FM 3-57-2021
FM 3-57-2021
FM 3-57-2021
JULY 2021
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-57, dated 17 April 2019.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate
(APD) site (https://armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army
Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).
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*FM 3-57
Contents
Page
PREFACE..............................................................................................................iv
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................v
Chapter 1 CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH OVERVIEW............................................................. 1-1
Role .................................................................................................................... 1-1
Authorities ........................................................................................................... 1-2
Core Competencies ............................................................................................ 1-4
Civil Affairs Missions........................................................................................... 1-6
Branch Characteristics ....................................................................................... 1-9
Branch Principles................................................................................................ 1-9
Chapter 2 CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 2-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 2-1
The Civil Component .......................................................................................... 2-1
Core Competencies ............................................................................................ 2-3
Transitional Governance .................................................................................... 2-3
Civil Network Development and Engagement .................................................. 2-10
Civil Knowledge Integration .............................................................................. 2-16
Civil-Military Integration .................................................................................... 2-20
Chapter 3 UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 3-1
Civil Affairs Contribution to Operations .............................................................. 3-1
Army Strategic Roles .......................................................................................... 3-2
Transition Operations ......................................................................................... 3-4
Decisive Action ................................................................................................... 3-5
Populace and Resources Control..................................................................... 3-12
Homeland Defense ........................................................................................... 3-17
The Extended Battlefield .................................................................................. 3-17
Competition Continuum .................................................................................... 3-19
Chapter 4 OPERATIONS STRUCTURE............................................................................. 4-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1
Civil Affairs Role in the Operations Process .......................................................... 4-1
Staff Integration .................................................................................................. 4-6
Figures
Introductory figure. Civil Affairs logic chart..........................................................................vi
Figure 1-1. Civil Affairs core competencies and missions ............................................... 1-5
Figure 2-1. Government function specialty areas and focus areas ................................. 2-5
Figure 2-2. Transitional governance across the competition continuum ......................... 2-6
Figure 2-3. Civil network development and engagement process ................................. 2-11
Figure 2-4. Achieving understanding ............................................................................. 2-17
Figure 2-5. Civil knowledge integration process ............................................................ 2-18
Figure 2-6. Notional Civil Affairs civil-military operations center configuration .............. 2-22
Tables
Introductory table. New and revised terms ....................................................................... viii
Table 4-1. Example of political, military, economic, social, information,
and infrastructure/areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,
people, and events analysis....................................................................... 4-11
Table D-1. Description of main icon and amplifier fields for unit frames ......................... D-2
Table D-2. Civil Affairs command framed symbols ......................................................... D-4
Table D-3. Civil Affairs brigade framed symbols ............................................................. D-5
Table D-4. Civil Affairs battalion framed symbols............................................................ D-6
Table D-5. Civil Affairs company framed symbols........................................................... D-7
Table D-6. Civil Affairs headquarters elements framed symbols .................................... D-7
Table D-7. Civil Affairs team framed symbols ................................................................. D-8
Table D-8. Civil Affairs elements ..................................................................................... D-9
Table D-9. Organizations and individuals...................................................................... D-12
Table D-10. Modifiers for individuals and organizations ............................................... D-13
Table D-11. Civilian installations ................................................................................... D-14
Table D-12. Civilian activities ........................................................................................ D-15
Table D-13. Amplifier descriptions for control measure symbols .................................. D-18
Table D-14. Civil network development symbols .......................................................... D-19
Table D-15. Civil reconnaissance symbols .................................................................... D-20
Table D-16. Civil engagement symbols ......................................................................... D-21
FM 3-57 clarifies the role of Civil Affairs forces in the execution of Civil Affairs operations with regard to the
missions, employment, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations of these forces. Civil Affairs forces
execute Civil Affairs operations in support of unified land operations in all theaters, at all echelons, across the
competition continuum to achieve unity of effort. A force multiplier for every commander, Civil Affairs forces are
one of the primary resources a commander has to assist in understanding and managing the complex and ever-
changing civil component of the operational environment. Civil Affairs forces are trained, organized, and equipped
to plan, execute, and assess Civil Affairs operations in support of Army and joint operations. Cultural orientation,
regional expertise, linguistic capabilities, advisory skills, civil network development expertise, and civilian-acquired
professional experience in common government functions distinguish Civil Affairs forces from other enablers.
This makes Civil Affairs forces essential to the success of all missions that occur near, among, or with civilian
populations, governments, or interorganizational partners.
The principal audience for FM 3-57 is the leadership of the Army, officers, and senior noncommissioned officers
who command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders of operations across the conflict
continuum. It is also an applicable reference for the civilian leadership of partner United States departments and
agencies.
This manual is written primarily to assist the Army component commands, Army corps, Army divisions, brigade
combat teams, maneuver enhancement brigades, theater special operations commands, and special operations task
forces with the integration of Civil Affairs operations in planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing unified
land operations.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers
operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)
FM 3-57 uses joint terms, where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-57 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an
asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which FM 3-57 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text.
For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows
the definition.
FM 3-57 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (or Army National Guard of the United States),
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-57 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence,
USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610; by email to
cadoctrine@socom.mil; or by submitting an electronic DA Form 2028.
This enhances Army commanders’ abilities to reach the ultimate goals of—
Enabling mission command.
Shaping the operational environment.
Maintaining operating tempo.
Preserving combat power.
Consolidating gains.
Creating effects in the civil component to support the four strategic roles of the Army, which are—
Shape operational environments.
Prevent conflict.
Prevail in large-scale combat operations.
Consolidate gains.
FM 3-57 provides Army Civil Affairs capstone doctrine as a foundation for employment of the force during
all phases of operations. FM 3-57 contains five chapters and four appendixes.
Chapter 1 highlights the roles, authorities core competencies, missions, characteristics, and principles of the
Civil Affairs branch.
Chapter 2 describes Civil Affairs operations, which establish and enhance shared understanding of the civil
component of the operational environment and create effects in military operations. The discussion details
the core competencies and missions executed within Civil Affairs operations that enable success across the
competition continuum.
Chapter 3 focuses on the four Army strategic roles and describes the contribution of Civil Affairs operations
to unified land operations within the framework of the four tasks of decisive action. This chapter also
describes the interactions between Civil Affairs forces and other organizations and operations in the multi-
domain extended battlefield. Finally, this chapter describes the Civil Affairs contribution to achieving
enduring objectives during competition through civil network development and enhanced governance.
Chapter 4 details the integration of Civil Affairs forces into the Army operations structure, the capabilities
of Civil Affairs forces by echelon, and the role of Civil Affairs task forces.
Chapter 5 outlines the role of Civil Affairs forces in integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing partners
and interorganizational elements to ensure unity of effort in support of joint forces in unified action.
Appendix A is a brief history of United States Army Civil Affairs forces, highlighting some critical events
during its continuous evolution.
Appendix B provides a description of the role Civil Affairs government function specialists and the
capabilities they provide in the provision of governmental sector expertise.
Appendix C describes the role of Civil Affairs forces in special operations and highlights the role of Civil
Affairs forces in unconventional warfare, direct action, counterterrorism, and countering weapons of mass
destruction.
Appendix D focuses on a variety of symbols and graphic control measures related to Civil Affairs and Civil
Affairs missions.
United States (U.S.) forces operate in all domains. The diversity of populations makes
the land domain most complex because of its intricate design, which includes cultures,
ethnicities, religion, and varied political settings. This complex design is described as
the civil component of the operational environment (OE). Civil Affairs (CA) forces are
the Army capability responsible for the analysis and evaluation and integration of all
civil considerations.
War is, and has always been, fought among populations. As such, no military efforts can
be divorced from those populations and the effects on those populations. From the early
days of U.S. military operations—beginning with the American Revolution and continuing
to present day—U.S. Soldiers have been charged with understanding, assisting, or
providing governance over indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) in peacetime, war,
and post-conflict environments. Following World War II, the U.S. military established
military governments in Korea, Japan, and Germany. More recently, CA forces supported
civil administrations in Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria by conducting a broad range
of Civil Affairs operations (CAO), supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) mission,
and meeting DOD component responsibilities to the civilian sector.
This chapter highlights the policy and directive authorities for CA. This chapter also
introduces new taxonomy to describe the role, core competencies, missions,
characteristics, and principles of the CA branch.
ROLE
1-1. The role of CA is to engage and leverage the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or
providing governance. CA forces accomplish this through the execution of the CA core competencies
throughout the range of military operations and across the competition continuum. These CA missions are
designed to provide and enable commanders with the capabilities to find, disrupt, and defeat threats within
the civil component. Threats in the civil component could be ineffective government, infrastructure
degradation, criminal threats, asymmetric threats, and other factors that lead to unstable environments.
Through CAO, CA forces enable mission command, increase situational understanding, preserve combat
power, and consolidate gains in support of the strategic objective of establishing a secure and stable OE that
is consistent with U.S. interests. CA forces are specifically organized, trained, and resourced to address the
civil environment and to integrate civil knowledge, resources, and considerations into decision making during
activities that span the competition continuum.
AUTHORITIES
1-2. U.S. Army CA forces provide the only CAO capability to the Army and joint force. The following
policy directives establish the basis for the capabilities required of CA forces.
1-7. Acknowledging civilian presence underscores the criticality of and the dynamic relationship between
friendly forces, adversaries, and populations. These relationships affect and are affected by daily changes in
the area of operations (AO). Several factors impact each AO, such as competing global and regional
influences; urbanization; failed, failing, or recovering governance apparatus; non-state actors; other state
actors; degraded economic conditions; pandemics; and other health crises. CA forces enable focused insights
and understanding of the complex relationships and influences affecting civil societies, institutions, and
populations within the AO. This enables commanders and their forces to have a clear understanding of the
common operational picture. CA forces provide unique capabilities to engage the civil component, enabling
consolidation activities that are fundamental to the stability of the affected population and civic institutions.
CORE COMPETENCIES
1-13. CA forces focus on the interests; functions; capabilities; and vulnerabilities of populations, institutions,
government apparatus, and unified action partners that reside or operate in and around an AO. The role and
missions of the CA branch form the basis for training, organizing, equipping, and employing CA forces.
The CA missions are the execution of capabilities that allow the CA force to accomplish its role.
1-14. Core competencies define the overall capabilities of a branch to the Army. The CA branch has the
following core competencies:
Transitional governance (TG).
Civil network development and engagement (CNDE).
Civil knowledge integration (CKI).
Civil-military integration (CMI).
1-15. CA core competencies are mutually reinforcing, interdependent, and designed to address critical
operational gaps with capabilities that are not organic to any other Army branch. At echelon, the ranges of
capability and capacity to execute the CA core competencies vary significantly. For example, a CA company
or team will have limited capability and capacity to augment the company requirements. On the other hand,
a CA battalion will have greater capability and capacity to augment the company requirements. In addition,
there are further and more specific capabilities that reside in the higher echelons of the CA force, such as
reachback. As a result, understanding the capabilities and limitations of CA organizations is helpful in
employing CA forces efficiently and effectively. Ultimately, the goal of the execution of the core
competencies is to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the civil component with Army operations to
achieve unified action.
1-16. Figure 1-1 depicts the CA core competencies and functions. The foundation of the structure is CA
missions which are found in all the core competencies in some combination. The central pillars of the structure
are TG and CNDE, which focus the other core competencies through interactions with the individuals and
networks that make up the civil component. Next, the support pillars of CKI and CMI provide structure and
guidance to ensure CA forces work in tandem with the overall military campaign while integrating civilian
partners to create unity of effort. Finally, CAO is the roof which the competencies support. These core
competencies, working in concert, create stability and enable consolidation of gains within the civil component.
The CA missions are housed within the framework of the core competencies and provide execution of CA
capabilities at the tactical level.
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE
1-17. TG is essential for maintaining stability in periods of competition, promoting resilience in periods of
crisis, and assuring continuity of governance during armed conflict. Transitional governance is the actions
taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the range of
military operations. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish a military government when occupying
enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies a military government as a directed requirement under CAO.
common interest. CNDE enables commanders to understand the civil component of the OE. The effects of
CNDE include—
Enabling freedom of movement and maneuver.
Managing limited resources.
Preserving combat power.
Providing the command with options to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component
such as—
Destabilized or failing infrastructure.
Enemy special purpose forces.
Enemy proxy forces.
Criminal entities or unidentified adversaries who aim to create civil strife.
Consolidating gains.
CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
1-21. Civil-military integration is the actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage
relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize,
coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. CMI is essential
to effective integration of operations with commanders and unified action partners to achieve unity of effort.
The establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC), or other mechanisms, enables civil
information sharing and integration.
interorganizational entities, NGOs, and other government agencies to collect and process information that is
needed for commanders and staffs to plan successful missions. Commanders and staffs evaluate civil
information for operational relevance to inform feasible courses of action. This civil information analysis
(and subsequent evaluation) is utilized throughout the core competencies to allow CA forces to achieve their
role of engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing
governance.
1-36. A transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and
organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government that
fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate host-nation authority.
1-37. CA forces enable transitional military authority as early as possible in consolidation areas by applying
civilian sector expertise to those functions normally executed by a civil government. CAO planners prepare
for operations requiring transitional military authority well in advance—in coordination with DOS—to
transfer those responsibilities to another authority as soon as security and political conditions allow.
BRANCH CHARACTERISTICS
1-38. CA branch characteristics are complementary to Army and joint capabilities. Some branches may
possess similar characteristics, but CA branch characteristics collectively allow for accomplishing the role
of the branch. While the following branch characteristics apply to the branch as a whole, individual units
may possess additional characteristics due to unique mission requirements. The CA Branch is—
Governance Oriented. CA forces execute the functions of civil administration throughout CAO.
Civil Component Focused. CA forces are the primary capability of the commander for the
analysis and evaluation of civil considerations during military operations. They enhance the
commander’s situational understanding of the civil component.
Civil Network Engagement Focused. CA forces engage IPI and unified action partners to
establish and maintain relationships, civil networks, and communication channels in order to—
Gain access to civilian resources and information.
Develop comprehensive situational understanding.
Integrate civil capabilities and information.
Enable unity of effort.
Civil Knowledge Integration Focused. CA forces collect, collate, process, analyze, and evaluate
civil information to produce valuable and timely civil knowledge for integration and
dissemination.
Culturally Attuned. Through extensive predeployment study, network engagement, and, when
possible, theater engagement, CA forces are aware of population demographics, cultural nuances,
divergent world views, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes that affect both the civil component and
military operations.
Diplomatically Astute. CA forces understand the sensitive political aspects of military
operations. They establish relationships with formal and informal influencers and carefully
manage those relationships to achieve positive outcomes during diplomatically sensitive
interactions.
BRANCH PRINCIPLES
1-39. CA principles provide comprehensive and fundamental rules—or assumptions of central importance—
that guide how CA approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations and captures the broad and
enduring guidelines for the employment of CA forces. CA forces are the critical capability that the
commander uses to influence, synchronize, and deconflict military operations with regards to the IPI, unified
action partners, and the interagency. CA branch principles are outlined below.
together in formal and informal ways to achieve common objectives. Early integration of CA forces into
plans, operations and campaigns is critical to freedom of action, reduces operational friction, and enables
unified action at the onset of military operations.
This chapter provides an overview of the civil component and then provides a detailed
breakdown on the core competencies and missions nested within CAO to give supported
commanders a better understanding of the capabilities that CA forces provide during
operations.
OVERVIEW
2-1. Civil affairs operations are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness
of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate
underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty
skills normally the responsibility of civil government (JP 3-57).
2-2. Army CA forces have the strategic objective of establishing and maintaining a secure and stable OE
that is consistent with U.S. interests. In order to achieve their strategic objective, Army CA forces execute
CAO across the range of military operations to—
Engage and leverage the civil component (people, organizations, and capabilities) in order to
enhance, enable, or provide governance.
Increase situational understanding.
Identify and defeat threats within the civil component.
Consolidate gains.
CAPABILITIES
2-4. The civil capabilities found within an OE depend on factors related to the IPI, government institutions,
foreign actors, and natural resources encountered in specific geographic areas. The capabilities and associated
resources are internal to all countries and allow for the support of a functioning society. Through proper
coordination, U.S. and partner forces work locally to integrate capabilities within the commander’s plan.
Capabilities include, but are not limited to, those unique to individual areas and—
Economic outputs.
Communication infrastructure.
Transportation infrastructure.
Local resources.
THREATS
2-7. The civil threats found within an OE are primarily related to the threats to civil security. Civil security
takes into consideration the factors of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and
political security. Threats within the civil component take many forms. These include, but are not limited to—
Persistent poverty, unemployment, and lack of opportunity.
Hunger and famine.
Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, and malnutrition.
Lack of access to basic health care and clean water.
Environmental degradation, resource depletion, and natural disasters.
Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, and child labor.
Interethnic, religious, and other identity-based tensions.
Political repression and human rights abuses.
Criminal elements.
Destabilized or failing infrastructure.
Elements aimed at fomenting societal collapse.
Enemy special purpose forces.
Propaganda, deception, misinformation, and disinformation.
At-risk populations.
Other elements or conditions that could lead to a breakdown of society.
2-8. Most threats target social structures within the civil component to destabilize the area. That destabilization
can be used to take advantage of the population or to target U.S. and partner forces maneuvering through (and
working within) the civil component.
2-9. Identification and reduction of threats is key to operational success within the civil component. The
existence of any of these threats to the civil population within an OE is an inherent threat to U.S. military and
civilian organizations operating there. Some of these threats may be created or exploited by adversaries specifically
to destabilize an area to promote threat objectives or hinder the achievement of U.S. or ally objectives.
2-10. The key to defeating these threats is the promotion of local stabilization and governance capabilities and
resources that are developed and leveraged from the CNDE processes. CA elements and staff, at all echelons,
working with interorganizational partners, fully identify threats and potential threats before, during, and after
military operations. CA commanders are responsible for continuous planning, coordination, and integration of civil
and military resources to counter those threats across time and space in the competition continuum.
VULNERABILITIES
2-11. Civil vulnerabilities are those elements within a society that could be exploited by a threat actor or
degraded by a natural event. In any given OE, there are specific, pertinent components that drive power
dynamics, which can be exploited by external powers as openings to gain access and leverage into a society
in order to influence that society.
2-12. The civil vulnerabilities found in an OE depend on a several factors related to resilience.
These vulnerabilities are often associated with the ability of populations, government institutions, and foreign
actors in the OE to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, or recover from one or more of the typical threats to
civil security as discussed above.
2-13. Vulnerabilities vary based on the degree of stability that exists within the specified geographic area
(particularly the degree of stability afforded by levels of civil security, civil control, essential services, and
critical infrastructure). Lack of resources, lack of public confidence and support, and the activities of internal
and/or external individuals or groups who intend to exploit existing vulnerabilities pose great challenges to
those responsible for transitioning to governance or maintaining governance.
2-14. CA forces, at all echelons, identify, classify, and propose courses of action to reduce vulnerabilities
and leverage strengths within the civil component that could affect the overall mission completion. CA forces
accomplish this through CND, CR, and CE. These mission tasks are focused by the civil information
collection plan.
2-15. CA forces (working with interorganizational partners, IPI, unified action partners and other government
entities) will attempt to fully identify the vulnerabilities or potential vulnerabilities. Once military operations
begin, CA forces—using all of their core competencies—will continue to identify civil vulnerabilities and
strengths within the OE. When large-scale combat operations end, CA forces will execute TG, transferring the
OE over to appropriate civil authorities. Once this transition to SCA is complete, CA forces will partner in DOS-
led U.S. stabilization efforts to identify civil strengths and vulnerabilities in targeted operational areas during
competition before they impact the security of the U.S., its allies, and its partners.
CORE COMPETENCIES
2-16. The CA branch provides four core competencies nested within CAO. CA forces may execute
competencies prior to, simultaneously with, or in the absence of other military operations across the conflict
continuum and throughout the range of military operations. The CA core competencies are mutually
supporting. The missions nested under the core competencies are capabilities executed to accomplish the
designated role of the branch. The CA branch has the overall responsibility to perform these missions to—
Enable the commander to visualize the common operational picture.
Consolidate gains.
Extend the culminating point.
Identify civil resources and capabilities.
Understand the civil component of the OE.
Produce effects in the civil component of the OE.
Synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil knowledge into the warfighting functions and other
Army processes.
