Birth Certificate Law
Birth Certificate Law
Birth Certificate Law
TABEL OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE
OF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND GREAT GENERAL INTEREST
AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION
5-6
10-12
PROPOSITION OF LAW H
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BY
THE TRAFFIC COURT'SREFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE I,SECTION 8, CLAUSE
17 OF TITE CONSTITUTON.
12-14
14-15
PROPOSITION OF LAW IV
THE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCIIANGE CUTS AGAINST THE
DICTATES OF THE BANKRUPTCY THAT WAS ESTABLISHED IN
1933 AN'D IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JUDGE
MAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVER DECISION.
CONCLUSION
PROOF OF SERVICF.
APPENDIX
Notice of Appeal
Appeal scheduling order
Entry Overruling Motion for Transcripts
Entry overruling Reconsideration niotion
Entry Dismissing Appeal as Untimely
Affidavit of Indigency
15-18
18
19
APPX. PAGE
i-6
7
8
9
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
It is further refevant to this Memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction that any
violation of the appellant's Rights, Freedom, or Property by the U.S. federal government,
or any agent thereof, would be an illegal and unlawful excess, clearly outside the limited
boundaries of federal jurisdiction. The appellant's standings is that the jurisdiction of the
U.S. federal government is defined by Article L, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S.
Constitution, quoted as follows:
5) Amcrican Samoa)
It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:
"We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a
government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is
distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same
person may bc at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen of
a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be
different froin those he has mider the other." Slaughter House Cases United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS A FOREIGI^T
CORPORATION WITH RESPECT TO A STATE." [einphasis added]
Voluine 20: Corpus Juris Sec. 1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441
S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.
This is further confirmed by the following quote from the Internal Revenue Service:
Federal jurisdiction "includes the District of Colunibia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Ainerican Samoa." - Internal
Revenue Code Section 312(e).
In legal terminology, the word "includes" means "is limited to."
When referring to this "District" United States, the Internal Revenue Code uses the term
"WITHIN" the United States. When referring to the several States, the Internal Revenue
Code uses the terni "WITHOUT" the United States.
Dozens, perhaps hnndreds, of court cases prove that federal jurisdiction is limited to the
few federal territory areas above indicated. For example, in two Supreme Court cases, it
was decided:
"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the
territorial liniits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
and other places that are within the exclusive jtuisdiction of the national
government," Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.
"We think a proper examination of this subject will show that the United
States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in
4
and to the territory, of which Alabaana or any of the new States were
formed..."
"fBiecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise
niunicipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of a
State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted..."
Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the
territory within her limits, subject to the common law," Pollard v. HaQan, 44
U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.
Likewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at 7 specifies that the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to
any of the several States.
Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal contract can obligate nie to
perforni in any manner withoutiny fully infornied and uncoerced consent, likewise, no
federal statutes or regulations apply to me or have any jurisdictiou over me. I hereby
affirm that I do not reside or work in any federal territory of the "District" United States,
and that therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority
over me.
I understand that by thcir Oaths of Office all U.S. and State government officials are
contractually bound by the U.S. Constitution as formulated by its framers, and not as
"interpreted," subverted, or corrupted by the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts.
According to the Ninth Ainendment to the U.S. Constitution:
"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitntion, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
Thus, appellant's understanding from these Amendnients is that the powers of all
U.S. and State government officials are limited to those specifically granted by the U.S.
Constitution. And,
further understand that any laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules, and procedures
contrary to the U.S. Constitution, as written by its framers, are null and void, as expressed
in the Sixteenth Anierican Jurisprudence Second Edition, Sectiou 177:
"The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the
appearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is
the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be in
agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to
be valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated as follows:
'The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form
and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for
any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactnient,
and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An
unconstitutional law in leval contemplation , is as inoperative as if it had
never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle
just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.'
'Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it
imposes no duties, confers no right, creates no office, bestows no power or
authority on anyone, affords no protection and iustifies no acts performed
under it...'
