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Arnold 2000 - Post-Kohlberg

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Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 12, No.

4, 2000
Stage, Sequence, and Sequels: Changing
Conceptions of Morality, Post-Kohlberg
Mary Louise Arnold
1
The years since Kohlbergs death have marked a pivotal stage in moral
psychology. The eld is addressing a number of critical questions and pursu-
ing new themes and approaches as it continues to (re)dene itself in the
course of its own development. This paper presents a brief overview of some
of these emerging themes within the context of the traditional cognitive
developmental approach to moral socialization. In particular, it highlights
changing conceptions of the moral person and raises questions about the
implications of these changes for the role of reason in contemporary
moral psychology.
KEYWORDS: moral development; moral reasoning; moral self; Kohlberg; moral psychology.
INTRODUCTION
For many readers, the title of this paper is likely to invoke a well-
known chapter in the 1969 Goslin Handbook in which Lawrence Kohlberg
rst fully elaborated the cognitivedevelopmental approach to moral social-
ization (Kohlberg, 1969). In the intervening 30 years, the notion of stage
and sequence has largely dominated moral psychology, and it now also
seems a somewhat tting depiction of the evolution of this paradigm itself.
Perhaps because morality, by its very nature, elicits such deeply felt convic-
tions, its study has been characterized by unique challenges and rampant
controversyand, as a result, by a truly revisionist spirit. Recent years
in particular, however, have marked an especially pivotal stage in moral
psychology. The eld is currently addressing a number of critical questions
1
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto.
365
1040-726X/00/1200-0365$18.00/0 2000 Plenum Publishing Corporation
366 Arnold
and pursuing new topics and approaches as it continues to (re)dene itself
in the course of its own development. The purpose of this paper is to
present a brief overview of some of these emerging themesor sequels
to Kohlbergs stage theorywithin the broader context of the traditional
cognitivedevelopmental approach to moral socialization.
In many respects the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm within moral
psychology has had a rather turbulent history. First introduced by Baldwin
(1906), then taken up but quickly abandoned by Piaget (1932/1965), many
years passed before it was reintroduced and fully delineated by Kohlberg
(1981, 1984). Described at the time as an odd duck swimming against
the tide within the social sciences (Brown and Herrnstein, 1975), arguably
Kohlberg soon came to revolutionize the study of morality, and his moral
stage theory is generally acknowledged to have dominated the eld ever
since (e.g., Kurtines and Gewirtz, 1991; Modgil and Modgil, 1986; Turiel,
1998). From the start, Kohlbergs theory has provoked controversy and
stimulated heated debate. However, just as he tenaciously defended the
cognitivedevelopmental approach, Kohlberg also listened carefully to his
critics as he continued to revise and reformulate his theory throughout his
career, admittedly eating his own words (Kohlberg, 1973a) while doing
so. The legacy of this revisionist spirit is aptly reected in Rests (1989)
suggestion a decade ago that moral psychologists continue to be as bold
and daring as Kohlberg had been in his unrelenting effort to advance the
study of morality.
A strong revisionist spirit does prevail among cognitive
developmentalists todayand many of the current initiatives being under-
taken in moral psychology are, indeed, both bold and daring. They encom-
pass a wide range of topics and approaches, challenging some of the central
tenets of Kohlbergs theory. The breadth and variety of these initiatives
defy easy (and certainly brief) synthesis. To attempt even a cursory overview
of them here is a daunting task. Therefore, my intent is to delimit the
scope of this review by focusing on only a few related themes reected in
contemporary sequels to Kohlbergs theory, and, most specically, on the
changing conceptions of the moral person and the implications of these
changes for the role of reason in moral psychology.
Reason is at the heart of the cognitivedevelopmental approach to
moral socialization and, if only by inference, it has typically been perceived
within this paradigm as the most distinguishing characteristic of a persons
moral maturity. Not surprisingly, the role of reason has also been a recurring
topic of debate, and its impact is seen in many recent developments in
moral psychology. Among these initiatives is an emerging focus on the
nature of the moral persona theme that contributes greatly to our under-
standing of moral maturity, but, at the same time, raises interesting ques-
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 367
tions regarding the role of reason in contemporary moral psychology. Ac-
cordingly, this review begins with a brief summary of Kohlbergs
commitment to reason, as a backdrop against which recent research can
be interpreted. I then present an overview of some emerging themes within
the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm, concluding with brief consideration
of the role of reason within the context of these new developments.
