Drones Aerial Surveillance McNeal FINAL PDF

The Robots Are Coming:
The Project On Civilian Robotics
Drones and
Aerial Surveillance:
Considerations For Legislators
Gregory McNeal
Pepperdine University School of Law | November 2014
ICE
L
PO
Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Gregory McNeal
is a professor at
Pepperdine University
School of Law and a
contributor to Forbes.
He is an expert
in law and public
policy with a specific
focus on security,
technology and crime.
The looming prospect of expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles,

colloquially known as drones, has raised understandable concerns for
lawmakers.1 Those concerns have led some to call for legislation mandating
that nearly all uses of drones be prohibited unless the government has first
obtained a warrant. Privacy advocates have mounted a lobbying campaign
that has succeeded in convincing thirteen states to enact laws regulating
the use of drones by law enforcement, with eleven of those thirteen states
requiring a warrant before the government may use a drone.2 The campaigns
mounted by privacy advocates oftentimes make a compelling case about the
threat of pervasive surveillance, but the legislation is rarely tailored in such
a way to prevent the harm that advocates fear. In fact, in every state where
legislation was passed, the new laws are focused on the technology (drones)
not the harm (pervasive surveillance). In many cases, this technologycentric approach creates perverse results, allowing the use of extremely
sophisticated pervasive surveillance technologies from manned aircraft,
while disallowing benign uses of drones for mundane tasks like accident and
crime scene documentation, or monitoring of industrial pollution and other
environmental harms.
The first drone-related legislation appeared in 2013 in Florida, Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas.3 In 2014, Wisconsin,
Illinois, Indiana, Utah, and Iowa also passed laws seeking to address the use
of drones by law enforcement.4 As of the writing of this paper, the California
legislature passed a drone-related bill that was vetoed by the governor,
but the bills sponsors have vowed to revisit the issue in the next legislative
session.5 These legislative efforts have been aimed at restricting the
governments use of drone technology, while largely allowing the government
to conduct identical surveillance when not using drone technology. This
absurd anachronism is intentional, as privacy advocates have explicitly
chosen to capitalize on the public interest and attention associated with the
demonization of drone technology as a way to achieve legislative victories.
These advocates are admittedly not focused on more sensible legislation that
addresses harms irrespective of the technology used.6
Privacy advocates contend that with drones, the government will be able to
engage in widespread pervasive surveillance because drones are cheaper
to operate than their manned counterparts. While drones are cheaper to
operate, the drones most law enforcement agencies can afford are currently
far less capable than their manned counterparts (oftentimes these drones are
small remote controlled helicopters or airplanes, capable of a flight time of
less than one hour). The surveillance equipment that can be placed on these
drones is also far less intrusive than that which can be mounted to manned
aircraft.
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Moreover, the term unmanned aircraft is also misleading as there are

no systems currently available to law enforcement that can conduct fully
autonomous operations, all systems need an operator for part of the mission.
Thus, in almost all instances drones are less capable than manned aerial
surveillance platforms, and while the platform is cheaper (but less capable),
the personnel costs still remain constant as an officer is required to operate
the drone. Granted, there are very sophisticated systems used by the
military, but even if law enforcement agencies were able to afford the highly
sophisticated multi-million dollar Predator and Reaper systems like those
used for surveillance on battlefields, those systems (both the aircraft and the
ground control station) are more expensive than manned helicopters, require
a ground crew to launch and recover the aircraft, and require both a pilot
and a camera operator. In light of these facts, the legislation being pushed
by privacy advocates has been explicitly directed at drone technology, not
because the technology represents an actual threat to civil liberties, but
because someday in the future, the technology may be intrusive.7
Privacy advocates
contend that
with drones, the
government will be
able to engage in
widespread pervasive
surveillance.
To counter the threat of surveillance, privacy advocates have focused solely

on requiring warrants before the use of drones by law enforcement. Such
a mandate oftentimes will result in the grounding of drone technology in
circumstances where law enforcement use of drones would be beneficial
and largely non-controversial. For example, in light of the Boston Marathon
bombing, police may want to fly a drone above a marathon to ensure the
safety of the public. Under many bills, police would not be allowed to use a
drone unless they had a warrant, premised upon probable cause to believe
a crime had been or was about to be committed. This requirement exceeds
current Fourth Amendment protections with regard to the reasonableness
of observing activities in public places. What this means is that the police
would need to put together a warrant application with sufficient facts to
prove to a judge that they had probable cause. That application would need
to define with particularity the place to be searched or the persons to be
surveilled. All of this would be required to observe people gathered in a
public place, merely because the observation was taking place from a drone,
rather than from an officer on a rooftop or in a helicopter. In a circumstance
like a marathon, this probable cause showing will be difficult for the police
to satisfy. After all, if the police knew who in the crowd was a potential
bomber, they would arrest those individuals. Rather, a marathon is the type
of event where the police would want to use a drone to monitor for unknown
attackers, and in the unfortunate event of an attack, use the footage to
identify the perpetrators. This is precisely the type of circumstance where the
use of drone could be helpful, but unfortunately it has been outlawed in many
states. To make matters worse, this type of drone surveillance would pose
little to no harms to privacy.
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A marathon is a highly public event, the event is televised, it takes place

on streets where there are surveillance cameras and spectators are
photographing the event. Moreover, in the states where drones have been
banned (unless accompanied by a warrant), the police have not been
prohibited from using any other type of surveillance equipmentjust drones.
This technology-centric approach has done little to protect privacy, but will
certainly harm public safety, depriving law enforcement of a tool that they
could use to protect people.
In light of the
Boston Marathon
bombing, police may
want to fly a drone
above a marathon
to ensure the safety
of the public.
While warrants are appealing to privacy advocates, the enactment of overly

broad restrictions on drone use can curtail non-invasive, beneficial uses
of drones. Legislators should reject a warrant-based, technology-centric
approach as it is unworkable and counterproductive. Instead, legislators
should follow a property rights-centric approach, coupled with limits
on persistent surveillance, data retention procedures, transparency and
accountability measures and a recognition of the possibility that technology
may make unmanned aerial surveillance more protective of privacy than
manned surveillance. This paper makes five core recommendations:
1. Legislators should follow a property-rights approach to aerial
surveillance. This approach provides landowners with the right to
exclude aircraft, persons, and other objects from a column of airspace
extending from the surface of their land up to 350 feet above ground
level. Such an approach may solve most public and private harms
associated with drones.
2. Legislators should craft simple, duration-based surveillance legislation
that will limit the aggregate amount of time the government may surveil
a specific individual. Such legislation can address the potential harm of
persistent surveillance, a harm that is capable of being committed by
manned and unmanned aircraft.
3. Legislators should adopt data retention procedures that require
heightened levels of suspicion and increased procedural protections
for accessing stored data gathered by aerial surveillance. After a
legislatively determined period of time, all stored data should be
deleted.
4. Legislators should enact transparency and accountability measures,
requiring government agencies to publish on a regular basis information
about the use of aerial surveillance devices (both manned and
unmanned).
5. Legislators should recognize that technology such as geofencing and
auto-redaction, may make aerial surveillance by drones more protective
of privacy than human surveillance.
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I. BACKGROUND
The domestic use of drones by law enforcement is a popular topic following
passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. The act directed
that the FAA must integrate unmanned aircraft systemsdronesinto the
national airspace by September of 2015. A number of organizations have
expressed concern over the possibility that thousands of drones will be
crowding the skies, some armed with sophisticated cameras. The ACLU, for
example, has been quite vocal in its criticism releasing a report that sets
out their concerns over the prospect of intrusive aerial surveillance without
proper safeguards. While a robust public debate over the use of domestic
drones is warranted, the conclusion that widespread privacy violations are
imminent is premature.
The conclusion
that widespread
privacy violations
are imminent
is premature.
While the FAA Modernization and Reform Act seeks the integration of
unmanned aircraft into U.S. airspace by September 30, 2015, most of the
provisions dealing with unmanned aircraft create a broad framework under
which the FAA can explore the uses and feasibility of integration of this new
technology. The key sections of the law direct the Secretary of Transportation
and the Administrator of the FAA to draft plans, standards, and rules to
ensure that drone integration proceeds in a safe and legal manner. In short,
this is a public process where civil liberties and privacy groups will no doubt
have a voice in crafting rules, and that voice seems to be at least as effective
as the industry associations voice. What is left out of the process is what
state and local governments will do with the technology, and that is the
primary focus of this paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES

A. THE CURRENT STATE OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE LAW
Aerial observations of the curtilage of a home are generally not prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment, so long as the government is conducting the
surveillance from public navigable airspace, in a non-physically intrusive
manner, and the government conduct does not reveal intimate activities
traditionally associated with the use of the home. The U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of aerial surveillance in a series of cases in the late 1980s:
In California v. Ciraolo8 the Supreme Court held, The Fourth Amendment was
not violated by the naked-eye aerial observation of respondents backyard.
In Ciraolo, the police received a tip that someone was growing marijuana in
the backyard at Ciraolos home. A police officer attempted to observe what
was growing, but his observations were obscured by a six foot high outer
fence and a ten foot high inner fence. The officer, suspicious that the fences
| November 2014

might be intended to hide the growth of marijuana, obtained a private plane

and flew over the backyard of Ciraolos property at an altitude of 1,000 feet.
That altitude was within the FAAs definition of public navigable airspace.
The Supreme Court found that this was not a search, and therefore was not
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. In so finding, Chief Justice Burger
stated that in erecting a 10 foot fence, Ciraolo manifested his own subjective
intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agriculture but
his intent and desire did not amount to an expectation of privacy. The
Court noted that the fence might not shield these plants from the eyes
of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level
bus.9 Accordingly, it was not entirely clear whether [Ciraolo] maintained
a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard,
or only from ground level observations.10 The Court believed that it was
unreasonable for Ciraolo to expect privacy in his backyard when a routine
overflight, or an observation by a power company repair mechanic on a pole
overlooking the yard would reveal exactly what the police discovered in their
overflight.11
At the same time that Ciraolo was decided, the Court held in Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States that the use of an aerial mapping camera to photograph
an industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace similarly does
not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
In Dow Chemical Co., the Supreme Court did acknowledge that the use of
technology might change the Courts inquiry, stating surveillance of private
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant. But then the Court dismissed the notion,
stating [a]ny person with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily
duplicate the photographs at issue. In short, the Court stated, taking of
aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is
not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
In Ciraolo, the court had articulated a similar theme, noting that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard,
despite having erected fences to obscure the yard from view. The Court
reasoned that while the defendant shielded his yard from the view of those
on the street, other observations from a truck or a two-level bus might have
allowed a person to see into his yard. Continuing, the Court stated The
Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to
require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home
on public thoroughfares. Despite the defendants fence, the Court said the
mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his
| November 2014

activities [does not] preclude an officers observations from a public vantage

point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly
visible. The police flew a small commercial airplane over Ciraolos land from
public navigable airspace and did so in a physically nonintrusive manner.
Therefore, while the defendant may have expected privacy in his backyard,
privacy from aerial viewing was not one that society was prepared to deem
reasonable. The Court stated, [i]n an age where private and commercial
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.
Shortly after Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Co. the Supreme Court analyzed the
use of helicopters for aerial surveillance. In Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police traveling in
the public airways at an altitude of 400 feet to obtain a warrant in order to
observe what is visible to the naked eye.12 The Riley court found that the rule
of Ciraolo controlled. Riley, just like Ciraolo, took measures that protected
against ground level observation but, the sides and roof of his greenhouse
were left partially open just as the sky above Ciraolos yard allowed one to
look directly down into his yard. In Riley, the police flew a helicopter over
Rileys land, and observed marijuana plants growing in Rileys greenhouse.
The Court in Riley found that what was growing in the greenhouse was
subject to viewing from the air. The police conduct in Riley was acceptable
because the police were flying in publicly navigable airspace, no intimate
details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and
there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury. The Court
continued, [a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over
Rileys property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have
observed Rileys greenhouse. The police officer did no more. In an important
passage, concurring in the judgment, Justice OConnor noted public use
of altitudes lower than [400 feet]particularly public observations from
helicopters circling over the curtilage of a homemay be sufficiently rare that
police surveillance from such altitudes would violate reasonable expectations
of privacy, despite compliance with FAA air safety regulations.
Thus, the law for at least the last 25 years has allowed the police to fly aircraft
over private property, backyards, factory farms, industrial plants, and any
other place where the average citizen may fly a Cessna. The police may make
observations from the air, just like a person on a commercial flight inbound to
an airport can look down and observe the yards of people below and just like
a utility worker on a pole can look down into an adjacent yard.
Armed with that information, the police can use it to get a warrant to go in
on foot and investigate what they previously observed from a lawful vantage
point (without a warrant).
| November 2014

For more than two decades, the police have not been required to turn a blind
eye to evidence of criminality merely because they observed it from the air,
they similarly should not be required to ignore evidence of criminality merely
because they witness the crime through the eyes of a drone.
B. THE CURRENT STATE OF AIRSPACE RIGHTS

As the prior section indicated, the Supreme Courts aerial surveillance
jurisprudence makes reference to public navigable airspace or observations
from a public vantage point where [an officer] has a right to be. By tying
the Fourth Amendments protections to the location in airspace from
which the surveillance was conducted, the Supreme Court has left open the
possibility that low altitude surveillance may violate the Fourth Amendment.
Importantly, the drones that law enforcement are most likely to acquire and
operate are most effective at altitudes below 500 feet. Thus, drones are
poised to disrupt settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, by operating in
airspace which heretofore has not been the subject of case law or statutes.
They should not

be required to
ignore evidence of
criminality merely
because they witness
the crime through
the eyes of a drone.
To understand this emergent legal issue, its necessary to understand the

unsettled nature of landowners rights in low-altitude airspace. In the 1946
case United States v. Causby, the Supreme Court analyzed the airspace
rights of landowners.13 The Causby case involved chicken farmers whose farm
was adjacent to a small municipal airport that the U.S. military began using
during World War II.14 The military flights were so low (83 feet above the land
and 67 feet above the Causbys home) that the Causbys chickens would be
frightened by each overflight, fly into the wall of their chicken coop, and die.15
The Causbys sued the federal government claiming that the governments
flights constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.16
The Supreme Courts opinion, authored by Justice William Douglas, began by
analyzing the ad coleum doctrine.17 That doctrine had its roots in common law
jurisprudence dating back centuries to Cino da Pisoias declaration Cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum which translated means [to] whomsoever
the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky.18 The doctrine assigned airspace
rights based on ownership of the surface land situated immediately below
the space...airspace held by landowners...theoretically extended indefinitely
to the outer reaches of the heavens.19 Justice Douglas, analyzing the ad
coelum doctrine quickly dispensed with it, stating that it had no place in the
modern world.20 Rather, Douglas said that a landowner owned at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection
with the land.21 If the government or any other party intrudes into that space,
such intrusions should be treated in the same category as invasions of the
surface.22
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Such invasions could, in the right circumstances, be treated as a trespass

and on the facts presented by Causby the flights could be considered a
compensable taking. The facts of Causby importantly involved flights that
were so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment and use of the land. The Causby opinion thus created
two types of airspace, the public navigable airspace, a public highway in
which the landowner could not exclude aircraft from flying, and the airspace
below that which extends downward to the surface, in which landowners held
some right to exclude aircraft.
This discussion brings into focus the possibility that a landowner may exclude
others from entering the low altitude airspace above their property, and as
such may exclude drones (whether government or civilian operated) from
entering that airspace. But, if such rights in fact exist, at what altitude are
such property rights triggered? Unfortunately there is very little clarity on
this point. The Supreme Court referred to this airspace as the immediate
reaches above the land, into which intrusions would subtract from the
owners full enjoyment of the property.23
This graphic illustrates the complexities associated with the
jurisprudence and regulations governing aerial surveillance
and airspace rights. FAA regulations create a minimum
altitude of 500 or 1000 feet in some areas (exempting
helicopters from those minimums in certain circumstances).
Those regulations also create a maximum altitude of 400
feet for model aircraft (which would include some drones).
The Supreme Court in Ciraolo approved aerial surveillance
from manned aircraft flying at 1,000 feet, and in Riley
approved aerial surveillance from a helicopter at 400 feet;
however in Causby the Supreme Court said flights at 83
feet while taking off from an airport violated the Causbys
property rights. The average two story home is 35 feet tall,
the question mark depicts the gray area which this paper
argues must be clarified.
Graphic: Gregory McNeal
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Suppose the police

