high, the
population may more readily accept them. But, as violence wanes, the inconvenience
threshold goes down. Any given population will have its own unique level of tolerance
for repression, which, if not managed, can lead to negative consequences.
Professors David Hess and Brian Martin write that social movement theory
(SMT) tells us that repression can result in transformative events, in outrage, and can
backfire. Hess and Martin define these terms in the following way: a transformative
event is a crucial turning point for a social movement that dramatically increases or
decreases the level of mobilization; outrage is the reaction of individuals to events
perceived as unjust, illegitimate, or otherwise inappropriate; and backfire is a public
reaction of outrage to an event that is publicized and perceived as unjust (Hess &
Martin, p. 2).
29
A recent and easy example of a transformative event, which created outrage and
had a significant backfire effect, is the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib. Although
there is no way to know the numbers of Iraqis who became insurgents because of Abu
Ghraib, it is commonly agreed that the scandal gave a significant boost to the insurgency
and hurt the legitimacy of the coalition.
The same phenomenon can happen if PRCMs are not carried out correctly. The
misapplication or poor implementation of a PRCM can turn a local population against the
COIN campaign. A proper understanding of what fits the situation along with continued
assessments of the environment coupled with the cultivation of legitimacy, can help to
mitigate or eliminate this problem.
There are also some tactical risks when conducting PRCMs. Chief among these
risks is that, in order to control the population, we typically force people to congregate
like at a checkpoint. This helps us minimize the resources required to run the PRCM, but
it also gives the insurgents a high casualty-producing target to attack. This is a tactic that
insurgents in Iraq have used to great effect (Car bomb kills 8 at checkpoint in western
Iraq, 2009). In the eyes of the population, we can often be blamed because we set up the
conditions that created this tempting target.
I. INTERACTION OF VARIABLES AND PRESCRIPTIVE
RECOMMENDATION
The social interactions that govern the success or failure of PRCMs in COIN are
varied and extremely complicated. No formula can be developed into a cookie cutter
solution to determine the likely success or failure of specific PRCMs. However, I believe
that there is an interactive relationship between the environment on one hand, and the
factors that lead to or detract from legitimacy on the other. Monitoring this relationship
through continual assessments can help commanders avoid the risks of PRCMs.
Understanding the nature of how environmental and legitimacy factors interact will allow
a commander to successfully utilize PRCMs to their full effect.

30
My contention is that as your understanding and capabilities to manipulate the
environmental factors improve, by extension so do your interactions with the population
and local leaders. This, in turn, should enhance your overall legitimacy. With
legitimacy, it becomes possible to implement PRCMs that will be more acceptable to the
population because they are more effective. In other words, as your environmental
awareness (and actions in relation to it) improve, your legitimacy will increase. This will
have the added benefit of increasing the intelligence you can gather and will result in a
more effective COIN campaign plan. In an optimal situation, these intangible effects will
result in the momentum necessary to separate the population from the insurgents and give
the non-military aspects (long-term economic growth, governmental reforms, etc.) a
chance to take hold.
On the other hand, if COIN force legitimacy decreases through a transformative
event, backfire, or general governmental loss of legitimacyas is currently occurring in
Afghanistan with the election debaclethen working with the environmental parameters
will become more difficult. This will lead to decreased PRCM effectiveness, which will
in turn cost legitimacy. Here a commander has little recourse but to work on regaining
legitimacy at least at the tactical level.
Legitimacy also feeds into how much slack the population is willing to extend
to the COIN force, and can hereby help shape environmental conditions. The more
legitimacy that a force has, the more political, social, and cultural faux pas the population
will accept before some kind of backfire may occur.
Additionally, legitimacy affects the amount of access the COIN force may have to
the population and its leaders. Here, I define access as both physical and mental. The
Nazis had little legitimacy in occupied Yugoslavia and enjoyed a certain amount of
physical access to the Yugoslav people. I would argue that due to the illegitimate way in
which Germany occupied Yugoslavia, no matter how well the Germans manipulated the
environmental factors, they had no real access to the Yugoslav psyche and were never
considered legitimate. This, in turn, created a situation where Yugoslav partisans were
able to operate successfully with the support of a large portion of the population. The
population considered the partisans more legitimate than their German occupiers.