THE ROLE OF REASON IN KOHLBERGS THEORY
Within the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984;
Piaget, 1932/1965; Rest, 1983; Turiel, 1998) the most distinguishing charac-
teristic of morality is the human capacity to reason. Moral judgment has
long been regarded as the single most important or inuential factorand
the only truly moral determinantof a persons moral behavior (Kohlberg,
1984). Although Kohlbergs position on the role of reason in moral function-
ing undoubtedly shifted during his career, certainly the strength of his
commitment to reason as the core of morality never wavered. The key
tenets of this commitment are explicated throughout his writings (Kohlberg,
1981, 1984) and will be summarized here only briey.
Essentially, Kohlbergs commitment to reason is grounded in a blend
of philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of morality itself and
psychological beliefs about the developmental process by which a person
comes to understand the social world. Following Kant, Kohlberg believed
that morality is an experiential domain that is differentiated from others
by its dependence on a persons capacity to reason. By denition, morality
requires that a persons actions be rational, motivated by purpose or intent,
and carried out with autonomous free will. Building on these assumptions
is a set of psychological beliefs about the way a persons capacity for moral
reason develops. In the tradition of Baldwin (1906) and Piaget (1932/1965),
Kohlberg believed that the developing person actively constructs or makes
meaning of the social environmentand that there is a structure or
form to this reasoning that develops in qualitatively more mature stages
as a result of social experience. As is well known, Kohlbergs six-stage
theory provides one account of the way a persons moral judgment assumes
a progressively more expansive sociomoral perspective or worldview of
justice and the rights of others.
Furthermore, Kohlberg maintained that it is as a result of development
in moral reasoning that one becomes a truly moral person, in both mind
and deed. His defense of this belief is twofold. First, on both philosophical
and psychological grounds, Kohlberg argued that higher stages lead to more
adequate solutions to moral problems because they better satisfy the formal
368 Arnold
criteria of justice (Kohlberg, 1973b). Moreover, in his view, knowledge
itself is motivating. Inherent in reason is an impinging or binding quality
that motivates a person to act in accordance with his or her judgment:
. . . perceived injustice is disequilibrating and action toward justice equili-
brating (Kohlberg, 1986, p. 499). Although Kohlberg (Kohlberg and
Candee, 1984) later admitted to having underestimated the complexity of
the relation between moral stage and action and revised his thinking to
include two intervening cognitive functions to explain ita prescriptive
judgment of the moral right and a personal judgment of responsibility to
act accordinglyhe still held to his conviction that it is the logic of a
persons reasoning that most strongly inuences his or her moral behavior.
It is in this respect, therefore, that reason constitutes the essential core or
backbone of a persons moral maturity in Kohlbergs theory.
As one might expect, Kohlbergs commitment to reason has stimulated
much critical debate throughout his theorys history. The role of reason
has been challenged on many grounds, and is complicated by its entangle-
ment with the developmental stage concept and related measurement issues.
Most notably, Kohlberg has been consistently criticized by both philoso-
phers and psychologists for granting reason far too much power. In empha-
sizing reason to the extent he did, he has been accused of disregarding
other factors also typically associated with moral functioning, such as emo-
tion (e.g., Gibbs, 1991; Hoffman, 1987) and traits or habits of character
(e.g., Kilpatrick, 1992; Peters, 1982). Even when reason is credited with
central importance, the theory has been plagued by criticism of its failure
to provide compelling evidence of the role of reason in interaction with
other components of morality, and of its link to moral behavior in particular
(e.g., Blasi, 1980; Kutnick, 1986).
The universality of Kohlbergs stages of moral reasoning has also been
persistently challenged, again from various perspectives. Culturalists, for
example, have repeatedly challenged the appropriateness and applicability
of Kohlbergs moral stages to the customs and traditions of life in other
societies (e.g., Shweder, 1990; Simpson, 1974). Closer to home, particular-
ists have argued that Kohlbergs stages of reasoning have little meaning
abstracted from the social context of daily moral life (e.g., Blum, 1990).
Feminists (among others) have criticized the hegemony of justice reasoning
in Kohlbergs theory, proposing that a more relational, care and response
orientation is an equally valid conception of morality and one that is often
more representative of the moral experience of women (e.g., Gilligan, 1982;
Noddings, 1984).
In addition, a host of long-standing criticisms have been lodged against
various aspects of Kohlbergs methodological approach to the study of
moral reasoning. In particular, his moral dilemmas have been criticized for
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 369
being articial and too abstruse (e.g., Haan, 1977); the reliability and validity
of his Moral Judgment Interview scoring system have been a source of
continual dispute, despite extensive revisions (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987);
the developmental properties of his moral stages have been found suspect
(e.g., Kurtines and Greif, 1974; Fischer, 1983); and even their conceptual
differentiation has been questioned, especially at the postconventional level
(e.g., Gibbs, 1977; Puka, 1990), to cite only some of the most common com-
plaints.
