Startup Funding
Startup Funding
Startup Funding
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November 2005
Venture funding works like gears. A typical startup goes
through several rounds of funding, and at each round you
want to take just enough money to reach the speed where
you can shift into the next gear.
Few startups get it quite right. Many are underfunded. A few
are overfunded, which is like trying to start driving in third
gear.
I think it would help founders to understand funding better
not just the mechanics of it, but what investors are thinking.
I was surprised recently when I realized that all the worst
problems we faced in our startup were due not to
competitors, but investors. Dealing with competitors was
easy by comparison.
I don't mean to suggest that our investors were nothing but
a drag on us. They were helpful in negotiating deals, for
example. I mean more that conflicts with investors are
particularly nasty. Competitors punch you in the jaw, but
investors have you by the balls.
Apparently our situation was not unusual. And if trouble with
investors is one of the biggest threats to a startup,
managing them is one of the most important skills founders
need to learn.
Let's start by talking about the five sources of startup
funding. Then we'll trace the life of a hypothetical (very
fortunate) startup as it shifts gears through successive
rounds.
Friends and Family
A lot of startups get their first funding from friends and
family. Excite did, for example: after the founders graduated
from college, they borrowed $15,000 from their parents to
start a company. With the help of some part-time jobs they
made it last 18 months.
If your friends or family happen to be rich, the line blurs
between them and angel investors. At Viaweb we got our
first $10,000 of seed money from our friend Julian, but he
was sufficiently rich that it's hard to say whether he should
be classified as a friend or angel. He was also a lawyer,
which was great, because it meant we didn't have to pay
legal bills out of that initial small sum.
The advantage of raising money from friends and family is
that they're easy to find. You already know them. There are
three main disadvantages: you mix together your business
and personal life; they will probably not be as well
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Yahoo is too. Both now compete directly with VCs. And this
is a smart move. Why wait for further funding rounds to jack
up a startup's price? When a startup reaches the point
where VCs have enough information to invest in it, the
acquirer should have enough information to buy it. More
information, in fact; with their technical depth, the acquirers
should be better at picking winners than VCs.
Venture Capital Funds
VC firms are like seed firms in that they're actual
companies, but they invest other people's money, and much
larger amounts of it. VC investments average several million
dollars. So they tend to come later in the life of a startup,
are harder to get, and come with tougher terms.
The word "venture capitalist" is sometimes used loosely for
any venture investor, but there is a sharp difference
between VCs and other investors: VC firms are organized as
funds, much like hedge funds or mutual funds. The fund
managers, who are called "general partners," get about 2%
of the fund annually as a management fee, plus about 20%
of the fund's gains.
There is a very sharp dropoff in performance among VC
firms, because in the VC business both success and failure
are self-perpetuating. When an investment scores
spectacularly, as Google did for Kleiner and Sequoia, it
generates a lot of good publicity for the VCs. And many
founders prefer to take money from successful VC firms,
because of the legitimacy it confers. Hence a vicious (for the
losers) cycle: VC firms that have been doing badly will only
get the deals the bigger fish have rejected, causing them to
continue to do badly.
As a result, of the thousand or so VC funds in the US now,
only about 50 are likely to make money, and it is very hard
for a new fund to break into this group.
In a sense, the lower-tier VC firms are a bargain for
founders. They may not be quite as smart or as well
connected as the big-name firms, but they are much
hungrier for deals. This means you should be able to get
better terms from them.
Better how? The most obvious is valuation: they'll take less
of your company. But as well as money, there's power. I
think founders will increasingly be able to stay on as CEO,
and on terms that will make it fairly hard to fire them later.
The most dramatic change, I predict, is that VCs will allow
founders to cash out partially by selling some of their stock
direct to the VC firm. VCs have traditionally resisted letting
founders get anything before the ultimate "liquidity event."
But they're also desperate for deals. And since I know from
my own experience that the rule against buying stock from
founders is a stupid one, this is a natural place for things to
give as venture funding becomes more and more a seller's
market.
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after this the option pool is down to 13.7%). [7] They also
spend a little money on a freelance graphic designer.
How much stock do you give early employees? That varies
so much that there's no conventional number. If you get
someone really good, really early, it might be wise to give
him as much stock as the founders. The one universal rule is
that the amount of stock an employee gets decreases
polynomially with the age of the company. In other words,
you get rich as a power of how early you were. So if some
friends want you to come work for their startup, don't wait
several months before deciding.
A month later, at the end of month four, our group of
founders have something they can launch. Gradually
through word of mouth they start to get users. Seeing the
system in use by real userspeople they don't knowgives
them lots of new ideas. Also they find they now worry
obsessively about the status of their server. (How relaxing
founders' lives must have been when startups wrote
VisiCalc.)
By the end of month six, the system is starting to have a
solid core of features, and a small but devoted following.
People start to write about it, and the founders are starting
to feel like experts in their field.
We'll assume that their startup is one that could put millions
more to use. Perhaps they need to spend a lot on
marketing, or build some kind of expensive infrastructure,
or hire highly paid salesmen. So they decide to start talking
to VCs. They get introductions to VCs from various sources:
their angel investor connects them with a couple; they meet
a few at conferences; a couple VCs call them after reading
about them.
Step 3: Series A Round
Armed with their now somewhat fleshed-out business plan
and able to demo a real, working system, the founders visit
the VCs they have introductions to. They find the VCs
intimidating and inscrutable. They all ask the same
question: who else have you pitched to? (VCs are like high
school girls: they're acutely aware of their position in the VC
pecking order, and their interest in a company is a function
of the interest other VCs show in it.)
One of the VC firms says they want to invest and offers the
founders a term sheet. A term sheet is a summary of what
the deal terms will be when and if they do a deal; lawyers
will fill in the details later. By accepting the term sheet, the
startup agrees to turn away other VCs for some set amount
of time while this firm does the "due diligence" required for
the deal. Due diligence is the corporate equivalent of a
background check: the purpose is to uncover any hidden
bombs that might sink the company later, like serious
design flaws in the product, pending lawsuits against the
company, intellectual property issues, and so on. VCs' legal
and financial due diligence is pretty thorough, but the
technical due diligence is generally a joke. [8]
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*unvested
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Notes
[1] The aim of such regulations is to protect widows and
orphans from crooked investment schemes; people with a
million dollars in liquid assets are assumed to be able to
protect themselves. The unintended consequence is that the
investments that generate the highest returns, like hedge
funds, are available only to the rich.
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