31
J. PRESCRIPTIVE RECOMMENDATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A PRCM PLAN AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
To sum up thus far, we must understand and actively try to manipulate the
environment in our favor. This will give our PRCMs the best chance of achieving their
objectives. As we succeed, we will garner increased legitimacy for both actor and action
which will make our ability to manipulate the environment that much easier.
Understanding and utilizing the nature of the relationship between the environmental
factors and legitimacy is key in establishing effective PRCMs.
A well thought out and synchronized local PRCM plan begins with an evaluation
of the PRCMs organized according to what is feasible at the strategic, operational, or
tactical levels, as per the recommendations in the Anderson and Volesky article. For
instance, it should be easy to discover whether strategic-level PRCMs have already been
implemented. U.S. Army doctrine and the majority of COIN theorists agree on the
strategic level steps that are necessary to affect a successful PRCM plan. The initial steps
prescribed in the literature include conducting a census and issuing of national
identification cards (FM 3-24, p. 521; Galula, p. 66; Anderson and Volesky, p. 102).
Anderson and Voleskys article, which places its greatest emphasis on the strategic level,
offers some additional suggestions, such as: a biometrics registration (tied to ID cards if
possible); instituting a weapons registration program; establishing border entry control
points; strict rule-of-law policies; enforcing a public assembly permit policy; and
economic recovery programs (Anderson and Volesky, p. 102). FM 3-24 advises some
more restrictive measures, such as curfews and travel restrictions that may help with
population control in particularly violent areas or times (FM 3-24, p. 521).
If these measures have not been enacted, it is important to ask why not. Are there
reasons these measures could not be implemented at the strategic level? Or does their
absence represent a flaw in the COIN campaign plan? Either way, local commanders
must determine the feasibility of implementing them on a local basis, which will depend
on the environmental and legitimacy factors described above.
32
A further consideration should be how to incentivize the PRCMs, particularly
measures such as participation in census, ID card, and biometric programs. Based on the
needs of the locals something as simple as a bag of rice, necessary medical care, or cash
rewards may be all that is necessary to get the majority of the population willing to
participate.
Critical to working through the environmental and legitimacy factors is getting
local leader buy-in, both formally and informally. This effort may require extending
extra incentives to these leaders. If done correctly and by, with, or through some facet of
the government, this entire process can help to increase the governments legitimacy and
make future attempts at other PRCMs easier. If you can obtain buy-in from local leaders,
they would be optimal candidates to inform the population about these measures.
At the operational level, it is important to develop your plan and get as much pre-
approval as possible, especially for resources. Nothing can erode your legitimacy like
planning for certain PRCMs, getting local buy in, and then not being able to conduct
them due to resource or legal constraints.
Additionally, your analysis should include how surrounding units areas of
operations affect your area, and how second and third order effects from your PRCMs
might extend to their areas. This analysis is critical to adjacent commanders being able to
coordinate their PRCM plans and will assist in their being on the lookout for indicators of
expected and unexpected consequences.
At the tactical level, selecting your PRCMs should be based on your tactical
assessment combined with your intended objectives. Once you have selected the tactical
level PRCMs to accomplish your objectives, you should run them through the same
vetting process mentioned earlier to establish strategic PRCMs. Again, as much of this
process should be conducted by government representatives as is feasible.
Finally, there is a need for continual reassessment of the effectiveness of the
PRCMs to determine how long they should be continued, and to gauge the positive
and/or negative effects they are having on the population. Assessments will help the
commander be able to determine when and if he should remove the PRCMs.
33
Collectively, this process should help to increase legitimacy, mitigate public
inconvenience, and reduce the possibility of backfire.
There may also come a time when the local government may completely take
over this process, especially the decision about when to remove the PRCMs. In most
COIN environments, it is considered good when the local and national governments are
ready and able to make these decisions. A time may even come when you do not agree
with the governments decisions and that will be cause for another detailed reassessment
of the environment and perceptions related to the governments legitimacy.
34
35
IV. PUTTING PRCMS INTO PRACTICE
To better illustrate how a leader can develop and incorporate a comprehensive
PRCM plan into a COIN campaign, I offer the following fictional narrative account. We
will follow Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) J ones as he commands his infantry battalion, the 1
st

Battalion, from deployment notification through PRCM implementation and beyond.
LTC J ones is a seasoned veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This
upcoming deployment will be his third combat deployment to Iraq. Since his last tour in
Baghdad, LTC J ones has become a real student of COIN theory and history. He has
studied FM 3-24, read much of its recommended reading list, and regularly visits the
Small Wars J ournal Web site (www.smallwarsjournal.com) to interact with his peers on
COIN-related topics.