However, one of the most damning criticisms of Kohlbergs theory
(and one that is embedded in many cited above) concerns the perception
of the moral person that its emphasis on reason has created. A number of
critics have characterized the moral reasoner in Kohlbergs model (even,
and somewhat ironically, the most mature reasoner) as a cold, rationalistic,
disembodied person, out of touch with the realities of everyday life (see
Boyd, 1989), a personication well reected in the gripping subtitle, Or
How to Reach Stage 6 and Remain a Bastard (Straughan, 1986).
In sum, although Kohlbergs vast legacy to moral psychology is widely
acknowledged to far outweigh the shortcomings of his theory, in recent
years there has been a growing sense within the cognitivedevelopmental
paradigm that a more comprehensive theory of morality is long overdue.
After having focused so squarely on moral judgment for so long, it was
time to put reason into larger perspective and redirect attention to the real
study of moralityto understanding how people actually function in the
social worldas Kohlberg himself was again doing in the Bronx schools
in the years before his death. As recently expressed by one prominent
cognitivedevelopmentalist, the study of morality has suffered from a
particular skew, which may now constrain our ability to develop a more
holistic understanding of moral functioning and its development, and per-
haps it can no longer be considered a progressive research enterprise
(Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995, p. 373).
EMERGING THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Recent years have marked a new stage in the development of the
cognitive-developmental paradigm(see, for example, Killen and Hart, 1995;
Kurtines and Gewirtz, 1991; Turiel, 1998). Contemporary psychologists are
now pursuing a range of new initiatives, or sequels, to earlier models of
moral development. This recent work comprises a number of interwoven
themes and strands of research: Some address long-standing limitations of
Kohlbergs model and attempt to build on it, others deviate from it in
370 Arnold
signicant ways, and all are drawing from advances in other areas of so-
cial science.
One major theme that is reected in several strands of current research,
for example, focuses on re-examining and redening the moral domain.
Most notably, the distinctiveness of morality from other domains of social
experience, such as social conventions and personal preferences, has now
been more clearly delineated (Turiel, 1983, 1998). From another vantage
point, the richness of the moral domain across cultures has been elaborated
in terms of distinct conceptual foundations, such as autonomy, community,
and divinity (Shweder, 1990). The boundaries of the moral domain have
nowbeen extended well beyond those of justice to encompass other orienta-
tions to moral experience, such as care (Gilligan, 1982) and lial piety
(Walker and Moran, 1991); its sociological parameters are being examined
and extended (Snarey, 1995); and, its landscape is being recharted with the
help of ordinary people (Walker and Pitts, 1998; Walker et al., 1995). In
varying ways, all of these initiatives are attempting to make our concep-
tion(s) of morality more representative of the diversity of individual so-
cial experience.
In recent years, moral psychology has also become considerably
more sensitive and attentive to the varieties and vicissitudes of moral
experience in everyday life (see, in particular, Killen and Hart, 1995),
and especially to the inuence of social context on moral functioning
(e.g., Helwig, 1995, Snarey, 1995, Youniss and Yates, 1997). A number
of studies have examined the impact of varying situational contexts (e.g.,
free trade, drug use) on moral judgment, frequently demonstrating a
threat to the consistency of moral stage reasoning (or structural whole-
ness) central to Kohlbergs theory (Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, and
Denton, 1991). Similarly, more contextually specic measures of moral
judgment and educational programs have recently been developed to
more appropriately address the special needs of diverse populations,
such as those designed to equip antisocial youth to think and act
responsibly (Gibbs, Potter, and Goldstein, 1995).
Contemporary moral psychologists have also begun to adopt more
varied methodological approaches to the study of moral development. For
example, strongly inuenced by the sociocultral framework, Tappan (1997;
Day and Tappan, 1996) has recently encouraged moral psychologists to take
a discursive turn, arguing that the use of narrative provides a valuable
reconception of the moral person, from that of an epistemic subject to
a dialogical self, and thus serves as a powerful means of understanding
both moral experience and moral development. Similarly, in a determined
effort to respect their distinguished subjects as true coinvestigators of
moral experience, Colby and Damon (1992) adopted a renewed adaptation
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 371
of the idiographic approach known as assisted autobiography to study
the life histories of people committed to moral excellence.
