G.R. Nos.

165399 and 165475: May 30, 2011

THERON V. LACSON, Petitioner, v. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY, and TEODORICO C. TAGUINOD, in his capacity as General
Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Public Estates Authority,
Respondents.
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G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489: May 30, 2011

JAIME R. MILLAN and BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Petitioners, v. THE HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, and the PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, Respondents.
MENDOZA,J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Lacson, Millan, and Viray were non-presidential appointees and career
service officials of respondent Philippine Estates Authority(PEA). Tagudfiled a
complaint-affidavit them with the Ombudsmanfor allegedly overpricing the contract for
the construction of the Central Boulevard Project.
The Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation of both the criminal (OMB-C-C-020667-J) and the administrative aspects of the case.
Meanwhile, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission(PAGC)requested the Ombudsman
for authority to conduct administrative disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners.
The Ombudsman responded that such authority is not necessary. The case filed with
this Office is criminal in nature (OMB-C-C-02-0667-J).Thus,the same did not preclude
the subsequent filing with the PAGC of an administrative complaint.
Subsequently, a formal complaint was filed by the Investigation Office of PAGC against
petitioners. PAGC then issued an order requiring petitioners to file their counteraffidavit/verified answer.
During the preliminary conference, petitioners raised several jurisdictional issues.
PAGC directed petitioners to file their memoranda to formalize their arguments. PAGC
then issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of petitioners.
The Office of the President informed the PEA Chairman and Members of the Board that
the President approved the recommendation of PAGC and directed them to take the
necessary actions to effect the instructions of the President.
PEA then dismissed the petitioners.
Aggrieved, Beri, Millan and Viray filed their Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition under
Rule 65 with the CA. Lacson, on the other hand, filed an MR addressed to Taguinod,
PEA General Manager and CEO.This motion was denied

Enriquezand Lacson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 with
the CA. Finally, in a consolidated decision, the CA dismissed the consolidated petitions.
Lacson and Beri, Millan and Viray filed their respective MRs which were denied. Hence,
these petitions.
ISSUES (1)Whether it is only the Ombudsman who should conduct the investigation on
the charge of overpricing of the Project against petitioners; (2) Whether the Court can
still review the dismissal ordered by PEA; (2) Whether Respondent erred in dismissing
the petitioners from PEA and Public Office in violation of their right to due process and
security of tenure,
HELD: The petitions are denied.
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction
Petitioners are not correct in arguing that only the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
them. The Ombudsman has authority to investigate offenses involving public officials is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies. At any rate,this issue is already
moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated its investigation of petitioners.
Dismissed by PEA, appeal should have been to the CSC
The dismissal of petitioners was made and effected by PEA. Granting that PEA
committed an error, petitioners should have appealed to the CSC. For their failure to
appeal to the proper forum, the decision of the PEA dismissing them has become final
and executory.Thus, the Court no longer has power to review and act on the matter.
Right to Due Process
Assuming arguendo that the Court can still review the matter, petitioners cannot claim
that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process. The demands of due
process are met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered. Here, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC
where they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions through their
memoranda.
Right to Security of Tenure
The right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal.As long as
their dismissal is for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met, the law
will not prevent their removal from office. Here, the dismissal was justified because (1)
they committed acts punishable under the anti-graft laws; and (2) their conduct was
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

G.R. No.168840 : December 8, 2010

ENRIQUE MIGUEL L. LACSON, Petitioner, v. MJLACSON DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
DELCASTILLO,J.:
FACTS:
Respondent MJ Lacson Development Company, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of
sugar production.It owns and operatesHaciendaSan Benitoin Negros Occidental.
Respondent alleged that petitioner Enrique Miguel Lacson was no longer reelected as
President.This notwithstanding, petitioner refused to relinquish his post to the newly elected
president.He continued to manage the hacienda, harvest and mill the sugar canes under his own
name, and refused to turn over the proceeds of the sale thereof. Hence, respondent filed before
the RTC of Negros Occidental inBacolodCitya Complaint for Injunction with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, Accounting and Damages against petitioner.
The RTC issued a 20-day TRO. However, the parties were thereafter able to arrive at an
Amicable Settlement which was eventually approved through a Judgment by Compromise. Just
less than a month after said approval, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Modification
of the Judgment by Compromise. Petitioner claims that during the hearing of his Motion for
Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise, he moved in open court that he be
allowed to present evidence in support of said motion. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to
rule on the same. Because of this, petitioner argues that he was denied due process. Petitioner
likewise reiterates that respondents failure to disclose to him the impending installation of the
farmer-beneficiaries in the hacienda when they executed the Amicable Settlement constitute
vices of consent or fraudulent acts which justify the partial modification of the judgment by
compromise.
ISSUES:
I.Whether or not the petitioner was denied of his right to due process when he was
deprived of his right to present evidence in support of his motion for partial
modification of the judgment by compromise.
II.Whether or not the non-disclosure by respondent of the impending installation of the
carp farmer-beneficiaries and its subsequent (inaction) constituted vices of consent
or fraudulent acts.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
REMEDIAL LAW; DUE PROCESS
First Issue: The petitioner was not denied due process. "Denial of due process means the total
lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court.There is no denial of due process

where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case." Here,
petitioner alleges that the trial court conducted a hearing on his Motion for Partial Modification
of the Judgment by Compromise. Clearly, he was given the opportunity to be heard thereon.The
failure of the lower court to rule on his oral motion to present evidence during said hearing is
not denial of due process.The fact is that the trial court heard his motion for partial modification
and his failure to present further evidence to support the same cannot be equated with lack of
due process.Also, petitioner was ordered by the trial court to reduce into writing his oral motion
but he did not do so.
REMEDIAL LAW; QUESTIONS OF FACT
Second Issue: It involves a question of fact which the Court cannot pass upon in this Petition
for Review on Certiorari. Here, the ultimate question to be answered in order to resolve the
second issue raised is: Is petitioners consent to the execution of the amicable settlement
vitiated? Certainly, this is a question of fact that entails re-evaluation of factual findings which
cannot be brought before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition isDENIED.

G.R. No. 170685: September 22, 2010

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is the government financial institution
established to aid in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) as well as to act as financial intermediary of the Agrarian Reform Fund.
Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of sugarland located in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Sometime between 1987 and 1988, Livioco offered his sugarland to the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form he submitted
to the DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an
international paper mill.

The DAR referred Liviocos offer to the LBP for valuation. Livioco was then promptly informed
of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been kept in trust pending
his submission of the ownership documentary requirements. It appears however that Livioco
did not act upon the notice given to him by both government agencies. LBP issued a
certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga as compensation for Liviocos hectares.
It was only two years later that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the
ground that its value had already appreciated from the time it was first offered for sale. The
request was denied by Regional Director Antonio Nuesa on the ground that there was already a
perfected sale.
The DAR proceeded to take possession of Liviocos property. The DAR awarded Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering Liviocos property to 26 qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to recover his property but the same
proved futile.
Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes was an outrageously low
valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation against DAR, LBP, and the CLOA holders Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City. He maintained that the area where his property is located has become predominantly
residential hence he should be paid his propertys value as such. To prove that his property is
now residential, Livioco presented a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Planning and

Development Coordinator of the Municipality of Mabalacat that, as per zoning ordinance,

Liviocos land is located in an area where the dominant land use is residential.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation for respondents property was determined in accordance with
law.

REMEDIAL LAW:
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.

HELD:
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three important
concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual
taking.
The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from
agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved
for conversion to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to
approve land use conversionsso as to prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform
coverage. Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by local government units (LGUs)
will not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or commercial.
Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of respondents property or an
actual expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said property
changed from agricultural to residential. Respondents property remains agricultural and
should be valued as such. Hence, the CA and the trial court had no legal basis for considering
the subject propertys value as residential.
The trial and appellate courts also erred in disregarding Section 17 of RA 6657 in their
determination of just compensation. The trial court revealed its awareness of the importance of
adhering to Section 17 of RA 6657. It recognized that the evidence presented by the parties were
insufficient to arrive at the just compensation and that the necessary evidence were unavailable
for its consideration. For some reason, however, the trial court proceeded to rule on the case
without actually receiving such relevant evidence. Instead, the trial court, as affirmed by the CA,
ruled in favor of respondent based on preponderance of evidence, regardless of the fact that the
evidence presented by respondent were not really relevant to the factors mentioned in section 17
of RA 6657.

Going over the factors in Section 17, it is clear that almost all were not properly considered and
some positively ignored. For instance: (a) The cost of acquisition was not even inquired
into. It would not have been difficult to require respondent to present evidence of the propertys
price when he acquired the same. (b) As to the nature of the property, it has already been
explained that the lower courts erroneously treated it as residential rather than agricultural. (c)

Also, no heed was given to the current value of like properties. Since respondents
property is agricultural in nature, like properties in this case would be agricultural lands,
preferably also sugarcane lands, within the municipality or adjacent municipalities. But the
chief appraiser of the Rural Bank of Mabalacat testified that he considered the value of adjacent
residential properties, not like properties as required under the law. Comparing respondents
agricultural property to residential properties is not what the law envisioned. (d) The factor of
actual use and income of the property was also ignored; what was instead considered
was the propertys potential use.

Thus, the valuation by the lower courts is not acceptable, as it is not in accordance with Section
17 of RA 6657. It was based on respondents evidence which were irrelevant or off-tangent to
the factors laid down by Section 17.
However, the valuation proffered by LBP is not acceptable too for lack of proper substantiation.

Given that both parties failed to adduce evidence of the propertys value as an agricultural land
at the time of taking, it is premature for the Court to make a final decision on the matter. The
barren records of this case leave us in no position to resolve the dispute. Not being a trier of
facts, the Court cannot also receive new evidence from the parties that would aid in the prompt
resolution of this case. We are thus constrained to remand the case to the trial court for the
reception of evidence and determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of
RA 6657.

G.R. No. 182758: May 30, 2011

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. HEIRS OF SEVERINO LISTANA,
Respondents.
CARPIO,J.:

FACTS:
Listana owned a parcel of land inSorsogon which he voluntarily sold to the government. The
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) set the amount at P10,956,963.25
and ordered petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to payListanathe same.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ordered Lorayes, who was the Land Bank
Manager and Agrarian OperationsCenter Head, to payListanaP10,956,963.25.He refused.
Thus,Listanafiled with the PARAD a motion for contempt againstLorayes. The same was granted
and Lorayes was ordered to be imprisoned until he complied with the DARAB decision.
Questioning the amount fixed by the DARAB, LBP, filed with the RTC, acting as special agrarian
court (SAC), a petition for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation. LBP prays
that it be fixed at P5,871,689.03. The petition was dismissed. LBP appealed.
The PARAD then ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to
payListanaP10,956,963.25. It then issued a warrant of arrest againstLorayes.
LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest
againstLorayes. The RTC granted the petition and enjoined the PARAD from implementing the
warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of just compensation for the
property. LBP posted aP5,644,773.02 cash bond.
Listana filed a MR against the enjoinment. It was denied. He then elevated the case the CA
which granted his petition. LBP, questioning the decision of the CA, filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, the Court then decided in favor of LBP and thus affirmed the orders of
the RTC. Thus, PARAD is enjoined from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property.
LBP then filed with the RTC a motionto withdraw theP5,644,773.02 cash bond. It was, however,
denied. LBP filed an MR which was likewise denied. LBP then elevated the issue to the CA where
it lost. Thus, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the withdrawal of the P5,644,773.02 cash
bond.
HELD:
No, the petition is unmeritorious.
In denying LBCs prayer that it be allowed to withdraw the cash bond, the Court held that the
underlying reason for the posting of the cash bond still remains, and that reason is the fact that
the cash bond was put up in order to secure any damages that the private respondentListanamay
incur by reason of the issuance of the injunction order. It clearly means that the release of the
cash bond would depend on the final termination of the main action the just compensation case.
To this date, the Supreme Court has not rendered a resolution pertaining thereto.

G.R. No. 166298: November 17, 2010

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOEL R. UMANDAP
and FELICIDAD D. UMANDAP, Respondents
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Spouses Umandap owned a 412 hectare land in Roxas, Palawan. The Department of Agrarian
Reform put 406 hectares under the CARP and offered 3.4 Million php for it. The spouses
rejected the offer, and a summary adjudicatory proceeding was commenced to determine the
value of the land. The mediator put the value at 23 Million php.
The LBP filed a petition for judicial determination of proper compensation with the RTC.
However, the Spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that LBP failed to attach the
certificate against forum shopping. The petition was dismissed also on the ground that there was
no authentication from the LBP officer or director to file the case. LBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, this time signed by the LBP President. Again, it was dismissed. Because the
spouses Umandap filed a Motion to Dismiss anew, pointing out that Section 11, Rule XIII of the
1994 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure provides
for a 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the Decision of the Adjudicator, and
that the refiled petition was filed beyond this period.
On certiorari, the CA favoured the LBP. However, the Motion for Reconsideration by the
Spouses reversed this decision. It stated that Certiorari was not the proper remedy for an order
of dismissal AND there must be a Motion for Reconsideration before filing a Certiorari case.
Certiorari cannot be substituted for a lost appeal. Thus, LBP files the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Certiorari is the proper remedy for the case of LBP.
HELD: Petition granted.
For clarity, the following are the pertinent dates necessary for the disposition of this case:
1.December 9, 2002 Adjudicators Decision fixing just compensation;
2.December 11, 2002 LBP received the December 9, 2002 Decision;
3.December 26, 2002 LBP filed Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3750;
4.February 3, 2003 RTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 3750 without prejudice;
5.February 21, 2003 LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching certification;
6.April 30, 2003 RTC issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration;
7.May 29, 2003 LBP received the April 30, 2003 Order;
8.June 3, 2003 LBP refiled the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 3785; and
9.June 30, 2003 RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 3785 on the ground that the DARAB Decision
dated December 9, 2002 had become final.
Remedial LAW: Jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts
The Court of Appeals held that since the decision of the adjudicator in the case at bar was
received by LBP on December 11, 2002, the appeal to the SAC should be filed on or before
December 26, 2002.The original Petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3750 was indeed filed on
the last day of the period, December 26, 2002.However, Civil Case No. 3750 was dismissed
without prejudice, and the Motion for Reconsideration on the Dismissal Order was denied.
In the case at bar, the refiling of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation
was done within five days from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the order
dismissing the original petition, during which time said dismissal could still be appealed to the

Court of Appeals.The SAC even expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the
period within which a complaint dismissed without prejudice may be refiled.The statutorily
mandated original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, as well as the above circumstances
showing that LBP did not appear to have been sleeping on its rights in the allegedly belated
refiling of the petition, lead us to assume a liberal construction of the pertinent rules. To be sure,
LBPs intent to question the RARADs valuation of the land became evident with the filing of the
first petition for determination of just compensation within the period prescribed by the DARAB
Rules. Although the first petition was dismissed without prejudice on a technicality, LBPs
refiling of essentially the same petition with a proper non-forum shopping certification while the
earlier dismissal order had not attained finality should have been accepted by the trial court.
Petition is GRANTED. The RTC case of determination of just compensation is REINSTATED.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Jacinto

G.R. No. 154622, August 3, 2010
Villarama, Jr.

Facts:
First Women Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from Land Bank of the Philippines. As
security for the loan, Ramon P. Jacinto, president of FWCC issued nine postdated checks in
favor of Land Bank.
Thereafter, the parties entered into several correspondences, which gave rise to the execution of
a Restructuring Agreement. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan under the
restructured agreement, Land Bank presented the checks for payment, but these were
dishonored for the reason of "payment stopped" or "drawn against insufficient funds."
Thus, Land Bank filed a case for violation of BP22 against Jacinto. Jacinto counters that there is
a prejudicial question involved, that is, a determination of whether there has been a novation of
the original agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the novation of the original agreement is a prejudicial question in a case
involving the violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Held:
No. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is
released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC
and Land Bank expressly provide that respondent JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue
to secure the loan obligation and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the
obligation.
Moreover, it is well settled that B.P. 22 covers the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if
merely as an accommodation. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if it be
subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is
not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the dishonored checks.

G.R. No. 190660 : April 11, 2011

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
ELIZABETH DIAZ, represented by FRANCISCA P. DE GUZMAN as Attorney-inFact, Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent Elizabeth P. Diaz (Elizabeth) was the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land measuring approximately 15 hectares, situated in Nueva Ecija. Ten hectares of
the land were expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Presidential
Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228.
Elizabeth was not satisfied with the valuation made by DAR. This prompted her to file a
complaint against the petitioner and DAR asking for just compensation over th said land. The
RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) adopted the DARs valuation on the basis of
average gross production and fixed the just compensation. Hence, the filing of a n appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner filed a filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Defendant-Appellee[s] Motion to Dismiss Appeal, maintaining that the appeal should be
dismissed because an ordinary appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by way of a
petition for review, citing Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Hence, Land Bank concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the
case, the SAC decision having attained finality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction over the appeal filed by Elizabeth.
HELD:

The petition is granted.

REMEDIAL LAW : Appeals
Following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, the proper mode of appeal from decisions of
Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The Court, in the immediately cited
case of Land Bank held that Sec. 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said
mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.
The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of appeal is justified in order to hasten the
resolution of cases involving issues on just compensation of expropriated lands under RA 6657.
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by
the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct
amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such
objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review
hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired
property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal.

In the case at hand, the resort by Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal was fatal to her cause as
it resulted in rendering the decision appealed from final and executory. Her notice of appeal did
not stop the running of the reglementary period to file a petition for review.
The Court stated that although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held
that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory
privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules
regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality,
it becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no
court - not even the Supreme Court - has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same.
Therefore, the petition is granted. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the
Decision of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court is deemed final and executory.

G.R. No. 176951: June 28, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES(LCP) Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS et al. , Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
We hereby consider and resolve:(a) the petitionersMotion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April2011, attached to which is aMotionfor
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For
Reconsideration), praying that theresolutionof April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside; and
(b) the respondentsMotion for Entry of Judgmentdated May 9, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether the Motion for Entry of Judgment should be granted
HELD:
Yes
REMEDIAL LAW: Motion for Reconsideration
As its prayer for relief shows, theMotion for Reconsiderationseeks the reconsideration, reversal,
or setting aside of theresolutionofApril 12, 2011.In turn, theresolutionofApril 12, 2011denied the
petitionersAd Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated15 February 2011).
Clearly, theMotion for Reconsiderationisreally asecondmotion for reconsideration in relation to
the resolutiondated February 15, 2011.
Anotherindicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact that theMotion for
Reconsiderationraises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners already raised in theirAd
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011).
TheMotion for Reconsideration,being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be
entertained. As to that, Section 2of Rule 51 of the Rules of Courtis unqualified. The Court has
firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may a
second motion for reconsideration be entertained. The restrictive policyagainsta second motion
for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgatedInternal Rules of the
Supreme Court,whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:
Section 3.Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of
justice by the Courten bancupon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership.There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties.A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by
the Courts declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the CourtEn Banc.
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration "can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by
the Courts declaration" even renders the denial of the petitionersMotion for Reconsideration
more compelling. As theresolutionofApril 12, 2011bears out,the ruling sought to be reconsidered
became finalby the Courts express declaration.Consequently, thedenialoftheMotion for
Reconsiderationis immediately warranted.

Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the
respondents own second motion for reconsideration.There is no similarity between then and
now, however, for the Courten bancitself unanimously declared in theresolutionofJune 2,
2009that the respondents second motion for reconsideration was "no longer a prohibited
pleading."No similar declaration favors the petitionersMotion for Reconsideration.
Finally, considering that the petitionersMotion for Reconsiderationmerely rehashes the issues
previously put forward, particularly in theAd Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February 2011),the Court, having already passed upon such issues with
finality, finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid repetition and redundancy.
Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood
Laws nowabsolutelywarrantsthe granting of respondentsMotion for Entry of Judgment.
PETITION DENIED.

G.R. No. 176389/ G.R. No. 176864: January 18, 2011

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent/

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Appellee vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,
ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ,
MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDOIONG
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
The Supreme Court, in a decision promulgated on December 14, 2010, overturned the
conviction of Hubert Webb et al. Complainant Lauro Vizconde questioned the said order. He
alleged that the decision deprived the prosecution due process, that there was serious
misappreciation of facts, that it was erroneous to disregard the credibility of witness Jessica
Alfaro, and that there was grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of Hubert Webb et al. was proper.
HELD:
Petition is without merit.
Remedial Law: As a general rule, an acquittal may not be appealed as such would be in violation
of the prohibition against double jeopardy. The decision, however, may be subject to judicial
review for grave abuse of discretion. The grounds for this judicial review are very narrow. One
such case was when the SC nullified an acquittal which was essentially not tried. There was lack
of due process, hence the acquittal was deemed capricious. In the matter at hand, though the
grounds for an exception were raised, they were not substantiated. All the appeal had were
conclusions of law and fact, and as such, cannot overturn the decision.
Remedial Law (from Concurring Opinion of Justice Serreno): The acquittal of Webb et al. is not
merely because of reasonable doubt. It is because the Court believes that Webb et al. were
innocent. The Trial Court erred in the appreciation of Jessica Alfaro as a credible witness. In
fact, she was protected by the trial court. She was not properly cross-examined as the matters
raised by the defense were struck down as irrelevant. Among these are the status of her brother
with the NBI, which should have brought her partiality in question, and the inconsistency
between her claim of finishing 2nd year college, but her transcript says that she only finished 9
units. Alfaro was also afforded the rights of an accused when the defense questioned the many
inconsistencies in her two affidavits, the judge upheld her right to counsel in the execution of
such and struck down the question. The trial judge also preferred speculation over the
presumptive truth of official documents. To prove that Webb was not in the Philippines when
the crime was allegedly committed, the defense presented a United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (US INS) Certification, which was further certified by the DFA. The judge
favored the unsubstantiated speculation that such was acquired through the influence of his
family. Official documents enjoy a presumption of regularity and truth. The only way to impeach
such presumption is through evidence proving the contrary. This, the prosecution did not have.
As such, Webb is innocent and should be acquitted.

G.R. No. 154462.January 19, 2011

SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES, petitioners, vs. FORMER TENTH

DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21,
BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1,
BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR and SPOUSES GUALBERTO & RENE CABAHUGSUPERALES, respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Superales filed a case for forcible entry with damages against the spouses Leynes.
They alleged that they own and occupy a lot in Davao del Sur and that the spouses Leynes,
through force, stealth and strategy, encroached upon and occupied a portion of the said lot. They
were able to reach an amicable settlement regarding the boundaries of each of their lots but the
spouses Leynes thereafter refused to comply with the terms. The spouses Superales then
proceeded with filing the civil action against the spouses Leynes. The spouses Leynes were
unable to file their answer within the reglementary period. Though the last day of which was a
Saturday there were court personnel present. The MCTC held that failure to file the answer by
that Saturday would merit judgment by the court motu proprio as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The spouses Leynes appealed
the MCTC decision to the RTC, which affirmed the MCTCs decision. The RTC also denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Leynes. The spouses Leynes then filed a petition
for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed it outright for being the wrong remedy. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied. The spouses Leynes then filed the instant petition
for certiorari charging the CA, RTC and MCTC with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of spouses Leynes based on mere technicality
without considering the merits of the case.
HELD:
The petition is unmeritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW Certiorari
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the spouses Leynes for being the wrong
mode of appeal. Since the RTC in this case decided in its appellate jurisdiction, according to
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 the spouses Leynes should have appealed it to the CA by
means of a petition for review under rule 42 of the Rules of Court. However, the spouses Leynes
in this case went before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Also, when appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Certiorari is not and cannot substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own
negligence or error in ones choice of remedy was the reason for such lapse. One of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Between an appeal and a petition forcertiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose.Certiorariis a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment.InPure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment.This cannot be allowed.The administration of justice would not survive such a

rule.Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action ofcertiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ ofcertioraricannot be exercised
for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the
basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision.Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province ofcertiorari.Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing.Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power
of review.Over acertiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition forcertiorariis an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of.The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action.In contrast, the
parties to a petition forcertiorariare the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner)
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter.Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declare are appealable.Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action forcertiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment;
or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing.Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from.Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment
or final order.A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice
of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.In an appeal bycertiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition forcertiorarishould be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution.If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration.A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition forcertiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors.Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law.Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 175256 : August 23, 2012

LILY LIM, Petitioner, v. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 179160
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, v. LILY LIM, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Charlie Co (Co) purchased 50,000 bags of cement from Fil-Cement Center and
Tigerbilt for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag covered by withdrawal
authorities. In turn, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lily Lim (Lim) at the
price of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Lim successfully withdrew 2,800
bags of cement. However, Lim failed to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags
covered by the withdrawal authorities. Co explained to Lim that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for
the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement.
Consequently, Lim filed a case for estafa against Co before the RTC of Pasig City.
The RTC acquitted Co and also relieved him from civil liability. Lim appealed the civil
aspect of the criminal case. The appeal was raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
Thereafter, Lim also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before
the RTC of Manila. Co moved to dismiss the case and Lims appeal in the civil aspect
of the estafa case on the grounds of lis pendens and forum shopping.
The CA Second Division ruled in favor of Co and dismissed Lims appeal from the
civil aspect of the estafa case. Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos motion to
dismiss. Thus, Co appealed the Manila RTCs decision. The CA Seventeenth Division
denied Cos petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim committed forum shopping in filing the civil case for
specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil
aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
HELD: Cos petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW: civil liability; independent civil actions
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender -- (1) civil liability ex delicto,
that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may
be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability
may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of
contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute
felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific
provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex
delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil

liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action
declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist." On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the
criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and
33 of the Civil Code.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. The first action is clearly a civil action ex
delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other
hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a
civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of
rights).

Lily Lims petition is GRANTED. Charlie Cos petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 193753 : September 26, 2012

LIVING @ SENSE, INC., Petitioner, v. MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

INC., Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Living @ Sense, Inc. (Living @ Sense) was the main contractor of the FOC Network
Project of Globe Telecom in Mindanao. In connection with the project, Living @ Sense
sub-contracted Dou Mac, Inc. (DMI). Thus, Living @ Sense required DMI to post a
bond. DMI secured surety and performance bonds from respondent Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. (Malayan). Malayan bound itself jointly and severally with DMI for the
damages and actual loss that Living @ Sense may suffer should DMI fail to perform its
obligations under the Agreement.
Living @ Sense terminated its agreement with DMI for the latters unsatisfactory work.
Thereafter, Living @ Sense sought indemnification from Malayan but Malayan refused
to pay. Hence, Living @ Sense filed a complaint before the RTC. However, the RTC
dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure of Living @ Sense to implead DMI
as an indispensable party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DMI is an indispensable party?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW: indispensable party
The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined mandatorily either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, the
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In this case, DMI is not an indispensable party because petitioner can claim indemnity
directly from respondent, having made itself jointly and severally liable with DMI for the
obligation under the bonds. Therefore, the failure to implead DMI is not a ground to
dismiss the case, even if the same was without prejudice.
Moreover, even on the assumption that DMI was, indeed, an indispensable party, the
RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the complaint. Failure to implead an
indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such
case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable, considering that parties may be
added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action.

Orders of the RTC are SET ASIDE. Petitioner's complaint is ordered

REINSTATED and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 156375: May 30, 2011

DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, Petitioner, v. RENATO AND
MELBAZAMORA, Respondents.
BERSAMIN,J.:
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC alleging that the
petitioner sold respondent a residential land and that petitioner requested that she be
allowed to stay until she finds a new residence. They further alleged that despite their
demand after a year, the petitioner did not vacate the premises.
Petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in default and proceeded to
receive the respondents evidence. Thereafter, the MTCC rendered judgment against
petitioner.
The petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring that there was extrinsic fraud and that she
had a meritorious defense in that there was no actual sale considering that the absolute
deed of sale relied upon by the plaintiff-appell[ees] is a patent-nullity as her signature
therein was procured through fraud and trickery.
The RTC resolved the appeal dismissing the complaint for failure to state cause of action
and further ruling that the same may be refilled in the same court by alleging plaintiffs
cause of action, if any.
The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for "disregarding the
allegations in the complaint" in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of
action.
The CA reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents.
The petitioners MR was denied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the CA correctly found that the RTC erred in ruling on issues not raised by
the petitioner in her appeal,
(2)Whether the CA correctly found that the complaint stated a valid cause of action,
(3) Whether petitioners defense of ownership was meritorious.
HELD: We grant the petition for review.
RTC, AS AN APPELLATE COURT, MAY RULE UPON AN ISSUE NOT
RAISED ON APPEAL
Petitioners appeal herein is taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC. It is
governed by Section 18 of Rule 70 of theRules of Court, thus, the RTC shall decide the
same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings. As a result, the RTC presently

decidesallappeals from the MTC based onthe entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin.
Further, even without the differentiation, the limitation of the review allows for certain
exceptions. Here, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and resolution of the
two errors despite their being: (a) necessary in arriving at a just decision and a complete
resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having some bearing on the issues
submitted that the lower court ignored.
CA CORRECTLY DELVED INTO WHETHER THE COMPLAINT STATED A
CAUSE OF ACTION
The complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer; it averred that
the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance; respondents demanded
petitioner vacate the property rendering her possession illegal; she remained in
possession of the property; respondents instituted the complaint within a year after the
demand to vacate was made. How the RTC came to the questionable conclusion that
Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action is beyond Us.
Yet, we must hold that the lower courts erroneously appreciated the real issue. It
certainly was not failure to state cause of action, but the respondents lack of cause of
action which refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action
alleged in the pleading. Here, neither Exhibit C nor Exhibit E was a proper demand to
vacate since both demanded payment. Thus, the RTC concluded that the demand
alleged in the complaint did not constitute a demand to pay rent and to vacate the
premises necessary in an action for unlawful detainer.
EJECTMENT NOT PROPER, DEFENSE OF OWNERSHIP ESTABLISHED
Here, there is conflict between the allegation of the complaint and the document
attached thereto. Respondents Exhibits, by demanding payment from the petitioner,
revealed the true nature of the transaction involving the property in question as one of
equitable mortgage, not a sale. Article 1602 of theCivil Code provides that a contract,
regardless of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage. Given the
circumstances of the case, petitioner rightfully claimed that she is still the owner of the
disputed property.

G.R. No. 173081: December 15, 2010

ERNESTO MARCELO, JR. and LAURO LLAMES, Petitioners v. RAFAEL R.
VILLORDON, Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 2 April 2004, petitioner, together with two others, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City a criminal complaint against their former employer Dee. The criminal complaint
stemmed from Dees non-payment of their wages as President and General Manager of New
Sampaguita Builders Construction Incorporated. On 28 April 2004, respondent Assistant City
Prosecutor of Villordon issued a subpoena against Dee to appear at the PI of the case. Dee failed
to appear. The case was again set for preliminary investigation on several dates but Dee failed to
appear in all of them. Each time the case was reset, petitioners asked that the case be declared
submitted for resolution. On 29 July 2004, Villordon declared the case submitted for resolution.
On 5 November 2004, Dee filed a motion to reopen the case and attached his Counter-Affidavit.
Assistant City Prosecutor Rogelio Velasco, Villordons Division Chief, approved the motion.
Villordon then called the parties to a hearing. At the hearing, Dee failed to appear but
petitioners were present and signed the minutes of the hearing confirming that they would
appear and submit their Reply-Affidavit. Another hearing was also scheduled. On both dates,
Dee failed to appear and petitioners did not submit their Reply-Affidavit. On 22 March 2005,
petitioners filed a proceeding for grievance/request for assistance with the OMB. After several
follow-ups for the early resolution of the case without receiving any action on the matter,
petitioners later filed a case for violation of Section 3(f) of RA 30197 against Villordon with the
OMB; OMB dismissed the case.
Meanwhile, on 19 September 2005, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus against Villordon
with the RTC. RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
REMEDIAL LAW; MANDAMUS
A preliminary investigation is conducted before an accused is placed on trial to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial.
It is also intended to protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. Thus,
a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal or technical right but is a substantive right
Here, due to the non-appearance of Dee on several hearings and the non-submission of the
reply-affidavit by petitioners, Villordon cannot be faulted if he is still not convinced that a
criminal information should be filed against Dee. Villordon may need to consider more evidence

material to the complaint and is giving both parties the chance to submit their supporting
documents.
Also, the assertion of petitioners that the evidence against Dee is strong, amounting to grave
abuse of discretion on Villordons part in not filing the criminal information, has not been clearly
established. The records show that aside from petitioners bare declarations, no other proof was
submitted.
Moreover, petitioners were not able to sufficiently demonstrate that they had no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in order to be entitled to mandamus. A more expeditious and
effective recourse could have been simply to submit their reply-affidavit in order for Villordon to
make the proper determination whether there was sufficient ground to hold Dee for trial.
Instead, petitioners resorted to filing cases in different fora like the OMB and the RTC to compel
Villordon to file the criminal information against Dee immediately.
In sum, since the institution of a criminal action involves the exercise of sound discretion by the
prosecutor and there being other plain, speedy and adequate remedies available to petitioners,
the resort to the extraordinary writ of mandamus must fail.

G.R. No. 192377 : July 25, 2012

CESAR V. MADRIAGA, JR., Petitioner, v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
Respondent.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
In 1991, the spouses Rolando and Norma Trajano (Spouses Trajano) sold two residential
properties covered by TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M) to petitioners father, Cesar
Madriaga, Sr. (Madriaga, Sr.). However, the spouses failed to deliver the titles. Thus,
Madriaga, Sr. sued the spouses before the RTC. During the pendency of the case, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement. The spouses failed to comply with their
obligation under the compromise judgment. On motion of Madriaga, Sr., the RTC issued
a writ of execution and several properties of Spouses Trajano were levied upon,
including the properties covered by TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M).
Meanwhile, on January 2, 1995, the spouses Trajano obtained a loan from China Bank
payable in one year and secured by a mortgage over the same properties covered by TCT
Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M).
At the auction held on February 22, 1995, Madriaga, Sr. was declared the winning
bidder. After the period of redemption, the titles of the said properties were
consolidated in his name and a writ of possession was issued in his favor.
However, on October 20, 1997, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage upon default of the
spouses and was declared as the highest bidder. Upon ex parte motion, the RTC issued a
writ of possession in favor of China Bank.
Perforce, Madriaga, Jr. filed a "Motion to Quash/Abate the Writ of Possession"
contending that his late father was the true owner of the properties, having obtained
them at the earlier execution sale. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal, the CA
upheld the RTC. Hence, the present recourse. Madriaga, Jr. claims that an ex parte writ

of possession is null and void ab initio for failure of the court to notify his father; thus,
due process was violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the ex parte motion for the issuance
of writ of possession?
HELD: The Court denies the petition.
REMEDIAL LAW: writ of possession
Section 7 of Act 3135 expressly allows the buyer at the auction to file a verified petition
in the form of an ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of possession. This connotes that
it is for the benefit of one party, without notice to or challenge by an adverse party.
Being summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits, but is simply
an incident in the transfer of title. Indeed, the proceeding in a petition for a writ of
possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the
benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adversely
interested. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without affording the person
against whom the relief is sought the opportunity to be heard. No notice is needed to be
served upon persons interested in the subject property. And as held in Carlos v. Court
of Appeals, the ex parte nature of the proceeding does not deny due process to the
petitioners because the issuance of the writ of possession does not bar a separate case
for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale. Hence, the RTC may grant the petition
even in the absence of Madriaga, Sr.s participation.
The rule, however, admits of an exception. Thus, it is specifically provided in Section 33,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that the possession of the extrajudicially foreclosed
property shall be withheld from the purchaser if a third-party is actually holding the
same adversely to the mortgagor/debtor. In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property,
when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third-party holding the same
adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and
may no longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property need
not only be possessed by a third- party, but also held by the third-party adversely to the
debtor/mortgagor.
In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc., the Court
discussed the meaning of a "third-party who is actually holding the property adversely
to the judgment obligor" "the exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the
property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The
co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right,
and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another
co-owner or the owner of the property."
Moreover, it must be emphasized that Madriaga, Sr.s possession was by virtue of the
1991 agreement between him and Spouses Trajano for the sale of the properties. It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that their claim of possession was acquired from Spouses
Trajano, which cannot be considered adverse or contrary, and the RTC had all the
authority to issue the ex parte writ of possession.

The petition for review is DENIED.

G.R. No. 171542 : April 6, 2011

ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ MAE GREGORIO, GIAN
CARLO CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, DONATO ENABE
and ALFIE FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and
double attempted murder against several accused, including Magno, who were public
officers working under the NBI.
Despite the petitioner objecttion to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy,
who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office
of the Ombudsman, the RTC issued an Order ruling that the Ombudsman is proper,
legal and authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other
entity/person other than those authorized under R.A. 6770. Thus, prohibiting the
appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the private offended parties.
A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA. The CA ruled that the private
prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the Criminal Case to intervene in the
prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the
Ombudsman to prosecute the case.
ISSUE : Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari
HELD:
The petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW : Jurisdiction

No, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari. The
Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs decision not to
allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman. PD No. 1606 which
created the Sandiganbayan establishes that it shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether
in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for
certiorari filed by Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC
is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should
have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of
committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred
by law and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot be
given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first
time on appeal or even after final judgment.
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case since Magno raised
the issue of jurisdiction before the CAs decision became final. Further, even if the issue
had been raised only on appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still not
be cured. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel. However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.
The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, the
Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for reconsideration is
overruled.
Therefore, the petitioners petitioners petition for review on certiorari is
denied. The decision of the CA is null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction.
Justina Maniebo v. Court of Appeals and Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010

Bersamin
Facts: A civil service employee was dismissed from service for falsification of the in the
required Career Service examination. Upon appeal of the CSC Decision, the CA
dismissed the same for failure to attach the annexes of such decision.