The soldiers of the 1
st
Battalion received notification that they would deploy to
Iraq one year out from the deployment date. Immediately upon notification, LTC J ones,
along with his Battalion Operations Officer, Major (MAJ ) J ennings, developed a
challenging pre-mission training (PMT) regimen that was dually focused on urban
infantry combat skills and the education of the battalions soldiers on the Iraqi theater of
operations. Because the battalion did not know its exact deployment location, this
education focused on general information such as: an overview of Iraqi history; the
history and practices of Islam; Iraqi cultural and sociological norms and taboos; and
finally, basic Arabic language study with an emphasis on important phrases. LTC J ones
knew that his soldiers would need this information in order to understand the
environment in which they would be operating. The PMT followed this pattern for the
next nine months.
Three months prior to deployment, LTC J ones and fifteen of the battalions key
leaders went to Iraq on a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS). LTC J ones used the PDSS
to hone the battalion in on its pinpoint location, the city of Gharya, which is located in
north-central Iraq. He hoped to obtain as much information as possible from the unit that
they would be replacing.
36
Prior to departure for the PDSS, LTC J ones instructed his subordinates that he
was particularly interested in three areas: intelligence about the area of operations (AO);
a history of the coalitions operations in the area, which he could evaluate through the
prism of his newfound COIN knowledge; and finally, a logistical estimate from his
Battalion Supply Officer.
In terms of intelligence, LTC J ones was of course interested in the AOs insurgent
picture, but he also instructed his Intelligence Officer, Captain (CPT) Driver, to spend
most of his time learning about the local population. This included everything he could
find out about the local history, demographics (ethnic and religious), leadership (formal
and informal), tribal affiliations and interactions, economy, and politics.
LTC J ones had similar instructions for MAJ J ennings. J ennings was instructed to
not only spend time on the operational history of the AO, but to ensure that he learned as
much as he could about the Iraqi forces that the battalion would be partnered with. This
included the Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) that lived and worked in Gharya. MAJ
J ennings, himself already an OIF veteran, quickly picked up the system of operations
inside the battalion headquarters and spent a significant amount of his time meeting with
the battalions future Iraqi partners. He went along with the IA on several operations in
order to observe their effectiveness and evaluate their training levels.
Finally, LTC J ones instructed CPT Greene, his logistician, to learn about the Iraqi
theaters supply system for Army materials. He also wanted information about the local
procurement system. Specifically, J ones wanted to know about host nation contractors
and construction companies. If possible, he wanted to be able to leverage as much local
labor and industry as possible.
LTC J ones had an ambitious plan for himself during the PDSS. He planned on
spending the first couple of days getting an overview of the AO from the current units
battalion commander. He needed to understand the basics of the AO before launching
into what he considered his most important task during the PDSSmeeting the
influential leaders in Gharya. He was able to meet with the mayor, police chief, tribal
sheiks, and some of the influential imams.
37
The PDSS was mostly a success in terms of information gathered but the 1
st

Battalion soldiers were surprised by the extent of violence and the insurgencys grip on
the population in Gharya. They quickly came to realize that the upcoming year was
going to be extremely challenging.
For his part, LTC J ones was concerned that the incumbent unit seemed to lack a
comprehensive and coherent COIN strategy. They seemed to flounder between offensive
combat operations and uncoordinated civil affairs projects under a misguided attempt at a
carrot and stick approach to COIN.
LTC J ones was also very concerned with the IA unit operating in Gharya. Based
on MAJ J ennings report, the IA battalion was not an effective force because the soldiers
were undisciplined, lacked basic soldiers skills, and were only concerned with their own
force protection. This was compounded by the fact that the IA leadership didnt
understand that their actions were making the situation worse.
This was confirmed during LTC J ones conversations with the local leaders and
population. The population believed that the IA soldiers did not care about the people of
Gharya, therefore they were unwilling to help the IA.
Upon returning to the U.S., LTC J ones had his subordinates prepare a PDSS
findings report in an effort to disseminate as much pertinent information as possible to
everyone in the battalion. This report would become the basis from which the battalion
would conduct an assessment in order to develop an initial plan and revise its current
PMT schedule.