All of these themes (and others) have contributed in varying ways to
more contemporary conceptions of morality and ways to study it. Either
explicit or implicit within several of them, however, is another theme that
has recently emerged as a focus of attention within moral psychology
changing conceptions of the moral persona theme that is reected vari-
ously in research on the moral self, moral identity, and moral personality.
Although moral psychology has undoubtedly always had the moral agent
as its ultimate concern, curiously his or her nature or personality has re-
mained somewhat veiled within earlier cognitivedevelopmental theory.
The predominant emphasis on reason within Kohlbergs theoryregardless
how justied it may be as the core or structural backbone of moral
personhoodprovides only one perspective on moral maturity. Several
contemporary cognitivedevelopmentalists now acknowledge that this bias
has resulted in an impoverished description of the moral agent, and that
there is a need for a more full-bodied account of moral functioningto
put some esh on bare bones (Walker et al., 1995, pp. 390, 404, respec-
tively). Several initiatives are now being undertaken to do this.
Changing Conceptions of the Moral Person
The theoretical underpinnings for research on the moral person
have existed for some time in the writings of several developmentalists
(e.g., Blasi, 1983, 1995; Rest, 1983; Davidson and Youniss, 1991). In his
four-component model of morality, for example, Rest (1983) cites self-
identity as a moral being as one potential explanation for a persons
motivation to assign higher priority to moral values than to other
competing values in moral decision-making. Similarly, Davidson and
Youniss (1991) have proposed a compelling conceptual analysis of the
link between moral cognition and identity, placing particular emphasis
on the role of social context.
The most extensive conceptual account of the moral person, however,
is presented in Blasis self-model of moral functioning (Blasi, 1983, 1995).
Blasi has long regarded the self as the missing motivational link in Kohl-
bergs theory, arguing that it is a need for self-consistency that provides
the sense of personal necessity, or obligation, required for a person to
act in accordance with his or her moral beliefs. In Blasis view, as crucial
as cognitive processes are to morality, they are only one aspect of the much
larger whole that characterizes the person; reason, alone, is incapable of
evoking within the person a corresponding sense of moral responsibility.
372 Arnold
Rather, he argues that the tendency for a person to behave morally is
largely dependent on the extent to which moral beliefs and values are
integrated in the personality, and in ones sense of self. The inuence our
moral beliefs have on our lives, therefore, is contingent on the personal
importance that we as individuals attach to themwe must identify and
respect them as our own . . . determining their rank in our motivational
hierarchy . . . and building on them our most intimate sense of ourselves,
what we think we deeply and truly are (Blasi, 1990, p. 56).
Guided by these various conceptual analyses, recent empirical work
has begun to explore more specically the characteristics of the moral
personality across the lifespan. These studies have had varying starting
points and are framed around varying guiding questions: How do people
understand morality and its importance to them? What role does morality
play in the larger context of peoples everyday lives? What explains, and
how does one acquire, a sense of moral identity and a commitment to
social responsibility? Howdo people conceptualize the moral domain, more
generally, and their personal experiences within it?
One strand of research on the moral person has aimed at understanding
the nature of moral excellence, the exemplary behavior of people who are
distinguished for their personal moral commitment (e.g., Colby & Damon,
1992; Hart and Fegley, 1995). For example, Colby and Damon (1992)
conducted extensive personal interviews with 23 individuals whose lives
exemplify an unfailing commitment to moral causes, such as the preserva-
tion of civil liberties and the challenges of overcoming poverty. Despite
vast differences in their personalities, social circumstances, and moral vision,
what emerged from this research as the most distinguishing characteristic
of these exemplary individuals was the extent to which they identied
themselves as agents of moral good and relentlessly pursued these goals,
even in the face of insurmountable obstacles. In keeping with Blasis theory,
it appeared that through the course of their lives their moral vision had
become seamlessly integrated with their personal goals and with their
conceptions of who they are as people. Interestingly, however, the maturity
of their moral reasoning was not a distinguishing characteristic, varying
from Stages 3 to 5 in Kohlbergs model. These ndings have led Colby
and Damon (1992, p. 309) to conclude that [t]he critical issue in moral
development is whether ones overall personal goalsand ultimately ones
sense of selfsupport an immersion in moral concerns and moral action.
Moreover, they argue that the exceptionality of these individuals is only
an extreme version of the developmental potential of all people, a matter
of degree and not quality.