employed this
miraculous tool to
discover not only
what crops people
were growing in
their greenhouses,
but also what books
they were reading.
10
The lack of clarity presents a significant issue of law and public policy as the
drones that are most likely to be operated by law enforcement (and citizens)
are small planes and helicopters that are most effective when used below
navigable airspace, that is to say, below 500 feet (although 500 feet is a
rough rule of thumb).24 Consider the Supreme Courts opinion in California
v. Ciraolo, central to the Courts holding was the notion that government
surveillance from 1,000 feet above the ground took place from a public
vantage point where a police officer had a right to be.25 But if the officer
in Ciraolo were to conduct that surveillance today, with a drone, he would
likely not fly the drone up to 1,000 feet, in fact he would likely fly it just
high enough above the landowners property to look down and observe
the marijuana plants, likely under 40 feet in altitude. Would such a flight
violate the landowners reasonable expectation of privacy? It would largely
depend on how obscured the land was from other observations at the same
altitude. It would also require that the landowner have a right to exclude
the drone from flying over their property. Of course such an exclusionary
right would not prevent the officer from flying the drone above public land,
such as the street. In such a circumstance the officer would need only stand
on the sidewalk and fly the drone to an altitude high enough to see into
the landowners property. Whether such a low altitude aerial observation
above public land, peering into private property, would be considered a
public vantage point and therefore acceptable from a Fourth Amendment
perspective is similarly an open question.26
In Riley, the plurality said the case was controlled by Ciraolo,27 in her
concurring opinion, Justice OConnor presciently highlighted the problems
with the Riley (and by extension the Ciraolo) Courts opinion. She wrote:
Imagine a helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed
courtyard or patio without generating any noise, wind, or dust at all
and, for good measure, without posing any threat of injury. Suppose
the police employed this miraculous tool to discover not only what
crops people were growing in their greenhouses, but also what books
they were reading and who their dinner guests were. Suppose, finally,
that the FAA regulations remained unchanged, so that the police were
undeniably where they had a right to be. Would todays plurality
continue to assert that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures was not infringed by such surveillance? Yet that is the logical
consequence of the pluralitys rule.28
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The question of what

exactly is the publicly
navigable airspace has
become increasingly
critical to resolving
how to deal with
aerial surveillance.
11
Analyzing this passage, Professor Troy Rule notes [t]wenty-five years

after Riley, law enforcement agencies can now easily purchase the very
hypothetical miraculous tool that OConnor forebodingly described.29 Its
not clear that such devices can be easily purchase[d], at least not yet. The
small drones police are likely to purchase today cannot operate without
creating noise and are incapable of seeing what books people are reading.
Interestingly, Justice OConnor was discussing manned aircraft, and manned
aircraft do in fact possess the capabilities she feared. Yet we have witnessed
very few proposals seeking to ban the use of high powered cameras mounted
to helicopters or airplanes.30 Given the lack of interest in banning those
capabilities from manned aircraft, its difficult to see why banning drones
(which do not yet possess such capabilities) is a rational policy choice.
Nevertheless, if engineers can continue to increase the lift capacity of drones,
and can miniaturize the superior technology already mounted on manned
aircraft, drones may eventually possess the capabilities Justice OConnor
feared. At that point it may be prudent to legislate with an eye towards
controlling those observations (irrespective of whether they are from a drone
or a manned platform).
More important than the future observational capabilities though, are the
locational capabilities drones currently possess, namely the ability to hover
just above an enclosed courtyard. At those lower altitudes, the drones that
law-enforcement agencies are most likely to acquire become highly capable
and problematic. Thus the question of what exactly is the publicly navigable
airspace has become increasingly critical to resolving how to deal with aerial
surveillance. State and local governments do not need to wait on the FAA to
define such areas. In fact, through zoning laws, state and local governments
can clearly define the rights of landowners in the airspace above their land,
in so doing they will answer many of the open questions regarding public
vantage points.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS DRONES AND AERIAL

SURVEILLANCE
This section is divided into two parts. The first part is a series of five core
recommendations which, if adopted, will address most public and private
harms associated with drones while balancing the rights of private parties
and the needs of law enforcement. The second part consists of a series
of principles that legislators should remain cognizant of if they choose to
forgo the core recommendations and follow the problematic warrant-based
approach advanced by some advocacy groups.
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12
A. CORE RECOMMENDATIONS
CORE RECOMMENDATION #1: LEGISLATORS SHOULD FOLLOW A
PROPERTY-RIGHTS APPROACH TO AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, EXPLICITLY
EXTENDING TO PROPERTY OWNERS RIGHTS IN THEIR AIRSPACE UP TO
350 FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL. SUCH AN APPROACH MAY SOLVE MOST
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH DRONES BY ALLOWING
THE LANDOWNER TO EXCLUDE INTRUSIONS INTO THEIR AIRSPACE BY
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PARTIES.
The uncertainty associated with landowner rights in the airspace immediately
above their property has raised two problems. First, there is little clarity
regarding where low altitude aerial surveillance by the government would
violate the Fourth Amendment. Is it at 500 feet if by a fixed wing aircraft,
or 1,000 feet?31 Is it 400 feet if by a helicopter? In Riley the Court said that
the surveillance conducted at 400 feet by a helicopter did not require a
warrant, but it left open the possibility that surveillance at a lower altitude
would be acceptable. Thus raising the question, what about a flight at 350
feet? The case law on whether this would be a lawful observation is not clear,
but its difficult to see how a court applying the principles of Riley would
find substantive differences from an observation at 350 feet versus one at
400 feet. Thats because the Supreme Courts jurisprudence tells us to look
at whether the observation took place from navigable airspace or from
a vantage point at which a member of the public could otherwise be. For
helicopters, navigable airspace could easily include 350 feet above ground
level, so long as the pilot was not creating a hazard.32 For drones and model
aircraft, FAA rules and guidelines for hobbyists require operation below 400
feet, thus an operation at 350 feet would be from a public vantage point.
The problem is not the technology, the problem is the ability of landowners
to exclude aerial observations from certain vantage points (thats a property
rights problem). Any legislative solution for aerial surveillance must address
this issue. Second, the absence of clarity with regard to property rights
has also raised concerns about the privacy implications of private (nongovernment) uses of drones. While private drone use is beyond the scope
of this paper, the right to exclude the government from conducting aerial
surveillance is inextricably tied to whether the public would have had a right
to make the observation the police made. The linkage of these two concepts
suggests that a property-rights approach may provide a way to harmonize
these separate policy concerns and also address most of the concerns
associated with aerial surveillance.
Property law is almost exclusively governed by state and local laws. Arizona
State law professor Troy Ruleone of the first scholars to analyze property
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13
rights in the context of dronesnotes, [u]nlike the murky set of legal rules
governing low altitude airspace, the laws delineating property rights in the
surface land could hardly be clearer.33 The land, Professor Rule explains,
is owned and those owners have rights to exclude trespassers and other
intruders. However, [t]he commons regime that governs high-altitude
airspace is in many ways the antithesis of the private property regime that
applies to surface land: no one owns high-altitude space, and everyone is
welcome to use it if they follow certain rules.34 In between the land and high
altitude airspace is an area that is murky, and largely undefined. State and
local governments can act to clarify the rights of landowners in the zone
between the land and high altitude airspace.35
State and local governments that act to craft laws clarifying property rights
in low altitude airspace could do so by arguing that they are merely codifying
long standing property law doctrine. In so doing, state and local governments
could rely on the Causby courts declaration that the flight of airplanes,
which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the
use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it...[such flights] are in the
same category as invasions of the surface.36
If low altitude flights immediately above a landowners property are akin
to walking onto that property, then police who fly drones at low altitude
above a landowners property to observe the backyard of a persons home
have engaged in conduct akin to walking onto that property. The Fourth
Amendment analysis would require analyzing whether the landowner could
have excluded the public from making an observation from that vantage
point (i.e. did the flight take place in an area where the public had a right to
be). Thus to control these low altitude flights, legislators will need to craft
statutes that provide property owners with the right to exclude members of
the public from this low altitude airspace.
Granted a rule extending property rights in a manner to prevent low altitude
flights directly over a landowners property wont preclude the police from
asking a neighbor if they can fly above their adjacent property to obtain a
better vantage point, just like existing rules dont preclude the police (or
a private citizen) from asking a neighbor if they can come inside to look
out a second floor window into neighboring property. Similarly, such a rule
wont preclude the police from flying above public land (such as sidewalks
and streets), but local zoning laws could address flights over public land.
This proposed approach will preclude the police from flying at low altitudes
directly over a greenhouse like the one in Riley or directly over a backyard
like that in Ciraolo, but it would preserve the ability of the police to conduct
those already lawful surveillance activities at or near the altitudes at which
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14
they were conducted in Riley (above 400 feet) and Ciraolo (above 1,000
feet). Such an approach would also have the secondary effect of making low
altitude paparazzi drone flights unlawful when flown for example, directly
above Kim Kardashian and Kanye Wests home.37
Legislators should follow a property-rights approach to aerial surveillance. This

