327 U.S. 1 66 S.Ct. 340 90 L.Ed. 499 Application of YAMASHITA. YAMASHITA v. STYER, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific

327 U.S.
up
327 U.S. 1
66 S.Ct. 340
90 L.Ed. 499
Application of YAMASHITA. YAMASHITA
v.
STYER, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces,
Western Pacific.
No. 61 Misc. and No. 672.
Argued Jan. 7, 8, 1946.
Decided Feb. 4, 1946.
[Syllabus from pages 1-3 intentionally omitted]

Captain A. Frank Reel, JAGD, of Boston, Mass., Colonel Harry E.
Clarke, JAGD, of Altoona, Pa., pro hac vice, by special leave of Court,
and Captain Milton Sandberg, JAGD, of New York City, for petitioner.
Solicitor General J. Howard McGrath, and Assistant Solicitor General
Harold Judson, both of Washington, D.C., for respondents.
Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE and Mr. Justice MURPHY dissenting.
Congress, by adoption of Article of War providing that jurisdiction

conferred upon courts martial should not be construed as depriving
military commissions, of concurrent jurisdiction of offenders which by
law of war are triable by such commissions, adopted the system of
military common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should
be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts and as further
defined and supplemented by the Hague Convention. Articles of War,
art. 15, 10 U.S.C.A. 1486.
The trial and punishment of an enemy combatant who has committed
violations of the law of war is not only a part of conduct of war, but also
is an exercise of authority sanctioned by Congress to administer system
of military justice recognized by law of war which sanction is without
qualification as to exercise of authority so long as a state of war exists,
form its declaration until peace is proclaimed. Articles of War, arts. 2,
15, 10 U.S.C.A. 1473, 1486; Proclamation July 2, 1942, No. 2561, 10
U.S.C.A. 1554 note; U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 10.
The war power, from which military commission derives its existence,
is not limited to victories in the field, but carries with it inherent power
to guard against immediate renewal of conflict and to remedy, at least
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in ways Congress has recognized, evils which military operations have

produced. Articles of War, arts. 2, 15, 10 U.S.C.A. 1473, 1486; U.S.C.
A. Const. art. 1, 8.
The mere fact that hostilities have ceased does not preclude the trial of
offenders against the law of war before a military commission, at least
until peace has been officially recognized by treaty or proclamation of
the political branch of the government. Articles of War, art. 15, 10 U.S.
C.A. 1486; U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 10.
Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of
prohibition and petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of
prohibition.
On petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Mr. Chief Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
No. 61 Miscellaneous is an application for leave to file a petition for
writs of habeas corpus and prohibition in this Court. No. 672 is a
petition for certiorari to review an order of the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (28 U.S.C. 349, 28 U.S.C.A. 349),
denying petitioner's application to that court for writs of habeas corpus
and prohibition. As both applications raise substantially like questions,
and because of the importance and novelty of some of those presented,
we set the two applications down for ral argument as one case.
From the petitions and supporting papers it appears that prior to
September 3, 1945, petitioner was the Commanding General of the
Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the
Philippine Islands. On that date he surrendered to and became a
prisoner of war of the United States Army Forces in Baguio, Philippine
Islands. On September 25th, by order of respondent, Lieutenant
General Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific, which command embraces the
Philippine Islands, petitioner was served with a charge prepared by the
Judge Advocate General's Department of the Army, purporting to
charge petitioner with a violation of the law of war. On October 8,
1945, petitioner, after pleading not guilty to the charge, was held for
trial before a military commission of five Army officers appointed by
order of General Styer. The order appointed six Army officers, all
lawyers, as defense counsel. Throughout the proceedings which
followed, including those before this Court, defense counsel have
demonstrated their professional skill and resourcefulness and their
proper zeal for the defense with which they were charged.
On the same date a bill of particulars was filed by the prosecution, and
the commission heard a motion made in petitioner's behalf to dismiss
the charge on the ground that it failed to state a violation of the law of
war. On October 29th the commission was reconvened, a supplemental
bill of particulars was filed, and the motion to dismiss was denied. The
trial then proceeded until its conclusion on December 7, 1945, the
commission hearing two hundred and eighty-six witnesses, who gave
over three thousand pages of testimony. On that date petitioner was
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found guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced to death by

hanging.
The petitions for habeas corpus set up that the detention of petitioner
for the purpose of the trial was unlawful for reasons which are now
urged as showing that the military commission was without lawful
authority or jurisdiction to place petitioner on trial, as follows:
(a) That the military commission which tried and convicted petitioner
was not lawfully created, and that no military commission to try
petitioner for violations of the law of war could lawfully be convened
after the cessation of hostilities between the armed forces of the United
States and Japan;
(b) that the charge preferred against petitioner fails to charge him with
a violation of the law of war;
(c) that the commission was without authority and jurisdiction to try
and convict petitioner because the order governing the procedure of
the commission permitted the admission in evidence of depositions,
affidavits and hearsay and opinion evidence, and because the
commission's rulings admitting such evidence were in violation of the
25th and 38th Articles of War (10 U.S.C. 1496, 1509, 10 U.S.C.A.
1496, 1509) and the Geneva Convention (47 Stat. 2021), and deprived
petitioner of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment;
(d) that the commission was without authority and jurisdiction in the
premises because of the failure to give advance notice of petitioner's
trial to the neutral power representing the interests of Japan as a
belligerent as required by Article 60 of the Geneva Convention, 47 Stat.
2021, 2051.
On the same grounds the petitions for writs of prohibition set up that
the commission is without authority to proceed with the trial.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, after hearing argument,
denied the petition for habeas corpus presented to it, on the ground,
among others, that its jurisdiction was limited to an inquiry as to the
jurisdiction of the commission to place petitioner on trial for the
offense charged, and that the commission, being validly constituted by
the order of General Styer, had jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner and over the trial for the offense charged.
In E parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3, we had occasion to
consider at length the sources and nature of the authority to create
military commissions for the trial of enemy combatants for offenses
against the law of war. We there pointed out that Congress, in the
exercise of the power conferred upon it by Article I, 8, Cl. 10 of the
Constitution to 'define and punish * * * Offenses against the Law of
Nations * * *,' of which the law of war is a part, had by the Articles of
War (10 U.S.C. 14711593, 10 U.S.C.A. 14711593) recognized
the 'military commission' appointed by military command, as it had
previously existed in United States Army practice, as an appropriate
tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war.
327 U.S. 1
Article 15 declares that 'the provisions of these articles conferring

jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving
military commissions * * * or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction in respect of offenders of offenses that by statute or by the
law of war may be triable by such military commissions * * * or other
military tribunals.' See a similar provision of the Espionage Act of 1917,
50 U.S.C. 38, 50 U.S.C.A. 38. Article 2 includes among those
persons subject to the Articles of War the personnel of our own
military establishment. But this, as Article 12 indicates, does not
exclude from the class of persons subject to trial by military
commissions 'any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial
by military tribunals,' and who, under Article 12, may be tried by court
martial, or under Article 15 by military commission.
We further pointed out that Congress, by sanctioning trial of enemy
combatants for violations of the law of war by military commission,
had not attempted to codify the law of war or to mark its precise
boundaries. Instead, by Article 15 it had incorporated, by reference, as
within the preexisting jurisdiction of military commissions created by
appropriate military command, all offenses which are defined as such
by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within
that jurisdiction. It thus adopted the system of military common law
applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and
deemed applicable by the courts, and as further defined and
supplemented by the Hague Convention, to which the United States
and the Axis powers were parties.
We also emphasized in Ex parte Quirin, as we do here, that on
application for habeas corpus we are not concerned with the guilt or
innocence of the petitioners. We consider here only the lawful power of
the commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged. In the
present cases it must be recognized throughout that the military
tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by the Articles of War are not
courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject to review by this
Court. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243, 17 L.Ed. 589; In re
Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 21 S.Ct. 48, 45 L.Ed. 118; cf. Ex parte Quirin, supra,
317 U.S. 39, 63 S.Ct. 168 87 L.Ed. 3. They are tribunals whose
determinations are reviewable by the military authorities either as
provided in the military orders constituting such tribunals or as
provided by the Articles of War. Congress conferred on the courts no
power to review their determinations save only as it has granted
judicial power 'to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of the restraint of liberty.' 28 U.S.C. 451, 452,
28 U.S.C.A. 451, 452. The courts may inquire whether the detention
complained of is within the authority of those detaining the petitioner.
If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and
condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because
they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their
errors of decision is not for the courts but for the military authorities
which are alone authorized to review their decisions. See Dynes v.
Hoover, 20 How. 5, 81, 15 L.Ed. 838; Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S.
543, 555, 556, 7 S.Ct. 1141, 1145, 1146, 30 L.Ed. 1167; Carter v.
McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 22 S.Ct. 181, 46 L.Ed. 236; Collins v.
McDonald, 258 U.S. 416, 42 S.Ct. 326, 66 L.Ed. 692. Cf. Matter of
Moran, 203 U.S. 96, 105, 27 S.Ct. 25, 26, 51 L.Ed. 105.
327 U.S. 1
Finally, we held in Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S. 24, 25, 63 S.Ct. 9,
10, 87 L.Ed. 3, as we hold now, that Congress by sanctioning trials of
enemy aliens by military commission for offenses against the law of
war had recognized the right of the accused to make a defense. Cf. Ex
parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 63 S.Ct. 115, 87 L.Ed. 58. It has not
foreclosed their right to contend that the Constitution or laws of the
United States withhold authority to proceed with the trial. It has not
withdrawn, and the Executive branch of the government could not,
unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the
duty and power to make such inquiry into the authority of the
commission as may be made by habeas corpus.
With these governing principles in mind we turn to the consideration
of the several contentions urged to establish want of authority in the
commission. We are not here concerned with the power of military
commissions to try civilians. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 132, 18 L.
Ed. 281; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S.Ct. 190, 77 L.Ed.
375; Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S. 45, 63 S.Ct. 19, 87 L.Ed. 3. The
Government's contention is that General Styer's order creating the
commission conferred authority on it only to try the purported charge
of violation of the law of war committed by petitioner, an enemy
belligerent, while in command of a hostile army occupying United
States territory during time of war. Our first inquiry must therefore be
whether the present commission was created by lawful military
command and, if so, whether authority could thus be conferred on the
commission to place petitioner on trial after the cessation of hostilities
between the armed forces of the United States and Japan.
The authority to create the Commission. General Styer's order for the
appointment of the commission was made by him as Commander of
the United States Armed Forces, Western Pacific. His command
includes, as part of a vastly greater area, the Philippine Islands, where
the alleged offenses were committed, where petitioner surrender as a
prisoner of war, and where, at the time of the order convening the
commission, he was detained as a prisoner in custody of the United
States Army. The Congressional recognition of military commissions
and its sanction of their use in trying offenses against the law of war to
which we have referred, sanctioned their creation by military
command in conformity to long established American precedents.
Such a commission may be appointed by any field commander, or by
any commander competent to appoint a general court martial, as was
General Styer, who had been vested with that power by order of the
President. 2 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 2d Ed., *1302; cf.
Article of War 8.
Here the commission was not only created by a commander competent
to appoint it, but his order conformed to the established policy of the
Government and to higher military commands authorizing his action.
In a proclamation of July 2, 1942 (56 Stat. 1964, 10 U.S.C.A. 1554
note), the President proclaimed that enemy belligerents who, during
time of war, enter the United States, or any territory possession
thereof, and who violate the law of war, should be subject to the law of
war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. Paragraph 10 of the
Declaration of Potsdam of July 6, 1945, declared that '* * * stern justice
shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited
327 U.S. 1
cruelties upon prisoners.' U.S. Dept. of State Bull., Vol. XIII, No. 318,
pp. 137, 138. This Declaration was accepted by the Japanese
government by its note of August 10, 1945. U.S. Dept. of State Bull.,
Vol. XIII, No. 320, p. 205.
By direction o the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the American
Military Forces, on September 12, 1945, instructed General MacArthur,
Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, to proceed
with the trial, before appropriate military tribunals, of such Japanese
war criminals 'as have been or may be apprehended.' By order of
General MacArthur of September 24, 1945, General Styer was
specifically directed to proceed with the trial of petitioner upon the
charge here involved. This order was accompanied by detailed rules
and regulations which General MacArthur prescribed for the trial of
war criminals. These regulations directed, among other things, that
review of the sentence imposed by the commission should be by the
officer convening it, with 'authority to approve, mitigate, remit,
commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed,'
and directed that no sentence of death should be carried into effect
until confirmed by the Commander in Chief, United States Army
Forces, Pacific.
It thus appears that the order creating the commission for the trial of
petitioner was authorized by military command, and was in complete
conformity to the Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such
tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of war committed by
enemy combatants. And we turn to the question whether the authority
to create the commission and direct the trial by military order
continued after the cessation of hostilities.
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military commander, not only to repel and defeat the
enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies
who, in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort, have
violated the law of war. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S. 28, 63 S.Ct. 11,
87 L.Ed. 3. The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have
committed violations of the law of war is thus not only a part of the
conduct of war operating as a preventive measure against such
violations, but is an exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress to
administer the system of military justice recognized by the law of war.
That sanction is without qualification as to the exercise of this
authority so long as a state of war existsfrom its declaration until
peace is proclaimed. See United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 70, 19
L.Ed. 615; The Protector, 12 Wall. 700, 702, 20 L.Ed. 463; McElrath v.
United States, 102 U.S. 426, 438, 26 L.Ed. 189; Kahn v. Anderson, 255
U.S. 1, 9, 10, 41 S.Ct. 224, 226, 65 L.Ed. 469. The war power, from
which the commission derives its existence, is not limited to victories
in the field, but carries with it the inherent power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways
Congress has recognized, the evils which the military operations have
produced. See Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 507, 20 L.Ed. 176.
We cannot say that there is no authority to convene a commission after
hostilities have ended to try violations of the law of war committed
before their cessation, at least until peace has been officially recognized
327 U.S. 1
by treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the Government. In