Other research has subsequently addressed exemplary moral commit-
ment in the formative years of adolescence (Hart and Fegley, 1995; Hart,
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 373
Yates, Fegley, and Wilson, 1995; Youniss and Yates, 1997). With the goal
of examining how altruistic adolescents understand their social worlds and,
particularly, how they understand themselves, Hart and Fegley conducted
lengthy interviews of 15 inner-city, minority adolescents who had been
nominated by community leaders for their exceptional commitment to the
needs of others, such as donating large blocks of time to social service
agencies and working in community soup kitchens. Their analyses of several
facets of self-concept and other forms of social understanding revealed a
clear synthesis of the adolescents sense of self and their moral commitment,
consistent with Colby and Damons (1992) ndings. For example, the self-
concepts of these young exemplars were distinguished from more typical
adolescents in several ways: They were more likely to describe themselves
in terms of moral traits and goals, to view themselves as having a greater
sense of stability and continuity over time, to be more oriented toward
their personal ideals and parental values, and to articulate theories of self
in which personal beliefs and philosophies are important. However, like
Colby and Damons (1992) adult sample, these exemplary adolescents did
not differ signicantly from other adolescents in the maturity of their moral
judgment, as dened by Kohlbergs theory. On the basis of this and other
factors, Hart and Fegley (1995) concluded that this degree of moral commit-
ment cannot be reduced to general developmental sophistication; and, like
Colby and Damon (1992), they suggest that although moral judgment is
an important aspect of moral behavior, its maturity is of limited inuence
in these contexts. Closely related research on moral commitment in adoles-
cence has recently been conducted by Youniss and Yates (1997). Derived
from a conceptual framework somewhat different from Kohlbergs, they
have conducted more extensive, longitudinal explorations of the develop-
mental processes by which youth acquire a sense of moral or civic identity
and social responsibility, through a sustained commitment to community
service.
Another strand of contemporary research focusing on the moral person
consists of studies of subjective or personal conceptions of morality and
moral experience, and the importance morality plays in everyday life. In
a study designed to explore the integration of morality in the adolescent
self, for example, Arnold (1993) investigated adolescents conceptions of
personal virtue and their interrelations with moral reasoning and behavior.
A sample of 80 middle-class adolescents, aged 1218, were rst asked to
identity their core, or essential, qualities from an assorted bag of virtues
and then responded to a series of interviewquestions asking them to explain
and elaborate the personal meaning or importance these qualities have for
themas individuals. Content analyses of the adolescents responses revealed
several interesting dimensions of the adolescent moral self. In particular,
374 Arnold
across ages, the adolescents varied greatly in their virtue choices, with
some identifying exclusively with moral qualities and others ascribing no
importance to them. They also varied in their explanations of the personal
importance of these qualities. Irrespective of their virtue choices, for some
the motivation to be a good person was dened in purely moral terms
and was accompanied by a keen sense of personal agency and emotional
resonance; in contrast, others were more clearly motivated by personal
achievement and self-interest, with little (if any) evidence of a concern
for others. Moreover, in keeping with Hart and Fegleys (1995) ndings,
adolescents who did reveal a strong sense of moral self were also more
likely than adolescents who did not to display exemplary patterns of moral
conduct, as rated by their classroom teachers; however, they did not differ
from others in the maturity of their moral judgment.
In a series of studies focusing on naturalistic conceptions of morality,
Walker and his colleagues (Walker et al., 1995; Walker and Pitts, 1998)
have recently explored how people across the lifespan understand and
experience morality in everyday life. In extensive open-ended interviews,
80 middle-class Canadians, aged 1684, were asked a series of questions
about moral experience, including examples of real-life moral dilemmas
and their experiences living through them, and their conceptions of the
moral domain, broadly dened. Content analyses of the interviews revealed
various dimensions of moral life, several of which contribute further to our
understanding of the nature of the moral person. In particular, it was
shown that peoples experiences of moral conict, as revealed in their self-
generated dilemmas, focused most typically on personal relationships and
intrapsychic issues, rather than on issues of justice. In recalling their feelings
and motivations in handling real-life conicts, the participants cited a num-
ber of intrapersonal factors: Typically, they expressed high degrees of angst
and confusion and tended to rely on intuition, conscience, or gut reaction
to evaluate the morality of their decisions, rather than on reectivity; and,
they also frequently cited the inuence of practical considerations and of
religion and faith on their moral experiences. On the basis of these analyses,
it was evident to Walker and his colleagues that, for some people, morality
was rooted in the heart of their being, whereas for others it was far less
important. In addition, in describing their conceptions of highly moral
people, they most frequently cited issues of character, virtues (such as
compassionate or caring), and behavior, with only rare reference to sophisti-
cated moral judgment. Yet again, then, at least in the context of these
interviews, moral reason did not appear to play a signicant role in peoples
conceptions of moral experience.