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE
2-17. The introduction of foreign military forces into sovereign territories often has a destabilizing effect on
the integrity of local governance structures and their ability to control activities within defined political
boundaries. When U.S. forces deploy to remove threat forces from a friendly country (or to defeat the security
forces and governance structures of a belligerent country or non-state actor) they must be prepared to assume
certain governance responsibilities over newly liberated or occupied territories until those responsibilities are
able to be transferred to another authority. In DODD 5100.01, this military government requirement is listed
as the sixth of thirteen specific functions of the Army. In turn, DODD 2000.13 requires the DOD to maintain
a capability to provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian
authorities.
2-18. According to NSPD-44, while the DOS has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DOD has
a requirement to support that effort. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish military government when
occupying enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies military government as a directed requirement
under CAO.
2-19. Within its capabilities, and in accordance with international law, the occupying force must maintain an
orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a legitimate
and effective civilian government.
2-20. CA forces conduct TG to assure appropriate control and the continuation of government functions during
times of destabilization. CA forces assure the effective transition of governance from civilian control to military
control and then back to civilian control as smoothly and efficiently as possible. All CA missions are essential
to proper execution of TG, but TG has two primary missions, which are—
Provide transitional military authority.
Provide SCA.
2-21. These missions give the Army the capability to better understand its military government role and to execute
the legal responsibilities to the residents of liberated and occupied territories defined by international law and,
specifically, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict and the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. DODD 5100.01
mandates that the DOD maintains the capability to conduct military government operations. The DOD supports
this mandate through TG.
2-22. CA forces providing TG use CMI, and the developed civil networks within the AO to support the
establishment of SCA or transitional military authority that will enable the accomplishment of U.S. military
objectives. SCA and transitional military authority support the whole of government approach and U.S.
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power abroad through execution
of governance tasks mandated by U.S. policy and international law.
GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE
2-23. CA forces have two distinct areas of expertise which are interrelated:
Governance.
Government functions.
2-24. Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by
which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (JP 3-24).
Governance speaks to the administration of control by authorities exercising the role of the government.
Government functions, however, refers to the structure that is used to conduct governance. That structure
includes all the public systems used to create laws, administer justice, provide essential services, and maintain
order. Expertise in government functions, therefore, is an expertise in those systems. Expertise in governance,
however, is an understanding of how those systems are related and utilized to provide for the needs of a
population.
Governance
2-25. Officers and noncommissioned officers provide governance expertise, while government function
specialties within CA formations are the vehicle for the provision of government function expertise. Further,
commanders and unified action partners have access to governmental sector expertise in the form of
government function specialists, who have extensive civilian experience in provision of specific civil sectors.
2-26. CA forces provide TG expertise to military commanders to enable and enhance options for interacting
with and influencing civil populations and institutions. CA forces execute TG through understanding the civil
factors throughout the competition continuum. These civil factors include, but are not limited to—
Security.
Justice.
Reconciliation.
Humanitarian assistance.
Social well-being.
Governance and participation.
Economic stabilization.
Infrastructure.
Culture.
2-27. CA responsibilities to enhance, enable, and provide governance include—
Developing monitoring and evaluation plans for TG.
Providing government function specialists.
Developing civil networks, as necessary, to provide resources, capabilities, and expertise within
the stability framework to assist in stabilizing the OE.
Providing instruction, mentorship, and expertise to newly formed government agencies, as required.
Assisting in the development of predictive analysis about government and civil sectors.
Developing and updating running assessments of relevant civil networks (which include features,
composition, and structure).
Advising military commanders on civil impacts to military operations and impacts of military
operations to the civil component at echelon.
Advising military commanders on integration of CAO and civil network capabilities into military
plans and operations.
Government Functions
2-28. CA force structure contains civil sector expertise within each of the focus areas, which fall under the
five government function specialty areas (depicted in figure 2-1). Technically qualified and experienced
individuals, known as CA government function specialists, advise, enable, and assist commanders and their
direct civilian counterparts with stabilizing and providing governance expertise for the OE until appropriate
civilian control is possible. Within their area of specialization, they possess the critical skills necessary to
establish, support, or reestablish capability and capacity, as well as understand the regional and local impact
of culture on that capability.
2-29. The preponderance of government function expertise capability is maintained within the United States
Army Reserve, while a minimal capability comprised of the other Army government function specialist
capabilities resides within the active component CA formations.
2-30. Depending on the OE in which CA units perform TG, the missions conducted to accomplish TG are
distinct, complementary, and performed with varying levels of frequency, magnitude, and concentration.
CA forces provide expertise in civilian sector functions and stability function tasks that are normally the
responsibility of civilian authorities in order to establish or improve local government capability, or to
perform military government functions until necessary conditions are established. The goal for TG is to return
governance control to the appropriate civil authorities as soon as possible. CA forces executing TG provide,
enhance, and enable—
The conduct of governance.
Building capabilities and capacity.
Administrative control.
Sustainability.
Resources development.
Transition of the AO to civil control.
2-31. Figure 2-2 illustrates the implementation of TG across the competition continuum.
2-32. CA forces are trained, educated, and organized to provide commanders with governance expertise,
support host-nation civil administration, and execute the functions of a civil administration. TG is enabled
by the CA core competencies of CNDE, CKI, and CMI to effectively gain situational understanding, ensure
CAO are achieving the desired end state of the supported commander, and assess effects in the civil
component of the OE.
2-33. TG executed by CA forces can be different within the same AO or joint operations area based on mission
requirements, the desired end states of the commander, and the capabilities and resources of the established
local civil networks. At the operational level, CA units inside the theater of operations for large-scale combat
operations may be conducting different TG requirements than CA units outside the theater of operations.
At the tactical level, CA units in the division consolidation area may be at a different point on the SCA graph
performing different missions than a CA unit in the corps consolidation area.
2-34. During the competition phase, CA units are primarily providing governance expertise to their
supported military commander and conducting SCA to—
Establish assessments of the civil component.
Create situational understanding.
Compete with adversaries to gain positions of advantage.
Build partner capacity to deny freedom of maneuver or action to near peer adversaries.
Set conditions in theater through persistent and episodic engagement.
2-35. As the joint force quickly transitions to armed conflict, CA forces mobilize civil networks and partners
to enable joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration; populace and resources control (PRC);
and FHA all in support of SCA.
2-36. During the commencement of offensive operations, CA units focus on establishing or reestablishing
contact with civil authorities or civil networks. This enables situational understanding (which enhances the
decision making of the commander), targeting, execution of effects, and reduction of civil interference (which
preserves combat power). CA units can also be allocated or task-organized to engage, assess, and evaluate
the civil components of bypassed population centers to begin the stabilization processes.
Note: These bypassed population centers must meet the bypass criteria established by the ground
force commander.
2-37. CA forces engage, assess, and evaluate the civil components of bypassed population centers through
building and mobilizing of friendly civil networks. These actions lead to preservation of combat power and
extend the operational reach of the supported commander. As units establish area security and designate
consolidation areas, the balance of tasks should shift more heavily towards stability operations tasks aimed
at consolidation of gains and focused on the control of populations and key nodes. The primary stability
operations tasks are—
Establish civil security.
Establish civil control.
Restore essential service.
Provide support to governance.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.
Conduct security cooperation.
2-38. The frequency, magnitude, and concentration of TG performed increases as consolidation area
boundaries extend. The President has the authority to implement transitional military authority and the
SecDef and joint forces commander exercise that authority. At the culmination of offensive operations (when
transitional military authority is authorized) the commander must make the decision whether to exercise that
authority or support a local civil administration that still has the capability to conduct governance.
2-39. The Joint Chiefs of Staff formulate broad policies and conduct initial planning for transitional military
authority. However, CACOM commanders, CAO staff of combatant commanders (CCDRs), theater Civil
Affairs planning teams (CAPTs), and CAO staff of Army Service Component Command should begin
transitional military authority planning prior to the initiation of armed conflict.
2-40. If transitional military authority is exercised, CA commanders establish military government or
provide advice and expertise to the commander and the governor. The commander and governor require this
advice and expertise to exercise functions of civil administration until established transition criteria are met
and/or until the arrival of the designated civil control transfer date.
2-41. If transitional military authority is not established, CA forces continue to provide SCA within occupied
areas and gradually decrease the frequency, magnitude, and concentration of tasks performed as the civilian
authorities increase capacity to levels prescribed by the stabilization plan of the DOS. The goal should always
be to transition control to civilian authorities as soon as established local government is able to stand on its
own and transition criteria are met.
2-44. CA provides transitional military authority through its commanders, governance expertise, and its
government function specialist capabilities. All CA forces are skilled in governance and understand the
importance of the five USG stability sectors to the implementation of governance at any level. These stability
sectors are—
Establish civil security.
Establish civil control.
Restore essential services.
Provide support to governance.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.
2-45. CA government function specialists have additional expertise within each of the USG stability sectors
to facilitate governance. CA forces enable the continuity of government functions by providing a bridge to
the more robust governance expertise of the DOS and other entities.
Note: See Appendix B for more detailed information on the role of CA in governance.
Note: ADP 3-07 provides information on the critical aspects of SCA. Its discussion of movement
corridors and personnel recovery provides guidance to CA forces when conducting these aspects
of SCA.
Note: CA forces can gain a baseline understanding of an OE through several means, which
include, but are not limited to, the reviews of current country studies by other CA forces and
government entities.
2-47. During the competition phase, SCA can complement, support, enhance, and enable security cooperation,
theater security cooperation activities, deterrence, foreign internal defense (FID), and CCDR campaign plans as
a function of stability operations.
2-48. During armed conflict, SCA is implemented through execution of stability operations tasks. SCA is
essential to consolidate gains that are made in offensive operations. In the close area, CA units establish contact
with existing civil authorities and prioritize SCA efforts. As consolidation areas are established, U.S. forces will
increase stability operations. Based on historical data from World War II liberation of occupied territories in the
European theater, a typical sequence of events may look like—
Dislocated civilian (DC) operations and FHA.
Re-establishment of local government.
Provision of emergency supplies.
Public health and sanitation surveys.
Organization and training of auxiliary police.
Issuance of passes for necessary civilian travel.
Liaison with resistance groups.
Procurement of civilian labor for the Army.
Assistance to Army in its relations with the civilian population.
Restoration to nearly normal pre-conflict conditions.
Note: CA is critical to the planning, coordinating, and execution of the above tasks (and others)
with civilian entities. These critical CA capabilities impact the commander’s influence and use of
command and control to consolidate gains within the OE.
2-49. The CA responsibilities during SCA in armed conflict are designed to enable the operational and
support functions of the commander with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation or host
nation (HN). Failure to consolidate gains leads to governance vacuums that will be exploited by adversaries.
2-50. In return to competition, if transitional military authority is not directed, CA units will continue to
provide SCA while gradually transitioning to civilian authorities and decreasing SCA. Continued CMI will
ensure SCA operations are synchronized with unified action partners.
2-51. CA responsibilities in SCA include—
Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the CA functional specialty
areas.
Engage and develop civil networks to facilitate TG requirements.
Develop civil capacity and identify resources and capabilities to support the commander’s mission.
Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
Execution of selected SCA operations.
Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs.
Facilitating the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous
government or international transitional government control.
Targeting and prioritizing SCA with inputs from the CNDE process.
Mobilizing civil networks to provide civil security and civil control.
Mobilizing civil networks to enhance emergency management plans.
throughout all steps and is part of the overall assessment activity of the operations process. While figure 2-3
portrays a cyclical CNDE process, all steps may be executed simultaneously.
Commander’s intent.
Mission analysis.
Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
Priority intelligence requirements of supported and CA unit commanders.
Planned branches and sequels to combat operations, including consolidation activities and
transition of governance activities to civil authorities.
2-57. CA forces (including individuals and teams) identify individuals, organizations, and existing networks
of people who are able to provide civil information, produce desired effects, or fulfill resource requirements
in the OE. CA forces are trained and required to develop new, or engage existing, civil networks within the
civil populations, government and nongovernment organizations, the private sector, unified action partners,
and others who reside or conduct business in and around the immediate AO.
2-58. The main outputs of this step include—
A developed civil information collection plan.
A CND plan to identify specific answers to CCIRs and targeting identification.
A mission order or concept of operations (CONOPS) that directs targeted CR and CE that answers
all information resource requirements.
Civil network identifications in an area study.
The use of initial or deliberate assessment and surveys of identified civil networks to confirm
critical civil information.
2-59. Other outputs include, but are not limited to—
Updates to the CA running estimate.
Identification of additional mission tasks to be executed.
Purpose.
Objective.
Effects.
Measures of performance.
Measures of effectiveness.
2-60. All these outputs, once analyzed and evaluated, provide civil knowledge that will be integrated by
CAO staff, at echelon, into the command’s planning processes. This information will be used to update the
common operational picture through knowledge management and inform the warfighting functions as
necessary.
2-61. CA forces work with other information-related capabilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess
communication activities. CNDE is used to understand and shape the information environment to create
effects in the cognitive dimension that support information dominance and freedom of action. CA forces
coordinate and synchronize objectives, effects, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance with
the other information-related capabilities.
Note: For further information and discussion on the center of gravity, see ADP 5-0.
2-72. Civil network analysis is a process that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and
influence of nodes within a civil network through network visualizations and qualitative and
quantitative analytical methods. CA forces conduct civil network analysis (CNA) utilizing multiple
methods of network analysis, which include, but are not limited to—
Organization mapping.
Nodal analysis.
Network function analysis.
Network template analysis.
Critical factors analysis.
Link analysis.
Social network analysis.
2-73. CA forces collate, process, analyze, and disseminate this civil network information for integration into
targeting and operations planning. CAO staff integrate this information into the operations process through CKI
in order to increase the commander’s and staff’s understanding of the OE and to further refine options for the
commander to extend the command influence or to produce desired effects in the civil component of the OE.
2-74. The output of this step is the identification of selected civil networks to be influenced, enhanced,
enabled, and integrated into operations to support the commander’s mission and update the common
operational picture, increase shared understanding of the OE, create freedom of action, and/or disrupt threats
directly or indirectly.
2-77. Civil networks are developed through capacity-building efforts such as training and advising, or
through projects aimed at building legitimacy. Formal governmental networks are aided through SCA
activities and assistance as directed by the command. Building friendly networks facilitates freedom of
maneuver for U.S. and partner forces. This enables initial contact with potential connecting nodes and
streamlines transitioning networks between different CA elements. It is critical that the incoming and
outgoing CA elements update each other on situational understanding and transfer critical civil information
and knowledge. This prevents duplicate efforts by different CA elements and the misuse of finite resources.
This passing of contacts must also occur during the transition between competition to conflict, and during
the rapid movement of CA forces towards the advancing forward line of troops.
2-78. Inputs to this step include analysis of which civil networks are capable of, willing to, and committed
to achieving the commander’s stated objectives and creating effects. This also includes a CND or assessment
plan through which CA forces (in conjunction with unified action partners) assess the civil networks’
capability, willingness, and commitment to achieve objectives and create effects.
2-84. Once integrated into operations, CA forces utilize these civil networks to engage the OE and the
information environment to—
Increase shared understanding of the civil component of the OE.
Increase freedom of action.
Find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component, both directly and indirectly.
2-85. When integrated with ongoing operations, these networks can extend the operational reach of the
commander to access denied, politically sensitive, or normally inaccessible areas, thereby creating multiple
dilemmas for an adversary force. The integration of these networks can increase the commander’s ability to
reach desired objectives within the AO and reduce operational risk to the force.
2-86. When feasible, these networks are developed and expanded during competition by CA forces. Under
the control of a commander, the networks may be further utilized during large-scale combat operations to
conduct CR and CE in their designated AO. These civil networks are developed to conduct the functions of
government, assist in stability, or increase local civil capabilities and capacities. They may also function in
areas where the commander and assigned forces do not have physical access.
Note: Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion on CPB. Chapter 4 describes the process with
which CAO staff integrates civil knowledge into supported commands.
2-89. CA forces are trained and organized to focus on the CCIRs related to the operational variables of political,
military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and civil
considerations of the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations [METT-TC]) in the OE. According to DODD 2000.13, this requires the DOD to
maintain a capability to provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of
civilian authorities.
2-90. CA forces provide the commander with expertise on the civil component of the OE through the
collection and development of civil data and civil information into civil knowledge. Civil knowledge is then
prioritized and integrated into the knowledge management, military decisionmaking process (MDMP),
targeting, other operating processes, and warfighting functions of the command. This civil knowledge is
critical to the commander’s understanding, visualization, and planning for permissive, uncertain, and hostile
environments. Figure 2-4 depicts how data is converted to the achievement of understanding.
2-95. The six steps are depicted in figure 2-5, page 2-18.
CA unit. Upon completion of cross-referencing and analysis, CA forces are assigned to conduct specific CND,
CR, or CE missions to engage or reconnoiter for the information needed.
Note: Chapter 4 provides an example of a PMESII – ASCOPE crosswalk, which is used to collate
civil data.
Note: Due to the large number of interactions with local and host-nation partners, CA units require
a significant investment in foreign disclosure training and training about assets that are authorized
to conduct foreign disclosure.
CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION
2-106. Successful military operations place an increased emphasis on civil considerations in order to
achieve U.S. goals and objectives. By design, CA forces seek out and work with the civilian populations,
private entities, government institutions, international organizations, NGOs, interagency, and multinational
partners that reside or operate in and around an AO or area of interest. Bringing these capabilities and
resources together under the influence of the commander and across the competition continuum, enables
CAO to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize civil capabilities and resources within the area. CMI is the
requirement of the CA force to incorporate the interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of these
nonmilitary groups into military plans and operations to enable unity of effort. CMI fosters unified action
with the military force to achieve a desired outcome through the collaboration, integration, and
synchronization of partner knowledge and capabilities.
2-107. There are two primary CMI actions that CA forces conduct within this construct. CA forces establish
a civil-military information sharing architecture and establish a CMOC. These actions are executed
exclusively by CA forces at all echelons, or by partner or allied forces augmented with properly manned and
equipped CAO staff elements. Properly executed CMI—through the use of civil networks—increases shared
understanding of the OE through information and knowledge transfer with unified action partners, preserves
combat power through increased capacity of civilian administration, and consolidates gains through rapid
stabilization efforts.
boards for sharing with the HN and partners. Presentation of civil products is dependent on OE restrictions,
such as no electricity or other restrictive conditions.
2-110. Information-sharing systems must use the lowest classification possible to ensure the widest
distribution of information needed to coordinate with civilian agencies and organizations operating in the
same operational area as military forces. During large scale combat operations, or in response to a disaster,
the organic military information infrastructure enables CA forces to rapidly establish information-sharing
architecture to store, integrate, and disseminate critical civil information. This is accomplished by tying local
civilian entities into the military system or by providing data connections to civilian systems. This exchange
of information increases the amount of information collected and supports an improved situational
understanding, increased trust with other entities within the AO, unity of effort, and a more detailed common
operational picture.
2-111. At the staff level this architecture is centered on the technology and population-centric systems used
to manage and disseminate data with partners. Sharing this architecture is mainly done in a technological
manner, but also includes people and processes as well. Placing liaison officers within participating
government agencies and host-nation institutions, receiving liaison officers from other government agencies
placed inside commands, and conducting scheduled information-sharing meetings and other interactions are
key to achieving CMI.
2-112. Information-sharing architecture also includes working groups and coordination groups. The United
Nations cluster system is an example of a coordination group and is a common system established to coordinate
efforts following disasters. CA liaison officers assigned to participate in the United Nations cluster system (and
other information-sharing platforms) should be empowered by their command to freely disseminate properly
vetted and releasable civil knowledge products that are beneficial to the response effort. Liaison officers should
be placed within other governmental organizations, such as the DOS or the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). In addition, liaison officers from organizations such as USAID and the
DOS, should be placed in the command for seamless planning and coordination.
Note: For more information on the United Nations cluster system, see FM 3-07.
2-113. In large-scale combat operations, a supported CCDR might elect to establish a joint interagency
coordination group or joint interagency task force tailored to meet the operational requirements of the
combatant command. The joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) provides the
CCDR with the capability to collaborate, at the operational level, with civilian USG departments and
agencies. The joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) complements the interagency
coordination that takes place at the national strategic level through the DOD, National Security Council, and
Homeland Security Council systems. Members participate in deliberate planning and crisis action planning
and provide links back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts
of civilian USG departments and agencies.
Note: Due to the large number of interactions with local and host-nation partners, CA units require
a significant investment in foreign disclosure training and assets that are authorized to conduct
foreign disclosure.
in an effort to enable unified action. This is a critical requirement in unified land operations during all phases of
operations and across the competition continuum. The CMOC is critical in the integration, coordination and
synchronization of CMI, CAO, and CMO in—
Defense support to stabilization during competition.
Joint reception.
Staging onward movement and integration during transition to armed conflict.
