The Long Peace, The End of The Cold War

The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism
Author(s): Richard Ned Lebow

Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 249-277
Published by: The MIT Press
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The longpeace, theend ofthecold

war,and thefailureofrealism
RichardNed Lebow
Nation-states
are engagedin a never-ending
struggle
to improveorpreserve
their
relativepowerpositions.
-Robert Gilpin
Thegreatness
oftheidea ofEuropeanintegration
on democratic
foundations
consistsin itscapacityto overcometheold Herderianidea ofthenationstateas
thehighest
expression
ofnationallife.
-Va'clav Havel
The dramaticeventsof 1989-91are widelyrecognizedto have usheredin a new
era in internationalrelations.Prominentrealistsmaintainthata shiftis under
wayin theinternational
systemfrombi- to multipolarity.
Some ofthempredict
that a multipolarworld will be more conflictualand urge states to acquire
nuclear weapons.' Realists and neorealists alike argue that superpower
behaviorsince 1945 is consistentwiththeirtheories.I contendthatit sharply
contradicts
thesetheories.
This and the otherarticlesin thisSymposiumwere preparedforInternational

Organization
and
forRichardN. Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds.,Intemational
RelationsTheoryand theEnd
oftheCold War,forthcoming.
I gratefully
acknowledgethe supportofthe HewlettFoundationand
the United States Instituteof Peace. I would also like to acknowledgethe helpfulcommentsof
FriedrichKratochwil,JohnOdell, KennethA. Oye, Thomas Risse-Kappen,JaniceGross Stein,
and Stephen Walt. The two epigraphs are taken from Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the
MultinationalCorporation(New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 35, emphasisoriginal;and Vaclav
Havel, "How Europe Could Fail," New YorkReviewofBooks, 18 November1993,p. 3.
1. See JohnJ. Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instabilityin Europe Afterthe Cold War,"
IntemationalSecurity15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Kenneth M. Waltz, "The Emerging
Structureof InternationalPolitics," paper presented at the annual meetingof the American
PoliticalScience Association,San Francisco,30 August-2September1990. For an argumentthat
therecentchangesmake realismand, in particular,realistscholarsmorerelevantto thepracticeof
international
relations,see StephenM. Walt,"The Renaissanceof SecurityStudies,"International
Studies Quarterly35 (June 1991), pp. 211-39. For a critique, see Edward A. Kolodziej,
36 (December
"Renaissance in SecurityStudies? Caveat Lector!" International
StudiesQuarterly
1992),pp. 421-38.
International
Organization
48, 2, Spring1994,pp. 249-77
? 1994 byThe 10 Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology

250 InternationalOrganization
I develop myargumentby lookingat realistexplanationsforthreeof the
moreimportantinternationaldevelopmentsof the last halfcentury:the "long
theSovietUnion's renunciation
peace" betweenthesuperpowers,
ofitsempire
and leadingrole as a superpower,and thepost-coldwar transformation
of the
international
system.Realisttheoriesat theinternational
leveladdressthefirst
and thirdof these developments,and realisttheoriesat the unit level have
made an ex postfactoattemptto accountforthesecond.The weaknessofthese
explanationsraisesseriousproblemsfortherealistparadigm.
Evaluatingrealism
The realist paradigmis based on the core assumptionthat anarchyis the
definingcharacteristic
of the internationalsystem.Anarchycompelsstatesto
make securitytheirparamountconcern and to seek to increase power as
againstothervalues. Power is definedas capabilityrelativeto other states.
Drawing on the core assumptionof anarchyand the "self-help"systemit
allegedlyengenders,realistshave advanced a varietyof sometimescontradictorypropositionsabout international
relations.Realistsdisagree,amongother
things,about the relativewar-pronenessand stabilityof multipolarversus
bipolar internationalsystems,the importanceand consequences of nuclear
abouttheweightofpoweras an explanation
weapons,and morefundamentally
of statebehavior.The competingpredictionsof realisttheoriesmake realism
difficult
to falsify.Almost any outcome can be made consistentwith some
variantof realisttheory.
Operationalization
Testable theoriesrequirecarefulconceptualand operationaldefinitions
of
theirdependentand independentvariables.These definitions
mustbe conceptuallyprecise and stipulatehow the variables are to be measured or their
presencedetermined.Realist theoriesdo not meet these conditions.They do
not share common definitionsof the core concepts they use to construct
variables.Individualdefinitions
of nationalinterest,power,balance of power,
and polarityallow foran unacceptablywide range of conceptualand operationalmeaningand makeitdifficult
to testrealistpropositionsagainstevidence
drawnfromspecificcases. Neorealism,the mostscientifically
self-conscious
of
realisttheories,is particularly
inadequate in thisregard,as mycritiqueof its
explanationforthelongpeace willdemonstrate.
Specification
Theories muststipulatethe conditionsassociatedwithpredictedoutcomes.
If these conditionsare met but repeatedlyfail to produce the predicted

Symposium 251
outcomes,thetheoriescan be rejected.If predictedand unpredictedoutcomes
occur,thetheoriesare inadequatelyspecified.
Powertransition
theoriescomprisethebranchofrealismthatanalyzesgreat
of
powerresponsesto decline.These theoriesfailedto envisagethepossibility
a peaceful accommodationbetweenthe twopoles of a bipolarsystemor that
one of themwould voluntarily
relinquishits core sphereof influenceto bring
about that accommodation.Such an anomalous outcome constitutesstrong
groundsforrejectingpower transitiontheories.Realists have soughtto save
theircore insightsby treatingthe end of the cold war as a special case and
reformulating
theirpropositionsto take it into account.2Anomalous cases
oftenserveas catalystsforbettertheory.But as the second partof mycritique
will show, realist attemptsex post facto to explain Mikhail Gorbachev's
reorientationof Soviet foreignpolicy are neither logicallyconsistentnor
empirically
persuasive.
Utility
Good theoryis based on good assumptions.Realistsmaintainthattheircore
assumptionof anarchyaccuratelycapturesthe dynamicsof the international
systemand generates powerfulexplanationsof interstatebehavior. Some
recentliteraturecontendsthatthe assumptionof anarchyhas no theoretical
I contendthat
contentand cannotgenerateusefulor testablepropositions.3
internationalstructureis not determining.Fear of anarchyand its conseactorsto modifytheirbehaviorwiththe
quences encouragedkeyinternational
goal of changingthat structure.The pluralistsecuritycommunitythat has
developed amongthe democraticindustrialpowersis in partthe resultof this
process. This communityand the end of the cold war provideevidence that
statescan escape fromthe securitydilemma.
A critical case?
At the finalsession of a 1991 conferenceon internationalrelationstheory
and the end of thecold war,a prominentparticipantexpressedhis dissatisfactionwiththe proceedings.4The end of the cold war,he insisted,was a "mere
2. See, forexample,Daniel Deudney and G. JohnIkenberry,"The InternationalSources of
Soviet Change," IntemationalSecurity16 (Winter1991-92), pp. 74-118; Daniel Deudney and G.
JohnIkenberry,
"Soviet Reformand the End of the Cold War: ExplainingLarge-scaleHistorical
Change," Reviewof IntemationalStudies17 (Summer 1991), pp. 225-50; and KennethA. Oye,
"Explainingthe End of the Cold War: Morphologicaland BehavioralAdaptationsto the Nuclear
RelationsTheory
and
Peace," in RichardNed Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds.,Intemational
theEnd oftheCold War,forthcoming.
3. See Helen Milner,"InternationalTheories of CooperationAmong Nations: Strengthsand
Weaknesses,"WorldPolitics44 (April1992),pp. 466-96; and AlexanderWendt,"AnarchyIs What
Organization
46 (Spring
ofPowerPolitics,"Intemational
StatesMake ofIt: The Social Construction
1992),pp. 391-425.
4. The conferencewas entitled"InternationalRelationsand theEnd of theCold War," Cornell
University,
Ithaca,N.Y., October1991.

data point" that could not be used to test or develop theory.However,
neorealismdrewon a singlecase of bipolarityto constructits theory.If that
case does not fitthe theory,it raises serious doubts about the validityof the
theory.Otherrealisttheorieshave cast theirempiricalnets morewidely.The
of internationalrelations
end of the cold war and the ongoingtransformation
also raise serious problemsforthese theories.This essay does not test in a
formalsense any of these theories;such tests are precluded by the lack of
specificationas well as by my own reliance on only a few cases. Rather, it
attemptsto demonstratethathistoricalevidencesince 1945 contradictsmany
realist claims and expectationsand suggeststhe need for alternativeaprelations.
proachesto thestudyofinternational
Realism and thelongpeace

Securityspecialistsconsiderit remarkablethatthe superpowersdid not go to
war as did rival hegemonsof the past. Many realist theoriesattributethe
which
system,
absence ofwarto thebipolarnatureofthepostwarinternational
theyconsiderless war-pronethanthemultipolarworlditreplaced.All ofthem
have poorly specified definitionsof bipolarity.None of the measures of
bipolarityderived from these theories sustains a characterizationof the
international
systemas bipolarbeforethemid-1950sat the earliest.
I willdiscussonlytworealisttheoriesthatemphasize
For thesake ofbrevity,
effectsof bipolarity,those of Hans Morgenthauand Kenneth
the restraining
international
relationstheoriesof
Waltz.Theyare arguablythemostinfluential
thecold war era.
Measures ofpower and polarity
The firsteditionof Morgenthau'sPoliticsAmongNationscoincidedwiththe
beginningof the cold war; in that and subsequent editions,Morgenthau
worriedthat the United States and the Soviet Union would stumbleinto a
nuclear war despite their mutual recognitionof its destructiveness.For
Morgenthau,thelongpeace was notan analyticalpuzzle buta desppratehope.5
Morgenthaubelieved that postwar internationalrelations was shaped by
bipolarityand nuclear weapons. Both were double-edgedswords.Bipolarity
was ''a mechanismthatcontainsin itselfthepotentialitiesforunheard-ofgood
as well as for unprecedentedevil." It "made the hostile oppositionof two
giganticpower blocs possible" but also held out the hope of regulatingthat
oppositionthroughan equilibriumof powermaintainedbymoderatecompetition. Nuclear weapons made leaders more cautious and mote insecure.The
5. Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). Subsequent
referencesto Morgenthauare fromthefourtheditionof thiswork(see below).