In summary, all of these emerging themes in moral psychology (and
others) are addressing and helping to overcome long-standing limitations
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 375
to the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm. By more closely attending to
the contextual and subjective features of morality in everyday life, this
contemporary work lays the foundation for a more comprehensive under-
standing of the nature of the moral person. Current research on this theme,
in particular, is providing valuable insights into characteristics of the person
neglected in our traditional model. The research illuminates some of the
intrapersonal dimensions of moral experience, such as the values and goals
that shape and give meaning to life and the affective dynamics of moral
experience. In some respects, contemporary research hints at a return to
notions of character banished from the cognitive-developmental para-
digm by Kohlberg years ago. By doing so, these studies have, indeed, begun
to provide a more full-bodied account of moral functioningto put some
esh on bare bones (Walker et al., 1995, p. 404).
At the same time, however, this recent research presents a quite differ-
ent conception of moral maturity from that portrayed in earlier cognitive
developmental theory. As discussed above, in Kohlbergs model, moral
maturity is characterized most specically by a persons capacity to reason;
reason provides the backbone or structural framework on which people
make meaning of moral situations. However, in attempting to expand on
this conceptionor, in sustaining Walkers metaphor, to put esh on
bare bonesthese recent studies suggest that other characteristics of the
person, specically the way a persons moral values and beliefs are inte-
grated into his or her sense of self or identity, are the critical factor, with
little (if any) evidence of the inuence of moral stage development. Al-
though these contemporary developmentalists (e.g., Walker et al., 1995)
nevertheless continue to acknowledge the importance of moral judgment
to moral maturity, their research leaves lots of ambiguity about the status
of reason in the contexts they have studied. Without greater clarity on this
issue, readers are left wondering what, exactly, constitutes the bare bones
to which they need to add esh. Or, more pointedly, to extend the
metaphor, what can one say about the strong Kohlbergian identication
of reason as the core or backbone of moral maturity as a result of these
recent empirical ndings? Such questions encourage cognitive
developmentalists to reconsider the role of reason in conceptions of moral
maturity in the context of this current work.
THE ROLE OF REASON IN CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE
MORAL PERSON
Contemporary research in moral psychology appears to challenge the
central tenets of the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm by raising ques-
376 Arnold
tions about the role of reason in conceptions of moral maturity. More
specically, it seems to raise two kinds of questions in particular: One kind
concerns the psychological aspects of moral development, and asks: Do
these recent ndings on the nature of the moral person cause one to question
the relevance of reason to a persons moral behavior or commitment? What
is the current status of moral reasoning in changing conceptions of the
moral person? A second set of questions pertains to the implications of
these recent ndings for the way psychologists study morality and moral
development: Is contemporary psychology still committed to the role of
reason in the study of morality? Or, are these studies calling into question
Kohlbergs central criterion for the psychological study of morality, the
belief that it requires us to access a persons own reason-based understand-
ing of his or her moral experience? In both cases, consideration of these
questions depends largely on the interpretation of the role of reason in
Kohlbergs theory. As summarized at the outset, Kohlbergs commitment
to reason as the core of morality is multifaceted, and each facet is relevant
to our consideration of these questions.
The most typical interpretation of the role of reason in Kohlbergs
theory, and the most salient within the context of the research reviewed
here, concerns the developmental stage concept for which his theory is best
known. This interpretation suggests that moral reason necessitates a stage-
of-moral-judgment analysis, in keeping with Kohlbergs claim that moral
stages constitute formal structures of reason, with an inherent logic that
inuences both the adequacy of a persons moral judgment and the commit-
ment to act on it. In this recent research, however, a stage-development
interpretation of moral reason as the crucial factor in moral commitment
is not supported: These studies have shown that in various contexts moral
stage is not related to behavior, whereas another characteristic of the per-
son, notably a sense of moral identity, is related.
The complexity of the judgmentaction problem in moral psychology
is well documented in the theoretical literature (see, in particular, Blasi,
1980; Rest, 1983; Thoma, 1994), and the fact that no stage relations have
been observed in the contemporary, empirical research reviewed here does
not necessarily mean that maturity of moral judgment is irrelevant. There
are a number of possible explanations for these recent ndings. For exam-
ple, as borne out by Colby and Damons (1992) study, sophisticated moral
reasoning is by no means a prerequisite for a highly moral life, as cognitive
developmentalists may have been somewhat loathe to acknowledge. Al-
though the moral exemplars Colby and Damon studied undoubtedly all
have personal explanations and justications for their commitments, these
reasons do not necessarily have any bearing on (and may be totally
irrelevant to) the maturity of their moral stage reasoning, as dened in
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 377
Kohlbergs theory. One question that logically arises from this research is:
When do people need sophisticated moral judgment and when do they
not? Or, from an empirical perspective: In what contexts does moral stage
reasoning relate to moral commitment and when does it not?