fact, in most instances the practical administration of the system of
military justice under the law of war would fail if such authority were
thought to end with the cessation of hostilities. For only after their
cessation could the greater number of offenders and the principal ones
be apprehended and subjected to trial.
No writer on international law appears to have regarded the power of
military tribunals, otherwise competent to try violations of the law of
war, as terminating before the formal state of war has ended.1 In our
own military history there have been numerous instances in which
offenders were tried by military commission after the cessation of
hostilities and before the proclamation of peace, for offenses against
the law of war c mmitted before the cessation of hostilities.2
The extent to which the power to prosecute violations of the law of war
shall be exercised before peace is declared rests, not with the courts,
but with the political branch of the Government, and may itself be
governed by the terms of an armistice or the treaty of peace. Here,
peace has not been agreed upon or proclaimed. Japan, by her
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and her surrender, has
acquiesced in the trials of those guilty of violations of the law of war.
The conduct of the trial by the military commission has been
authorized by the political branch of the Government, by military
command, by international law and usage, and by the terms of the
surrender of the Japanese government.
The Charge. Neither Congressional action nor the military orders
constituting the commission authorized it to place petitioner on trial
unless the charge preferred against him is of a violation of the law of
war. The charge, so far as now relevant, is that petitioner, between
October 9, 1944 and September 2, 1945, in the Philippine Islands,
'while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the
members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes against people of the United States and of its
allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he * * *
thereby violated the laws of war.'
Bills of particulars, filed by the prosecution by order of the
commission, allege a a series of acts, one hundred and twenty-three in
number, committed by members of the forces under petitioner's
command, during the period mentioned. The first item specifies the
execution of a 'a deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and
exterminate a large part of the civilian population of Batangas
Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private and religious
property therein, as a result of which more than 25,000 men, women
and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally
mistreated and killed, without cause or trial, and entire settlements
were devastated and destroyed wantonly and without military
necessity.' Other items specify acts of violence, cruelty and homicide
inflicted upon the civilian population and prisoners of war, acts of
wholesale pillage and the wanton destruction of religious monuments.
327 U.S. 1
It is not denied that such acts directed against the civilian population
of an occupied country and against prisoners of war are recognized in
international law as violations of the law of war. Articles 4, 28, 46, and
47, Annex to Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2296,
2303, 2306, 2307. But it is urged t at the charge does not allege that
petitioner has either committed or directed the commission of such
acts, and consequently that no violation is charged as against him. But
this overlooks the fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful breach
of duty by petitioner as an army commander to control the operations
of the members of his command by 'permitting them to commit' the
extensive and widespread atrocities specified. The question then is
whether the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take
such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the
troops under his command for the prevention of the specified acts
which are violations of the law of war and which are likely to attend the
occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and
whether he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure
to take such measures when violations result. That this was the precise
issue to be tried was made clear by the statement of the prosecution at
the opening of the trial.
It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose
excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander
would almost certainly result in violations which it is the purpose of
the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect civilian populations
and prisoners of war from brutality would largely be defeated if the
commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect to take
reasonable measures for their protection. Hence the law of war
presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of
the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent
responsible for their subordinates.
This is recognized by the Annex to Fourth Hague Convention of 1907,
respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Article I lays down as
a condition which an armed force must fulfill in order to be accorded
the rights of lawful belligerents, that it must be 'commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates.' 36 Stat. 2295. Similarly
Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, relating to bombardment by
naval vessels, provides that commanders in chief of the belligerent
vessels 'must see that the above Articles are properly carried out.' 36
Stat. 2389. And Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of
1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092, for the amelioration of the condition of the
wounded and sick in armies in the field, makes it 'the duty of the
commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the
details of execution of the foregoing articles (of the convention), as well
as for unforeseen cases.' And, finally, Article 43 of the Annex of the
Fourth Hague Convention, 36 Stat. 2306, requires that the commander
of a force occupying enemy territory, as was petitioner, 'shall take all
the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.'
These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time
specified was military governor of the Philippines, as well as
commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take such
327 U.S. 1
measures as were within his power and appropriate in the

circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.
This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore been recognized, and
its breach penalized by our own military tribunals.3 A like principle has
been applied so as to impose liability on the United States in
international arbitrations. Case of Jenaud, 3 Moore, International
Arbitrations, 3000; Case of 'The Zafiro,' 5 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law, 707.
Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations, of which the law of war is a
part, has recognized the 'military commission' appointed by military
command, as it had previously existed in United States army practice,
as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses
against the law of war. Espionage Act 1917, tit. 1, 7, 50 U.S.C.A. 38;
Articles of War, arts. 2, 12, 15, 10 U.S.C.A. 1473, 1483, 1486; U.S.C.
A. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 10.
We do not make the laws of war but we respect them so far as they do
not conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution. There
is no contention that the present charge, thus read, is without the
support of evidence, or that the commission held petitioner
responsible for failing to take measures which were beyond his control
or inappropriate for a commanding officer to take in the
circumstances.4 We do not here appraise the evidence on which
petitioner was convicted. We do not consider what measures, if any,
petitioner took to prevent the commission, by the troops under his
command, of the plain violations of the law of war detailed in the bill of
particulars, or whether such measures as he may have taken were
appropriate and sufficient to discharge the duty imposed upon him.
These are questions within the peculiar competence of the military
officers composing the commission and were for it to decide. See Smith
v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 178, 6 S.Ct. 570, 576, 29 L.Ed. 601. It is plain
that the charge on which petitioner was tried charged him with a
breach of his duty to control the operations of the members of his
command, by permitting them to commit the specified atrocities. This
was enough to require the commission to hear evidence tending to
establish the culpable failure of petitioner to perform the duty imposed
on him by the law of war and to pass upon its sufficiency to establish
guilt.
Obviously charges of violations of the law of war triable before a
military tribunal need not be stated with the precision of a common
law indictment. Cf. Collins v. McDonald, supra, 258 U.S. 420, 42 S.Ct.
328, 66 L.Ed. 692. But we conclude that the allegations of the charge,
tested by any reasonable standard, adequately allege a violation of the
law of war and that the commission had authority to try and decide the
issue which it raised. Cf. Dealy v. United States, 152 U.S. 539, 14 S.Ct.
680, 38 L.Ed. 545; Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 447, 28
S.Ct. 163, 171, 52 L.Ed. 278; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66,
62 S.Ct. 457, 463, 86 L.Ed. 680, and cases cited.
The Proceedings before the Commission. The regulations prescribed by
General MacArthur governing the procedure for the trial of petitioner
by the commission directed that the commission should admit such
327 U.S. 1
evidence 'as in its opinion would be of assistance in proving or

disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would
have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man,' and that in
particular it might admit affidavits, depositions or other stateme ts
taken by officers detailed for that purpose by military authority. The
petitions in this case charged that in the course of the trial the
commission received, over objection by petitioner's counsel, the
deposition of a witness taken pursuant to military authority by a
United States Army captain. It also, over like objection admitted
hearsay and opinion evidence tendered by the prosecution. Petitioner
argues as ground for the writ of habeas corpus, that Article 255 of the
Articles of War prohibited the reception in evidence by the commission
of depositions on behalf of the prosecution in a capital case, and that
Article 386 prohibited the reception of hearsay and of opinion evidence.
We think that neither Article 25 nor Article 38 is applicable to the trial
of an enemy combatant by a military commission for violations of the
law of war. Article 2 of the Articles of War enumerates 'the persons * **
subject to these articles,' who are denominated, for purposes of the
Articles, as 'persons subject to military law.' In general, the persons so
enumerated are members of our own Army and of the personnel
accompanying the Army. Enemy combatants are not included among
them. Articles 12, 13 and 14, before the adoption of Article 15 in 1916,
39 Stat. 653 made all 'persons subject to military law' amenable to trial
by courts-martial for any offense made punishable by the Articles of
War. Article 12 makes triable by general court martial 'any other
person who by the law of war is (triable) by military tribunals.' Since
Article 2, in its 1916 form, 39 Stat. 651, includes some persons who, by
the law of war, were, prior to 1916, triable by military commission, it
was feared by the proponents of the 1916 legislation that in the absence
of a saving provision, the authority given by Articles 12, 13 and 14 to try
such persons before courts-martial might be construed to deprive the
non-statutory military commission of a portion of what was considered
to be its traditional jurisdiction. To avoid this, and to preserve that
jurisdiction intact, Article 15 was added to the Articles.7 It declared
that 'The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military
commissions * * * of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or
offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by such military
commissions.'
By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve their
traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the
Articles, Congress gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any
use of the military commission contemplated by the common law of
war. But it did not thereby make subject to the Articles of War persons
other than those defined by Article 2 as being subject to the Articles,
nor did it confer the benefits of the Articles upon such persons. The
Articles recognized but one kind of military commission, not two. But
they sanctioned the use of that one for the trial of two classes of
persons, to one of which the Articles do, and to the other of which they
do not apply in such trials. Being of this latter class, petitioner cannot
claim the benefits of the Articles, which are applicable only to the
members of the other class. Petitioner, an enemy combatant, is
therefore not a person made subject to the Articles of War by Article 2,
327 U.S. 1
and the military commission before which he was tried, though

sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved, by Article 15, was not convened
by virtue of the Articles of War, but pursuant to the common law of
war. It follows that the Articles of War, including Articles 25 and 38,
were not applicable to petitioner's trial and imposed no restrictions
upon the procedure to be followed. The Articles left the control over
the procedure in such a case where it had previously been, with the
military command.
Petitioner further urges that by virtue of Article 63 of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2052, he is entitled to the benefits
afforded by the 25th and 38th Articles of War to members of our own
forces. Article 63 provides: 'Sentence may be pronounced against a
prisoner of war only by the same courts and according to the same
procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of
the detaining Power.' Since petitioner is a prisoner of war, and as the
25th and 38th Articles of War apply to the trial of any person in our
own armed forces, it is said that Article 63 requires them to be applied
in the trial of petitioner. But we think examination of Article 63 in its
setting in the Convention plainly shows that it refers to sentence
'pronounced against a prisoner of war' for an offense committed while
a prisoner of war, and not for a violation of the law of war committed
while a combatant.
Article 63 of the Convention appears in part 3, entitled 'Judicial Suits,'
of Chapter 3, 'Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War,' of Section V,
'Prisoners' Relations with the Authorities,' one of the sections of Title
III, 'Captivity.' All taken together relate only to the conduct and control
of prisoners of war while in captivity as such. Chapter 1 of Section V,
Article 42, deals with complaints of prisoners of war because of the
conditions of captivity. Chapter 2, Articles 43 and 44, relates to those
of their number chosen by prisoners of war to represent them.
Chapter 3 of Section V, Articles 45 through 67, is entitled 'Penalties
Applicable to Prisoners of War.' Part 1 of that chapter, Articles 45
through 53, indicates what acts of prisoners of war, committed while
prisoners, shall be considered offenses, and defines to some extent the
punishment which the detaining power may impose on account of such
offenses.8 Punishment is of two kinds'disciplinary' and 'judicial,' the
latter being the more severe. Article 52 requires that leniency be
exercised in deciding whether an offense requires disciplinary or
judicial punishment. Part 2 of Chapter 3 is entitled 'Disciplinary
Punishments,' and further defines the extent of such punishment, and
the mode in which it may be imposed. Part 3, entitled 'Judicial Suits,'
in which Article 63 is found, describes he procedure by which 'judicial'
punishment may be imposed. The three parts of Chapter 3, taken
together, are thus a comprehensive description of the substantive
offenses which prisoners of war may commit during their
imprisonment, of the penalties which may be imposed on account of
such offenses, and of the procedure by which guilt may be adjudged
and sentence pronounced.
We think it clear, from the context of these recited provisions, that part
3, and Article 63 which it contains, apply only to judicial proceedings
directed against a prisoner of war for offenses committed while a
327 U.S. 1
prisoner of war. Section V gives no indication that this part was

designed to deal with offenses other than those referred to in parts 1
and 2 of chapter 3.
We cannot say that the commission, in admitting evidence to which
objection is now made, violated any act of Congress, treaty or military
command defining the commission's authority. For reasons already
stated we hold that the commission's rulings on evidence and on the
mode of conducting these proceedings against petitioner are not
reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities.
From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider what, in other
situations, the Fifth Amendment might require, and as to that no
intimation one way or the other is to be implied. Nothing we have said
is to be taken as indicating any opinion on the question of the wisdom
of considering such evidence, or whether the action of a military
tribunal in admitting evidence, which Congress or controlling military
command has directed to be excluded may be drawn in question by
petition for habeas corpus or prohibition.
Effect of failure to give notice of the trial to the protecting power.
Article 60 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2051, to
which the United States and Japan were signatories, provides that 'At
the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war,
the detaining Power shall advise the representative of the protecting
Power thereof as soon as possible, and always before the date set for
the opening of the trial.' Petitioner relies on the failure to give the
prescribed notice to the protecting power9 to establish what of
authority in the commission to proceed with the trial.
For reasons already stated we conclude that Article 60 of the Geneva
Convention, which appears in part 3, Chapter 3, Section V, Title III of
the Geneva Convention, applies only to persons who are subjected to
judicial proceedings for offenses committed while prisoners of war.10
It thus appears that the order convening the commission was a lawful
order, that the commission was lawfully constituted, that petitioner
was charged with violation of the law of war, and that the commission
had authority to proceed with the trial, and in doing so did not violate
any military, statutory or constitutional command. We have
considered, but find it unnecessary to discuss other contentions which
we find to be without merit. We therefore conclude that the detention
of petitioner for trial and his detention upon his conviction, subject to
the prescribed review by the military authorities were lawful, and that
the petition for certiorari, and leave to file in this Court petitions for
writs of habeas corpus and prohibition should be, and they are
Denied.
Writs denied.
Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.
Mr. Justice MURPHY, dissenting.
327 U.S. 1
The significance of the issue facing the Court today cannot be

overemphasized. An American military commission has been
established to try a fallen military commander of a conquered nation
for an alleged war crime. The authority for such action grows out of the
exercise of the power conferred upon Congress by Article I, 8, Cl. 10
of the Constitution to 'define and punish * * * Offenses against the Law
of Nations * * *.' The grave issue raised by this case is whether a
military commission so established and so authorized may disregard
the procedural rights of an accused person as guaranteed by the
Constitution, especially by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The answer is plain. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of
law applies to 'any person' who is accused of a crime by the Federal
Government or any of its agencies. No exception is made as to those
who are accused of war crimes or as to those who possess the status of
an enemy belligerent. Indeed, such an exception would be contrary to
the whole philosophy of human rights which makes the Constitution
the great living document that it is. The immutable rights of the
individual, including those secured by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to the members of those nations
that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the democratic
ideology. They belong to every person in the world, victor or
vanquished, whatever may be his race, color or beliefs. They rise above
any status of belligerency or outlawry. They survive any popular
passion or frenzy of the moment. No court or legislature or executive,
not even the mightiest army in the world, can ever destroy them. Such
is the universal and indestructible nature of the rights which the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment recognizes and protects when
life or liberty is threatened by virtue of the authority of the United
States.
The existence of these rights, unfortunately, is not always respected.
They are often trampled under by those who are motivated by hatred,
aggression or fear. But in this nation individual rights are recognized
and protected, at least in regard to governmental action. They cannot
be ignored by any branch of the Government, even the military, except
under the most extreme and urgent circumstances.
The failure of the military commission to obey the dictates of the due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment is apparent in this case.
The petitioner was the commander of an army totally destroyed by the
superior power of this nation. While under heavy and destructive
attack by our forces, his troops committed many brutal atrocities and
other high crimes. Hostilities ceased and he voluntarily surrendered.
At that point he was entitled, as an individual protected by the due
process clause of the Fifth amendment, to be treated fairly and justly
according to the accepted rules of law and procedure. He was also
entitled to a fair trial as to any alleged crimes and to be free from
charges of legally unrecognized crimes that would serve only to permit
his accusers to satisfy their desires for revenge.
A military commission was appointed to try the petitioner for an
alleged war crime. The trial was ordered to be held in territory over
which the United States has complete sovereignty. No miilitary
327 U.S. 1
necessity or other emergency demanded the suspension of the