approach provides landowners with the right to exclude aircraft, persons, and
other objects from a column of airspace extending from the surface of their land
up 350 feet above ground level (AGL).
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15
What might such a statute look like? To preserve privacy, the landowners
right must extend high enough to make the exclusion effective. However to
preserve a right of transit for an Amazon or Google delivery drone, a mapping
and real estate drone, or model aircraft, the right of exclusion cannot extend
all the way up to the navigable airspace line (500 feet in most locations,
1,000 feet in congested areas).38 An appropriate statute would thus state
that landowners own the airspace above their property up to 350 feet above
ground level. In most locations that will provide the landowner with airspace
rights that extend to more than ten times the height of the average two story
home. By virtue of owning this column of land up to 350 feet, the landowner
will have a right to exclude the general public (and therefore the police) from
flying above their property in a way that will interfere with their enjoyment
of the land. This proposal draws the line at 350 feet because while navigable
airspace is generally understood as existing at a minimum altitude of 500
feet, the FAA has promulgated regulations and guidance which allow for the
use of model aircraft (which includes drones) at altitudes up to a maximum
of 400 feet (thus leaving a 100 foot buffer space between model aircraft
operations and navigable airspace).39 Setting the landowners airspace at
350 feet provides a 50 foot buffer space between the ceiling of the property
owners airspace and the ceiling of model aircraft airspace, allowing for a
small transit zone for model aircraft. Such a transit zone may allow model
aircraft operators to traverse the airspace above private property without fear
of violating the landowners property rights, while simultaneously avoiding
violating FAA regulations.
This proposal creates, from 350 feet upwards to navigable airspace, a buffer
zone in which drones and other aircraft can fly (up to the established limit).
In between the 350 foot ceiling of the landowners airspace and the floor
of publicly navigable airspace (500 or 1,000 feet) drones could otherwise
operate to transit over a landowners property en route to delivering goods.
This also means that drones could even operate in this space to take
photographs or conduct surveillance. But, while such surveillance may at first
blush seem problematic, this proposal is in fact a nearly status quo solution.
Under Riley, a warrantless helicopter observation from 400 feet was deemed
constitutional, with the Court leaving open the possibility that observations
from lower altitudes might also be constitutional. Thus, this proposal provides
greater protections than those in Riley by providing greater precision. This
proposal creates a bright line rule at 350 feet, making it clear that any aerial
intrusion at or below that altitude would violate the landowners property
rights and therefore would be a non-public vantage point. Thus, while drones
and helicopters might still conduct surveillance at 350 feet, drone surveillance
at that altitude will be far less intrusive than helicopter surveillance at
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400 feet because a helicopters larger size enables it to carry far more
sophisticated surveillance equipment; concomitantly observations from
drones at 350 feet will be far less intrusive than observations from helicopters
flying at the same altitude.40
This image shows what a commercially available ($1,300) drone equipped with
an HD camera sees at 350 feet altitude. The red arrow points to the drone
operator. Some drones can carry cameras with zoom lens capabilities, however
those systems are more expensive, larger, and louder. Those systems are also
universally less capable than manned aircraft, which can carry heavier and more
sophisticated surveillance equipment. (Photo credit: NPR https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=2zT1f_k0qRQ).
Defining property rights in this manner (extending them up to 350 feet) will
allow courts to readily adjudicate claims that an aerial observation violated
the Fourth Amendment. A courts inquiry into whether an officer had a right
to be in the place where they made the observation, or whether the police
observation was from a public vantage point will turn on this question Did
the police observation take place from a vantage point that violates the
landowners right to exclude? To answer that question, a court need only
look to the statute and facts associated with the observation. With drones,
those can be readily discernible as most law enforcement drones carry
sophisticated GPS software that pinpoints their location. The salutary effect
of this approach is that civil suits for unlawful operation of drones above a
landowners property by voyeurs and other onlookers will be adjudicated
with reference to clearly defined property rights, allowing courts to evaluate
trespass and other claims.41
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This proposal is not intended to ban aerial surveillance, rather it is intended

to place aerial surveillance from drones and manned aircraft on equal legal
footing; in that sense it is a status quo solution that is technology neutral.
This proposal also ensures that policymakers remain focused on the harms of
aerial surveillance, not the platform. Thus, if future law enforcement agencies
begin using blimps (also known as aerostats), manned aircraft equipped with
sophisticated cameras, or drones, in a manner that appreciably increases the
current amount of aerial surveillance, policymakers can address those new
technologically-enabled harms, rather than focusing merely on drones.
CORE RECOMMENDATION #2: LEGISLATORS SHOULD CRAFT SIMPLE
DURATION BASED SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION THAT ADDRESSES THE
POTENTIAL FOR PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE.
Place aerial
surveillance from
drones and manned
aircraft on equal
legal footing.
To address the concern that the property based approach will allow drones
or other aircraft to sit in the buffer airspace between the property owners
airspace and publicly navigable airspace, legislators should focus on
controlling the duration of surveillance. Doing so will limit two feared harms;
first, duration based limits on aerial surveillance will address the possibility
that drones or other technologies will enable the police to follow individuals
and monitor their day to day activities. Second, duration based limits will
address the possibility that drones or other aircraft will be used to hover
directly above a landowners property for lengthy periods of time monitoring
an individuals day to day activities. These two forms of persistent surveillance
can be conducted with manned or unmanned aircraft, therefore legislators
should take a technology neutral approach to the problem, placing limits
on the duration of surveillance rather than on the platform from which the
surveillance can be conducted.
Crafting legislation that places aggregate limits on how long law enforcement
may surveil specific persons or places can protect against the possibility of
persistent surveillance. For example:
Surveillance of a person may continue for 60 minutes at the officers
discretion.
60 minute to 48 hour surveillance may only take place with a court
order and reasonable suspicion.
Surveillance of longer than 48 hours is permissible only when
accompanied by a warrant and probable cause.42
The specific amount of time legislators may settle on (and the period of
aggregation) will depend on whether a jurisdiction wants to value privacy
or law enforcement efficiency. Note that the focus here is on surveillance of
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a specific person. If surveillance of widespread areas is occurring, legislators

may want lengthier limits. For example, limiting aerial surveillance to 60
minutes unless accompanied by a warrant would mean that law enforcement
could not monitor specific events such as the Boston Marathon. Such a
limitation is likely not a desired policy outcome, and legislators should be
careful to craft limitations in such a way that they address the harm of
persistent surveillance (tracking of individuals) versus public safety (area
surveillance) or event based surveillance.
Irrespective of the time chosen, the point is that carefully crafting duration
based rules for surveillance (whether by drone, a manned aircraft, or
otherwise) is a better approach than the current drone focused approach
which is oftentimes riddled with blanket bans and exceptions.43 Rather
than crafting special exceptions, legislating with an eye towards persistent
surveillance rules based on clearly defined durational limits creates public
policy that is clearer and easier to follow, easier for courts to adjudicate, and
doesnt allow for loopholes based on technology.
CORE RECOMMENDATION #3: ADOPT DATA RETENTION PROCEDURES
THAT REQUIRE HEIGHTENED LEVELS OF SUSPICION AND INCREASED
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR ACCESSING DATA AS TIME PASSES.
Many critics of drones raise the legitimate concern that the governments
collection of aerial imagery and video will enable pervasive surveillance that
allows the government to know what all citizens are doing at all points in
time, and even will allow government officials to review footage years after
its collection, revealing the most intimate details about a persons life. This is
not a problem unique to drones, but is rather a recurring theme in critiques
of all video and still imagery collection. Legislators should adopt policies that
address collection and retention of information in a way that focuses on the
information that is collected, how it is stored, and how it is accessed, rather
than the particular technology used to collect the information. Thus, while
this section speaks specifically about drones, the principles articulated here
apply to all forms of video and imagery collection.
To protect against pervasive surveillance and warehousing of data about
citizens, legislators should enact retention policies and procedures that make
it more difficult for the government to access information as time passes.
Eventually, information collected by the government should be destroyed at
the end of a pre-determined period of time. While the specific duration of
time and processes may be subject to debate, all procedures and timelines
should be legislatively determined and therefore cannot be modified by
individual agencies. To protect the rights of individuals, the information
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gathered and stored should be exempt from sunshine act requests, but
should be fully discoverable in any criminal prosecution. A few process items
will form the bulk of any responsible retention procedure:
At the moment of collection up to 30 days after collection,
information should be treated like any other contemporaneous or near
contemporaneous observation. Agents of government should be able
to monitor aerial surveillance in real time or near real time just as they
observe CCTVs in real time or near real time. This 30 day window will
allow law enforcement to respond to immediate or nearly immediate
complaints about violations of the law.
After 30 days have passed from initial collection, information collected
from aerial surveillance should be moved from servers openly accessible
by law enforcement, to servers that are only accessible with a court
order and a showing of reasonable suspicion.
After 90 days have passed from initial collection, police should not be
allowed to access information stored on servers without a court order
and a showing of probable cause that indicates that the information
contained on the servers contains evidence of a crime.
All information stored on servers should be automatically deleted after
a period of time so that the government does not maintain a long term
archive of information about individuals. That period of time may be as
short as 120 days, but should not be longer than five years.
CORE RECOMMENDATION #4: LEGISLATORS SHOULD ADOPT
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES, REQUIRING
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO PUBLISH ON A REGULAR BASIS INFORMATION
ABOUT THE USE OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE DEVICES (BOTH MANNED AND
UNMANNED).
Transparency and accountability measures should be required regardless
of whether legislators follow the core recommendations or the warrantbased principles (Part B. below). Transparency and accountability measures
may be more effective than suppression rules or warrants for controlling
and deterring wrongful government surveillance. To hold law enforcement
accountable, legislators should mandate that the use of all aerial surveillance
devices (manned or unmanned) be published on a regular basis (perhaps
quarterly) on the website of the agency operating the system.
These usage logs should detail who operated the system, when it was
operated, where it was operated (including GPS coordinates), and what
the law enforcement purpose for the operation was. Legislators may even
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mandate that unmanned systems operated in their jurisdictions come