The petitioner claims that the attachment of the certified true copy of the resolution
constitutes substantial compliance, thus, the petition for review before the CA should
not have been dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not attaching a certified true copy of an appealed decision of an
administrative agency constitutes substantial compliance for the requirement of
attaching the annexes of said decision.
Held: No. The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by "a
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers."The requirement
is intended to immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the
appeal or not by having all the material necessary to make such determination before it.
This is because an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA
may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the
petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice.
G.R. No. 189311 : December 6, 2010
DENNIS R. MANZANAL and BAGUIOCOUNTRYCLUB CORPORATION,
Petitioners, v. RAMON K. ILUSORIO, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
FACTS:
A penthouse unit (PH-1) at the Baguio Country Club Corporation building inBaguiowas
assigned to respondent by one Felix Adolfo B. Lopez, Jr., with the conformity of BCCC.
Respondent requested for a breakdown of the his statement of account which BCCC,
thru Vice President Manzanal, complied with, to which was attached respondents
Statement of Account itemizing the amount which in fact totaledP2,928,223.26.
BCCC subsequently sent a final demand letter to respondent for the immediate payment
of the unpaid charges, failing which, BCCC stated, it "shall be constrained to take the
necessary action available under the clubs rules to protect the interests of the club."
Taking the demand letters letter as a form of harassment from his family who was
utilizing Manzanal and BCCC (petitioners) for that purpose, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners before the Makati RTC.Respondent averred
that,inter alia,he should not be charged for the use of the unit as he, as owner, is
entitled to its use and enjoyment.
Petitioner Manzanal filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, he alleging that being merely an officer who signed on behalf of BCCC, he
should not be personally liable.He explained that the act of sending a demand letter
does not constitute a cause of action against the obligee/creditor. Alternatively,
Manzanal claimed that respondents asseverations against him and BCCC should be
ventilated as a matter of defense in the collection suit filed against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has a cause of action in filing the complaint.
HELD: T
he petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW; CAUSE OF ACTION
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another,
entitling the injured party to relief.Its existence is determined from the
allegations in the complaint.
The Court finds from the tenor of the demand letters, which respondent annexed to his
complaint, that it did not deviate from the standard practice of pursuing the satisfaction
of a club members obligations.Respondent did not indicate in his complaint how
tenuous petitioners claim for unpaid charges is. In his reply to petitioners final letter of
demand, he in fact did not contradict petitioners statement that his work partners and
employees used his unit, thereby admitting that he welched on his undertaking in the
contract thatonly family members are allowed free usage.
As an exclusive organization which primarily derives life from membership fees and
charges, BCCC is expected to enforce claims from members in default of their
contractual obligations.
The petition isGRANTED.

G.R. No. 168707: September 15, 2010

MARLA MACADAEG LAUREL, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, A
BODY CORPORATE ACTING THROUGH THE SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION AND THE PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED
PERSONS (PARP), REPRESENTED BY HONESTO C. GENERAL,
Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Honesto General, a Social Security System (SSS) member and a representative of the
Philippine Association of Retired Persons, charged some SSS officers and employees,
including its Senior Vice-President for Administration, petitioner Marla M. Laurel, with
grave misconduct, conduct gravely prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
gross neglect in the performance of duty before the Office of the Ombudsman.
General alleged that on August 1 and 2, 2001, Laurel and the others held concerted
strikes within the premises of the SSS Main Office, demanding the resignation of then
SSS President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Vitaliano Nanagas II. After evaluating
the charges, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman referred the matter to the Social Security
Commission (SSC) for disposition.
Laurel countered that she had no part in the strike and that General charged her based
on the guilty by association theory. Indeed, on June 14, 2001 she issued a
Memorandum, advising all SSS officers and employees to avoid any action that could
adversely affect their status and the SSS operations and to stay within the bounds of the
law.
The SSC denied admission of General's complaint on the ground that the pieces of
evidence he submitted did not sufficiently substantiate his allegation of conspiracy.
Still, the SSC kept the supplemental and additional affidavits as part of the record for
whatever they were worth.

Subsequently, the SSC rendered a Decision in the case, finding Laurel guilty of simple
neglect of duty and imposing on her a fine equivalent to one months salary.
On appeal, the CA rendered a decision, denying Laurel's petition. The CA ruled that the
proper mode of appeal for her is a petition under Rule 43, not a special civil action of
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in denying the petition on the technical ground it
invoked
2. Whether or not the SSC gravely abused its discretion in finding Laurel guilty of
simple neglect of duty
REMEDIAL LAW: Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities involving disciplinary actions against its officers and
employees are final and inappealable when the penalty they impose is
suspension for not more than 30 days; thus, a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 is available

HELD:
The SSC is a quasi-judicial agency and, therefore, its decisions are reviewable by petition
for review under Rule 43. The CA committed a serious error.
Under the law, the decisions of heads of departments, agencies, and instrumentalities
involving disciplinary actions against its officers and employees are final and
inappealable when the penalty they impose is suspension for not more than 30 days or,
as the SSC meted out to Laurel, a fine not exceeding 30 days salary.
True, petitions for review under Rule 43 specifically cover decisions rendered by the
SSC. But this applies only to SSC decisions where the remedy of appeal is available.
Here, considering that the law regards the kind of penalty the SSC imposed on Laurel
already final, she had no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against the decision of that body. Provided the SSC committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision against her, Laurel can avail herself
of the remedy of special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Laurel is not guilty of simple neglect of duty. The SSC also regarded the July 15, 2001
Manifesto as a sign that Laurel encouraged the employees to engage in mass action. On
the contrary, the Manifesto expressed Laurel's longing to see an end to the dispute
between Nanagas and the SSS officers and employees. Laurel and other SSS officers
were caught in the middle and had become targets of increasing animosities from the
unyielding sides. They wanted to find a peaceful way to end it, prompting them to sign
the Manifesto requesting then President Gloria Arroyo to just replace Nanagas as SSS
President and CEO since he had declared that he was serving at the President's pleasure
and so would not resign.
Also, On July 26, 2001 Laurel and the Senior Vice-President for Legal and Collection
issued a second Memorandum, reminding all SSS officials and employees that they were

prohibited from engaging in strikes and that the Civil Service Commission forbade mass
absences without leave that would result in temporary stoppage of public service, acts
that constitute grounds for administrative charges.

G.R. No. 187912-14, January 31, 2011

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH DIVISION and
THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The Commission on Audit found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding,
Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of bullets of

different calibers that were grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered
as an arms and ammunitions dealer with either the Firearms and Explosives Division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Marquez claimed that his signature was forged. He filed a Motion to Refer Prosecutions
Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation. However, the prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
of Court and posited that since Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had relied on the
competence of his subordinates, there could be no "palpable mistake," thus, he was
estopped from alleging that his signatures on the subject documents were forged. The
prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion merely to delay the proceedings. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan denied Marquez's motion. Citing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, it was of the view that while resort to the expert opinion of handwriting experts
would be helpful in the examination of alleged forged documents, the same was neither
mandatory nor indispensable, since the court can determine forgery from its own
independent examination.
ISSUE:
Whether the SB 5th Division erred in dismissing Marquez's motion.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW - Criminal Procedure; due process; evidence
It is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary
implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his
defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court
fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the
exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of
due process.
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook
rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence of his
choice in his defense, the SB-5th Division committed grave abuse of discretion warranting
intervention from the Court. The anti-graft court should allow him to refer the evidence of
the prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI for examination at the
soonest time possible and for the latter to immediately conduct such examination and to
submit the results to the court within a reasonable time.
Petition is GRANTED.

A.M. No. P-11-2932: May 30, 2011

ANGELITA D. MAYLAS, Complainant, v. JUANCHO M. ESMERIA, Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, MasbateCity, Respondent.
BRION,J.:
FACTS:

The complainant and her husband, Ignacio Maylas, were the plaintiffs in a civil action
forquieting of title and recovery of possession and ownershipagainst the defendantsspouses Oscar and Marilyn Dolendo.
The RTC rendered a Decision as follows: XXXX (2) Declaring the defendants the
possessor and owner of the lot where his (sic) house is presently being constructed
XXXX.
The court issued a writ of possession that, according to the complainant, is defective as
it failed to conform to the second paragraph of the decisions dispositive portion.
On the same day, the respondent filed a motion to secure the assistance of a geodetic
engineer, without furnishing a copy of the motion to the parties, especially the plaintiffs.
The complainant regards this omission to be gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
for it deprived the plaintiffs the opportunity to oppose the motion.
The court granted the respondents motion.
The following day, the respondent filed an officers returnwhich allegedly provided an
inaccurate and misleading information that half of the house ofSps. Oscar and Marilyn
Dolendo was demolished by Sps. Maylas and in the area where the demolition occurred,
the Maylas couple constructed an apartment.
By way of a comment,the respondent asks for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit, contending that it is pure harassment intended to stop him from enforcing the
writ.
With respect to the alleged defective writ of possession, the respondent argues that the
issue is judicial in nature; it was his ministerial duty, as sheriff, to implement the writ.
The respondent further accuses the complainant of citing only portions of the decision
favorable to her and her husband, without taking into consideration that the defendants
(Dolendos) were declared the possessors and owners of the lot where their house is
presently being constructed.
In its memorandum submitted to the Court, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommends that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit, based on the following
evaluation:
EVALUATION: The accusation centers on the alleged distortion of facts by respondent
sheriff in his Officers Return. At any rate, considering that the conflict arose from an
alleged irregularity in the implementation of a writ issued by a trial court, it proper to let
the trial court which issued the Writ of Possession settle the matter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the tribunal which rendered the decision or award has a
general supervisory control over the process of its execution, and this includes the power
to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.
Herein complainant, therefore, should first bring the alleged erroneous allegation and
conclusion of fact by respondent sheriff before the trial court.
Regarding the alleged defective Writ of Possession, respondent sheriff was right when
he pointed out that this is judicial in nature as the same was issued as per Order of the
judge. Clearly, respondent sheriffs duty to implement the same is purely ministerial on
his part.

Lastly, vis-vis the lack of hearing of the Motion for the Assistance of a Geodetic
Engineer, the same was eventually granted by the trial court. If complainant really
believes that they were deprived of the required procedural due process, she should have
impleaded as respondent either the presiding judge or the branch clerk of court, for
these are the court officers primarily responsible in the setting and granting/denying of
a motion.
RECOMMENDATION: Complaint against Juancho M. Esmeria, Sheriff IV of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,MasbateCity, be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
(1) Is this Court, rather than the trial court that issued the writ of execution, the proper
forum to resolve the alleged irregularities in implementing the said writ,
(2) Is respondent, rather than the judge or the clerk of the court that is responsible for
setting and granting/denying motions, the proper person to hold liable for the lack of
notice to the parties in regard to the questioned motion.
HELD:
We approve and adopt the OCAs well-founded recommendation.
Indeed, as the OCA noted, the present controversy is the offshoot of an alleged
irregularity in the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch
46,MasbateCity. The matter, therefore, remains with the supervisory control of the court
and the alleged errors committed by the courts ministerial officers, like the respondent
sheriff, should be correctible by the court.We, thus, support the OCAs view that the
alleged irregularities should have been brought first to the RTC for its resolution.
The same is true with the writ of possession itself. The respondent had nothing to do
with it. It was the judges responsibility as the writ was issued by the court. The
respondent sheriffs duty, it must be stressed, is only to implement the writ and this duty
is ministerial.

G.R. NO. 173292: September 1, 2010

MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO CRUZ, Petitioner, v.
OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila
a Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for Annulment of
Sale, Reconveyance and Damages.
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased)
Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay
Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila. This lot was registered in her name under TCT No.
63467 at the Register of Deeds of Manila. However, sometime in July 1992, she
discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by appellee and the latters
wife in their names in August 1991 under TCT No. 0-199377 by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated February 12, 1973. She now argues that the said deed was executed through fraud,
forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void.
After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30,
1996.
For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs
reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a partys death,
pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to
continue would result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant
and is a co-plaintiff in this case.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case without prejudice to the prosecution
in the proper estate proceedings.
Edgardo Cruz, as an heir of Memoracion Cruz, filed a notice of appeal in behalf of the
deceased plaintiff, signed by Atty. Neri, but the appeal was dismissed by Judge
Mindaro-Grulla, stating that the proper remedy being certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. On appellants motion for reconsideration, Judge Lucia Pena
Purugganan granted the same, stating that the remedy under the circumstances is
ordinary appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruzs Petition
for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action
which did not survive her death
REMEDIAL LAW: Procedure when a party dies during the pendency of the case
HELD:
The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was
elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, to wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.

Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival
despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, it provides that if
the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceaseds counsel to
inform the court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceaseds
legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending
action.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal
representative fails to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where
the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to
protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the
deceased and his estate.
In the instant case, petitioner (plaintiff) Memoracion Z. Cruz died on 30 October
1996. Her counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of such death on 13
January 1997, through a Manifestation stating thus:
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully
gives notice that the plaintiff, Memoracion Z. Cruz, died on October 30, 1996, in Manila
as shown by a Certificate of Death, a certified true copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex A hereof.
The legal representative of the deceased plaintiff is her son EDGARDO CRUZ
whose address is at No. 3231-E Tabora St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila.
Thus, We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier,
the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and
hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit
belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of
her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require
Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending
case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and
established jurisprudence.

G.R. No. 165678: November 22, 2010

JOSE MENDOZA, Petitioner v. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO,
Respondents
Brion, J.:
FACTS:

Mendoza filed a complaint of forcible entry against Gemino. They alleged that despite
repeated demands, Germino did not vacate the property. Respondents answered that they
were agricultural lessees. The MTC remanded the case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).
The PARAD ruled that respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, noting that
they failed to prove that respondent Benigno was the plaintiffsbona fideagricultural lessee.
The PARAD ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs
500 cavans of palay as actual damages. On appeal to the DARAB, it affirmed the decision of
the PARAD. The CA however reversed the decision of the DARAB because it found that the
MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material allegations of the
complaint and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It
noted that the subsequent filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon
the DARAB.Thus, the CA set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC
for further proceedings.
Petitioner filed the present case.
ISSUE:
Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction
HELD:
Petition has no merit.
REMEDIAL LAW: Jurisdiction
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in
the complaint.It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived,
enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character.
Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in
his answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It
continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had
jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits.After all, jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,as amended by R.A. No. 7691,the MTC shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Neither did the
amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the DARAB.The plaintiffs alleged in the
amended complaint that the subject property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo, and
the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their knowledge and
consent. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the
action was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA is affirmed

G.R. No. 176984 : August 29, 2012

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SERVANDO
ARGUELLES (Deceased) & CLAUDIO ARGUELLES and MARILOU
TRINIDAD, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor children
namely, LLOYD, MARK, ADRIAN, and GEORGIA, all surnamed TRINIDAD,
TRISTAN TRINIDAD and EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR., Respondents.

x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 179131
MARILOU TRINIDAD, for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor
children LLOYD, MARK, ADRIAN & GEORGIA, all surnamed TRINIDAD,
EDGARDO TRINIDAD, JR. and TRISTAN TRINIDAD, Petitioners, v. SERV
ANDO ARGUELLES (Deceased) and CLAUDIO ARGUELLES, and
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On November 23, 1983, Servando and Claudio Arguelles (the Arguelleses) entered into a
conditional sale of land with Edgardo Trinidad and his wife Marilou (the Trinidads).
With a deed of sale in their favor, the Trinidads had the land titled in their names.
Thereafter, they obtained a loan from Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(Metrobank) secured by the land.
On January 7, 1997, the Arguelleses filed a complaint against the Trinidads with the
RTC for the cancellation of the title in the latters name and sought to nullify the
mortgages made by the Trinidads in favor of Metrobank. The Arguelleses claimed that
the Trinidads did not fully pay the purchase price of the land. They also averred that the
signatures appearing on the deed of sale were merely forged.
Two handwriting experts testified during the trial on the authenticity of the Arguelleses
signatures appearing on the deed of sale: 1) Atty. Desiderio Pagui whom the Arguelleses
hired and 2) Rogelio Azores of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Atty. Pagui
testified that the signatures were forged while Azores maintained that the signatures
were authentic.
Thus, the RTC ruled in favor of the Arguelleses. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Arguelleses sufficiently proved that the deed of sale was a falsified
document?
HELD:
Petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: burden of proof
Actually, as plaintiffs, the Arguelleses carried the burden of proving the affirmative of
their claims (1) that the Trinidads had not fully paid for the land and (2) that they
caused the falsification of a deed of sale supposedly executed by the Arguelleses in their
favor and used it to transfer the title to the property in their names. Further, by the
nature of their action, the Arguelleses must rely on the strength of their evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendants.
If the Arguelleses were to be believed, they endured the fact that the Trinidads did not
bother to pay them even one installment after the down payment made in November

1983. The Arguelleses supposedly contented themselves with just waiting for when the
payment would come. And they did not bother to make any demand from 1983 to 1996
on the Trinidads for what was due them. Indeed, it was only after some 13 years that
Claudio Arguelles went to the Registry of Deeds to check on the standing of their title.
But, while the trial court generally has discretion to determine the weight to be given to
an expert testimony, it erroneously disregarded Azores findings. Azores, as government
handwriting expert, was a neutral source of opinion. The Chief of the Questioned
Documents Division of the NBI concurred in his findings. Azores findings should be
treated as an official act performed with accepted competence and cloaked with the
mantle of impartiality and neutrality. Atty. Pagui, on the other hand, was a private
practitioner paid for by the Arguelleses. It was but natural for him to support the
position of his client, bringing up tiny details to make up for lack of substance.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 173780:March 21, 2011.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. MARINA B.
CUSTODIO, Respondent.
SERENO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner bank filed a complaint for civil liability against respondent, a bank teller in a
Metrobank branch in Laoag, for allegedly taking P600,000 from the bank while she was
at work. The stipulated facts state that respondent, in the morning of June 13, 1995,
requested a transfer of money from another teller for a withdrawal transaction.
Metrobank alleged that this transfer was unnecessary since there were enough funds
with respondent. At around noon, the security guard testified that respondent ate alone,
though she was usually with a co-worker. She also carried two bags as she went outside
to have lunch, such bags which were not checked by the guard. At the end of the day,
respondent balanced her transactions and turned over the money with her, amounting
to around P2M, to the cash custodian. Ms. Castro, the cash custodian, signed
respondents Cash Transfer Slip and let her go. It was after all the cash was collected that
the P600,000 was discovered missing. The next day respondent returned to work. Later,
several bill wrappers for the amount of P400,000 were found with the stamp
corresponding to respondent teller. An investigation followed, which involved all bank
employees.
Though respondent was allowed to work for a few days after the incident, Metrobank
filed a complaint for a sum of money with a writ for preliminary attachment against
respondent, which was granted by the trial court. The CA, however, reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a preponderance of evidence to establish that
respondent Custodio incurred a cash shortage of PhP600,000 at the close of the
banking day on13 June 1995and is therefore liable to pay petitioner Metrobank the said
amount.
HELD:
The petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW: Preponderance of evidence.
In civil cases such as in the instant action for a sum of money, petitioner Metrobank
carries the burden of proof and must establish its cause of action by a preponderance of
evidence.The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence that is of greater
weight or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
means probability of truth.
The Court sustains the appellate courts finding that petitioner Metrobank failed to
discharge its burden of proving that respondent Custodio was responsible for the cash
shortage. Petitioner Metrobanks evidence on record does not sufficiently establish that
respondent Custodio took the funds that were entrusted to her as a bank teller.
The issue of respondent Custodios civil liability for the cash shortage turns on whether
she is the proximate or direct cause of the loss. There is nothing on record that will show
that there were any missing bundles of one-thousand-peso and five-hundred-peso bills
when respondent Custodio turned over the funds to the cash custodian, Ms. Marinel
Castro. As the appellate court correctly found, the Cash Transfer Slip was the best
evidence that respondent Custodio had properly turned over the amounts in her care,
and that the cash custodian received them without any shortage. According to the
records, and as admitted by Metrobank, Ms. Castro signed the slip. As the Court of
Appeals correctly surmised, Ms. Castros procedural lapse in trusting her co-employees

by automatically signing the cash transfer slip without ensuring its correctness
contributed significantly to the loss of the banks money.
If petitioner bank had to attribute any negligence on the part of its employees, then it
should have set its sights on the acts and/or omissions of Ms. Marinel Castro, the cash
Custodian, and Mr. Hanibal Jara, the security guard.Ms. Castro, who, as cash custodian,
disregarded established procedures and blindly signed the tellers cash transfer slips
without counting the money turned over to her. Meanwhile, Mr. Jara failed to inspect
respondent Custodios belongings as she left the bank on that day for lunch. Despite his
own suspicions of respondent tellers conduct, he ignored them and decided not to check
the bags.
Considering the failure of the cash custodian and the security guard to abide by the
procedural safeguards, petitioner bank is now left to find other evidence to determine
the person liable for the cash shortage. The Court, however, is not sufficiently convinced
that petitioner Metrobank has introduced a preponderance of circumstantial evidence to
show that respondent Custodio was liable for the missing bundles of cash worth
PhP600,000.
Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 185535, January 31, 2011