Symposium 253
nuclear arms race reduced internationalpoliticsto a "primitivespectacle of
two giants eyingeach other with watchfulsuspicion." Human survivaldepended on mutual restraint.This was not a functionof the polarityof the
ofleaders.6
systembutoftheskilland commitment
international
Drawing on Morgenthau's insightthat bipolarityhad the potential to
promotea more stable internationalorder,Waltz built a formaldeductive
to create a parsimonioustheory
theoryof internationalrelations.7In an effort
weightto thenatureof the system,the
at the systemlevel,he gave explanatory
oftheircapabilities.He downplayedthe
numberof actors,and thedistribution
includingleadership.
powerof stateattributes,
explanatory
Writingin the late 1970s,Waltz was struckby the seemingstabilityof the
earlierpredictions
postwarorderand thesuccessofthesuperpowersin defying
thatthe cold warwould sooneror laterturnhot.He attributedthe absence of
which,he maintained,was less war-pronethanmultipolarity.
war to bipolarity,
Waltz argued that war arose primarilybecause of miscalculation;states
misjudgedtherelativepoweror thepowerand cohesionofopposingcoalitions.
of estimating
The latter errorwas more common because of the difficulty
and oftenunstablecoalitions.In
accuratelythepowerand cohesionof shifting
a bipolarworld,wherehegemonsrelyon theirown vastlysuperiorpowerfor
their security,coalitions are less importantand "uncertaintylessens and
calculationsare easier to make."8
as a unitattributeand outsidehistheory.
technology
Waltzregardedmilitary
He soughtto minimizeitsconsequencesand insistedthatthe"perennialforces
thannuclearweaponsin shapingthebehavior
ofpolitics"weremoreimportant
of nations.Nuclear adversaries"may have strongerincentivesto avoid war"
than conventionally
armed states,but then the United States and the Soviet
to learn to livewitheach other"than more
Union also foundit more difficult
experiencedand less ideologicaladversarieswouldhave."9
Politicshas one majordependentvariable,the
Waltz's Theory
ofIntemational
war-pronenessof internationalsystems,thatis explainedbyone independent
variable,the polarityof the system.The theoryresides entirelyat the system
characterand polarityis a structural
is a systemproperty,
level:war-proneness
istic of the system.Waltz is unyieldingin his contentionthat a theoryof
relationsshouldnotincorporatevariablesat the unitlevel or use
international
4thed. (New York: Knopf,1966),especiallypp. 347-49,
6. Morgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations,
fromwhichthequotationsare drawn.
1979).
Politics(Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
ofIntemational
7. KennethN. Waltz,Theory
8. See ibid.,especiallypp. 168-70,fromwhichthequotationsare drawn;and KennethN. Waltz,
"The Stabilityof a Bipolar World,"Daedalus 93 (Summer1964), pp. 881-909. On the questionof
also see Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer,
the relativestabilityof bi- and multipolarity,
"Multipolar Power Systemsand InternationalStability,"WorldPolitics 16 (April 1964), pp.
and the Future,"Joumalof Conflict
390-406; Richard N. Rosecrance,"Bipolarity,Multipolarity,
Resolution10 (September1966), pp. 314-27; and Thomas J.Christensenand JackSnyder,"Chain
Organization
Intemational
Gangs and Passed Bucks:PredictingAlliancePatternsin Multipolarity,"
44 (Spring1990),pp. 137-68.
Politics,pp. 173-74.
ofIntemational
9. Waltz,Theory

propertiesto predictthe behaviorof individualunits.Bipolarity
system-level
constraintsand incentives
by structuring
affectsstate behavioronlyindirectly
forleaders.10
Many internationalrelationsscholarsand historianscontendthat nuclear
weapons have played a farmore importantrole in preservingthe peace than
Waltz's theoryacknowledged.Waltz has come to accept the contentionof his
critics.In 1981, he upgradedthe role of nuclearweapons, arguingthat they
"have been the second forceworkingforpeace in the postwarworld.""1In
1986, he conceded that the introductionof nuclear weapons, a unit-level
In a 1990 essay Waltz went furtherand
effect.12
change, had a system-level
arguedthat"The longestpeace yetknownhas restedon twopillars:bipolarity
and nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons deterredattacks on states' "vital
interests";and "because strategicweapons servethatend and no other,peace
has held at the center throughalmost fivepostwardecades, while war has
thisargumentin 1993.14
Waltz reaffirmed
ragedat theperiphery."'13
frequently
Waltz's 1990 essay argued that the internationalsystemwas undergoinga
Neorealismrecognizedthe
to multipolarity.
frombipolarity
peacefultransition
possibilityof systemchange-although not peaceful systemchange-but
maintainedthatmultipolarsystemswere morewar-prone.While not rejecting
this core propositionof neorealism,Waltz's essay indicated that it was no
longer relevant.The long peace would endure because the superpowers
possessed nuclearweapons. Waltz was arguingthat nuclearweapons, by his
the mostimpordefinitiona unit-levelcapability,can explainwar-proneness,
tantsystem-level
property.Such a "reductionist"argumentvitiatesthe need
for a theoryof internationalrelationswhose principalpurpose is to explain
This maybe whyWaltz has subsequentlybacked awayfromhis
war-proneness.
characterizationof the internationalsystem as moving from bipolar to
multipolar.
Waltz now insiststhatthe internationalsystemremainsbipolar even after
thebreakupof the SovietUnion.15His depictionofthe post-coldwarworldas
at odds withtheviewsofotherprominentrealists.More to
bipolaris strikingly
ofpowerin Waltz's Theory
of
thepoint,itcannotbe derivedfromthedefinition
IntemationalPolitics. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.
Defense Department studies showed that Japan, the United States, and
WesternEurope were steadilyincreasingtheirlead over the Soviet Union in
10. Ibid.,especiallypp. 123-28.
11. KennethN. Waltz, The SpreadofNuclearWeapons:MoreMay be Better,Adelphi Paper no.
171 (London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,1981),pp. 3-8.
Politics,"in Robert0. Keohane,
12. KennethN. Waltz,"Reflectionson TheoryofIntemational
Press,1986),p. 327.
ed.,Neorealismand Its Critics(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
13. KennethN. Waltz (1990), "The EmergingStructureof InternationalPolitics,"manuscript
pp. 1 and 13.
Security
14. KennethN. Waltz,"The EmergingStructureofInternationalPolitics,"Intemational
18 (Fall 1993),pp. 44-79.
15. Ibid.

Symposium 255
the developmentand application of almost all the technologiescriticalto
militarypower and performance.16
Post-Soviet Russia is in a demonstrably
weakerposition.
What distribution?What capabilities?
to develop
Realist definitionsof power are imprecise,makingit difficult
treatmentof capabilitiesremains
measuresof polarity.The most thoughtful
that of Morgenthau.In his chapteron the elementsof national power, he
reviewedthe physicaland politicalcomponentsof power.These includesize,
population, natural resources, industrialcapacity, militarypreparedness,
national character,morale, and the qualityof diplomacyand government.17
The discussionis enlightening
forthe emphasisit placed on the less tangible
and less easilymeasuredpoliticalcomponentsof nationalpower.Morgenthau
was adamantthatno one factoradequatelycapturesthe powerof a state and
In his discussionof industrial
castigatedpreviousauthorsfor this fallacy.18
of
characteristic
capacity,Morgenthauneverthelessdescribedit as thedefining
greatpowersand of bipolarity.The SovietUnion, he insisted,alwayshad the
potentialof a greatpower,but onlybecame one "whenit enteredthe ranksof
the foremostindustrialpowersin the [19]30s,and it became the rivalof the
UnitedStatesas theothersuperpoweronlywhenit acquiredin the [19]50sthe
industrialcapacityforwagingnuclearwar."'19
Morgenthau'sformulationof bipolarityofferslittlehelp to scholarsinterestedin explainingthelongpeace. His equationofsuperpowerstatuswith"the
industrialcapacityforwagingnuclear war" supportshis judgmentthat the
Soviet Union became a superpowersometime in the 1950s. There is a
consensusamongotherrealiststhatbipolarityand the long peace date from
1945. Morgenthau's characterizationof superpower status is also vague
because it leaves the thresholdof nuclear capabilityundefined.If it is the
capabilityto producenuclearweapons,theSovietUnion could be considereda
superpowerbeginningin 1948. If it is the capabilityto produce significant
numbersof nuclear weapons and the requisitemeans of theirdelivery,the
Soviet Union did not achieve superpower status until sometime in the
mid-1960s.
Waltz'sconceptualizationofpoweris similarto Morgenthau's,fromwhichit
is derived.Like Morgenthau,Waltzinsiststhatstatesdo notbecomesuperpow16. See "Statementof the Under Secretaryof Defense forResearch and Engineering,"in U.S.
99thCong.,2d
forResearchand Engineering,
Congress,TheFY1987DepartmentofDefenseProgram
ofDefenseCritical
sess, 18 February1986,p. II-11; U.S. Departmentof Defense, TheDepartment
Technologies
Plan, 15 March 1989; U.S. Congress,Officeof TechnologyAssessment,ArmingOur
OTA-ISC-449, May 1990; andAviation
in DefenseTechnology,
Allies:Cooperationand Competition
20 May 1991,p. 57.
Week& Space Technology,
Nations,pp. 106-44.
17. Morgenthau,PoliticsAmong
18. On typicalerrorsofevaluatingpower,see ibid.,pp. 149-54.
19. Ibid.,p. 114.

ers because theyexcel in one categoryof power. Rank is determinedby how
resource
states score on all its components:size of populationand territory,
and politicalstabilityand
endowment,economiccapability,militarystrength,
competence.Waltz ignoreshis own caveat and reduces superpowerstatusto
one component."In internationalaffairs,"he writes,"forceremainsthe final
arbiter,"and the United States and the SovietUnion "are set apart fromthe
technologyon a large scale and at
others... bytheirabilityto exploitmilitary
frontiers."20
thescientific
Waltz's use of militarycapabilityas the indicatorof superpowerstatusis
puzzling.He is adamantthat"nuclearweapons did not cause the conditionof
bipolarity."He insiststhatthe worldwas bipolar in the late 1940s,when the
Soviet Union had no nuclearweapons, and has not become multipolarsince
otherstateshave acquiredthem."Nuclear weapons do notequalize thepower
ofnationsbecause theydo notchangetheeconomicbases ofa nation'spower."
The superpowersare set apart"not byparticularweapons systemsbutbytheir
abilityto exploit militarytechnologyon a large scale and at the scientific
frontiers."Had the atom neverbeen split,the superpowerswould still"far
and each would remainthe greatestthreat
strength,
surpassothersin military
and sourceofpotentialdangerto theother."21
a
Waltzseemsto argue,likeMorgenthau,thatsuperpowerstatusis primarily
and industrialcapability.It is thiscapabilitythat
functionofadvancedscientific
weapons and to fieldlarge,
permitsthe superpowersto deploystate-of-the-art
forces.
Nuclear
weapons are a symbol,not a cause
well-equippedconventional
that
theseweapons in theabsence
and
countries
develop
ofgreatpowerstatus,
do not become
and
infrastructures
industrial
scientific
of similarlyadvanced
superpowers.
On the basis of Waltz's criteria,the Soviet Union was not a superpowerin
its-gross
the 1940s.At the end ofWorldWar II, and fora longtimethereafter,
national productwas a fractionof that of the United States. In 1947, its
industrialbase and output were roughlycomparable to Britain's-each
produced12 percentof theworld'ssteelin comparisonwiththeUnitedStates'
54 percent, and 12 and 9 percent,respectively,of the world's energyin
comparisonwiththe United States' 49 percent.Britainhad moreengineers,a
network,and a highlydeveloped financial
betterand denser transportation
base.22Soviet technologyremainedbackward.The Red Armywas equipped
withinferior
weapons. Its triumphoverGermanywas the resultof sheermass
and the abilityof an authoritarianregimeto mobilize almost all available
The SovietUnion did notproducea jet engine
effort.
resourcesforitsmilitary
untilthelate 1940s,and thatwas a copyof a Rolls Royce engineobtainedafter
Politics,pp. 131 and 180-81.
ofIntemational
20. Waltz,Theory
21. Ibid.,pp. 180-81.
Yearbook1948 (Lake Success,N.Y.: UnitedNations,1949),Table 1.
22. UnitedNations,Statistical