'A void act caimot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional
law cannot operate to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a
6
Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 for April 29, 2009. The Mnnicipal Court is Magistrate Jay
G. Littner and Judge Brad Greenberg hearing the matter of 112-09-TRD-1945 (A) and (B).
Greenberg Court denied the appellant's restricted appearance notice as well as any
and all case law sanctioned to the states by the United States Supreme Court. This Supreine
Court sanction the appellant's liberty interest to travel the lughways without restriction as
a Sovereign American Citizen. And, vehemently announced that the appellant does not
need to possess a driver's license, nor license plates to travel the highways. The Suprenie
Court further enshrined this right as guaranteed; and, if this right is mutilated that
retaliation can be compensated as a violation of the United Sates Constitution and the
Separation of Powers Doctrine. The Greenberg Court decreed the appellant to be in
violation of the Ohio revised Code and sanction a fine of $197.00, which is Federal Reserve
notes that have been sanctioned as counterfeit in State of Minnesota Coirnty of Scott, First
National bank of Montgomery, Planitff vs Jerome Daly defendant. The Justice Martin V.
Mahone,y ruled the Federal Reserve notes are comiterfeit.
Furthermore, the Greenberg strictly ignored the bankruptcy of 1993 and executive
order declared so by President Roosevelt by Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 611.1 and
Executive Order 6260. This information can be retrieved from the following resources:
(I.M.F.). 26
IRC 165 (g)(1); U.C.C. 1-201(23), C.R.S. 39-22-103.5, Westfall vs. Braley, 10 Oliio 188,
75 Am. Dec. 509, Adams vs. Richardson, 337 S.W. 2d. 911 Ward vs. Snzith, 7 Wall 447
"Mr. Speaker, we are now in Chapter 11. Members of Congress are official Trustees
presiding
over the greatest reorganization of any bankrupt entity in world history, the United States
government..." -- (Mr. Trafficant from Ohio, Congressional Record, pg. II1303, March
17th,1993)
"...the United States obligations in the International Monetary Fund..." -- Public Law
94-564,
94th Congress, Sec. 10(a)
State of National Emergeney
"Since March 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national
emergency..."
(Senate Resolution 9, 93d. Congress, lst. Session, Foreward, 1973)
"When Congress declares an emergency, there is no Constitution... (Congressman Beclc,
Congressional Record, Farm Bill, 1933)
"A majority of people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency
rule. For
40 years, freedoms and governniental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have in
varying
degrees been abridgeci by laws brought into fore.e by states of national emergeney..." -Senate
Report 93-549 (Introduction) 1973
"The President may: Seize property, organize commodities, assign military forces abroad,
institute
9
Martial Law, seize and control and transportation and conimunication, regulate operation
of private
enterprise, restrict travel, and in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all
American
citizens". -- Senate Report 93-549; Senate Resolution 9, 93d Congress, l st. Session (I11)
1973
See: Chapter 1, Title 1, Section 48, Statute 1, March 9, 1933; Proclamation 2038; Title 12
U.S.C 95(b)
Currently, permanent state of national emergency. -- 22 U.S.C.A. 286d. 1977
See: Executive Order 12919 signed by President Clinton
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 & 1933 (People Declared the Enemy)
Oct. 6, 1917, under the Trading with the F,neniy Act, Section 2, subdivision (c), Chapter
106Eneiny defined "other than citizens of the United States..."
March 9, 1933, Chapter 106, Section 5, subdivision (b) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act of
Oct.6 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411) amended as follows "...any person within the United States.."
Sce H.R. 1491 Public No.l
As a direct result of this bankruptcy, the Greenberg Court is action is de facto and
in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, all of which, suspend administering
jurisdiction to the United States of America and its Sovereign Ainerican Citizens as
Michael Turner White, authorized agent of: MICHAEL TURNER WHITE "STRAWMAN".
Every system of civilized law must have two characteristics: Remedy and Recourse.