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
REYNALDO (REYMUNDO) AVILA, CALIXTO AGUIRRE and SPS.
ROLANDO and ANGELITA QUILANG, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Tarrosa leased a parcel of land along the MIAA Road in Pasay city from its owner,
MIAA. Before the expiration of the lease, Tarrosa filed a case against the MIAA to allow
him to exercise his pre-emptive right to renew the lease contract. However, the trial
court dismissed the case because it found that Tarrosa violated certain provisions of its
contract with MIAA. The CA affirmed the lower court's decision. Subsequently, Tarrosa
passed away and he was represented by his heirs.
Thereafter, MIAA sent demand letters to the heirs asking them to vacate the subject
land. The heirs did not heed the demands so MIAA instituted an ejectment suit against
the Estate of Tarrosa. The MeTC ruled in favor of MIAA ordering the Estate and all
persons claiming rights under it to vacate the premises. The RTC affirmed the decision.
After the writ of execution was issued, the remaining occupants, respondents Aguirre,
Avila and spouses Quilang filed motions to squash it. They alleged that they were not
covered by the writ of execution because they did not derive their rights from the Estate
since they entered the premises after the expiration of the lease contract between MIAA
and Tarrosa. Also, they claim that the subject premises had already been set aside as a
government housing project. The RTC denied these motions to set aside the writ of
execution However, the CA annulled the RTC decisions because according to it the
respondents were mere squatters or trespassers so they were not covered by the writ of
execution.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC decision.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW - Jurisdiction; ejectment
Going over the RTCs findings and disposition, the Supreme Court is of the considered
view that it acted well within its jurisdiction. It is settled in ejectment suits that a
defendants claim of ownership over a disputed property will not divest the first level
courts of their summary jurisdiction. Thus, even if the pleadings raise the issue of
ownership, the court may still pass on the same although only for the purpose of
determining the question of possession. Any adjudication with regard to the issue of
ownership is only provisional and will not bar another action between the same parties
which may involve the title to the land. This doctrine is but a necessary consequence of
the nature of ejectment cases where the only issue up for adjudication is the physical or
material possession over the real property.
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 173815: November 24, 2010

MILWAUKEE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
CIR notifiedMilwaukeeof its intent to examine their books of account and other
accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for 1997 and other unverified prior
years. Thereafter, CIR issued three undated assessment noticestogether with a demand
letter and explanation of the deficiency tax assessments.Milwaukeeallegedly owed a
total ofP173,063,711.58 corresponding to the deficiencies on income tax, expanded
withholding and value-added taxes for the 1997 taxable year. Milwaukee protested. The
CTA refused to allow Milwaukee to present rebuttal evidence during the trial, thus the
current petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not allow
Milwaukee to present rebuttal evidence.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
REMEDIAL LAW: Certiorari
In order for a petition forcertiorarito succeed,the following requisites must concur,
namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
In this case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough opportunity
forMilwaukeeto
present
its
rebuttal
evidence.Records
reveal
that
whenMilwaukeerequested for resetting onSeptember 5, 2005andOctober 26, 2005, its
motions were granted by the CTA.As a matter of fact, byJanuary 16,
2006,Milwaukeewas already able to partially present its rebuttal evidence.Thus, when
the CTA called onMilwaukeeto continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence
onFebruary 27, 2006, it should have been prepared to do so. It cannot be said that the
CTA arbitrarily deniedMilwaukees supposed simple request of resetting because it had
already given the latter several months to prepare and gather its rebuttal evidence.
Petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 163286 : August 22, 2012

MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC., Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 166025

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. HON. CESAR M. SOLIS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, MANILA
AND MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 170269
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. HON. CESAR M. SOLIS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, MANILA
AND MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC.,
Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On 28 August 1990, the RTC rendered a decision in Philippine Ports Authority v.
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc., ordering Mindanao Terminal and
Brokerage Service, Inc. (MINTERBRO) to pay Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) the sum
of P36,585,901.18. Aggrieved, MINTERBRO assailed the RTC decision before the Court
of Appeals (CA). The CA in a Decision dated 21 November 2002, affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.
On even date, copies of the said Decision were sent via registered mail to the parties
respective counsels along with the Notice of the Decision. On 17 January 2003, the PPA
received the CAs decision. However, MINTERBRO failed to receive its copy of the CA
decision. Upon inquiry of the CAs Division Clerk of Court, the Postmaster advised the
CA that the copy of the decision addressed to Atty. Rafael S. Dizon, MINTERBROs
counsel, was received by a certain Virgie Cabrera, at 6/F, Padilla Bldg., Emerald Ave.,
Ortigas Commercial Center, Pasig City on 4 December 2002.
Counted from that date, 4 December 2002, the CA Decision became final and executory
on 20 December 2002 or 15 days after Cabreras receipt of the decision. The decision
was, thus, recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Atty. Rafael S. Dizon moved to reconsider arguing that he was not served with the copy
of the CA Decision and therefore, the aforesaid decision has not become final. The CA
denied Atty. Dizons motion. Hence, MINTERBRO appealed to the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the PPA, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment, filed a Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Execution which was granted by the RTC. This notwithstanding, the RTC
later held in abeyance the execution of judgment, per motion of MINTERBRO.
Hence, PPA filed the present petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the decision was properly served on MINTERBROs counsel?
II. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to implement/execute a decision which had
already become final and executory?
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW: service of judgments; execution of judgments

FIRST ISSUE: There was proper service of judgment on MINTERBROs counsel.

The first point is crucial for the service of judgment serves as the reckoning point to
determine whether a decision was appealed within the reglementary period, because
otherwise, i.e., in the absence of an appeal or if the appeal was made beyond the
reglementary period, the decision would, as a consequence, become final.
There is no dispute that as dictated by the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 10
thereof, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or
five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date
is earlier.
The purpose of the afore-quoted rule on service is to make sure that the party being
served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that such
party can take steps to protect the interests, i.e., enable to file an appeal or apply for
other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.
As between the claim of non-receipt of notices of registered mail by a party and the
assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices, which assertion is fortified by the
presumption that the official duty has been regularly performed, the choice is not
difficult to make. As shown in the records, the postmaster included in his certification
the manner, date and the recipient of the delivery, a criterion for the proper service of
judgment which this Court enunciated in Santos v. Court of Appeals. Atty. Dizon has no
one to blame but himself for allowing his client to lose the multi-million case because of
his negligence to appeal the same within the reglementary period.
SECOND ISSUE: The RTC abused its discretion when it held in abeyance the issuance of
the writ of execution of the judgment.
As a matter of law, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to a Writ of Execution as mandated by Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule is clear that it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty
of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become
executory.
Hence, this Court holds that the RTC abused its discretion when it held in abeyance the
issuance of the writ of execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 87-42747 entitled
Philippine Ports Authority v. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services, Inc.,
notwithstanding the fact that the same had already become final and executory this
notwithstanding that MINTERBRO filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is a basic rule that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not by itself interrupt
the course of the proceedings. It is necessary to avail of either a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued by a higher court against a public
respondent so that it may, during the pendency of the petition, refrain from further
proceedings.

G.R. No. 184980:March 30, 2011.

DANILO MORO, Petitioner, v. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR.,
Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:

On December 7, 2005 the Ombudsman charged respondent Generoso Reyes Del

Castillo, Jr. (Del Castillo), then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ)
Accounting Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. On April 1, 2006
the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center by
virtue of GHQ AFP Special Order 91 (SO 91).Through the same order, petitioner Danilo
Moro (Moro), then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of
Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive
suspension for six months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on
February 5, 2007. The penalty imposed on him included cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
the government.Del Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration, which is still pending.
Following the lapse of his six-month suspension or on March 12, 2007 Del Castillo
attempted to reassume his former post of GHQ Chief. Moro declined to yield the
position.Consequently, on April 4, 2007 Del Castillo filed a petition forquo
warrantoagainst Moro with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Del Castillo claimed that
Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed Del
Castillo under preventive suspension.Since the latters period of suspension already
lapsed, he was entitled to resume his former post and Moro was but a usurper.
The RTC denied. In a petition for certiorari before the CA (supposed to be an appeal),
the CA reversed. Among others, the CA held as non-executory the Ombudsmans
dismissal of Del Castillo in view of his appeal from that dismissal. Moro filed the present
petition under Rule 45 after a denial of his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief
Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Quo warranto petition.
An action forquo warrantounder Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In this case, it
was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to
reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended
on March 11, 2007.He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting
Center was valid, the same could not exceed one year.Since his detail at the PAF took
effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could last not later than March 31, 2007.By then,
Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as GHQ Chief
Accountant.
However, as Moro points out, Del Castillo had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as
GHQ Chief Accountant.Del Castillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed
from the service by the Ombudsman, and therefore cannot reassume the said petition.
In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary
of DPWH, the Court held that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order 7, as amended
by Administrative Order 17, clearly provides that an appeal shall not stop a decision of
the Ombudsman from being executory. The Court later reiterated this ruling inOffice of
the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.
Here, Del Castillo brought the action forquo warrantoin his name on April 4, 2007,
months after the Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5,

2007.As explained above, that dismissal order was immediately executory even pending
appeal.Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action forquo warrantoor reassume
the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
Petition is GRANTED, and the CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 196877 : November 21, 2012

ELOISA R. NARCISO, Petitioner, v. ESTELITA P. GARCIA, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:

Plaintiff Estelita P. Garcia (respondent in this case) filed a complaint for damages
against defendant Eloisa R. Narciso (petitioner) before the RTC. Narciso filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint since it averred facts constitutive of forcible entry. Narciso also
assailed the venue as improperly laid.
Garcia opposed the motion to dismiss and at the same time sought to have Narciso
declared in default. Garcia cited the Supreme Courts administrative circular that
discouraged the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of answer. Since the time to file an
answer had already elapsed, said Garcia, she was entitled to have Narciso declared in
default.
On November 30, 2004, the RTC denied Narcisos motion to dismiss and, as a
consequence, declared her in default for failing to file an answer.On December 22, 2004
defendant Narciso filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders denying her motion
to dismiss and declaring her in default for failing to file an answer. The trial court
denied the motion. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs order of denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the order of default that
the RTC issued against petitioner Narciso?
HELD:
Petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: default
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a defending party may be declared
in default upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of failure to file an answer within the time allowed for it.
Here, however, defendant Narciso filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff Garcias complaint
against her before filing an answer. As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that
defendant Narciso filed, the running of the period during which the rules required her to
file her answer was deemed suspended. When the trial court denied her motion to
dismiss, therefore, she had the balance of her period for filing an answer under Section
4, Rule 16 within which to file the same but in no case less than five days, computed
from her receipt of the notice of denial of her motion to dismiss.
What is more, Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts order denying her motion to dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of such a motion
for reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied it does Narciso become
bound to file her answer to Garcias complaint.
Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Order of default against Narciso is
LIFTED.
National Tobacco Administration v. Daniel Castillo
G.R. No. 154124, August 4, 2010
Bersamin
Facts:

Daniel Castillo was one of the former employees of National Tobacco Association
(NTA), whose employment as Cashier I was terminated due to the abolition of his
position. The CSC ordered the re-appointment of Castillo. NTA motion for
reconsideration was denied, and its second motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on the ground that the rules only allow one MR.
NTA filed a petition for review before the CSC, but it was dismissed on the ground that
the proper relief should have been an appeal before the CA.
NTA filed a belated appeal before the CA, but it was dismissed on the ground that NTA
claims of excusable negligence (heavy workload of the lawyer) and meritorious defense
were unconvincing.
Issue:
Whether or not NTA appeal was still allowable.
Held:
No. Mere volume of the work of an attorney has never excused an omission to comply
with the period to appeal. Also, NTA itself caused its own counsel to be overburdened
with work by not employing additional lawyers to handle its excessive legal work and
avoid its present predicament. Clearly, the neglect of counsel in not filing the appeal on
time was not something that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against.
A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer; otherwise, there would never
be an end to a litigation as long as a new counsel could be employed, and who could then
allege and show that the preceding counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
experienced or learned. The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family; such lawyer should adopt
the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions.Moreover, a lawyer owes it to
himself and to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly system of keeping track of the
developments in his cases, and should be knowledgeable of the remedies appropriate to
his cases.

G.R. No. 178611: January 14, 2013

ESTRELLA ADUAN ORPIANO, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ANTONIO C. TOMAS
and MYRNA U. TOMAS, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano (Estrella) is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano
(Alejandro). Part of their conjugal estate is a lot. The court declared Estrella an
absent/absentee spouse and granted Alejandro the authority to sell the lot.
Subsequently, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses Antonio
and Myrna Tomas (the Tomas spouses) wherein a new title was issued. Due to the
balance of the price supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas spouses, Alejandro filed a
collection case.
During the pendency of the collection case, Alejandro passed away. His heirs, Estrella
included, were substituted in his stead in the collection case. Estrella moved to amend
the Complaint to one for rescission/annulment of sale and cancellation of title, but the
court denied her motion. She next moved to be dropped as party plaintiff but was again
rebuffed. It prompted Estrella to file a case for annulment of the sale and cancellation of
new title against the Tomas spouses. She claimed that the declaration of her absence
and accompanying authority to sell the lot were obtained by Alejandro through
misrepresentation, fraud and deceit. Thus, the declaration of absence and Alejandros
authority to sell the lot are null and void. Correspondingly, the ensuing sale to the
Tomas spouses should be voided, and the new title cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Estrella is guilty of forum shopping.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW: Forum shopping
Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with
judicial processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the
said case should be dismissed because it produces the same effect which the rule on
forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. Allowing the two cases to remain pending
makes litigation simply a game of chance where parties may hedge their position by
betting on both sides of the case, or by filing several cases involving the same issue,
subject matter, and parties, in the hope of securing victory in at least one of them.
While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her amending the
Complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party she committed a mistake in
proceeding to file the annulment case directly after these remedies were denied her by
the collection court without first questioning or addressing the propriety of these
denials. Her proper recourse should have been to file a petition for certiorari or
otherwise question the trial court's denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff citing
just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or
misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of certiorari.

G.R. No. 188818: May 30, 2011

TOMAS R. OSME, in personal capacity and in his capacity as City Mayor of
CebuCity, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ONAUDIT, Respondent.
BRION,J.:

FACTS:
The City ofCebuwas to host to the 1994Palarong Pambansa(Palaro).Tus, the City
engaged the services of two constructions companies (WTCI and DCDC) to construct
and renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex.Osme, then city mayor, was authorized by
theSangguniang Panlungsod(Sanggunian) to represent the City and to execute the
construction contracts.
During the construction, Osmeissued a total of20 Change/Extra Work Ordersto WTCI,
amounting to P35,418,142.42 (about 83% of the original contract price), and to DCDC,
amounting toP15,744,525.24 (about 31%of the original contract price).These
Change/Extra Work Orders were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was
there a prior authorization from theSanggunian.Nevertheless, the work proceeded on
account of the "extreme urgency. ThePalarowas successfully held at the Cebu City Sports
Complex during the first six months of 1994.
Thereafter, WTCI and DCDC demanded payment for the extra work they performed.A
resolution to authorize Osme to execute the supplemental agreements was rejected by
the members of theSanggunian. This prompted WTCI and DCDC to file two separate
collection cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC ordered the City to pay for the extra work performed and awarded damages,
litigation expenses and attorneys fees in the amount ofP2,514,255.40 to
WTCIandP102,015.00 to DCDC.The decision was affirmed on appeal. To satisfy the
judgment debts, theSanggunianfinallypassed the required appropriation ordinances.
During post-audit, the City Auditor disallowed the payment of litigation expenses,
damages, and attorneys fees. Further, it held Osme, the members of theSanggunian, and
the City Administrator liable for the P2,514,255.40 andP102,015.00 because these were
concluded to be unnecessary expensesfor which the public officers should be held liable
in their personal capacities.
On reconsideration, the City Auditor absolved the members of thesanggunianfrom any
liability and made Osme solely liability.
The COA Regional Offices Decision was sustained by the COAs National Director for
Legal and Adjudication. Osme filed an appeal against this Decision.
OnMay 6, 2008, the COA issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the notices of
disallowance. Osme received a copy of the Decision onMay 23, 2008.Eighteen days after
or onJune 10, 2008, Osme filed a motion for reconsideration of theMay 6, 2008COA
Decision.
The COA denied Osmes motion. The Office of the Mayor of Cebu City received
theResolution onJune 29, 2009.A day before, however, Osme left for theUnited States of
Americafor his check-up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his office
only onJuly 15, 2009.Thus, it was only onJuly 27, 2009that Osme filed the present
petition forcertiorariunder Rule 64.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the rules pertaining to the reglementary period should be relaxed,
(2) Whether petitioner should be made personally liable for the awards granted to WTCI
and DCDC.

HELD:
Petition is meritorious.
RELAXATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES TO GIVE EFFECT TO A PARTYS RIGHT TO
APPEAL
We find Osmes reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules.Although the
service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009
through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City,we consider July 15,
2009 the date he reported back to office as the effective date when he was actually
notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal.If we were to
rule otherwise, we would be denying Osme of his right to appeal the Decision of the
COA, despite the merits of his case.
Moreover, acertioraripetition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified,
and a verification requires the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer
that he has read the petition and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge.Given that Osme was out of the country to attend to his medical
needs, he could not comply with the requirements to perfect his appeal of the Decision
of the COA.
PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR EXPENDITURES OF GOVERNMENT FUND WHEN
MADE IN VIOLATION OF LAW
We find that the prevailing circumstances at the time the change and extra work orders
were executed and completed indicate that the City ofCebutacitly approved these orders,
rendering a supplemental agreement or authorization from theSanggunian
unnecessary.Thus, it is "unjust to order the petitioner to shoulder the expenditure when
the government had already received and accepted benefits from the utilization of the
[sports complex]." There was "no showing that [the] petitioner was ill-motivated, or that
[the petitioner] had personally profited or sought to profit from the transactions, or that
the disbursements have been made for personal or selfish ends."