Symposium 257
the war. It exploded an atomicdevice in 1949,but Britainalso possessed the
knowledgeto producenuclearweapons.
What distinguishedthe Soviet Union fromBritainwas its populationand
size; but this had always been so and did not make the Soviet Union a
superpowerbeforeWorldWar II. The SovietUnion did fielda massivearmy,
largerforcesthaneveryoneelse in 1939.The postwar
butithad proportionately
Red Armywas capable of littlebeyonditsprimarymissionof occupation.U.S.
militaryestimatesin the late 1940s depicted it as a poorlyequipped, poorly
trained,poorlyled forcewithoutthelogisticalbase to sustaina majoroffensive
in WesternEurope.23Untilat least the mid-1950s,ifnot later,therewas little
this
the SovietUnion could do to damage the United States,whilethroughout
period it was vulnerableto nuclear attackby long-rangeU.S. bombers.The
SovietUnion remaineda regionalpoweruntilitdevelopeda "blue water"navy
and airborne"powerprojection"capabilitiesin theearly1970s.
By Waltz's criteriathe internationalsystemmustbe consideredunipolarin
the late 1940s. It did not become bipolar untilthe mid-1950sat the earliest.
This was the assessmentof Morgenthau,who used a similardefinitionof
It is also theconclusionofPeterBeckman,who carriedout themost
bipolarity.
rigorousattemptto date to measurerelativepowerin thisperiod.24Combining
scoresformostof Waltz's componentsof power,Beckmanrankedthe United
followedbythe SovietUnion and
Statesfirstin 1947witha scoreoffifty-three,
Great Britainwith scores of nine and six, respectively.By 1955, the Soviet
the
Union had begun to narrowthe gap; the United States led at forty-one,
and Britainand WestGermanyeach scored
SovietUnionwas second at fifteen,
four.The United States was stillmore than twice as powerfulas the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union had exploded a thermonucleardevice, but it is
of
questionableif it met Waltz's conditionof being at the scientificfrontiers
industrialand military
technology.
What
The yeartheSovietUnion acquiredsuperpowerstatusis unimportant.
the SovietUnion was
is relevantforour purposesis thatbyWaltz's definition,
nota superpowerin thelate 1940sand early1950s.The greatpowerpeace that
survivedthetenseststageofthecold war-the yearsoftheCzech coup,thefirst
Berlin crisis and blockade, and the Korean War-cannot be attributedto
bipolarity.
Waltz and JohnMearsheimerarguedthatby 1990 bipolaritywas comingto
an end or had already disappeared.25They predictedthe emergenceof a
23. MatthewA. Evangelista,"Stalin's PostwarArmyReappraised," IntemationalSecurity7
(Winter1982-83),pp. 110-68.
24. Peter R. Beckman, World Politics in the TwentiethCentury(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,1984),pp. 207-9, and 235-38.
25. See Waltz, "The Emerging Structureof InternationalPolitics" (1990), pp. 1-2, 29;
Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future"; and Christensenand Snyder,"Chain Gangs and Passed
Bucks."

multipolarsystemwithall its associated tensionsor a systemthatwill retain
some of thebenefitsof bipolaritybecause of the presenceof nuclearweapons.
Their contentionthatthe worldwas in the course of a systemtransformation
was notderivedfromneorealisttheory.
resourceendowment,
Poweris a functionof size ofpopulationand territory,
and politicalstabilityand competence.
strength,
economiccapability,military
theSovietUnioncould be considered
In 1985,whenGorbachevassumedoffice,
a superpoweron thebasis ofthesecriteria-neorealistscertainlyarguedso. By
was underway,the
1990,whenWaltz contendedthatthe shiftto multipolarity
resource
SovietUnion stillarguablymetthesecriteria.Its population,territory,
were unchanged.The Soviet economyhad
endowment,and militarystrength
declined but its relativestandingwas the same. In 1990 the worldremained
bipolar. In the judgmentof many prominentrealists,it was not until the
breakupoftheSovietUnion thatbipolaritycame to an end.26
In 1990,Waltz and Mearsheimereach claimedthata systemtransformation
retreatfrom
was underwaybecause oftheSovietUnion's politicaland military
and dramatic,thereare no
EasternEurope. Althoughthisretreatwas startling
By
theoreticalgroundsforits use as an indicatorof a systemtransformation.
the criteriaexpoundedin Theoryof IntemationalPolitics,it did not affectthe
distribution
of capabilities.Neorealism,moreover,maintainsthatalliancesare
muchless importantin a bipolarworld.The two hegemonswere so powerful
vis-a-visthirdparties that they did not need alliances to guarantee their
security.Gorbachev'sretreatfromEasternEurope mighteven be interpreted
of this propositionand as evidence that the international
as confirmation
systemremainsbipolar.Neorealisttheorywould not expecta greatpowerto
behave thiswayin a multipolarworld.
Since 1990,the pace of change in the internationalsystemhas accelerated.
The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have ceased to exist. Post-Soviet
Russia is a smaller,less populous state, consumed with the problems of
and precipitouseconomicdecline.Its
ethnicfragmentation,
politicalinstability,
leaders are compelled to seek aid fromtheir formeradversariesto build
housingin Russia fortroopsto be withdrawnfromthe Baltic republicsand
technicalassistanceto dismantleold nuclearweapons forwhichtheblueprints
have been lost.The Kremlinno longerattemptsto expanditsinfluencebut to
use whatlittleleverageit has to extracteconomicconcessionsfromthe West.
The mostrecentexampleis Russia's threatto ignoreUnitedNationssanctions
against Libya unless the Westernpowers make good on the formerSoviet
Union's outstandingloans to thatcountry.27
Russia's nucleararsenalremainsrobust-if considerablysmallerbecause so
much of it is in Ukraine or in the process of being dismantled-but its
withvariousscholarsat the annual meetingof the AmericanPolitical
26. Based on interviews
(letter)
D.C., 1-4 September1993;and personalcommunication
Science Association,Washington,
fromStephenWalt,20 October1993.
27. TheNew YorkTimes,30 October1993,p. Al.

Symposium 259
conventionalforceshave undergonea notabledeclinein size and effectiveness.
maintenance,and much
Most armoreddivisionslack spare partsand effective
of the formerSovietnavyis rottingin portand unable to put to sea. Withthe
economicdisruptionthatfollowedthe breakup of the Soviet Union and the
behind
of itscommandeconomy,Russia has fallenfurther
partialdismantling
weapons and
the West in the developmentand deploymentof state-of-the-art
technology"on
has lostfortheforeseeablefuturetheabilityto exploitmilitary
a large scale and at the scientific
frontiers."
Many of itsleadingscientistsand
engineershave gone abroad in searchof employment.
Waltz acknowledgesthat "no state lackingthe militaryabilityto compete
with the other great powers has ever been ranked among them." He
system
neverthelesscontendsthatRussia is a superpowerand theinternational
bipolar.28By any reasonable applicationof Waltz's criteria,the international
systemhas shiftedin thedirectionofunipolarity.
Even this cursoryreviewof the literatureindicatesthat bipolaritycannot
satisfactorily
explainthe long peace. When Waltz's definitionof bipolarityis
applied to the postwarinternationalsystem,it lends supportto Morgenthau's
contentionthat the systemdid not become bipolar until at least the midof thecold war. Different
1950s.29This was afterthemostacute confrontations
operationalcriteriaofbipolaritydo notprovidea betterfitwiththelongpeace.
No singlemeasure-or combinationof the componentsof poweridentifiedas
importantbyrealists-indicatesthe onset of bipolarityin 1945 and its passing
in 1985-90.
Waltzinsiststhatthe determination
ofpolarityis a simplematter."We need
onlyrank[the powers]roughlyby capability."The questionof polarity"is an
empiricalone, commonsense can answerit."30Differencesamongrealists,and
between the Waltz of 1990 and 1993 about when the internationalsystem
became bipolar and when bipolarityended-or if it did-indicate that
"common sense" offersno help in determiningpolarity.For this,we need
ofpolarityand measuresofpower.31
definitions
well-specified
Realism and declininghegemony

Realist theoriesare foundat the systemand unitlevels.Realist and neorealist
theoriesthat attemptto explain the absence of superpowerwar since 1945
operate at the systemlevel. Realist theoriesthatpredictthe foreignpolicyof
individualstatesoperateat theunitlevel,and itis to thesetheorieswe nowturn
to tryto explainrecentchangesin theforeignpolicyofone ofthetwopoles of a
28. Waltz,"The EmergingStructureof InternationalPolitics"(1993), p. 54.
29. Morgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations,p. 114.
ofInternational
Politics,p. 131.
30. Waltz,Theory
31. The same point is made by R. Harrison Wagner,"What Was Bipolarity?"Intemational
47 (Winter1993),pp. 77-106.
Organization