safeguards of due process. Yet petitioner was rushed to trial under an
improper charge, given insufficient time to prepare an adequate
defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the most elementary rules
of evidence and summarily sentenced to be hanged. In all this needless
and unseemly haste there was no serious attempt to charge or to prove
that he committed a recognized violation of the laws of war. He was not
charged with personally participating in the acts of atrocity or with
ordering or condoning their commission. Not even knowledge of these
crimes was attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control
the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to
commit the acts of atrocity. The recorded annals of warfare and the
established principles of international law afford not the slightest
precedent for such a charge. This indictment in effect permitted the
military commission to make the crime whatever it willed, dependent
upon its biased view as to petitioner's duties and his disregard thereof,
a practice reminiscent of that pursued in certain less respected nations
in recent years.
In my opinion, such a procedure is unworthy of the traditions of our
people or of the immense sacrifices that they have made to advance the
common ideals of mankind. The high feelings of the moment doubtless
will be satisfied. But in the sober afterglow will come the realization of
the boundless and dangerous implications of the procedure sanctioned
today. No one in a position of command in an army, from sergeant to
general, can escape those future Indeed, the fate of some future
President of the United States and his chiefs of staff and military
advisers may well have been sealed by this decision. But even more
significant will be the hatred and ill-will growing out of the application
of this unprecedented procedure. That has been the inevitable effect of
every method of punishment disregarding the element of personal
culpability. The effect in this instance, unfortunately, will be magnified
infinitely for here we are dealing with the rights of man on an
international level. To subject an enemy belligerent to an unfair trial,
to charge him with an unrecognized crime, or to vent on him our
retributive emotions only antagonizes the enemy nation and hinders
the reconciliation necessary to a peaceful world.
That there were brutal atrocities inflicted upon the helpless Filipino
people, to whom tyranny is no stranger, by Japanese armed forces
under the petitioner's command is undeniable. Starvation, execution or
massacre without trial, torture, rape, murder and wanton destruction
of property were foremost among the outright violations of the laws of
war and of the conscience of a civilized world. That just punishment
should be meted out to all those responsible for criminal acts of this
nature is also beyond dispute. But these factors do not answer the
problem in this case. They do not justify the abandonment of our
devotion to justice in dealing with a fallen enemy commander. To
conclude otherwise is to admit that the enemy has lost the battle but
has destroyed our ideals.
War breeds atrocities. From the earliest conflicts of recorded history to
the global struggles of modern times inhumanities, lust and pillage
have been the in vitable by-products of man's resort to force and arms.
327 U.S. 1
Unfortunately, such despicable acts have a dangerous tendency to call

forth primitive impulses of vengeance and retaliation among the
victimized peoples. The satisfaction of such impulses in turn breeds
resentment and fresh tension. Thus does the spiral of cruelty and
hatred grow.
If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based
upon a recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that
the necessary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as
possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness. Justice
must be tempered by compassion rather than by vengeance. In this,
the first case involving this momentous problem ever to reach this
Court, our responsibility is both lofty and difficult. We must insist,
within the confines of our proper jurisdiction, that the highest
standards of justice be applied in this trial of an enemy commander
conducted under the authority of the United States. Otherwise stark
retribution will be free to masquerade in a cloak of false legalism. And
the hatred and cynicism engendered by that retribution will supplant
the great ideals to which this nation is dedicated.
This Court fortunately has taken the first and most important step
toward insuring the supremacy of law and justice in the treatment of
an enemy belligerent accused of violating the laws of war. Jurisdiction
properly has been asserted to inquire 'into the cause of restraint of
liberty' of such a person. 28 U.S.C. 452, 28 U.S.C.A. 452. Thus the
obnoxious doctrine asserted by the Government in this case, to the
effect that restraints of liberty resulting from military trials of war
criminals are political matters completely outside the arena of judicial
review, has been rejected fully and unquestionably. This does not
mean, of course, that the foreign affairs and policies of the nation are
proper subjects of judicial inquiry. But when the liberty of any person
is restrained by reason of the authority of the United States the writ of
habeas corpus is available to test the legality of that restraint, even
though direct court review of the restraint is prohibited. The conclusive
presumption must be made, in this country at least, that illegal
restraints are unauthorized and unjustified by any foreign policy of the
Government and that commonly accepted juridical standards are to be
recognized and enforced. On that basis judicial inquiry into these
matters may proceed within its proper sphere.
The determination of the extent of review of war trials calls for judicial
statesmanship of the highest order. The ultimate nature and scope of
the writ of habeas corpus are within the discretion of the judiciary
unless validly circumscribed by Congress. Here we are confronted with
a use of the writ under circumstances novel in the history of the Court.
For my own part, I do not feel that we should be confined by the
traditional lines of review drawn in connection with the use of the writ
by ordinary criminals who have direct access to the judiciary in the first
instance. Those held by the military lack any such access; consequently
the judicial review available by habeas corpus must be wider than usual
in order that proper standards of justice may be enforceable.
But for the purposes of this case I accept the scope of review
recognized by the Court at this time. As I understand it, the following
issues in connection with war criminal trials are reviewable through
327 U.S. 1
the use of the writ of habeas corpus: (1) Whether the military
commission was lawfully created and had authority to try and to
convict the accused of a war crime; (2) whether the charge against the
accused stated a violation of the laws of war; (3) whether the
commission, in admitting certain evidence, violated any law or military
command defining the commission's authority in that respect; and (4)
whether the commission lacked jurisdiction because of a failure to give
advance notice to the protecting powe as required by treaty or
convention.
The Court, in my judgment, demonstrates conclusively that the
military commission was lawfully created in this instance and that
petitioner could not object to its power to try him for a recognized war
crime. Without pausing here to discuss the third and fourth issues,
however, I find it impossible to agree that the charge against the
petitioner stated a recognized violation of the laws of war.
It is important, in the first place, to appreciate the background of
events preceding this trial. From October 9, 1944, to September 2,
1945, the petitioner was the Commanding General of the 14th Army
Group of the Imperial Japanese Army, with headquarters in the
Philippines. The reconquest of the Philippines by the armed forces of
the United States began approximately at the time when the petitioner
assumed this command. Combined with a great and decisive sea battle,
an invasion was made on the island of Leyte on October 20, 1944. 'In
the six days of the great naval action the Japanese position in the
Philippines had become extremely critical. Most of the serviceable
elements of the Japanese Navy had become committed to the battle
with disastrous results. The strike had miscarried, and General
MacArthur's land wedge was firmly implanted in the vulnerable flank
of the enemy * * *. There were 260,000 Japanese troops scattered over
the Philippines but most of them might as well have been on the other
side of the world so far as the enemy's ability to shift them to meet the
American thrusts was concerned. If General MacArthur succeeded in
establishing himself in the Visayas where he could stage, exploit, and
spread under cover of overwhelming naval and air superiority, nothing
could prevent him from overrunning the Philippines.' Biennial Report
of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30,
1945, to the Secretary of War, p. 74.
By the end of 1944 the island of Leyte was largely in American hands.
And on January 9, 1945, the island of Luzon was invaded. 'Yamashita's
inability to cope with General MacArthur's swift moves, his desired
reaction to the deception measures, the guerrillas, and General
Kenney's aircraft combined to place the Japanese in an impossible
situation. The enemy was forced into a piecemeal commitment of his
troops.' Ibib, p. 78. It was at this time and place that most of the
alleged atrocities took place. Organized resistance around Manila
ceased on February 23. Repeated land and air assaults pulverized the
enemy and within a few months there was little left of petitioner's
command except a few remnants which had gathered for a last stand
among the precipitous mountains.
As the military commission here noted, 'The Defense established the
difficulties faced by the Accused with respect not only to the swift and
327 U.S. 1
overpowering advance of American forces, but also to the errors of his

predecessors, weaknesses in organization, equipment, supply with
especial reference to food and gasoline, training, communication,
discipline and morale of his troops. It was alleged that the sudden
assignment of Naval and Air Forces to his tactical command presented
almost insurmountable difficulties. This situation was followed, the
Defense contended, by failure to obey his orders to withdraw troops
from Manila, and the subsequent massacre of unarmed civilians,
particularly by Naval forces. Prior to the Luzon Campaign, Naval forces
had reported to a separate ministry in the Japanese Government and
Naval Commanders may not have been receptive or experienced in this
instance with respect to a joint land operation under a single
commander who was designated from the Army Service.'
The day of final reckoning for the enemy arrived in August, 1945. On
September 3, the petitioner surrendered to the United States Army at
Baguio, Luzon. He immediately became a prisoner of war and was
interned in prison in conformity with the rules of international law. On
September 25, approximately three weeks after rrendering, he was
served with the charge in issue in this case. Upon service of the charge
he was removed from the status of a prisoner of war and placed in
confinement as an accused war criminal. Arraignment followed on
October 8 before a military commission specially appointed for the
case. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. He was also served on that day with
a bill of particulars alleging 64 crimes by troops under his command. A
supplemental bill alleging 59 more crimes by his troops was filed on
October 29, the same day that the trial began. No continuance was
allowed for preparation of a defense as to the supplemental bill. The
trial continued uninterrupted until December 5, 1945. On December 7
petitioner was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to be hanged.
The petitioner was accused of having 'unlawfully disregarded and
failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of
the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes.' The bills of particular further alleged
that specific acts of atrocity were committed by 'members of the armed
forces of Japan under the command of the accused.' Nowhere was it
alleged that the petitioner personally committed any of the atrocities,
or that he ordered their commission, or that he had any knowledge of
the commission thereof by members of his command.
The findings of the military commission bear out this absence of any
direct personal charge against the petitioner. The commission merely
found that atrocities and other high crimes 'have been committed by
members of the Japanese armed forces under your command * * * that
they were not sporadic in nature but in many cases were methodically
supervised by Japanese officers and noncommissioned officers * * *
that during the period in question you failed to provide effective
control of your troops as was required by the circumstances.'
In other words, read against the background of military events in the
Philippines subsequent to October 9, 1944, these charges amount to
this: 'We, the victorious American forces, have done everything
possible to destroy and disorganize your lines of communication, your
effective control of your personnel, your ability to wage war. In those
327 U.S. 1
respects we have succeeded. We have defeated and crushed your

