12.

1, #3

SPOUSES YAP vs. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANCK, et al.

G.R. No. 175145, March 28, 2008
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank) filed a collection suit with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Alberto Looyuko and
Jimmy T. Go in the Makati RTC, which rendered a Decision finding Looyuko and Go liable. The
two were ordered to pay the amount of P96,000,000, plus penalty. Two Writs of Execution on the
judgment were issued against Looyuko and Mr. Go for their respective parts of the liability.
Respondent Sheriff Renato C. Flora issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale notifying all the parties
concerned, as well as the public in general, that certain real properties, among others, allegedly
owned by Mr. Go will be sold at public auction. This auction did not push through.

Petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction with the Pasig City RTC. Petitioners
sought to stop the auction sale alleging that the properties are already owned by them by virtue
of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Go in their favor. The RTC issued an Order denying
petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, it took a third auction to
be scheduled before the properties were sold. Respondent sheriff then issued a Certificate of Sale
stating that the subject properties had been sold at public auction in favor of respondent iBank,
subject to the third-party claims of petitioners.

Petitioners filed with the Pasig City RTC the instant case for Annulment of Sheriffs Auction
Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale against iBank, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff
of RTC Makati City, and Sheriff Flora. The Complaint was amended to include a prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Sheriff Flora
filed an Omnibus Motion (Motion to Refer the Complaint to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
Raffle in the Presence of Adverse Party and Motion to Dismiss). This Omnibus Motion was
denied for lack of merit. Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was left pending.

As for the application for preliminary injunction, a hearing was thus held, leading to the issuance
of an Order granting petitioners application. Upon posting a bond in the amount of P3,000,000,
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. A Motion for Reconsideration of the order
granting the Writ was denied. Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction. The CA dismissed the Petition. Respondents thereafter filed with
the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari which was dismissed. Accordingly, an Entry of
Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court certifying that the resolution dismissing the case had
become final and executory.

Respondents filed with the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss
Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) praying that their pending Motion for Reconsideration
which seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
previously issued be dissolved. Petitioners filed their Comment thereon, praying that the pending
Motion for Reconsideration be denied for being devoid of merit, and that the Motion to Dissolve
Writ of Preliminary Injunction be also denied, it being a clear defiance of the directive of the
Supreme Court which ruled with finality that the injunction issued by the trial court was
providently issued and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The trial court recalled and dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and ordered respondents
to post a counter-bond amounting to ten million pesos. It directed the Branch Clerk of Court to
issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction upon the filing and approval of the required
counter-bond.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA asking that the trial courts Order be set
aside. The CA resolved to dismiss outright the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioners to
file a motion for reconsideration of the Order with the court a quo. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) May the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the
rulings of the CA and by the SC that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
(2) Did the CA err when it dismissed outright their Petition for Certiorari filed without a
previous Motion for Reconsideration brought before the court a quo?

RULING:

(1) YES.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. As long as the
party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any
of the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court
previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Under [Section 6 of Rule 58], a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears

after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order,
the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage
to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such
damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on
condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the
dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur: first, the
court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would
cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for
such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-bond. The Order of
the trial court [...] is based on this ground.

[The] matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound

judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless
 it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or,
otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that issued such a
preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant. In the
case on hand, the trial court issued the order of dissolution on a ground provided for by
the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with the rules, we find no reason to
disturb the same.

(2) NO.

The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. It must be stressed that a
petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the trial court an
opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual issues. By their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they
deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was
any.

[A] perusal of petitioners petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals shows
that they filed the same because there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law except via a petition for certiorari. [This argument] does not
convince. We have held that the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or
Resolution. The mere allegation that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is not one of the exceptions to the rule that a motion for
reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may be filed.
12.1, #4

MANILA BANKING CORPORATION vs. CA and LUZON BROKERAGE

CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-45961, July 3, 1990
Narvasa, J.