In attempting to answer these questions, at least two critical factors
appear worthy of attention: the kind of social problem or situation at issue,
and the nature of the person who chooses to address it. Quite likely, some
moral situations do require sophisticated, analytical thought for an adequate
resolution (such as the kind of complex issues routinely deliberated by
Supreme Court Justices); whereas others (such as the interpersonal issues
surrounding life-choice issues) may not, regardless of their signicance to
the individual. Irrespective of a particular kind of moral situation, however,
people differ in what is salient in their personal experience, and they may
well orient and respond differently to moral situations (even the same moral
situation), thus revealing a variety of moral personalities (Flanagan, 1991).
In Colby and Damons research, for example, all their exemplary partici-
pants shared an intense commitment to moral causes; however, there was
considerable variation in the specic problems they identied, in their
individual perceptions of them, and in their personal motivations for ad-
dressing them. Conceivably, some may have perceived their commitments
primarily in terms of social justice (as epitomized by some interpretations
of Martin Luther King, for example), and they may have sought to remedy
them in a highly analytical, reasoned manner. Others, however, may have
perceived and responded to similar (or different) social ills with a more
purely empathic or altruistic sensitivity toward human suffering (as epito-
mized, perhaps, by Mother Theresa). In both sets of cases, a strong moral
self or personality is clearly evident, but the role of complex moral reasoning
is likely far more relevant in the former cases than in the latter. Moreover,
both instances present valid conceptions of moral maturity and should be
equally represented and valued in moral development theory. To date,
methodological analyses have typically obscured such distinctions, but an
individual case analysis of Colby and Damons data would presumably test
this possibility. In the studies of Hart and Fegley (1995) and Arnold (1993)
the lack of a judgment-action relation is much less surprising, given the
limited variance in the participants developmental stages and the kinds of
behaviors under investigation, although a similar case could likely be made.
Undoubtedly, these contemporary research ndings encourage us to
reconsider the role of moral stage reasoning in our evolving conceptions
of moral maturity. Do they really suggest that the traditional backbone
of moral functioning is not valid, after all; or, rather, that psychologists
need to reconceptualize how they think about it in future research? Despite
the considerable attention already focused on the moral judgment-action
378 Arnold
relation, it appears that cognitivedevelopmentalists still have not yet ade-
quately explored the empirical means of testing it. The methodological
challenge is now to overcome the ambiguity in these recent ndings and to
investigate the ways that moral reasoning and moral commitment interact,
heeding more precisely than in the past the signicance of both the kinds
of problems that arise in everyday life and the nature of the people who
choose (or choose not) to address them.
On the other hand, a reassessment of the role of moral stage reasoning
also may mean that we eventually largely reject the stage concept (as a
large contingent of cognitive developmentalists already has) and consider
alternative ways of looking at moral reasoning, such as cognitive schemas,
scripts and products now being used in other areas of psychology, and
which Rest and his colleagues are pursuing in their neo-Kohlbergian model
of moral development (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma, 1999). Despite
how enlightening such approaches may prove to be, however, they may well
represent a sharp departure from the fundamental tenets of the structuralist
paradigm as originally conceived by Baldwin (1906) and Piaget (1932/1965).
Another facet of Kohlbergs commitment to reason as the core of
moralitya less constrained interpretation, but conceptually more funda-
mental to his theorypertains to the concept of moral meaning-making,
and to his belief that moral psychologists must attend to the way a person
understands and interprets his or her own social reality. There are at least
two levels on which this facet of moral reason can be interpreted. A rela-
tively loose interpretation of moral meaning-making requires us to attend
closely to the persons self-awareness of his or her psychological states,
as compared, for example, to Freudian notions of anxiety reduction or
behavioristic response mechanisms. In all instances, it appears that the
contemporary studies reviewed here have been true to this empirical phe-
nomenological approach. The continued use of extensive interviewing pro-
cedures in current research, alone, conrms an obvious appreciation that
it is only through careful analyses of a persons thoughts that his or her
moral experience can be examined legitimately.
A second interpretation of the meaning-making facet of Kohlbergs
commitment to reason in moral psychology is more fundamental to his
theory, and goes to the very nature or denition of morality. This interpreta-
tion places emphasis on the specically moral dimension of moral under-
standing, in the belief that it is only when a person demonstrates the capacity
and disposition to have reasons for his or her moral actions (i.e., to be
acting with purpose and intent in social interaction with others) that re-
searchers are truly studying morality. Moreover, from a psychological per-
spective, it is the having of reasons for ones moral behavior that embodies
the logical necessity of knowledge itself, in Kohlbergs belief, and that
provides the binding or impinging quality inherent in moral judgment.