bipolar internationalsystem.For realists,these two levels of analysis are
of
distinctbutrelated.Changesin unit-levelbehaviorcan alterthedistribution
capabilitiesand bydoingso changethe polarityof the internationalsystem.A
of the internationalsystemwill in turn have important
transformation
consequencesforunit-levelbehavior.
Realismrecognizesthatgreatpowersand superpowerscan experiencesharp
relativedeclines.Some realisttheoriesincorporatethe Hegelian notionthat
carrieswithit the seeds of subsequentdecay.32
successfulexpansioninevitably
All realist theories that address the question are unambiguous in their
predictionthatdecliningstates,in thewordsof Waltz,"tryto arrestor reverse
theirdecline."33Realists contendthat stateshave no choice. Because of the
anarchical characterof the internationalsystem,they must maintaintheir
relativepoweror riskbeingvictimizedbyothers.
Power transitiontheoriesand the Soviet Union
on
Withinthe realistparadigm,powertransitiontheoriesfocusspecifically
the problem of hegemonicdecline and its consequences.34Many of these
theoriesargue that hegemonicwar is most likelyto occur when the power
capabilitiesof a risingand dissatisfiedchallengerincreaseto the pointwhere
in theirpredictionabout
theyapproachthoseofthedominantstate.Theydiffer
whetherthechallengeror thedeclininghegemonwillinitiatethewar.35
Not all power transitiontheories maintainthat hegemonicdecline will
inevitablylead to war. Gilpin argues that the firstand "most attractive"
response is to launch a preemptivewar against the risingpower while the
advantage.A decliningpowercan also expand
decliningstatestillhas a military
and thereby
againstthirdpartiesin thehope ofobtainingmoresecurefrontiers
32. The twomostprominentexamplescan be foundin RobertGilpin,Warand Changein World
Press,1981); and Paul Kennedy,TheRiseand Fall ofthe
Politics(New York: CambridgeUniversity
GreatPowers:Economic Change and MilitaryConflictfrom1500 to 2000 (New York: Random
House, 1987).
33. Waltz,"The EmergingStructureof InternationalPolitics"(1990), pp. 7-8.
34. This literatureis reviewedbyJackS. Levy,"DecliningPowerand thePreventiveMotivation
forWar," WorldPolitics40 (October 1987), pp. 82-107; and Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides,
PowerTransitionTheory,and the Causes of War," in RichardNed Lebow and BarryS. Strauss,
eds., HegemonicRivalry:From Thucydidesto theNuclearAge (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress,
1991),pp. 125-68.
35. See A.F.K. Organski,WorldPolitics,2d ed. (New York: Knopf,1967), pp. 202-3; A.F.K.
of ChicagoPress,1980), chaps. 1
Organskiand JacekKugler,The WarLedger(Chicago: University
and 3; George Modelski,"The Long Cycleof Global Politicsand the Nation-State,"Comparative
Studiesof Societyand Histoty20 (April 1978), pp. 214-35; WilliamR. Thompson,ed., Contending
Approachesto World SystemAnalysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); Raimo Vayrynen,
"Economic Cycles,PowerTransitions,PoliticalManagement,and Wars BetweenMajor Powers,"
27 (December 1983), pp. 389-418; and Gilpin,Warand Changein
International
StudiesQuarterly
WorldPolitics.Doran and Parsonsarguethatthisis onlyone of the situationsin whichhegemonic
war is likely.See Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons,"War and the Cycle of Relative Power,"
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview74 (December 1960),pp. 947-65.

Symposium 261
reducingtheburdenofdefense.The Romanswerepastmastersat thisstrategy.
The Austrianand Russian empirestriedwith less success. Their effortsto
expandin theBalkanswas a majorcause ofwarin 1914.36
as a more peaceful response to decline. A
Gilpin describesretrenchment
state can tryto slow its decline and preserve the core of its power by
The Roman, Byzantine,and
abandoningsome of itsperipheralcommitments.
timesin their
Venetian empiresconductedstrategicwithdrawalsat different
history,and Gilpin considersthe Nixon Doctrine a possible modernanalog.
Decliningstatescan also retrenchthroughalliance and accommodationwith
less threateningpowers.They attemptto share the benefitsof hegemonyin
returnfor assistance in its preservation.Britain pursued this strategywith
form
considerablesuccessin thedecade beforeWorldWar I. The mostdifficult
of retrenchment
is appeasement. It attemptsto buy offa risingchallenger
throughconcessions. When appeasement conveysweakness, as it did at
demands.Gilpinassertsthatall forms
Munichin 1938,itcan encouragefurther
thanexpansionofretrenchment
are fraught
withdangerand are less attractive
iststrategies.37
War and Change in WorldPolitics was published in 1981. In analyzing
hegemonicdecline,Gilpin'sfocuswas verymuchon theUnited States and the
possible consequences of its continuingeconomic and militarydecline. He
foresawthe possibilityof a relativeSoviet decline broughtabout by a U.S.
resurgenceand alliances with an increasinglypowerfulChina, Japan, and
WesternEurope. He worriedthata superpowerin decline,facingtheprospect
of encirclement,
wouldrespondbybehavingmoreaggressively.38
Until the late 1980s,Soviet foreignpolicyappeared consistentwithrealist
theories. Moscow tried to expand its influencein the Third World and
consolidateit in EasternEurope. Sovietleaders suppressedrebellionsin East
Germanyin 1953 and in Hungaryin 1956,invadedCzechoslovakiain 1968 to
in
restorehard-linecommuniststo power,and used the threatof intervention
1980to keep Solidarityfrompowerin Poland.
Under Gorbachev,Soviet foreignpolicybecame increasinglyinconsistent
withpowertransitionand otherrealisttheories.Militarydisengagementfrom
at the
carriedout in 1988-89,could be explainedas retrenchment
Afghanistan,
periphery.The 1987 treatyon intermediatenuclear forceswas problematic
because it clearlywas not motivatedbya concernforrelativegain. The Soviet
Union agreed to removemanymoremissilesfromthe European theaterthan
as advantageousto
did theUnitedStates,and thetreatywas widelyinterpreted
theWest.
The SovietwithdrawalfromEasternEurope was moreanomalous.Realists
like Gilpin who recognize retrenchmentas a possible response to decline
36. Gilpin,Warand Changein WorldPolitics,pp. 191-92 and 197.
37. Ibid.,pp. 192-97.
38. Ibid.,pp. 231-44.

notin a primary
sphereofinfluence.In all of
expectitto occurat theperiphery,
Gilpin'sexamples,statesretrenchedto marshaltheirresourcesagainsta rising
challenger.The Soviet retreatappears to have been motivatedby a combinationofideologicaland domesticpoliticalconsiderations.39
The Soviet Union retreatedfroma regionthe controlof whichhad always
been regarded as essential to blunt attack fromthe West. The communist
governmentsof Eastern Europe faced opposition,especiallyin Poland, but
in controluntiltheywere underminedby Gorbachev's calls for
were firmly
withdemocratizareformand his promisenot to use Sovietforcesto interfere
tionin the region.Gorbachevmayhave been surprisedbythe pace of change,
of
butnotbyitsresults.He and his advisershad begundiscussingthepossibility
cuttingloose EasternEurope as farback as 1987.40
The SovietretreatfromEasternEurope notonlywentfarbeyondanyrealist
but stands in sharp contrastto a core realist
conceptionof retrenchment
assumption:hegemonsare expected to make everypossible effortto retain
theirprincipalsphereof influence.This propositioncan be traced to ThucyOne ofthe mostfamousspeechesof
dides,fromwhomrealistsclaimdescent.41
Thucydides'historyis theAtheniandefenseoftheirempirebeforetheSpartan
assembly.The Athenians make no pretense about theirmotivesor of the
expectedconsequencesof actingotherwise:
And thenatureof the case firstcompelledus to advanceour empireto its
presentheight,fearbeingour principalmotive,thoughhonourand interest
afterwards
came in. And at last,whenalmostall hated us,whensome had
alreadyrevoltedand had been subdued,whenyou had ceased to be the
friendsyou once were,and had become objectsof suspicionand dislike,it
appeared no longersafeto giveup our empire,especiallyas all who leftus
wouldfallto you.And no one can quarrelwitha people formaking,in mattersof tremendousrisk,thebest provisionthatit can foritsinterest.42
JosephStalin,NikitaKhrushchev,and Leonid Brezhnevwould neverhave
made such a revealingspeech,but it capturestheirmotivesnicely.Like Cimon
withan iron
and Pericles beforethem,theyruled theiralliance-cum-empire
Georgyi
withMikhailGorbachev,AnatoliyDobrynin,Oleg Grinevsky,
39. Personal interviews
Shakhnazarov,and Vadim Zagladin, Moscow, New York, Stockholm,Toronto, and Vienna,
of
1989-93.See also RobertHerman,"SovietNew Thinking:Ideas, Interests,and theRedefinition
CornellUniversity,
in preparation.
Security,"Ph.D. diss.,Departmentof Government,
40. Ibid.
41. On the analogy,see RichardNed Lebow, "SuperpowerManagementof SecurityAlliances:
The SovietUnion and the WarsawPact," in Arlene Idol Broadhurst,ed., TheFutureofEuropean
Alliance Systems(Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1982), pp. 185-236; and the followingthree
chaptersin Lebow and Strauss,HegemonicRivalry:RobertGilpin,"PeloponnesianWar and Cold
War" pp. 31-52; Lebow, "Thucydides,PowerTransition,and the Causes of War," pp. 125-68; and
MatthewA. Evangelista,"Democracies, AuthoritarianStates, and InternationalConflict,"pp.
213-34.
42. Thucydides,The PeloponnesianWar,trans.Richard Crawley(New York: Random House,
1982), p. 44. Gilpin cites thisparagraphin supportof his own argument;see Warand Changein
WorldPolitics,p. 207.

Symposium 263
hand forfearthatanydefectionwould put the alliance as a whole at riskand
constitutean intolerablethreatto theirsecurity.RealistsacceptedtheseSoviet
oftheSovietpositionin
concernsas legitimate,
and manydeemed preservation
Eastern Europe essentialto superpowerpeace.43How thencan theyexplain
theSovietretreat?
The Sovietresponseto relativedeclineconfoundsexistingrealisttheoriesin
otherimportant
ways.Insteadof launchinga preventive
war,theSovietUnion
soughtan accommodationwiththe United States,its principaladversaryand
rivalhegemon,and made concessionsthatgreatlyenhancedthe relativepower
of theUnited States and itsNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO) ally,
the Federal Republic of Germany.Under Gorbachevand Boris Yeltsin,the
Soviet Union has been contentto play a subordinaterole in international
affairs.44
The Sovietresponseto declineis not one capturedbyanyrealisttheory.At
all
theveryleast,thosetheoriesare underspecified.
Theyneed firstto identify
of the genericresponsesof great powers to decline and then to specifythe
conditionsunderwhicheach will apply.Untilsuch timeas theydo, the realist
paradigmconsistsof a fundamentalaxiom-that the pursuitof power is the
principal objective of states-and a collection of loose propositionsand
underspecifiedtheories that attemptto apply this maxim in diverse and
sometimescontradictory
ways.This makes it impossibleforrealiststo predict
muchof anything
beforethe fact,but all too easy forthemto explainanything
once ithas occurred.
Realism afterthefact
Some realistscontendex postfactothatSovietforeignpolicyafter1985was
notinconsistent
withrealisttheoriesand is a logicaland longoverdueresponse
to the Soviet Union's economic decline. Perestroika and glasnost were
intendedto revitalizetheeconomyand providetheresourcesnecessaryforthe
Soviet Union to resume the role of a superpower. Foreign policy was
theRed Armyfrom
subordinatedto thisgoal. Gorbachevwithdrew
temporarily
Afghanistan,negotiatednuclear and conventionalarms controlagreements
43. See JohnLewis Gaddis,"One Germany-in BothAlliances,"TheNewYorkTimes,21 March
1990, p. A21; Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment:AnalyzingU.S. Grand
Strategy,"International
Security14 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; Lawrence Eagleburger,speech at
13 September1989,TheNew YorkTimes,16 September1989,p. Al; and
GeorgetownUniversity,
Mearsheimer,"Back to theFuture."The latterarguesthatbecause theWestwantsto maintainthe
theCold Warorder,and hencehas an interestin
has an interestin maintaining
peace, "It therefore
the continuationof the Cold War confrontation;developmentsthat threatento end it are
dangerous"(p. 52).
44. For a descriptionof the severalpost-coldwar schoolsof foreignpolicythathave developed
18
IntemationalSecurity
in Russia, see Alexei G. Arbatov,"Russia's ForeignPolicyAlternatives,"
(Fall 1973), pp. 5-43. For the viewsof criticsof the Gorbachev-Yeltsinaccommodationwiththe
in David Remnick,Lenin'sTomb:TheLast Days oftheSovietEmpire(New
West,see theinterviews
York: Random House 1993),passim.

