EN BANC [G.R. No. 148571.

September 24, 2002]

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B.
JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice
and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important,
are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel
questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as
the exceptionsto, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 [1] and July
3, 2001[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. [3] The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance
of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause
against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of
the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE
MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his
passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to
include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the
cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.

however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR
No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court
issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution.[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after
three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier
Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18,
2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as
Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been
issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281
CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in
violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title
18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18
US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in
violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US
Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed
for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of
PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed
before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, [10] which prayed that
petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing,
petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. [11] After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]

The Facts

Issues

This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of

Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, [6] the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos.
0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign
affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate
action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also
known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25.[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,

Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this

Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any
law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended,
which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in
extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings
leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or
proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the
public respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may
justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists
that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not
ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public
respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the
subject bail orders.[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1)
whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his
arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall
take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek
relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. [15] We shall also
preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits
the following reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of
Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides
them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all
lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one
case[17] ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to
recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise
adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail
both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided
by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would
resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties.[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. [19] As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20] Aside
from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important
reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of
the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to
be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy
vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated inCuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first
with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the issues were fully considered
by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda
and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration
motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent
nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is
extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample
opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are
purely of law.[16]

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests
of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said
in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain

direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important
issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of
the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or
construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the
interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.
[25]
Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, [26] understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing
crime[27] by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer [28] of a
fugitive[29] from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the
flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing
with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look
upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation
in the suppression of crime.[30] It is the only regular system that has been
devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law.[31]
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that
criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them
is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to
the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a
significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State,
so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the
deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x
x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crime itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and
one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties
duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming
the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are
undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the
Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to
crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel,
and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford
to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto
have examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and
judicial process.[34] More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person

sought to be extradited.[35] That signature signifies our full faith that the
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and
basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise,
the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked
for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[36] extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence,
as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxx xxx

xxx

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal

proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of
evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing
of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the
President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres
to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be
extradited.[37] Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only
result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. [38]The ultimate purpose
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes
comity[40]with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our
obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world
community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith
with our obligations under the Treaty. [42] This principle requires that we deliver
the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law
require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the
surrender.[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This
prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience [44] of the
executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused
will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons
sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings
would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country.[45] Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the
requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with
are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,
what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second
time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing
the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed
against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may
invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be
hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without
due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the
petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It
states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of
Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of
the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a
warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that
the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued,
shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately
setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law,
uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties,
[46]
receiving facts and arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have

intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of

imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is
not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and
actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit
executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the
Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US
Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various
exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with
Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the
crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of
Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers
and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J Table
of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix with enclosed Exhibits
121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward and enclosed
Statements in two volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an
impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial
determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately
be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. He could have
determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request
was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that probable cause did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support
of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the
Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against
the extraditee.[50]
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing
the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of
the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the
summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word hearing is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding
of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings
are summary[52]in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans
to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate
with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something
reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized
principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards
third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute
an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that

consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of
arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause.[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was
not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine
the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses.[57] In the present
case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of
hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant
with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be
heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop
him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so
desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could
convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This
scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal
action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a
more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of
respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the
proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,
the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding[58] is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,

then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant,
the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of
the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best serve the ends
of justice in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional
provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 [59] of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent
with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according
to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject
of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.[60] It follows that the constitutional provision
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.[61] Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision
on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the
present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process

Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in arguing that,

constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due
process of law.

extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or
property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.[70]

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the

extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.[65] In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation
of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so

hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter
of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either,

in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his
arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the
DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under
the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase
the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent
Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the
Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without
the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in
cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights
accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and
palpable government interests.[66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards
and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions,
choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the
risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively
liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or
escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in
extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a
general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into
place with and gives life to Article 14[67] of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse
of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
and enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right to
due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and

since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness,
the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement
with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it
partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the
exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the
sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives
and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances
that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional
release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall
now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as
a member of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are
not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,[72] the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,
they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To
give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that
he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties
imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the

Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[73]
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or
should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are
constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself
a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition
proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency
of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition
cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to
address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in
a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith,
unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue
here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory
and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the
more reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay
by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim,
he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he
has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary
stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as
he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and
closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean
that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the
trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior
to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case,

the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail,
which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is
totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular,
Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both
by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only
petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents
prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda
on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which
were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the
Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both
parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a
procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this
Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with
additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties and CounterManifestation by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr.
Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be
repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and
evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings
and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a
remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear
factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of
Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will
not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited
Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices
themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed
upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any
useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed
proceedings,[74] which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in
character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the
merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly
disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition. We believe
that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in
its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights
to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.

grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to
judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten
points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine
whether the request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and
the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting
state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to
have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a
criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person
would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the
petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If
convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden
of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and
(b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to

fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to
the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition
and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion
of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also
well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations
and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government
has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and
exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They
should not allow contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of
the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile
but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply
in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse,
our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and
defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with
all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that
purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order
dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged
Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDEinsofar as it granted bail to
Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent
is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the
spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as
our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.