FACTS: Luzon Brokerage Corporation filed a complaint in the Surigao del Norte CFI against
Manila Banking Corporation and two (2) others, the Pacific Copra Export Co., Inc. (PACOCO),
and the Provincial Sheriff of Surigao del Norte. As per the complaint, Luzon Brokerage entered
into a "Field Warehouse Storage Agreement" with PACOCO to operate warehouses in Surigao
del Norte for Philippine copra in bags and/or in bulk, and sometime later, a lease of the latter's
two warehouses for the purpose of depositing copra therein; pursuant to the agreements, Luzon
Brokerage received from PACOCO for deposit in said warehouses 150 long tons of copra
resecada valued at more or less P84,000 in connection with which Luzon Brokerage issued a
warehouse receipt; some two months later, Manila Banking Corporation addressed a formal
request to the Provincial Sheriff of Surigao del Norte to extrajudicially sell the copra above
described at public auction; this request was made without prior satisfaction of Luzon
Brokerage's warehouseman's lien, the surrender of the warehouse receipt, or presentation of a
"written order" from the entities mentioned in said receipt.

Alleging further that the extra-judicial sale was violative of Luzon Brokerage's rights, and would
cause it injustice and irreparable injury, the complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued ex parte restraining the defendants, their agents, representatives or deputies
from selling the 150 long tons of copra in the two warehouses of PACOCO leased to plaintiff,
and that after due proceeding, defendants be perpetually enjoined from committing said acts.

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and set the application for preliminary
injunction for hearing. Manila Banking filed an opposition to the injunction application. The trial
court then issued an order requiring the parties to submit their memoranda and directing that as
the subject matter of this case is copra, which is fungible, and copra will deteriorate in the
passing of time, in order to save the same from deterioration and ultimate loss to the prejudice of
the party or parties who may be found to be entitled to the same, the Provincial Sheriff was to
cause notice to be published again according to law for the sale at public auction of the copra in
question, to the highest and best bidder within five days from the time that the notices are
published or posted according to the requirements of the law. The copra was accordingly sold at
public auction which amount was deposited with Manila Banking in the name of the Provincial
Sheriff of Surigao del Norte, subject to the orders of the Trial Court.

In the meantime, memoranda were submitted by the parties as previously required. Manila
Banking's memorandum contained a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. Luzon Brokerage's memorandum, as might be expected, included an
opposition to the motion.

The trial court later promulgated an Order dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff
Luzon Brokerage, declaring Manila Banking entitled to all the balance of the proceeds of the
copra in the amount of P78,062.71 and directing the Sheriff to deliver the same to Manila
Banking. Luzon Brokerage appealed to the CA which set aside said order of dismissal and
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings and trial on the merits, ruling that
"there is still a main action of injunction [which] should not be confused with the provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction." hence, this appeal by Manila Banking to the SC by
certiorari.

ISSUE: Can an injunction be issued against consummated acts?

RULING: NO.

[An] action for permanent injunction should be dismissed when it appears in the trial or
otherwise that the acts, to restrain which the action was begun, have been accomplished or fully
executed.
13.1, #26

WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, et al.

G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011
Carpio, J.

FACTS: This is an original petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief and declaration
of nullity of the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines to Metro Pacific Assets
Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific) filed with
the SC.

Petitioner Wilson Gamboa claims, among others, that the sale of said shares would result in an
increase in First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and
this, combined with Japanese NTT DoCoMos common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to
a total foreign common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent
constitutional limit.

At the outset, Gamboa is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the remedies Gamboa seeks,
only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of the SC, which however is
not exclusive but is concurrent with the RTC and the CA. The actions for declaratory relief,
injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the SC. On
this ground alone, the petition may be dismissed outright.

ISSUE: Should Gamboa's petition be dismissed?

RULING: NO.

[Since] the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy, the [SC]
treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.

[It] is well-settled that [the SC] may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications [...] and raises questions that
should be resolved [...] (Emphasis added.)

The interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-
reaching implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will determine
whether Filipinos are masters, or second class citizens, in their own country. What is at stake
here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective control of the national economy.
Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-reaching implications to the entire nation, and to
future generations of Filipinos, it is the [threshold] legal issue presented in this case.
13.1, #27

CANDELARIO L. VERSOZA, JR. vs. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, et al.

G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS: On two separate occasions, the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) purchased
from Tetra Corporation (Tetra) a total of forty-six (46) units of computer equipment and
peripherals in the total amount of P2,285,279. Tetra was chosen from among three qualified
bidders (Tetra, Microcircuits and Columbia). In the technical evaluation of the units to be
supplied by the qualified bidders, CDA engaged the services of the Development Academy of the
Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC). The bidding was thereafter conducted.
Petitioner Candelario Versoza who was then the Executive Director of the CDA approved the
purchase.

The Resident Auditor later sought the assistance of the Technical Services Office (TSO), COA in
the determination of the reasonableness of the prices of the purchased computers. In its reply-
letter, the TSO found that the purchased computers were overpriced. Moreover, it was found that
when CDA first offered to buy computers, of the three qualified bidders, Tetra offered the highest
bid. The Resident Auditor thus issued a Notice of Disallowance.

In a letter, CDA Chairman Edna E. Aberilla appealed for reconsideration of the disallowance to
COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan. Respondent COA issued the assailed decision affirming the
disallowance. COA declared inter alia that CDA should not have awarded the contract to Tetra
but to the other competing bidders, whose bid is more advantageous to the government, and
being that the price for the equipment delivered has been paid, when such equipment could be
acquired at a lower cost, the disallowance of the price difference would be justified.

Versozas motion for reconsideration having been denied, he now comes to the SC for relief.

ISSUE: Should the petition be given due course?

RULING: NO.

[Versoza] availed of the wrong remedy in filing a petition for review under Rule 45. Article IX-
A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on
Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.24 Moreover,
under Section 2, Rule 64, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65.
13.1, #28

ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA and ATTY. CLARITO SERVILLAS vs. JUDGE VICTOR A.
CANOY
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298, February 22, 2012
Carpio, J.

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Atty. Rene O. Medina and Atty. Clarito
Servillas against Judge Victor A. Canoy, Presiding Judge of Branch 29 of the Surigao City RTC,
for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, Undue Interference and Gross Inefficiency,
relative to two civil cases and one special proceeding. Among other offenses, Judge Canoy was
indicted for disregarding the basic and elementary principle that TRO and preliminary injunction
are improper remedies to transfer possession of one property to another whose title has not been
clearly established.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dismissed specifically the charges of gross
ignorance of the law for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Are TROs and preliminary injunction proper remedies to transfer possession of property
from one to another person whose title has not been clearly established?

RULING: NO.

[An] injunction cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a property to another when
the legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal title has not been clearly established.
In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this established doctrine applied in
numerous cases when it granted the preliminary injunction in favor of [someone] whose legal
title is disputed. [...] Respondent judge should have been more cautious in issuing writs of
preliminary injunctions because as consistently held these writs are strong arms of equity which
must be issued with great deliberation.
14.1, #23

VANGIE BARRAZONA vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY
G.R. No. 154282, April 7, 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building located in
Baguio City. Vangie Barrazona, petitioner, has been leasing portions of the building identified as
Units 203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the lease is for two (2) years. The monthly
rental is P400.00 per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter for Unit 203 B.
Petitioner soon defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay despite
demands by respondent. Thus, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages.

On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others,
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the allegations therein
clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Petitioner pointed out that in the complaint, it
shows that it is not for sum of money but for ejectment. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss
for lack of merit.

Forthwith, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss?

RULING: YES.

Petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction is pursuant to Section 1, Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides [that] a motion to dismiss
may be made [where the court] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.

[Petitioner] stated in her motion that respondents allegations in its complaint show that it is one
for ejectment cognizable, not by the RTC but, by the MTC of Baguio City.