withNATO, and retreatedfromEastern Europe to freeeconomicresources
and laborforagriculture
and industry.
WithdrawalfromEasternEurope would
also help secureloans and creditsfromtheWest.45
This explanationis not persuasive. If Gorbachev had been a moderate
reformer
whose foreignpolicywas essentiallyan extensionof Brezhnev's,the
same realistswho now advance thisexplanationwould have regardedSoviet
policyas entirelyconsistentwiththeirtheoreticalexpectations.None of them
wouldhave insistedthattheSovietUnion's relativedeclinedemandeda leader
democraticreforms,hold relativelyfree
who would introduceWestern-style
elections,acknowledgethe legal rightof republicsto secede fromthe Soviet
Union, encourage anticommunistrevolutionsin Eastern Europe, agree to
dissolvethe Warsaw Pact, withdrawSoviet forcesfromthe territoriesof its
formermembers,accept the reunificationof GermanywithinNATO, and
whenconfronted
withgrowingdemandsforindependenceby
exerciserestraint
constituentrepublicsof the SovietUnion. Such recommendations,
let alone a
predictionthat all this would soon come to pass, would have been greeted
as theheightofunrealism.
derisively
Sovietforeignpolicyhad been livingbeyonditsmeansfora longtime.Stalin,
Khrushchev,and Brezhnevall pursuedenormouslyexpensivemilitaryand aid
programs.Brezhnevdid thiswell afterthe disparitybetweenSovietgoals and
resourceshad become painfullyapparent.By themid-1970s,theSovietgrowth
rate had declined to about 2 percent;by the end of the decade, growthhad
constantand
stopped.Throughoutthisperiod,military
spendingwas relatively
consumed an increasingshare of the gross national product.46A realist
of Sovietdomestic
explanationthatdepictsGorbachev'sradical reorientation
and foreignpolicy as a response to the country'sdecliningeconomy has
difficulty
accountingforthestatusquo underBrezhnev.
Realists mightrespond that theirtheoriespredicttrendsbut not timing.
Leaders and political systemsvary enormouslyin their responsivenessto
changingcapabilities.Brezhnevwas slow to recognizethe country'seconomic
problemsand reluctantto initiatethe necessarychanges. As the economy
withthe statusquo mountedand facilitatedthe
deteriorated,dissatisfaction
riseto powerof a reformist
leader.
45. See Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future," pp. 53-54; Waltz, "The EmergingStructureof
InternationalPolitics," p. 8; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: The
GorbachevRegime and EasternEurope," EasternEuropeanPoliticsand Societies3 (Spring1989),
pp. 235-67; Valerie Bunce, "The SovietUnion Under Gorbachev:Ending Stalinismand Ending
theCold War,"InternationalJournal
46 (Spring1991),pp. 220-41; and Oye,"ExplainingtheEnd of
theCold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen,International
RelationsTheory
and theEnd oftheCold
War,chap. 3.
46. On the Soviet economyand militaryspendingin the 1970s, see U.S. Congress,House
PermanentSelect Committeeon Intelligence,CL4 EstimatesofSovietDefenseSpending(Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice,1980); and FranklynD. Holzman,"Politicsand Guesswork:
CIA and DIA Estimatesof Soviet MilitarySpending,"International
Security14 (Fall 1989), pp.
101-31.

Symposium 265
This interpretation
is belied by the evidence.Brezhnevallocated enormous
sumsofmoneyto themilitary,
weaponsresearchand development,and foreign
aid in thehope of makingthe SovietUnion a globalpowerequal to theUnited
States. He was neverthelessincreasingly
disturbedby the downwardtrendof
theSovieteconomyand itslong-term
implicationsfortheSovietUnion's status
as a superpower.Bytheearly1970s,he recognizedthattheSovieteconomywas
and thatthegap betweenthe SovietUnion and theWest
performing
sluggishly
was likelyto increase. He tried to rectifythis situationthrougha series of
limitedreformsintendedto "rationalize" planningand investment.He also
supporteddetentewiththe West to gain access to advanced foreigntechnology.47
Brezhnev'sstrategy
failed.Administrative
reformand massiveinvestment
in
agricultureaccomplishedvery little.The cumbersomecommand economy,
whichBrezhnevand his colleagues hoped to reformand make more efficient,
was the cause of, not the solutionto, the Soviet Union's economicmalaise.
Detente also failed to produce the expectedtransferof technologyfromthe
West; this was the principalreason Brezhnevwas willingto sacrificeit in
pursuitofunilateraladvantagein theThirdWorld.
The stasisof Brezhnev'slateryearswas not the resultof politicalimmobilisme.Far-reachingreformsor shiftsin spendingprioritieswould undeniably
have antagonizedsome of the powerfulinterests,especiallythe military,
that
Brezhnevhad initiallyco-opted to build and sustainhis authority.However,
Brezhnevhad longsinceconsolidatedhis authority
to thepointwherehe could
A
have promotedmajor policyinitiativeswithoutfear of being overthrown.
more likelyexplanationis his inability,afterthe failureof his reforms,to see
any alternativeor one thatwould not pose a challengeto the Sovietpolitical
systemand the privilegesof itsnomenklatura
(upper partycadres). In his last
years,ill healthprobablyalso tookitstoll.
ConsideringBrezhnev'sgoals and the constraintshe faced,his foreignand
domesticpolicies, while ultimatelyunsuccessful,were neverthelessa direct
responseto theSovietUnion's perceiveddecline.He attemptedto managethat
decline by strengthening
central authorityand providingthe militarywith
enough state-of-the-art
technologyto maintainthe Soviet Union's claim to
superpowerstatus. To buttressMoscow's position in Eastern Europe, he
sought and obtained Western recognitionof the region's Soviet-imposed
boundaries.He allowedtheseregimesmorelatitudefor
regimesand territorial
linkswiththeWest.
economicexperimentation,
trade,and investment
47. On Brezhnevand his responseto the Soviet Union's economicproblems,see George W.
in SovietPolitics(London: Allen
Breslauer,Khrushchev
and Brezhnevas Leaders:BuildingAuthority
and Unwin,1982), pp. 137-268; HarryGelman, TheBrezhnevPolitburoand theDeclineofDetente
(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press, 1984); and RichardAnderson,"CompetitivePoliticsand
and Bargainingin the BrezhnevPolitburo,"Ph.D. diss.,
SovietForeignPolicy:Authority-building
of Californiaat Berkeley,1989.
DepartmentofPoliticalScience,University

A morepersuasiverealistargumentwould recognizeBrezhnev'sattemptto
cope withthe relativedecline of the Soviet Union and depict Gorbachev's
of
strategyas a moreextremeversionpromptedbythe bleakercircumstances
betweentheprogramsofthe
themid-1980s.There are indeedmanysimilarities
twoleaders.Like Brezhnev,Gorbachevsoughtto revitalizetheSovieteconomy
throughdomesticreformand accommodationwiththe West whilepreserving
the core of Soviet state structure-itscommand economyand all-powerful
CommunistParty.Gorbachev'smoreradical domesticreformsand his accomdecline
modationwiththeWestmightbe explainedas a responseto thefurther
in relativeSovietcapabilities.
of Gorbachevis equallyproblematic.The SovietUnion's
This interpretation
economicdeclinewas gradualifpersistentduringtheyearsbetweenthefailure
of Brezhnev'sreformsand Gorbachev'saccessionto powerin 1985. Its relative
declinewas onlymarginalbecause thesewerenotyearsof greatgrowthforthe
United States,whichwas itselfa decliningpower relativeto Japan and the
The sharpdownturnin the Soviet economy
European Economic Community.
came onlyafterGorbachevbegan his reformsand largelyas a resultofthem.
The shadow of the future mightalso be invoked to account for the
betweenthe twoleaders. Brezhnevwas pessimisticbut anticipated
differences
only a gradual erosion of the Soviet Union's relativestanding.By 1985, the
Soviet politicalelite regardedthe futurewithdeep foreboding;the economy
were anticipated-and the cost of
shortfalls
had stoppedgrowing-budgetary
militarycompetitionwith the West had increased. There were compelling
reasonsforGorbachevto adopt a moreradical,ifriskyapproachto economic
reform.
Gorbachevwas undeniablycommittedto revitalizingthe Soviet economy.
However,in his sixyearsin powerGorbachevtalkeda lot about the need for
but took fewmeaningfulstepsin thatdirection.Until
economicrestructuring
1989, he made no major cuts in defense spending.Between 1985 and 1989,
defenseconsumedabout the same percentageof grossnationalproductas it
had under Brezhnev. After 1989, it consumed more.48Gorbachev never
attemptedto dismantle the command economy or to encourage private
capitalistventures.He backed awayfromhis mostimportantinitiativesin this
directionwhen they encounteredopposition fromconservativeparty and
public opinion. Until the unsuccessfulcoup of August 1991, he remained
committedto the"leadingrole" ofa reformedCommunistPartyin thepolitical
to preserve
struggled
and economiclifeofthecountry.Gorbachevthereformer
domesticstructuresthat stood in the way of the
archaic and dysfunctional
economicgrowthnecessaryto preservetheSovietUnion as a greatpower.
The realistcontentionthat Gorbachev'sdomesticreformswere "an exterIt is outside
flawed.49
nallyimposednecessity"is conceptuallyand empirically
48. Evangelista,"Stalin'sPostwarArmyReappraised."
49. The quotationis fromWaltz,"The EmergingStructureof InternationalPolitics,"p. 8.