As LTC J ones read the PDSS report, he realized that the incumbent units biggest
problem was that it received no support from the population. He further hypothesized,
given the high number and intense violence of attacks against the population, that the
U.S. forces in Gharya couldnt protect the population. J ones needed to develop a plan
that would: protect the population; identify and separate the insurgents from the
population; and finally, cut off the resources (people and materiel) that the insurgency
required to continue its attacks.
38
After much research and many late nights at the office, the 1
st
Battalion staff,
under LTC J ones guidance, developed an initial concept of operations that focused on
the use of PRCMs to accomplish LTC J ones intent. They wisely incorporated continual
reassessments that would allow them to revise their plans as they learned more about
Gharya and as the situation changed.
The transition between the outgoing unit and 1
st
Battalion went relatively
smoothly. The 1
st
Battalion soldiers tried to learn as much as possible during the two-
week transition period.
Upon the departure of the previous unit, 1
st
Battalion began the first phase of its
plan to quell the insurgency in Gharya. The main effort of this phase was to conduct a
detailed study of the local situation. LTC J ones needed to truly understand his AO. In
addition, LTC J ones knew that he needed to quickly improve and integrate with his IA
counterpart unit. To accomplish this, LTC J ones ordered the development of a training
program for the Iraqis. He believed this would pay significant dividends down the road.
1
st
Battalion developed a three-pronged approach to better learning its AO. LTC
J ones had given his unit six weeks to do this, so the steps happened concurrently. First,
the battalion conducted a detailed assessment of the area. MAJ J ennings found that the
1
st
SFG PRC Handbooks assessment tool (1
st
SFG, p. 174212) offered a great start-off
point. J ennings tailored it to what was already known about Gharya and sent the updated
template to his subordinate companies. The companies conducted individual assessments
within their company AOs.
The second part of this approach was key leader engagements across all of
Gharya. LTC J ones put his personal focus here. He worked with higher-level local
leaders such as the mayor, IA commander, Chief of Police, and the most influential
sheiks of each tribe. LTC J ones tried to meet with a different leader or group of leaders
every day. He emphasized this focus with his company commanders by instructing them
to do the same with local leaders in their company AOs.

39
Finally, 1
st
Battalion reached out to the local Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Alpha (ODA or A Team) that was living on the same combat outpost (COP).
The ODA responded by briefing the battalion on its capabilities and mission. LTC J ones
instructed MAJ J ennings to coordinate and facilitate ODA missions to the extent that he
could. The ODA, in turn, promised to share intelligence. This was significant because
the battalion would be able to leverage some of the intelligence the ODA received from
its vast network of informants.
LTC J ones felt so strongly about the importance of training the IA that he set
aside his scout platoon as a cadre of instructors for the Iraqis. Based on MAJ J ennings
assessment of the IA and input from the IA Battalion Commander, a training plan was
developed that focused on basic and collective soldier skills such as: basic rifle
marksmanship, first aid, conduct of dismounted urban patrols, running checkpoints, use
of biometrics equipment, and conducting raids. More importantly, law-of-land warfare
classes were also taught. LTC J ones believed these skills would greatly increase the IA
effectiveness and professionalism. In an effort to illustrate this to the people of Gharya,
LTC J ones invited local leaders to the IA graduation ceremonies at the end of the training
cycle. He believed that this was an important first step in establishing the IAs legitimacy
with the people of Gharya.
During this entire phase, the battalions staff was busy compiling and analyzing
all the information that was being collected. This new information, combined with the
known enemy situation, formed the battalions initial understanding of the environment.
After six weeks, the battalion developed a summary of its findings (Figure 1).

40

Figure 2. Summary of findings
From this summary of findings and a steep upturn in violence, LTC J ones put his
staff back to work to devise a plan of action. His biggest priority was to reduce violence
in order to protect the population. He believed that he could not affect any other change
unless he first secured and controlled Gharya.
In response, the staff devised a PRCM-heavy plan that had four sequential steps.
First, LTC J ones called a meeting with all the local leaders where he laid out his plan to
establish security in Gharya. The plan sought to enforce existing control measures and
enforce new ones in and around Gharya. After explaining his plan, he listened in turn, as
the local leaders were allowed to comment and give their input on the plan.