forces. And now we charge and condemn you for having been
inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the period
when we were so effectively beseiging and eliminating your forces and
blocking your ability to maintain effective control. Many terrible
atrocities were committed by your disorganized troops. Because these
atrocities were so widespread we will not bother to charge or prove that
you committed, ordered or condoned any of them. We will assume that
they must have resulted from your inefficiency and negligence as a
commander. In short, we charge you with the crime of inefficiency in
controlling your troops. We will judge the discharge of your duties by
the disorganization which we ourselves created in large part. Our
standards of judgment are whatever we wish to make them.'
Nothing in all history or in international law, at least as far as I am
aware, justifies such a charge against a fallen commander of a defeated
force. To use the very ineffciency and disorganization created by the
victorious forces as the primary basis for condemning officers of the
defeated armies bears no resemblance to justice or to military reality.
International law makes no attempt to define the duties of a
commander of an army under constant and overwhelming assault; nor
does it impose liability under such circumstances for failure to meet
the ordinary responsibilities of command. The omission is
understandable. Duties, as well as ability to control troops, vary
according to the nature and intensity of the particular battle. To find an
unlawful deviation from duty under battle conditions requires difficult
and speculative calculations. Such calculations become highly
untrustworthy when they are made by the victor in relation to the
actions of a vanquished commander. Objective and realistic norms of
conduct are then extremely unlikely to be used in forming a judgment
as to deviations from duty. The probability that vengeance will form
the major part of the victor's judgment is an unfortunate but
inescapable fact. So great is that probability that international law
refuses to recognize such a judgment as a basis for a war crime,
however fair the judgment may be in a particular instance. It is this
consideration that undermines the charge against the petitioner in this
case. The indictment permits, indeed compels, the military
commission of a victorious nation to sit in judgment upon the military
strategy and actions of the defeated enemy and to use its conclusions to
determine the criminal liability of an enemy commander. Life and
liberty are made to depend upon the biased will of the victor rather
than upon objective standards of conduct.
The Court's reliance upon vague and indefinite references in certain of
the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Red Cross Convention is
misplaced. Thus the statement in Article 1 of the Annex to Hague
Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295, to the
effect that the laws, rights and duties of war apply to military and
volunteer corps only if they are 'commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates,' has no bearing upon the problem in this case.
Even if it has, the clause 'responsible for his subordinates' fails to state
to whom the responsibility is owed or to indicate the type of
responsibility contemplated. The phrase has received differing
interpretations by authorities on international law. In Oppenheim,
327 U.S. 1
International Law (6th ed., rev. by Lauterpacht, 1940, vol. 2, p. 204, fn.
3) it is stated that 'The meaning of the word 'responsible' * * * is not
clear. It probably means 'responsible to some higher authority,'
whether the person is appointed from above or elected from below; * *
*.' Another authority has stated that the word 'responsible' in this
particular context means 'presumably to a higher authority,' or
'possibly it merely means one who controls his subordinates and who
therefore can be called to account for their acts.' Wheaton,
International Law (14th ed., by Keith, 1944, p. 172, fn. 30). Still
another authority, Westlake, International Law (1907, Part II, p. 61),
states that 'probably the responsibility intended is nothing more than a
capacity of exercising effective control.' Finally, Edwards and
Oppenheim, Land Warfare (1912, p. 19, par. 22) state that it is enough
'if the commander of the corps is regularly or temporarily
commissioned as an officer or is a person of position and authority.' It
seems apparent beyond dispute that the word 'responsible' was not
used in this particular Hague Convention to hold the commander of a
defeated army to any high standard of efficiency when he is under
destructive attack; nor was it used to impute to him any criminal
responsibility for war crimes committed by troops under his command
under such circumstances.
The provisions of the other conventions referred to by the Court are on
their face equally devoid of relevance or significance to the situation
here in issue. Neither Article 19 of Hague Convention No. X, 36 Stat.
2371, 2389, nor Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of
1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092, refers to circumstances where the troops of
a commander commit atrocities while under heavily adverse battle
conditions. Reference is also made to the requirement of Article 43 of
the Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, 36 Stat. 2295, 2306, that the
commander of a force occupying enemy territory 'shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country.' But the petitioner was more than a
commander of a force occupying enemy territory. He was the leader of
an army un er constant and devastating attacks by a superior reinvading force. This provision is silent as to the responsibilities of a
commander under such conditions as that.
Even the laws of war heretofore recognized by this nation fail to impute
responsibility to a fallen commander for excesses committed by his
disorganized troops while under attack. Paragraph 347 of the War
Department publication, Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare,
FM 27-10 (1940), states the principal offenses under the laws of war
recognized by the United States. This includes all of the atrocities
which the Japanese troops were alleged to have committed in this
instance. Originally this paragraph concluded with the statement that
'The commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under
whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished
by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall.' The meaning of the
phrase 'under whose authority they are committed' was not clear. On
November 15, 1944, however, this sentence was deleted and a new
paragraph was added relating to the personal liability of those who
violate the laws of war. Change 1, FM 27-10. The new paragraph 345.1
states that 'Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws
327 U.S. 1
and customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact that
the acts complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior or
government sanction may be taken into consideration in determining
culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment.
The person giving such orders may also be punished.' From this the
conclusion seems inescapable that the United States recognizes
individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war only
as to those who commit the offenses or who order or direct their
commission. Such was not the allegation here. Cf. Article 67 of the
Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. 1539, 10 U.S.C.A. 1539.
There are numerous instances, especially with reference to the
Philippine Insurrection in 1900 and 1901, where commanding officers
were found to have violated the laws of war by specifically ordering
members of their command to commit atrocities and other war crimes.
Francisco Frani, G.O. 143, Dec. 13, 1900, Hq. Div. Phil.; Eugenio
Fernandez and Juan Soriano, G.O. 28, Feb. 6, 1901, Hq. Div. Phil.;
Ciriaco Cabungal, G.O. 188, Jul. 22, 1901, Hq. Div. Phil.; Natalio
Valencia, G.O. 221, Aug. 17, 1901, Hq. Div. Phil.; Aniceta Angeles, G.O.
246, Sept. 2, 1901, Hq. Div. Phil.; Francisco Braganza, G.O. 291, Sept.
26, 1901, Hq. Div. Phil.; Lorenzo Andaya, G.O. 328, Oct. 25, 1901, Hq.
Div. Phil. And in other cases officers have been held liable where they
knew that a crime was to be committed, had the power to prevent it
and failed to exercise that power. Pedro Abad Santos, G.O. 130, June
19, 1901, Hq. Div. Phil. Cf. Pedro A. Cruz, G.O. 264, Sept. 9, 1901, Hq.
Div. Phil. In no recorded instance, however, has the mere inability to
control troops under fire or attack by superior forces been made the
basis of a charge of violating the laws of war.
The Government claims that the principle that commanders in the field
are bound to control their troops has been applied so as to impose
liability on the United States in international arbitrations. Case of
Jeannaud, 1880, 3 Moore, International Arbitrations (1898) 3000;
Case of The Zafiro, 1910, 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law
(1943) 707. The difference between arbitrating property rights and
charging an individual with a crime against the laws of war is too
obvious to require elaboration. But even more significant is the fact
that even these arbitration cases fail to establish any principle of
liability where troops are under constant assault and demoralizing
influences by attacking forces. The same observation applies to the
common law and statutory doctrine, referred to by the Government,
that one who is under a legal duty to take protective or preventive
action is guilty of criminal homicide if he willfully or neglig ntly omits
to act and death is proximately caused. State v. Harrison, 107 N.J.L.
213, 152 A. 867; State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567; Holmes, The
Common Law, p. 278. No one denies that inaction or negligence may
give rise to liability, civil or criminal. But it is quite another thing to say
that the inability to control troops under highly competitive and
disastrous battle conditions renders one guilty of a war crime in the
absence of personal culpability. Had there been some element of
knowledge or direct connection with the atrocities the problem would
be entirely different. Moreover, it must be remembered that we are not
dealing here with an ordinary tort or criminal action; precedents in
those fields are of little if any value. Rather we are concerned with a
proceeding involving an international crime, the treatment of which
327 U.S. 1
may have untold effects upon the future peace of the world. That fact
must be kept uppermost in our search for precedent.
The only conclusion I can draw is that the charge made against the
petitioner is clearly without precedent in international law or in the
annals of recorded military history. This is not to say that enemy
commanders may escape punishment for clear and unlawful failures to
prevent atrocities. But that punishment should be based upon charges
fairly drawn in light of established rules of international law and
recognized concepts of justice.
But the charge in this case, as previously noted, was speedily drawn
and filed but three weeks after the petitioner surrendered. The trial
proceeded with great dispatch without allowing the defense time to
prepare an adequate case. Petitioner's rights under the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment were grossly and openly violated
without any justification. All of this was done without any thorough
investigation and prosecution of those immediately responsible for the
atrocities, out of which might have come some proof or indication of
personal culpability on petitioner's part. Instead the loose charge was
made that great numbers of atrocities had been committed and that
petitioner was the commanding officer; hence he must have been guilty
of disregard of duty. Under that charge the commission was free to
establish whatever standard of duty on petitioner's part that it desired.
By this flexible method a victorious nation may convict and execute
any or all leaders of a vanquished foe, depending upon the prevailing
degree of vengeance and the absence of any objective judicial review.
At a time like this when emotions are understandably high it is difficult
to adopt a dispassionate attitude toward a case of this nature. Yet now
is precisely the time when that attitude is most essential. While peoples
in other lands may not share our beliefs as to due process and the
dignity of the individual, we are not free to give effect to our emotions
in reckless disregard of the rights of others. We live under the
Constitution, which is the embodiment of all the high hopes and
aspirations of the new world. And it is applicable in both war and
peace. We must act accordingly. Indeed, an uncurbed spirt of revenge
and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure for purposes of
dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting harm
than all of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit. The people's faith in
the fairness and objectiveness of the law can be seriously undercut by
that spirit. The fires of nationalism can be further kindled. And the
hearts of all mankind can be embittered and filled with hatred, leaving
forlorn and impoverished the noble ideal of malice toward none and
charity to all. These are the reasons that lead me to dissent in these
terms.
Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
Not with ease does one find his views at odds with the Court's in a
matter of this character and gravity. Only the most deeply felt
convictions could force one to differ. That reason alone leads me to do
so now, against strong considerations for withholding dissent.
Mor is at stake than General Yamashita's fate. There could be no
327 U.S. 1
possible sympathy for him if he is guilty of the atrocities for which his
death is sought. But there can be and should be justice administered
according to law. In this stage of war's aftermath it is too early for
Lincoln's great spirit, best lighted in the Second Inaugural, to have
wide hold for the treatment of foes. It is not too early, it is never too
early, for the nation steadfastly to follow its great constitutional
traditions, none older or more universally protective against unbridled
power than due process of law in the trial and punishment of men, that
is, of all men, whether citizens, aliens, alien enemies or enemy
belligerents. It can become too late.
This long-held attachment marks the great divide between our enemies
and ourselves. Theirs was a philosophy of universal force. Ours is one
of universal law, albeit imperfectly made flesh of our system and so
dwelling among us. Every departure weakens the tradition, whether it
touches the high or the low, the powerful or the weak, the triumphant
or the conquered. If we need not or cannot be magnanimous, we can
keep our own law on the plane from which it has not descended
hitherto and to which the defeated foes' never rose.
With all deference to the opposing views of my brethren, whose
attachment to that tradition needless to say is no less than my own, I
cannot believe in the face of this record that the petitioner has had the
fair trial our Constitution and laws command. Because I cannot
reconcile what has occurred with their measure, I am forced to speak.
At bottom my concern is that we shall not forsake in any case, whether
Yamashita's or another's, the basic standards of trial which, among
other guaranties, the nation fought to keep; that our system of military
justice shall not alone among all our forms of judging be above or
beyond the fundamental law or the control of Congress within its orbit
of authority; and that this Court shall not fail in its part under the
Constitution to see that these things do not happen.
This trial is unprecedented in our history. Never before have we tried
and convicted an enemy general for action taken during hostilities or
otherwise in the course of military operations or duty. Much less have
we condemned one for failing to take action. The novelty is not
lessened by the trial's having taken place after hostilities ended and the
enemy, including the accused, had surrendered. Moreover, so far as the
time permitted for our consideration has given opportunity, I have not
been able to find precedent for the proceeding in the system of any
nation founded in the basic principles of our constitutional democracy,
in the laws of war or in other internationally binding authority or usage.
The novelty is legal as well as historical. We are on strange ground.
Precedent is not all-controlling in law. There must be room for growth,
since every precedent has an origin. But it is the essence of our
tradition for judges, when they stand at the end of the marked way, to
go forward with caution keeping sight, so far as they are able, upon the
great landmarks left behind and the direction they point ahead. If, as
may be hoped, we are now to enter upon a new era of law in the world,
it becomes more important than ever before for the nations creating
that system to observe their greatest traditions of administering
justice, including this one, both in their own judging and in their new
creation. The proceedings in this case veer so far from some of our
327 U.S. 1
time-tested road signs that I cannot take the large strides validating
them would demand.
I.
It is not in our tradition for anyone to be charged with crime which is
defined after his conduct, alleged to be criminal, has taken place;1 or in
language not sufficient to inform him of the nature of the offense or to
enable him to make defense.2 Mass guilt we do not impute to
individuals, perhaps in any case but certainly in none where the person
is not charged or shown a tively to have participated in or knowingly to
have failed in taking action to prevent the wrongs done by others,
having both the duty and the power to do so.
It is outside our basic scheme to condemn men without giving
reasonable opportunity for preparing defense;3 in capital or other
serious crimes to convict on 'official documents * * *; affidavits; * * *
documents or translations thereof; diaries * * *, photographs, motion
picture films, and * * * newspapers'4 or on hearsay, once, twice or
thrice removed,5 more particularly when the documentary evidence or
some of it is prepared ex parte by the prosecuting authority and
includes not only opinion but conclusions of guilt. Nor in such cases do
we deny the rights of confrontation of witnesses and crossexamination.6
Our tradition does not allow conviction by tribunals both authorized
and bound7 by the instrument of their creation to receive and consider
evidence which is expressly excluded by Act of Congress or by treaty
obligation; nor is it in accord with our basic concepts to make the
tribunal, specially constituted for the particular trial, regardless of
those prohibitions, the sole and exclusive judge of the credibility,
probative value and admissibility of whatever may be tendered as
evidence.
The matter is not one merely of the character and admissibility of
evidence. It goes to the very competency of the tribunal to try and
punish consistently with the Constitution, the laws of the United States
made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the nation's
authority.
All these deviations from the fundamental law, and others, occurred in
the course of constituting the commission, the preparation for trial and
defense, the trial itself, and therefore, in effect, in the sentence
imposed. Whether taken singly in some instances as departures from
specific constitutional mandates or in totality as in violation of the
Fifth Amendment's command that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, a trial so vitiated cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
One basis protection of our system and one only, petitioner has had.
He has been represented by able counsel, officers of the army he
fought. Their difficult assignment has been done with extraordinary
fidelity, not only to the accused, but to their high conception of military
justice, always to be admi istered in subordination to the Constitution
327 U.S. 1
and consistent Acts of Congress and treaties. But, as will appear, even
this conceded shield was taken away in much of its value, by denial of
reasonable opportunity for them to perform their function.
On this denial and the commission's invalid constitution specifically,
but also more generally upon the totality of departures from
constitutional norms inherent in the idea of a fair trial, I rest my
judgment that the commission was without jurisdiction from the
beginning to try or punish the petitioner and that, if it had acquired
jurisdiction then, its power to proceed was lost in the course of what
was done before and during trial.
Only on one view, in my opinion, could either of these conclusions be
avoided. This would be that an enemy belligerent in petitioner's
position is altogether beyond the pale of constitutional protection,
regardless of the fact that hostilities had ended and he had surrendered
with his country. The Government has so argued, urging that we are
still at war with Japan and all the power of the military effective during
active hostilities in theatres of combat continues in full force
unaffected by the events of August 14, 1945, and after.
In this view the action taken here is one of military necessity,
exclusively within the authority of the President as Commander-inChief and his military subordinates to take in warding off military
danger and subject to no judicial restraint on any account, although
somewhat inconsistently it is said this Court may 'examine' the
proceedings generally.
As I understand the Court, this is in substance the effect of what has
been done. For I cannot conceive any instance of departure from our
basic concepts of fair trial, if the failures here are not sufficient to
produce that effect.
We are technically still at war, because peace has not been negotiated
finally ordeclared. But there is no longer the danger which always
exists before surrender and armistice. Military necessity does not
demand the same measures. The nation may be more secure now than
at any time after peace is officially concluded. In these facts is one great
difference from Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3.
Punitive action taken now can be effective only for the next war, for
purposes of military security. And enemy aliens, including belligerents,
need the attenuated protections our system extends to them more now
than before hostilities ceased or than they may after a treaty of peace is
signed. Ample power there is to punish them or others for crimes,
whether under the laws of war during its course or later during
occupation. There can be no question of that. The only question is how
it shall be done, consistently with universal constitutional commands
or outside their restricting effects. In this sense I think the Constitution
follows the flag.
The other thing to be mentioned in order to be put aside is that we
have no question here of what the military might have done in a field of
combat. There the maxim about the law becoming silent in the noise of
arms applies. The purpose of battle is to kill. But it does not follow that
this would justify killing by trial after capture or surrender, without
327 U.S. 1
compliance with laws or treaties made to apply in such cases, whether

trial is before or after hostilities end.
I turn now to discuss some of the details of what has taken place. My
basic difference is with the Court's view that provisions of the Articles
of War and of treaties are not made applicable to this proceeding and
with its ruling that, absent such applicable provisions, none of the
things done so vitiated the trial and sentence as to deprive the
commission of jurisdiction.
My Brother MURPHY has discussed the charge with respect to the
substance of the crime. With his conclusions in this respect I agree. My
own primary concern will be with the constitution of the commission
and other matters taking place in the course of the proceedings, rela
ing chiefly to the denial of reasonable opportunity to prepare
petitioner's defense and the sufficiency of the evidence, together with
serious questions of admissibility, to prove on offense, all going as I
think to the commission's jurisdiction.
Necessarily only a short sketch can be given concerning each matter.
And it may be stated at the start that, although it was ruled in Ex parte
Quirin, supra, that this Court had no function to review the evidence, it
was not there or elsewhere determined that it could not ascertain
whether conviction is founded upon evidence expressly excluded by
Congress or treaty; nor does the Court purport to do so now.
II.
Invalidity of the Commission's Constitution.
The fountainhead of the commission's authority was General
MacArthur's directive by which General Styer was ordered to and
pursuant to which he did proceed with constituting the commission.8
The directive was accompanied by elaborate and detailed rules and
regulations prescribing the procedure and rules of evidence to be
followed, of which for present purposes Section 16, set forth below,9 is
crucial.
Section 16, as will be noted, permits reception of documents, reports,
affidavits, depositions, diaries, letters, copies of documents or other
secondary evidence of their contents, hearsay, opinion evidence and
conclusions, in fact of anything which in the commission's opinion
'would be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge,' without
any of the usual modes of authentication.
A more complete abrogation of customary safeguards relating to the
proof, whether in the usual rules of evidence or any reasonable
substitute and whether for use in the trial of crime in the civil courts or
military tribunals, hardly could have been made. So far as the
admissibility and probative value of evidence was concerned, the
directive made the commission a law unto itself.
It acted accordingly. As against insistent and persistent objection to the
reception of all kinds of 'evidence,' oral, do umentary and
327 U.S. 1
photographic, for nearly every kind of defect under any of the usual
prevailing standards for admissibility and probative value, the
commission not only consistently ruled against the defense, but
repeatedly stated it was bound by the directive to receive the kinds of
evidence it specified,10 reprimanded counsel for continuing to make
objection, declined to hear further objections, and in more than one
instance during the course of the proceedings reversed its rulings
favorable to the defense, where initially it had declined to receive what
the prosecution offered. Every conceivable kind of statement, rumor,
report, at first, second, third or further hand, written, printed, or oral,
and one 'propaganda' film were allowed to come in, most of this
relating to atrocities committed by troops under petitioner's command
throughout the several thousand islands of the Philippine Archipelago
during the period of active hostilities covered by the American forces'
return to and recapture of the Philippines.11
The findings reflect the character of the proof and the charge. The
statement quoted above12 gives only a numerical idea of the instances
in which ordinary safeguards in reception of written evidence were
ignored. In addition to these 423 'exhibits,' the findings state the
commission 'has heard 286 persons during the course of this trial,
most of whom have given eye-witness accounts of what they endured
or what they saw.'
But there is not a suggestion in the findings that petitioner personally
participated in, was present at the occurrence of, or ordered any of
these incidents, with the exception of the wholly inferential suggestion
noted below. Nor is there any express finding that he knew of any one
of the incidents in particular or of all taken together. The only
inferential findings that he had knowledge, or that the commission so
found, are in the statement that 'the crimes alleged to have been
permitted by the accused in violation of the laws of war may be
grouped into three categories' set out below,13 in the further statement
that 'the prosecution presented evidence to show that the crimes were
so extensive and so widespread, both as to time and area,14 that they
must either have been wilfully permitted by the accused, or secretly
ordered by' him; and in the conclusion of guilt and the sentence.15
(Emphasis added.) Indeed the commission's ultimate findings16 draw
no express conclusion of knowledge, but state only two things: (1) the
fact of widespread atrocities and crimes; (2) that petitioner 'failed to
provide effective control * * * as required by the circumstances.'
This vagueness, if not vacuity, in the findings runs throughout the
proceedings, from the charge itself through the proof and the findings,
to the conclusion. It affects the very gist of the offense, whether that
was wilful, informed and intentional omission to restrain and control
troops known by petitioner to be committing crimes or was only a
negligent failure on his part to discover this and take whatever
measures he then could to stop the conduct.
Although it is impossible to determine from what is before us whether
petitioner in fact has been convicted of one or the other or of both
these things,17 the case has been presented on the former basis and,
unless as is noted below there is fatal duplicity, it must be taken that
327 U.S. 1
the crime charged and sought to be proved was only the failure, with
knowledge, to perform the commander's function of control, although
the Court's opinion nowhere expressly declares that knowledge was
essential to guilt or necessary to be set forth in the charge.
It is in respect to this feature especially, quite apart from the reception
of unverified rumor, report, etc., that perhaps the greatest prejudice
arose from the admission of untrustworthy, unverified,
unauthenticated evidence which could not be probed by crossexamination or other means of testing credibility, probative value or
authenticity.
Counsel for the defense have informed us in the brief and at the
argument that the sole proof of knowledge introduced at the trial was
in the form of ex parte affidavits and depositions. Apart from what has
been excerpted from the record in the applications and the briefs, and
such portions of the record as I have been able to examine, it has been
impossible for me fully to verify counsel's statement in this respect. But
the Government has not disputed it; and it has maintained that we
have no right to examine the record upon any question 'of evidence.'
Accordingly, without concession to that view, the statement of counsel
is taken for the fact. And in that state of things petitioner has been
convicted of a crime in which knowledge is an essential element, with
no proof of knowledge other than what would be inadmissible in any
other capital case or proceeding under our system, civil or military, and
which furthermore Congress has expressly commanded shall not be
received in such cases tried by military commissions and other military
tribunals.18
Moreover counsel assert in the brief, and this also is not denied, that
the sole proof made of certain of the specifications in the bills of
particulars was by ex parte affidavits. It was in relation to this also vital
phase of the proof that there occurred one of the commission's
reversals of its earlier rulings in favor of the defense,19 a fact in itself
conclusive demonstration of the necessity to the prosecution's case of
the prohibited type of evidence and of its prejudicial effects upon the
defense.
These two basic elements in the proof, namely, proof of knowledge of
the crimes and proof of the specifications in the bills, that is, of the
atrocities themselves, constitute the most important instances perhaps,
if not the most flagrant,20 of departure not only from the express
command of Congress against receiving such proof but from the whole
British-American tradition of the common law and the Constitution,
Many others occurred, which there is neither time nor space to
mention.21
Petitioner asserts, and there can be no reason to doubt, that by the use
of all this forbidden evidence he was deprived of the right of crossexamination and other means to establish the credibility of the
deponents or affiants, not to speak of the authors of reports, letters,
documents and newspaper articles; of opportunity to determine
whether the multitudinous crimes specified in the bills were committed
in fact by troops under his command or by naval or air force troops not
under his command at the time alleged; to ascertain whether the
327 U.S. 1
crimes attested were isolated acts of individual soldiers or were