Symposium 267
of any realist theoryand is not logicallyderived fromrealist assumptions.
Realists who make the argumentcontendthat decline can be a catalystfor
change. Grantedthat thisis a valid proposition,it is not a helpfulone. The
responsesto decline.
policies of Brezhnevand Gorbachevindicatedifferent
Other possibilitiesinclude a more aggressiveforeignpolicy-as predictedby
theories-or an "ostrichpolicy"thatdeniestheproblem,
mostpowertransition
the apparent preferenceof the current"red-brown" coalition in Russia
betweenformercommunistsand thenationalistright.As mentionedabove,to
therangeof
accountforGorbachev,realisttheorieswouldhavebothto identify
responsesto decline and specifythe conditionsunderwhichtheyare likelyto
be adopted.
Gorbachev'sforeignpolicywould stillconstitutea problembecause it went
way beyond the requirementsof realism.In Eastern Europe, there were a
rangeof optionsshortof those the Soviet Union took (allowingpro-Western
governmentsto come to power, dismantlingthe Warsaw Pact, withdrawing
ofGermanywithinNATO). For
Sovietforces,and agreeingto thereunification
example,Gorbachevcould have permitteddomesticchangein EasternEurope
governments
butmade it clear thatthe SovietUnion expectedpostcommunist
to remainwithintheWarsawPact. NeithertheUnitedStatesnortheEuropean
membersofNATO wouldhave opposed sucha compromise;theywouldalmost
concerns.
to Sovietsecurity
havewelcomeditand displayedsensitivity
certainly
in
famous
his
On
the
contrary,
Gorbachevneverseriouslyexploredthatoption.
their
to
reform
own
called
on
Eastern
Europeans
April1987Praguespeech,he
when
mass
to
the
protests
did
resulting
nothing dampen
politicalsystems.He
theythreatenedthesurvivalof manyoftheregion'scommunistregimes.
to reconcileSovietforeignpolicyin Eastern Europe with
It is verydifficult
realism.Neorealistsmightargue thatalliances are less importantin a bipolar
worldbecause the superpowersdo not depend on alliances fortheirsecurity
the way great powers do in a multipolarworld. But this postulate applied
equallywellto theSovietUnion ofKhrushchevand Brezhnev,and bothleaders
wentto greatlengthsto preservetheSovietpositionin EasternEurope. In two
Berlin crises,Khrushchevriskedwar withthe United States to shore up the
of East Germany'scommunistregime.
authority
faltering
Nuclear deterrenceas an explanationis even more problematic.Some
fromEasternEurope because of
realistshave arguedthatGorbachevwithdrew
his confidencein nuclear deterrence;the Soviet Union no longerneeded a
Butwhythendid Brezhnevinvade
defensiveglacisto protectitfrominvasion.50
Czechoslovakia and threaten to invade Poland to restore and preserve
pro-Sovietgovernments?Nuclear deterrencewas a realityin 1968 and was
certainlyas robustin 1980 as itwas in 1985.
Nuclear deterrenceis intended to protecta state or its protege against
againstinternalthreatsto security
attack.No realistcontendsthatitis effective
50. See Oye, "ExplainingtheEnd ofthe Cold War," forsuchan argument.

arisingfromideologicalor ethnicopposition.But thisis a principalreasonwhy
past Soviet leaders maintainedtheir authorityin Eastern Europe. Before
orderingthe Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia,Brezhnevconfidedto Polish
leader WladyslawGomulkathatall WarsawPact nationsneeded to participate
unrestmightspill
in theinvasionbecause in theabsence ofEast bloc solidarity,
overintotheSovietUkraine.51Brezhnev'sremarkindicatesthatSovietleaders
subscribedto a dominotheoryin EasternEurope. Theyworriedthattheloss of
woulddestroythealliance,and thatthedemiseofthe
anyWarsawPact country
alliancewould seriouslyweaken theirhold on thewesternborderprovincesof
the SovietUnion,whose peoples were unreconciledto Sovietrule and wanted
withtheircompatriotsacrosstheirborders.The
independenceor reunification
eventsof 1990-91demonstratedthevalidityof Brezhnev'sfears.
The mostfundamentaltenetof realismis that states act to preservetheir
territorial
Gorbachev'sdecisionto abandonEasternEurope's commuintegrity.
of the SovietUnion intoquestion.It
called the integrity
nistregimeswittingly
triggereddemandsforindependencefromthe Balticsto CentralAsia thatled
to the demise of the Soviet state. Soviet foreignpolicyunder Gorbachevis
outside the realistparadigm.To explain it, the analystmustgo outside that
paradigmand look at the determininginfluenceof domesticpolitics,belief
and learning.52
systems,
The emerginginternationalsystem(s)
In the Hobbesian world of realism,there are only two orderingprinciples:
Multianarchyand hierarchy.
Unipolarworldsare characterizedbyhierarchy.
and bipolarsystemsare anarchical,althoughthereis likelyto be morestructure
in a bipolarsystembecause ofthewayeach hegemondominatesitsownbloc or
alliance system.A tight bipolar world might even be described as two
hierarchiescompetingunderconditionsof anarchy.
Stalin imposed a tight,hierarchicalstructureon the Soviet bloc. The
Westernalliancewas alwaysmuchlooser. Paradoxically,the hierarchy
of both
blocs began to decline almost as soon as the internationalsystembecame
bipolar in the mid-1950s.By the late 1970s, the United States was at best
primusinter pares withinNATO; it had to negotiate changes in military
doctrine,weapons deployments,and arms control policies with its allies.
Consultationsand negotiationsfrequently
led to compromisesthatbore little
of powerwithinthe alliance. The influenceof the
relationto the distribution
UnitedStatesin NATO and withmanyofitsnon-NATO allieswas constrained
51. TheNew YorkTimes,28 August1980,p. A4.
52. For attemptsat such explanations,see Richard Ned Lebow, "When Do Leaders Initiate
ConciliatoryPolicies," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen,IntemationalRelationsTheoryand theEnd of
theCold War;and JaniceGross Stein,"PoliticalLearningby Doing: Gorbachevas Uncommitted
Thinkerand MotivatedLearner,"in thisissue ofIntemationalOrganization.

Symposium 269
bynormsof cooperationand consensusthatbenefitedless powerfulallies. On
arms control and other issues, some of these allies also benefitedfrom
on theU.S. capacityto shape
transnational
coalitionsthatimposedconstraints
NATO
policy.53
The internationalsystemis stilltechnicallyanarchicalbecause thereis no

However,relationsamongthe developed,democratic
enforcement
authority.
statesof Asia, NorthAmerica,Oceania, and WesternEurope can hardlybe
characterizedas a self-helpsystem.The allegedlyinescapableconsequencesof
anarchyhave been largelyovercomeby a complexweb of institutionsthat
governinterstaterelationsand provide mechanismsfor resolvingdisputes.
reflectand help sustaina consensusin favorof consultation
These institutions
and compromisethat mute the consequences of power imbalances among
of nationshas evolved
states.In the course of two generations,a community
thatis bound togetherby the realizationthatnationalsecurityand economic
well-beingrequireclose cooperationand coordinationwithotherdemocratic
and democratizing
states.54
In 1957, Karl Deutsch and colleagues developed the conceptof a security
where"thereis a real assurancethatmembersof thatcommunity
community
but willsettletheirdisputesin some other
willnot fighteach otherphysically,
in which
communities,
betweenamalgamatedsecurity
way."They distinguished
units,and
independent
therehas been a formalmergerof twoor morepreviously
inwhichseparategovernments
retainlegalindependence.55
pluralistic
communities,
There is good reason to consider the communityof developed nations
Since 1945,therehave been
identifiedabove a pluralisticsecuritycommunity.
no wars or war-threatening
crises between its members.The most serious
of
overNorthernIreland,Gibraltar,and fishingrightsin thevicinity
conflicts,
to the restraintof the governments
involved.Contrast,
Iceland, are testimony
response
forexample,theRepublicofIreland'scarefuland largelyconstructive
and escalatory
to the troublesin the North with the more interventionist
responsesof Greece and Turkeyin Cyprusor Pakistanin Kashmir.56
Perhaps the best evidence for the existence of a pluralisticsecurity
member
is thegeneralabsence of military
plans byone community
community
53. See, for example, Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO
Press,1990); Thomas
Out-of-Area
ProblemsSince1949 (Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
and ArmsControl(Boulder,Colo.: Westview
Risse-Kappen,TheZero Option:INF, WestGermany,
Press, 1988); and Richard C. Eichenberg,"Dual Track and Double Trouble: The Two-Level
Politicsof INF," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson,and Robert D. Putnam,Double-edged
ofCaliforniaPress,
Bargaining
and DomesticPolitics(Berkeley:University
Diplomacy:Intemational
1993),pp. 45-76.
Iceland, Ireland,the United Kingdom,
54. I includethe followingcountriesin thiscommunity:
Norway,Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Portugal,Spain, France, Belgium,Luxembourg,Netherlands, Germany,Switzerland,Austria, Canada, United States, Mexico, Japan, South Korea,
Philippines,Taiwan,Singapore,Australia,and New Zealand.
and theNorthAtlanticArea (Princeton,N.J.:
55. Karl W. Deutsch et al., PoliticalCommunity
Press,1957),pp. 5-6.
PrincetonUniversity
56. Lebow, "Ireland,"p. 264.

foroperationsagainstanother.In 1969,theIrishArmydevelopeda plan forthe
occupationof NorthernIreland,but it was shelvedafterthe cabinet crisis.57
Spain may retain an operational plan for the occupation of Gibraltar,but
authoritiesinsistthatitis not an optiontheythinkabout,plan
Spanishmilitary
membersclearly
for,or rehearse.Militaryplanningamongsecuritycommunity
reflectstheexpectationthatrelationsamongthemwillcontinueto be peaceful.
Manyoftheseplans are collaborativeand testedinjointexercises.This is most
evidentin NATO, butthereis also close,ifless publicizedcooperationbetween
Japan, South Korea, and the United States and between Australia, New
Zealand, and theUnitedStates.
Jointplanning is only one of the militaryties that binds togetherthe
Theyhave establishedmanyprogramsfor
membersofthe securitycommunity.
common trainingand exchanges of militaryofficers.They routinelyshare
intelligenceand have established bi- and multilateralagreementsfor the
developmentof advanced militarytechnologyand weapons systems.Integration is evident in NATO, where officersof differentnationalities staff
commandsto whichmemberstatescontributeor earmarkforces.France and
Germanyhave gone a step furtherand are establishinga joint brigade,
somethingthatwouldhavebeen unthinkablea generationago.
WithinNATO, theimpetusforintegration
was twofold:memberstateswere
threatfromthe SovietUnion butwantedto
respondingto a perceivedmilitary
preventthe emergenceof a strong,independentGerman militaryforce.The
Soviet threat has disappeared, but NATO governmentsand their publics
remainstronglycommittedto the alliance and its effortsat militaryintegration.58Interviewswith defense officialsand militaryofficersindicate the
in manyways.
widespreadbeliefthatNATO contributesto European stability
They emphasize the politicalreassurancethat militaryintegrationprovides,
especiallyto thoseconcernedabout Germany'srole in Europe. Manyofficials
to buildingdemocracyin Greece, Portugal,
also stressNATO's contribution
to professionalizeand transform
theworldviewof
and Spain throughitsefforts
57. The IrishArmyplan called fora borderincidentto be stagedas the pretextforinvasion.A
was to be firedon while
Republic ambulance,requestedbya Catholicphysicianin Londonderry,
crossingthe CraigavonBridge.In response,the SixthBrigadeof the IrishArmywas to securethe
bridge and march into Londonderry.Meanwhile, an armored column would cross into the
southeasterncornerofUlsterand strikeat Lurganand Toome Bridge,cuttingoffBelfastfromthe
rest of Ulster. The two forces were to link up and "liberate" Belfast. The plan assumed
noninterference
bythe BritishArmy.See RichardNed Lebow, "Ireland," in GregoryHenderson,
RichardNed Lebow, and JohnG. Stoessinger,eds.,DividedNationsina DividedWorld(New York:
David McKay,1974),p. 247.
58. See NATO Heads of Government,
CopenhagenDeclaration,7 June1991; "New Strategic
Concept,"Communiqu6of NATO Summit,Rome, 8 November1991; MinisterialMeetingof the
NorthAtlanticCouncil in Athens,Final Communiqu6,10 June1993; and StatementIssues at the
Meetingof the NorthAtlanticCooperationCouncil in Athens,11 June1992. For publicopinion
AllgemeineZeitung,9 December 1991;
data, see "Europabarometer36-Herbst1991,"Frankfurter
and InternationalReticence," documentno.
and Ronald D. Asmus, "National Self-confidence
N-3522-AF(Santa Monica,Calif.:RAND Corp., 1992).

