Llorente Vs Court of Appeals
Llorente Vs Court of Appeals
Llorente Vs Court of Appeals
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor.
Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage,
(3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
the conjugal property.
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc.
No. IR-888.
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is
not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained
the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of
the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of
their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then
one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal
shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned
for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the
proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that
Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. Amending
its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, the issue is simple. Who are entitled to
inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic
validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula;
(2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and
the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in
this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies
when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly
apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other
than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi
doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance
with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country
in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31,
1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce
granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will
and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July 31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes +, J., ponente, Torres, Jr. and Hofilena, JJ., concurring.
In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Lorenzo N. Llorente,
Lorenzo N. Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888 (Petition for the Grant of Letters of Administration for the Estate of
Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T. Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18, 1987, Judge Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.
Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
Ibid.
This was issued pursuant to Lorenzos petition, Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court. Exhs. H and H-3 Trial Court
Folder of Exhibits, p. 157, 159.
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
Ibid.
Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.
Exh. B-1 Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.
Exh. D, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.
Exh. E, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.
Exh. F, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
Comment, Rollo, p. 147.
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4; Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
Ibid., pp. 52-53.
Ibid., p. 53.
RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.
Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos. IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.
Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which states, The following cannot adopt: xxx
(3) a married person, without the consent of the other spouse; xxx, the trial court reasoned that since the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo did not dissolve his first marriage with Paula, then the adoption of Raul and Luz was void, as Paula did not give her
consent to it.
Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.
Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.
On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with this Court a verified complaint against the members of the Special Thirteenth
Division, Court of Appeals, Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., Celia Lipana-Reyes + and Hector Hofilena for gross ignorance of
the law, manifest incompetence and extreme bias (Rollo, p. 15).
Again with Associate Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Hector
Hofilena (Former Special Thirteenth Division).
Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.
Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration; (2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has been repealed by Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Code and (3) That
Alicia and her children not are entitled to any share in the estate of the deceased (Rollo, p. 19).
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 (1961).
Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.
In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).
139 SCRA 139 (1985).
300 SCRA 406 (1998).
174 SCRA 653 (1989).
The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present civil code is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction
is NOT applicable in the case at bar as Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce.
Article 15, Civil Code provides Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (Underscoring ours)
Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).