military acts committed by troop units acting under supervision of
officers; and, finally, whether 'in short, there was such a 'pattern' of
conduct as the prosecution alleged and its whole theory of the crime
and the evidence required to be made out.'
He points out in this connection that the commission based its decision
on a finding as to the extent and number of the atrocities and that this
of itself establishes the prejudicial effect of the affidavits, etc., and of
the denial resulting from their reception of any means of probing the
evidence they contained, including all opportunity for crossexamination. Yet it is said there is no sufficient showing of prejudice.
The effect could not have been other than highly prejudicial. The
matter is not one merely of 'rules of evidence.' It goes, as will appear
more fully later, to the basic right of defense, including some fair
opportunity to test probative value.
Insufficient as this recital is to give a fair impression of what was done,
it is enough to show that this was no trial in the traditions of the
common law and the Constitution. If the tribunal itself was not strange
to them otherwise, it was in its forms and modes of procedure, in the
character and substance of the evidence it received, in the denial of all
means to the accused and his counsel for testing the evidence, in the
brevity and ambiguity of its findings made upon such a mass of
material and, as will appear, in the denial of any reasonable
opportunity for preparation of the defense. Because this last
deprivation not only is important in itself, but is closely related to the
departures from all limitations upon the character of and modes of
making the proof, it will be considered before turning to the important
legal questions relating to whether all these violations of our traditions
can be brushed aside as not forbidden by the valid Acts of Congress,
treaties and the Constitution, in that order. If all these traditions can
be so put away, then indeed will we have entered upon a new but
foreboding era of law.
III.
Denial of Opportunity to Prepare Defense.
Petitioner surrendered September 3, 1945, and was interned as a
prisoner of war in conformity with Article 9 of the Geneva Convention
of July 27, 1929.22 He was served with the charge on September 25 and
put in confinement as an accused war criminal. On October 8 he was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On October 29 the trial began and it
continued until December 7, when sentence was pronounced, exactly
four years almost to the hour from the attack on Pearl Harbor.
On the day of arraignment, October 8, three weeks before the trial
began, petitioner was served with a bill of particulars specifying 64
items setting forth a vast number of atrocities and crimes allegedly
committed by troops under his command.23 The six officers appointed
as defense counsel thus had three weeks, it is true at the prosecution's
suggestion a week longer than they sought at first, to investigate and
prepare to meet all these items and the large number of incidents they
embodied, many of which had occurred in distant islands of the
327 U.S. 1
archipelago. There is some question whether they then anticipated the

full scope and character of the charge or the evidence they would have
to meet. But, as will appear, they worked night and day at the task.
Even so it would have been impossible to do thoroughly, had nothing
more occurred.
But there was more. On the first day of the trial, October 29, the
prosecution filed a supplemental bill of particulars, containing 59 more
specifications of the same general character, involving perhaps as
many incidents occurring over an equally wide area.24 A copy had been
given the defense three days earlier. One item, No. 89, charged that
American soldiers, prisoners of war, had been tried and executed
without notice having been given to the protecting power of the United
States in accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Convention,
which it is now argued, strangely, the United States was not required to
observe as to petitioner's trial.25
But what is more important is that defense counsel, as they felt was the
r duty, at once moved for a continuance.26 The application was denied.
However the commission indicated that if, at the end of the
prosecution's presentation concerning the original bill, counsel should
'believe they require additional time * * *, the Commission will
consider such a motion at that time,' before taking up the items of the
supplemental bill. Counsel again indicated, without other result, that
time was desired at once 'as much, if not more' to prepare for crossexamination 'as the Prosecutor's case goes in' as to prepare affirmative
defense.
On the next day, October 30, the commission interrupted the
prosecutor to say it would not then listen to testimony or discussion
upon the supplemental bill. After colloquy it adhered to its prior ruling
and, in response to inquiry from the prosecution, the defense indicated
it would require two weeks before it could proceed on the
supplemental bill. On November 1 the commission ruled it would not
receive affidavits without corroboration by witnesses on any
specification, a ruling reversed four days later.
On November 2, after the commission had received an affirmative
answer to its inquiry whether the defense was prepared to proceed with
an item in the supplemental bill which the prosecution proposed to
prove, it announced: 'Hereafter, then, unless there is no (sic) objection
by the Defense, the Commission will assume that you are prepared to
proceed with any items in the Supplemental Bill.' On November 8, the
question arose again upon the prosecution's inquiry as to when the
defense would be ready to proceed on the supplemental bill, the
prosecutor adding: 'Frankly, sir, it took the War Crimes Commission
some three months to investigate these matters and I cannot conceive
of the Defense undertaking a similar investigation with any less period
of time.' Stating it realized 'the tremendous burden which we have
placed on the Defense' and its 'determination to give them the time
they require,' the commission again adhered to its ruling of October 29.
Four days later the commission announced it would grant a
continuance 'only for the most urgent and unavoidable reasons.'27
327 U.S. 1
On November 20, when the prosecution rested, senior defense counsel

moved for a reasonable continuance, recalling the commission's
indication that it would then consider such a motion and stating that
since October 29 the defense had been 'working night and day,' with
'no time whatsoever to prepare any affirmative defense,' since counsel
had been fully occupied trying 'to keep up with the new Bill of
Particulars.'
The commission thereupon re ired for deliberation and, on resuming
its sessions shortly, denied the motion. Counsel then asked for 'a short
recess of a day.' The commission suggested a recess until 1:30 in the
afternoon. Counsel responded this would not suffice. The commission
stated it felt 'that the Defense should be prepared at least on its
opening statement, to which senior counsel answered: 'We haven't had
time to do that, sir.' The commission then recessed until 8:30 the
following morning.
Further comment is hardly required. Obviously the burden placed
upon the defense, in the short time allowed for preparation on the
original bill, was not only 'tremendous.' In view of all the facts, it was
an impossible one, even though the time allowed was a week longer
than asked. But the grosser vice was later when the burden was more
than doubled by service of the supplemental bill on the eve of trial, a
procedure which taken in connection with the consistent denials of
continuance and the commission's later reversal of its rulings favorable
to the defense was wholly arbitrary, cutting off the last vestige of
adequate chance to prepare defense and imposing a burden the most
able counsel could not bear. This sort of thing has no place in our
system of justice, civil or military. Without more, this wide departure
from the most elementary principles of fairness vitiated the
proceeding. When added to the other denials of fundamental right
sketched above, it deprived the proceeding of any semblance of trial as
we know that institution.
IV.
Applicability of the Articles of War.
The Court's opinion puts the proceeding and the petitioner, in so far as
any rights relating to his trial and conviction are concerned, wholly
outside the Articles of War. In view of what has taken place, I think the
decision's necessary effect is also to place them entirely beyond
limitation and protection, respectively, by the Constitution. I disagree
as to both conclusions or effects.
The Court rules that Congress has not made Article 25 and 38
applicable to this proceeding. It think it has made them applicable to
this and all other military commissions or tribunals. If so the
commission not only lost all power to punish petitioner by what
occurred in the proceedings. It never acquired jurisdiction to try him.
For the directive by which it was constituted, in the provisions of
Section 16,28 was squarely in conflict with Articles 25 and 38 of the
Articles of War29 and therefore was void.
327 U.S. 1
Article 25 allows reading of depositions in evidence, under prescribed

conditions, in the plainest terms 'before any military court or
commission in any case not capital,' providing, however, that
'testimony by deposition may be adduced for the defense in capital
cases.' (Emphasis added.) This language clearly and broadly covers
every kind of military tribunal, whether 'court' or 'commission.' It
covers all capital cases. It makes no exception or distinction for any
accused.
Article 38 authorizes the President by regulations to prescribe
procedure, including modes of proof, even more all-inclusively if
possible, 'in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military
commissions, and other military tribunals.' Language could not be
more broadly inclusive. No exceptions are mentioned or suggested,
whether of tribunals or of accused persons. Every kind of military body
for performing the function of trial is covered. That is clear from the
face of the Article.
Article 38 moreover limits the President's power. He is so far as
practicable to prescribe 'the rules of evidence generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the United States,' a
clear mandate that Congress intended all military trials to conform as
closely as possible to our customary procedural and evidentiary
protections, constitutional and statutory, for accused persons. But
there are also two unqualified limitations, one 'that nothing contrary to
or inconsistent with these articles (specifically here Article 25) shall be
so prescribed'; the other 'that all rules made in pursuance of this article
shall be laid before the Congress annually.'
Notwithstanding these broad terms the Court, resting chiefly on Article
2, concludes the petitioner was not among the persons there declared
to be subject to the Articles of War and therefore the commission
which tries him is not subject to them. That Article does not cover
prisoners of war or war criminals. Neither does it cover civilians in
occupied territories, theatres of military operations or other places
under military jurisdiction within or without the United States or
territory subject to its sovereignty, whether they be neutrals or enemy
aliens, even citizens of the United States, unless they are connected in
the manner Article 2 prescribes with our armed forces, exclusive of the
Navy.
The logic which excludes petitioner on the basic that prisoners of war
are not mentioned in Article 2 would exclude all these. I strongly doubt
the Court would go so far, if presented with a trial like this in such
instances. Nor does it follow necessarily that, because some persons
may not be mentioned in Article 2, they can be tried without regard to
any of the limitations placed by any of the other Articles upon military
tribunals.
Article 2 in defining persons 'subject to the articles of war' was, I think,
specifying those to whom the Articles in general were applicable. And
there is no dispute that most of the Articles are not applicable to the
petitioner. It does not follow, however, and Article 2 does not provide,
that there may not be in the Articles specific provisions covering
persons other than those specified in Article 2. Had it so provided,
327 U.S. 1
Article 2 would have been contradictory not only of Articles 25 and 38

but also of Article 15 among others.
In 1916, when the last general revision of the Articles of War took
place,30 for the first time certain of the Articles were specifically made
applicable to military commissions. Until then they had applied only to
courts-martial. There were two purposes, the first to give statutory
recognition to the military commission without loss of prior
jurisdiction and the second to give those tried before military
commissions some of the more important protections afforded persons
tried by courts-martial.
In order to effectuate the first purpose, the Army proposed Article 15.31
To effectuate the second purpose, ArtiFootnote 31--Continued.
Court of the United States. It is an institution of the greatest
importance in a period of war and should be preserved. In the new
code the jurisdiction of courts-martial has been somewhat amplified by
the introduction of the phrase 'Persons subject to military law.' There
will be more instances in the future than in the past when the
jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap that of the war courts, and
the question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction
by statute the common law of war jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to
make it perfectly plain by the new article that in such cases the
jurisdiction of the war court is concurrent.' S.Rep.No.229, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 53. (Emphasis added.)
And later, in 1916, speaking before the Subcommittee on Military
Affairs of the Senate at their Hearings on S.3191, a project for the
revision of the Articles of War, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., printed as an
Appendix to S.Rep.230, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., General Crowder
explained at greater length:
'Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military
law a number of persons who are also subject to trial by military
commissions. A military commission is our common-law war court. It
has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law. As
long as the articles embraced them in the designation 'persons subject
to military law,' and provided that they might be tried by court-martial,
I was afraid that, having made a special provision for their courtmartial, it might be held that the provision operated to exclude trials
by military commission and other war courts; so this new article was
introduced. * * *'
'It just saves to these war courts the jurisdic ion they now have and
makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial, so that the
military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to
employ either form of court that happens to be convenient. Both
classes of courts have the same procedure. For the information of the
committee and in explanation of these war courts to which I have
referred I insert here an explanation from Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents
"The military commissiona war courthad its origin in G.O. 20,
Headquarters of the Army at Tampico, February 19, 1847 (Gen. Scott).
327 U.S. 1
Its jurisdiction was confined mainly to criminal offenses of the class