Consolidation activities, defense support to stabilization, and TG in rear areas (within transitional
military authority or SCA, as appropriate) during armed conflict and return to competition.
2-116. During unified land operations conditions may shift from offense to defense to stabilization, and
multiple conditions can exist simultaneously within an AO. CMOCs are an asset for the commander in their
role of collecting, analyzing, and evaluating information from multiple sources to track and understand
changing conditions. They can also play a role in planning future operations by integrating with stabilization
focused departments, agencies, and organizations.
Generate broad-spectrum information regarding the civil component, which commanders use to
develop an understanding of their OE.
Support the commander and associated S-9, G-9, and J-9 staff elements by enabling consolidation
of gains through planning and conduct of the minimum-essential stability operations tasks to
establish civil security and provide immediate needs where they exist as a result of combat
operations.
2-118. The ability of the CMOC to coordinate directly with local government is often limited to the tactical
level. When coordinating with the local government, CMOCs initiate PRC measures, humanitarian
assistance, stability operations tasks, and other stabilization activities designated by the commander.
Coordination with the civil component (such as IPI, international organizations, NGOs) the private sector,
and the interagency, is minimized given the urgency of defeating lethal threats.
2-119. During conditions that favor primarily defensive operations, CMOCs become static, much like the
units they support. When static, CMOCs—
Can focus on the civil conditions within a specific area.
Increase the amount of civil information gleaned from civil network nodes and ground forces
operating in the area, the longer the CMOCs remain static.
During mobile defense, work to establish, maintain, or hand off communication with civil entities
to ensure the planning for and conduct of minimum-stability tasks.
Support the commander and associated S-9, G-9, and J-9 staff elements by enabling consolidation
of gains through planning for and conduct of minimum-essential stability operations tasks to
establish civil security and provide immediate needs where they exist as a result of combat
operations.
Coordinate with entities within the civil component (such as IPI, international organizations,
NGOs, and the interagency) to—
Identify threats to the civil populace.
Execute TG.
Coordinate civil capabilities and resources to support the commander’s mission.
2-120. Developed and integrated civil networks allow the commander to maintain influence over those
areas that might need to be bypassed or vacated during mobile defense. CMOCs also plan and direct
minimum-essential stability operations where the need exists because of combat operations. During defense,
coordination with civil components (such as IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and the interagency) is
essential and urgent. This is due to the importance of defeating lethal threats within the civil component, and
the need to rapidly and effectively consolidate gains to free resources for prosecuting the enemy in other
areas of the OE.
2-121. CMOCs continuously plan for and reinforce stability during operations to enable consolidation of
gains. During conditions where stability operations tasks prevail, a combination of offensive and defensive
operations will continue, but in lesser proportion than support to stabilization. In such conditions, CMOCs—
Gain the time necessary to establish and reestablish civil networks through CA units of action
within the civil component.
Plan for civil component assessments.
Recommend initial procedures necessary for commanders to expand beyond the minimum-
essential stability operations tasks and conduct the full range of stability operations tasks.
Provide greater visualization of the civil component of the OE to the commander to enable
effective mission planning.
2-122. CMOCs orchestrate assessments and recommend initial procedures necessary for commanders to
expand beyond the minimum-essential stability operations tasks to conduct the full range of stability
operations tasks. CMOCs plan and direct the implementation of PRC measures, SCA, FHA, and nation
assistance to achieve stability in the civil component of an OE. Through the commander, the CMOC has the
latitude and freedom of action (that is necessary during stability-oriented operations) to exercise all its
capabilities. When fully operational, the CMOC provides commanders with greater visualization of the civil
component within an OE to achieve essential stability objectives through unified land operations via the
execution of TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI.
2-123. The CMOC, at each CA echelon, is manned and equipped with the same mobility, communications,
and protection capabilities of its supported unit to facilitate quick and continuous interoperability in high
tempo, mobile, and static operations. It is also capable of locating and configuring itself in multiple
environments to facilitate the integration of, and interaction with, civilian partners who have varying degrees
of mobility, communications, and protection capabilities of their own. Finally, the CMOC is capable of
safeguarding the collection, storage, and transmission of sensitive or classified information in all operations.
According to ADP 3-0, unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains,
and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in
sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability
operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions
for favorable conflict resolution. The goal of unified land operations is to establish
conditions that achieve the end state of the joint force command by applying land
power as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy.
This chapter details CA support to the Army’s strategic roles as addressed through
unified land operations and executed through decisive action. The strategic roles clarify
the enduring reasons for which the U.S. Army is organized, trained, and equipped.
Strategic roles are not tasks assigned to subordinate units nor are they phases. Strategic
tasks should not be confused with the joint phasing construct. The civil population
impacts every aspect of military operations. Failure to plan and failure to leverage the
IPI within the OE will lead to failure of the military mission and failure to achieve the
desired end state.
SHAPE
3-8. Shaping the OE helps set the conditions for successful theater operations. Shaping operations are
designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, assure friends, and set conditions for contingency plans. CA forces
support the shaping activities of the commander through conducting CAO, enabling unified action, and
providing an added stabilizing effect on the OE. Shaping activities precede operation order activation and
continue through and after an operation order is terminated, with the intent of enhancing international
legitimacy and gaining multinational cooperation. CAO, through its support of the elements of decisive
action, enable—
Building civil networks through CNDE.
Conducting preparation of the environment.
Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.
Mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.
Setting the conditions for stability through TG.
Setting the conditions for civil security through TG, CMI, and CNDE.
Increasing governance capacity and capability through SCA.
Improving information exchange and intelligence sharing through the collaborative fusion of civil
and threat information through CKI and CMI.
Developing allies and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations in
conjunction with inter-organizational partners.
Shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries and allies.
Increasing situational understanding of the civil component for the commander in exercise of
command and control.
PREVENT
3-9. Prevent operations include all activities to deter an adversary’s undesirable actions and cease
deterioration of a situation in a manner that is contrary to U.S. interests. These activities are an extension of
shaping operations. These activities are designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit
positions of relative advantage by raising the potential costs, to adversaries, of continuing activities that
threaten U.S. interests.
3-10. Prevent activities enable the joint force to gain positions of relative advantage prior to potential combat
operations. Prevent activities are weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and
to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation.
3-11. During operations to prevent, CA forces provide or enable stability and prevention of future conflict
by supporting Army forces in the performance of the following activities:
Developing and executing flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.
Enabling the Army to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; tailor forces;
and project power through CNDE and CMI.
Increasing information collection through CNDE and CKI to provide detection, focus relevant
collection on named areas of interest, and recognize early warnings and threat indicators to the
civil component.
Building friendly civil networks, influencing neutral civil networks, and degrading threat networks
in the civil component.
Integrating friendly civil networks into operations to—
Increase governance capacity and capability through TG.
Disrupt threats in the civil component.
Increase freedom of action for U.S. forces.
Create multiple dilemmas to obstruct and disrupt threat actors.
CONSOLIDATE GAINS
3-13. CA forces secure the victory by consolidating gains. Army operations to consolidate gains include
activities to convert any temporary operational success into an enduring success and to set the conditions for
a sustainable security environment—allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.
Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving
success across the competition continuum. Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all
phases of an operation. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation conducted while
other operations are ongoing, and they enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest
time span. CA forces enable consolidation of gains through developing and leveraging of civil networks.
These networks have capabilities and resources that can be used to reestablish a sustainable security
environment that will allow commanders to use fewer military resources.
3-14. Army forces consolidate gains by executing area security and stability operations tasks (focused
through the five USG stability sectors) when the operational emphasis in an AO shifts from large-scale
combat operations. Consolidating gains enables a transition from the occupation of a territory and control of
populations by Army forces—that occurred as a result of military operations—to the transfer of control to
civil authorities. Activities to consolidate gains continue through all phases of a military operation.
3-15. CA forces must evaluate the capability and capacity of the HN to provide services. These forces must
also determine the ability of other USG agencies, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors to provide
support. CA forces, as required, will lead and direct these identified capabilities and capacities until the proper
civilian control is enacted. The goal is to address sources of conflict or friction, foster resilience of the HN,
and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. CA forces conduct CAO in support of the
elements of decisive action to—
Conduct SCA and transitional military authority during transitions across the competition
continuum.
Enable situational understanding through CNDE and CKI.
Establish security, create stability, and reduce civil interference through CNDE, CMI, and PRC.
Provide essential services (such as restoration or development) through TG.
Prevent future conflict.
Enable area security through CNDE by the identification of civil network resources, capabilities,
and capacities that can be utilized.
Support stability operations tasks.
Influence local and regional audiences.
Plan and execute measures to transition from area security to civil security.
Note: FM 3-0 provides additional information on the strategic roles of the Army in support of joint
operations.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
3-16. Post-conflict stability activities begin with significant military involvement then, move increasingly
toward civilian dominance—with the diminishment of the threat and the reestablishment of civil security and
civil control. Termination or transition occurs when U.S. forces accomplish their mission, or the President or
SecDef directs that the mission be completed. Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation
require significant preparation, planning, and coordination among the partner nation government, HN,
interagency community, NGOs, and international organizations. During transition, U.S. military forces will
support long-term U.S. interests and strategic objectives, including the establishment of security and stability
in the region.
3-17. Commanders must initiate transition planning prior to, or during, the initial phases of operation
planning to ensure they give adequate attention to this critical area. Leaders may base the criteria for
termination or transition on events, measures of effectiveness and success, availability of resources, or a
specific date. Transitions may occur independently, sequentially, or simultaneously across the AO or within
a theater. Ideally, U.S. forces execute each type of transition according to synchronized transition plans.
Depending on the situation, CAO in transition operations may be—
Terminated.
Transferred to follow-on forces.
Transitioned to other government agencies, IPI, or international organizations.
3-18. CA forces play a critical role in TG planning. Based upon their expertise and understanding of
governance, stability operations tasks, and the USG stability sectors, these planners are the best individuals to
perform this function. Planners must have a clearly identifiable end state and transition of authority, or
termination criteria for the operation to accomplish the task of transition planning. The transition plan prioritizes
and plans for the successful handover of missions to interorganizational partners or a follow-on military force.
3-19. CA forces play a critical role in both planning and executing the transition process. In any major
operation or lesser contingency, CA forces have significant interaction with the civilian populace and the
local government. CA personnel must ensure that the gains made in the AO are not lost in the transition
process. Civil Affairs teams (CATs) are also expected to prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing
projects, coordination points of contact, resources, and other information for incoming forces or appropriate
civil authorities.
3-20. CA forces are heavily involved in the transition process. During transition, CA forces prepare to hand
over their role as the facilitator between U.S. forces and international organizations, NGOs, other interagency
organizations, and local government agencies. CA personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all
ongoing projects and coordination points of contact for all agencies, possible resources, and any other
information that may facilitate the transition process. CA forces support joint, combined, or single-Service
operations from the strategic to the tactical level.
DECISIVE ACTION
3-21. As depicted in figure 3-1, page 3-6, CAO are conducted within the four elements of decisive action,
which are offense, defense, stability, and DSCA. CA forces support unified land operations through all
phases at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Commanders at all levels must plan to
integrate civil considerations during operations. Within the OE, U.S. commanders could and can have
access to indigenous supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources that may be used to support military
operations. Combat operations can be disrupted by uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians
and hostile or illegal actions by entities within the populace. Leveraging, integrating, and coordinating of
IPI and local civil networks with military operations enhances the ability of the commander to achieve a
desired end state.
OFFENSE
3-22. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat and destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain,
resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations impose the will of the commander on the
enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a
physical and psychological advantage. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden action directed
toward enemy weaknesses, which capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation fails to destroy
the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. Executing offensive operations compels the
enemy to react, which creates new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can then exploit.
3-23. During offensive operations, the primary focus is defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of
terrain. During these operations, CA forces must also plan for civil considerations and threats within the civil
component. The full capability of the CA force is essential to and manifests in the conduct of successful
offensive operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CAO support to offense includes the
execution of all four CA core competencies and continuous analysis of the civil component—in terms of both
operational and mission variables—by CAO staff elements. Critical tasks executed by CA forces in support
to offense include—
Providing employment options for CA capabilities.
Gaining civil information and developing civil networks through CND, CR and CE.
Collecting civil information to—
Develop and maintain the civil component of the common operational picture of the commander.
Enhance and enable freedom of movement and maneuver.
Enhance and enable preservation of combat power.
Enable the isolation of enemy forces.
Enable the legitimacy of the U.S. mission.
Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of—
Irregular threats.
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
DEFENSE
3-24. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Normally the defense cannot
achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables
forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action. They defeat
attacks, thereby destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land,
resources, and populations. The purpose of defensive operations is to retain key terrain, guard populations,
protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. Commanders execute
defensive operations to gain time, promote civil security, and economize forces so offensive operations can
be executed elsewhere.
3-25. The full capability of the CA force is essential to and manifests in the conduct of successful defensive
operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CAO support to defense includes the execution of
all four CA core competencies and continuous analysis of the civil component—in terms of both operational
and mission variables—by CAO staff elements. Critical tasks executed by CA forces supporting defense
include—
Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
Collecting civil information through CNDE to—
Develop the civil component of the common operational picture for the supported commander.
Isolate enemy forces.
Fill intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps through CND, CR, and CE.
Providing civil component analysis and evaluation through CNDE and CKI toward the
identification of—
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
STABILITY
3-26. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0).
According to ADP 3-0, “Commanders are legally required to provide minimum-essential stability operations
tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These essential services provide minimal levels of
security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.”
3-27. CAO are inherently stabilizing in the context of U.S. interests and consolidation of gains.
Stability operations—
Support governance by an HN, an interim government, or a military government.
Involve coercive and constructive actions.
Help to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among
local or regional adversaries.
Assist in building relationships among unified action partners.
Promote U.S. security interests.
Help establish and improve political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting
transition to a legitimate host-nation government.
Cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives.
Must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve causes of instability.
Note: JP 3-07, ADP 3-07, and FM 3-07 provide additional information on stability.
3-28. CA forces set the conditions for stability operations by conducting CAO during the execution of
offensive and defensive tasks to preserve combat power and lethality by mitigating the effects of the civil
component on combat operations. The level of CAO support required to execute stability operations is
directly related to the conditions within the OE. The CAO staff continually monitors the condition of the
HN throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian component, and
recommends military government or functional skills required to support this critical phase. CAO support
conventional forces, SOF, USG agencies, and the host-nation civil administration in transitioning power
back to a local government.
3-29. CAO provide the commander with the ability to execute the stability mechanisms of compel, control,
influence, and support in order to establish a lasting and stable peace. TG, CNDE, and CMI, specifically provide
the commander the capability to interface with the civil component. CNDE actions enable the commander to
compel in order to effect behavioral change. TG and CNDE actions provide the commander the ability to control
in an effort to establish civil order and safety. CNDE and CMI provide options to influence in an effort to alter
opinions of friendly, neutral, unknown, and threat populations. The implementation of all CA core competencies
provides support to the civil population in order to set conditions necessary for the instruments of the host-
nation government to function effectively.
3-30. Integration with civil networks in the AO also enables a commander to fully employ the defeat
mechanisms of dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Civil networks provide advanced indicators and warnings
of enemy presence through civil knowledge (which is integrated within CPB to inform IPB of a command)
and targeting processes to allow for more accurate and effective planning.
3-31. The full capability of the CA force is essential to, and manifests in, the conduct of successful stability
operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. CAO support to stability includes the execution of
all four CA core competencies and continuous analysis of the civil component—in terms of both operational
and mission variables—by CAO staff elements. Critical tasks executed by CA forces supporting stability
include—
Recommending employment options for CA capabilities.
Collecting civil information through CND, CR and CE.
Integrating civil knowledge to develop the common operational picture.
Providing civil component analysis and evaluation toward the identification of—
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
Critical links and nodes of civil networks.
Branches and sequels.
Providing government function specialists to enable SCA and transitional military authority
missions.
Providing government function specialist support as required.
Strengthening governance and participation through CMI and CNDE.
Safeguarding civil component resources and capabilities.
Planning and directing PRC, in coordination with the provost marshal and military police that
support transitional public security to promote, restore, and maintain public order, and protect
civilian populations when civil security has broken down or is nonexistent.
Developing mitigation strategies to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and
culturally sensitive sites.
Identifying and tracking damage to civil infrastructure, personal property, and culturally sensitive sites.
Integrating civil knowledge into the planning processes to protect the populace, critical assets, and
infrastructure.
Planning and executing DC operations to address endangered populations.
Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the AO.
Fostering economic stability and development.
Assessing the activities and capabilities of the IPI, unified action partners, and interagency in
relation to achieving national policy goals and shaping the environment for interagency and host-
nation success.
Conducting budgetary programming and management in order to resource stability projects and
programs in support of stability objectives.
Providing liaisons to the interagency, IPI, and unified action partners, as necessary.
Identifying and assessing the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness of CAO.
Through CMI, facilitating the integration, coordination, and synchronization of civilian agencies
and organizations with military forces.
Providing civil component analysis and evaluation to identify root causes of instability.
Providing CAO support to the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegration of former belligerents
into civil society, and providing a secure environment.
Providing CAO support to rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security
forces.
3-32. Figure 3-2 depicts CA support to a corps offensive.
to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. DSCA is a task executed in the homeland and
in U.S. territories. DSCA is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local
authority. National Guard forces are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When
federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under federal military command and
control at all times.
3-34. It is DOD policy that the DOD will cooperate with and provide DSCA as directed by and consistent
with applicable law, presidential directives, executive orders, and DODD 3025.18. Defense assistance is in
support of civilian authorities who retain primary responsibility. DODD 2000.13 states “DOD Civil Affairs
capabilities may be used to assist in domestic emergencies and to provide other support to domestic civil
authorities consistent with law and in accordance with DODD 3025.18, DODI 3025.21, other DOD issuances,
and supporting plans.”
3-35. United States Northern Command and United States Pacific Command are the combatant commands
with standing missions to conduct DSCA providing, as directed by the President or the SecDef, military
assistance to civil authorities including crisis management and consequence management (domestic incident
management). In addition, USSOCOM has responsibilities for countering weapons of mass destruction and
civil disturbance operations in accordance with DODD 2060.02 and DODI 3025.21. Generally, CA tasks
include—
Providing consultation to decision makers through the defense coordinating officer.
Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of DSCA tasks through the
joint task force (JTF) and the defense coordinating officer.
Executing CAO in support of selected DSCA tasks, as needed or directed.
3-36. CA government function specialists may participate in DSCA based on METT-TC analysis.
Note: DODD 3025.18, JP 3-28, and ADP 3-28 provide additional information on the role of U.S.
forces in DSCA. DODI 3025.21, DODI 5400.11, and DODD 5200.27 provide information
regarding the legalities of the collection of data during DSCA.
continuum. PRC operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations. CA forces
provide multiple capabilities to the commander assisting in the development and execution of these measures.
Every CA unit has the ability to access government function specialties capabilities within the CACOM to
facilitate the identification, requisition, and utilization of the full range of CA government function specialist
capabilities, as required, in support of PRC efforts.
POPULACE CONTROL
3-41. Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability operations in the
areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves—
Establishing public order and safety.
Securing borders, population centers, and individuals.
3-42. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure
environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace, resources, and capabilities.
CA forces are critical in the planning, development, and assessment of these control measures to ensure
commanders are provided with the effects that meet mission requirements. Control measures require a
capability to—
Secure borders.
Protect the population.
Hold individuals accountable for criminal activities.
Control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk.
Reestablish essential civil services.
Set conditions in the OE that support stability through unity of effort.
3-43. The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly
with the type of mission and the OE. The OE includes a wide variety of intangible factors, such as the culture,
perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, enemy, neutral, or friendly political and social systems.
These factors must be analyzed and continuously assessed throughout the operations process to develop a
situational understanding of the environment. The characterization of the OE as permissive, uncertain, or
hostile further impacts the planning for and the execution of populace control measures.
3-44. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access
to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures may
include the following:
Establishing border security, including immigration procedures to—
Prevent trafficking of persons.
Regulate immigration and emigration.
Establish control over major points of entry.
Establishing identification procedures, including securing documents relating to—
Personal identification.
Property ownership.
Court records.
Voter registries.
Birth certificates.
Driver’s licenses.
3-49. The term DC is unique to the DOD and not used by the DOS and NGOs. These organizations use the
term internally displaced persons for civilians displaced within their country and the term refugees for people
who flee their country of origin and cross an international border. The following distinctions exist among the
various categories of DCs:
According to JP 3-29, displaced persons is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally
displaced persons collectively. In addition—
Returnees are displaced persons who have returned voluntarily to their former place of
residence.