Morality, Post-Kohlberg 379
The relevance of this interpretation of moral meaning-making is raised
by one of Walker and his colleagues (Walker et al., 1995) recent ndings:
Many of the people they interviewed claim to depend primarily on gut
reaction, intuition, or conscience to determine the rightness of their real-
life moral decisions, rather than on reasoned personal reection. Without a
more precise analysis of this response pattern, one can only speculate on
its true signicance. However, it raises the question whether a gut reac-
tion (as opposed to deliberate thought) does, indeed, constitute legitimate
grounds for morality. Presumably, if moral psychologists were to accept
this manner of moral decision-making (if one can even call it that in this
instance) we would risk losing the very core of moralityby denition,
the rationality or conceptual backbone of morality would have dissolved.
Moreover, would we not also risk taking ourselves back where Kohlberg
began, when the study of morality was not necessarily real morality?
Again, such descriptions of real-life moral experience raise new meth-
odological challenges, and seem to beg the question: But, what is it that
evokes a persons gut reaction? What gives the gut this sense of
rightness? Although, at face value, such descriptions may appear to
suggest that people have no need to think deliberately in moral situations,
there are various interpretations of this response pattern. One interpreta-
tion does imply a denial (of one sort or another) of the relevance of moral
reasoning, at least in some situations and for some people. For example,
relying on ones intuitive gut reaction can imply a persons lack of ability
or skill to be systematically reective about moral issues, or a personal
tendency not to give explicit attention to reason in moral situations (often
resulting, perhaps, in a tendency to express relativistic thoughts or be-
liefs). In such cases, it might well be valid to conclude that reasoning, per
se, plays little (if any) role in moral life. Alternatively, however, it is also
plausible that some people simply do not need to think deliberately or
ponderously in all situations. Their moral beliefs and values may be so
deeply integrated in the self and, therefore, have become so habitual that
they truly are intuitive, and a particular course of action does, indeed,
simply feel right. Here, though, it would be wrong to conclude that a
persons conduct is not grounded in moral reason. Until such time as
psychologists have greater clarity as to what is behind such vague expres-
sions, it is premature to interpret them, necessarily, as a rejection of the
relevance of moral reason to real-life moral experience.
CONCLUSION
The contemporary research trends summarized in this reviewrepresent
a new stage in the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm and describe some
380 Arnold
of the ways that moral psychologists are beginning the process of putting
esh on [the] bones (Walker et al., 1995) of an earlier conception of
moral maturity. As a result of these efforts, however, there now appears
to be considerable ambiguity surrounding the status of reason in under-
standings of moral experience, at least as it was originally elaborated in
Kohlbergs theory.
Assuredly, this current work has continued to honor the phenomeno-
logical, meaning-making criterion of morality and, thereby, has remained
true to the study of morality in the spirit of the cognitivedevelopmental
tradition. What does seem to be called into question is the relevance of
developmental stages of reasoning to moral commitment; and, unquestion-
ably, it is the developmental qualities of moral reason that comprise one
of the most signicant aspects of Kohlbergs legacy. As discussed above,
however, even this interpretation of the role of moral reason cannot easily
be discredited on the basis of the evidence provided to date. Thus, despite
the many strengths of this contemporary work, and its valuable contribu-
tions to moral development theory, it may be much farther from posing a
major threat to reason, as the backbone of morality, than some of the
rhetoric surrounding it might have us believe. At the very least, these
studies raise newchallenges and encourage us to seek clarication of the role
of reason in future empirical work. In the interim, however, any rejection or
denigration of the relevance of reason, in my view, would be prematureif
not tantamount to throwing the reasoning person out with the moral bath-
water.
I readily acknowledge that I have devoted more time in this review
to raising some of the questions that have emerged from this new work
than in attempting to answer them. My purpose, essentially, has been to
convey the lack of clarity that currently exists within the eld regarding
the role of reason in moral psychology and to suggest some of the kinds
of work needed to elucidate these issues. In many respects, contemporary
research continues to wrestle with much the same challenge that Kohlberg
faced over 30 years agothe challenge of nding effective means to study
the developing persons understanding of the social world, while also re-
specting the uniqueness of morality itself. By comparison, however, contem-
porary moral psychologists do so with the great benet of hindsight
(Rest, 1989).
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