Not all of the locals were happy with the plan, but LTC J ones assured them that
these measures would exist only as long as the threat level merited them. Sheiks from
two different tribes recommended the movement of some barriers in order to keep their

41
respective tribes together, and the Chief of Police recommended making certain roads
one-way routes for ease of movement and control. LTC J ones agreed and added both
suggestions to the plan.
LTC J ones then asked each of these leaders to publicly support the plan. He
conducted a media blitz by publicizing the plan in the local newspapers, on local radio
stations, and by spreading leaflets. What J ones wanted was for these leaders to
participate in the media events. In exchange, J ones offered that, once security was
established, he would bring in coordinated civil affairs projects that would benefit each of
them. Not all of the leaders agreed to help, but at least a few did, and that was a good
start. These local leaders endorsements would help to legitimize these measures in the
eyes of the people.
Additionally, LTC J ones, along with the Mayor and Chief of Police, established
punishment guidelines for those not following the new rules they were about to establish.
The penalties were to be publicized along with the plan during the media blitz and ranged
from monetary fines to confiscation of property and imprisonment. LTC J ones decided
that to add a further deterrent effect to these measures individual punishments were to be
made public in the newspaper and on public notices posted around the city.
LTC J ones understood that enforcing these measures was important to their
success. He explained this critical requirement to his staff by instructing them to select
only PRCMs that could be strictly enforced. Unenforced control measures would only
spread confusion and reduce legitimacy because these measures would be viewed as
another failure by the COIN forces.
After incorporating ideas from the local leaders, the plan was put into action. The
first phase of the plan started with a surge in operations and forces focused on controlling
the city. The forces used were combined elements of 1
st
Battalion and IA soldiers. The
companies, in their respective AOs, strong pointed areas throughout the city in an effort
to control it. The curfew was enforced for the first time in over a year. This part of the
plan was extremely manpower-intensive and could not be maintained for a long period of
time.
42
Engineer assets from the division and brigade converged on Gharya and built a
barrier around the entire city. In most places, the barrier was made with a large berm. In
other areas where a berm was not practical, the barrier was made from either T-walls or
chain link and concertina fencing. The barrier allowed for controlled access with only
three entry points into the city located in the north, west, and southeast. These access
points corresponded with the main roads leading into the city. They were controlled by
combined U.S./IA units that conducted searches of vehicles and personnel as they entered
the city. In order to accommodate the searching of females, 1
st
Battalion received
eighteen female soldiers to work at these entry points.
The entry points themselves were elaborate configurations with four lanes of
traffic entering and leaving the city. During rush hours, the numbers of lanes, either
going out of or entering the city, could be adjusted to accommodate the traffic. To the
side of each entry point was an open area where detailed vehicle searches could be
conducted. The soldiers who manned these entry points were given criteria on whom to
search. They searched all large trucks, buses, and any car with multiple-military aged
males. The remainder of vehicle searches was conducted on a random basis. The
soldiers would receive different instructions each day as to how to conduct these
searches. One day it would be every third car and the next day it would be every fifth
car. Finally, procedures were put into place that would allow the entry control points to
quickly relay information about wanted personnel or vehicles.
To aid in the vehicle searches, the soldiers were issued telescoping mirrors and
were supported by military working dogs trained to detect explosives. At first, the
searches were slow, but as the soldiers got more efficient, they were able to maintain an
acceptable flow of traffic.
After the barrier with controlled entry points was successfully established, the
companies left their strong point positions around the city and moved to their newly
selected checkpoints. They set up these checkpoints and rerouted necessary traffic
patterns. At first, there was a lot of confusion, but much of that was worked out nightly
during curfew hours.
43
This pattern of life continued for a week while the population was allowed to get
accustomed to the new way of life in Gharya. Insurgent attacks went down immediately
as this operation interrupted their normal attack routines and tactics.
As the population calmed, coalition troops passed around flyers about the next
phase. A combined force of U.S. and IA soldiers, accompanied by cooperating local
leaders in each company sector, went around during the early hours of the curfew (before
10 pm) and conducted a census. This census included taking the typical household
information, biometric data, and the issuance of an ID card.
The coalition team also informed the population about the new weapons control
program that it was instituting. The new rule stipulated that each family could have one
AK-47 rifle per household. These weapons were only for use in home defense and while
conducting neighborhood watch-type activities. The coalition team issued weapons
registration cards that matched individual weapons, by serial number, to the people who
were authorized to carry them.
