THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G.
MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
[1]
in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999
Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which
convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado
a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term
of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional,
as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided
by law.
Costs against accused.
[2]

The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as
follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr.
Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991
before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said
document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time
of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City
per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further
blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred
Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and
complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr.
Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two
children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and
in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the
evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for
validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited
the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and
void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with
Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage
ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that
accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his
first wife.
[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not
before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for
bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
[4]

Hence, this Petition.
[5]

The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to
convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the
Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable
doubt.
[6]

The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
[7]

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy
were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976
in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage,
this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for
bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab
initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a
competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place
at all.
[8]
Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also
quotes the commentaries
[9]

of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the
first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the
first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage has been characterized as conflicting.
[10]
In People v.
Mendoza,
[11]
a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court
ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted
a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he
married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting
him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been
contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was
obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married
for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,
[12]
which
involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,
[13]
Jose Consuegra married for the second time
while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half
of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the
second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second
marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,
[14]
however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his
Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife
then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in
favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and
of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,
[15]
the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that
case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After
pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others,
that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that
there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need
of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to
this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,
[16]
the Court reverted to the ruling in People v.
Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,
[17]
the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity
was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile
spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has settled
once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage
is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
[18]

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was
not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for
a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the
Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage
Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a
competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages.
[19]

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950
Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a
new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such
marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier
ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision
Commitee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial
declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision
changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).
[20]

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there
is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside
by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can
contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,
[21]
which
involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting
the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first
one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was
cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that
the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void, was bigamous and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited
by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code
and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:
[22]

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning
is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code
Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet
no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by
then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy
cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the
Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.
[23]

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her;
hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.
[24]
In any event, we find no
reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we
quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case
that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was
well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
x x x x x x x x x
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado
had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge
anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was
fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that
she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.
[25]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.