equipped with software that allows for the easy export of flight logs
that contain this information. Such logs will allow privacy advocates and
concerned citizens to closely monitor how aerial surveillance devices are
being used, enabling the political process as a mechanism to hold operators
accountable.
In circumstances where publishing usage logs may reveal information
that is law enforcement sensitive (such as an ongoing investigation) the
agency operating the drone may keep their usage logs confidential until
the investigation is closed. The agency should be required to make the logs
public within 30 days of the close of an investigation. To facilitate public
accountability legislators should mandate that all logs be published in an
open and machine-readable format consistent with the Presidents Executive
Order of May 9, 2013.44
The police
department went
from struggling to
handle the overload
of noise complaints
relating to the
departments use
of its helicopter
to receiving no
complaints after
the creation of its
Helicopter Twitter.
For evidence that this flight log approach works, one need only look across
the Atlantic to the United Kingdom where many police departments publish
their helicopter flight logs on their webpage; in fact some even live tweet
their helicopters activities. While there is no law within the United Kingdom
that specifically requires police departments or law enforcement agencies
to publish the flight logs of their helicopters, their version of the Freedom of
Information Act appears to be the legislative authority prompting publication
of police helicopter logs.
Like the United States, there are a number of public watchdog groups in the
United Kingdom that monitor police activity, including groups whose sole
purpose is to monitor the activity (and related noise complaints) of police
helicopters.45 These groups, and their respective websites, act as a forum for
noise and privacy complaints from various individuals across the Kingdom,
and several of these groups organize and lobby Members of Parliament
(MPs) to pass legislation restricting helicopter flyovers.46 These groups, and
the advocacy which they generate, appear to be largely responsible for the
recent trend of many UK police departments publishing their helicopters
flight logs, or even creating Twitter accounts for their helicopters that publish
real-time or delayed-time updates of the aircrafts activity.47
These helicopter Twitter accounts, which have become a growing trend
amongst British police departments, have had an immediate and powerful
effect on public relations in their respective jurisdictions. In Islington, the
police department went from struggling to handle the overload of noise
complaints relating to the departments use of its helicopter to receiving no
complaints after the creation of its Helicopter Twitter feed.48 The Twitter
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21
account gained over 7,000 followers after its first few weeks, and the public
criticism of police helicopter activity ceased entirely. The department
reflected on the effectivenessas well as future potentialof the Twitter feed
by issuing this statement:
Maybe that is all people wantedjust to know and understand what we
were doing. We dont update people in real time, but my vision is that
soon we will be able to let people know about an operation as soon as it
is over. In some cases we could get them to helpimagine if an elderly
person with Alzheimers was missing in Islington, we could Tweet our
followers to keep an eye out.
The Suffolk Police Department launched its Twitter feed with the hope of
shedding some light on police practices. Roger Lewis, an observer with the
Suffolk Police, described the departments intentions in the following way:
We hope to use the Twitter feed to highlight the positive work being
done by the Air Operations Unit and to keep members of the public
informed as to why the helicopter has been deployed. We hope people
will enjoy finding out more about the Unit and hopefully our tweets will
give some explanation as to why we have been deployed and give some
interesting insights into a very important policing tool.49
It is not difficult to see how the practice of disclosing non-sensitive flight
logs through a public channelsuch as a department web page or through
Twittercan be a useful tool in reassuring the public that law enforcements
helicopter does not represent Big Brothers eye in the sky, but rather
embodies a part of the departments lawful policing practices. Just as a
police helicopter high overhead can be ominous to those on the ground who
are unaware of its purposes, the very idea of dronesof any kindflying
above American cities and towns might be foreboding to many lay persons.
By requiring law enforcement to publish data or logs, legislators can add a
citizen-centric political check that will help quell the fears of a society that
is not yet certain how it should react to the increasing presence of aerial
surveillance devices over the skies of America.
CORE RECOMMENDATION #5: RECOGNIZE THAT TECHNOLOGY
SUCH AS GEOFENCING AND AUTO-REDACTION MAY MAKE AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE BY DRONES MORE PROTECTIVE OF PRIVACY THAN
HUMAN SURVEILLANCE.
Technology continues to evolve at such a rapid pace that it is possible drones
and other aerial surveillance technologies may enable targeted surveillance
that protects privacy, while still allowing for the collection of evidence.
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Technology can further the goal of privacy by using geofencing technology

to only collect evidence from specific locations, and using redaction
programming to automatically obscure information at the point of collection.
Creative legislators can embrace technology by writing laws requiring that
aerial surveillance devices have systems to protect privacy.
For example, imagine that the police receive a tip about marijuana growing
in the backyard of 123 Main Street. They dispatch a helicopter to gather aerial
photographs of the 123 Main Street property from an altitude of 700 feet.
Technology can
further the goal
of privacy by
using geofencing
technology to only
collect evidence from
specific locations.
While the police are overhead photographing 123 Main Street, they look down
and see a woman sunbathing in the adjacent property at 125 Main Street.
While the inadvertent observation of the woman at 125 Main Street does not
violate her Fourth Amendment rights, it may nevertheless be viewed from her
perspective as an offensive intrusion that violates her personal expectation
of privacy (even if its not one that society, per the courts, is willing to deem
reasonable). Imagine the same collection scenario, this time conducted by a
drone or a camera on a manned helicopter with software that is programmed
to protect privacy. Prior to the mission the aircraft would be instructed to
only document the activities ongoing at 123 Main Street. The software could
be required to automatically redact any additional information gathered from
adjoining properties (such as 125 Main Street, the home of our hypothetical
sunbather). Furthermore, legislators could also require that software
automatically blur the faces of individuals, with faces only being revealed
upon an adequate showing of either reasonable suspicion or probable cause
(the particular standard to be determined by the legislature) to believe
that an individual is or was involved in criminal activity. If a state or local
government required that aircraft engaged in aerial surveillance be coded
for privacy, the rights of the adjacent sunbather and any other inadvertently
observed individuals would be protected. If such policies were mandated,
society may evolve to the point where drones are mandated when manned
flights might place law enforcement officers in a situation where they might
be tempted to make unwanted observations of innocent people. Thus, drones
may someday be more protective of privacy than manned aircraft.
B. ALTERNATE RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES

If legislators choose to ignore the core principles and approach articulated
above, the following recommendations are intended to provide legislators
with principles that will guide their policymaking in the more problematic
warrant-based approach to drones and aerial surveillance.
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LEGISLATORS SHOULD REJECT CALLS FOR A BLANKET REQUIREMENT