G.R. No. 165423January 19, 2011

NILO PADRE,Petitioner,
vs.

FRUCTOSA BADILLO, FEDILA BADILLO, PRESENTACION CABALLES,

EDWINA VICARIO (d) represented by MARY JOY VICARIO-ORBETA and
NELSON BADILLO,Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO,J.:
FACTS:
The RTC of Allen, Northern Samar, Branch 28, rendered judgment in a civil case for
Recovery of Ownership and Possession filed by the Badillos against the Padres in favor
of the former. The decision became final and executory. The Badillos then filed another
complaint with the MTC of San Isidro, Northern Samar against those who continued to
occupy their lot which included some of the Padres in the first case. The allegations in
the complaint state that despite the service of the writ of execution and vacating the
properties illegally occupied by the Padres they re-entered the premises and refused to
vacate, reasserting their claim of ownership. The MTC ruled in favor of the Badillos,
interpreting the case as an action to revive a dormant judgment. Nilo Padre, herein
petitioner, appeared and moved to reconsider, opining that the action for revival of
judgment is a real action and should have been filed with the RTC instead of the MTC.
He also alleged the value of the property exceeded 20,000 pesos and was therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC. The MTC denied this motion for reconsideration. It
held that the case is an action for revival of judgment and not an action for ownership
and possession, which had long been settled. It held that a personal action under the
Section 2, Rule 4 of Rules of Court may be filed, at the election of the plaintiffs, either at
the court of the place where they reside or where the defendants reside.
By way of a special civil action for certiorari, Nilo Padre brought the case up to the RTC
to question the jurisdiction of the MTC, reiterating the same grounds he raised in the
MTC. The RTC dismissed the petition, upholding the decision of the MTC. Nilo Padre
now questions the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC correctly affirmed the MTC ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
second case filed by the Badillos.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW: Jurisdiction; Accion publiciana
"What determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought."
In their second complaint against the Padres, the Badillo family alleged that the decision
in the first complaint they filed had become final and executory. However, despite
repeated demands the Padres refused to vacate the premises. The Supreme Court ruled
that in the second complaint, the Badillos were not seeking a revival of the judgment
and instead were asking the court to legally oust the Padres from the occupied lots. This
action could no longer be considered one for ejectment, i.e. forcible entry due to the
lapse of the one-year filing period after dispossession and could therefore not have been
within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The Supreme Court construed it instead as an action
of accion publiciana, an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of

possession of realty independent of title and which may be instituted within 10 years. In
such cases, jurisdiction properly belongs to the RTC. Also, in civil cases involving realty
or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction only if
assessed value of the realty or interest therein does not exceed 20,000 pesos. The same
does not obtain in the case at bar. Hence, the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the
second complaint. A decision by a court without jurisdiction is null and void.
Whether the action is real or personal is irrelevant because the distinction is only for the
purpose of determining venue. In the case at bar, the question raised concerns
jurisdiction, not venue.
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 174251: December 15, 2010

RAUL PALOMATA, Petitioner v. NESTOR COLMENARES and TERESA
GURREA, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
This case involves a parcel of land in Balasan, Iloilo on which stand petitioner Raul
Palomatas house and talyer. Letecia Colmenares claiming ownership over the said land,
filed a criminal complaint for squatting against Raul in 1981.However, for reasons
undisclosed by the records, the case was eventually dismissed.
In order to prevent further ejectment from the subject property, Raul, together with his
father Alipio, filed a complaint in 1984 before the RTC, sitting as a Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR), for "maintenance and damages" against Letecia, her son Nestor
Colmenares, and Teresa Gurrea. The complaint alleged that Alipio was the bona fide
agricultural lessee of Letecia. After the issuance of PD No. 27, an approximate twohectare portion of Colmenares landholding was awarded to Alipio, who was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer. Raul contended that the subject property occupied by his
house and talyer was part of Alipios farmlot. Thus, Raul and Alipio prayed to be
maintained in the subject property and that the Colmenareses be ordered to refrain
from ejecting the Palomatas from the subject property.
The Colmenareses admitted that Alipio was their agricultural lessee but denied any
knowledge of the survey which led to the issuance of the CLT in Alipios favor. The
Colmenareses countered that the property claimed by Raul is within their subdivision,
not within the agricultural land tenanted by Alipio.
The trial court ruled that the subject property was not part of Alipios farmlot. On appeal,
CA denied Rauls allegations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in the appreciation of facts when
they ruled that the subject property belongs to respondents
HELD:
Remedial Law - factual review of the case is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition
All the circumstances support the trial and the appellate courts refusal to give the
investigation reports much weight and credence. The Court would not disturb the
conclusions arrived at by the CAR and the appellate court when these are wellsupported by the evidence.
Raul then argues that the trial and appellate courts should have given more weight to
the surveys of the Bureau of Lands because these carry the presumption of the regular
performance of official duty. The argument fails to convince. There is a presumption of
regular performance of official duty only when there is nothing on record that would
arouse suspicions of irregularity. The refusal of the Bureau of Lands and DAR officials to
affirm their written findings in open court indicates that the presumption should not
apply in the evaluation of these reports.
In sum, the CLT, tax declaration and investigation reports offered by the Palomatas as
evidence of their right to the subject property are, at best, inconclusive and insufficient
to prove their claim that the subject property is included in Alipios farmlot. In fact, they
even prove quite the opposite: that the subject property is actually not included in the
farmlot.

Raul then maintains that the Colmenareses did not prove their ownership over the
subject lot; hence it should be presumed that the lot is owned by its current possessor.
Rauls argument ignores the fact that, by alleging their right to the subject property as
tenant-farmers of the Colmenareses, the Palomatas readily admitted that the land
belonged to the Colmenareses. Thus, if Raul fails, as he did fail, to prove that the subject
property was awarded to his father through a CLT, then the presumption is that it
remains the property of the Colmenareses.

G.R. No. 192217:March 2, 2011.

DANILO L. PAREL., Petitioner, v. SIMEON PRUDENCION, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Simeon Prudencion filed a complaint for damages and recovery of possession against
Danilo Parel. Simeon allowed Danilo to occupy the first story of his house since Danilo
was a relative. However, Simeon alleges that Danilo failed to vacate his house in Baguio
City even after repeated demands. Danilo alleges that he was a co-owner of the property,
and that the land under which the house was constructed under Danilos fathers name.
The trial court ruled for co-ownership; the CA reversed and ruled that Simeon is solely
entitled to the property, and adjudged that Danilo should pay P2,000 monthly rentals
from April1988 to 2007. Simeon prayed for a writ of execution in the trial court, which
was granted. Danilo contested this writ of execution, through a supplemental petition
with urgent motion to issue a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction, saying that his
monthly rentals should only be paid from until March 2004 only, since he vacated the
place in March 2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition to issue a TRO/injunction to stay the writ of execution
should be granted
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: When a writ of execution may be appealable.
It has not been determined in this case when Danilo actually vacated; the issue is a
subject matter under dispute. While it is true that Danilo should have told the Court
earlier of the fact of his vacating the property on March 2004, and that the judgment
should be final and executory, it will be inequitable and unjust to let Danilo pay Simeon
monthly rentals if the issue of vacating the property has not been settled. Danilo, said
the Court, could be paying rentals indefinitely.
Banaga v. Majaducon enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be
appealed:
1)the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2)there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3)execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4)it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
5)the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or
6)it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that
there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher

court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by
a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has
left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would
make execution inequitable or unjust.
The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the
circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue
regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the
opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay
monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in the instant case.
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 178062: September 8, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABDUL AMINOLA y
OMAR and MIKE MAITIMBANG y ABUBAKAR, Accused-Appellants.
VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
According to the prosecution, in the afternoon of August 31, 1999, at around five, Nestor
Gabuya closed his motorcycle and bicycle spare parts store. He then headed home on
his bike. Unbeknownst to him, accused-appellant Abdul Aminola and accused Alimudin
Laminda were observing him from a nearby basketball court. Aminola proceeded to
follow Gabuya. Upon catching up with Gabuya, Aminola put his arms around Gabuya
and wrestled for the bag Gabuya was carrying. Gabuya refused to let go of his bag,
whereupon Aminola pulled out a gun and shot him. Gabuya fell to the ground but still
resisted, prompting Aminola to take another shot.
Accused-appellant Mike Maitimbang then approached and took something from the
fallen Gabuya. Maitimbang shot Gabuya behind and fled towards the direction of
eyewitness Oliva. Joel, Gabuyas caretaker, gave chase but was fired upon by
Maitimbang. Oliva testified seeing the incident while he was on Genera Valdez St. in
Purok V, Upper Bicutan.
Later that evening, an informant known as Abdul told the police that he witnessed
what had happened to Gabuya and could tell them where the suspects could be found. A
blocking force was organized while Col. Bernido formed a team to make the arrests on
the suspects.
The four men were arrested and identified as Aminola, Laminda, Datu Ban Ampatuan,
and Abdulan Sandaton, were then brought to the Criminal Investigation Division at
Camp Crame, Quezon City for further investigation. On September 2, 1999, Maitimbang
was also arrested.
According to the defense, Maitimbang testified that he was arrested on September 2,
1999 after arriving home from work due to a grenade found in his possession. At the
police precinct, he was not informed that his arrest was made in connection with the
death of Gabuya. It was only during the inquest, according to him, that he saw his
fellow accused for the first time. He further averred that Gabuyas widow pinpointed
him as one of the suspects when she learned he was a Muslim. He claimed his name was
only included and superimposed on the list of suspects.
Laminda, for his part, disavowed any knowledge of the reason for their arrest and
claimed that the arresting police officers had neither a warrant of arrest nor a search
warrant. He likewise denied acting as a lookout in the robbery resulting in the death of
Gabuya. He attested that he was a tricycle driver, and that on August 31, 1999, he was
ferrying passengers in his usual route of Maharlika-Triumph-Signal.
Mymona Quirod corroborated Lamindas story. On the witness stand, Quirod testified
that she boarded Lamidas tricycle at around 5:10 in the afternoon of August 31, 1999
and got off at exactly six in the evening.
Sandaton, on the other hand, narrated that it was only during the inquest proceedings
that he learned of the criminal charge against him. He denied knowing Oliva and being
a lookout while Gabuya was being robbed and killed.
Instead of testifying for his defense, Ampatuan filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The court
found no proof of Ampatuans involvement in the robbery with homicide, the trial court
granted his Demurrer to Evidence.
After trial, the RTC found accused-appellants Aminola and Maitimbang guilty of
robbery with homicide, but acquitted accused Sandaton and Laminda.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision but reduced the penalty imposed to
reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty.

On review, accused-appellants question the legality of their warrantless arrest, arguing

that there was no hot pursuit to speak of, since there was no indication that they were
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers
or that they had just committed an offense. As claimed, a considerable period of time
had elapsed between their arrest and the commission of the crime, thus necessitating a
warrant of arrest.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
2. Whether or not the arrest of accused-appellants should be accompanied by a warrant
of arrest
REMEDIAL LAW: Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony of the witness identifying a person as the perpetrator of the crime absent
proof of ill motive
HELD:
Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an
intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time.

The prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellants committed robbery with
homicide through the totality of their evidence. The first three elements were
established when Oliva testified that he saw, and positively identified, accusedappellants taking Gabuyas property by force and both shooting Gabuya. Gabuyas
death resulting from their attack proves the last element of the complex crime as duly
confirmed by the post-mortem report.
Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the
witness identifying a person as the perpetrator of the crime absent proof of ill motive.
No reason or motive was given for Oliva to falsely testify against accused-appellants on
such a serious crime. As often noted, the trial court is in a better position to observe the
demeanor and candor of the witnesses and to decide who is telling the truth. We, thus,
defer to the trial courts findings especially when duly affirmed by the appellate court.
REMEDIAL LAW: Warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to
it is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection
A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is waived when
the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this case.
Accused-appellants are questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal and are,
therefore, deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against
illegal arrests and searches.

G. R. Nos. 187117 and 187127: October 12, 2011

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSE D. AZARRAGA and
JOHN REY PREVENDIDO,Respondents.

SERENO,J.:
FACTS:
private respondent John Rey Prevendido for Violation of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The case was raffled twice due to conflict of interest with the parties. Citing Chap. V, Sec. 9
of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive Judge Antonio M. Natino ordered the Clerk of Court to
forward the entire records of the cases to Branch 37 presided over by public respondent, the
pairing judge of Branch 36, which was the special court that originally handled the cases.
On 16 March 2009, however, as soon as public respondent proceeded with the cases,
Prosecutor Kenneth John Amamanglon filed a Motion to Transfer Case to a Branch of
Competent Jurisdiction.He questioned the jurisdiction of public respondent to hear the
cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Prosecutor Amamanglon also claimed that, as the
prosecutor assigned to Branch 37, he was not among the prosecutors who had been
designated to handle cases exclusively involving violations of R.A. 9165.
The motion was denied nonetheless and public respondent proceeded with the hearing of
the motion for admission to bail. Prosecutor Amamanglon, however, moved for a
reconsiderationof respondent judges Order, contending that the trial court needed a special
designation from this Court in order to have jurisdiction over the cases. Thus, Prosecutor
Amamanglon concluded, absent the special designation, respondent court should remand
the cases to the Office of the Executive Judge for re-raffling to another court specially
designated pursuant to R.A. 9165.He further supported his position by citing Resolution in
A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC, which clarified whether drug courts should be included in the regular
raffle
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court violated Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 when it issued A.M. 03-8-02-SC,
particularly Chap. V, Sec. 9, prescribing the manner the executive judge reassigns cases in
instances of inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special courts.
HELD:
Court did not commit any violation of R.A. 9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines.
Rather, it merely obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates
that the rules promulgated by this Court should provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all persons to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Under R.A. 9165, Congress empowered Courts with the full discretion to designate special
courts to hear, try and decide drug cases. It was precisely in the exercise of this discretionary
power that the powers of the executive judge were included in Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC vis-vis Sec. 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, in cases of inhibition or disqualification, the executive judge is mandated to assign the
drug case to a regular court in the following order: first, to the pairing judge of the special
court where the case was originally assigned; and, second, if the pairing judge is likewise
disqualified or has inhibited himself, then to another regular court through a raffle. Under
these exceptional circumstances, this Court designated the regular court,ipso facto, as a
special court but only for that case.Being a "designated special court," it is likewise bound to
follow the relevant rules in trying and deciding the drug case pursuant to R.A. 9165.

G.R. No. 181422: September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ARNEL BABANGGOL Y
MACAPIA, CESAR NARANJO Y RIVERA, Appellants.

ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of May 18, 1999 a police
informant showed up at the Service Support Office of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Narcotics Group and spoke to PO2 Alfonso and P/Sr. Insp. Romualdo Iglesia.
After their meeting, Iglesia ordered several police officers to conduct a buy-bust
operation against accused Sumayan and Babanggol. The police informant would make
an order for 300 grams of shabu from the two for a price of P300,000.00. The purchase
was to take place at the Coastal Mall between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m. Alfonso then
prepared the boodle money and marking the bills with his initials "WCA."
Right after 6:00 and before 7:00 p.m., a blue Kia Besta Van came into the parking lot.
Two persons got off and walked towards Alfonso and the informant. The informant told
Alfonso, "Pare yan na si Arnel" (referring to accused Babanggol).
The informant introduced Alfonso as "Jeffrey," a big-time buyer from Manila.
Babanggol then introduced his companion as Cesar (accused Naranjo). Babanggol
asked Alfonso if it was he who ordered the "stocks" and if he brought the money.
Alfonso replied by asking to see the stuff. Babanggol told them to wait and he and
Naranjo returned to their van. When they came back to the buyer, they brought with
them two other persons (accused Sumayan and San Jose), one holding a brown paper
bag. Alfonso opened the paper bag after it was handed to him and found in it a sealed
transparent plastic bag that contained white crystalline substance. He ascertained that
it was shabu.
When Babanggol asked for the payment, Alfonso gave him the boodle money and
ignited his cigarette lighter as a signal for his team to move in. Alfonso identified
himself as a police officer and arrested Babanggol. The other accused fled but were
apprehended by the other officers. Alfonso recovered the boodle money from
Babanggol.
Alfonso took custody of the suspected shabu, the paper bag, and the boodle money and
with the other officers brought their captives to the police station.
For the defense, Babanggol and Sumayan, childhood friends, uniformly testified that on
May 18, 1999, while they were driving down the coastal road to Cavite, a group of armed
men stopped their van. When they asked what the matter was, the strangers responded
by beating them up and divesting them of their belongings. As it turned out the men
were police officers. The accused were taken to Camp Crame, shown a bag of shabu, and
told that they would be charged in connection with the drugs unless they paid up.

The RTC found all four accused guilty of the crime charged. Meantime, Sumayan passed
away.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision with respect to the three
remaining accused. Two of them, Naranjo and Babanggol, appealed the CA decision to
this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has sufficient evidence to find accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
REMEDIAL LAW: Presentation of the police informant is not necessary to prove the
offense charged
HELD:

Appellants claim that the prosecution should have presented the police informer in the
case. They point out that, since the informant was said to be Sumayan and Babanggol's
friend, then the accused had known him beforehand and concealing his identity did not
make any sense. The failure to present the informant implies that the supposed buybust operation did not take place at all.
The presentation of the police informant is not necessary to prove the offense charged.
The prosecution of criminal actions is under the public prosecutor's direction and
control. He determines what evidence to present. In this case, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses sufficiently covered the facts constituting the offense. Since
police officer Alfonso who testified was present during the buy-bust operation, the
testimony of the informant would have merely been corroborative.
REMEDIAL LAW: A person's mere presence when an illegal transaction had taken place
does not mean that he was into the conspiracy. To be guilty as a conspirator, the
accused needs to have done an overt act in pursuit of the crime.
However, this Court agrees with appellant Naranjo that the prosecution in this case
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted in conspiracy with the other
accused. The buy-bust operation was supposedly set-up based on the police informant's
report of illegal activities of "Acas and Arnel." But the evidence shows that the
informant was not familiar with Naranjo. Indeed, the informant got to identify only
Babanggol during the buy-bust operation. And it was Babanggol who introduced
Naranjo to Alfonso, the poseur-buyer.
According to police officer Alfonso, it was Babanggol who did all the talking during the
sale. The evidence does not indicate that Naranjo knew what the transaction was about
or that it referred to the sale of illegal drugs. In fact, in their conversation Alfonso and
Babanggol referred to the shabu merely as "stocks" and "stuff."
After Babanggol and Naranjo returned to their van, Babanggol went back to the poseurbuyer already with the two other accused, one of whom carried the bag of shabu. The
evidence does not show that Naranjo had at some point possession of the shabu or knew
that it existed.
A person's mere presence when an illegal transaction had taken place does not mean
that he was into the conspiracy. To be guilty as a conspirator, the accused needs to have
done an overt act in pursuit of the crime.