Resettled persons are a subset of displaced persons. These are civilians who have been able
to resettle in a third country, usually with the assistance of United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the government of their new country of residence, rather than
returning to their previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement.
Resettled persons are usually a very small subset of the original displaced population as
opportunities for third country resettlement are rare.
Evacuees are civilians who are removed from their places of residence by military direction for
reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.
Note: The term evacuee is unique to the DOD and not used by the DOS (except for noncombatant
evacuation operations), NGOs, or international organizations.
Internally displaced persons are any persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects
of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
Migrants are persons who belong to a normally migratory culture who may cross national
boundaries or have fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or
ethnic persecution. Migrants travel to escape economic stagnation and poverty. This is in contrast
to refugees, who travel to escape persecution, conflict, and perhaps death.
Refugees are any persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside
the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail
themselves of the protection of that country.
Stateless persons are civilians who either have been denationalized, whose country of origin
cannot be determined, or who cannot establish their right to the nationality claimed.
3-50. While the following are not categories of DCs, they are categories of civilians with whom military
members may come into contact in an operational area and should be part of this discussion for FHA:
Trafficking Victims. Simply stated, trafficking in persons is modern-day slavery, involving
victims who are forced, defrauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation, such as
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision of, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a
commercial sex act, in which any of these apply:
A commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion.
The person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age.
The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision of, or obtaining of a person for labor or
services through the use of force, fraud, or coercion is for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
Vulnerable Persons. Vulnerable persons are persons who may not have equal access to
humanitarian assistance because of physical, cultural, or social barriers (examples include,
women, children, the elderly, the disabled, ethnic minorities, and people living with an incurable
virus or disease). While this is not a legal distinction, it is important to describe this population,
as it is the most vulnerable who often have the greatest needs.
3-51. In DC operations, controlling agencies (such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross, or the HN)
normally care for the basic needs of DCs. This usually means they provide food, water, shelter, sanitation,
and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable
disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces.
Note: FM 3-39, ATP 3-39.30, and ATP 3-57.10 provide additional information on DC operations.
3-52. During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians—
Those remaining at their homes or places of habitual residence.
Those dislocating.
3-53. U.S. policy dictates the placement of people in one of these categories. The U.S. category may conflict
with how international organizations, NGOs, and the HN refer to the people. Therefore, CA forces executing
CNDE must ensure that the description of each category of civilian is accurate and used the same throughout
the process. These categories become critical as CA forces develop civil networks to support DCs and execute
TG to consolidate gains, enable area security, and increase civil security.
3-54. The first category includes civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians
from other countries. Civilians within this category may need help. If they are able to care for themselves,
they should remain in place.
3-55. On the other hand, DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence hinder
military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing,
and similar items. These needs will be identified through the execution of CNDE, and the civil networks that
are developed can be leveraged to assist with appropriate resources to support DCs. DCs may not be
indigenous to the area or to the country in which they reside.
RESOURCES CONTROL
3-56. Resources control provides security for the natural and human-made materiel resources of a nation-
state, mobilizes economic resources, denies enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the
effectiveness of enemy agents and criminal entities. Resources control measures include, but are not limited
to—
Licensing.
Regulations or guidelines.
Checkpoints.
Border security, to include—
Customs inspections.
Ration controls.
Amnesty programs.
Inspection of facilities.
3-57. Resources control directly impacts the economic system of an HN or territory occupied and governed
by U.S. forces. Resources control measures regulate public and private property and the production,
movement, or consumption of materiel resources. Controlling a nation’s resources is the responsibility of
indigenous civil governments. During a civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and
enforce resources control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stability
operations in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to
economic and infrastructure development tasks.
3-58. Enactment of resources control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be enforced
justly and firmly by the governing authority. U.S. forces will not execute these measures unless the
requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the security forces of the HN, the HN has requested
assistance, and appropriate U.S. authorities (to include the U.S. Ambassador) have granted approval for such
assistance.
3-59. Resources control includes property control which is the control of movable and immovable private
and public property. CA generalists support the lead of the HN by facilitating integration and security while
CA military government and government function specialists support by providing advice, assistance, and
training for host-nation forces executing these missions. Resource control measures may include—
Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (such as food and fuel).
Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop
contraband (such as drugs and natural resources).
Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives
to bring trade into the market.
Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants.
Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and
archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.
3-60. Implementing effective resources control requires the host-nation government or transitional military
authority to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. The message
to the population must clearly convey that the control measures are necessary to ensure the security of the
populace. Enforcement of the restrictions must be consistent and impartial so that the government establishes
and maintains legitimacy among the populace. A well-crafted PRC plan limits control measures to the least
restrictive measures necessary to achieve the desired effect. Continuous assessment of the OE measures the
effectiveness of the restrictions, the attitude of the population toward the government, and the impact the
restrictions have on the OE. As the security situation improves, restrictions should be modified or rescinded.
HOMELAND DEFENSE
3-61. Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President
(JP 3-27). The DOD has lead responsibility for homeland defense. The strategy for homeland defense (and
DSCA) calls for defending the U.S. territory against attack by state and non-state actors through an active,
layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protects the homeland.
The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to
U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland.
3-62. CA forces conduct CAO in support of homeland defense if directed by government authorities. CA forces
possess unique capabilities to assist in the stabilization of civil infrastructure and functions. This includes the
establishment of a CMOC for integration, coordination and synchronization of resources, personnel, and efforts
by multiple entities that are working toward stabilizing the impacted areas. The capabilities provided by CNDE,
CR, CE, and SCA, along with the processing of civil information through CKI enables the transition of
operations back to the proper civilian authorities more quickly.
CYBERSPACE
3-69. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks
of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12). Friendly, enemy, adversary,
and host-nation networks, communications systems, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical
infrastructures are all part of cyberspace.
3-70. Cyberspace has increasingly become a domain that will provide the capability for essential interactions
between CA forces and the civil populace. Social media, internet-based radio stations, internet-based
communications systems, and other advancements have enabled CA forces to conduct information collection,
engagement opportunities, and influence activities using cyberspace resources. CND, CR, and CE might even
be conducted through social media. Given the proper communications resources, CA forces are able to
maintain near constant contact with IPI, multinational forces, unified action partners, NGOs, international
organizations, and private entities while not being able to physically maintain a presence in that environment.
3-71. CMOCs utilize local social media and cyber networks to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize critical
information to unified action partners and to ensure dissemination of civil knowledge to all required entities
within the AO, thereby enabling unity of effort. Ensuring that CA forces are able to use the cyber domain
efficiently will help fill critical gaps in information requirements and relieve the supported command from
providing critical communications to attached CA forces.
INFORMATION ADVANTAGE
3-72. CAO are designed to provide accurate, balanced, credible, and timely civil information to local
officials, agencies, and external audiences. CA forces and CAO planners ensure CAO are consistent with the
themes and messages of the command in order to ensure legitimacy and unity of effort. While the public
affairs office, judge advocate general office, and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces are purveyors of
messaging for the commander, CA forces enable messaging through dissemination of information to
developed civil networks and other civil entities within the civil component of the AO. This dissemination
of information enables developed civil networks to assist in the planning, preparation, execution, and
assessment of targeted effects.
Information Operations
3-73. According to FM 3-13, CAO are an information-related capability. CAO are a capability that
commanders employ to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. CA representation in the IO
working group assists in—
Identifying civil networks to target.
Synchronizing communications media, media assets, and messages.
Providing news and information to the local population.
Provide civil knowledge.
3-74. CAO complement IO and facilitate mission accomplishment by enhancing the relationship between
the civilian populace and the military force. CAO enhance or enable conditions that create a decisive
advantage in the information decision making cycles. It is critical when CA forces are used to support IO,
that CA forces maintain their credibility with the civilian populace.
Public Affairs
3-75. As an official spokesperson, the public affairs officer ensures—through established public affairs
guidance—that the command speaks with one voice and observes operations security. CA, PSYOP, and
public affairs elements use many of the same communications media and present similar messages to
audiences for varied intended purposes. CA personnel engage IPI and unified action partners to influence,
coordinate, and integrate their support for the command’s messaging. PSYOP personnel address friendly,
neutral, and adversary populations to influence. Public affairs personnel address national and international
news media and U.S. forces in order to inform.
COMPETITION CONTINUUM
3-77. Competition is the condition when two or more actors in the international system have competing and
potentially incompatible interests but neither seeks to escalate to open conflict in pursuit of those interests.
While violence is not the adversary’s primary instrument in competition, challenges may include a range of
violent instruments including irregular forces with uncertain attribution to the state sponsor. This closely
corresponds with the shape and prevent strategic roles and is where the vast majority of military operations
are actioned. Winning in competition is critical for the strategic interests of the U.S. government because it
reduces the requirement to deploy and utilize combat forces to achieve diplomatic goals.
3-78. During competition, regional security is promoted by the forward presence of strategic land forces,
accessing potential trouble spots, and enabling partner nations to participate in a community (or network) of
partners to establish or maintain security and stability. CA forces are an economy of force effort to maintain
awareness of conditions within an OE. CA forces augment and enable U.S. embassies or U.S. missions, joint
force headquarters, or a theater Army by building the civil knowledge necessary for strategic leaders to make
decisions.
3-79. CA forces identify critical civilian infrastructure status and capabilities, and areas of cultural
significance (protected targets) in order to develop running estimates for mission analysis and course of action
development. They also identify causes of instability within a civil society and identify potential threat
networks as they develop within the society.
3-80. CA forces engage and develop friendly or neutral networks that enable rapid entry of other U.S. or
coalition capabilities. These forces may also support civil administration during competition to help the
country team develop democratic institutions or to address governmental sectors that CA forces have civil
functional expertise to advise in.
3-81. Civil preparation of the environment is the continuous development of civil knowledge within an
area of operations to help commanders identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated
with operations for stability and security activities. This minimizes the requirement for U.S. Army forces
to conduct some of these actions and facilitates the maintenance or restoration of host-nation governance and
legitimacy.
3-82. A critical strategy for winning in competition is through the provision of effective, responsive local
governance. This strategy uses a whole of government approach which engages the diplomatic, information,
military, and economic instruments of national power. CA forces develop and integrate mobilized civil
networks that are in line with U.S. interests; deny space, resources, and capabilities to threat networks; and
simultaneously provide governance, as directed, to address the hardships placed on the population due to the
destruction of infrastructure during manmade or natural disasters. CAO degrade the freedom of action of
threat networks, reduce their flexibility and endurance, and disrupt their plans and coordination.
3-83. Degrading access to the civil populace, resources, and capabilities places critical threat functions at
risk, and denies threat elements the ability to synchronize or recruit from vulnerable populations. The
application of CAO capabilities in a complementary and reinforcing manner with the instruments of national
power creates critical problems for the threat element. These operations effectively reduce the ability to
engage and mobilize a population in support of the ideals and goals of the threat networks, thereby eroding
both the effectiveness and the will to fight of the threat network.
This chapter describes the CA role in Army operations through CAO planning, design,
and capabilities within the operational framework and defines its integration into the
Army’s operational structure.
CA Soldiers, elements, and units are assigned to, have a command relationship with,
or provide support to Army, joint force, coalition, and U.S. government civilian
headquarters at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This chapter focuses on
the CA role in Army operations. CA leaders and CAO planners must clearly understand
the Army operations structure, planning, and orders production. They must understand
the mechanics that underlie Army operations and the manner in which civil knowledge
and CAO are integrated into the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and
CONOPS.
OVERVIEW
4-1. The operations structure consists of the operations process, combat power, and the operational
framework. This is the Army’s common construct for unified land operations. It allows Army leaders to
organize efforts rapidly, effectively, and in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations
process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting
functions provide a common organization for critical functions. The operational framework provides Army
leaders with conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations.
4-2. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out
effective ways of bringing that future about. Well-considered and developed plans lead to success. Plans for
military operations are based on an imperfect understanding and uncertainty of how the military situation will
evolve once the operation has started. CAO is one tool a commander uses to enhance understanding of the OE.
4-3. A plan does not guarantee mission success. Instead, a well-developed plan ensures the consideration of
multiple competing factors within the OE, adherence to the commander’s mission and intent, and the ability for
leaders and Soldiers to be flexible and adaptable during implementation. In the military, decisive actions demand
a flexible approach to operations that adapts methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures
the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. Following this type
of planning process—whether for offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA operations—offers the best opportunity
for mission success.
Figure 4-1. Civil Affairs inputs and outputs in the military decision-making process
Figure 4-1. Civil Affairs inputs and outputs in the military decision-making process (continued)
4-8. The integration of civil knowledge allows commanders to increase their situational understanding of
the OE and allows staffs to produce plans and operations orders armed with the most accurate and current
understanding of the civil component of the OE. As missions intersect with varying types of civilian activity,
this increased understanding is essential to enable unified action at all echelons and achieve the mission,
goals, and end state of the commander.
INFORMATION COLLECTION
4-15. Information consists of data, in context, to inform or provide meaning for action. Information collection
is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the
processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations
(FM 3-55). CA forces are a valuable information collection and management capability because of their
interaction with populations, government institutions, and inter-organizational partners.
4-16. CA forces collect information through physical engagements such as CR, CEs, area studies, and
assessments. When physical meetings cannot take place due to constraints within the OE, these meetings can
be done via computer or cell phone resources. CR, and CE can be conducted using satellites, computer links,
or cell phone resources. This is done in the virtual context. CA forces also collect information through
integration, coordination, and synchronization with unified action partners.
4-17. CA forces collaborate with other information-related capabilities within the information environment
to ensure synchronization of information collection to meet the priorities of the commander. The S-9 or G-9
CAO staff officer develops a civil information collection plan that supports the information requirements of
the commander or fulfills information gaps in the CA area study. This collection plan is passed down to the
lowest echelons, allowing for collection plans to be developed down to the CAT level.
TARGETING
4-18. According to JP 3-0, targeting is a complex and multidisciplinary effort that requires coordinated
interaction among many command and staff elements. The functional elements necessary for effective
collaboration participate in the targeting working group.
4-19. CA forces provide commanders with options for engagement of the civil component of the OE by
utilizing CATs and partner civil networks. This engagement capability empowers commanders with courses
of action to produce nonlethal effects in the civil component of the OE. Through CKI, supported commanders
are provided with actionable civil knowledge, which is needed to identify and produce—
Targeted lethal and nonlethal effects in the civil component with the least amount of force.
Least disruption to the population.
The most efficient use of finite resources and capabilities.
Leverages in the capabilities and resources of the civil network.
RISK MANAGEMENT
4-20. The Army uses RM to help maintain combat power while ensuring mission accomplishment in current
and future operations. The Army also uses RM to reduce collateral damage to civilians, critical infrastructure,
and noncombatants. According to JP 3-0, hazards create the potential for harmful events that cause
degradation of capabilities or mission failure.
4-21. CAO staff analysis identifies threats to military operations and hazards to the force that emerge from
within the civil component or that will affect the interests, functions, or capabilities of civil sector groups or
organizations. For example, the presence of a large civilian population and its daily activities may create
hazards to U.S. forces during operations. High civilian traffic densities may present hazards to convoys and
maneuver schemes. Planners must assess such diverse elements as insurgents, riots, and criminal activity that
emerge from civil society. Legal, regulatory, or policy considerations may introduce hazards that affect
operations and other activities. Commanders and staffs must also weigh the importance of protecting civilians
from violence during operations.
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
4-22. Knowledge management is performed by the staff to enhance the commander’s understanding and
support the commander’s decision making. Knowledge is information that has been analyzed to provide
meaning or value and is evaluated for operational implications. CA forces enhance the knowledge
management process by producing civil knowledge through CKI. Civil knowledge is produced by analyzing
and evaluating civil data and civil information gained through engagement with civil networks, through CR
and CE, and through conducting area studies and assessments. CAO staff, at all echelons, integrates civil
knowledge into the operations process in order to create a common understanding of the mission and OE.
STAFF INTEGRATION
4-23. The commander’s intent links the mission, CONOPS, and tasks to subordinate units. CAO staff integrates
the capabilities of supporting CA forces into the operation plan in support of the commander’s intent. CAO staff
also integrate civil knowledge gained through CNDE, CKI, and CMI into the operational planning cycle of the
commander all the way through execution of CKI. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of Annex K (Civil Affairs
Operations) to the operation plan of the supported command addresses the CAO scheme of support and
subordinate unit tasks. Paragraph 3 of Annex K also coordinates instructions that CA and other Army forces
execute to accomplish the commander’s intent. The execution paragraph outlines what the supported commander
wants CAO to achieve in support of the mission.
4-24. CA forces execute TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI to enhance the understanding of the OE, visualization
of the battlefield, and decision-making of the commander and staff so that they may accomplish missions
and achieve unified action. In the absence of an integrated CA staff, CA forces assigned by echelon will be
required to conduct the CAO planning requirements. The following CA elements provide direct input to, or
augment, the planning process:
Assistant chief of staff, CAO (G-9).
Battalion and brigade CAO staff officer (S-9).
Civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9).
Theater CAPT.
CAPT.
CAO working groups.
Security force assistance brigade CAO staff section.
CA company staff.
CMOC staff.
CATs.
CAO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other
USG departments and agencies and participating nonmilitary organizations in order to synchronize U.S. and
multinational efforts. Responsibilities of the G-9 or S-9 include—
Enhancing the conduct of CAO by integrating the capabilities of a CA government function
specialty skills into areas which are normally the responsibility of civil government.
Evaluating civil information and data in collaboration with other staff entities to develop civil
knowledge and to advise the commander on recommended courses of action.
Ensuring civil knowledge is integrated with supporting CA elements.
Ensuring civil knowledge, in conjunction with CMI, is integrated with unified action partners to
achieve unity of effort.
Coordinating with the fires support officer on the restricted target list, which should include
cultural, religious, historical, and high-density civilian populace areas.
Participating in the fires targeting board.
Providing options for producing effects in the civil component of the OE.
Providing the intelligence staff officer information gained from civilians in the AO and
information gained about the civil component of the AO.
Coordinating with the surgeon on the military use of civilian medical treatment facilities,
materials, and supplies.
Coordinating with the IO officer to ensure planned activities are synchronized and disseminated
and information is not contradictory.
Coordinating with the public affairs officer on supervising public information media under civil control.
Providing instruction to units on identifying, planning, and implementing programs to support
civilian populations and strengthen internal defense and development.
Identifying and assisting the assistant chief of staff, signal or the battalion or brigade signal staff
officer with military use of local information systems.
Coordinating with the provost marshal to control civilian traffic in the AO.
Assisting the G-4 or S-4 in identifying and procuring services, facilities, supplies, and other
materiel resources available from the civil sector to support operations.
Analyzing and evaluating the effects of civilian activities on military operations.
Analyzing and evaluating the effects of military operations on the HN and its population.
Analyzing HN evacuation plans to propose DC movement, routes, and assembly areas.
Assessing the ability of the IPI to care for civilians.
Assessing the IPI resources to support military operations.
Identifying private sector, NGOs, and other independent organizations operating in the AO.
Identifying U.S. departments and agencies in the AO and their objectives, capabilities, and
activities.
Preparing the CAO annex and its attachments.
Preparing the CAO running estimates.
Participating in boards, groups, centers, and cells to integrate the analysis of civil considerations.
Planning for and determining the requirements and priority of the distribution of Class X across
the civil component.
Coordinating with the G-4, S-4 or, functional quartermaster organization for the storage and
movement of Class X.
Coordinating with the division or corps transportation officer to deconflict humanitarian assistance
convoys.
Providing guidance for the civil information collection plan.
theater CAPT is to provide a dedicated CAO planning capability. At geographic combatant commands that
have an established J-9, the theater CAPT is a critical capability that serves to strengthen the directorate’s
efforts. The J-9 and theater CAPT develop, integrate, synchronize, and coordinate CAO plans, policies,
programs, and operations with theater-aligned CA forces and interagency entities. These are integrated with
and enhance the geographic combatant command’s strategic plans, campaigns or operations, and theater
security cooperation initiatives. Responsibilities of the theater CAPT include—
Developing, integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating strategic and operational-level CAO into
theater campaign and contingency plans in all phases of operations.
Developing—from civil knowledge—the strategic-level civil component factors that inform
operational variables (PMESII-PT) and incorporating them into the joint planning process.
Advising and assisting combatant and Service component commanders to develop, implement,
assess, and execute theater-level, population-centric policies, strategies, and plans for confronting
challenges to U.S. national security interests across the competition continuum.
Providing theater-level analysis and evaluation of civil strengths and vulnerabilities based on
operational variables.