Reniedy is a way to get out froin under that law. The Recourse is if you have been damaged
under the law, you can recover your loss. The Coinmon Law, the Law of Merchants, and
10
even the Uniform Coinniercial Code all have reinedy and recourse. The remedy and
recourse are found in the UCC. They are found right in the first volume, at 1-207 and 1103. The making of a valid Reservation of Rights preserves whatever rights the person then
possesses, and prevents the loss of such rights by application of concepts of waiver or
estoppel. (UCC 1-207.7)
In the case sub judice, the appellant his constitutional rights by signing the traffic
citation with UCC-1-207. This same i-ight was fiu-ther demanded when the appellant
appeared in traffic court made a reservation of rights under the UCC 1-207 which goes on
to say, "When a waivable right or claim is involved, the failure to make a reservation
thereof, causes a loss of the right, and bars its assertion at a later date. (UCC 1-207.9).
further, any expression indicating an intention to reserve rights, is sufficient, such as
"without prejudice". (UCC 1-207.4). thus and therefore, the signing of the traffic citation
and the proffering of this right in the traffic court and in the `connection with the
appellant's autograph, this clearly states a reserve and the right not to be compelled to
perform under any contract or commercial agreexncnt that the appellant did not enter
Icnowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. And fnrthermore, the appellant does not accept
the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.'
The Recourse appears in the Uniform Conunercial Code at 1-103.6, which says: The
Code is complimentary to the Common Law, which remains in force, except where
displaced by the code. A statute should be construed in harmony with the Common Law,
unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the Common Law. The Code recognizes
the Common Law. If it did not recognize the Common Law, the government would have
11
had to admit that the United States is bankrupt, and is completely owned by its creditors.
'Therefore, the explicit reservation at 1-207 and insist that the statutes be construed in
harmony with the Conunon Law. In furtherance to the traffic citation, the appellant
requisitions this court to produce the injured person who has filed a verified complaint. To
further cement this deniand the last sentence of 1-103.6, which states: The Code cannot be
read to preclude a Common Law action. Further, the appellant understand that the traffic
court has made a legal determination that the sections 1-207 and 1-103 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which is the system oi'law you are operating under, are not valid law
before this court?' if, the answer to this is affirmative the appellant places this court on
notice that an appeal will ensue regarding this legal determination.
PROPOSITION OF LAW II
TI3E JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BY THE TRAFFIC
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERAL JURISDICTION AS DEFINED
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 17 OF THE CONSTITUTON.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, is quoted as follows:
"The Congress shall have the power ... To exercise exclusive legislation in
all cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILES
SQUARE) as inay, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of
Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, [District
of Colunibia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the
consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needful
Buildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers..." [eniphasis added]
arad Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
12
Mariana Islands
6) Northern
7) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
8) Military bases within the several states
9) Federal agencies witlwi the several states
5) American Samoa
It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:
"We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a
government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is
distinct froin the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it
allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same
person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen of
a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be
different from those he has under the other." Slaughter House Cases United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
"THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN'I' IS A FOREIGN
CORPORATION W1TI3 RESPECT TO A STATE." [emphasis added]
Volume 20: Corpus Juris Sec. 1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441
S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.
This mater has further been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows;
"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the
territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national
government," Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.
"We think a proper exaniination of this subject will show that the United
States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in
and to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new States were
formed..."
"[B]ecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise
municipal jurisdictiou, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of a
State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted..."
"Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the
territory within her limits, subject to the common law," Pollard v. Hagan, 44
U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.
13
Lilcewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at 7 specifies that the "territorial
jurisdiction" of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to
any of the several States. Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal
contract can obligate the appellant to perform in any manner without hini being fully
informed and uncocrced consent, likewise, ito federal statutes or regulations apply to the
appellant or have any,jurisdiction over the appellant. And, the appellant hereby affirm that
he does not reside or work in any federal territory of the "District" United States, and that
therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority over the
appellant..