THAT ALL DRONE USE BE ACCOMPANIED BY A WARRANT.
If legislators forgo the property-rights approach detailed in Part A. above,
they should eschew proposals that require warrants for the use of drones.
Such prohibitions are overbroad and ill-advised.50 Legislation that requires
warrants for drones treats the information from a drone differently than
information gathered from a manned aircraft, differently than that gathered
by a police officer in a patrol car, or even from an officer on foot patrol. Under
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, police are not required to shield
their eyes from wrongdoing until they have a warrant. Why impose such a
requirement on the collection of information by drones?
Much of the anti-drone activists efforts are aimed at the threat of persistent
and pervasive surveillance of the population by the government, an
understandable fear. But what is an unreasonable fear, and should not work
its way into legislation, is a ban on ordinary aerial observations that are only
controversial because they take place with a remote controlled helicopter
rather than a manned one. If anybody in a Cessna can see the pollution
pouring from a factory, or if the police flying in a helicopter can see a cartels
drug operations or human trafficking ringand such observations can be
admitted as evidence in a criminal trial, shouldnt citizens and the police be
able to make the same observations and expect that the evidence wont be
excluded merely because it is collected with a remote control aircraft?
For example, imagine a police officer was on patrol in her patrol car. While
driving, she witnesses the car in front of her strike a pedestrian and speed
off. Until witnessing the crime she did not have probable cause (the predicate
level of suspicion for a warrant), or even reasonable suspicion (the predicate
level of suspicion for a brief investigatory stop) to believe the vehicle in
front of her would be involved in a crime. Lets further assume that her dash
camera recorded the entire incident. Nonetheless, that dashcam video may
be used as evidence against the driver in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
However, under broadly worded proposals that have been introduced in
many state legislatures and the U.S. Congress, the same piece of evidence if
gathered by a drone would be inadmissible in court because police did not
have a warrant.
Consider another example. Police receive an anonymous tip that someone
is growing marijuana in their backyard. A police officer attempts to view the
backyard from the ground but his view is blocked by a 10 foot tall fence.
The officer next decides to fly a commercially available remote controlled
helicopter51 over the backyard and from a vantage point that does not
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violate FAA regulations observes marijuana plants growing in the yard. This
observation would be unlawful under proposals that require a warrant for
observations from a drone. However, these facts are nearly identical to the
facts in the Supreme Courts 1986 California v. Ciraolo52 decision which upheld
aerial surveillance (discussed above). The only difference is that in Ciraolo, the
officer flew over the backyard in an airplane, rather than using a drone. In fact,
in Ciraolo the Court noted that not only would observation of the marijuana
plants from the air (as described above) be lawful, police officers peering
over the fence from the top of a police truck would also be behaving lawfully,
and by extension, observation of the marijuana plants by police from the
third floor of a neighboring home would also be lawful. But under proposals
requiring a warrant for observations by a drone, this evidence would be
inadmissible.
The examples above raise questions about what public policy goals are
advanced by the suppression of evidence of a crime when documented by
a drone, when the same evidence if recorded by a dashcam, observed from
an airplane, or viewed from a neighboring home would be admissible in
court. Such examples highlight the requiring warrants for evidence gathered
by drones, when other methods of gathering the same evidence would not
require a warrant.
LEGISLATORS SHOULD REJECT BROADLY WORDED USE RESTRICTIONS.
Some jurisdictions have enacted limitations on how information gathered
from drones may be used. Legislators should reject these broadly worded
use restrictions that prohibit the use of any evidence gathered by drones in
nearly any proceeding. Such restrictions exceed the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment and in some circumstances may only serve to protect criminals
while not deterring governmental wrongdoing.
For example, the Alameda County California Sheriffs Department proposed
the use of small drones for: crime scene documentation, EOD missions,
HAZMAT response, search and rescue, public safety and life preservation
missions, disaster response, fire prevention, and documentation of a felony
when such documentation is premised upon probable cause.53 Linda Lyle, a
privacy advocate with the ACLU criticized the proposal, stating: If the sheriff
wants a drone for search and rescue then the policy should say he can only
use it for search and rescue...Unfortunately under his policy he can deploy a
drone for search and rescue, but then use the data for untold other purposes.
That is a huge loophole, its an exception that swallows the rule.54 Her points
mirror the ACLUs position in their December 2011 white paper where they
state that drone use is acceptable so long as the surveillance will not be
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25
used for secondary law enforcement purposes.55 It is also similar to the

language used in other proposals prohibiting the use of information gathered
by a drone as evidence against an individual in any trial, hearing or other
proceeding....56
A simple hypothetical can help to illustrate the problem with this approach.
Imagine that law enforcement uses a drone to search for a lost hiker in a
state park. This is a search and rescue mission that fits within the public
safety, emergency, or exigency exceptions in most legislative proposals
aimed at controlling drone usage. However, imagine that during the course
of the search the drone observed a man stabbing a woman to death in the
park. That collection was entirely inadvertent, and as such suppressing the
videotape of the stabbing would not serve to deter the police from using
drones in the future as they were not searching for an unrelated stabbing
crime, they were searching for a lost hiker. Yet, that evidence under the
blanket use restrictions found in various proposals circulating in state
legislatures, Congress, and under the ACLUs secondary law enforcement
purposes standard would need to be suppressed.57
Suppressing secondarily gathered evidence doesnt protect privacy (as
inadvertent discovery cant be deterred); it merely protects a criminal who
if observed from a helicopter, an airplane, or from the ground would face
evidence of his crime, but under broadly worded drone focused privacy bills
may be more difficult to prosecute. It is difficult to see what public policy
goal is furthered by suppressing evidence of a crime merely because the
evidence was gathered from a drone instead of a helicopter. Do legislators
really want to be in the position of making it harder to punish perpetrators of
violent crime? If the discovery were genuinely inadvertent, there is little to no
deterrent value that justifies suppressing such evidence.
IF LEGISLATORS CHOOSE TO IMPOSE A WARRANT REQUIREMENT, THEY
SHOULD CODIFY EXISTING EXCEPTIONS.
If legislators seek to impose a statutory warrant requirement on the use
of drones, they should codify exceptions to the warrant requirement and
exclusionary rule that the courts have developed through decades of
jurisprudence. Such codification could either state that existing exceptions to
the warrant requirement apply to the statutory requirement of a warrant, or
the statute could enumerate the exceptions that should apply.
As the Supreme Court has noted, suppressing evidence has serious
consequences for the truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives of
our criminal justice system, and as such should present a high obstacle for
those urging [for its] application58 it should be our last resort, not our first
impulse.59
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As such, the measure for when we should apply the exclusionary rule should
not be whether a drone was used, but rather should be when the benefits
of deterrence...outweigh the costs.60 Some exceptions and other procedural
devices that legislators should consider codifying are:
Rather than codify a blanket restriction on the use of any information
gathered from a drone, legislators should codify a standing requirement
that premises ones ability to raise a suppression challenge on whether
the person raising the suppression claim was the purported target of
drone surveillance. Thus, if law enforcement uses a drone to document
illegal dumping of toxic waste by Co-conspirator #1, non-present Coconspirator #2s privacy rights were not violated and #2 should not have
the ability to vicariously assert #1s privacy rights to protect himself from
prosecution.
Evidence gathered by drones should be admissible in proceedings
short of trial such as grand jury proceedings,61 preliminary hearings,62
bail hearings,63 and other non-trial proceedings.
Evidence gathered by drones should be admissible for impeachment
purposes as there is little deterrent value in keeping such impeachment
evidence out of a trial (as law enforcement is unlikely to gather it solely
for that purpose) and the use of evidence gathered by drones for such a
limited purpose furthers the truth-seeking process and deters perjury.64
If legislators impose a statutory warrant requirement on the use
of drones, it should also codify directly, or by reference the body of
jurisprudence associated with the so-called good faith exception as
articulated in United States v. Leon65 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard.66
The good faith exception allows for the admission of evidence gathered
pursuant to a defective warrant, unless, based on objective facts, a
reasonably well trained officer would have known the search was illegal
despite the magistrates authorization.
Legislators should make clear that the independent source doctrine
as articulated in Murray v. United States applies equally to drone related
surveillance.67 The independent source doctrine allows for the admission
of evidence, despite police illegality, if the evidence seized was not
causally linked to the illegal police conduct.
Legislators should codify the inevitable discovery rule articulated in Nix
v. Williams.68 In the context of drone surveillance, the rule would operate
to allow the admission of drone gathered evidence in a criminal trial if
the prosecutor can prove (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the
evidence would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered by lawful
means.69
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Rather than suppress all fruit of drone surveillance, Legislators should