Liaising across military and civilian organizations.
Participating with and supporting the joint interagency coordination group or joint interagency
task force if either is part of the joint staff.
Assisting the CCDR and staff to—
Integrate stability activities and considerations into their theater campaign plans, theater
strategies, and applicable DOD-directed plans.
Incorporate stability activities and concepts into training, exercises, and experimentation.
Incorporate military government operations into training, exercises, experimentation, and
planning.
4-30. The composition of the working group changes based on the level of command, but the G-9 or S-9
should chair the group. Other members of this working group may include the following:
Government sector functional specialists.
Director, CMOC.
CA unit representatives.
Targeting working group.
IO representative.
Medical representative.
Engineer representative.
Provost marshal or representative.
Staff judge advocate representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit’s senior rule of law
officer.
Chaplain or religious affairs noncommissioned officer.
Interagency representative, if applicable.
Political advisor, if applicable.
Public affairs officer.
S-2, G-2, or J-2 targeting officer representative.
S-3, G-3, or J-3 current operations representative.
S-4, G-4, or J-4 logistics representative.
S-5, G-5, or J-5 plans representative
Resource management representative.
Subordinate liaison officer.
4-31. As these lists (and the doctrinal publications that discuss them) are not all inclusive, CA professionals
should constantly assess the battle rhythm of the units they are assigned to, attached to, or supporting in order
to identify those opportunities to engage and provide input to best support the mission of the commander. Some
additional Army and joint boards, groups, centers, and cells are listed below:
Rules of engagement or rules for the use of force working group.
Emerging planning teams.
Assessment working group (plans or future operations cell).
Operations and intelligence working group (intelligence cell).
Protection working group (protection cell).
Promoting the legitimacy of the missions of the security force assistance brigade and the foreign
security force among the IPI.
Understanding civil knowledge of the civil component to update the common operational picture.
4-33. Understanding the civil component of the OE requires comprehension and analysis of civil considerations
within METT-TC. Civil considerations reflect the influence of human-made infrastructure; civilian institutions;
and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct
of military operations. CAO staff organizes data collection for mission analysis according to groupings of
ASCOPE (for example, cities and population sizes, resources, capacities, ethnicities, and cultural nuances as
they apply to the IPI). CAO planners and staff must understand the strengths, vulnerabilities, opportunities, and
threats of the civil component with respect to each category represented by ASCOPE.
4-34. Army forces use operational variables to understand, analyze, and evaluate the broad environment in
which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of
the environment that apply to their mission. Military planners describe the OE in terms of operational
variables. Operational variables describe the military aspects of an OE and the population’s influence on it.
Joint doctrine identifies the operational variables as political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure (PMESII). U.S. Army doctrine adds two variables to the joint variables, physical environment,
and time (PT), to make PMESII-PT.
4-35. The application of the elements of ASCOPE during civil considerations analysis identifies the key and
decisive civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each operational variable.
For example, analysts would apply ASCOPE to the entire concept of economics. The staff would ask the
questions—
Where are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?
Where are the key and decisive structures associated with economic activity?
What are the key and decisive economic capabilities that forces must engage and restore (for
example, banking)?
What are the key and decisive economic organizations?
Who are the key and decisive economic people?
What are the key and decisive economic events?
4-36. These questions would lead to effective CAO supporting plans to the CONOPS of the commander,
identify measures of effectiveness, and provide the basis for troops-to-task analysis.
4-37. An operational and mission variable analysis approach integrates people and processes by using
multiple information sources, collaborative analysis, and evaluation to build a common, shared, holistic
knowledge base of the OE. Operational variable analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach toward
situational understanding, distinguished by an analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE
within each variable. Table 4-1 depicts a PMESII/ASCOPE analysis.
P M E S I I
Land use, natural Religious, economic, rivers and
Designated areas Radio,
resources and ethnic estuaries, electric
National, provincial, of responsibility, Television,
A financial services, demographics, service area/grid,
district and municipality jurisdictions, key internet service
markets, cities, population centers sewer networks,
borders and boundaries terrain, security areas, word of
agricultural, mining, tribal boundaries, water tables,
and party and tribal boundaries, mouth,
manufacturing, traditional meeting irrigation networks,
affiliation areas Coalition bases, newspaper,
salvage yards, sites, national and water distribution
historic ambush graffiti
import/export local parks systems
Infrastructure from Operating bases,
Commercial Parks, club houses, Radio, television, Interstate system,
which any level of provincial/district
centers, sport facilities, satellite reception, rail system,
S governance or political police
banks, energy religious structures, internet systems, power generators
activity is perpetuated headquarters and
infrastructure, historic/cultural/ transmission secondary and
including National, buildings, border
transportation archeological sites, facilities and tertiary roads,
Provincial and district points of entry,
(highways, rail, informal gathering relays, print government
centers, government or gang locations,
ports, airports), places, universities shops, internet buildings, banks,
political buildings, militia, enemy or
processing plants schools, courthouses cafes schools
meeting halls insurgent bases
Response times, Commodity market
Influence control or training, aircraft Land ownership, Social media, interstate
Economic class
communication and boats number land use, water internet, commerce,
system, social
C between the governed and type resources controls,
mobility, tribal
telephone, radios regional economic
and the governing. of personnel, energy resources or television per zones, jail/prison
influences, religious
Monetary policy, Fiscal security, offense controls, food household, capacity,
influences, support
policy, informational and defense production, raw printing abilities, emergency
networks
distribution weapons material mining literacy rate services
Coalition/host-
Political parties or Ministries,
nation Army, Navy, Religious, News networks,
opposition, Regional criminal
O Air Force, Marines, educational, and religious
collective security organizations Ministries, unions,
border police, advocacy groups, organizations,
organizations or national commodity construction firms,
highway police, relief organizations, ministry of public
alliances, religious, exchange, trading medical and
municipal police, government affairs, religious,
intergovernmental guilds, banks, Transportation
national police, ministries, police, tribal, political and
organizations, money exchanges, companies
national worship, tribal, government
nongovernmental government support
investigation family, sports, clubs businesses
organizations agencies
services, gangs
Business leaders,
Media owners,
Defense and ministers, banks, Political leaders,
reporters,
P coalition leaders, non-state entities, minorities, influential Civil servants,
Key leaders, Formal influencers,
ministries, morale business owners, families, religious builders,
and informal political Religious leaders,
of members, labor leadership, leaders, tribal or contractors, local
leaders, religious teachers,
commanders, poverty level, village elders, key development
leaders, judges, clergy prominent
police chiefs, tribal foreign investors, mentors with social councils, engineers
families, tribal
leaders landholders, money influence
leaders
lenders, criminals
Elections, holidays Days of worship, Days of worship,
Lethal events, loss Medical, police,
Elections, tribal planting seasons holidays, holy days, media publishing
of leadership, transportation,
gatherings, provincial harvest seasons births, weddings, dates, project
operations, peace Disruptions of
E council meetings,
operations support,
drought, flood, rain, deaths and bazaar openings, civilian
Service, major
protests and speeches, snow fall or melt days, traditional casualty events,
attacks, crime, construction
religious gatherings, cycles, financial holidays, state opening and
riots, political and projects or
political meetings, crisis, business holidays, religious closing of media
labor unrest, capability/capacity
rallies, trials, debates activity, agricultural holidays, gatherings, outlets,
regional meetings increases
activities, weather festivals information media
Legend:
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and event
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure
MISSION VARIABLES
4-38. During the planning process, CA planners at each echelon provide the commander with analysis and
evaluation of the civil aspects that shape the OE using the evaluation tool known as ASCOPE. The CAO
staff apply the METT-TC mission variables, concentrating on the “C” as the civil considerations aspect of
the AO during conduct of the MDMP. This is similar to how observation and fields of fire, avenues of
approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment evaluate the physical terrain of METT-TC.
The six characteristics of ASCOPE are discussed in FM 6-0.
OPERATIONAL VARIABLES
4-39. The conditions of an OE are described in terms of operational variables. Operational variables describe
not only the military aspects of an OE, but also the population’s influence on it. Army planners analyze an OE
in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time—PMESII-PT. Joint planners use only the initial six variables,
not including physical environment and time.
4-40. The operational variables provide the commander with a systems perspective of the OE. A systems
perspective facilitates Army design methodology and provides the staff with a common frame of reference
for collaboration with unified action partners. Civil data and information for each of these variables that has
been transformed into civil knowledge informs the IPB process, warfighting functions, and the common
operational picture through CKI.
Note: JP 5-0, JP 3-24, JP 3-57, ADP 5-0, and FM 3-24 provide additional information on operational
variables.
AREA STUDIES
4-46. CA personnel obtain, analyze, evaluate, and record information in advance of the need. The basic
evaluation of an area is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil
components of the area in question. The CA area study is a pre-mission study prepared regionally, by country,
or for a specific subnational area within a country, as the baseline research document for CA operational
planning. The CA area study presents a description and analysis of the geography, historical setting, and the
social, political, military, economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national security
systems and institutions of a country. The CA area study uses a combination of open- and restricted-source
materials and, when possible, interviews of people who recently operated in the area. CA personnel update
the information detailed in the CA area study periodically, as required, prior to the receipt of a mission.
CA requires the ability to retrieve accurate and current data on demand. This requirement necessitates a
system to capture, store, collate, and produce this data in the form of a report, which is comprised of all
available collected data at any given time.
4-47. This baseline information is used as the basis for the creation of the CAO running estimate during the
planning process. If an area study for a particular area does not already exist, then the CA force must use all
available resources to develop a hasty study during mission preparation and planning. If unable to develop a
hasty study, it must use similar research and analysis techniques to produce the initial CAO running estimate,
which will be continuously updated over time.
detailed with an ultimate goal of identifying civil interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities that
affect mission outcomes.
4-49. During continuous operations, the results of each type of assessment must be shared and passed on to
follow-on CA forces to preclude wasting time, resources, effort, and good will associated with over-assessing
target facilities, organizations, and individuals. As with all military missions, this task must have a well-
formed, practical plan.
INITIAL ASSESSMENTS
4-50. The initial assessment is conducted upon initial entry into a designated AO and every time a CA unit
moves into a new area not covered by previous assessments. The objective and focus of the initial
assessment should be broad enough to allow CA forces to quickly obtain an updated baseline of the general
conditions within the entire AO. This allows CA forces to validate or refute the information and
assumptions of the area study used in planning, and to update the CAO priorities and civil information
collection plan. CATs conducting initial assessments must always be aware of the security situation.
DELIBERATE ASSESSMENTS
4-51. Deliberate assessments are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities, and
against specific civil information requirements. They are a determination of current conditions, capabilities,
or attitudes within defined geographic areas or social, economic, governmental, or infrastructure systems of
interest. Deliberate assessments are characterized by firsthand observations, interviews, and other tools to
collect information used to make knowledgeable decisions and to determine locations and priorities for
follow-on, in-depth analysis. CATs may use a wide variety of detailed checklists or formats during a
deliberate assessment to ensure they have scrutinized all aspects of the assessment area.
SURVEYS
4-52. The survey is a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during
an inspection or investigation. Surveys are conducted in a methodical manner in accordance with CAO priorities
and specific civil information requirements identified during deliberate assessments. This investigation may
include people, groups, locations, facilities, or capabilities within a location or part of a critical geopolitical,
cultural, or ethnic system. During the survey, the CAT may use a variety of detailed checklists or formats to
ensure it has scrutinized all aspects of the specified entity, location, or facility targeted for survey.
Survey development should leverage operations or research analysis capabilities, if available. The findings of a
survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources.
RUNNING ESTIMATE
4-53. ADP 5-0 describes how running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations
from the perspective of each staff section. Running estimates help to refine the common operational picture
and supplement it with information not readily displayed. Staffs evaluate and synthesize information and
provide it to commanders in the form of running estimates to help commanders build and maintain their
situational understanding. Upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission, each staff section begins updating its
estimate based on information requirements related to the mission. CA forces record relevant civil
information in running estimates. They maintain a continuous assessment of the civil component as related
to current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the mission, commander’s
intent, and common operational picture.
4-54. The CAO running estimate feeds directly into the MDMP—whether conducted unilaterally as part of
CA-only operations, or integrated into the supported unit’s planning process and development of the common
operational picture through CKI. To focus the estimate process, planners first develop a restated mission
statement that delineates those CAO tasks necessary to successfully support the commander’s mission.
The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the CAO essential task (or tasks) and
purpose of the unit that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the
elements of who, what, when, where, and why, as well as the reason thereof, but seldom specifies how.
Figure 4-2, shows the crosswalk of the MDMP steps with the information in the CAO running estimate.
4-55. During course of action analysis, CAO staff ensure each course of action effectively integrates civil
considerations (the C of METT-TC) and present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their
findings impact or are impacted by other staff functions. The CAO staff must be able to articulate how
operations affect civilians and estimate the requirements for essential stability operations related to the
mission. Ultimately, the CAO staff recommends the most effective way to integrate CA, host-nation, and
interorganizational capabilities into combined arms operations to support unified land operations.
4-56. CAO planners and staff use the running estimate throughout the operations process to—
Provide the civil situation portion of operations orders and course of action wargaming
Maintain awareness of the changing situation.
Determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent.
Develop branches and sequels to current operations.
Determine resource requirements for future operations.
Step 1
Preparation and commencement of recording information.
Receipt of Mission
Paragraphs 1 and 2, Mission or Situations and Considerations, such as—
CAO concept of support.
Step 2 Enemy forces.
Mission Analysis Friendly forces.
Assumptions.
METT-TC/ASCOPE.
Step 3
Course of Action Paragraph 3, Course of Action Development.
Development
Paragraph 4, Course of Action Analysis including—
CAO in course of action 1.
CAO concept of support.
Step 4 CAO goals and objectives.
Course of Action Analysis
Analysis.
Risk analysis.
CAO in course of action 2, and so on…
Step 5
Course of Action Paragraph 5, Course of Action Comparison.
Comparison
Step 6
Course of Action Paragraph 6, Recommendations and Conclusions.
Approval
Step 7
Production,
Dissemination, and Update of running estimate to reflect approved course of action information.
Transition of Orders
Legend:
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CAO Civil Affairs operations
MDMP military decisionmaking process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations
ANNEXES
4-57. FM 6-0 describes how staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the
OE; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make
recommendations and prepare plans and orders for the commander. Staffs use annexes as attachments to
plans and orders to provide more detail and organize information. The CAO staff supports the commander
in communicating the commander’s decisions and intent through these products. Key information recorded
in the running estimate informs the orders process—particularly in the functional annexes.
4-58. The CAO staff (G-9 or S-9) refines the CAO aspects of the plan and order by publishing Annex K,
further amplifying the commander’s intent in terms of CAO. In addition to Annex K, the CAO staff is
involved in the development of Annex V (Interagency Coordination), in conjunction with the G-3 or the S-3
and operations staff. In addition, the CAO staff must take great interest in Annex P (Host-Nation Support).
the operation. The G-9 or S-9 is the primary staff entity for contact with the interagency and other entities
within the civil component for civil-military matters.
4-64. Interagency partners may require the establishment of coordination mechanisms. These coordination
mechanisms must be addressed in Annex V. They may include exchanges of liaison officers. They may also
include the establishment of a CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations
center, joint interagency task force, joint interagency coordination group, or other interagency coordination
entities.
Note: The format for Annex V is found in FM 6-0. JP 3-08 provides additional information on
interagency coordination.
warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other elements of combat power to
accomplish missions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities
within their headquarters and across the force through the command and control warfighting function.
These tasks are—
Command forces.
Control operations.
Drive the operations process.
Establish the command and control system.
4-70. CA forces provide the commander with increased command and control by providing an improved
situational awareness through CKI, enabling unity of effort through CMI, and providing expertise in
governance when conducting TG. Civil networks built and integrated into operations during all phases of the
competition continuum provide commanders with a wealth of information regarding the civil component of
the OE. CNDE provides access to information sources, resources, and the ability to produce desired effects
in areas where U.S. forces may have no physical presence. CNDE and CMI also provide the commander the
ability to extend command influence across the operational area and into areas of interest.
4-71. In the consolidation and support areas, CNDE provides access to resources, information, and data that
leads to better plans for SCA or transitional military authority. Identification of civil governance resources,
capabilities, and critical infrastructure enable civil security and civil control requirements. The enhanced
understanding and knowledge promote decisions that lead to more accurate and precise operations in support
of offensive, defensive, or stability actions needed at other locations within the AO. In the close and deep
areas, civil networks developed by CA forces provide valuable civil information and data regarding the
conditions that await U.S. forces beyond the forward line of own troops. This information also allows staffs
to prepare for the consolidation operations, identification of critical infrastructure, and resources that are
needed as the bulk of the U.S. offensive moves forward.
4-72. Through CNA, civil information is used to produce relevant and current civil knowledge. CKI is
accomplished through CAO staff to integrate the resulting civil knowledge into the commander’s decision-
making process to increase the effectiveness of command and control at all echelons and to gain the
information advantage.
Information on DC movement routes; critical infrastructure; and significant social, religious, and
cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities.
Information impacts on the civil component.
Key civilian nodes.
Review of lethal fires packets to ensure that lethal and nonlethal effects of targeting are synchronized.
troops and materiel around the battlefield in a more efficient and timely manner, thereby maintaining
operating tempo. This frees military resources the commander needs to continue the offense in other areas.
INTELLIGENCE
4-82. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the
enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment
(ADP 3-0). Other significant aspects of an OE include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, which
vary with the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection
with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations.
Intelligence is driven by commanders, and it involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting
operations to develop the situation. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
through operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information
collection. The intelligence warfighting function includes these tasks:
Provide intelligence support to force generation.
Provide support to situational understanding.
Conduct information collection.
Provide intelligence support to targeting and IO.
4-83. Interaction with civil networks across the operational area and area of interest provides commanders with a
greater understanding of societal factors and allows staffs to create a more detailed map of the interactions of
friendly and threat actors in the OE. Friendly civil networks provide the commander an exponentially larger
platform for surveillance and reconnaissance than would otherwise be available. Engagement with civil networks
also provides the commander with access to civil information coming from areas where the commander might not
have physical or virtual presence. This understanding empowers commanders with the ability to plan and execute
greater and more effective operations actions against threat activities. Greater situational understanding of culture
and civil considerations also identifies the risks to U.S. forces and the overall military campaign in the civil
component of the OE, thereby ensuring the commander is able to make more timely and informed decisions.
FIRES
4-84. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains
against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks
and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint forces, as well as other unified
action partners. CA forces typically provide effects in the nonlethal realm but also use civil knowledge to enhance
considerations for the use of lethal actions. Targeting is a function of fires and is greatly enhanced by the integration
of civil knowledge.
4-85. Civil information gained through CR, CE, CND, area studies, and other methods is analyzed and
evaluated and the resulting civil knowledge is integrated into the commander’s targeting process. To enhance
targeting the CAO staff provide—
Options for engagement and effects utilizing CA forces.
Identified, developed, and integrated civil networks.
Validate survey control points.
Enhanced governance capability.
Services and recommendations for PRC that protect—
Civilians.
Critical infrastructure.
Resources.
Other noncombatants.
4-86. In consolidation and support areas, CNDE and CMI provide the commander with courses of action to
create effects in the civil component of the OE which support the commander’s lines of effort, mission, and end
states. Partner civil networks provide early identification of threats and adversarial actors which might pose a
threat to local security and military missions. Mobilization of those same networks to enhance governance also
provides the commander an option for neutralizing threat actors locally with minimal resources and damage.
4-87. In close and deep areas, partner civil networks help identify threats and adversaries in the civil component
of the OE which might not be readily visible to military intelligence processes. Partner civil networks provide
commanders with options to neutralize those threats through local governance action, and to identify and categorize
civilian entities and infrastructure which must be protected from the effects of war to the greatest extent practicable.
Information gained through civil networks also helps to fill in gaps in the targeting process, which enable the
targeting staff to provide more accurate and effective targeting to meet the operational needs of the commander.
4-88. During targeting the staff has the responsibility to mitigate the unintended or incidental risk of damage
or injury to the—
Civilian populace and noncombatants.
Military personnel.
Structures and cultural heritage sites in the immediate area.
Targets that are on the—
No-strike list.
Restricted target list.
Livestock.
Environment.
Civil air.
Other factors that could have a negative effect on military operations.
4-89. This will assist the commander in weighing risk against military necessity and in assessing
proportionality within the framework of the MDMP. CA forces identify civilian entities and infrastructure
that should be protected and placed on a no strike list or should be protected with restricted fire.