14
Can a state require the appellant to have a license? The answer is negativc. No state
can require the appellant to possess a license. See, Shuttlesworth v Birminghani Alabama,
373 U.S. 262, (1962). If a state does convert the appellant's right into a priviledge and
issues a license for it, the appellant can ignore the license and a fee and engage in the right
with impunity.
In regards to evillfuhzess: as an evil intent or notion to avoid a known duty or task
under law with a inoral certainty, is the definition of the Supreme court in U.S. v Bishop at
412 U.S. 346. Here, the appellant has relied upon the Constitution and United States
Supreme Court decision to enforce his right to travel freely. This is not the appellant's
interpretation; rather, the interpretation of Byres v U.S., 273 U.S. 28 says it is to he
interpreted in favor of the appellant. See, 16 Am.Jurp.2i, section 97 states:
"then a constitution should receive literal interpretation in favor of the Citizen, is especially
true, with respect to those provision whieh were designed to safeguard the liberty and
security of the Citizen in regard to person and property". Bary v U.s., 273 128. And, "any
constitutional provision intended to confer a benefit should be liberally construed in favor
of the clearly intended and expressedly designated beneficiary". The appellant is tbe
beneficiary of the United States Constitution.
Thus and therefore, pursuant to Boyd v U.S., 116 U.S. 616, ( 1886), this court is to
protect against any constitutional infringement. And, pursuant to Norton v Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, ( 1886) an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is legal contemplation as inoperative
as though it had never been passed.
PROPOSITION OF LAW IV
THE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCHANGE CUTS AGAINST THE DICTATES OF
THE BANKRUPTCY TI3AT WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1933 AND IS IN DIRECT
OPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JiJDGE MAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVER
DECISION.
15
Clause l: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; eniit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Clause 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall
be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
Clause 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay an,y Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
16
another State, or with a forcign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
sach iinniincnt Danger as will uot adniit of delay
The security of exchange is the underwriting of insurance for the corporate
UNITED STATES mauitenance is the criniinai penalty of $130.00 (one hundred and thirty
dollars) are federal reserve notes, which is explained by the Jeronie Daly, Judge Mahon,y &
The Credit Rivet Decision. In the decision a Minnesota Trial Court's decision holding the
Federal Reserve Act unconstitutional and VOID; holding the National Banking Act
unconstitutional and VOID; declaring a mortgage acquired by the First National Bank of
Montgomery, Minnesota in the regular course of its business, along with the foreclosure
and the sheriff's sale, to be VOID. Meaning, the Federal Reserve uotes are counterfeit and
uncoustitutional. See, First National Bank of Montgomery vs. Jerome Daly, State of
Minnesota, County of Scott, Township of Credit River and Justice Martin v Mahoney,
Credit River township, Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968. Wherefore, the
appellant invokes the United States Constitution Article 7 Section 101ega1 tender that only
gold and silver can originate to pay a debt. Considering the State of Ohio does not provide
gold and silver to the appellant the traffic criminal offence must be absolved. Most
iinportantly, the failure to present the charging instrument is constitutional grounds for a
disniissal with prejudice in this matter, as well as, releasing the order of the court to the
appellant.
PROPOSITION OF LAW VI
THE SEPERATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE
SOVEREIGN CITIZEN WAS SENTENCED IN AN ADMIRALTY COURT OF A
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS IN WANT OF JURISIDCTION.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
17
The State of Ohio is in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, which says
the United States cannot pass legislation mi to the United States of America. Is this true"?
Yes, this is true. The United States Supreme Court opined the following:
"...the Constitutioti divides authority[legislative jurisdiction] between federal and state
goveniments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power." Coleinan v Thompson, 501 U.s. 722, 759 (1991)(BLACKMAN, j.,
DISSEMTINGO. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branehes of
the federal government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v, 1505 U.S. 144, ] 82] Ashcroft,
501 U.S. at 458. See the federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)" [New York v united
Sates, 505 U.S. 144, (1992)].The federal government has no legislative power outside of its
territory. And, this very same law is spoken of by Judge Story, in his treatise on the
Conflicts of law.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for want of jurisdiction, the herein Propositions of Law ought to be
within the spirit of the ancient veils of justice that are crevices of sacred wrinldes that guide
the ageless wisdom of Conimon Law. Most iniportantly, injustice is a threat to justice
everywhere in the universe and the cancer that is spread by injustice ought to be extricated
froni this memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction.
