David Carse: The Current State of Banking Reform in Hong Kong
David Carse: The Current State of Banking Reform in Hong Kong
David Carse: The Current State of Banking Reform in Hong Kong
Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the
luncheon of the Hong Kong Foreign Bank Representatives Association, held at the Hong Kong Club,
on 5 September 2000.
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In September 1999, the one-building condition that applied to foreign banks licensed after
1978 was relaxed to allow such banks to open branches in a maximum of three separate
buildings. At the same time we eliminated any restriction on the number of regional and
back offices that foreign banks can maintain.
In December 1999, we announced that agreement had been reached with the various parties
involved for restricted licence banks to join the RTGS interbank payment system. The
detailed legal arrangements were finalised in May of this year and a formal invitation to join
the system was issued to those RLBs with a clear business need to do so.
Finally, at the beginning of July of this year, we embarked on the first phase of deregulation
of the remaining interest rate rules. This involved removal of the interest rate cap on time
deposits with a maturity of less than 7 days. Following this, all time deposits are now
completely deregulated.
What has been the reaction to these changes? The answer is that not much has happened so far.
Despite the fears of some of the local banks that they would have to cope with a flood of new foreign
bank branches, no foreign banks have as yet taken the opportunity to establish additional branches. Of
course, many foreign banks are engaged in wholesale, corporate or private banking business in Hong
Kong and do not require an extensive branch network. Moreover, a number of banks are still
recovering from the Asian crisis or are in the process of merging, and are not in an expansion mode at
present. As mentioned previously, however, there are some foreign banks that are enthusiastic about
building up their presence in Hong Kong. But perhaps for these, the organic route of establishing new
branches, and having these limited to three, is too slow and restrictive. Acquisition of an existing
operation is likely to be more attractive for such banks.
We have already said that we will review the impact of the three building condition in the first quarter
of 2001. If it appears that it is serving little useful purpose - because there is not in any case a huge
demand on the part of foreign banks for additional branches - we may simply dispense with the
condition altogether.
Similarly, no RLB has yet applied to join the RTGS system. It is however early days for this, and we
are aware that some of the more active RLBs are considering whether to apply. They will need to
weigh the costs and benefits of direct membership compared with the existing practice of using a
settlement bank. The important point is that the RLBs are now in a position to make that choice based
on their own business needs. If the RLBs feel that there are any remaining impediments to their
joining the system we would be pleased to hear from them.
Interest rate deregulation
The first phase of interest deregulation also produced a muted response. This is not unexpected nor is
it unwelcome. We are trying to avoid big bang deregulation that might be disruptive. Some banks
have introduced new overnight deposit accounts, which pay interest above the savings account rate.
But so far we have not seen any large-scale migration from savings accounts to 24-hour call accounts.
This is perhaps not surprising given the ample liquidity in the banking system, which means that the
banks have a reduced incentive to bid actively for fresh deposits. This is reflected in the unusually
small differential between the interest rate on savings accounts and those on time deposits. For
example, the gap between the savings account rate and the one-month time deposit rate was only about
0.5% at the end of August. This reduces the incentive for depositors to forego the loss of liquidity
involved in switching into time deposits.
Of course, there could be a more significant impact in July 2001 when the process of deregulation is
due to be completed with the removal of the interest rate cap on savings accounts and of the
prohibition of interest on current accounts. Based on self-assessments that we asked the banks to
prepare earlier this year, there is a general view that competition in the banking sector will intensify
after the final phase of deregulation and that there could be quite a significant impact on the net
interest margin.
That was also the conclusion of the KPMG/Barents Consultancy Study. But the actual impact will
obviously depend on the conditions at the time. If the supply of deposits remains ample in a years
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time, banks will have less reason to bid aggressively for deposits. Despite this, many banks may use
deregulation as an opportunity to try to gain market share and to attract new customers by offering
new deposit products with an attractive interest rate. Innovation and competition of that kind is what
deregulation is intended to achieve. It should also encourage more efficiency in pricing and the
elimination of cross-subsidisation. Expect therefore to see more transaction fees and charges to
recover servicing costs, and use of differential pricing to encourage customers with low and volatile
balances to use less costly delivery channels such as the internet.
The need for fairness and transparency
Banks are at liberty to impose such fees and charges, but it is essential that they should be fair and
transparent in doing so. This is particularly the case if the banks are intending to get more involved in
consumer and wealth management business where it is important to retain the trust of the customer.
The banks cannot afford a bad image otherwise they may find their customers going elsewhere - for
example, to internet-based financial institutions.
As we have seen from some recent incidents, the banks in Hong Kong have been lagging behind in the
provision of clear information to their customers about the cost of some financial products such as
credit card advances. Moreover, there has been recent controversy about the provisions in credit card
agreements that entitle the lenders to reclaim from debtors the full legal costs and expenses of
recovering overdue debts. In a recent court case, the judge ruled that the relevant provisions were
unconscionable and therefore could not be enforced.