An amnesty period was set up where citizens could turn in extra weapons for
monetary rewards. The final piece of the weapons control program included random and
targeted searches for violators of this policy. The punishment for breaking this policy
included the confiscation of the weapon in question and either a monetary fine or
imprisonment based on the number of contraband weapons seized.
Additional members of the census team included medical and intelligence
personnel. The medic observed and asked medical questions in order to develop an
understanding of what, if any, medical needs could be answered by a medical civil action
program (MEDCAP). The intelligence specialist asked pertinent questions in order to
gather as much intelligence as possible. This proved to be an excellent source of
information because the population was able to anonymously supply the coalition with
information without fear of the insurgents learning the source.
44
Finally, the teams gave each family small gifts such as fresh fruit or bread,
clothing, a soccer ball, or candy for the children. This helped to mitigate any
inconvenience or frustration felt by the family due to the manner in which the census was
being conducted.
Incentives and penalties were developed to ensure that the citizens of Gharya kept
and used their ID cards. The penalties were mainly in the form of inconvenience. Any
individual who didnt have his or her ID would either be denied entrance to the city or
suffer the inconvenience of spending long periods of time at the ID card center waiting in
line for a new ID. Repeat offenders would be investigated for ties to the insurgency.
Additionally, coalition patrols would conduct random ID checks, which included
certain days where an ID would be required for purchasing items at the market, etc.
These ID checks would have the secondary effect of forcing the COIN force and
population to interact and help them develop relationships. These interactions could also
serve as a time when citizens could anonymously pass information to the COIN force.
The incentives included providing MEDCAP services and other beneficial
government-led aid projects to ID carrying citizens. ID cards were also required for any
employment by the Iraqi government or coalition forces. This was a powerful incentive
as these were the only well paying jobs available in Gharya.
Each night, the coalition forces would bring the information they gathered back to
the battalion where groups of soldiers would update databases, maps, and other
information sources. This slowly built a wealth of easily accessible knowledge that had
never before existed about Gharya.
During this part of the operation, the units were tasked to conduct a continual
reassessment of the situation. This task became much easier as 1
st
Battalion soldiers had
much greater access to the population. Additionally, LTC J ones was able to check the
pulse of Gharya through his continued and aggressive leader engagement program. He
set up a system of checks and balances where the population, primarily through their
local leaders, could report abuses conducted by either his troops or the local IA. To
facilitate this effort, coalition forces rented some strategically placed storefronts around
45
the city in order to give the citizens easy access to this service. LTC J ones felt strongly
that this would greatly increase the legitimacy of the coalitions efforts and by extension
the coalition itself. LTC J ones would then investigate reports of abuses and immediately
rectify the problem if it occurred. He also set up a system of monetary reimbursements to
the population for damages caused by coalition operations.
These storefronts also served as the source for governmental paperwork such as
passports, weapons registration, etc. This gave the population an excuse for visiting
governmental offices and the ability to pass information without the insurgency finding
out. This greatly increased the amount of intelligence received by coalition forces.
At the one-month mark of the implementation of LTC J ones PRCM plan, the
battalion staff produced another report detailing the most current situation (Figure 2).

Figure 3. Reassessment of findings and results
Having secured the control and security of Gharya, LTC J ones then turned his
focus to measures that would maintain and build long-term security. He ordered his staff
to develop a list of projects that would benefit the population using the battalions boots-
46
on-the-ground experience, the results of the assessment process, and requests he had
received through the leader engagement process.
The staff came up with a list of four projects that could make a difference for the
city and its people. Two of the projectsthe maintenance of the electrical power station
and the sewage systemwere larger projects that would take some time to accomplish.
To offset that, the staff picked two other projects that could be accomplished quickly and
could have a more immediate effect. Once again, through local officials Iraqis were hired
to conduct area fix up tasks like basic reconstruction on public buildings and the
painting over of graffiti.
The other project was a series of MEDCAPs evenly distributed across the city
with the goal of having a medic see every citizen for a quick check up at a minimum.
LTC J ones believed that the MEDCAPs were important to showcase both the IA and
Iraqi civilian medical personnel to the population. Iraqi doctors and medics performed as
many of the medical services as possible with the U.S. military only acting in a
supporting role. This helped to not only distribute medical services, but also build
governmental legitimacy and develop further connections between the IA and the people.
It also helped to mark the reestablishment of some pre-war civilian medical clinics as
these doctors continued to practice locally on completion of the MEDCAPs.