codify the attenuation principles articulated in Nardone and Wong
Sun.70 The Court in Wong Sun stated that when considering whether fruit
of an unlawful search should be suppressed, a court must ask whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint. Stated differently, at some point the fruit of the
poisonous tree loses its potency. Factors Legislators should consider
codifying are: 1) passage of time between the illegal search and the
acquisition of evidence; 2) intervening events and a lack of foreseeability
that the illegal drone surveillance would result in the gathering of
evidence; 3) whether the initial illegal surveillance was a flagrant or
deliberate violation rather than an accidental one.71
LEGISLATORS SHOULD CAREFULLY DEFINE TERMINOLOGY AND SPECIFY
WHAT PLACES ARE ENTITLED TO PRIVACY PROTECTION.
What a layperson
sees when they read
the word search or
surveillance, what a
legislator means when
they write it, and what
a court may think the
legislature meant are
all different things.
If legislators choose to prohibit certain types of surveillance, such as

prohibiting drone surveillance, the legislative drafting task will become more
difficult and the task of defining terminology will be critical. What a layperson
sees when they read the word search or surveillance, what a legislator
means when they write it, and what a court may think the legislature meant
are all different things. As such, when using terms like search, surveillance,
reasonable expectations, curtilage, private property, public place and other
terms of art, legislators should specify what the terms mean.
This definitional task will be the most important part of the legislative
drafting process as the terminology will drive what actions are allowable and
what places are entitled to privacy protection. Legislators should consider
adopting an entirely new set of definitions, and be prepared to reject existing
terminology which may be confusing. A good example of a well thought
out definitional approach is the proposed legislation offered by Professor
Christopher Slobogin.72 He uses the following terms:
Search: An effort by government to find or discern evidence of
unlawful conduct. A targeted search seeks to obtain information about a
specific person or circumscribed place. A general search seeks to obtain
information about people or places that are not targets at the time of
the search.
Public search: A search of a place, in the absence of explicit consent,
focused on activities or persons, limited to what the natural senses of a
person on a lawful public vantage point could discern at the time of the
search."
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Probable cause: An articulable belief that a search will more likely

than not produce contraband, fruit of crime, or other significant
evidence of wrongdoing...
Reasonable suspicion: An articulable belief that a search will more
likely than not lead to evidence of wrongdoing....
CONCLUSION
The emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles in domestic skies raises
understandable privacy concerns that require careful and sometimes creative
solutions. The smartest and most effective solution is to adopt a propertyrights approach that does not disrupt the status quo. Such an approach,
coupled with time-based prohibitions on persistent surveillance, transparency,
and data retention procedures will create the most effective and clear
legislative package.
Legislators should
reject alarmist calls
that suggest we
are on the verge
of an Orwellian
police state.
Legislators should reject alarmist calls that suggest we are on the verge of
an Orwellian police state.73 In 1985, the ACLU argued in an amicus brief filed
in California v. Ciraolo that police observation from an airplane was invasive
modern technology and upholding the search of Ciraolos yard would alter
societys very concept of privacy. Later, in 1988, the ACLU argued in Florida
v. Riley that allowing police surveillance by helicopter was Orwellian and
would expose all Americans, their homes and effects, to highly intrusive
snooping by government agents... In a different context in 2004 (before
the advent of the iPhone) police in Boston were going to use Blackberry
phones to access public databases (the equivalent of Googling). Privacy
advocates decried the use of these handheld phones as mass scrutiny
of the lives and activities of innocent people, and a violation of the core
democratic principle that the government should not be permitted to violate
a persons privacy, unless it has a reason to believe that he or she is involved
in wrongdoing.74 Reactionary claims such as these get the publics attention
and are easy to make, but have the predicted harms come true? Is the sky
truly falling? We should be careful to not craft hasty legislation based on
emotionally charged rhetoric.
Outright bans on the use of drones and broadly worded warrant requirements
that function as the equivalent of an outright ban do little to protect privacy
or public safety and in some instances will only serve to protect criminal
wrongdoing. Legislators should instead enact legislation that maintains
the current balance between legitimate surveillance and individuals
privacy rights. The best way to achieve that goal is to follow a propertycentric approach, coupled with limits on pervasive surveillance, enhanced
transparency measures, and data protection procedures.
| November 2014

29
1. For a lengthier discussion of these issues and an expanded analysis of

the legal concepts discussed in this policy paper, See, Gregory S. McNeal,
Domestic Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498116
2. For a summary and analysis of the legislation, see Michael L. Smith,
Regulating Law Enforcements Use of Drones: The Need For State Legislation
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492374.
3. FL. STAT. 934.50 (2013), IDAHO CODE ANN. 21-213 (2013), MONT.
CODE ANN. 46-5-109 (2013), OR. REV. STAT. 837.310 et. seq. (2013), 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws. 1040, TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-609 (2013), TEXAS GOV.
CODE ANN. 423.002 (2013), 2013 Va. Acts 1408.
4. WIS. STAT. 175.55 (2014), 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/10 et seq. (2014), IND.
CODE 35-33-5-9 (2014), UTAH CODE ANN. 63G-18-103 (2014), IOWA
CODE ANN. 321.492B, 808.15 (2014).
5. AB 1327: Unmanned Aircraft Systems California Legislative Information
(August 22, 2014) http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.
xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1327
6. The Rise of Domestic Drones Radio Times With Mary Moss-Coane, at
42:20 http://whyy.org/cms/radiotimes/2014/08/25/the-rise-of-domesticdrones/ (ACLU advocate stating Ideally we would like to see broad
legislation that covers all surveillance technologies, whether it is GPS, or
phone tracking, or what have you. But if you go to state legislaturesand
we have our lobbyists in state legislaturesand try and put forth a very very
broad surveillance bill like that right now, its not going to go anywhere.
We are fighting a large scale war here against surveillance and privacy and
right now we have an opportunity to get in place some rules around drones
because there is so much public interest and fascination with drones. And so
we are pushing forward on that front.).
7. See generally, The Rise of Domestic Drones Radio Times With Mary MossCoane, at 42:20 http://whyy.org/cms/radiotimes/2014/08/25/the-rise-ofdomestic-drones/
8. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
9. Id.
10. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure: Volume 1:
Investigation, p.8889, citing Ciraolo.
11. 476 U.S. 207, 21415
12. 488 U.S. 445 (1989)
13. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
14. Id.
15. Id.
| November 2014

30
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace In An Age Of Drones, 95 Boston University Law
Review__ (forthcoming 2015), 12 available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482567, citing Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of
Ownership in Land, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev 631 (1928), and Blacks Law Dictionary
453 (4th ed. 1968) noting that the full maxim reads cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos.
19. Troy A. Rule, Airspace In An Age Of Drones, 12.
20. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21. 328 U.S. 256, 264.
22. Id. at 265.
23. Id. at 264266.
24. While 500 feet is a useful rule of thumb for defining navigable versus
non-navigable airspace, regulations governing navigable airspace are actually
a bit more complex. Helicopters for example are exempted from minimum
altitude regulations if the operation is conducted without hazard to persons
or property on the surface. 91.119(d). For fixed wing aircraft the rule is that
over congested areas, the minimum altitude is 1000 feet above the highest
obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2000 feet of the aircraft. 91.119(b). For
non-congested areas other than over open water or sparsely populated areas,
the minimum is 500 feet. 91.119(c). Over open water and sparsely populated
areas, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person,
vessel, vehicle, or structure. See 14 C.F.R. 91.119(b)(c) (2012). Moreover,
within certain distances of certain classes of airports and airspace altitude
restrictions below 500 feet may also be in place.
25. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
26. Of course if such observations became frequent occurrences, legislatures
could develop rules to govern such conduct.
27. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
28. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 462463.
30. See, NYPD Helicopter Views Faces From Miles Away, Wired, http://www.
wired.com/2008/06/nypd-helicopter/ (explaining how an NYPD helicopter s
flying over the skies of Manhattan allowing police to see and recognize a face
from two miles away, peer inside a building from three to four miles away, and
track a suspect car from 12 miles away.).
31. Notably, FAA regulations dont clearly answer this question as the
minimum altitude varies based on how congested an area is.
| November 2014