The commander may issue targeting guidance that constrains and restrains the use of fires by identifying no-
strike or restricted target lists. The no-strike list consists of objects or entities protected by:
Law of war.
International laws.
Rules of engagement.
Other considerations.
4-90. A restricted target list is a valid target with specific restrictions such as:
Limit collateral damage.
Preserve select ammo for final protective fires.
Do not strike during daytime.
Strike only with a certain weapon.
Proximity to protected facilities and locations.
SUSTAINMENT
4-91. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services
to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment
determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by
increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and
exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements:
Logistics.
Financial management.
Personnel services.
Health service support.
4-92. CA forces provide commanders, at all echelons, options for enhancing reception, staging, onward
movement and integration, and for utilizing civilian support channels for provision of military needs. Persistent
or episodic engagement with civil networks, and development of partner capacity through security cooperation
missions allows commanders access to civil information that is critical in planning initial entry and staging
operations. Those same partner civil networks can be utilized to identify and provide civilian resources which
can be allocated for military use and for the creation of partnerships with local governments for the purpose of
enhancing host-nation support that has been negotiated between the U.S. and the HN.
4-93. Sourcing requirements locally reduces the logistical burden on commanders and allows for greater
conservation of resources which are hard to acquire, but necessary for prosecuting the fight against the enemy.
Local resources also shorten the logistic lines, which slow a force’s movement. Host-nation support is civil
and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or
emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 4-0).
4-94. CA forces in the consolidation and support areas partner with local governments and organizations
through CNDE and CMI to ensure that there is no disruption to logistics supply from adversaries in the civil
component. Logistics convoys, especially those contracted locally during operational preparation of the
environment and stability operations, are ripe for exploitation from criminal elements. CA forces partnered with
local civil networks and governments help identify and disrupt criminal enterprises that may be associated with
enemy elements. This action benefits the security of logistics supplies into the close area. Greater civil security
in the rear area frees military resources that the commander needs to push to the forward line of own troops. It
also allows for more reliable logistics chains supporting elements on the offensive.
4-95. During stabilization operations, CA forces and planners are critical in identifying humanitarian needs and
working with local sources and international partners to provide for the humanitarian needs of the population.
Partnerships built through CNDE and executed through CMI ensure that local governance elements always
provide a local face for the diminution of humanitarian distress. These actions help to build legitimacy of the
HN.
PROTECTION
4-96. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the
commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). Commanders
incorporate protection when they understand and visualize threats and hazards in an OE. This allows them to
synchronize and integrate all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces.
4-97. Preserving the force includes protecting the following assets of the U.S., unified action partners, and HNs:
Personnel (combatants and noncombatants).
Physical assets.
4-98. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations so that forces may
counter or mitigate those threats before they can act. However, protection is not a linear activity—planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing protection are continuous and enduring activities. The protection
warfighting function includes these tasks:
Conduct survivability operations.
Conduct support to SCA.
Integrate civil knowledge in the development of security control, area security, and civil security plans.
Execute CNDE to inform the common operational picture.
Develop civil networks to identify capabilities, capacities, and resources that can be used to secure
and protect the force.
Provide force health protection.
Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
Coordinate air and missile defense support.
Conduct personnel recovery.
Conduct detention operations.
Conduct RM.
Implement physical security procedures.
4-107. The nature of the mission may require more CA assets. For example, advising on or conducting the
responsibilities normally performed by a civil government will likely require more CA augmentation to succeed.
The workload rule of allocation shown in figure 4-5, page 4-27, was designed to account for these variables.
Using the metrics provided at the bottom of figure 4-5 helps create an accurate assessment of CA force
requirements based on population of an area in square miles or based on a population within a specific
population center.
Level of
Operational
Support Unit Focus of Functions Coordination
Scope
(Name)
Level of
Operational
Support Unit Focus of Functions Coordination
Scope
(Name)
of the OE. While CATs are generally placed under the tactical control of maneuver battalion commanders, the CA
company headquarters element maintains the ability to develop CAO plans, across BCTs, which are aimed at—
Developing civil networks to create effects in the civil component of the OE.
Establishing support to governance aimed at increasing civil security, civil control, and local authority.
Conducting CMI with local governments, NGOs, and interagency partners.
4-112. While the CA company provides a great asset to the supported commander by increasing analytical
capability for understanding the civil component of the OE and adding support to plan and direct CAO, the
CA company is not as robust a planning and analysis element as the CA battalion. A CA company has the
ability to displace and move rapidly with its supported BCT, but the CA company is in need of certain life
support sustainment and force protection.
4-113. Whether as a CA company headquarters supporting a BCT or CAT supporting maneuver battalions,
CA company personnel can contribute to and or perform—
Mission command of assigned or attached CMOC and CATs.
Tactical-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of CAO within the
supported commander’s AO.
Assessment of the civil component of the AO of the supported command facilitating integration
of civil input into the common operational picture of the supported command.
Collation, analysis, and fusion of civil information for input to the common operational picture of
the supported command.
Assistance in coordinating IPI, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and U.S. assistance and
resources to support local government as part of CMO.
4-114. The CA company is a deployable CA command and control node capable of commanding and
controlling CATs and operating a CMOC. CA companies conduct CR and CE at the tactical level to support
strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level civil-military objectives capable of—
Developing and leveraging civil networks.
Conducting CMI to find, disrupt, and defeat hybrid threats in the civil component.
Providing an advantage for the USG, allies, and partners.
Being task-organized or augmented to form the core of a joint civil-military operations task force
(JCMOTF) led by a major.
4-124. When tasked to form a one-star combined joint integrated CMO task force, the CACOM may also
provide command and control over the following assigned or attached military capabilities across the
competition continuum:
Joint or multinational engineer.
Military police.
Medical.
Maneuver.
4-125. The CACOM may also provide command and control to other stability-related, civilian and military
capabilities during periods of competition, armed conflict, and return to competition.
Transfer in Afghanistan
The fall of Kandahar and Kabul in November of 2001 marked the collapse of the
Taliban government and disintegration of its fighting forces. While the organization of
the Afghan Interim Authority was taking place, JSOTF-North consolidated the
stabilization effort by assigning UW to the three 5th SFG battalion commanders.
The Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCEs) were formed to
better control operations by various Alliance warlords and to reduce bypassed pockets
of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance around Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan.
A second Ranger parachute assault (Objective Bastogne) seized a remote airfield to
support ARSOF attack helicopter operations. Destroying al-Qaeda leaders became a
secondary mission for JSOTF-North under the new functional alignment directed by
SOCCENT. That was to be the primary mission of the new JSOTF-South. The ADVON
of that headquarters relocated to Kandahar Air Base when Marine Corps forces at
Objective Rhino moved there. The 10th Mountain Division left K2 for Bagram Air base,
south of Kabul. Just days after Hamid Karzai became interim prime minister, the Joint
Civil Military Operations Task Force was established in Kabul to direct and coordinate
civil and humanitarian affairs in rebuilding Afghanistan. In mid-January 2002, TF
Rakkasan from the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Kandahar Airport to replace
the Marines…
…3rd SFG at Fort Bragg had been alerted to replace 5th SFG in the combat zone, and
19th and 20th SFG (ARNG) battalion staffs and ODAs were arriving in theater.
Mobilized USAR CA and PSYOP units had been “earmarked” to replace Active Army
forces in theater…
Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan
CMH Pub 70-100-1
4-135. The JFC may establish a JCMOTF to accomplish a specific contingency mission with a civil-military
nature (such as FHA, PRC or transitional military authority) and/or to provide CMO support to U.S. or
coalition military forces conducting military operations. Service component and other task force commanders
are still responsible for accomplishing the CMO—that is within their ability—in their AOs. When their need
exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF assists in meeting the shortfall. A JCMOTF can—
Be a stand-alone JTF or a subordinate unit in a JTF.
Assist JTF unit commanders when their organic ability cannot meet the CMO needs of their joint
operations area.
Provide linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the joint operations area
through a CMOC.
Advise the JTF commander on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities;
and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
Provide command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning,
and other assistance activities by joint U.S. forces.
Assist in establishing U.S. or multinational and military-to-civilian links for greater efficiency of
cooperative assistance arrangements.
Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies; country teams; United Nations
agencies; and deployed U.S. multinational, host-nation military forces, and their supporting
logistic organizations.
Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to—
Publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects.
Build civil acceptance and support of U.S. operations.
Promote local capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
Plan and conduct joint and combined CMO training exercises.
Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services.
Assess or identify host-nation support, or relief capabilities and funding requirements to the—
Commander.
JTF for transmission to supporting commanders.
Services.
Other responsible USG departments or agencies.
Facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other
government agencies, international organizations, or host-nation responsibility.
4-136. A JCMOTF should not—
Be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF.
Have the primary responsible force for accomplishing all CMO in the joint operations area when
subordinate to a JTF.
Eliminate the need for all units to train for CMO.
Eliminate the need for all commanders in the joint operations area to plan and conduct CMO.
Note: JP 3-57 and JP 3-33 provide additional information on the establishment of a JCMOTF and
its capabilities.
OVERVIEW
5-1. CA plays an integral role in the coordination of military actions with unified action partners. CA forces
can provide for better local governance (thereby, relieving commanders of the burden of civil security and civil
control), develop networks, share information with interagency and interorganizational partners, and integrate
civilian and military actions. CA forces contribute to unified actions through integration, coordination, and
synchronization with interorganizational partners, joint forces, and interagency partners.
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION
5-2. Interorganizational cooperation refers to the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department
of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and
tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations;
nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). The proper execution of interorganizational
cooperation leads to unity of effort through identifying common objectives and building a common
understanding. CA forces are integral to this effort through their mandate to interact with civilian populations,
organizations, and agencies. Inter-organizational cooperation refers to the interactions between DOD,
participating USG departments and agencies, and:
Domestic governments such as—
State.
Territorial.
Local.
Tribal.
Multinational Elements, including—
Foreign military forces.
Foreign government agencies.
International organizations.
NGOs.
The private sector, including—
Multinational corporations.
Academia.
Operational contract support.
5-3. CA forces form a critical point in the interaction between U.S. forces and interorganizational partners.
This is due to the training that CA forces receive in governance and governmental sector expertise, regional
expertise, cultural understanding, and language capabilities. CA forces utilize this interaction to help create
a common understanding of the OE. Interorganizational partners can provide local information which may
be available through military channels. This information highlights—
Historical perspectives and insight.
Local cultural practices.
Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders, which are used
to corroborate information provided by Service intelligence and non-intelligence organizations.
Security situation.
Role and capabilities of the host-nation government.
5-4. Through development of local civil networks, CA elements are able to increase the capabilities of local
governance and add to the common understanding that is essential to unified action. Through CKI and CMI,
CA forces collect civil information, produce civil knowledge products, and integrate and share those products
in order to increase shared understanding and integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all elements to achieve
unity of effort. Through TG, CA elements are able to build local governance capacity in order to enable
strengthened local efforts leading to more capable and reliable interorganizational partners.
5-5. One of the most important elements for interorganizational cooperation is a CMOC. The CMOC is the
meeting place of stakeholders. It may be physical, virtual, or conducted collaboratively through online
networks, or by intermediates (as NGOs may be reluctant to conduct coordination meetings in settings
managed by the military). At the joint level the CMOC is formed to:
Execute the CMO guidance of the JFC.
Provide liaison with departments, agencies, and organizations.
Provide a forum for organizations that want to discuss CMO issues and raise concerns, yet
maintain their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for
stakeholder discussions but not a stakeholder decision-making forum.
Receive, validate, and action requests for support from NGOs, international organizations, and the
private sector. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.
JOINT OPERATIONS
5-6. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in
specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0).
A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments
operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). Almost all military actions interact with the civilian
population or affect the civilian population, and it is important to ensure proper civil-military interactions
for all operations. U.S. Army CA constitutes the largest proportion of CA forces among the separate
branches of the U.S. military. As such, U.S. Army CA often take on a significant portion of joint CA
missions and must plan accordingly.
5-7. When the Army supports the joint force in competition, its role is to shape the OE and prevent conflict
by supporting the theater campaign plan of the JFC. The Army does this by supporting security cooperation.
The primary purpose of supporting security cooperation is to build relationships and gain access. The
secondary purpose is to promote regional stability. Security cooperation is a primary stability operations task.
Security cooperation initiated with partner nations promotes regional stability by deterring potential threats.
Note: FM 3-22 and ADP 3-07 provide more information on Army support to security cooperation
and stability operations respectively.
Facilitating the movement, security, and control of funds to subordinate units and coordinating with
the funds controlling authority and financial manager to meet the objectives of the commander.
Planning and supporting transitions (such as terminated, transferred to follow-on forces, or
transitioned to USG departments and agencies, IPI, or international organizations), as required.
Providing expertise and support to the joint interagency coordination group or joint interagency
task force, if either is part of the joint staff.
Managing collection and integration of civil knowledge in the operational area of the supported
commander.
Coordinating with the J-2 for the integration of civil knowledge into the joint intelligence
preparation of the OE.
Coordinating with the comptroller for the disposition of funding for CMO and foreign assistance.
Coordinating with the J-4 and IPI for host-nation support.
Coordinating with the J-2 and J-5 to support center of gravity analysis.
Coordinating with the political advisor of the joint force commander to develop policy for the
implementation of transitional military authority.
Coordinating with the staff, country team, CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint
interagency task force, humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian operations
center, and IPI to ensure planning and execution of FHA.
Coordinating with the staff, country team, CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint
interagency task force, and IPI to ensure planning and execution of foreign assistance.
Coordinating with the staff, country team, CMOC, joint interagency coordination group, joint
interagency task force, and IPI to ensure planning and execution of PRC.
Coordinating with the staff, country team, special operations component command, CMOC, joint
interagency coordination group, joint interagency task force, and IPI to ensure planning and
execution of CME.
Coordinating with the country team, J-3, J-4, staff judge advocate, Service component commands,
partner nation, and IPI for various permissions and agreements, to include—
Access.
Status of forces.
Overflight.
Frequency usage.
Land use.
Participating in the targeting process.
5-10. The J-9 is responsible for Annex G to operation plans, concept plans, and operation orders. Annex G
promulgates CMO requirements in a formal plan or operation order. CMO require coordination among CA,
maneuver, health support, military police, engineer, transportation, and SOF. CMO also involve interaction
between staff sections and subordinate units. Annex G identifies, consolidates, and deconflicts the activities
of the various sections and units. Planning and coordination at lower echelons require significantly more
details than discussed in Annex G.
Note: CJCS GDE 3130 and JP 3-57 provide additional information on Annex G.
Note: JP 5-0 provides the doctrinal discussion, process, and formats for joint planning.
The coordination of CMO requirements with other appropriate staff functions, the interagency,
international organizations, NGOs, HN, and private sector.
Additional lead time normally necessary for the availability of reserve component forces.
CMO input to the targeting process will help reduce destruction of essential civilian capabilities
needed during stabilization.
The tactical, operational, and strategic objectives achievable via CMO.
Recommendation of the formation of a JCMOTF, as required.
Crop cycles of the HN.
Historical events and local holidays of the HN.
Note: JP 3-08 provides additional information on the joint interagency coordination group.
5-18. A CACOM has the capabilities to provide theater-level analysis of civil considerations in coordination
with the joint interagency coordination group (or equivalent organization) and to develop strategic-level civil
input to the supported JFC. A J-9 staff section plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and
civilian component issues through direct coordination with the J-3 of the supported unit. Throughout the
process, the plans officer of the CACOM staff continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received
from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and
host-nation sources to the common operational picture of the JFC. The integration of CMO into the staff or
working group is imperative. The capabilities of the private sector partnership, when orchestrating
interagency coordination, is extremely valuable.
CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
5-19. CME is part of the DOD’s strategy, to building partner nation capacity in a preventive, population
centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered indigenous
governments. It is persistent engagement conducted by, with, and through unified action partners to shape
and influence the IPI within the OE in support of the campaign plans of the commander and the campaign
support plan of the theater special operations command (TSOC). CME is also and executed in conjunction
with U.S. embassy strategies. The conduct of CME—
Increases the capability of USG-supported IPI.
Reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions.
Leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE.
5-20. CME identifies and addresses critical civil strengths and vulnerabilities in under-governed and
ungoverned areas or high-threat environments where host-nation authorities, the country team, or USAID
cannot operate. These objectives are accomplished through the conduct of CAO during the execution of the
following CME program key tasks:
CR. CME elements conduct CR to observe and evaluate specific aspects of the civil environment
to fulfill information requirements. CME practitioners must understand the overall preparation of
the environment plan during the conduct of CR. By planning and executing targeted CAO that
influences unified action partners and IPI relationships and resources, CA elements help shape the
OE, thereby contributing to preparation of the environment efforts.
Network Analysis. Regional and theater civil-military support elements (CMSEs) conduct
network analysis and evaluation to identify critical and relevant nodes. This is done by using
CNDE and CKI to partner with friendly networks and engage neutral networks in order to counter
threat networks. Network analysis is executed with the purpose of determining, analyzing, and
evaluating links between these nodes as a means of gaining an understanding of a group, place,
physical object, or system.
Network Engagement. Regional CMSEs and CMSEs conduct network engagement to engage
critical nodes within friendly and neutral networks in order to counter threat networks. All the data
and information gathered through CR and CE are used during the CKI process. Network
engagement is conducted continuously and simultaneously at all levels of warfare to help achieve
the commander’s objectives within the OE.
Interorganizational Cooperation. Inter-organizational cooperation enables unity of effort,
common objectives, and a common understanding by synchronizing actions. It facilitates
cooperation in areas of mutual interest, promotes a common operational picture, and enables the
sharing of critical information and resources that contribute to economy of force in accomplishing
TSOC objectives.
Capacity Building. Capacity building develops the capability and capacity—within friendly and
neutral networks—to counter malign actor influence and activities. Capacity building increases
host-nation government and military capacity to reduce the causes of instability, thereby denying
malign actor influence.
5-21. The CME program consists of four distinct capabilities-based, task-organized units of action.
These units of action include:
CMSE. A civil-military support element is a task-organized Civil Affairs force established to
plan, facilitate, and execute Civil Affairs operations in support of civil-military engagement
in a specified country, region, or theater. The CMSE is primarily sourced by a special operations
CAT. Through CAO, the CMSE conducts planned and targeted CR and CE, engaging networks
to affect the behavior and will of relevant actors, audiences, and adversaries in the OE in support
of combatant command campaign plans, the TSOC campaign support plan, and in conjunction
with U.S. embassy strategies.
Regional CMSE. The regional CMSE conducts network engagement and analysis within a
subordinate command architecture to the TSOC, and is primarily sourced by a special operations
CA company. It conducts tactical to operational level human network analysis to comprehensively
study and understand the relationships of networks to support preparation of the environment.
The regional CMSE is a task-organized unit of action based upon mission specific requirements
with the ability to conduct command and control of the CME elements in their assigned region to
achieve desired effects.
Theater CMSE. The theater CMSE is primarily sourced by elements from a special operations
CA battalion headquarters and is filled based upon specific mission requirements. It conducts and
integrates network analysis into the joint planning process, joint intelligence preparation of the
OE, and the joint targeting cycle. The theater CMSE is collocated with a theater-level special
operations command and control node. It also has the ability to conduct command and control of
the CME elements in their theater to achieve desired affects.
Trans-Regional CME Element. The trans-regional CME element is sourced from special
operations CA personnel assigned to USSOCOM who carry out their duties at interorganizational
partners in USSOCOM-identified priority locations. This unit of action is tasked with developing
and maintaining long-term relationships through an enduring presence across the unified action
partner network to enhance trans-regional synchronization and improve inter-organizational
cooperation.
5-22. Trans-regionally and persistently engaged CME elements conduct targeted CAO to increase the
capability of USG-supported IPI and to reduce the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and
regions. These elements leverage civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE in support of the
campaign plans of the CCDR and the TSOC campaign support plan, and in conjunction with U.S. embassy
strategies.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
5-23. Interagency coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between agencies of the
USG, including the DOD, to accomplish an objective. The accomplishment of strategic objectives identified
in U.S. national security policy requires a whole-of-government approach that achieves unity of effort.
Note: FM 3-05.401 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in
the Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
5-24. CA forces enable interagency coordination through organizational structures at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels including—
J-9.
Theater CAPT.
G-9.
CAPT.
S-9.
CMOCs.
Civil-military advisory group.
Theater CMSE.
Regional CMSE.
Civil liaison teams (CLTs).
CMSE.
CATs.
5-25. The DOS is the lead entity when coordinating between interagency partners of any given country.