cognizable by civil courts in time of peace committed by inhabitants of
the theater of hostilities. A further war court was originated by Gen.
Scott at the same time, called 'council of war,' with jurisdiction to try
the same classes of persons for violations of the laws of war, mainly
guerillas. These two jurisdictions were united in the later war court of
the Civil War and Spanish War periods, for which the general
designation of 'military commission' was retained. The military
commission was given statutory recognition in section 30, act of March
3, 1863, 12 Stat. 736, and in various other statutes of that period. The
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the validity of its
judgments (Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (17 L.Ed. 589) and
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (24 L.Ed. 1118)). It tried more than
2,000 cases during the Civil War and reconstruction period. Its
composition, constitution, and procedure follows the analogy of courtsmartial. Another war court is the provost court, an inferior court with
jurisdiction assimilated to that of justices of the peace and police
courts; and other war courts variously designated 'courts of
conciliation,' 'arbitrators,' 'military tribunals' have been convened by
military commanders in the exercise of the war power as occasion and
necessity dictated.'
'Yet, as I have said, these war courts never have been formally
authorized by statute.'
'Senator Colt: They grew out of usage and necessity? cles 25 and 38
and several others were proposed.32 But as the Court now construes
the Articles of War, they have no application to military commissions
before which alleged offenders against the laws of war are tried. What
the Court holds in effect is that there are two types of military
commissions, one to try offenses which might be cognizable by a courtmartial, the other to try war crimes, and that Congress intended the
Articles of War referring in terms to military commissions without
exception to be applicable only to the first type.
This misconceives both the history of military commissions and the
legislative history of the Articles of War. There is only one kind of
military commission. It is true, as the history noted shows, that what is
now called 'the military commission' arose from two separate military
courts instituted during the Mexican War. The first military court,
called by General Scott a 'military commission,' was given jurisdiction
in Mexico over criminal offenses of the class cognizable by civil courts
in time of peace. The other military court, called a 'counsel of war' was
given jurisdiction over offenses against the laws of war. Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., reprinted 1920) *1298-1299.
During the Civil War 'the two jurisdictions of the earlier commission
and council respectively * * * (were) united in the * * * war-court, for
which the general designation of 'military commission' was retained as
the preferable one.' Winthrop, supra, at *1299. Since that time there
has been only one type of military tribunal called the military
commission, though it may exercise different kinds of jurisdiction,33
according to the circumstances under which and purposes for which it
is convened.
The testimony of General Crowder is perhaps the most authoritative
327 U.S. 1
evidence of what was intended by the legislation, for he was its most
active official sponsor, spending years in securing its adoption and
revision. Articles 15, 25 and 38 particularly are traceable to his efforts.
His concern to secure statutory recognition for military commissions
was equalled by his concern that the statutory provisions giving this
should not restrict their pre-existing jurisdiction. He did not wish by
securing additional jurisdiction, overlapping partially that of the courtmartial, to surrender other. Hence Article 15. That Article had one
purpose and one only. It was to make sure that the acquisition of
partially concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial should not cause
loss of any other. And it was jurisdiction, not procedure, which was
covered by other Articles, with which he and Congress were concerned
in that Article. It discloses no purpose to deal in any way with
procedure or to qualify Articles 25 and 38. And it is clear that General
Crowder at all times regarded all military commissions as being
governed by the identical procedure. In fact, so far as Articles 25 and
38 are concerned, this seems obvious for all types of military tribunals.
The same would appear to be true of other Articles also, e.g., 24, 10 U.S.
C.A. 1495, (prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination), 26, 27, 32, 10
U.S.C.A. 1497, 1498, 1503 (contempts), all except the last dealing
with procedural matters.
Article 12 is especially significant. It empowers general courts-martial
to try two classes of offenders: (1) 'any person subject to military law,'
under the definition of Article 2, for any offense 'made punishable by
these articles'; (2) 'and any other person who by the law of war is
subject to trial by military tribunals,' not covered by the terms of
Article 2. (Emphasis added.)
Article 12 thus, in conformity with Article 15, gives the general courtmartial concurrent jurisdiction of war crimes and war criminals with
military commissions. Neither it nor any other Article states or
indicates there are to be two kinds of general courts-martial for trying
war crimes; yet this is the necessary result of the Court's decision,
unless in the alternative that would be to imply that in exercising such
jurisdiction there is only one kind of general court-martial, but there
are two or more kinds of military commission, with wholly different
procedures and with the result that 'the commander in the field' will
not be free to determine whether general court-martial or military
commission shall be used as the circumstances may dictate, but must
govern h choice by the kind of procedure he wishes to have employed.
The only reasonable and, I think, possible conclusion to draw from the
Articles is that the Articles which are in terms applicable to military
commissions are so uniformly and those applicable to both such
commissions and to courts-martial when exercising jurisdiction over
offenders against the laws of war likewise are uniformly applicable, and
not diversely according to the person or offense being tried.
Not only the face of the Articles, but specific statements in General
Crowder's testimony support this view. Thus in the portion quoted
above34 from his 1916 statement, after stating expressly the purpose of
Article 15 to preserve unimpaired the military commission's
jurisdiction, and to make it concurrent with that of courts-martial in so
far as the two would overlap, 'so that the military commander in the
327 U.S. 1
field in time of war will be at liberty to employ either form of court that
happens to be convenient,' he went on to say: 'Both classes of courts
have the same procedure,' a statement so unequivocal as to leave no
room for question. And his quotation from Winthrop supports his
statement, namely: 'Its (i.e., the military commission's) composition,
constitution and procedure follow the analogy of courts-martial.'
At no point in the testimony is there suggestion that there are two
types of military commission, one bound by the procedural provisions
of the Articles, the other wholly free from their restraints or, as the
Court strangely puts the matter, that there is only one kind of
commission, but that it is bound or not bound by the Articles
applicable in terms, depending upon who is being tried and for what
offense; for that very difference makes the difference between one and
two. The history and the discussion show conclusively that General
Crowder wished to secure and Congress intended to give statutory
recognition to all forms of military tribunals; to enable commanding
officers in the field to use either court-martial or military commission
as convenience might dictate, thus broadening to this extent the latter's
jurisdiction and utility; but at the same time to preserve its full
preexisting jurisdiction; and also to lay down identical provisions for
governing or providing for the government of the procedure and rules
of evidence of every type of military tribunal, wherever and however
constituted.35
Finally, unless Congress was legislating with regard to all military
commissions, Article 38, which gives the President the power to
'prescribe the procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before
courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other
military tribunals' takes on a rather senseless meaning; for the
President would have such power only with respect to those military
commissions exercising concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial.
All this seems so obvious, upon a mere reading of the Articles
themselves and the legislative history, as not to require demonstration.
And all this Congress knew, as that history shows. In the face of that
showing I cannot accept the Court's highly strained construction, first,
because I think it is in plain contradiction of the facts disclosed by the
history of Articles 15, 25 and 38 as well as their language; and also
because that construction defeats at least two of the ends General
Crowder had in mind, namely, to secure statutory recognition for every
form of military tribunal and to provide for them a basic uniform mode
of procedure or method of providing for their procedure.
Accordingly, I think Articles 25 and 38 are applicable to this
proceeding; that the provisions of the governing directive in Section 16
are in direct conflict with those Articles; and for that reason the
commission was invalidly constituted, was without jurisdiction, and its
sentence is therefore void.
V.
The Geneva Convention of 1929.
If the provisions of Articles 25 and 38 were not applicable to the
327 U.S. 1
proceeding by their own force as Acts of Congress, I think they would

still be made applicable by virtue of the terms of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, in particular Article 63. And in other respects, in
my opinion, the petitioner's trial was not in accord with that treaty,
namely with Article 60.
The Court does not hold that the Geneva Convention is not binding
upon the United States and no such contention has been made in this
case.36 It relies on other arguments to show that Article 60, which
provides that the protecting power shall be notified in advance of a
judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, and Article 63,
which provides that a prisoner of war may be tried only by the same
courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of persons
belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power, are not properly
invoked by the petitioner. Before considering the Court's view that
these Articles are not applicable to this proceeding by their terms, it
may be noted that on his surrender petitioner was interned in
conformity with Article 9 of this Convention.
The chief argument is that Articles 60 and 63 have reference only to
offenses committed by a prisoner of war while a prisoner of war and
not to violations of the law of war committed while a combatant. This
conclusion is derived from the setting in which these articles are
placed. I do not agree that the context gives any support to this
argument. The argument is in essence of the same type as the
argument the Court employs to nullify the application of Articles 25
and 38 of the Articles of War by restricting their own broader coverage
by reference to Article 2. For reasons set forth in the margin,37 I think
it equally invalid here. Footnote 37--Continued.
between subsection 2 and subsection 3 one between minor disciplinary
action against a prisoner of war for acts committed while a prisoner
and major judicial action against a prisoner of war for acts committed
while a prisoner. This narrow view not only is highly strained,
confusing the different situations and problems treated by the two
subdivisions. It defeats the most important protections subsection 3
was intended to secure, for our own as well as for enemy captive
military personnel.
At the most there would be logic in the Court's construction if it could
be said that all of Chapter 3 deals with acts committed while a prisoner
of war. Of course, subsection 2 does, because of the very nature of its
subject-matter. Disciplinary action will be taken by a captor power
against prisoners of war only for acts committed by prisoners after
capture.
But it is said that subsection 7 deals exclusively with acts committed by
a prisoner of war after having become a prisoner, and this indicates
subsection 3 is limited similarly. This ignores the fact that some of the
articles in subsection 1 appear, on their face, to apply to all judicial
proceedings for whatever purpose instituted. Article 46, for example,
provides in part:
'Punishments other than those provided for the same acts for soldiers
of the national armies may not be imposed upon prisoners of war by
327 U.S. 1
the military authorities and courts of the detaining Power.'

This seems to refer to war crimes as well as to other offenses; for surely
a country cannot punish soldiers of another army for offenses against
the law of war, when it would not punish its own soldiers for the same
offences. Similarly, Article 47 in subsection 1 appears to refer to war
crimes as well as to crimes committed by a prisoner after his capture. It
reads in part:
'Judicial proceedings against prisoners of war shall be conducted as
rapidly as the circumstances permit; preventive imprisonment shall be
limited as much as possible.'
Thus, at the most, subjection 1 contains, in some of its articles, the
same ambiguities and is open to the same problem that we are faced
with in construing Articles 60 and 63. It cannot be said, therefore, that
all of chapter 3 and especially subsection 3 relate only to acts
committed by prisoners of war after capture, for the meaning of
subsection 3, in this argument, is related to the meaning of subsection
1; and subsection 1 is no more clear restricted to punishments and
proceedings in disciplinary matters than is subsection 3.
Neither Article 60 nor Article 63 contains such a restriction of meaning
as the Court reads into them.38 In the absence of any such limitation, it
would seem that they were intended to cover all judicial proceedings,
whether instituted for crimes allegedly committed before capture or
later. Policy supports this view. For such a construction is require for
the security of our own soldiers, taken prisoner, as much as for that of
prisoners we take. And the opposite one leaves prisoners of war open
to any form of trial and punishment for offenses against the law of war
their captors may wish to use, while safeguarding them, to the extent of
the treaty limitations, in cases of disciplinary offense. This, in many
instances, would be to make the treaty strain at a gnat and swallow the
camel.
The United States has complied with neither of these Articles. It did
not notify the protecting power of Japan in advance of trial as Article
60 requires it to do, although the supplemental bill charges the same
failure to petitioner in Item 89.39 It is said that, although this may be
true, the proceeding is not thereby invalidated. The argument is that
our noncompliance merely gives Japan a right of indemnity against us
and that Article 60 was not intended to give Yamashita any personal
rights. I cannot agree. The treaties made by the United States are by
the Constitution made the supreme law of the land. In the absence of
something in the treaty indicating that its provisions were not intended
to be enforced, upon breach, by more than subsequent
indemnification, it is, as I conceive it, the duty of the courts of this
country to insure the nation's compliance with such treaties, except in
the case of political questions. This is especially true where the treaty
has provisionssuch as Article 60for the protection of a man being
tried for an offense the punishment for which is death; for to say that it
was intended to provide for enforcement of such provisions solely by
claim, after breach, of indemnity would be in many instances,
especially those involving trial of nationals of a defeated nation by a
conquering one, to deprive the Articles of all force. Executed men are
327 U.S. 1
not much aided by post-war claims for indemnity. I do not think the
adhering powers' purpose was to provide only for such ineffective relief.
Finally, the Government has argued that Article 60 has no application
after the actual cessation of hostilities, as there is no longer any need
for an intervening power between the two belligerents. The premise is
that Japan no longer needs Switzerland to intervene with the United
States to protect the rights of Japanese nationals, since Japan is now in
direct communication with this Government. This of course is in
contradiction of the Government's theory, in other connections, that
the war is not over and military necessity still requires use of all the
power necessary for actual combat.
Furthermore the premise overlooks all the realities of the situation.
Japan is a defeated power, having surrendered, if not unconditionally
then under the most severe conditions. Her territory is occupied by
American military forces. She is scarcely in a position to bargain with
us or to assert her rights. Nor can her nationals. She no longer holds
American prisoners of war.40 Certainly, if there was the need of an
independent neutral to protect her nationals during the war, there is
more now. In my opinion the failure to give the notice required by
Article 60 is only another instance of the commission's failure to
observe the obligations of our law.
What is more important, there was no compliance with Article 63 of
the same Convention. Yamashita was not tried 'according to the same
procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of
the detaining Power.' Had one of our soldiers or officers been tried for
alleged war crimes, he would have been entitled to the benefits of the
Articles of War. I think that Yamashita was equally entitled to the same
protection. In any event, he was entitled to their benefits under the
provisions of Article 63 of the Geneva Convention. Those benefits he
did not receive. Accordingly, his trial was in violation of the
Convention.
VI.
The Fifth Amendment.
Wholly apart from the violation of the Articles of War and of the
Geneva Convention, I am completely unable to accept or to understand
the Court's ruling concerning the applicability of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment to this case. Not heretofore has it been held
that any human being is beyond its universally protecting spread in the
guaranty of a fair trial in the most fundamental sense. That door is
dangerous to open. I will have no part in opening it. For once it is ajar,
even for enemy belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for others,
perhaps ultimately for all.
The Court does not declare expressly that petitioner as an enemy
belligerent has no constitutional rights, a ruling I could understand but
not accept. Neither does it affirm that he has some, if but little,
constitutional protection. Nor does the Court defend what was done. I
think the effect of what it does is in substance to deny him all such
safeguards. And this is the great issue in the cause.
327 U.S. 1
For it is exactly here we enter wholly untrodden ground. The safe

signposts to the rear are not in the sum of protections surrounding jury
trials or any other proceeding known to our law. Nor is the essence of
the Fifth Amendment's elementary protection comprehended in any
single one of our time-honored specific constitutional safeguards in
trial, though there are some without which the words 'fair trial' and all
they cannot become a mockery.
Apart from a tribunal concerned that the law as applied shall be an
instrument of justice, albeit stern in measure to the guilt established,
the heart of the security lies in two things. One is that conviction shall
not rest in any essential part upon unchecked rumor, report, or the
results of the prosecution's ex parte investigations, but shall stand on
proven fact; the other, correlative, lies in a fair chance to defend. This
embraces at the least the rights to know with reasonable clarity in
advance of the trial the exact nature of the offense with which one is to
be charged; to have reasonable time for preparing to meet the charge
and to have the aid of counsel in doing so, as also in the trial itself; and
if, during its course, one is taken by surprise, through the injection of
new charges or reversal of rulings which brings forth new masses of
evidence, then to have further reasona le time for meeting the
unexpected shift.
So far as I know, it has not yet been held that any tribunal in our
system, of whatever character, is free to receive 'such evidence 'as in its
opinion" would be 'of assistance in proving or disproving the charge'
or, again as in its opinion, 'would have probative value in the mind of a
reasonable man'; and, having received what in its unlimited discretion
it regards as sufficient, is also free to determine what weight may be
given to the evidence received without restraint.41
When to this fatal defect in the directive, however innocently made, are
added the broad departures from the fundamentals of fair play in the
proof and in the right to defend which occurred throughout the
proceeding, there can be no accommodation with the due process of
law which the Fifth Amendment demands.
All this the Court puts to one side with the short assertion that no
question of due process under the Fifth Amendment or jurisdiction
reviewable here is presented. I do not think this meets the issue,
standing alone or in conjunction with the suggestion which follows that
the Court gives no intimation one way or the other concerning what
Fifth Amendment due process might require in other situations.
It may be appropriate to add here that, although without doubt the
directive was drawn in good faith in the belief that it would expedite
the trial and that enemy belligerents in petitioner's position were not
entitled to more, that state of mind and purpose cannot cure the
nullification of basic constitutional standards which has taken place.
It is not necessary to recapitulate. The difference between the Court's
view of this proceeding and my own comes down in the end to the
view, on the one hand, that there is no law restrictive upon these
proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may be
327 U.S. 1
prescribed for their government by the executive authority or the

military and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the Articles of
War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amendment apply.
I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system resides or lurks a
power so unrestrained to deal with any human being through any
process of trial. What military agencies or authorities may do with our
enemies in battle or invasion, apart from proceedings in the nature of
trial and some semblance of judicial action, is beside the point. Nor has
any human being heretofore been held to be wholly beyond elementary
procedural protection by the Fifth Amendment. I cannot consent to
even implied departure from that great absolute.
It was a great patriot who said:
'He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy
from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent
that will reach himself.'42
Mr. Justice MURPHY joins in this opinion.
1 The
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on