graph of:
ael Turner White Au orized Representative of:
CHAEL TURNFR W-HITE "STRAWMAN"
3756 READING ROAD
APARTMENT #307
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229
18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The Sovei-eign Citizen, Michael Turner White, an American Citizen, certify that on
this 5th day of Octobcr , 2009, a true and exact copy of the aforesaid Appellant's notice of
appeal is submitted to clerk of court of the Ohio supreme Court, at 30 East broad Street,
State Office Tower, Columbns, Ohio 43226-0419 with a return receipt pursuant to the Ohio
Criminal Rule 55. And, a receipt is requested by the sovereign appellant as filed and timed
stamped, per Ohio Criininal Rule 55. And, a copy is sent to Norwood County Prosecutor,
Christopher brown, Norwood Mayor's Court, 4645 Montgomery Road, Norwood, Ohio
45212. This Certificate of Service is sanctioned pursuant to Houston v Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
108 S.Ct. 2379, (1988) and sanctioned to 28 U.S.C. 1746. And, is prepared outside of the
UNITED STATES, INCORPORATED.
AVRights Rescrve
C d-207 and UC
ograph of:
hael Turner Vylti'fe, Ainerican Sovereign
19
APPENDIX
JUDGES:
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT JR.
MARK PHILIP PAINTER
COURT OF APPEAI.,s
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT
MARK E. COMBS
COURT AnMINISTRATOR
MOLLY LEONARD
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
CHRISTOPHER P. DIETZ
www.hamilton-co.org/appealscourt
CUtLror STAFF
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TRIAL NOS.Mo9TRDr9aSiA.
Mo9TRDi9451B
To The Clerk:
^
'
.\'.
..
e. '
Enter upon the Journal of the Court on June i2. 2ooq per order df'the Court.
By:
Appellee,
vs.
The Court's scheduling order of June 16, 2009 obligates the Clerk of Courts to
prepare and certify the docket and journal entries, thus making appellant's statement
and praecipe moot. The docket and journal entries are to be filed by July 24, 2009.
As stated in this Court's entry of July 7, 2009, the transcript of proceedings
or, in lieu of a transcript, an agreed statement, shall be filed by July 24, 2oo9. The
agreed statement portion of appellant's filing dated July 15, 2009 fails to comport
with Appellate Rule 9(D). Appellate Rule 9(D) requires that the appellant present
his statement to the trial court for its review. The failure of appellant to file the
transcript of proceedings or a properly filed agreed statement by July 24, 2009 may
result in this appeal being dismissed.
To The Clerk:
Enter ug0n ;& Journal of the Court on JUL 1`6 2Q09per order of the Court.
(Copies sent to all counsel)
STATE OF OHIO,
APPEAL NO.C-o9o379
C-o9o380
TRIAL NO. Mo9TRD19451-A & B
Appellee,
ENTRY OF DISMISSAL
vs.
MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,
Appellant.
This cause came on to be considered upon the appeal from the trial court.
'Phe Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal for failure of the appellant to
comply with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure to wit: the transcript of
proceedings or an agreed statement under Appellate Rule 9(D) was not timely filed
It is further ordered that a certified copy of this judgment shall constitute the
mandate to the trial court puisuant to Rule 27, Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
To The Clerk:
Enter upon tjieJournal of the Court onlUL 2 9 2009 per order of the Court.
By: (Copy
Presiding Judge
sent to counsel)
STATE OF OHIO,
Appellee,
ENTRY OVERRULING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
vs.
Appellant.
To The Clerk:
Enter uponAe Aournal of the Court onAU6 2 62009 per order of the Court.
By:
^^^
Presiding Judge