G.R. NO. 185708: September 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA,

Appellant
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In the evening of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor children BBB, CCC, and
DDD slept inside AAAs small sari-sari store. At around 3:30 a.m. of the next day, AAA
was awakened when clothes fell on her face. When she looked up, she saw a man whose
face was covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage jacket and cycling
shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her. AAA shouted Ayyy!, rousing her three
children from sleep. Despite the cover on the burglars face, BBB was able to identify
him as Romulo Grondiano, one of their neighbors, based on the hanging mole located
below his left eye. Armed with a stainless handgun, Grondiano ordered AAA and her
children to lie face down. Though stricken with fear, BBB noticed that Grondiano had a
companion who stayed at the balcony keeping watch. Grondiano then ransacked the
store, taking with him P3,000.00 cash from the cabinet and P7,000.00 worth of grocery
items. Before he left, Grondiano pointed the gun at AAAs back and warned them not to
make any noise.
As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB identified the man as
appellant Juanito Cabigquez as the latter did not conceal his face. Armed with
Grondianos gun, Cabigquez stripped AAA of her short pants and underwear, placed a
pillow on her lower abdomen and mounted her from behind. He proceeded to ravish her
in full view of her children, and even as the latter cried for mercy. Before he left,
Cabigquez threatened to kill AAA and her children if they would tell anyone about the
incident.
AAA was physically examined by the resident physicians at the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center. Dr. Villapaes examination revealed that the smear recovered from
AAAs vagina was positive for spermatozoa, while Dr. Ricardo found a two-centimeter
contusion on AAAs left hand dorsum.
Cabigquez and Grondiano were arrested for possession of illegal drugs on two separate
occasions. With the two men incarcerated, and now certain of their safety, BBB finally
mustered the courage to reveal the identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her
mother.
On July 18, 2001, two Informations were filed against Cabigquez and Grondiano for
Robbery and Rape.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting Cabigquez and Grondiano of the crimes
charged.
In his appeal, appellant maintained his defense of alibi and denial. He questioned the
accuracy and credibility of BBBs testimony given her failure to immediately divulge the
identity of the perpetrators after the incident. Appellant also noted that AAAs lone
interjection (Ayyy!), while she was allegedly being raped by him, can hardly be
considered as a manifest resistance. The defense also argued that the prosecution failed
to establish conspiracy since BBB did not actually see that Cabigquez was on the balcony
while the robbery was being committed.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt despite a negative DNA result
REMEDIAL LAW: DNA Identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence
HELD:
The factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, indubitably prove
that appellant raped AAA even if the specimen obtained from the vaginal swabs and
submitted to the NBI failed to match appellants DNA profile. Rape is committed by a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation.
The commission of rape was clearly shown by testimonial and documentary evidence;
the defense submits that it is the identity of the perpetrator, which is not duly
established.
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is indeed a fertile source of
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. In this case, however, the result of the DNA
test is rendered inconclusive to exculpate or inculpate the appellant since the sample
tested by the NBI merely contained vaginal discharges. In the laboratory test earlier
conducted by Dr. Villapae on the vaginal swab obtained from AAAs genitalia, the
presence of spermatozoa was confirmed. This notwithstanding, the totality of evidence
satisfactorily established that it was indeed appellant who raped AAA.
Appellant cannot seek acquittal on the basis of the negative result of the DNA test on the
specimen conducted by the NBI.
A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the evidence presented before
the court points to no other possible conclusion, i.e., appellant raped the private
offended party. A positive DNA match may strengthen the evidence for the prosecution,
but an inconclusive DNA test result may not be sufficient to exculpate the accused,
particularly when there is sufficient evidence proving his guilt. Notably, neither a
positive DNA match of the semen nor the presence of spermatozoa is essential in finding
that rape was committed. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission
of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.

G.R. No. 184761: September 8, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. JULIUS GADIANA y
REPOLLO, Appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Julius Gadiana y Repollo (appellant) was convicted of violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City for having in his possession 2 sachets with a total weight of 0.09
grams of Shabu.
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the Forensic Officer Jude Daniel Mendoza
will testify, and affirm and confirm his findings and conclusion within the four corners
of his forensic report with the clarification that what was admitted was the existence
but not the source of the two sachets.
Lone prosecution witness PO1 Julius Busico (PO1 Busico) adopted as his testimony at
the witness stand that he and other police officers saw the accused holding two sachets
containing crystalline substance which the accused is about to pocket.
The policemen, identifying themselves as such, apprehended appellant at once,
confiscated the two sachets from his right hand, brought him with the confiscated
sachets to their office, and turned over the sachets to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory Service which found them positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
The accused, on the other hand, denied the accusations of PO1 Busico. The court ruled
against the accused stating that:
With the bare and lame denials of the accused, abjectly uncorroborated and without
substantiation, apart from his self-serving attempt at extenuation as against the positive
testimony of the arresting police officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties, there being no showing of malicious motive to testify
against the accused, it is the Courts view that the State has successfully discharged its
prosecutory function by sufficiently showing the concurrence of the elements of the
offense charged.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
REMEDIAL LAW: Chain of custody must be proven when there is doubt on the
authenticity of the item confiscated
HELD:
The trial court credited the positive version of PO1 Busico in light of the presumption
of regularity in the performance of his official duties and absent a showing of malice.
Recall, however, that during the pre-trial, the existence but not the source of the two
sachets was stipulated on by the parties. It was thus incumbent on the prosecution to
prove the chain of custody rule.
Chain of custody establishes the identity of the subject substance. It requires that
testimony be presented about every link in the chain, from the moment the item is

seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. When nagging doubts persist on whether
the item confiscated is the same specimen examined and established to be prohibited
drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug.
Except for the charge sheet prepared against appellant which stated that evidence
consisted of two (2) heat-sealed clear plastic sachets containing shabu with markings
JGR-1 and JGR-2, nowhere in the record is a showing that the marking was done in
the presence of appellant or his representatives or that a physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items were taken as required under paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Non-compliance with the above requirements does not of course necessarily render void
and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs, provided that there are justifiable
grounds to warrant exception therefrom. The prosecution must, therefore, explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses and must show that the integrity and value of the
seized evidence had been preserved.
In their Joint Affidavit which served as part of PO1 Busicos testimony, he and PO3
Joseph merely stated that they brought appellant, together with the confiscated
evidence, to their office for proper documentation and filing of appropriate charges. No
statement was made that the allegedly seized sachets were the same sachets which were
subject of the letter-request for laboratory examination prepared and brought to the
Crime Laboratory by PO2 Ferrer per PO1 Busico.
Parenthetically, appellants arrest, not to mention resulting confiscation of the alleged
confiscation of the plastic sachets of crystalline substances in his possession, leaves
nagging doubts on its validity in light of the fact that what PO1 Busico merely saw was
appellants placing of the plastic sachets in his pocket which, without more, does not
justify his warrantless arrest under the Rules.

G.R. No. 186494: September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROY ALCAZAR y MIRANDA,
Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
Appellant Roy Alcazar y Miranda was charged with raping AAA, who is his 10-year-old sister-inlaw.
Sometime in the afternoon of 25 June 2001, while AAA, who was then 10 years old, was
sweeping the floor of their house located in XXX, XXX City, when appellant arrived. AAA
immediately climbed to the attic of their house to escape from appellant for fear that the latter
would again do something wrong to her. Unfortunately, appellant was able to get closer to her
in the attic. Appellant then removed AAAs clothes and subsequently took off his own clothes.
At once, appellant licked AAAs vagina. He thereafter inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and
made a push and pull movement. AAA did not shout as the appellant threatened to punch her if
she does.
At this juncture, CCC suddenly came into the house of AAA. CCC called out for AAA believing
that the latter was just in the attic. Upon hearing CCC, appellant, instantly responded that AAA
was not there as he had sent her for some errands. CCC noticed from the voice of appellant that
he was gasping and seemed tired. While appellant was busy answering CCCs queries, AAA
began putting on her clothes. CCC then observed from the opening in the attic that somebody
was struggling. She subsequently saw a portion of the dress AAA was wearing on that particular
day. With that, CCC hesitantly left the house.
Appellant claimed that the possible reason why he was charged with rape was the
misunderstanding between him and AAAs uncle, EEE. Appellant averred that on 25 June
2000, he caught his wife inside a theater with another man. He then went to the house of his inlaws to tell them about what he saw and it so happened that EEE was there. He told EEE about
it but the latter told him not to lay hands on his wife, otherwise, something wrong will happen to
him. After the incident, he did not frequent his in-laws place anymore.
RTC rendered a Decision giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
rejecting the defense of denial adduced by appellant. RTC found appellant guilty of Qualified
Rape.
On appeal, Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial
court and finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple statutory rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of simple statutory rape
REMEDIAL LAW: Affidavit of Desistance is looked upon with disfavor because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary
consideration
HELD:
In this case, appellant vehemently contends that reasonable doubt exists as to his guilt because
CCC, one of prosecution witnesses, never actually saw him with AAA at the attic at the time the
alleged rape incident happened. Moreover, AAAs testimony was neither credible nor consistent
with human nature as she could easily shout and ask for help had she wanted to, but she failed
to do so.
The transcribed notes reveal that AAAs testimony was given in a candid, categorical and
straightforward manner and despite the grueling cross-examination, she never faltered in her
testimony. With tears in her eyes, AAA recounted the details of her harrowing experience in the
hands of appellant. She categorically described before the court a quo how the appellant got
closer to her in the attic followed by appellants act of removing her clothes and his own clothes

and the successful penetration of appellants penis into her vagina. AAA went further by stating
that while appellant was making a push and pull movement, her cousin, CCC, suddenly arrived
and called out for her, but appellant denied that she was there in the attic. Once her cousin left,
appellant again removed her clothes, inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and
pull movement until something sticky came out from his penis.
Worthy to note were the tears shed by AAA while giving an account of her awful experience in
the hands of her ravisher before the court a quo. To the mind of this Court, such tears were a
clear indication that she was telling the truth. AAA, young as she is, would not endure the pain
and the difficulty of a public trial wherein she had to narrate over and over again how her person
was violated if she has not in truth been raped and impelled to seek justice for what the
appellant had done to her. As it has been repeatedly held, no woman would want to go through
the process, the trouble and the humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense unless she
actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is but a response to the compelling need to
seek and obtain justice.
The result of AAAs medical examination corroborated her testimony of defilement. The
medical findings of Dr. Vasquez revealed two healed hymenal lacerations on AAAs private part,
which findings are consistent with AAAs testimony that appellant twice inserted his penis into
her vagina. Where a victims testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration,
there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.
Appellant further argued that if he really raped AAA, the latter and her mother would not have
executed and signed an Affidavit of Desistance.
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance.
The rationale for this was extensively discussed in People v. Junio, cited in People v. Alicante.
x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked
upon with disfavor by the courts [xxx] because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.
In the instant case, records disclose that AAA, who was then 10 years old, and her mother, who
has only reached Grade VI, signed the Affidavit of Desistance without understanding its
contents as nobody explained it to them. Such lack of knowledge as regards the contents of the
affidavit was clearly manifested in the statement of AAAs mother that she signed the said
affidavit because appellant raped her daughter. AAA also divulged that she signed the affidavit
because somebody asked her to sign it despite the fact that she did not understand its contents.
Given these circumstances, the affidavit of desistance is clearly worthless.

G.R. NO. 181829: September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. SATURNINO VILLANUEVA,
Appellant
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed against appellant for the crime of rape
alleging that on September 27 & 28 of 1999, and June 9, 2002, the accused, who is the father of
the complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, had sexual intercourse with one AAA who was
then a minor, 9 and 12 years of age, respectively.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of AAA. It was likewise
agreed that AAA was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened.
Appellant denied the charges against him. Appellants father, Marcelino Villanueva, testified
that the reason AAA filed the rape cases against appellant was that the latter forbade her to
entertain suitors.
The RTC convicted the accused of three counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of DEATH for each offense and to indemnify the complainant AAA for damages, in the amount
of P50,000.00 per count.
On appeal, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to formally offer in evidence the medical
certificate and to present the doctor who conducted the medical examination to testify on his
findings. Likewise, AAAs birth certificate was not formally offered. Neither did the Municipal
Civil Registrar who allegedly prepared the same take the witness stand. Thus appellant claimed
that assuming he was indeed guilty of the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for
simple rape and not qualified rape because the minority of the victim was not duly established.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of qualified rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B.
The CA concluded that even without the medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable
for three counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible testimony of
AAA and the medical certificate would only be corroborative evidence. Anent the birth
certificate, the CA recalled that during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her relationship
with the appellant had already been stipulated upon. Hence, the said elements have been
sufficiently alleged in the Informations and proven during trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the medical certificate and the birth certificate, despite being stipulated and
marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, must be formally offered in evidence to be considered as
such.
RULES OF EVIDENCE: No Evidence shall be considered which has not be formally offered
HELD:
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did
not formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the
prosecution rested its case after presenting the testimony of AAA without formally offering any
documentary exhibit at all.
Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parochais instructive, thus:
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within
a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this
case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
xxxx
The Rules of Court [provide] that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings
of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
xxxx
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude
the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits
during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner
be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight
and value.
In the instant case, we find that both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing the admission
of AAAs medical certificate and birth certificate. The records would show that the lone
witness for the prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain their contents. When
AAA was placed on the witness stand, she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No
reference was ever made to her birth certificate. The same is true with the medical certificate.
After the marking during the pre-trial, the prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the
proceedings. Neither did it present the doctor who prepared the same.

G.R. No. 186232: September 27, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELPIDIO PAROHINOG
ALEJANDRO, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In five (5) Informations, all dated August 16, 2001, appellant Elpidio Parohinog Alejandro was
charged for the rape of AAA, his daughter, when she was 13 years old until she was 17 years old.
During trial, AAAs birth certificate which showed that she was born on May 25, 1983 and
appellant is her father was presented as proof of her minority during the rape incidents as well
as her relationship with appellant.
The RTC promulgated a decision finding appellant guilty of five counts of rape and to suffer the
penalty of Death.
On automatic review, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt
REMEDIAL LAW: A variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence of the
prosecution with respect to the time when the crime was committed would not result in an
acquittal of the accused; but if the accused interposed timely objection to such variance and
showed that it was prejudicial to his interests in that it deceived him and prevented him from
having a fair opportunity to defend himself, the trial court might grant an adjournment for such
time as would enable the defendant to meet the change in date which was the cause of his
surprise
HELD:
The prosecution sufficiently established the following: first, aside from appellant, AAA was only
with her two (2) younger brothers in the house that night; second, appellant lied down beside
AAA and began touching her private parts despite her resistance; third, as AAA continued to
struggle, appellant boxed her on the right eye rendering her unconscious; and fourth, when she
regained consciousness the following morning, she felt pain in her vagina when she urinated
and saw traces of blood in her urine.
The combination of these circumstances establishes beyond moral certainty that AAA was raped
while she was in a state of unconsciousness and that appellant was the one responsible for
defiling her. These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of events which inevitably
points to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., they are consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that appellant is guilty of the rape that occurred
on January 6, 1997 and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis.
As to appellants argument that there was confusion as to when the second rape took place,
whether it was in July 1998, as alleged in the information, or in July 1997, appellant should
have made a timely objection on such variance instead of using it to impeach AAAs credibility to
gain his acquittal. As ruled by this Court in People v. Rivera, citing United States v. Bungaoil:
[x x x] a variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence of the
prosecution with respect to the time when the crime was committed would not result in an
acquittal of the accused; but if the accused interposed timely objection to such variance and
showed that it was prejudicial to his interests in that it deceived him and prevented him from
having a fair opportunity to defend himself, the trial court might grant an adjournment for such
time as would enable the defendant to meet the change in date which was the cause of his
surprise, and that the accused must take advantage of the variance some time during the trial
by appropriate objection and satisfy the trial court that he had been prejudiced by reason
thereof so that the trial court may take such measures (as an adjournment) as would give the
defendant an opportunity to produce such witnesses or evidence as the variance x x x made
necessary.

G.R. No. 186459: September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER,
Appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Nita Eugenio y Pejer (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. During a by-bust operation, appellant was caught
in her possession one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance, found positive to the test of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant argues that she was arrested without reason while heading to get water.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of May 31, 2005, convicted appellant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

In her present appeal, appellant claims, in the main, that there was failure to follow the
requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, that the apprehending team shall immediately, after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same, in the presence of the
accused.
Appellant specifically claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the specimen took
place. Respecting the required conduct of an inventory, since only one sachet was seized, failure
to comply therewith may understandably have been rendered unnecessary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution failed to show proper chain of custody of the seized substance
REMEDIAL LAW: Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not
fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.
HELD:
Based on PO1 Marianos testimony, it was shown that no photograph of the seized substance
was taken, that no media was present, and that there was no coordination with the local
barangay as required by the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
However, failure to comply with the provision of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily
doom the case for the prosecution. People v. Pringas enlightens:
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as
there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.
As reflected in the above-quoted Memorandum of P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel, the time of
operation was on or about 8:30 P.M., 13 May 2003. If the allegedly seized substance-filled
sachet was confiscated at 8:30 p.m., it is highly improbable that it was received at the Crime
Laboratory at 8:33 P.M or a mere three minutes after the seizure, given that appellant was after
his arrest first brought to a hospital for physical check-up.
Doubt is thus engendered on whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination
and presented in court is the same as that allegedly sold by appellant. In fine, the prosecution
failed to prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the 0.03 gram specimen.

G.R. No. 183829: September 6, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PATERNO LASANAS,
Appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Paterno Lasanas (appellant) was charged with rape allegedly committed against AAA,
his 14-year old niece, on August 28, 1994.
Based on the prosecution, at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of the said date, while the
then 14 year old AAA was fixing clothes inside the room at the second floor of their
house, her then 39 year old uncle (first cousin of her mother-herein appellant) arrived
and entered the room, grabbed her by the shoulders and pulled her down. As AAA lay
sprawled on the floor, appellant removed her underwear, undressed himself, went on
top of her and forced his penis into her vagina amidst her loud cries for help.
AAAs pleas were heard by her then 17 year old brother BBB who went to the room,
grabbed and held appellant who, however, told him Ipus ka lang hindi ka magsuguid
sang guinikanan mo.
AAAs mother, to whom AAA reported the incident later in the afternoon upon her
arrival, immediately reported to the police authorities who promptly responded and
apprehended appellant in his house still in the same afternoon.
Eight days after the incident, AAA was physically examined by one Dr. Loribel Ann
Sevilla (Dr. Sevilla) at the Cotabato Regional Hospital. The examination yielded
findings of fresh complete hymenal laceration at 3 oclock and 9 oclock positions.
Denying the accusation, appellant proffered alibi, claiming that at the time of the
incident, he was at his house, which is about 100 meters away from AAAs, preparing
dinner which he and his family partook at 5:00 p.m. His wife Editha Lasanas
corroborated his claim as did his first cousin Heidi Libresa.
Cotabato RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt
REMEDIAL LAW: The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to
present as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness as long as it meets the
quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD:
Appellant brands AAAs version as not only implausible but contrary to human
experience. He cites AAAs claim that her brother heard her cries for help and went to
her rescue while she was being raped, yet the prosecution never called him to testify.