the Enforcement of Penalties of the Versailles Peace Conference, which
met after cessation of hostilities in the First World War, were of the view
that violators of the law of war could be tried by military tribunals. See
Report of the Commission, March 9, 1919, 14 Am.J.Int.L. 95, 121. See
also memorandum of American commissioners concurring on this point,
id., at p. 141. The treaties of peace concluded after World War I
recognized the right of the Allies and of the United States to try such
offenders before military tribunals. See Art. 228 of Treaty of Versailles,
June 28, 1919; Art. 173 of Treaty of St. Germain, Sept. 10, 1919; Art. 157
of Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920.
The terms of the agreement which ended hostilities in the Boer War
reserved the right to try, before military tribunals, enemy combatants
who had violated the law of war. 95 British and Foreign State Papers
(19011902) 160. See also trials cited in Colby, War Crimes, 23
Michigan Law Rev. 482, 496, 497.
See cases mentioned in Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S. at page 32, 63 S.
Ct. at page 13, 87 L.Ed. 3, note 10 and in 2 Winthrop, supra,* 1310, 1311,
note 5; Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op.Atty.Gen. 249.
Failure of an officer to take measures to prevent murder of an inhabitant
of an occupied country committed in his presence. Gen.Orders No. 221,
Hq.Div. of the Philippines, August 17, 1901. And in Gen.Orders No. 264,
Hq.Div. of the Philippines, September 9, 1901, it was held that an officer
could not be found guilty for failure to prevent a murder unless it a
peared that the accused had 'the power to prevent' it.
In its findings the commission took account of the difficulties 'faced by
the accused, with respect not only to the swift and overpowering advance
of American forces, but also to errors of his predecessors, weakness in
organization, equipment, supply * * *, training, communication,
discipline and morale of his troops,' and 'the tactical situation, the
character, training and capacity of staff officers and subordinate
commanders, as well as the traits of character of his troops.' It
nonetheless found that petitioner had not taken such measures to
327 U.S. 1
control his troops as were 'required by the circumstances.' We do not

weigh the evidence. We merely hold that the charge sufficiently states a
violation against the law of war, and that the commission, upon the facts
found, could properly find petitioner guilty of such a violation.
5
Article 25 provides: 'A duly authenticated deposition taken upon

reasonable notice to the opposite party may be read in evidence before
any military court or commission in any case not capital, or in any
proceeding before a court of inquiry or a military board, * * * Provided,
That testimony by deposition may be adduced for the defense in capital
cases.'
Article 38 provides: 'The President may, by regulations, which he may
modify from time to time, prescribe the procedure, including modes of
proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military
commissions, and other military tribunals, which regulations shall, in so
far as he shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the
United States: Provided, That nothing contrary to or inconsistent with
these articles shall be so prescribed: * * *.'
General Crowder, the Judge Advocate General, who appeared before
Congress as sponsor for the adoption of Article 15 and the accompanying
amendment of Article 25, in explaining the purpose of Article 15, said:
'Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military law
a number of persons who are also subject to trial by military
commission. A military commission is our commonlaw war court. It has
no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law. As long as
the articles embraced them in the designation 'persons subject to
military law,' and provided that they might be tried by court-martial, I
was afraid that, having made a special provision for their tria by courtmartial, (Arts. 12, 13, and 14) it might be held that the provision operated
to exclude trials by military commission and other war courts; so this
new article was introduced. * * *' [Sen.R. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p.
40.]
Part 1 of Chapter 3, "General Provisions", provides in Articles 45 and 46

that prisoners of war are subject to the regulations in force in the armies
of the detaining power, that punishments other than those provided "for
the same acts for soldiers of the national armies" may not be imposed on
prisoners of war, and that "collective punishment for individual acts" is
forbidden. Article 47 provides that "Acts constituting an offense against
discipline, and particularly attempted escape, shall be verified
immediately; for all prisoners of war, commissioned or not, preventive
arrest shall be reduced to the absolute minimum. Judicial proceedings
against prisoners of war shall be conducted as rapidly as the
circumstances permit * * *. In all cases, the duration of preventive
imprisonment shall be deducted from the disciplinary or the judicial
punishment inflicted."
Article 48 provides that prisoners of war, after having suffered "the
judicial of disciplinary punishment which has been imposed on them"
are not to be treated differently from other prisoners, but provides that
"prisoners punished as a result of attempted escape may be subjected to
special surveillance." Article 49 recites that prisoners "given disciplinary
punishment may not be deprived of the prerogatives attached to their
rank." Articles 50 and 51 deal with escaped prisoners who have been
retaken or prisoners who have attempted to escape. Article 52 provides:
"Belligerents shall see that the competent authorities exercise the
greatest leniency in deciding the question of whether an infraction
committed by a prisoner of war should be punished more than once
327 U.S. 1
because of the same act or the same count."

9
10
Switzerland, at the time of th trial, was the power designated by Japan

for the protection of Japanese prisoners of war detained by the United
States, except in Hawaii. U.S.Dept. of State Bull. Vol. XIII, No. 317, p.
125.
One of the items of the bill of particulars, in support of the charge
against petitioner, specifies that he permitted members of the armed
forces under his command to try and execute three named and other
prisoners of war, 'subjecting to trial without prior notice to a
representative of the protecting power, without opportunity to defend,
and without counsel; denying opportunity to appeal from the sentence
rendered; failing to notify the protecting power of the sentence
pronounced; and executing a death sentence without communicating to
the representative of the protecting power the nature and circumstances
of the offense charged.' It might be suggested that if Article 60 is
inapplicable to petitioner it is inapplicable in the cases specified, and
that hence he could not be lawfully held or convicted on a charge of
failing to require the notice, provided for in Article 60, to be given.
As the Government insists, it does not appear from the charge and
specifications that the prisoners in question were not charged with
offenses committed by them as prisoners rather than with offenses
against the law of war committed by them as enemy combatants. But
apart from this consideration, independently of the notice requirements
of the Geneva Convention, it is a violation of the law of war, on which
there could be a conviction if supported by evidence, to inflict capital
punishment on prisoners of war without affording to them opportunity
to make a defense. 2 Winthrop, supra, *434, 435, 1241; Article 84,
Oxford Manual; U.S. War Dept., Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land
Warfare (1940) par. 356; Lieber's Code, G.O. No. 100 (1863)
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, par. 12; Spaight, War Rights on Land, 462, n.
Further, the commission, in making its findings, summarized as follows
the charges, on which it acted, in three classes, any one of which,
independently of the others if supported by evidence, would be sufficient
to support the conviction: (1) Execution or massacre without trial and
maladministration generally of civilian internees and prisoners of war;
(2) brutalities committed upon the civilian population, and (3) burning
and demolition, without adequate military necessity, of a large number
of homes, places of business, places of religious worship, hospitals,
public buildings and educational institutions.
The commission concluded: '(1) that a series of atrocities and other high
crimes have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces'
under command of petitioner 'against people of the United States, their
allies and dependencies; * * * that they were not sporadic in nature, but
in many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers and
noncommissioned officers'; (2) that during the period in question
petitioner 'failed to provide effective control of (his) troops, as was
required by the circumstances.' The commission said: 'Where murder
and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offenses, and
there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even
criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, depending upon their
nature and the circumstances surrounding them.'
The commission made no finding of non-compliance with the Geneva
Convention. Nothing has been brought to our attention from which we
could conclude that the alleged non-compliance with Article 60 of the
327 U.S. 1
Geneva Convention had any relation to the commission's finding of a

series of atrocities committed by members of the forces under
petitioner's command, and that he failed to provide effective control of
his troops, as was required by the circumstances; or which could support
the petitions for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioner had been
charged with or convicted for failure to require the notice prescribed by
Article 60 to be given.
1
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356; Kring v. Missouri, 107

U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506.
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83, 84, 28 S.Ct. 428,
436, 437, 52 L.Ed. 681; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045, cf. Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031. See note 17 and text.
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S.Ct. 116; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575: 'What may
not be taken away is notice of the charge and an adequate opportunity to
be heard in defense of it.' See Part III.
The commission's findings state: 'We have received for analysis and
evaluation 423 exhibits consisting of official documents of the United
States Army, the United States State Department, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; affidavits; captured enemy
documents or translations thereof; diaries taken from Japanese
personnel, photographs, motion picture films, and Manila newspapers.'
See notes 19 and 20.
Concerning the specific nature of these elements in the proof, the issues
to which they were directed, and their prejudicial effects, see text infra
and notes in Part II.
7
8
Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290, 3 L.Ed. 348; Donnelly v. United

States, 228 U.S. 243, 273, 33 S.Ct. 449, 459, 57 L.Ed. 820, Ann.
Cas.1913E, 710. See Part II; note 21.
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471, 20 S.Ct. 993, 998, 44 L.Ed.
1150; Paoni v. United States, C.C., 281 F. 801. See Parts II and III.
See Part II at notes 10, 19; Part III.
The line of authorization within the military hierarchy extended from the
President, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, to
General Styer, whose order of September 25th and others were made
pursuant to and in conformity with General MacArthur's directive. The
charge was prepared by the Judge Advocate General's Department of the
Army. There is no dispute concerning these facts or that the directive
was binding on Feneral Styer and the commission, though it is argued
his own authority as area commanding general was independently
sufficient to sustain what was done.
'16. Evidence.a. The commission shall admit such evidence as in its
opinion would be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or
such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the
mind of a reasonable man. In particular, and without limiting in any way
the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be
admitted:
(1) Any document while appears to the commission to have been signed
or issued officially by any officer, department, agency, or member of the
armed forces of any government, without proof of the signature or of the
issuance of the document.
327 U.S. 1
(2) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or
issued by the International Red Cross or a member thereof, or by a
medical doctor or any medical service personnel, or by an investigator or
intelligence officer, or by any other person whom the commission finds
to have been acting in the course of his duty when making the report.
(3) Affidavits, depositions, or other statements taken by an officer
detailed for that purpose by military authority.
(4) Any diary, letter or other document appearing to the commission to
contain information relating to the charge.
(5) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of its contents,
if the commission believes that the original is not available or cannot be
produced without undue delay. * * *'
10
11
12
13
14
15
In one instance the president of the commission said: 'The rules and
regulations which guide this Commission are binding upon the
Commission and agencies provided to assist the Commission. * * * We
have been authorized to receive and weigh such evidence as we can
consider to have probative value, and further comments by the Defense
on the right which we have to accept this evidence is decidedly out of
order.' But see note 19.
Cf. text infra at note 19 concerning the prejudicial character of the
evidence.
Note 4.
Namely, '(1) Starvation, execution or massacre without trial and
maladministration generally of civilian internees and prisoners of war;
(2) Torture, rape, murder and mass execution of very large numbers of
residents of the Philippines, including women and children and
members of religious orders, by starvation, beheading, bayoneting,
clubbing, hanging, burning alive, and destruction by explosives; (3)
Burning and demolition without adequate military necessity of large
numbers of homes, places of business, places of religious worship,
hospitals, public buildings, and educational institutions. In point of time,
the offenses extended throughout the period the Accused was in
command of Japanese troops in the Philippines. In point of area, the
crimes extended through the Philippine Archipelago, although by far he
most of the incredible acts occurred on Luzon.'
Cf. note 13.
In addition the findings set forth that captured orders of subordinate
officers gave proof that 'they, at least,' ordered acts 'leading directly to'
atrocities; that 'the proof offered to the Commission alleged criminal
neglect * * * as well as complete failure by the higher echelons of
command to detect and prevent cruel and inhuman treatment accorded
by local commanders and guards'; and that, although 'the defense had
established the difficulties faced by the Accused' with special reference
among other things to the discipline and morale of his troops under the
'swift and overpowering advance of American forces,' and
notwithstanding he had stoutly maintained his complete ignorance of
the crimes, still he was an officer of long experience; his assignment was
one of broad responsibility; it was his duty 'to discover and control'
crimes by his troops, if wide-spread, and therefore
'The Commission concludes: (1) That a series of atrocities and other high
crimes have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces
under your command against the people of the United States, their allies
327 U.S. 1
and dependencies throughout the Philippine Islands; that they were not
sporadic in nature but in many cases were methodically supervised by
Japanese officers and noncommissioned officers; (2) that during the
period in question you failed to provide effective control of your troops
as was required by the circumstances.
'Accordingly upon secret written ballot, two-thirds or more of the
members concurring, the Commission finds you guilty as charged and
sentences you to death by hanging.' (Emphasis added.)
16
17
See note 15.

The charge, set forth at the end of this note, is consistent with either
theoryor bothand thus ambiguous, as were the findings. See note 15.
The only word implying knowledge was 'permitting.' If 'wilfully' is
essential to constitute a crime or charge of one, otherwise subject to the
objection of 'vagueness,' cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct.
1031, it would seem that 'permitting' alone would hardly be sufficient to
charge 'wilful and intentional' action or omission; and, if taken to be
sufficient to charge knowledge, it would follow necessarily that the
charge itself was not drawn to state and was insufficient to support a
finding of mere failure to detect or discover the criminal conduct of
others.
At the most 'permitting' could charge knowledge only by inference or
implication. And reasonably the word could be taken in the context of
the charge to mean 'allowing' or 'not preventing,' a meaning consistent
with absence of knowledge and mere failure to discover. In capital cases
such ambiguity is wholly out of place. The proof was equally ambiguous
in the same respect, so far as we have been informed, and so, to repeat,
were the findings. The use of 'wilfully,' even qualified by a 'must have,'
one time only in the findings hardly can supply the absence of that or an
equivalent word or language in the charge or in the proof to support that
essential element in the crime.
The charge was as follows: 'Tomoyuki Yamashita, General Imperial
Japanese Army, between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at
Manila and other places in the Philippine Islands, while commander of
armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America and its
allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies,
particularly the Philippines; and he, General Tomoyuki Yamashita,
thereby violated the laws of war.'
18
19
Cf. Text infra Part IV.

