Marcoso vs.

court of appeals
G.R. No. 96605. May 8, 1992
FACTS:
In 1984, private respondent Rosa Tirol (now Rosa Tirol-Maquirang) filed a complaint against the petitioner Feliciano
Morcoso for the recovery of possession and declaration of ownership of a fishpond situated in Barangay Aslum,
Ibajay,
Aklan.
In her complaint, she alleged that the said fishpond is a part of the 4.5 hectare of land she inherited from her father
Eriberto Tirol in 1930; that in December 28, 1979, she entered into a lease agreement with Morcoso, allowing the
latter without paying rental and for a period of six years, to develop into a fishpond a 5,880 sq.m. portion of the
land she inherited, with usufructuary rights (Exhibit "A"); that while working on the fishpond, Morcoso was informed
by the personnel of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR, for brevity) that said portion of the land of
Tirol leased to him is within the area of alienable and disposable public land; that in 1973, Morcoso applied for a
fishpond permit with the BFAR; that the latter subsequently refused to surrender the possession of the fishpond to
Tirol in 1976 when the term of the lease expired, and that Tirol filed an unlawful detainer case against Morcoso but
the
same
was
dismissed
for
not
having
been
timely
filed.
As his defense, Morcoso claimed that the fishpond in dispute from which he is being evicted is not the fishpond
subject of the contract of lease; that he developed two fishponds: (a) the fishpond subject to the lease, from which
he was forcibly ejected by Tirol in 1971 as a result of a disagreement with her; and (b) the fishpond in dispute,
which adjoins the first fishpond and which he developed after the BFAR personnel assured him that the area he had
moved to is a forested area, suitable for fishpond development; that he applied for a fishpond permit in 1973; and
that he declared said fishpond in his name for taxation purposes. Morcoso also assailed the jurisdiction of the trial
court because of a pending administrative case before the BFAR regarding their conflicting claims.
The trial court ruled that the fishpond in dispute belongs to Tirol.
ISSUE:
whether or not the doctrine of administrative exhaustion is applicable in cases when the property in
dispute is private?
HELD:
The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to courts is inapplicable
to the instant case because the fishpond in dispute is private and not public land
We find the foregoing conclusions drawn by the trial court from the documentary evidence submitted by
the parties to be in order. The technical descriptions of the fishpond stated in the lease contract and in the sketch
plan of the BFAR personnel who conducted an ocular inspection of the fishpond area applied for by Morcoso
explicitly show that the latter was the subject of the lease contract between Tirol and Morcoso. The fishpond not
having been part of the public domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.c
hanrobles

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through
the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the so-called Giporlos
Area. IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the countrys coal supply-demand balance,
the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned

and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for
failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the
contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court
ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED
to issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEIs application. CA reversed the decision
and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that
has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE:
whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?
HELD:
It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving
matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY

On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought
suit in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the PCA from
issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner
alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCAs Administrative Order No. 02, series of
1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered congested under the administrative
order.[1]
On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a
writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, Inc., Coco
Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.[2]
Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA
issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority

from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut
product processors, the registration would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and
administration of quality standards.
The PCA then proceeded to issue certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated
coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April
26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993,
petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The certificates of registration issued in the
meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.
ISSUE:
whether or not respondent pcas board resolution no. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise
of legislative power by an administrative body?
HELD:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so
strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The
resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only
judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject
to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete [4] and it
is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the
desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President
of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the
powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President
before they become effective.
In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the Office of the President, considering
the fact that two months after they had sent their first letter on April 26, 1993 they still had to hear from the
Presidents office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately to new
coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was justified in filing this case on June 25, 1993. [5]Indeed, after writing the
Office of the President on April 26, 1993[6] petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once, but twice, on May 26,
1993[7]and on June 2, 1993,[8] but petitioner did not receive any reply
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
255 SCRA 438 (1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied
Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate
petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the
consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties,
this Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition 1 , where SIPALAYs
petition was docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED as S.B. 0100.
Concerning SIPALAY (S.B. 0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corporation which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of Lucio C. Tans ill-gotten
wealth. The PCGG on July 24, 1986 thus sequestered these SIPALAY shares under a "Sequestration Order and
Supervisory Committee.
SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the PCGG sought to implement the sequestration without acting on its
motion." . . To Lift Sequestration Order" and." . . For Hearing For Specification Of Charges And For Copies Of
Evidence." SIPALAY maintained that the sequestration was without evidentiary substation, violative of due process,
and deemed automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period mandated
under Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution.

Anent ALLIED (S.B. 0100), its Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 was served a "Search and Seizure
Order" by agents of the PCGG. The order was directed to submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the
abovementioned premises which our representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being
conducted
by
this
Commission.
ALLIED went to court for the same reason that the PCGG was bent on implementing the order. ALLIED
contended that this order is not one for sequestration but is partially a general search warrant which fails to meet
the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.
For the PCGGs part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former PCGG Commissioner
Mary Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin Alonte, Director IV, Legal Department of the PCGG
who headed the team that served the search and seizure order on ALLIED. Commissioner Doromal identified
voluminous documents. Former Commissioner Bautista died midway her cross-examination. The PCGG almost failed
to present Atty. Alonte, had the SANDIGANBAYAN not reconsidered its Order of March 8, 1993 6 declaring the cases
submitted for decision after the PCGG was deemed to have waived presentation of its evidence for its repeated
postponements of the hearing. After Atty. Alontes testimony and upon the PCGGs manifestation that it was no
longer presenting any witness, the SANDIGANBAYAN 7 gave the PCGG twenty (20) days (from July 1, 1993) within
which to submit its formal evidence in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED were given the same period (20 days) from
receipt of such written formal offer of evidence within which to file their formal comments and/or objections thereto,
and after which, the incident will be deemed submitted for resolution.
What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as directed by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this motion to dismiss
came nearly seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this Court on September
16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAYs and ALLIEDs alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration
orders t o the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules
and Regulations. An "Oppositions" and a "Reply" were filed in relation to the motion.
At some earlier time (May 21, 1992), the PCGG filed a "Motion For The Consolidation Or Joint Trial" of
SIPALAYs and ALLIEDs petitions (S.B. 0095 and S.B. 0100) with Civil Case 0005 a complaint for "Reversion,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages" dated July 17, 1987 likewise filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN
by the PCGG against Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, and other defendants. 8 The SANDIGANBAYAN
formally denied this motion in an extended Resolution dated July 6, 1993. The PCGG filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration" thereof. This motion was deemed submitted for resolution when no opposition and reply were
filed. SIPALAY and ALLIED then filed a "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision", to which an opposition
and reply were filed.

ISSUE:
whether or not non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is deemed for failure to invoke at
proper time?
HELD:
A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature,
warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of
this case preclude the rightful application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to
dismiss, nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the
proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings
where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the
SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144 SCRA 116, 119 has mad it quite clear that: "Failure to observe
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have
repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper
time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is guilty of
estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has
abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG should be deemed to have waived
such perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and unreasoned length of time.
The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of
laches or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time.