We have written to authorised institutions to ask them to review their terms and conditions in the light
of the courts ruling and to ensure that they are consistent with Hong Kong law. We have also initiated
a review of the Code of Banking Practice with a view to strengthening the provisions on such issues as
transparency in the provision of banking services and the proper and responsible use of debt collection
agents. These issues are already addressed in the Code to some extent, and perhaps if the spirit of the
Code had been more closely adhered to, some of the recent bad publicity for the banks could have
been avoided. However, it is evident that the Code needs to be made more specific in some areas, and
the issue of how to ensure compliance must also be addressed.
The Code of Banking Practice is not part of our reform measures, but I have digressed to talk about it
for two reasons. First, as already indicated, it becomes all the more important in a deregulated
environment to ensure that there is a fair and balanced relationship between banks and their customers.
Second, the fact that we are going to have to devote resources to this issue for the rest of this year
means that one of our reform measures, namely a review of the current three tier system of
authorisation, will be postponed from this year to next. This will also allow us to take into account the
results of our forthcoming review of deposit protection arrangements, which may have a bearing on
the minimum size of deposits that authorised institutions which are not licensed banks should be
allowed to take.
Safety and soundness of the banking system
Deposit protection is part of what might be called the safety net arrangements for the banking system.
As the name suggests the safety net is there to catch banks that are in trouble or, if not the banks, then
at least their depositors. This is part of the other aspect of our reform measures that are aimed at
promoting the safety and soundness of the banking system.
One aspect of this is already in place in the form of a policy statement issued by the HKMA in June of
last year on its role as Lender of Last Resort to authorised institutions.
The major safety and soundness issues however lie ahead. The first is whether we should introduce a
commercial credit reference agency in Hong Kong which would gather and collate information from
participating institutions about the indebtedness and credit record of their corporate borrowers. This
would enable lenders to obtain a more complete picture of the financial position of their customers,
and thus improve their credit assessment and perhaps make them willing to lend. That is the theory,
BIS Review 69/2000
which seems to be supported by both academic research and the experience of overseas countries. We
are currently nearing the end of a consultation period and will consider the way forward in the light of
the comments received.
As this consultation ends, we are about to embark on another that may be more contentious. I am
referring to the possible enhancement of the deposit protection arrangements in Hong Kong. In their
Consultancy Study, KPMG/Barents identified this as an important issue as the banking sector becomes
more competitive and the level of risk possibly increases. They also considered that the current
arrangements, which give priority to small depositors, did not appear to have sufficiently raised the
crisis of confidence threshold to avoid bank runs. They therefore recommended that the issue of
deposit protection should be looked at again.
This we have done in the form of a new consultancy study by Arthur Andersen that was completed in
July of this year. This has looked at various options for deposit protection, including maintenance of
the status quo at one extreme and the introduction of an explicit scheme for deposit insurance at the
other. Such schemes are increasingly being introduced around the world and are advocated by a
number of international standard setting bodies. The drawbacks of deposit insurance are however well
known, including the risk of increased systemic instability due to moral hazard. The costs of such a
scheme would also need to be carefully considered.
This is a controversial issue that will need to be fully debated. Subject to views of Exco, it is our
intention to undertake a consultation on the various options for deposit protection at the beginning of
October. If it is eventually decided to introduce one of these options, further consultation would then
be required on the detailed arrangements.
Risk-based supervision
Of course, the best thing would be for the safety net not to be actually used. In other words, we should
be trying to prevent banks getting into difficulties in the first place. This requires effective
management by the banks themselves as well as careful monitoring by the banking supervisors. The
first of these we have tried to address through our recent Guideline on the Corporate Governance of
Locally Incorporated Authorised Institutions. This is intended to encourage high standards of
management in such institutions and thus help them to deal with the challenges ahead.
These challenges also require enhancements to our system of banking supervision. As recommended
by KPMG/Barents, we are introducing a more risk-based approach. This aims to be more forwardlooking than the old style of supervision. It focuses more precisely on the various types of risk being
run by individual banks, the quantity of such risks and the quality of the system used to manage them.
If used properly, it should lead to a less intrusive and less burdensome supervisory approach towards
well-managed institutions.
We have been developing this approach over the last year and have applied it to a number of the local
banks. We intend to roll it out to cover foreign banks next year. It is important that the whole process
should be transparent and to assist in this we intend to issue a framework document quite shortly
which will outline the new approach. We are also engaged in a major rewrite of our supervisory
guidelines to make them more user-friendly and to put them into a common format. This is a
substantial project that will take about a year to complete. In the meantime, we shall be issuing new
and revised supervisory guidelines in the new format as they come off the production line.
Conclusions
To sum up, our reform package is not intended to be revolutionary. The Hong Kong banking system is
already well-managed and competitive. But even good players need to improve their game as
conditions become tougher. The main responsibility for doing this in the Hong Kong banking context
will rest with the banks themselves. We in the HKMA are trying to do our bit by removing possible
barriers to change in a cautious manner, and by making sure that our supervisory approach remains
appropriate to the changing market environment.
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