On November 1, early in the trial, the president of the commission
stated: 'I think the Prosecution should consider the desirability of
striking certain items. The Commission feels that there must be
witnesses introduced on each of the specifications or items. It has no
objection to considering affidavits, but it is unwilling to form an opinion
of a particular item based solely on an affidavit. Therefore, until evidence
is introduced, these particular exhibits are rejected.' (Emphasis added.)
Later evidence of the excluded type was offered, to introduction of which
the defense objected on various grounds including the prior ruling. At
the prosecution's urging the commission withdrew to deliberate. Later it
announced that 'after further consideration, the Commission reverses
that ruling (of November 1) and affirms its prerogative of receiving and
considering affidavits or depositions, if it chooses to do so, for whatever
probative value the Commission believes they may have, without regard
327 U.S. 1
to the presentation of some partially corroborative oral testimony.' It

then added: 'The Commission directs the prosecution again to introduce
the affidavits or depositions then in question, and other documents of
similar nature which the prosecution stated has been prepared for
introduction.' (Emphasis added.)
Thereafter his type of evidence was consistently received and again, by
the undisputed statement of counsel, as the sole proof of many of the
specifications of the bills a procedure which they characterized correctly
in my view as having 'in effect, stripped the proceeding of all semblance
of a trial and converted it into an ex parte investigation.'
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
This perhaps consisted in the showing of the so-called 'propaganda' film,

'Orders from Tokyo,' portraying scenes of battle destruction in Manila,
which counsel say 'was not in itself seriously objectionable.' Highly
objectionable, inflammatory and prejudicial, however, was the
accompanying sound track with comment that the film was 'evidence
which will convict,' mentioning petitioner specifically by name.
Innumerable instances of hearsay, once or several times removed,
relating to all manner of incidents, rumors, reports, etc., were among
these. Many instances, too, are shown of the use of opinion evidence and
conclusions of guilt, including reports made after ex parte investigations
by the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Department,
which it was and is urged had the effect of 'putting the prosecution on
the witness stand' and of usurping the commission's function as judge of
the law and the facts. It is said also that some of the reports were
received as the sole proof of some of the specifications.
Also with Paragraph 82 of the Rules of I and Warfare.
Typical of the items are allegations that members of the armed forces of
Japan under the command of the accused committed the acts 'During
the months of October, November and December 1944 (of) brutally
mistreating and torturing numerous unarmed noncombatant civilians at
the Japanese Military Police Headquarters located at Cortabitarte and
Mabini Streets, Manila' and 'On or about 19 February 1945, in the Town
of Cuenca, Batangas Province, brutally mistreating, massacring, and
killing Jose M. Laguo, Esteban Magsamdol, Jose Lanbo, Felisa Apuntar,
Elfidio Lunar, Victoriana Ramo, and 978 other persons, all unarmed
noncombatant civilians, pillaging and unnecessarily, deliberately and
wantonly devastating, burning and destroying large areas of that town.'
The supplemental bill contains allegations similar to those set out in the
original bill. See note 23. For example, it charged that members of the
armed forces of Japan under the command of the accused 'during the
period from 9 October 1944 to about 1 February 1945, at Cavite City,
Imus and elsewhere in Cavite Province,' were permitted to commit the
acts of 'brutally mistreating, torturing, and killing or attempting to kill,
without cause or trial, unarmed non-combatant civilians.'
See note 39 and text, Part V.
In support of the motion counsel indicated surprise by saying that,
though it was assumed two or three new specifications might be added,
there had been no expectation of 59 'about entirely new persons and
times.' The statement continued:
'We have worked earnestly seven days a week in order to prepare the
defense on 64 specifications. And when I say 'prepare the defense,' sir, I
do not mean merely an affirmative defense, but to acquaint ourselves
with the facts so that we could properly cross-examine the Prosecution's
witnesses.
327 U.S. 1
'* * * 'In advance of trial' means: Sufficient time to allow the Defense a
chance to prepare its defense.
'We earnestly state that we must have this time in order adequately to
prepare the defense. I might add, sir, we think this is important to the
Accused, but far more important than any rights of this Accused, we
believe, is the proposition that this Commission should not deviate from
a fundamental American concept of fairness. * * *'
27
28
29
The commission went on to question the need for all of the six officers
representing the defense to be present during presentation of all the
case, suggested one or two would be adequate and others 'should be out
of the courtroom' engaged in other matters and strongly suggested
bringing in additional counsel in the midst of the trial, all to the end that
'need to request continuance may not arise.'
See note 9.
Article 25 is as follows: 'A duly authenticated deposition taken upon
reasonable notice to the opposite party may be read in evidence before
any military court or commission in any case not capital, or in any
proceeding before a court of inquiry or a military board, if such
deposition be taken when the witness resides, is found, or is about to go
beyond the State, Territory, or district in which the court, commission,
or board is ordered to sit, or beyond the distance of one hundred miles
from the place of trial or hearing, or when it appears to the satisfaction
of the court, commission, board, or appointing authority that the
witness, by reason of age, sickness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, or
other reasonable cause, is unable to appear and testify in person at the
place of trial or hearing: Provided, That testimony by deposition may be
adduced for the defense in capital cases.' (Emphasis added.) 10 U.S.C.
1496, 10 U.S.C.A. 1496.
Article 38 reads: 'The President may, by regulations, which he may
modify from time to time, prescribe the procedure, including modes of
proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military
commissions, and other military tribunals, which regulations shall, in so
far as he shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the
United States: Provided, That nothing contrary to or inconsistent with
these articles shall be so prescribed: Provided further, That all rules
made in pursu nce of this article shall be laid before the Congress
annually.' (Emphasis added.) 10 U.S.C. 1509, 10 U.S.C.A. 1509.
30
Another revision of the Articles of War took place in 1920. At this time
Article 15 was slightly amended.
In 1916 Article 15, 39 Stat. 653, was enacted to read: 'The provisions of
these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be
construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or
offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by such military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.' (Emphasis
added.)
The 1920 amendment put in the words 'by statute or' before the words
'by the law of war' and omitted the word 'lawfully.'
31
Speaking at the Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,

House of Representatives, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess., printed as an Appendix
to S.Rep.229, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., General Crowder said:
327 U.S. 1
'The next article, No. 15, is entirely new, and the reasons for its insertion
in the code are these: In our War with Mexico two war courts were
brought into existence by orders of Gen. Scott, viz. the military
commission and the council of war. By the military commission Gen.
Scott tried cases cognizable in time of peace by civil courts, and by the
council of war he tried offenses against the laws of war. The council of
war did not survive the Mexican War period, and in our subsequent wars
its jurisdiction has been taken over by the military commission, which
during the Civil War period tried more than 2,000 cases. While the
military commission has not been formally authorized by statute, its
jurisdiction as a war court has been upheld by the Supreme
'Gen. Crowder: Out of usage and necessity. I thought it was just as well,
as inquiries would arise, to put this information in the record.' S.Rep.
No.130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) p. 40. (Emphasis added.)
Article 15 was also explained in the 'Report of a committee on the
proposed revision of the articles of war, pursuant to instructions of the
Chief of Staff, March 10, 1915,' included in Revision of the Articles of
War, Comparative Prints, Etc., 1904 1920. J.A.G.O., as follows:
'A number of articles * * * of the revision have the effect of giving courtsmartial jurisdiction over certain offenders and offenses which, under the
law of war or by statute, are also triable by military commissions,
provost courts, etc. Article 15 is introduced for the purpose of making
clear that in such cases a court martial has only a concurrent jurisdiction
with such war tribunals.'
32
33
34
35
Of course, Articles 25 and 38, at the same time that they gave protection
to defendants before military commissions, also provided for the
application by such tribunals of modern rules of procedure and evidence.
Winthrop, speaking of military commissions at the time he was writing,
1896, says: 'The offences cognizable by military commissions may thus
be classed as follows: (1) Crimes and statutory offences cognizable by
State or U.S. courts, and which would properly be tried by such courts if
open and acting; (2) Violations of the laws and usages of war cognizable
by military tribunals only; (3) Breaches of military orders or regulations
for which offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the
Articles of War.' (Emphasis added.) Winthrop, at *1309. And cf.
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule (2d ed. 1943): 'Military commissions
take cognizance of three categories of criminal cases: offenses against the
laws of war, breaches of military regulations, and civil crimes which,
where the ordinary courts have ceased to function, cannot be tried
normally.' (Emphasis added.) Fairman, 265266. See also Davis, A
Treatise on the Military Law of the United States (1915) 309, 310.
Note 31.
In addition to the statements of General Crowder with relation to Article
15, set out in note 31, supra, see the following statements made with
reference to Article 25, in 1912 at a hearing before the Committee on
Military Affairs of the House: 'We come now to article 25, which relates
to the admissibility of depositions. * * * It will be noted further that the
application of the old article has been broadened to include military
commissions, courts of inquiry, and military boards.
'Mr. Sweet. Please explain what you mean by military commission.
'Gen. Crowder. That is our common law of war court, and was referred to
by me in a prior hearing. (The reference is to the discussion of Article
15.) This war court came into existence during the Mexican War, and
was created by orders of Gen. Scott. It had jurisdiction to try all cases
327 U.S. 1
usually cognizable in time of peace by civil courts. Gen. Scott created

another war court, called the 'council of war,' with jurisdiction to try
offenses against the laws of war. The constitution, composition, and
jurisdiction of these courts have never been regulated by statute. The
council of war did not survive the Mexican War period, since which its
jurisdiction has been taken over by the military commission. The
military commission received express recognition in the reconstruction
acts, and its jurisdiction has been affirmed and supported by all our
courts. It was extensively employed during the Civil War period and also
during the Spanish-American War. It is highly desirable that this
important war court should be continued to be governed as heretofore,
by the laws of war rather than by statute.' S.Rep.No.229, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess., 59; cf. S.Rep.130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 5455. (Emphasis added.)
See also Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Military Affairs of the Senate on Establishment of Military Justice, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess., 11821183.
Further evidence that procedural provisions of the Articles were
intended to apply to all forms of military tribunal is given by Article 24,
10 U.S.C. 1495, 10 U.S.C.A. 1495, which provides against compulsory
self-incrimination 'before a military court, commission, court of injury,
or board, or before any officer conducting an investigation.' This article
was drafted so that 'The prohibition should reach all witnesses,
irrespective of the class of military tribunal before which they appear. * *
*' (Emphasis added.) Comparative Print showing S.3191 with the Present
Articles of War and other Related Statutes, and Explanatory Notes,
Printed for use of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess., 17, included in Revision of the Articles of War, Comparative
Prints, Etc., 19041920, J.A.G.O.
36
We are informed that Japan has not ratified the Geneva Convention. See
discussion of Article 82 in the paragraphs below. We are also informed,
howeverand the r cord shows this at least as to Japanthat at the
beginning of the war both the United States and Japan announced their
intention to adhere to the provisions of that treaty. The force of that
understanding continues, perhaps with greater reason if not effect,
despite the end of hostilities. See note 40 and text.
Article 82 provides:
'The provisions of the present Convention must be respected by the High
Contracting Parties under all circumstances.
'In case, in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the
Convention, its provisions shall nevertheless remain in force as between
the belligerents who are parties thereto.'
'It is not clear whether the Article means that during a war, when one of
the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, the provisions must
nevertheless be applied by all the other belligerents to the prisoners of
war not only of one another but also of the power that was not a party
thereto or whether it means that they need not be applied to soldiers of
the nonparticipating party who have been captured. If the latter meaning
is accepted, the first paragraph would seem to contradict the second.
'Legislative history' here is of some, if little, aid. A suggested draft of a
convention on war prisoners drawn up in advance of the Geneva meeting
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Actes de la Conference
Diplomatique de Geneve, edited by Des Gouttes, pp. 2134) provided in
Article 92 that the provisions of the Convention 'ne cesseront d'e tre
obligatories qu'au casou l'un des Etats bellige rents participant a la
Convention se trouve avoir a combattre les forces arme es d'un autre
Etat que n'y serait par partie at a l'e gard de cet Etat seulement.' See
327 U.S. 1
Rasmussen, Code des Prisonniers de Guerre (1931) 70. The fact that this
suggested article was not included in the Geneva Convention would
indicate that the nations in attendance were avoiding a decision on this
problem. But I think it shows more, that is, it manifests an intention not
to foreclose a future holding that under the terms of the Convention a
state is bound to apply the provisions to prisoners of war of
nonparticipating state. And not to foreclose such a holding is to invite
one. We should, in my opinion, so hold, for reasons of security to
members of our own armed forces taken prisoner, if for no others.
Moreover, if this view is wrong and the Geneva Convention is not strictly
binding upon the United States as a treaty, it is strong evidence of and
should be held binding as representing what have become the civilized
rules of international warfare. Yamashita is as much entitled to the
benefit of such rules as to the benefit of a binding treaty which codifies
them. See U.S. War Dep't Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare
(1940), par. 5-b.
37
Title III of the Convention, which comprises Articles 7 to 67, is called

'Captivity.' It contains Section I, 'Evacuation of Prisoners of
War' (Articles 7, 8); Section II, 'Prisoners-of-War Camps' (Articles 9
26); Section III, 'Labor of Prisoners of War' (Articles 2734); Section IV,
'External Relations of Prisoners of War' (Articles 3541); and Section V,
'Prisoners' Relations with the Authorities' (Articles 4267). Thus Title
III regulates all the various incidents of a prisoner of war's life while in
captivity.
'Section V, with which we are immediately concerned, is divided into
three chapters. hapter 1 (Article 42) gives a prisoner of war the right to
complain of his condition of captivity. Chapter 2 (Articles 4344) gives
prisoners of war the right to appoint agents to represent them. Chapter 3
is divided into three subsections and is termed 'Penalties Applicable to
Prisoners of War.' Subsection 1 (Articles 4553) contains various
miscellaneous articles to be considered in detail later. Subsection 2
(Articles 5459) contains provisions with respect to disciplinary
punishments. And subsection 3 (Articles 6067) which is termed
'Judicial Suits' contains vavious provisions for protection of a prisoner's
rights in judicial proceedings instituted against him.
Thus, subsection 3, which contains Articles 60 and 63, as opposed to
subsection 2, of Chapter 3, is concerned not with mere problems of
discipline, as is the latter, but with the more serious matters of trial
leading to imprisonment or possible sentence of death; cf. Brereton, The
Administration of Justice Among Prisoners of War by Military Courts
(1935) 1 Proc. Australian & New Zealand Society of International Law
143, 153. The Court, however, would have the distinction
38
Article 60 pertinently is as follows: 'At the opening of a judicial

proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the detaining Power shall
advise the representative of the protecting Power thereof as soon as
possible, and always before the date set for the opening of the trial.
'This advice shall contain the following information:
'a) Civil state and rank of prisoner;
'b) Place of sojourn or imprisonment;
'c) Specification of the (count) or counts of the indictment, giving the
legal provisions applicable.
'If it is not possible to mention in that advice the court which will pass
upon the matter, the date of opening the trial and the place where it will
327 U.S. 1
take place, this information must be furnished to the representative of

the protecting Power later, as soon as possible, and at all events, at least
three weeks before the opening of the trial.'
Article 63 reads: 'Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war
only by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the
case of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power.'
39
40
41
42
Item 89 charged the armed forces of Japan with subjecting to trial

certain named and other prisoners of war 'without prior notice to a
representative of the protecting power, without opportunity to defend,
and without counsel; denying opportunity to appeal from the sentence
rendered; failing to notify the protecting power of the sentence
pronounced; and executed a death sentence without communicating to
the representative of the protecting power the nature and circumstances
of the offense charged.'
Nations adhere to international treaties regulating the conduct of war at
least in part because of the fear of retaliation. Japan no longer has the
means of retaliating.
There can be no limit either to the admissibility or the use of evidence if
the only test to be applied concerns probative value and the only test of
probative value, as the directive commanded and the commission
followed out, lies 'in the Commission's opinion,' whether that be
concerning the assistance the 'evidence' tendered would give in proving
or disproving the charge or as it might think would 'have value in the
mind of a reasonable man.' Nor is it enough to establish the semblance
of a constitutional right that the commission declares, in receiving the
evidence, that it comes in as having only such probative value, if any, as
the commission decides to award it and this is accepted as conclusive.
2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine (edited by Foner, 1945) 588.
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327 U.S. 1 66 S.Ct. 340 90 L.Ed. 499 Application of YAMASHITA. YAMASHITA v. STYER, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific

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327 U.S.

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Congress, by adoption of Article of War providing that jurisdiction

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in ways Congress has recognized, evils which military operations have

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found guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced to death by

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Article 15 declares that 'the provisions of these articles conferring

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by treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the Government. In

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measures as were within his power and appropriate in the

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evidence 'as in its opinion would be of assistance in proving or

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and the military commission before which he was tried, though

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prisoner of war. Section V gives no indication that this part was

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The significance of the issue facing the Court today cannot be

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necessity or other emergency demanded the suspension of the

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Unfortunately, such despicable acts have a dangerous tendency to call

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overpowering advance of American forces, but also to the errors of his

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respects we have succeeded. We have defeated and crushed your

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compliance with laws or treaties made to apply in such cases, whether

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crimes attested were isolated acts of individual soldiers or were

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archipelago. There is some question whether they then anticipated the

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On November 20, when the prosecution rested, senior defense counsel

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Article 25 allows reading of depositions in evidence, under prescribed

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Article 2 would have been contradictory not only of Articles 25 and 38

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Its jurisdiction was confined mainly to criminal offenses of the class

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