Symposium 271
thosecountries'military
organizations.Theyhope NATO mightplaya similar
role in the East.59Civilianand militaryauthoritiesin non-NATO membersof
the securitycommunityalso speak of the continuingimportanceof military
cooperation.60
The nature and extentof postwar militarycooperation and integration
amongthedevelopeddemocraciesare unprecedented.It is accordingly
difficult
to make confidentjudgmentsabout theirlong-termpoliticalconsequences.If
analogiesto economicintegration
are valid,military
integration
willcreatehigh
exit costs. Cooperative training,deployment,and coproductionof weapons
encouragean economyof scale thatmaximizesthe comparativeadvantagesof
participants.If integration
has progressedsufficiently
far,it maybe extraordinarilydifficult
in the short-term-andthis is the criticaltimeperspectivein
manyconflicts-to disengageand develop equally capable and fullynational
forcesand the weapons industrynecessaryto supportthem.The veryact of
disengagement
would sound a loud politicalalarmand encourageotherstates
to takeprecautionary
measures.
It is also reasonableto suppose thatmilitarycooperation,like its economic
buildsa greatersense of community
counterpart,
amongparticipants.Armies
thattraintogether,like companiesthatworktogether,develop profitableties
and evenloyaltiesthattheyare anxiousto preserve.The Frenchexperienceis a
case in point. After President Charles de Gaulle withdrewfrommilitary
participationin NATO, Frenchmilitary
officialsdevelopeda dense networkof
informallinkswiththeircolleaguesin NATO and keptcooperationalive as far
as was politicallyfeasible.61
Furtherevidenceforthe existenceof a securitycommunity
is the beliefon
the part of otherstatesthatsuch a community
exists.In Eastern Europe the
Czech Republic, Hungary,and Poland seek membershipin NATO and the
European Communityin the expectationthat this will confer significant
securityand economic benefits.In the Far East, too, expanded effortsat
multilateral
cooperationin theeconomicand securityspheresare underway.
The pluralisticsecuritycommunity
thatnow spans fourcontinents(Australia, NorthAmerica,NorthAsia, and WesternEurope) began as at least two
separate securitycommunities:Canada-United States and Norway-Sweden.
Deutsch and his colleagues countedMexico and the United States as a third
In the firstdecades of the twentiethcentury,the
securitycommunity.62
59. Personal interviewswithvarious officialsin Lisbon, Madrid, Paris, Brussels,the Hague,
Bonn,Rome, and Copenhagen,1991-93.
in Wellington,Canberra,and Tokyo.
60. Personalinterviews
61. See Diego Ruiz Palmer, FrenchStrategicOptionsin the 1990s, Adelphi Paper no. 260
(London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,1991). ElizabethPond, in BeyondtheWall:
Germany'sRoad to Unification(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1993), p. 66, quotes
interviewswith NATO officials.See also David G. Haglund, Alliance Withinthe Alliance?
Franco-GermanMilitary
Cooperationand theEuropeanPillarofDefense(Boulder,Colo.: Westview
Press,1991).
62. Deutsch et al.,PoliticalCommunity
in theNorthAtlanticArea,pp. 28 and 68.

was extendedto theUnitedKingdom
Canadian-Americansecuritycommunity
and Ireland, and the Norway-Swedencommunitygrew to include all of
was
Scandinavia.By 1957,Deutsch et al. believedthatthe securitycommunity
developingin the widerNorthAtlanticarea. From the vantagepointof 1994,
appears robust.It is also growinglarger,
community
theNorthAtlanticsecurity
withthe accessionof Spain and Portugal.Pluralisticsecuritycommunitiesalso
have developedbetweenAustraliaand New Zealand and betweenJapan and
could
therestofthedevelopedworld.One largepluralisticsecuritycommunity
eventuallyencompassall of thesecountries,muchof EasternEurope, some of
the formerSoviet Union, and the countriesof the rapidlydevelopingPacific
rim.
Deutsch and his colleagues found two essential conditionsfor pluralistic
of major values relevantto political
securitycommunities:the compatibility
politicalunitsto respondto
decisionmakingand the capacityof participating
each other's needs, messages,and actions quickly,adequately,and without
ofbehavior,was
resortto violence.A thirdcondition,themutualpredictability
also thoughtto be important.63
The mostvitaloftheseconditionsis thefirst;sharedvalues makeresponsiveof develpossible. The pluralisticsecuritycommunity
ness and predictability
oped democraciesis based on manycommonvalues and ideals. In a recent
address to the General Assemblyof the Council of Europe, Czech President
Havel identifiedthe commonvalues of Europe as "respectforthe uniqueness
and freedom of each human being, the principlesof a democratic and
pluralisticpoliticalsystem,a marketeconomy,and a civicsocietywiththe rule
and share a
of law. All of us [also] respectthe principleof unityin diversity
nationsand
to fostercreativecooperationbetweenthedifferent
determination
spheresofcivilizationethnic,religious,and culturalgroups-and thedifferent
thatexistin Europe."64
The appearance and spread of securitycommunitiesclosely parallel the
developmentof democraticinstitutionsand successfulmarketeconomies.65
indicatesthatdemocracyand capitalismare necesThe Deutsch formulation
communities.
Responsiveconditionsforpluralisticsecurity
sarybutinsufficient
also are essential,and theyare encouragedbygreater
ness and predictability
politicalparticipationwithincountriesand more intensepersonal and economic interactionbetween or among them. Cross-nationalinteractionalso
to thedevelopmentof a "we feeling"amongpeoples.66
contributes
63. Ibid.,pp. 66-67.
64. Vaclav Havel, "How Europe Could Fail," New YorkReviewofBooks, 18 November1993,p.3.
do not fightother
65. There is considerableresearchthatarguesthatdemocraticgovernments
See, forexample,SteveChan, "Mirror,Mirroron theWall ... Are Freer
democraticgovernments.
CountriesMore Pacific?"Journalof ConflictResolution20 (December 1984), pp. 617-40; Zeev
Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, "Regime Types and InternationalConflicts,1816-1976,"Joumalof
Resolution33 (March 1989),pp. 3-36; and Randall L. Schweller,"DomesticStructuresand
Conflict
PreventiveWar: Are DemocraciesMore Pacific?"WorldPolitics44 (January1992),pp. 235-69.
in theNorthAtlanticArea,pp. 117-61.
66. Deutsch et al.,PoliticalCommunity

Symposium 273
Some of the countriesof EasternEurope, the formerSovietUnion, and the
Pacificrimappear committedto the developmentof pluralistdemocracyand
freemarketeconomies.Success would establishthe essentialpreconditionfor
a wider securitycommunity.To the extentthat the principlesthat govern
relationsamong the industrialdemocracies come to characterizerelations
betweenthemand some or all of these countries,a singlepluralisticsecurity
communitycould come to encompass most of the developed world. In its
presentor expanded formit will coexistwiththe more traditional,conflictpronepatternof relationsthatcontinueto characterizerelationsamongother
formercommuniststates(e.g., Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia,Armenia-Azerbaijan),
amongmanylesserdevelopedcountries,and betweenthemand the developed
world.67
Adaptation versus learning

or "positional" ontology.68
Realists and neorealistsshare a "structuralist"
Unitsprecede the systemand generateits structurethroughtheirinteraction.
Structureis the unintendedby-productof unit interaction.It is immuneto
effortsto modifyit or mitigateits effects.Once structureis formed,Waltz
insists,"the creatorsbecome the creaturesof the market[thatis, the system]
thattheiractivity
gave rise to."69And thisis why"Throughall the changesof
boundaries,of social, economic,and politicalform,of economicand military
activity,the substance and style of internationalpolitics remain strikingly
constant."70
For realists,statescannotescape fromthe predicamentof anarchy;thebest
realitiesof internationalrelations.The
theycan do is adapt to the underlying
predictiveclaims of realisttheoriesreston the assumptionthatstateson the
and
wholedo adapt and thereforerespondin similarwaysto similarconstraints
opportunities.Neorealism maintains that adaptation is facilitatedby an
evolutionaryprocess. Like Darwin, Waltz assumes that the environment
(internationalstructure,in the language of neorealism) rewards certain
adaptationsin structureand behaviorand punishesothers.Througha process
of natural selection,well-adapted units prosper and the unfitdecline or
become extinct.71
67. A similarargumenthas been made byJamesM. Goldgeierand Michael McFaul, "A Tale of
46 (Spring
Two Worlds:Core and Peripheryin the Post-coldWar Era," IntemationalOrganization
1992),pp. 467-91.
68. For an elaboration, see Richard Ashley, "The Povertyof Neorealism," Intemational
Problemin
38 (Spring1984), pp. 225-86; AlexanderWendt,"The Agent-Structure
Organization
InternationalRelations Theory,"IntemationalOrganization41 (Summer1987), pp. 335-70; and
Debate," IntemationalOrganization43
David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-structure
(Summer1989),pp. 441-73.
Politics,p. 90.
ofIntemational
69. Waltz,Theory
Politics,"p. 329.
70. Waltz,"Reflectionson Theory
ofIntemational
71. See Waltz, Theoryof IntemationalPolitics,p. 118; and Waltz, "Reflectionson Theoryof
" pp. 330-31.
Politics,
Intemational