The DOS is also the lead in establishing an international agreement. The DOD and its components are
governed by international agreements under DODI 5530.3 (figure 5-1, page 5-12), and that authority is
limited under Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 181.
5-26. When not engaged in a forcible entry, invasion, or occupation, military forces are not permitted in
foreign countries in their official capacity without authority being advanced through an international
agreement or country clearance of some type. Access granted by the permissions manager is designated as
part of joint deployment and redeployment operations. Therefore, they must be addressed in a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, which is consummated by the U.S.
5-27. Contingency basing (agreement to stay in a country) must be negotiated with a foreign country unless
basing is being established through forcible entry and establishing a lodgment. Such basing can be authorized
through a bilateral agreement also called a defense cooperation agreement. It can also be negotiated through
a status-of-forces agreement or a “diplomatic note”. These international agreements are sometimes referred
to as host-nation agreements or host-nation support agreements or diplomatic agreements in common usage.
In such agreements use of existing HN, host country, or partner nation bases can be utilized. If new
construction is occurring or land is set aside for U.S. forces, it usually requires a separate land use agreement.
Note: See JP 3-0, JP 3-34 and JP 3-35 for more information about deployment and redeployment,
joint engineer operations, and joint operations.
An international agreement is any agreement concluded with one or more foreign governments
(including their agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions) or with an international
organization, that—
Is signed or agreed to by personnel of any DOD component, or by representatives of the
DOS or any other Department or Agency of the U.S. Government.
Signifies the intention of its parties to be bound in international law.
Is denominated as an international agreement or as a memorandum of understanding,
memorandum of agreement, memorandum of arrangements, exchange of notes,
exchange of letters, technical arrangement, protocol, note verbal, aide memoire, agreed
minute, contract, arrangement, statement of intent, letter of intent, statement of
understanding or any other name connoting a similar legal consequence.
Any oral agreement that meets the criteria set forth in DODI 5530.3 is an international agreement.
The DOD representative who enters into the agreement will cause such agreement to be reduced
to writing.
During a state of war, the Law of War (codified in the Geneva-Hague Conventions), permits local
“special” agreements in some cases, that are necessitated by interaction at the tactical and
operational level.
The following are not considered to constitute international agreements for the purposes of this
Directive:
Contracts made under the Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Foreign Military Sales Credit Agreements.
Foreign Military Sales Letters of Offer and Acceptance and Letters of Intent.
Standardization agreements, quadripartite standardization agreements, Army Service
component command air standards, and naval standardization agreements in accordance
with DODI 5530.3.
Leases under Title 10, United States Code, Sections 2667 and 2675 (reference [f]), and
Title 22, United States Code, Section 2796 (reference [l]).
Agreements solely to establish administrative procedures.
Acquisitions or orders pursuant to cross-servicing agreements made under the authority of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act (Title 10, United States Code,
Section 2321 et seq. (reference [f]) and DODD 2010.9 (reference [m]). (Umbrella
agreements, implementing arrangements, and cross-servicing agreements under the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act are international agreements.)
Note: U.S. DOS Foreign Affairs Manual, Correspondence Handbook, describes the use of
diplomatic notes (5 FAH-1).
5-31. Commanders have limited authority to negotiate or interact at a tactical or operational level. Such
interaction is limited to special agreements as addressed under the law of war. Such agreements are typically
verbal and must not have an adverse effect on protected persons (such as prisoners of war or civilians).
Special agreements are binding between those governments or military commanders that made the
agreements. When engaging the civil component, CA Soldiers often negotiate and make agreements with
segments of the populations, HN, or partner nation institutions.
5-39. While each U.S. embassy is different, CA Soldiers may interact with embassy stakeholders, such as
defense attachés, political and economic officers, and USAID mission personnel. While the missions CA
Soldiers support will most likely fall under the authority of geographic CCDRs (not under the authority of
Chiefs of Mission), it is still critical for CA Soldiers to—
Understand the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the host country.
Understand the status of the bilateral relationship.
Ensure that all activities conducted in country are mutually supportive of the U.S.-host nation
objectives.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
5-44. Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to a foreign nation through development
assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and SA. The U.S. provides foreign assistance through security
cooperation in conjunction with the theater security cooperation plan of a geographic CCDR. Foreign
assistance can also be provided when the U.S. is sponsoring a FID program or FHA in conjunction with other
security cooperation efforts. Foreign assistance operations support an HN by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.
5-45. Figure 5-2 highlights the components of foreign assistance, which can be divided into three broad
categories:
SA. This fosters stability and security abroad by strengthening the military and law enforcement
forces in our partner countries through capacity building and training and helps countries purchase
defense equipment and services produced in the U.S.
Economic and Development Assistance. This advances our national security by helping countries
meet near-term political, economic, and development needs.
HA. This supports disaster and emergency relief efforts, including programs that save lives,
alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity.
Note: ATP 3-57.30 provides additional information regarding SA, FID, and 10 USC authorities
that oversee these missions.
is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and humanitarian assistance to foreign countries.
The USAID will normally serve as the lead federal agent for the U.S.
5-60. FHA missions conducted by U.S. military forces span the full competition continuum. This could be
from crisis response and limited contingency operations to activities in various steady-state programs as part
of the security cooperation program of the geographic CCDR, or to achieve specific theater campaign plan
objectives.
5-61. DODD 5105.65 assigns the Defense Security Cooperation Agency the responsibility to direct,
administer, and provide DOD-wide guidance for the execution of DOD SA and security cooperation. It
further directs the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to provide oversight and exercise overall program
management responsibility for DOD humanitarian assistance and demining activities funded by the Overseas
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The directive directs the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency to produce Defense Security Cooperation Agency manual 5105.38-M. This manual provides policy
and direction for humanitarian assistance.
5-62. The CA role in FHA is to assist the commander in planning; advising on the activities; and coordinating
with unified action partners, IPI, and interagency to synchronize efforts. CA forces also play a key role in
conducting assessments. FHA operations are inherently complex and require a significant amount of
interagency coordination. FHA is normally directed from the strategic level, planned and managed at the
operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. On all levels, in support of FHA activities, CA forces—
Participate in interagency assessment, planning and synchronization of FHA activities.
Identify, validate, or evaluate host-nation and international resources available for FHA activities.
Mobilize vetted and developed civil networks to aid in FHA activities.
Advise, assist, and plan displaced civilian movement and control.
Participate in the execution of selected FHA activities as directed.
Provide liaison with IPI.
Assist in the coordination of local labor.
Coordinate with judge advocates to assist the commander to meet legal and moral obligations.
Monitor and evaluate FHA.
Assess requirements and support for the operation of a CMOC.
Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions.
Identify shortfalls in host-nation humanitarian assistance programs and resources.
5-63. Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type
has unique characteristics. For example, FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace
operations, but each has its own strategic end state. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit
their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA
simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives, as well
as measures of effectiveness and measures of performance complementary to simultaneous military
operations. Civil networks developed and integrated into operations through the CNDE process aid in
execution of FHA tasks, thereby relieving commands of resource demands that might take away from
completion of other operations.
5-64. One example of FHA is humanitarian mine action, which includes activities related to the furnishing
of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to detection, clearance, physical security, and
stockpile management of land mines and other explosive remnants of war. Explosive remnants of war include
landmines, unexploded ordnance (mortar rounds, artillery shells, bomblets, rockets, sub-munitions, rocket
motors and fuel, grenades, small arms ammunition, and so on), and abandoned ammunition storage and cache
sites. The CA role in humanitarian mine action is normally to assist with the request and approval process
and to assist the HN in establishing a national demining office.
5-65. There are many operations that are related to FHA. These operations are diverse and CA forces will
support these related operations as necessary. The related operations consist of—
Stability operations.
Foreign assistance, to include—
Humanitarian and civic assistance.
SA.
Development assistance.
Peace operations.
Noncombatant evacuation operations.
Mass atrocity response operations.
International chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response.
5-68. CAO are vital to theater FID operations in areas from planning to execution. It is a valuable resource in—
Planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct support (not involving combat
operations), and combat operations in support of the overall FID effort.
Supporting the reconstitution of viable and competent civil infrastructure in the operational areas
that were previously ungoverned, under-governed, or in the direct control of threat forces or
shadow governments.
5-69. Through CAO, CA forces also assist the government by executing SCA.
5-70. The CA forces supporting FID range from staffs to CATs. Essential tasks performed may include—
Incorporating CAO in all activities related to FID (from planning to execution).
Reviewing and supporting host-nation internal defense and development goals.
Ensuring host-nation public support, from local to national levels.
Establishing and maintaining contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
Ensuring the relevant parties always maintain host-nation sovereignty.
Advocating for host-nation self-sufficiency.
Note: JP 3-05, JP 3-22, JP 3-57, FM 3-18, and ATP 3-05.2 provide more information on FID.
COUNTERINSURGENCY
5-71. Insurgencies exist apart from, before, during, or after a conventional conflict. Elements of a population
often grow dissatisfied with the status quo. When a population or groups in a population are willing to fight
to change the conditions to their favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the
prevailing authority, they often initiate an insurgency. Ideally, the host country is the primary actor in
defeating an insurgency. Even in an insurgency that occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central
government, or after a major conflict, the host country must eventually provide a solution that is culturally
acceptable to its society and meets U.S. policy goals.
5-72. The U.S. uses a range of methods to aid a partner nation in defeating an insurgency.
Effective counterinsurgency operations require—
Understanding of the military profession, civil factors, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
Execution of and challenges to governance.
Societal understanding.
Cultural knowledge.
5-73. The tasks that counterinsurgents perform in countering an insurgency are not unique. It is the organization
of these tasks in time and space that is unique. Although all tasks executed to establish the conditions to reach
a desired end state are significant, stability operations may be critical in a counterinsurgency.
5-74. By definition, counterinsurgencies occur in the civil component. As such, a civil component solution is the
most effective deterrent to counterinsurgencies. Insurgencies are most readily defeated locally by local actors. Civil
networks provide the commander a partner in the civil component to identify and defeat insurgent threats with
minimal use of U.S. military resources while also utilizing a local partner. SCA missions allow CA forces to
reinforce the stability, security, and effective governance needed to choke out insurgent support. Effective
governance meets the needs of the population and provides security.
5-75. Entities best qualified to accomplish nonmilitary tasks may not always be available. In such cases,
military forces may need to perform those tasks until civilian-led capabilities become available. Within the
Army, CA is the branch ideally organized, trained, and equipped to assist in these functions. CA forces are
also ideally suited to interact with the population to determine the root causes of instability and improving
the relationship between the populace and the HN. CAO, in counterinsurgency, should focus on the following
tasks:
Planning and conducting CR, CE, and CND to determine causes of instability.
Providing SCA, as required, to bolster host-nation government capability or capacity.
Building and/or mobilizing civil networks to support stable governance.
Conducting transitional military authority until the host-nation government has the capacity to
conduct required governance activities.
Improving host-nation legitimacy through activities such as military civil action.
Developing, planning, and executing projects that address the humanitarian needs of the populace.
Providing CAO and CMO training to host-nation and partner security forces and civilian agencies.
Providing coordination and liaison between the IPI, interagency, and civil component to support
unified action.
Conducting activities with host-nation authorities, interagency, international organizations, NGO,
private sector, or international military partners to deny support to the insurgents.
Note: FM 27-10 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in the
Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
A-3. The true beginning of modern U.S. Army CA was the post-World War I occupation of the German
Rhineland by the Third U.S. Army from December 1918 until 11 July 1923. The lessons from this experience
led the Army to develop CA doctrine, provide professional education, and eventually create specialized CA
(Military Government) units. In the words of Major Truman Smith, the main author of the final report on the
occupation, the Army’s post-World War I actions “lacked both training and organization to guide the
destinies of nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”
While it lasted, the U.S. Army occupation performed civil administration tasks and ensured that Germany
would not resume hostilities. A new experience for the modern Army, it left such an impact that it led to the
creation of a formal CA capability.
A-4. For CA, the most important development was the subsequent publication of American Military
Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army
and American Forces in Germany. Known as the Hunt Report after its director, Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, it
provided analyses of the Army’s experience, highlighting the lack of formal CA training. This groundbreaking
official study, which published the experiences of American Soldiers who occupied Germany, drove change.
A-5. The Hunt Report and similar, but less widely distributed, studies of Army involvement in the
Philippines pointed to requirements for a standing CA staff section for incorporating CA in war planning.
This led to the publication of an updated Rules of Land Warfare in 1934 that contained a section on military
government and established the need for a CA (Military Government) capability. Based on these sources, in
1940, the Army published its first doctrine that focused on these special skills, FM 27-5, which guided U.S.
Army CA (Military Government) efforts throughout World War II. Further study of the Hunt Report and the
new doctrinal publications led to the creation of the first formal U.S. Army CA training program—the School
of Military Government—at the University of Virginia in May 1942.
Note: FM 27-5 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in the
Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
A-6. The school instructed officers in staff-level military government functions. However, because the
School of Military Government could not meet the growing demand for trained CA personnel, the Army
exported the program to other civilian universities throughout the U.S. By 1945, the Army taught CA courses
at Fort Custer, Michigan; the CA Staging Area at Fort Ord/Presidio of Monterey, California; or in overseas
schools.
A-7. To manage its CA (Military Government) efforts, the U.S. Army created the Military Government
Division, established in July 1942 under the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Its small size and lack
of influence, compounded by the sheer number of CA matters experienced by Lieutenant General Dwight D.
Eisenhower after the invasion of North Africa on 8 November 1942, prompted the formation of the
CA Division under the War Department in March 1943. Led by Major General John H. Hilldring, the
CA Division formulated policy for CA (Military Government) units. These units ranged in size from the
European CA Division, with more than 8,200 personnel, to nine-person CA Detachments spread throughout
combat units.
A-8. These elements worked closely, near, or with combat forces, helping to address the concerns of civilian
populations and stabilizing rear areas so that combat commanders could remain focused on the enemy.
CA (Military Government) elements had expanded roles in the final year of World War II and particularly in
stabilizing post-war Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and Korea. However, the number of CA personnel
declined considerably as the Army reduced force structure in the postwar drawdown. A standing CA
capability appeared to be on its way out of the Army until another conflict guaranteed its survival as a
permanent U.S. Army capability.
A-9. The Korean War not only resurrected U.S. Army CA, but also served as a turning point for the
employment of CA and led to a permanent establishment of the capability in the U.S. Army. With the brief
exception of conducting military government in North Korea in late 1950, U.S. CA personnel worked in
South Korea, a sovereign allied country with a functioning government. There, CA Soldiers, organized first
under the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment (1950), then the United Nations Civil
Assistance Command (1951 to 1953), and later, under the Korean Civil Assistance Command (1953 to 1955).
CA Soldiers provided refugee assistance and medical care for the civilian population, while helping to rebuild
destroyed public infrastructure. The large-scale effort provided the rationale for the U.S. Army to establish
the CA (Military Government) Branch in the USAR on 17 August 1955. On 2 October 1959, the Army
eliminated the term Military Government and renamed it the CA Branch. This name change reflected recent
operations and changes in doctrine describing how the U.S. Army would employ CA in future conflicts.
A-10. Similar to the Korean War, the U.S. Army CA effort in South Vietnam (1965 to 1971) was based on
operating within a sovereign allied country. However, this time, as guided by FM 41-10, CA became associated
with unconventional warfare (UW). The three active duty CA companies—the 41st, 2d, and 29th—assigned to
South Vietnam helped integrate rural and war refugee populations into the national economic and political
systems. The CA companies provided medical care and assisted with agricultural, educational, and
infrastructure improvements, while giving credit to the government of South Vietnam for their efforts. That
mission would be later reincarnated as village stability operations in Afghanistan in 2010 to 2014.
Note: FM 41-10 is an obsolete publication, which provides historical reference and is listed in the
Obsolete Publications section of the references for this FM.
A-11. The experience in Vietnam brought lasting changes to CA. On 15 September 1971, the CA School,
then administered under the Provost Marshal General’s Office and based at Fort Gordon, Georgia, moved to
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There, it came under the direction of the U.S. Army Institute for Military
Assistance, now the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USAJFKSWCS). Active duty CA units soon relocated to Fort Bragg and were placed under the 95th CA
Group. However, in the post-Vietnam drawdown, the Army disbanded most active duty CA units. Only the
96th CA Battalion at Fort Bragg remained on active duty. Then, as now, the preponderance of CA units
resided in the USAR.
A-12. During the next two decades, CA made incremental steps toward becoming a core element of U.S.
Army Special Operations. On 1 October 1982, the Army established 1st Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) at Fort Bragg in which the 96th CA Battalion was a subordinate element. After the U.S. Army
created the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) at Fort Bragg on 1 December
1989, the 96th CA Battalion remained under 1st SOCOM. All reserve CA units based in the contiguous U.S.
were assigned to the United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC), which became
the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) on 27 November 1990.
Subordinated under USASOC, this placed the command and control of all contiguous U.S.-based active duty
(96th CA Battalion) and the USAR CA and PSYOP units under a single headquarters. On 3 March 1993,
Secretary of Defense Leslie ‘Les’ Aspin formally designated active and reserve CA units in the contiguous
U.S. as Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). The reserve formation based outside the contiguous U.S.,
the 322d CA Brigade in Hawaii, was not designated as ARSOF.
A-13. These organizational changes coincided with the Army’s increased use of CA units following the
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent global instability. USASOC routinely deployed CA
forces to assist in all phases of operations—including supporting peacekeeping, disaster relief,
counterinsurgency, combat, and stability efforts. Reserve CA units, namely the 352d CA Command,
spearheaded the Kuwaiti Task Force and its efforts to stabilize Kuwait following the expulsion of the Iraqi
invaders in February 1991. Other USAR CA units and the 96th CA Battalion provided CA support in Iraq
for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the post-war
humanitarian mission to assist the Kurds. Other notable deployments for CA units include peacekeeping and
disaster relief efforts in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in
Haiti, and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in the Balkans. However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack
on the United States ushered CA into a new era.
A-14. Significant changes for CA took place during the Global War on Terror. To meet the growing needs
of the conventional force, on 1 October 2006, the Army reassigned USACAPOC from USASOC to USAR.
USASOC retained the single Active Duty special operations CA unit, the 96th CA Battalion. Two weeks
later, on 16 October 2006, the Army established CA as a branch in the regular Army. Prior to that, it had
been a functional area. Constant rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq accelerated the operating tempo of CA
units and promoted growth in the active force. USASOC used 96th CA Battalion personnel as cadre to create
four additional active special operations CA Battalions (91st, 92d, 97th, and 98th) under the newly organized
95th CA Brigade (2007). Currently, the 95th CA Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) is assigned to the
1st Special Forces Command supporting ARSOF and USSOCOM commitments.
A-15. The demand to support continued Global War on Terror operations also resulted in the creation of the
conventional 85th CA Brigade on 16 September 2011, with five subordinate battalions (80th, 81st, 82d, 83d,
and 84th). Based at Fort Hood, Texas, this regular Army unit was subordinated to United States Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and provided CA support to conventional forces. However, following troop level
drawdowns, the Army deactivated the 80th and 84th CA battalions on 15 September 2016. The 85th CA
Brigade, along with its 81st and 82d battalions were inactivated on 15 March 2018, leaving the 83d CA
Battalion as the sole active CA unit supporting the conventional force.
A-16. Army CA has evolved considerably since its origins in the post-World War I occupation of Germany.
The Army has recognized the continuing need for formal CA instruction and planning and the requirement
for a standing CA force. CA engages across the range of military operations—from the prevention of
hostilities to assisting people in returning to daily life after hostilities or humanitarian crises end. The demand
for CA is strong because it is a force multiplier and has a history of proven utility.
RULE OF LAW
B-5. The rule of law functional specialty places emphasis on the judiciary systems of the national and
subnational governments that incorporate customary indigenous methods with internationally acceptable
standards. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments,
analysis, and evaluation, which allow for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional
resources. This augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to
implement and conduct assessments and oversight, provide policies and programs, and operate institutional
systems and agencies from national to local levels.
B-6. This enhanced capability provides development for the structuring, resourcing, organizing,
rehabilitation, and implementation of the requisite curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel
development required to implement and sustain the rule of law. This functional specialty team is prepared to
assume administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by
conditions of the OE. Additional advice and expertise is also resident with this team to support war crime
courts and tribunals, and the establishment and administration of truth commissions.
CORRECTIONS
B-7. The corrections functional specialty places emphasis on the role of the national and subnational
governments in fulfilling the punitive phase of the rule of law through a transparent correctional system that
conveys safe and humane detention, incarceration, rehabilitation, and reintegration of qualified prisoners.
Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments, analysis, and
evaluation, which allows for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional resources.
This augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to conduct
assessments, implement oversight, provide policies and programs, and operate institutional systems and
agencies at national to local levels.
B-8. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement
and sustain a correctional system. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume administrative and
supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC SAFETY
B-9. The public safety functional specialty advises and assists in (or reestablishes) the evaluation,
assessment, planning, and implementation of systems and programs that establish civil security sector
assistance, or emergency management administration, and planning assistance. They promote community
resilience through application of the prevention and resolution framework, and planning for the mitigation of
effects of human-made or natural disasters for the maintenance of public order. This section consists of teams
educated and experienced in emergency management, policing, and community relations.
PUBLIC EDUCATION
B-10. The public education functional specialty team is concerned with the structure and conduct of the
formal education system of indigenous institutions, any competing system, and their collective impacts upon
stability across the OE. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers
assessments, analysis, and evaluation that permits this team to provide advice and guidance access to
additional resources. This augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those
institutions to conduct assessments, implement oversight, provide policies and programs, and operate
institutional systems and agencies at national to local levels.
B-11. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement
and sustain inclusive public education. With consideration toward equitable accessibility by individuals,
institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for reestablishment of stability.
These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional areas.
This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national
and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC HEALTH
B-12. The public health functional specialty advises and assists commanders, interagency, and host-nation
representatives in matters pertaining to the vulnerabilities and strengths of indigenous health care institutions
through the data collection, analysis, evaluation, legislation, regulation, and/or policy guidance. If necessary,
the public health functional specialty also reestablishes the administration of health care institutions and
programs at the national, regional, and provincial levels. With consideration toward equitable accessibility
by individuals, institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for reestablishment
of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the
national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
CIVILIAN SUPPLY
B-13. The civilian supply functional specialty is concerned with the response mechanism of indigenous
institutions in reaction to a crisis through surveying, assessing, and conducting a resources analysis and
evaluation of the local area. Results are used to determine the status of the essential needs of the indigenous
population. This helps determine the type and amount of resources available, and the location and application
of solution sets. Civilian needs that cannot be met with reallocated indigenous resources are then assessed
and requested to integrate the donor-sourced resources of NGOs or international organizations, or U.S.
military resources—including Class X supplies. An additional competency of this team is development of
civil authorities available to collect and distribute supplies or provide statistical analysis and operational
oversight as a response to refugees and displaced persons. This functional specialty team is prepared to
assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by
conditions of the OE. In doing so, the team identifies supplies and resources that can be diverted for U.S.
military use and identifies any associated negative impacts upon the civil component of the OE.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
B-14. The public administration functional specialty places emphasis on the structure and conduct of the
indigenous government from national to local levels. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this
functional specialty team provides advice and guidance access to additional resources to augment the nationwide
network of indigenous civil authorities to promote oversight and assessing, advising, improving, or establishing
legislative and executive institutions from national to local levels; and the processes of these institutions in the
administration of governance. Considerations for the public administration functional specialty include political
parties, eligibility for franchise, elections, tenure, civil servant service, policy and programming, and all other
aspects of the development and operation of the apparatus of government. These activities enable the
interconnectivity of individuals, civil society, and institutions to produce coordinated, integrated, and
synchronized efforts toward stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements
of, the other functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and
supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC INFORMATION
B-15. The public information functional specialty places emphasis on the ability of the indigenous government
to be transparent, accountable, informative, and effective in communicating to the citizenry. Application of the
technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments, analysis, and evaluation that permits
this team to provide advice and guidance access to additional resources. This augmentation to indigenous
institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to conduct assessments, implement oversight, provide
policies and programs, and operate public information systems and agencies from national to local levels.
B-16. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel required to develop and execute public
relations and information dissemination activities. These activities include support to the political and
electoral processes, emergency management actions, societal participation in issues, respect of dissenting
views, independence of private and international media, communication of policy and development
objectives, and the provision of equitable accessibility by individuals, institutions and the private sector.
Public information efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the
national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
CULTURAL RELATIONS
B-17. The cultural relations functional specialty places emphasis on the stewardship of the social and cultural
resources, official public records, and archives of the state. This functional specialty also places emphasis on
the educated expertise, and the focused understanding of traditional culture, customs, and arts of an area of a
nation, or region. Application of the technical expertise of this functional specialty team delivers assessments
and analysis, which allow for the provision of advice, guidance, and access to additional resources. This
augmentation to indigenous institutions enhances the capability of those institutions to conduct assessments,
implement oversight, provide and regulate policies and programs, and operate institutional systems and
agencies at national to local levels.
B-18. This enhanced capability provides for the structuring, resourcing, organizing, rehabilitation, and
implementation of the curriculum, facilities, processes, and personnel development required to implement and
sustain the activities for the administration of public records, archives, and cultural assets. These activities
ensure the authenticity, safe-guarding, preservation and restoration, cataloging and accounting, accessibility,
and transparency of public documents, heritage, and properties. With consideration toward equitable
accessibility by individuals, institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for
reestablishment of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other
functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume administrative and supervisory roles of
the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
B-19. The environmental management functional specialty places emphasis on the principles of protection and
conservation of the natural resources and mitigation of hazards or pollution as it concerns the state, while
fostering supportable access, development, and utilization. Through the application of technical skills,
functional specialists advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government
environmental management agencies and systems and their associated requisite plans, policies, and procedures
while supporting the integration of the efforts of individuals, civil society organizations, NGOs, international
organizations, and other U.S. assistance and resources. With consideration toward equitable accessibility by
individuals, institutions, and the private sector, these activities position communities for reestablishment or
preservation of stability. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other
functional areas. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles
of the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
B-20. The economic development functional specialty places emphasis on the existing national to localized
economic network, any competing system, and their collective impacts upon stability within the OE.
Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this functional specialty team provides advice and guidance
access to additional resources to augment the national network to develop, implement, regulate, and enforce
interstate and international policies and programs focused upon macroeconomics, market(s) development,
and microeconomics. These activities enable the interconnectivity of individuals, civil society, and
institutions to produce coordinated, integrated, and synchronized efforts. These efforts have inherent
crosscutting affects upon, and requirements of, the other functional areas. This functional specialty team is
prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational institutions, as
required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
B-24. The public communications functional specialty places emphasis on the national communications
network as it exists within the OE. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this functional specialty team
provides advice and guidance access to additional resources aimed to enhance the national network to develop,
implement, regulate, and enforce interstate and international policies for communications by radio, television,
wire, wireless, satellite, cable, and postal means. These activities enable the interconnectivity of individuals,
civil society, and institutions to produce coordinated, integrated, and synchronized efforts. These efforts have
inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional specialty areas. This functional
specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of the national and subnational
institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
B-25. The public transportation functional specialty places emphasis on the national transportation network
as it exists within the OE. Through assessments, analysis, and evaluation, this functional specialty team
provides advice and guidance access to additional resources aimed to enhance the national network to
develop, implement, regulate, and enforce interstate and international policies for the physical movement of
commerce and people across ground, water, and through air conveyances. These activities enable the
interconnectivity of individuals; civil society; and associated organizations, institutions, and the private
sector. These efforts have inherent crosscutting effects upon, and requirements of, the other functional
specialties. This functional specialty team is prepared to assume the administrative and supervisory roles of
the national and subnational institutions, as required by conditions of the OE.
OVERVIEW
C-1. CAO are conducted within conventional and special operations missions. The difference between the two
is that CA special operations are generally conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments
utilizing specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures. CA special operations are conducted alongside other
SOF from across the DOD, and in support of DOS priorities in embassies around the world.
C-2. Given the environments in which special operations are conducted, CA forces conducting those
missions are at a greater risk for isolation than conventional forces. This greater risk necessitates extended
training on small unit tactics, tactical movement, survival, evasion, resistance, escape, and other techniques
that are unique to special operations.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
C-3. The DOD defines unconventional warfare as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with
an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (JP 3-05). UW is a core activity of ARSOF,
and has strategic utility to alter the balance of power between sovereign states.
C-4. CA forces support UW through the execution of CAO, which is critical to the planning and execution
of UW campaigns. When integrated throughout all phases of UW planning and execution, CA forces provide
the capability to analyze the strengths, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the civil component, as applicable,
to both the existing regime and the resistance movement. CAO also provide a comprehensive approach
toward assisting the resistance in legitimacy and TG, from the initial resistance movement, through transition,
to an emergent stable government. CA forces also are able to assist in developing broader governance efforts
in support of the resistance.
C-5. CA forces are typically sought for their unique capabilities with regards to identifying and mitigating
the underlying causes of instability in order to create a stable environment. This same analysis, however, can
be utilized by the resistance to identify and degrade those identified strengths and bonds of the existing regime
into vulnerabilities, resulting in its continued delegitimization. This creates legitimacy opportunities for the
movement.
C-6. Separately, within their sphere of control and influence, the resistance can consolidate gains in public
support and initial governance capacity by utilizing CA assessments, strengthening civil vulnerabilities, and
cementing a bond with the greater population. Methods to realign the legitimacy of power should consider
the timeliness required to restore essential services and strengthen the bonds between the population and the
resistance movement (or new government) upon the collapse of the old regime.
C-7. Through CNDE and SCA, CA forces can support an underground, auxiliary, or government-in-exile
to plan for and administer civil government in the areas of rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure,
governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information. SCA is the systematic
application of specialized skills for assessing and advising on the development of stability and governance.
When conducting CR and CE to develop civil consideration data, ARSOF CA forces collaborate with CA
military government specialists within USAR CA formations to formulate governance and stability lines of
effort for the resistance.
C-8. The resistance gains legitimacy through TG via support to its alternate administration. This is
accomplished by addressing grievances and providing essential services to create a civil strength or bond
with the population. As the regime becomes severely degraded or collapses, CA will assist with addressing
the remaining civil vulnerabilities to create stability for the emergent government, and inclusively, across the
indigenous population.
C-9. It is critical to note that CAO support to UW, is not intended to represent a linear process. As depicted
in figure C-1, it represents the relationship between civil strengths and civil vulnerabilities as they pertain to
civil instability for the current regime, civil opportunities for the resistance, and stability for a new
government. The left side depicts CAO and corresponding resistance actions that increase the de-
legitimization of the current regime, through degradation of civil strengths with the population, and attacking
civil vulnerabilities to provide legitimacy opportunities for the resistance.
Note: DODD 3000.07, JP 3-05, FM 3-05, FM 3-18, ATP 3-05.1, and ATP 3-18.1 provide more
information on UW.
DIRECT ACTION
C-10. Direct action is a core activity of ARSOF consisting of short-duration strikes and other small-scale
offensive actions conducted by select ARSOF elements as a special operation in hostile, denied, or
diplomatically sensitive environments, which employs specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy,
capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive
actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.
C-11. CA forces do not conduct direct action missions; however, CA forces conduct CR and CE to gain shared
understanding of the civil component to address possible adverse effects of direct action and to mitigate those
effects through civil network engagement and civil considerations analysis. CAO planning support to direct
action may include—
Gaining civil information to develop the civil component of the common operational picture of
the commander.
Providing civil component analysis to planning processes.
Providing civil component analysis toward the identification of—
Critical links and nodes.
Decisive points.
Centers of gravity.
Advising on the presence and potential of culturally, economically, and politically significant
assets and resources within the objective area.
Participating in the targeting process by nominating restrictive-fire areas and no-fire areas to
minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
Evaluating damage to infrastructure and other combat-related effects to the civil component.
Providing post-strike employment options for CA capabilities.
Note: JP 3-05 and ATP 3-18.3 provide additional information on direct action.
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE
C-12. Special reconnaissance is a core activity of ARSOF consisting of reconnaissance and surveillance actions
conducted by select ARSOF elements as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or
politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, which
employs military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. CA forces do not conduct special
reconnaissance missions. However, CA forces conduct CND, CR, and CE to gain shared understanding of the
civil component to inform the planning effort for special reconnaissance missions. CAO planning support to
special reconnaissance may include—
Engaging civil networks that have access to denied or sensitive areas.
Gaining civil information to develop the civil component of the common operational picture of
the supported commander.
Providing civil component analysis to planning processes.
Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the objective area.
Note: FM 3-05 and ATP 3-18.4 provide additional information on special reconnaissance.
COUNTERTERRORISM
C-13. Counterterrorism consists of activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies to achieve their goals (JP 3-26). Counterterrorism actions include strikes and raids
against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the U.S. and its territories.
C-14. CA forces combat terrorism efforts indirectly through activities to defeat the ideologies or motivations
that spawn terrorism. Counterterrorism is usually attributed to direct action specifically against terrorists or
violent extremist organizations. CAO planning support to counterterrorism action may include—
Identifying TSOC objectives and developing nonlethal activities that support them.
Identifying CCDR objectives and developing nonlethal activities that support them.
Identifying the ambassador or country team objectives and developing nonlethal activities that
support them.
Gaining civil information through CR, CE, and CND to develop the civil component of the
common operational picture of the supported commander.
Providing civil component analysis toward the identification of—
Centers of gravity.
Decisive points.
Critical links and nodes.
Denying the enemy civil component resources.
Recommending post-strike employment options for CA capabilities.
Participating in the targeting process to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure
and culturally sensitive sites.
Providing civil component analysis to planning processes to protect—
The populace.
Critical assets.
Infrastructure.
Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and
resources within the objective area.
Note: JP 3-40, JP 3-05, and ADP 3-05 provide additional information on countering weapons of
mass destruction.
CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
C-17. CME is USSOCOM’s contribution, and part of the DOD’s strategy, to building partner nation capacity
in a preventive, population-centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy
of partnered indigenous governments. CME is persistent engagement conducted by, with, and through unified
action partners to shape and influence the IPI within the OE in support of the campaign plan of CCDR and
the campaign support plan of the TSOC, in conjunction with U.S. embassy strategies. The CME program—
Increases the capability of USG-supported IPI.
Reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions.
Leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE.
Engages with civil networks to provide access, information, and effects across the competition
continuum.
OVERVIEW
D-1. A military symbol is a graphic representation of a unit, equipment, installation, activity, control measure, or
tactical task relevant to military operations that is used for planning or to represent the common operational picture
on a map or overlay. Military symbols are governed by the rules in MIL-STD-2525D. FM 1-02.2 also provides an
extensive number of icons and modifiers for building a variety of framed symbols.
Figure D-1. Main and modifier icon and amplifier placement locations
Table D-1. Description of main icon and amplifier fields for unit frames
Table D-1. Description of main icon and amplifier fields for unit frames (continued)
B Company,
83d Civil Affairs Battalion
Basic framed symbol for a Civil Affairs
company with the echelon amplifier for
company and the unique alphanumeric
unit designation amplifier outside the
frame.
A Company,
402d Civil Affairs Battalion
Leader
Assassination victim(s)
Modifiers in these sections are used to
add more detail to the main icons,
giving the user a way to provide
additional information. (These are not
complete symbols, but mere
representations of the location of the
Execution victim(s) modifiers in the symbols.)
CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS
D-14. Installations are sites that vary from permanent to temporary structures. Icons in the main sector
represent the main function of the symbol and sector 1 modifiers reflect specific capabilities of the
installation. The framed symbols below are in the friendly standard identity frame (rectangular shape).
Table D-11, pages D-14 and D-15, shows common examples of civil installations.
CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES
D-15. Activity symbols are applicable across the competition continuum, but they normally focus on stability
activities and DSCA activities. These activities may affect military operations. Table D-12 shows common
examples of civilian activities. Icons in the main sector reflect the main function of the symbol. Some of are
framed in the friendly standard identity frame (rectangular shape), others are framed in the hostile standard
identity frame (diamond shape). FM 1-02.2 provides a more extensive list of icons and modifiers for
activities.
Table D-12. Civilian activities
Election, voting, or
polling place
Demonstration
Black market
Riot
Note: FM 1-02.2 provides further information on symbols for tactical mission tasks.
CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE
D-19. Table D-15 portrays examples of how CR can be displayed on a maneuver or course of action sketch.
The control measure symbols use the standard point and area symbols combined with the CA main icon,
unique unit designation, echelon, and free text amplifiers.
Table D-15. Civil reconnaissance symbols
CIVIL ENGAGEMENT
D-20. Table D-16 portrays examples of how CE can be displayed on a maneuver or course of action sketch.
The control measure symbols use the standard point, area, and point of interest symbols combined with the
CA main icon, unique unit designation, echelon, and free text amplifiers.
Table D-16. Civil engagement symbols
FM field manual
FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command
HN host nation
IO information operations
IPB information preparation of the battlefield
IPI indigenous populations and institutions
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9 civil-military operations/interagency cooperation directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force
JFC joint force commander
JP joint publication
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JTF joint task force
MDMP military decisionmaking process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available and civil considerations
NGO nongovernmental organization
OE operational environment
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, time
PRC populace and resources contol
PSYOP Psychological Operations
RM risk management
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 battalion or brigade plans staff officer
S-9 battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SA security assistance
SCA support to civil administration
SOF special operations forces
TG transitional governance
TSOC theater special operations command
USACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USAR United States Army Reserve
USARSOC United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USC United States Code
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USG United States government
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
UW unconventional warfare
SECTION II – TERMS
Civil Affairs operations
Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the
interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and reduce underlying
causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills
normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)
*civil engagement
a targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential contacts in a civil network that is
designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect information. Also called CE.
(FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil information evaluation
The evaluation of civil information for operational relevance and feasible courses of action. Also
called CIE. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil knowledge integration
The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational
relevance and informing the warfighting function Also called CKI. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion
in FM 1-02.1)
*civil military integration
The actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and
indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational
cooperation and to achieve unified action. Also called CMI. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in
FM 1-02.1)
*civil-military support element
A task-organized Civil Affairs force established to plan, facilitate, and execute Civil Affairs operations
in support of civil-military engagement in a specified country, region, or theater. Also called CMSE.
(FM 3-57)
*civil network
A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations
within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency,
trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil network analysis
A process that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and influence of nodes within a civil
network through network visualizations and qualitative and quantitative analytical methods. Also
called CNA. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil network development
The planned and targeted action in which Civil Affairs forces develop networks within the civil
component of the operational environment to influence populations and manage local resources in
order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. Also called
CND. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
*civil network development and engagement
The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and
integrated into operations. Also called CNDE. (FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
information requirements
In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of
the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence
requirements of a commander. Also called IR. (JP 2-0)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. Also called IPB.
(ATP 2-01.3).
intelligence warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil
considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. (ADP 3-0)
interorganizational cooperation
The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States
Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military
forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the
private sector. (JP 3-08).
joint force
A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating
under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0).
joint interagency coordination group
A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian
and military operational planners. Also called JIACG. (JP 3-08).
joint operations
Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command
relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0).
movement and maneuver warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage
over the enemy and other threats. (ADP 3-0)
offensive operation
An operation to defeat and destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population
centers. (ADP 3-0)
protection warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat
power to accomplish the mission. (ADP 3-0)
security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security
relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation
military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States
forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. (JP 3-20)
stability operation
An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)
support to civil administration
Assistance given by United States armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing
body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government. Also called SCA.
(FM 3-57, proposed for inclusion in FM 1-02.1)
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as of January 2021.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 9 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 10 November 2020.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
OBSOLETE PUBLICATIONS
This section contains references to obsolete historical doctrine. The Archival and Special Collections in the
Combined Arms Research Library on Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas, contains copies. These publications are
obsolete doctrine publications referenced for citations only.
FM 3-05.401/MCRP 3-33.1A. Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 5 July 2007.
FM 27-5/OPNAV 50E-3. United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and
Civil Affairs. 22 December 1943.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
5 FAH-1 H-600. Correspondence Handbook, Diplomatic Notes. 7 February 2019.
https://fam.state.gov/Default.aspx.
1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. https://www.loc.gov.
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
www.unesco.org.
American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of
Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany,
https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/interwar_years/american_military_governm
ent_of_occupied_germany_1918-1920.pdf.
Center for Complex Operations. The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency
Coordination. Complex Operations Case Studies Series. Naval Postgraduate School. 2010.
https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/case-studies/4-kuwait_task_force-teacher.pdf.
CMH Pub 70-100-1. Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan. 2003.
https://history.army.mil/catalog/index.html
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for
the Execution of the Convention 1954. 14 May 1954. http://www.unesco.org/.
Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague, II), https://www.loc.gov/.
Lincoln, Abraham. General Orders No. 100. 24 April 1863.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
MIL-STD-2525D. Joint Military Symbology. 10 June 2014. https://assist.dla.mil.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
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General, United States Army
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Official:
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to the Secretary of the Army
2120401
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