Appellant goes on to argue that the medical certificate showing hymenal lacerations in
AAA cannot strengthen her claim as Dr. Sevilla who examined her was not presented in
court
The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as
witnesses. It need not present each and every witness as long as it meets the quantum of
proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
AT ALL EVENTS, a medical examination is not indispensable to successful prosecution
of rape. AAAs testimony on direct examination, standing alone, proves appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Notably, appellant did not cross examine her, sufficient time
and opportunity afforded him notwithstanding, which thus prompted the trial court to
declare him to have waived his right to cross-examine.
Appellants alibi fails to persuade especially gains light from the fact that it was not
physically impossible for him to have been at the house of AAA. Recall that his house is
only about 100 meters away from AAAs.

G.R. No. 185386 : November 21, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE ANESLAG
y ANDRADE, MENDA ANESLAG y NECOLAY (acquitted), and JOCELYN
CONCEPCION y LAO, Accused.
BERNABE ANESLAG y ANDRADE and JOCELYN CONCEPCION y LAO,
Accused-Appellants.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
An Information for illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu) was filed
against Menda Aneslag (Menda), Mae Elarmo (Mae), appellant Bernabe Aneslag
(Bernabe) and appellant Jocelyn Concepcion (Jocelyn).
Records show that PDEA conducted a surveillance against Bernabe, et al. upon receiving
information that there was an expected arrival of shabu in Iligan City. PDEA was also
told to watch Room 65 of the Patria Pension at Laya St., Iligan City. Thereafter, PDEA
went to Patria Pension and checked in at Room 64 across the corridor of Room 65. After
several hours, the sale of shabu took place between Bernabe et al., and the civilian asset
of PDEA. The buy-bust team immediately proceeded to Room 65 and arrested Bernabe,
et al. The PDEA officers took possession of a red bag containing the sachets of shabu.
PDEA brought the confiscated items to the police precinct for marking. A Request for
Laboratory Examination was prepared and the sachets of shabu were brought to the
PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination. The specimens were originally
examined by P/Insp. Mary Leocy Jabonillo-Mag-abo, Forensic Chemical Officer of the
said laboratory. After her examination, she delivered the specimens to the Office of the
City Prosecutor. However, when the case was called for hearing before the RTC, the
prosecution informed that Insp. Mag-abo was not available because she was sent to the
Philippine Public Safety College, Makati City to undergo training for a period of four (4)
months. To avoid further delay, the court issued an order directing the PDEA to arrange
for another laboratory examination of the specimens. Consequently, the subject shabu
packs were turned over to SPO2 Salo, as evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt and
thereafter delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory where the said packs were received by
PNCO PO3 Paltinca who, in turn, forwarded the same to P/Sr. Insp. Bernido. Insp.
Bernido immediately performed the required laboratory examination of the specimens
in three steps, namely: the physical test, color or screening test and the confirmatory
test. After which, the chemistry report was prepared.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Bernabe and Jocelyn guilty of illegal sale of shabu.
However, with respect to Mae and Menda, the RTC rendered a judgment of acquittal.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this present appeal.
Bernabe and Jocelyn argue that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody
of the seized shabu and the identity of the substance subjected to laboratory
examination. In addition, the police officers did not immediately mark the seized items
and no certificate of inventory was prepared and no photographs taken in accordance
with Section 2 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the chain of custody rule was complied with?

HELD:
The Court affirms the CA.
REMEDIAL LAW: chain of custody
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the procedure for the handling of
seized or confiscated illegal drugs. However, non-compliance with Section 21 does not
necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible. What is essential is
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the case at bar, while the procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165
was not strictly complied with, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized shabu was duly preserved consistent with the chain of custody rule. As correctly
observed by the appellate court, from the time of the arrest of the appellants and the
confiscation of the subject shabu packs until their turnover for laboratory examination,
SPO2 Salo was in sole possession thereof. During his testimony, he identified the subject
shabu packs and the markings that he had previously made thereon.
Appeal is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 191062 : September 19, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOHAMAD ANGKOB y
MLANG, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
An informant disclosed the illegal drugs activities of accused Mohamad Angkob (Angkob) to the
PDEA. PDEA then conducted a buy-bust operation wherein PO3 Peter Sistemio (Sistemio)
would act as poseur-buyer.
On the day of the buy-bust operation, Sistemio and the informant went to a Jollibee restaurant
in Metropolis Mall, Alabang for the transaction. Upon arriving at the said place, Sistemio asked
Angkob for shabu. Then, they went outside the restaurant for the exchange. While they were
walking, Sar, Angkobs companion, handed a white plastic bag containing one plastic of shabu.
After giving the pre-arranged signal, PDEA immediately arrested Angkob and Sar. They were
first brought to the Security Office of the mall. Thereat, Sistemio prepared the Certificate of
Inventory of the items confiscated.They then proceeded to the PDEA office where markings
were made.Sistemio marked his initials "PVS" on the plastic bag, and his initials "PVS" and the
date "02-05-05" on the white plastic sachet. Sistemio likewise prepared and brought the request
for a laboratory examination and specimen to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory.
Thus, Angkob was criminally charged for violating R.A. No. 9165 before the RTC while Sar
remained at large. During the trial, the prosecution submitted the confiscated item to the court
as its evidence. However, the forensic chemist was not presented as witness. The RTC convicted
Angkob. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chain of custody rule has been complied with?
HELD:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW: chain of custody rule
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti. To ascertain the identity of the illegal drugs presented in court as the ones
actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure
under Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within
the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link in the chain of
custody with respect to the confiscated items.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachet containing
shabu during the buy-bust operation. The second link is the turnover of the drugs at the PDEA
Office, which was brought and marked by Sistemio himself. The third link constitutes the
delivery of the request and the specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The fourth link seeks to
establish that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination is the one presented in court.
The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the forensic
chemist is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by
the prosecution is not for the court to decide.
Under these circumstances, the prosecution has established beyond doubt an unbroken link in
the chain of custody.
Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

People of the Philippines v. Porferio Angus, Jr.

Villarama, Jr.
Facts:
Accused Porferio Angus was found guilty of the crime of parricide for the death of his wife, Betty
Angus. The accused was questioning his conviction on the ground that there were no direct
evidence presented for the killing of his wife; merely circumstantial evidence were presented,
which are: Betty was last seen alive the night of January 9, 2002, the couple was thereafter
heard arguing about a woman, and the following morning, Betty was found dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
No. Circumstantial evidence, in order to support a conviction, must consist of an unbroken
chain of inferences, which lead to only one conclusion, that is, the guilt of the accused.
The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00 olock in the
evening of January 9, 2002.Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over the latter
illicit relationship with another woman.The following day, appellant went out of his bunker at
around 6:00 olock in the morning.He had breakfast at the mess area with his companions, but
went back to his bunker at around 8:00 olock to ask his wife to join them for breakfast.When he
returned, he told his men that his wife could not join them for breakfast because she was still
asleep.At around 10:00 a.m., appellant returned to his bunker followed by Malaran who saw the
dead body of the victim.
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife.The trial
court relied on the testimonies of persons who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about
the latter illicit relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to
commit the crime.However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night
before her death, it would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant
to kill his wife.Clearly, the motive is not convincing.If at all, the testimonies merely show a
suspicion of appellant responsibility for the crime.Needless to state, however, suspicion no
matter how strong can not sway judgment. In the absence of any other evidence reasonably
linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.

G.R. No. 182229: December 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. JUN-JUN ASUELA, Appellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Asuela was, along with six others was charged of Frustrated Murder, allegedly committed by
conspiring and confederating and mutually helping and aiding other, armed with lead pipes and
pieces of wood, with intent to kill and with abuse of superior strength, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbe one ANTHONY A. VILLANUEVA on his body, but
due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said ANTHONY A. VILLANUEVA his
death was prevented.
The second charge against Asuela was Murder allegedly committed on WILFREDO
VILLANUEVA, by spraying him with teargas in the eyes and taking advantage of their superior
strength, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed one WILFREDO, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
CAs having affirmed the decision of the RTC convicting Jun-jun Asuela of Slight Physical
Injuries in the first Criminal Case and of Murder in the second Criminal Case, Asuela lodged the
present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses should render an
acquittal for Asuela
HELD:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
REMEDIAL LAW; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES
The trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded the highest respect in light
of its opportunity to directly observe them on the witness stand and to determine if they are
telling the truth.
In the present case, the alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Hayens failure to initially name Asuela during cross examination; Marks alleged contradictory
statement on who was stabbed first, he or his father, do not disprove the material fact that they
actually saw appellant and his convicted co-conspirators to have participated in the commission
of the crimes.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the substance, the veracity or the weight of the testimony, and even shows
candor and truthfulness, more so in the absence of proof, as in the present case, that improper
or ulterior motive impelled Mark, Magdalena and Hayen to wrongly implicate appellant in the
commission of the crimes.
The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EULOGIO BALAO,
defendant-appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
FACTS:
Ombudsman Prosecutor Cristoria filed with the Sandiganbayan an information against
respondents Balao (General Manager of the NHA), Angsico (Team Head of the Visayas
Management Office of the NHA), Dacalos (Division Manager of NHA's Visayas Management
Office), Lazarte and two others for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The
information stated that such persons, in their capacity as officers of the National Housing
Authority, in connivance with the accused Arceo C. Cruz, a private individual and General
Manager of A.C. Cruz Constructions, deliberately and unlawfully cause to be paid to A.C.
Construction public funds amounting to P232,628.35 supposedly for the excavation and
roadfilling works to be undertaken by A.C. Construction. However, it was revealed by the
Commission on Audit that there was no such project undertaken.
The Sandiganbayan found the information inadequate. Respondents Lazarte, Jr., Balao, Angsico
and Dacalos prayed that their motion to quash the information be admitted. The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion except for Lazarte's. It held that the four accused cannot use the fact that
they are high ranking officers of the NHA and that they only relied on the recommendation of
their subordinates in affixing their signatures to escape liability. However, the general averment
or conclusion of the prosecution in its memorandum that the accused allegedly had
foreknowledge of the supposed anomalies and yet the accused did nothing to verify this, does
not sufficiently show the basis of the charge of conspiracy insofar as accused Balao, Angsico and
Dacalos are concerned. The information did not describe how the three could have known of the
anomalies. As regards Lazarte, however, it was alleged specifically that he was the Chairman of
the Inventory and Acceptance Committee, which undertook the inventory and final qualification
of the accomplishment of A.C. Construction.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the information in Criminal Case No. 26583 which sufficiently
charged repondents Balao, Angsico and Dacalos of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW - Criminal Procedure; Information
Sections 6 and 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court state, respectively:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constitutiing the offense, and specify

its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
In quashing the subject information, the Sandiganbayan held that the information failed to
satisfy the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110. The Information still failed to state the acts or
omissions of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos with sufficient particularity so as to
enable them to make a carefully considered plea to the charges against them. However, in
Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that the fundamental test in determining the
adequacy of the averments in an information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. Matters extrinsic or evidence
aliunde should not be considered.
In Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, the Court enumerated the essential elements of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, as amended. The Court held that:
In a number of cases, the elements of this offense have been broken down as follows:
1. That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions;
3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
4. That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
5. That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexusable
negligence.
Clearly, the allegations in the information, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated that (1) Balao, Lazarte, Jr., Angsico, and
Dacalos were the general manager, team head of the Visayas Management Office, and Visayas
division manager, respectively, of the National Housing Authority; (2) they committed the
prohibited acts "in or about the month of March, 1992," "while in the performance of their
official functions"; (3) they caused undue injury to the Government in the amount of
P232,628.35, "supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken"; (4) they
gave "unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C.
Construction and themselves"; and (5) they acted "with deliberate intent, with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith."
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 177137 : August 23, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PEDRO BANIG, Appellant.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On the night of March 27, 1996, AAA attended a pre-wedding dance in their barrio which lasted
until the early hours of the next day. At about 3:00 am of March 28, 1996, AAA felt the need to
urinate. She thus left the dance hall and went up to a hill about 50-100 meters away. Suddenly,
two persons came out of nowhere, held her hands, poked a knife at her thigh, and warned her
not to scream for help or else they would kill her. Thereafter, Pedro Banig (Banig) proceeded to
remove her pants and undies while Tony Ginumtad (Ginumtad) pressed her shoulders down to
the ground. When Banig was already on top of her, he spread her legs and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After a while, Ginumtad took his turn and also raped AAA. After Ginumtads turn,
Banig again raped AAA until she lost consciousness.
The incident was then reported to the police authorities on April 15, 1996. Consequently, Banig
and Ginumtad were charged with rape.
Banig denied the accusations against him. He claimed that he and AAA were sweethearts who
were about to get married.
The RTC convicted Banig while Ginumtad was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. On
appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTCs judgment of conviction.
Hence, this appeal. Banig averred that the place where the alleged rape took place "is not one
where no other person would be able to hear her had she opted to cry for help, because it is just
ten to fifteen (10-15) meters away from an inhabited house." To further cast doubt on AAAs
credibility, Banig points to the fact that AAA did not report the offense at the first opportunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Banigs guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
REMEDIAL LAW: judgment of acquittal; sweetheart theory
Aggrieved that he was the only one convicted of the crime charged, appellant argues in his Brief
that the trial court erroneously concluded that he is the sole perpetrator of the crime charged.
He claims that when his co-accused Ginumtad was acquitted, he was made to be the fall guy,
"just because he is unrelated by blood to the private complainant." A judgment of acquittal is
final and is no longer reviewable. As we have previously held in People v. Court of Appeals, "a
verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense." True, the
finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court commits grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such a case, the judgment of
acquittal may be questioned through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
It is well-settled that lust respects neither time nor place. There is no rule that rape can be
committed only in seclusion. In People v. Corpuz, we ruled that "physical resistance need not be
established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself
to the embrace of her rapist because of fear."

As to the matter of delay in reporting the rape incident, the same does not affect the credibility
of AAA. It is not unusual for a rape victim immediately following the sexual assault to conceal at
least momentarily the incident. Delay in reporting a rape incident renders the charge doubtful
only if the delay is unreasonable and unexplained. There is no uniform behavior expected of
victims after being raped. In this case, the delay in reporting the incident only consists of a little
over two weeks. Such a span of time is not unreasonable when coupled by the fact that the victim
AAA was threatened by her aggressor.
The "sweetheart theory" hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any
evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim
were sweethearts. Appellants bare testimony that he and AAA are lovers who agreed to get
married is insufficient for the defense of "sweetheart theory" to prosper. Moreover, even if it
were true that they were sweethearts, mere assertion of a romantic relationship would not
necessarily exclude the use of force or intimidation in sexual intercourse.
The CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

People of the Philippines v. Bartolini

G.R. No. 179498, August 3, 2010
Villarama, Jr.
Facts:
Bartolini was charged with 3 counts of rape for raping his eldest and second eldest daughters.
He was convicted by the trial court of the crime of qualified rape, since the victims were below
18 years of age. He appeals his conviction of qualified rape on the ground that the information
did not contain the ages of the victims.
Issue:
Whether or not Bartolini may be convicted of the crime of qualified rape.
Held:
No. Although it was proven in the course of trial that the victims were below 18 years old, the
special qualifying circumstance since the age of the victim was not specifically alleged in the
information.
The qualifying circumstance of relationship of the victim to the accused was specifically alleged
and proven during the trial. Notably absent in the information, however, is a specific averment
of the victim age at the time the offense against her was committed. Such an omission
committed by the prosecutor is fatal in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death against
the offender. It must be borne in mind that the requirement for complete allegations on the
particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the
nature of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to
the constitutional requirement on due process, specially so if the case involves the imposition of
the death penalty in case the accused is convicted. Thus, even if the victim is below eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is her parent, but these facts are not alleged in the information, or
if only one (1) is so alleged such as what happened in the instant case, their proof as such by
evidence offered during trial cannot sanction the imposition of the death penalty.

G.R. No. 181699 : November 28, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY BATULA, alias
"Cesar," Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
AAA, the victim, then 9yrs old, went with her mother BBB and father CCC to their farm. Upon
arrival, BBB ordered AAA to get the lighter from their nipa hut. On her way back, AAA met Jerry
Batula (Batula). Batula asked AAA for directions going to Barangay Canano. After answering
Batula, AAA resumed walking but she noticed that Batula was following her. Batula seized AAA
and brought her to a creek. Batula made stabbing motions with his bolo and threatened AAA
that if you will not undress yourself, I will stab you. Fearing for her life, AAA removed her
shorts. Then, Batula raped AAA. Batula was interrupted when CCC shouted, Where are you,
AAA? Batula immediately left. AAA told her father that she has been raped.
A criminal case was filed charging Batula for rape. Batula denied the charges against him and
claimed that he went to the forest with his brother and stayed there for 3 days. RTC found
Batula guilty of the crime charged. Court of Appeals affirmed Batulas conviction.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of
the prosecutions witnesses?
2.

Whether or not Batula should be held liable for statutory rape?

HELD:
Petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW: credibility of witnesses; victims age should be alleged in the information
FIRST ISSUE:
The trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the prosecutions
witnesses.
The issue of credibility of witnesses is resolved primarily by the trial court since it is in a better
position to decide the same after having heard the witnesses and observed their conduct,
deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, the findings of the trial court are entitled to
the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing
that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or
substance which would otherwise affect the result of the case. There is no exceptional reason
herein for us to depart from the general rule.
As the RTC declared, AAA was straightforward, sincere, and very credible. Forced to relive her
ordeal all over again, AAA broke down in tears as she was testifying. The crying of a victim
during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion
indicates the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience.
SECOND ISSUE:
Batula cannot be held liable for statutory rape.
Supreme Court is not holding Batula liable for statutory rape as the fact that AAA was only nine
years old at the time of commission of the rape, although proved during the trial, was not alleged
in the Information. Nonetheless, Batula can still be convicted for rape as it was properly alleged
in the Information, and subsequently proved beyond reasonable doubt during trial, that he had
carnal knowledge of AAA by means of force, threats, and intimidation, and armed with a bladed
weapon.
Appeal is DENIED.

G.R. No. 166948-59 : August 29, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A.
BELLO, MANUEL S. SATUITO, **** MINVILUZ S. CAMINA, JOELITA
TRABUCO, ABEL,IO JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D. TROPEL, FELIPE Y.
VILLAROSA, RAUL APOSAGA, HERMIE BARBASA and ROSARIO
BARBASA-PERLAS, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged
anomalies at the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefit
System (AFP-RSBS). After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring
lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized
bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale
that showed a discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS
Legal Department while the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then
use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS.
Acting on the Committees recommendation, the Ombudsman (OMB) filed a case before
the Sandiganbayan against Meinrado Enrique A. Bello (Bello), the Legal Department
Head AFP-RSBS, along with the other respondents for six counts of violation of R.A.
3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
RPC.
Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. The Sandiganbayan granted
the motions and ruled that it has no jurisdiction over Bello since he cannot be
considered as a "manager" within the meaning of Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Bello?
HELD:
The Court grants the petition.
REMEDIAL LAW: jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
On motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan
changed its position and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-owned and
controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public function.
Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since
Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the
crime charged, did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that
section, the pertinent portion of which reads: "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations."

Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word
"manager" used above as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its
businesses or of its branch establishments, and who is vested with a certain amount of
discretion and independent judgment. The Sandiganbayan cited Blacks Law Dictionary,
Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support this definition.
After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, however, the
Court finds this additional definition of "manager": "a manager is one who has charge of
corporation and control of its businesses, or of its branch establishments, divisions, or
departments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent
judgment."
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes "divisions,
or departments," which are corporate units headed by managers. The United States case
of Braniff v. McPherren also referred to "divisions" and "departments" in relation to the
position of "manager." Under this definition, respondent Bello would fit into the term
"manager," he having charge of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department when the questioned
transactions took place.
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 173474 : August 29, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNALDO
BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Reynaldo Belocura (Belocura) was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the
Western Police District. He was on his to work on board his owner-type jeep when other
police officers spotted him using a spurious government plate. Thus, he was
apprehended by the police officers. During the inspection, PO2 Santos allegedly found
under the drivers seat a red plastic bag containing marijuana bricks. Perforce, Belocura
was charged with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
During the trial, Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it
was PO2 Santos, a member of the team, who had discovered and had actually recovered
the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep. SPO1 Rojas also
testified that he did not actually witness the recovery of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura. The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of the
marijuana bricks from the accused.
Both the RTC and the CA found Belocura guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not Belocuras arrest is valid?
II. Whether or not the prosecution has established Belocuras guilt beyond reasonable
doubt?
HELD:
The CA is reversed and set aside.
REMEDIAL LAW: warrantless arrest; personal knowledge of witness
FIRST ISSUE:
Belocuras arrest is valid.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right
against warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances in
which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or
reasonable. Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a
peace officer or a private person.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139
(The Land Transportation and Traffic Code). In flagrante delicto means in the very act
of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the
positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses.Such identification
is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid

of any inference or presumption." Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell
under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid,
therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to
validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the
trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or under his
control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article.
SECOND ISSUE:
The corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the
prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually
recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct
knowledge of the possession.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were
insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was
personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks
from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that
the Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his
own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own perception. Indeed,
only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of the marijuana
bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas account was to be believed.
The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 180452: January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI
CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, and
RAYMOND S. TAN, Accused-Appellants.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. They were
caught loading several bags of shabu into a L-300 van, within the vicinity of a resort in Quezon
province. The authorities came to knowledge of their activities through an informant.
Afterwards, they proceeded to observe the accused-appellants. When the authorities were
satisfied that the accused-appellants were indeed loading contraband into the van, the
authorities sprang into action. The authorities, however, were unable to secure a warrant prior
to the arrest. Accused-appellants question the legality of their arrest, as well as the admissibility
of the evidence taken from said arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest made on accused-appellants was according to law.
HELD:
Petition is without merit
Remedial Law: An arrest in flagrante delicto is a valid exception to the rule that an arrest must
be accompanied by a valid warrant.
The Rules of Court provide that an arrest is valid when the crime, was committed, is being
committed, or is about to be committed by the arrested person. In the case at bar, the
authorities received information of the illegal activities of the accused-appellants. Afterwards,
authorities commenced observation of accused-appellants, and found that they were loading the
contraband into the van. A valid warrantless arrest obtains in this case.

G.R. No. 198589 : July 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and JULIETA G. ANDO, Respondents.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Julieta Ando (Ando) was convicted by the MeTC of three (3) counts of Falsification of Public
Documents. The MeTC found Ando guilty for making it appear that Tee Ong (Ong), father of
private complainant William Tee (Tee), executed a Deed of Sale, an Affidavit and a Transfer of
Rights in her favor notwithstanding that Ong was already dead at the time the said documents
were purportedly executed.
The RTC affirmed the MeTC. On appeal to the CA, Ando was acquitted. The CA ruled that the
prosecution did not present any expert witness to prove the forgery. Aggrieved, Tee, under the
authority and supervision of the OSG, filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
alleging that there was no necessity to produce an expert witness to determine the forgery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari should be given due course?
HELD: Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of the principle of double jeopardy.
REMEDIAL LAW: double jeopardy-- exception
In People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, this Court reiterated that mistrial is the only exception to the
well-settled, even axiomatic, principle that acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed
on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court was categorical in stating that a re-examination of
the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which is
what is protected by the rule against double jeopardy.
This petition does not allege a mistrial and the sole challenge posed by Tee and the OSG against
the validity of the CAs disposition is the latters supposed misappreciation of the evidence, which
is an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction or a manifestation of grave abuse of discretion,
hence, not correctible by a writ of certiorari.
In People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), this Court clarified that
for an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing
that the prosecutions right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham:
"although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be
shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void."
The petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 185715,January 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appelle, vs. ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, appellant
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Appellant Erlinda was accused of selling, delivering and giving away to another, one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which was
found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and which
substance produces a physiological action similar to amphetamine or other compound thereof
providing similar physiological effects.
Erlinda pleaded not guilty to the charge, but the arresting police officers testified that they
conducted a buy-bust operation and that was how they assured that Erlinda was openly selling
drugs. Erlinda, on the other hand, said that she was in her house when the men who introduced
themselves as policemen asked to look around her house. The RTC convicted Erlinda of the
crime charged and the CA affirmed it with the modification of the penalty.
The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the
handling of the seized specimen. She claims that the apprehending team did not mark the seized
items upon confiscation. Moreover, there was no showing that the police inventoried or
photographed the seized items in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.
ISSUES: Whether the prosecution failed to prove Erlindas guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW Criminal Procedure; Quantum of proof
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the
status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so
doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may
logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails
and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in
court of thecorpus delicti, i.e.,the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime
has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is thesameillegal drug actually recovered
from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A.
No. 9165 fails.
From the exchange of testimonies during the trial, the apprehending team, upon confiscation of
the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen to the police station.No
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in the presence of the
appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official.
At no time during the arresting officers testimony did he even intimate that they inventoried or
photographed the confiscated item.
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 188901: December 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. GILBERT CASTRO Y AGUILAR,
Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
AAA (victim) is an 18-year old lass with a mental capacity akin to a 5-year old child. Accused,
Castro is the second cousin of AAA and was charged with two counts of rape.
From the witness stand AAA pointed to accused Castro as the man who raped her for two times,
first, during the wake for a deceased neighbor or supposedly on February 5, 2002, when he
brought her under a mango tree where he raped her, and, second, on November 27, 2002, when
he did same things to her at the same place under the mango tree.
To exculpate himself from liability, accused Castro offered both denial and alibi as his defense.
The RTC dismissed Castro on the first case but ruled him guilty of rape on the second charge.
This decision was upheld by the CA, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to convict Castro
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA.
HELD:
The SC affirms Castros conviction.
REMEDIAL LAW; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Ultimately, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the finding of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial court
is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial
"Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a child below
12 years old constitutes statutory rape." Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a
mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are
the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of
the latter.
The prosecution was able to establish through clinical and testimonial evidence that AAA is a
mental retardate. It presented and offered the psychological report of Dr. de Guzman of the
National Center for Mental Health stating that AAA was suffering from moderate mental
retardation (imbecile) and a mental age equivalent to that of a five and a half year old child.
Castros contention which essentially assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
testimony is untenable. It was observed that on the witness stand AAA remained steadfast and
never wavered in her testimony. She maintained even on cross-examination that it was Castro
who defiled her. The inconsistencies raised by appellant are insignificant matters which are not
material ingredients of the crime of rape. The SC maintain that inconsistencies on minor details
do not lessen a victims credibility; are common and may be expected from an uncoached
witness.

G.R. No. 189330 : November 28, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIE CATALAN y DEDALA,
Accused-Appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Louie Catalan (Catalan) was arrested during a buy-bust operation conducted at a billiard hall for
selling shabu to a police officer poseur-buyer.
At the trial, the Prosecution presented PO1 Ignacio, the poseur-buyer, as its only witness. It
dispensed with presenting the forensic chemist as another witness, after the Defense admitted
the existence of the Request for Laboratory Examination.
According to the prosecution, a civilian informant told PO1 Alvin Echipare of the Police SubStation at the Pacita Complex in San Pedro, Laguna that a certain Louie was engaged in selling
shabu in a billiard hall in Brgy. San Roque, San Pedro, Laguna. Arriving at the target area, the
buy-bust team first surveyed the billiard hall from inside their vehicle, which they parked only
ten feet from the billiard hall. Seeing two persons having a suspected transaction in shabu, PO1
Ignacio alighted and approached them, telling the person who appeared to be the seller that he
was buying shabu worth P100.00, simultaneously tendering the P100.00 buy-bust money to the
seller. Then, the police officers arrested Catalan.
At the police station, PO1 Ignacio turned the two plastic sachets and their contents over to the
investigator, who placed the marking "BLCO 020804" on the sachet handed to him by Catalan.
Both the RTC and the CA found Catalan guilty of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the Catalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation
of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165?
HELD:
The appeal is meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW: chain of custody; corpus delicti; presumption of regularity vs. presumption of
innocence
To be sure, the dangerous drugs are themselves the corpus delicti, which, literally translated
from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the
particular offense charged. Corpus delicti, as the Court puts it in People v. Roluna: "The corpus
delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result
forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of
this act or result."
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore,
the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not
comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Sec. 5 of Republic Act No.
9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the
evidence presented in court.
A review of the records exposes the abject failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the
statutory procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR on ensuring the integrity of
the chain of custody.

First of all, PO1 Ignacio himself did not do the marking despite being the arresting officer taking
initial custody of the plastic sachet of shabu the accused handed to him. Instead, he said that it
was the investigator who marked the plastic sachet of shabu, and that the investigator did so
only after the accused had been brought to the police station. Secondly, the requirement for the
presence of a media or Department of Justice representative, or an elected public official at the
time of the seizure and inventory was to insulate the seizure from any taint of illegitimacy or
irregularity. But that lofty objective could not be achieved here after PO1 Ignacio did not
mention the presence of either such representative or of the elected public official during the
buy-bust operation or at the time of the seizure of the shabu or even in the police station.
Thirdly, the Prosecution did not present the investigator as its witness to directly validate his
marking of "BLCO 020804" in court. The omission diminished the importance of the marking
as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. And, fourthly, the buy-bust
team did not conduct a physical inventory and did not take any photograph of the seized shabu
either at the place of seizure, or in the police station.
We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in relying on the presumption of
regularity. Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duty
was patently bereft of any factual and legal basis. We remind the lower courts that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger
presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the
accused being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence
allocating the burden of evidence.
The CAs decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 159450:March 30, 2011.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA
CRISTOBAL, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
The Information charged the accused with qualified theft, alleging that accused, as "the teller of
Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City, and as such is
entrusted with cash and other accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles Main
Branch."
The accused pleadednot guiltyat arraignment, and trial ensued. Upon the State resting its case
against the accused, her counsel filed aDemurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence,praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did
not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the RTC denied
theDemurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidenceand deemed the case submitted
for decision on the basis that her filing herdemurrer to evidencewithout express leave of court as
required by Section 15, Rule 119, of theRules of Courthad waived her right to present evidence.
The RTC convicted the accused, which the CA affirmed. Upon appeal, petitioner submits that
the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly transpired on December 29, 1995,
but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her conviction because it actually proved that
the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996; and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice
her rights as an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare for her
defense. She also questions the denial of her demurrer to evidence, and the admissibility of the
her letter datedJanuary 4, 1996to Prudential Banks President explaining the shortage of her
dollar collection as bank teller.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the information against the accused was valid for failing to indicate the proper
time she allegedly committed the act
2. Whether her demurrer was validly denied
3. Whether or not her letter was an extrajudicial confession, inadmissible under the rules on
evidence
-+
The appeal is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW: What an Information should contain; demurrer; admissibility of evidence.
First issue: As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the time or date of the commission of the
offense, Section 6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of theRevisedRules of Court,the rules applicable,
provide that what is required is the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and that
"it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed." The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As such, the
1offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a dateas near as possibleto the

actual date of its commission, December 29, 1995andJanuary 2, 1996were dates only four days
apart.
Second issue:
Under Section 15, Rule 119, of theRevisedRules of Court, when the accused files such motion to
dismiss (based on insufficiency of evidence) without express leave of court, he waives the right
to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution." Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to
present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to
evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present evidence.
The RTC did not need toinquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her
opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively
waived her right to present her evidence.
Third issue:
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed
with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under
Section 26Rule 130 of theRules of Courtthat was admissible against her.By virtue of its being
made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter.
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the
letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation.
Appeal is DENIED.

G.R. No. 185005 : December 10, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANTE DEJILLO and
GERVACIO "Dongkoy" HOYLE, JR., Accused-Appellants.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Dante Dejillo (Dante) and Gervacio Dongkoy Hoyle, Jr. (Gervacio) were
having a drinking spree with Aurelio Basalo (Aurelio) when Dante suddenly stabbed the latter
while being held by Gervacio.
Meanwhile, Florenda, Aurelios sister, was asleep at her residence when she was awakened by the
sound of running feet. Florenda got up and heard Aurelio shouting for help. Florenda found her
brother at a road canal leaning against the canal wall. Thinking that her brother was only drunk,
she carried Aurelio home but as she embraced Aurelio, the latter whispered to Florendas left ear
that I was stabbed by Dante while Dongkoy held me. Florenda and her husband brought Aurelio
to the hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
Dante and Gervacio were charged with murder before the RTC. During the trial, the RTC
admitted Aurelios dying declaration. Thus, the RTC convicted Dante and Gervacio. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC.
Hence, this present appeal. Dante and Gervacio argued that the trial court erred when it
admitted Aurelios dying declaration. They averred that Aurelio would have already lost too
much blood from his stab wound, rendering him unable to talk, and even unconscious, by the
time Florenda found him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to Aurelios dying declaration?
HELD:
The Court finds the appeal devoid of merit.
REMEDIAL LAW: dying declaration
The RTC admitted Aurelios dying declaration to prove the identity of his assailants and the
circumstances that led to his death because it qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule with
the concurrence of all four essential requisites, to wit: One of the most reliable pieces of evidence
for convicting a person is the dying declaration of the victim. Courts accord credibility of the
highest order to such declarations on the truism that no man conscious of his impending death
will still resort to falsehood. The requisites for admitting such declaration as evidence an
exception to the hearsay rule are four, which must concur, to wit: a.) the dying declaration must
concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; b.) at the time it
was made the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; c.) the declarant was
competent as a witness; and d.) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide in which the decedent was the victim. The four requisites are undoubtedly
present in this case. About thirty minutes or so before his death, the slain victim in this case,
Aurelio Boy Basalo, uttered a statement identifying the two accused, Dante Dejillo and Gervacio
Dongkoy Hoyle, as his assailants. The dying statement of Aurelio Basalo is a statement of the
surrounding circumstances of his death as the same refers to the identity of his assailants; thus,
the first requisite is present. The second requisite is also present. Aurelio Basalo gave such
declaration under the consciousness of an impending death as shown by the serious nature of
his wound which in fact resulted in his death thirty minutes or so after he was found with a stab
wound on his left chest. Further, the fact that Aurelio Basalo at the time he gave the dying
declaration was competent as a witness is too obvious to require further discussion. Finally,
Basalos dying declaration is offered as evidence in a criminal prosecution for murder in which
he was himself, the victim.
Judgment AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

G.R. No. 188107 : December 5, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD M. DEL ROSARIO
@ "AGING," Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Accused Ronald Del Rosario (Del Rosario) was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The prosecution
alleged that in the evening of April 26, 2003, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation
upon receiving information that Del Rosario is engaged in selling illegal drugs. Thereupon, Del
Rosario handed a sachet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to the poseur-buyer.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the police officers as witnesses. Their testimonies,
however, showed patent inconsistencies as to how the sachet of shabu was marked. Nonetheless,
the RTC convicted Del Rosario. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
Thus, Del Rosario appealed to the Court alleging that the buy-bust operation did not comply
with Sec. 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 and that the prosecution failed to show that the sachet of
shabu presented in court was the same one recovered from him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Del Rosarios guilt for the illegal sale of dangerous drug, was proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
HELD:
The Court resolves to acquit Del Rosario.
REMEDIAL LAW: corpus delicti; chain of custody
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. It must be remembered that to
successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is not enough that the buyer,
seller, and consideration for the transaction are identified. It is equally important that the object
of the case is identified with certainty.
The prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the shabu,
from the moment it was seized from Del Rosario, up to the time it was presented in court as
proof of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime
has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. The
dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the
corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily
arises from the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise.
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Appeal is GRANTED. Accused is ACQUITTED.

G.R. No. 177357 : October 17, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VAL DELOS REYES,
Accused-Appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Herein appellant Val Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) and Donel Go (Go) were charged with three (3)
and two (2) counts of rape respectively.
The prosecution established that on December 22, 1994, at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon,
AAA was requested by CCC to deliver pictures to Go. Arriving at the place, AAA saw Go standing
by the roadside talking to Delos Reyes. According to AAA, there was a sudden downpour before
she could leave. Upon invitation of Go, she took shelter in his house. She noticed that there was
nobody in the house. Alarmed and fearful, she tried to leave despite the pouring rain but Go
stopped her by forcibly pulling her. Delos Reyes then joined the two, bringing with him two (2)
bottles of beer. Delos Reyes then forced her to drink by pinching her nose while Go was forcibly
opening her mouth. Despite her resistance, the two succeeded in pouring beer into her mouth.
Shortly, thereafter, she felt weak and dizzy. Delos Reyes then brought AAA to a construction site
near Go's house where Delos Reyes ravished her. Afterwards, Go arrived and helped Delos Reyes
in dressing up AAA. They returned to Go's house and she was brought inside the bedroom.
While Delos Reyes restrained her hands, Go started raping AAA. After Go was done with her,
Delos Reyes again satisfied his lust for the second time.
Delos Reyes countered that he should be acquitted based on the inconsistencies in the testimony
of the witnesses. He also averred that AAAs affidavit was inconsistent with her testimonies made
in open court. On how she was forced to drink beer, AAA testified that Delos Reyes pressed her
nose and Go forcibly opened her mouth. In her sworn statement, however, she stated that
because of her fear, she drank the beer. Regarding where she was when Go forced her to stay,
she testified that she was already inside the house of Go but her sworn statement stated that she
was still outside. With respect to what Delos Reyes was doing when Go was raping her, she
testified that Delos Reyes was holding her while her sworn statement stated that he was just
watching them.
Both the RTC and the CA found the two (2) accused guilty of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Delos Reyes guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
The Court affirms the conviction of Delos Reyes.
REMEDIAL LAW: credibility
The rule is well-settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial courts observations and conclusions deserve great respect and
are accorded finality, unless the records show facts or circumstances of material weight and
substance that the lower court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if
properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The testimony of AAA on the elements
constituting the crime of rape, as committed on three separate occasions through force and
intimidation after she was rendered almost unconscious after being forced to drink two (2)
bottles of beer, was clear, categorical and positive. A candid narration by a rape victim deserves
credence particularly where no ill motive is attributed to the rape victim that would make her
testify falsely against the accused. Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually abused,

she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her person, provided
her testimony meets the test of credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral
matters, do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their
testimony. They do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.
At any rate, these alleged inconsistencies do not militate against her credibility as the Court has
repeatedly held that sworn statements are almost always incomplete and inaccurate and do not
disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions. It is a matter of judicial
experience that an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate and is generally considered to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the
latter is subject to the test of cross-examination.
The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.