For evolutionto bringabout a worldof betteradapted units,the effectsof
natural selection must be cumulative.If giraffeswith long necks have an
advantagebecause theycan reach moreleaves, moreof themwill surviveand
reproduce. Their offspringwill on average have longer necks than the
generationto whichtheirparentsbelonged,and theprocesswillcontinueuntil
the most advantageousneck lengthis reached. This is not true for states.
Clever,adaptiveleadersmaymobilizetheircountry'sresourcesand increaseits
Accomplished
powerrelativeto otherstates.But theirskillsare nothereditary.
statesmenare just as likelyto be followedby hacks or leaders whose foreign
policyis severelyconstrainedby domesticconsiderations,and theircountry
Prussia
maylose its competitiveadvantage.Frederickthe Great transformed
froman inconsequentialfiefdominto a greatpower. Otto von Bismarckand
KingFrederickWilliamIV made Prussiathedominantunitwithinan enlarged
and extraordinarily
powerfulGermany.Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler
squandered Germany'sresourcesand reduced its size and relativestanding
throughpoorlyconceived bids for hegemony.Because bad leadership and
domesticconstraintsare recurrentproblems,and largelyindependentof the
successor failureof the foreignpoliciesof previousleaders,it is unrealisticto
in theperformance
ofunitsovertime.
expecta significant
improvement
The twentiethcenturyofferslittle support for the neorealist notion of
evolutionaryadaptation.We need only note one of the supremeironies of
frommultipolarity
to
neorealism:that the previoussystemtransformation,
bipolarity,
was broughtabout bythe blatantfailureof keyunitsto respondto
structuralimperatives.Germany,Japan, and the Soviet Union were grossly
ineptin theirforeignpolicies. Germanyand Japan challengedpowerswhose
combinedstrength
was manytimestheirs.The SovietUnion helped to unleash
the world'smostdestructive
war by refusingto balance againstGermanyand
bandwagoninginstead,in the hope of makingterritorialgains. Britainand
France were equallyculpable; theyneglectedtheirmilitary
powerand triedto
appease ratherthanoppose bothBenito Mussoliniand Hitler.If one or more
ofthesestateshad been betteradapted,theworldmightstillbe multipolar.
Naturalselectionand interspecific
competitiondo not requireorganismsto
understandhow theywork.In fact,theyworkbestwhentheirmechanismsare
unknown.Thisprincipleis well-illustrated
bythenowextinctOligocenehorned
gopher,Epigaulus.In the matingseason, males locked hornsin combat,with
thewinnertakingall theavailablefemales.Large hornsseem to have conferred
an advantagein combat,so largerhornedanimalsreproduced,and over time
the species developed largerand largerhorns.The pointwas reached where
thegopherneeded biggerand biggerburrows
thehornsbecame dysfunctional:
in whichto hide and thusbecame morevulnerableto predators.
IfEpigaulushad recognizedthesuicidalnatureofsexualselectionbycombat,
criteria.Such a
femalesmighthave chosentheirmateson thebasis ofdifferent
of evolution
shiftwould have requireda relativelysophisticatedunderstanding
and familiarity
withthe fateof overspecializedspecies. Individualswould also

Symposium 275
have had to develop a longer term perspectiveon themselvesand their
This was impossiblegiventhe limitedintellectualcapabilitiesof
environment.
Epigaulus.
it or of
An understandingof structurecreates the possibilityof modifying
this
possess
Human
beings
escapingfromsome of its apparentconsequences.
and
other
capability.They have already affectedthe evolutionof theirown
species in dramaticways. Some of these changes are a directresultof our
understandingof evolution.We have developed and maintainmany farm
animals and plants throughselectivebreeding.Modern maize and camels
cannot reproducewithouthuman assistance. Natural selection would have
workeddifferently
amonghumansifwe did notcare foror heal individualswho
would not otherwisesurviveto reproduce. Modern technologyraises the
possibilityof a more fundamentalreshapingof our species throughgenetic
engineering.
Knowledgeof structureand processhas enabled humanbeingsto altertheir
social environmentin profoundways. Smith,Malthus, and Marx described
what theybelieved to be inescapable laws thatshaped humandestiny.Their
predictionswere not fulfilled,at least in part because their analyses of
populationdynamicsand economicspromptedpolicies intendedto prevent
themfromcomingto pass.
A similarprocess is under way in internationalrelations.Throughoutthe
thegreatpowersbehavedon
century,
nineteenthand firsthalfof thetwentieth
the whole like Epigaulus.Prodded by the examplesof two destructiveworld
wars and the possibilityof a thirdthat would likelybe foughtwithnuclear
weapons, leaders soughtways to escape fromthe deadly consequences of
self-helpsystems.They developed and nurturedsupranationalinstitutions,
norms,and rules that mitigatedanarchyand providedincentivesfor closer
cooperationamongstates.Gradually,the industrialdemocraciesbound themselvestogetherin a pluralisticsecuritycommunity.
of modern
Superpowerleaders were also conscious of the destructiveness
warfarebutnevertheless
became entangledin an intensepowerstruggle.In the
in Moscow and Washingtonbothwere
late 1940sand early1950s,policymakers
pessimisticabout theirchances of avoidingwar over the course of the next
In these years,and again in the early 1960s, the superpowers
generation.72
in Berlinand Cuba.
came to thebrinkofwar in tenseconfrontations
werecharacterizedbycrises
The cold war and itssometimestenseaftermath
and arms races but also by attemptsto reduce the threatof war through
accommodation,armscontrol,and reassurance.Americanand Sovietleaders
graduallybecame convincedthat theiroppositeswere as anxious as theyto
avoid war. Some influentialfiguresin both camps came to the equally
importantrealization that attemptsto gain unilateral advantage through
72. Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity:Do States Jump Through Them?"
Intemational
Security
9 (Summer1984),pp. 147-86.

Througha
failor evenbackfire.73
invariably
weapons deployments
threatening
series of small steps,the superpowersmoved back fromthe abyss.With the
advent of Gorbachev,theytook giant steps. Human intellectand a mutual
to avoidwargavethesuperpowersand theiralliestheunderstandcommitment
ingand courageto escape fromtheirsecuritydilemma.
Elite learningat the unitlevel had systemicconsequences.A bipolarsystem
is definedby its poles. Because the Soviet Union and the United States
repudiated the notion of internationalrelationsas a self-helpsystemand
theirrelationship
changedthe rulesbywhichtheyoperated,theytransformed
and, by extension,the characterof the internationalsystem.Superpower
success in escaping the securitydilemmaindicatesthatunitsare not always
victimsof some abstract,foreordainedstructure,but intelligent,reflective
actors who, by their coordinatedbehavior,can and have transcendedthe
consequencesof anarchyas depictedbyrealism.
The postwarexperiencesuggeststhat an "atomist"or "transformational"
conceptionof structureis more appropriateto the studyof contemporary
relationsamongthe developeddemocracies.In thisformulation,
international
structureis both an antecedentand consequence of unitbehavior.In the first
instance,structureenables action and constrainsits possibilities;but it is
subsequentlyreshaped by that action. Language and its set of semanticand
possible.Speakersof any
syntacticrulesmake certainkindsof communication
languagegraduallyintroducenewvocabularyand grammarand dropold words
and forms;as a resultof theirbehavior,the structureof the languageevolves.
relationsbydeveloping
Postwarleaders changedthe structureof international
new institutions,norms,and rules. The altered structureencourages and
kindsof behaviorthe way new semanticand syntacticrules
rewardsdifferent
facilitatea different
use of a language.
Realism and thefutureof greatpower relations
In the absence of a
Realists maintainthat this achievementis illusory.74
humankindis doomed to repeat endlesslythe cycleof
hierarchicalstructure,
expansion and decline and war and renewal. Only nuclear weapons, some
ofpreventing
greatpowerwar.
realistsaver,hold out thepossibility
The pessimismof realists derives from their view of the fundamental
differencesbetween domestic and internationalsociety.The formerhas a
encase theirfistsin velvet,
Leviathan.No matterhow delicatelygovernments
theyhave the power to enforcetheirdecrees and to maintainorder. Such
73. See McGeorge Bundy,Dangerand Survival:ChoicesAbouttheBomb in theFirstFiftyYears
(New York: Random House, 1988); JohnLewis Gaddis, TheLongPeace; RichardNed Lebow and
Press,1994).
JaniceGrossStein,WeAll Lost theCold War(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
and patternsof cooperation,when theydevelop in
74. Waltz writesthat"Rules, institutions,
self-helpsystems,are all limitedin extentand modifiedfromwhattheymightotherwisebe." See
" p. 336.
Politics,
ofIntemational
"Reflectionson Theory

Symposium 277
level.I contendthatthedifference
does not existat theinternational
authority
is overdrawn.Governmentscan onlyenforcelaws and regulationswhen the
vast majorityof the population willinglycomplies. When compliance is
absent-as duringProhibitionor withcurrentU.S. laws concerningmarijuana
and the fifty-five
mile-per-hourspeed limit-law enforcementagencies are
has more or
largelyhelpless.It is no exaggerationto say thatpolice authority
less ceased to functionin many sections of American cities where their
authorityis viewed as illegitimateby citizens and is forciblyopposed by
well-armeddrugdealers.
Internationalrelationsamongthedevelopeddemocracieshas takenon many
of the characteristicsof relationshipsin domestic societies. An increasing
numberof stateshas begun to acknowledgethe necessityof regulatingtheir
politicaland economicintercoursethroughrules,norms,and agreements.As
in domesticrelations,thishighdegree of complianceis motivatedby enlightened self-interest.
ofchangein
structure
recognizesthepossibility
The conceptof evolutionary
of developed nationswill
different
directions.It maybe thatthe community
become more peaceful and generate structuresthat encourage peaceful
behavior.It is also possiblethatunforeseendevelopmentscould bringabout a
returnto a self-helpsystemand the kindof behavioridentifiedwithrealism.
Onlytimewilltell.Internationalrelationsscholarswhoworkat thesystemlevel
need to recognizeboth possibilitiesand to develop the intellectualtools that
iftheyare
structure
willenable themto monitorthe evolutionof international
to makepredictionsbased on it.
Realism descendsfroma long and venerableintellectualtradition.Some of
luminarieslike E. H. Carr and Morgenits mostimportanttwentieth-century
thau embracedrealismin the darkdecades of the 1930s and 1940sbecause it
appeared to offerthebesthope ofsavinghumankindfromtheravagesof a new
and moredestructive
war.Contemporary
realistsremaincommittedto thegoal
to accept thatthe postwarbehaviorof the great
of peace but findit difficult
powers has belied their unduly pessimisticassumptionsabout the consetheirtheoriesand someofthepolicyrecommenquencesofanarchy.Ironically,
dationsbased on themmaynowstandin thewayofthebetterworldwe all seek.


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The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism

Author(s): Richard Ned Lebow

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