Besides the intended results of these projects, the coalition forces started receiving
a lot of information about insurgent forces. The population was no longer intimidated by
insurgents. They did not want to see the gains in their society reverse back into violence
and chaos.
Using this new treasure trove of intelligence, coalition forces started conducting
precision raids both inside and outside Gharya. This further deteriorated the insurgencys
ability to effectively attack the population or coalition forces.
As violence was significantly reduced, internal politics and business interests
started to take on added significance. For example, some of Gharyas businesses needed
to move goods and equipment at night. These businesses were allowed to apply for
curfew-hour movement passes. The Chief of Police reviewed each application, with final
47
approval authority resting with LTC J ones. Other control measures were reduced or
eliminated as the current situation warranted, but always after reassessment and close
consideration was paid to the expected consequences. And again, LTC J ones was the
approval authority for major changes to his PRCM plan.
Another by-product of the reduced violence was LTC J ones ability to shift more
of the operational burden to the IA. This also marked a change in the type of training that
1
st
Battalion would conduct with the IA. Though the tactical training would continue, the
focus of training would shift to staff and leadership tasks, especially intelligence and
operations fusion. LTC J ones needed the Iraqi leaders to start conducting this COIN
campaign on their own.
To help the IA battalion commander, LTC J ones brought him to all the key leader
engagement meetings and slowly inserted him into the spotlight. This made him the
focal point of coalition operations and further increased his credibility among the local
leaders of Gharya.
This process of reassessment and readjustment of PRCMs based on the local
conditions would continue through the rest of 1
st
Battalions tenure. LTC J ones would
ensure that his successor received a full written accounting of what was tried, and what
did or did not work. This detailed operational history could be used by follow-on units to
give them greater historical context for decision making and a basis from which to guide
their future plans.
48
49
V. CONCLUSION
If utilized correctly, PRCMs are powerful operational tools that can be used by a
COIN force to break the cycle of insurgent violence and establish the security necessary
for all other COIN campaign initiatives. I believe that a comprehensive PRCM plan,
instituted across all operational levels, coupled with a deep understanding of the local
environment and local views of legitimacy are key factors for success in a COIN
campaign.
Further research and study is necessary in order to better elaborate on the
usefulness of PRCMs. First, a comprehensive study of the PRCMs used in Operations
Enduring and Iraqi Freedom should be conducted. During the course of these operations,
many PRCMs have been used, both successfully and unsuccessfully. A full accounting
of these operations would significantly add to our PRCM knowledge. The study of these
experiences could have positive operational results as this knowledge would help inform
our decisions during the course of these continuing conflicts. But it is also important that
we conduct this study sooner rather than later, while the commanders and soldiers who
conducted these operations are still in the U.S. military. We need to collect this
information before it is lost so that future generations will not have to relearn these costly
lessons.
Next, it is important to understand that insurgents use PRCMs as well. We must
determine what measures the insurgents are using and then do our best to counter them.
For a good example of insurgents successfully using PRCMs, I suggest Bob Andrews
book The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong
Province, 19601964. Andrews details how the Vietnamese communists effectively used
PRCMs to control entire villages in South Vietnam. A detailed study of the PRCMs that
the insurgents are using in Afghanistan and Iraq will help us better counter their efforts
and defeat them.

50
Third, we must invest in technological research, which will enable us to better
conduct PRCMs. The recent advances in biometrics and surveillance equipment,
particularly unmanned aerial vehicles, illustrates how new technology can significantly
increase our ability to implement control measures. This research should focus on
technology that will, first, increase the effectiveness of PRCMs, and second, reduce the
manpower required to conduct them.
Finally, PRCM background, theory, and new research need to be better integrated
into the U.S. militarys COIN doctrine. It is unfortunate that PRCMs can play such an
important role in COIN operations and yet warrant such a small part of the discussion in
current U.S. COIN doctrine. Increased PRCM doctrinal material will help to expose
larger audiences within the U.S. military to the benefits of correctly implementing these
measures.
The use of measures aimed at controlling populations is not new and yet we have
not established a complete body of lessons learned, never mind doctrine to help us
effectively institute that control. PRCMs have been, and will continue to be, an
important part of any COIN campaign. This necessitates devoting our resources,
primarily through the education of military leaders, towards improving those capabilities
in order for us to be successful in both ongoing and future COIN operations.
51
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55
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