31
32. See, 14 C.F.R. 91.119 which reads: Except when necessary for takeoff or
landing, no person may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:
(a)Anywhere.An altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an emergency
landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.(b)Over
congested areas.Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement,
or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above
the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
(c)Over other than congested areas.An altitude of 500 feet above the
surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases,
the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel,
vehicle, or structure. (d)Helicopters, powered parachutes, and weight-shiftcontrol aircraft.If the operation is conducted without hazard to persons
or property on the surface(1)A helicopter may be operated at less than
the minimums prescribed in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section, provided
each person operating the helicopter complies with any routes or altitudes
specifically prescribed for helicopters by the FAA (emphasis added)
35. Id. at 34 (making a similar argument, noting state legislatures could...
enact new laws that gave landowners clear rights to exclude drones or other
aircraft from entering into the low-altitude airspace above their land up to the
existing navigable airspace line...).
36. Causby 264265.
37. See, Kanye West Is Totally Right To Worry About Paparazzi Drones
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/08/07/kanye_west_fears_
paparazzi_drones_that_s_totally_reasonable.html (noting Wests stated
concerns [as recorded in a deposition] about drones Wouldnt you like to
just teach your daughter how to swim without a drone flying? What happens
if a drone falls right next to her? Would it electrocute her? As for how that
could happen, Kanye says, Could it fall and hit her if that paparazzi doesnt
understand how to remote control the drone over their house?). Limiting
flights above private property, or property that is otherwise not accessible
to the public could similarly prohibit flights like the reported drone flight
above an LAPD impound lot that was otherwise obscured from view by a 16
foot wall, See Dont Fly Camera Equipped Drones Over Our Police Station,
LAPD Says http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/dont-fly-cameraequipped-drones-over-our-police-stations-lapd-says/ (noting police stating,
What concerns us is that they are filming over private property and its gated
youre looking at the layout of the police station, how we operate, personnel
license plates, police Lt. Michael Ling said. Its kind of like if it was your
house, if theyre flying over your backyard youd start asking questions about
it.).
38. For a contrary approach that extends the right to the public navigable
airspace line, see Troy A. Rule, Airspace In An Age Of Drones, 35. ( To
preserve a level of privacy and safety comparable to what landowners
enjoyed prior to the drones era, laws clarifying landowner airspace rights
should define these rights as extending all the way up to the navigable
airspace line of 500 feet above ground in most locations. A rule defining
| November 2014

32
exclusion rights as covering only 100 feet or 200 feet above the ground
would arguably be insufficient because it would allow small drones to cheaply
hover above land and violate landowners privacy or threaten their safety
from those altitudes...Because navigable airspace designations can vary by
location, the exact heights of each parcels exclusion rights could initially be
established based on the FAAs existing navigable airspace designations.).
39. See, Interpretation of the Special Rule For Model Aircraft, available at: ,
See also, FAA Fact Sheet Unmanned Aircraft Systems, http://www.faa.gov/
news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153 (stating Recreational
use of airspace by model aircraft is covered by FAA Advisory Circular
9157, which generally limits operations to below http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0396-0001 400 feet above ground level
and away from airports and air traffic.).
40. To address the threat of pervasive surveillance whereby law enforcement
might park a drone or other aircraft over a landowners property for extended
periods of time, See Recommendation 2.
41. States may need to update their trespass laws to address aerial trespass.
For example, many jurisdictions define trespass as entering on or remaining
on property, legislatures may need to clarify that property includes airspace.
42. This is adapted in part from Slobogin at p.24.
43. To see the perils of a process riddled with exceptions, consider the bill
passed by the Texas legislature which has no fewer than 22 exceptions for
drone use with carve outs for agricultural interests, electrical companies, oil
companies, real estate brokers and others). See HB 912, available at: http://
www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=HB912
44. See, Executive Order - Making Open and Machine Readable the New
Default for Government Information http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/09/executive-order-making-open-and-machine-readablenew-default-government45. See https://twitter.com/HelicopterNoise; https://www.whatdotheyknow.
com/request/issue_of_police_helicopter_fligh
46. See http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2012-13/394 (proposed legislation
to regulate/reduce the amount of noise pollution caused by nighttime police
helicopter flyovers in London).
47. Not all activity is published. The Cleveland (UK) Police Departments
website indicates that: This page is intended to provide basic information
to the general public regarding the work of the police helicopter and will be
updated on a daily basis. Weekend and public holiday updates will appear on
the next working day. Please note that not all items are always listed due to
operational sensitivity or ongoing investigation. http://www.cleveland.police.
uk/news/helicopter-watch.aspx
48. http://www.islingtongazette.co.uk/news/environment/police_helicopter_
twitter_account_stops_islington_complaints_1_1206725
| November 2014

33
49. http://helihub.com/2012/09/03/uks-suffolk-police-helicopter-unit-nowon-twitter/
50. For example, the Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act
of 2012.
51. Perhaps a Parrot A.R. drone from the local malls Brookstone store, or a DJI
Phantom bought on-line.
52. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
53. Alameda County Sheriffs Office, General Order 615 available at: http://
nomby.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/small-unmanned-aircraft-systemgeneral-order-6-15-draft.pdf
54. Paul Detrick, Cops with Drones: Alameda Co. CA Weighs Technology
vs. Privacy available at: http://reason.com/reasontv/2013/04/04/cops-withdrones-technology-vs-privacy
55. Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for
Government Use of Drone Aircraft, American Civil Liberties Union, December
2011, p. 16.
56. For example, the Preserving American Privacy Act of 2013 in Section
3119c creates a general prohibition on the use of covered information as
evidence against an individual in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding...
While the Act provides a set of exceptions, including one for emergencies, the
language of the emergency exception as currently drafted does not clearly
specify that inadvertent discovery of information unrelated to the emergency
justifying the drone usage would be admissible, and its likely that defense
counsel in such a case would seek to prohibit the admission of evidence in
such a case by relying on the lack of a clearly specified exception.
57. Id.
58. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364365
(1998).
59. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
60. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009).
61. This is consistent with the Supreme Courts approach to Fourth
Amendment violations per United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
(noting that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule
would unduly interfere with the effective and expeditious discharge of
the grand jurys duties, and extending the rule to grand jury proceedings
would achieve only a speculative and minimal advance in deterring police
misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the grand jurys role.).
62. This is consistent with Congress guidance in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5.1(e) which states in relevant part At the preliminary hearing,
the defendant may cross-examine adverse witnesses and may introduce
evidence but may not object to evidence on the ground that it was unlawfully
acquired.
| November 2014

34
63. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(f) noting the rules concerning admissibility of evidence
in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of
information at the hearing.
64. Contra James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
65. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
66. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
67. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
68. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
69. Note, Nix was a Sixth Amendment case but courts have applied the fruits
analysis to searches.
70. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) and Wong Sun v. United
States 371 U.S. 471 (1963) respectively.
71. See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975).
72. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, Duke
Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy (forthcoming) available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2098002.
73. Interestingly, Orwell seems to be a favorite citation for the ACLU who has
cited him nearly 70 times in briefs.
74. See Gregory S. McNeal, Can The Drone Industry Compete With
The Privacy Lobby? available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/
gregorymcneal/2012/08/13/can-the-drone-industry-compete-with-theprivacy-lobby/
| November 2014

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The Robots Are Coming:

The Project On Civilian Robotics

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

The looming prospect of expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles,

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Moreover, the term unmanned aircraft is also misleading as there are

To counter the threat of surveillance, privacy advocates have focused solely

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

A marathon is a highly public event, the event is televised, it takes place

While warrants are appealing to privacy advocates, the enactment of overly

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

might be intended to hide the growth of marijuana, obtained a private plane

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

activities [does not] preclude an officers observations from a public vantage

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

B. THE CURRENT STATE OF AIRSPACE RIGHTS

They should not

To understand this emergent legal issue, its necessary to understand the

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Such invasions could, in the right circumstances, be treated as a trespass

Graphic: Gregory McNeal

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Suppose the police

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

The question of what

Analyzing this passage, Professor Troy Rule notes [t]wenty-five years

III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS DRONES AND AERIAL

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Graphic: Gregory McNeal

Legislators should follow a property-rights approach to aerial surveillance. This

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Graphic: Gregory McNeal

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

This proposal is not intended to ban aerial surveillance, rather it is intended

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

a specific person. If surveillance of widespread areas is occurring, legislators

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

mandate that unmanned systems operated in their jurisdictions come

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Technology can further the goal of privacy by using geofencing technology

B. ALTERNATE RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

LEGISLATORS SHOULD REJECT CALLS FOR A BLANKET REQUIREMENT

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

used for secondary law enforcement purposes.55 It is also similar to the

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Rather than suppress all fruit of drone surveillance, Legislators should

If legislators choose to prohibit certain types of surveillance, such as

Drones and Aerial Surveillance:

Probable cause: An articulable belief that a search will more likely