Wendt 1992 PDF

Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics
Author(s): Alexander Wendt

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425
Published by: The MIT Press
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Anarchyis whatstatesmake ofit: the
ofpowerpolitics
social construction
AlexanderWendt
The debatebetweenrealistsand liberalshas reemergedas an axisofcontention

in internationalrelationstheory.1Revolvingin the past around competing
theoriesof humannature,the debate is moreconcernedtodaywiththe extent
to whichstateactionis influencedby"structure"(anarchyand the distribution
of power) versus"process" (interactionand learning)and institutions. Does
the absence of centralizedpoliticalauthorityforcestatesto play competitive
powerpolitics?Can international regimesovercomethislogic,and underwhat
conditions?What in anarchyis givenand immutable,and whatis amenableto
change?
The debate between "neorealists"and "neoliberals" has been based on a
sharedcommitment to "rationalism."2Like all social theories,rationalchoice
directsus to ask some questions and not others,treatingthe identitiesand
interestsof agentsas exogenouslygivenand focusingon how the behaviorof
This articlewas negotiatedwithmanyindividuals.If myrecordsare complete(and apologiesif

theyare not), thanksare due particularlyto JohnAldrich,Mike Barnett,Lea Brilmayer,David
Campbell,JimCaporaso, Simon Dalby, David Dessler, Bud Duvall, Jean Elshtain,KarynErtel,
Lloyd Etheridge,ErnstHaas, MartinHollis, Naeem Inayatullah,StewartJohnson,FrankKlink,
Steve Krasner,FriedrichKratochwil,David Lumsdaine,M. J. Peterson,Spike Peterson,Thomas
Risse-Kappen,JohnRuggie,Bruce Russett,JimScott,RogersSmith,David Sylvan,JanThomson,
MarkWarren,and JuttaWeldes. The articlealso benefitedfrompresentations and seminarsat the
AmericanUniversity,the Universityof Chicago, the Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst,
SyracuseUniversity, of Washingtonat Seattle,the University
the University of Californiaat Los
Angeles,and Yale University.
1. See, forexample,JosephGrieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsofCooperation:A RealistCritique
oftheNewestLiberalInstitutionalism," 42 (Summer1988),pp. 485-507;
IntemationalOrganization
JosephNye,"Neorealismand Neoliberalism,"WorldPolitics40 (January1988),pp. 235-51; Robert
A Perspectiveon WorldPolitics,"in hiscollectionofessays
Keohane, "NeoliberalInstitutionalism:
entitledIntemational and StatePower(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1989),pp. 1-20;
Institutions
JohnMearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instability in Europe Afterthe Cold War,"Intemational
Security13 (Summer1990), pp. 5-56, along withsubsequentpublishedcorrespondenceregarding
Mearsheimer'sarticle;and EmersonNiou and Peter Ordeshook,"Realism Versus Neoliberalism:
A Formulation," AmericanJoumalofPoliticalScience35 (May 1991),pp. 481-511.
2. See Robert Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions:Two Approaches," IntemationalStudies
Quarterly32 (December 1988),pp. 379-96.
46, 2, Spring1992
IntemationalOrganization
? 1992bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology

392 InternationalOrganization
agents generates outcomes. As such, rationalismoffersa fundamentally

behavioralconceptionof both process and institutions: theychange behavior
but not identitiesand interests.3In additionto thisway of framingresearch
problems,neorealists and neoliberals share generally similar assumptions
about agents: states are the dominantactorsin the system,and theydefine
securityin "self-interested" terms.Neorealistsand neoliberalsmay disagree
abouttheextentto whichstatesare motivatedbyrelativeversusabsolutegains,
butbothgroupstakethe self-interested stateas thestartingpointfortheory.
This startingpointmakessubstantivesense forneorealists,sincetheybelieve
anarchiesare necessarily"self-help"systems,systemsin whichboth central
authority and collectivesecurityare absent.The self-helpcorollaryto anarchy
does enormouswork in neorealism,generatingthe inherentlycompetitive
dynamicsof the securitydilemmaand collectiveaction problem.Self-helpis
not seen as an "institution"and as suchoccupies a privilegedexplanatoryrole
vis-a-visprocess,settingthe termsfor,and unaffectedby,interaction.Since
statesfailingto conformto thelogicofself-helpwillbe drivenfromthesystem,
onlysimplelearningor behavioraladaptationis possible;thecomplexlearning
involvedin redefinitionsof identityand interestis not.' Questions about
identity-and interest-formation are thereforenot importantto studentsof
internationalrelations.A rationalistproblematique,whichreducesprocessto
dynamicsof behavioral interactionamong exogenouslyconstitutedactors,
definesthescope ofsystemictheory.
By adopting such reasoning,liberals concede to neorealists the causal
powersof anarchicstructure, but theygain therhetoricallypowerfulargument
thatprocesscan generatecooperativebehavior,even in an exogenouslygiven,
self-helpsystem.Some liberals may believe that anarchy does, in fact,
constitutestates with self-interested identitiesexogenous to practice. Such
"weak" liberalsconcede the causal powers of anarchyboth rhetorically and
substantively and accept rationalism'slimited,behavioralconceptionof the
causal powersof institutions. They are realistsbeforeliberals(we mightcall
them "weak realists"), since only if internationalinstitutionscan change
powersand interestsdo theygo beyondthe"limits"ofrealism.5
3. Behavioral and rationalistmodels of man and institutionsshare a common intellectual

heritagein the materialistindividualismof Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham. On the relationship
betweenthe two models,see JonathanTurner,A Theoryof Social Interaction(Stanford,Calif.:
StanfordUniversity Press, 1988), pp. 24-31; and George Homans, "Rational Choice Theoryand
Behavioral Psychology,"in Craig Calhoun et al., eds., Structuresof Power and Constraint
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1991),pp. 77-89.
4. On neorealistconceptionsof learning,see Philip Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet
ForeignPolicy,"in George Breslauerand PhilipTetlock,eds.,Leamingin U.S. and SovietForeign
Policy(Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1991), pp. 24-27. On the.difference betweenbehavioral
and cognitivelearning,see ibid., pp. 20-61; Joseph Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet
SecurityRegimes,"IntemationalOrganization41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402; and ErnstHaas,
WhenKnowledgeIs Power(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,1990),pp. 17-49.
5. See Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous
Variables,"in StephenKrasner,ed., Intemational Regimes(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity
Press,
1983),pp. 355-68.

Anarchy 393
Yet some liberals want more. When Joseph Nye speaks of "complex
learning,"or RobertJervisof "changingconceptionsof selfand interest,"or
RobertKeohane of "sociological"conceptionsof interest,each is assertingan
importantrole for transformations of identityand interestin the liberal
researchprogramand,byextension,a potentially muchstrongerconceptionof
processand institutions in worldpolitics.6"Strong"liberalsshouldbe troubled
bythedichotomousprivileging ofstructure overprocess,sincetransformations
of identityand interestthroughprocess are transformations of structure.
Rationalismhas littleto offersuch an argument,7 whichis in partwhy,in an
importantarticle, FriedrichKratochwiland John Ruggie argued that its
ontologycontradictedtheintersubjectivist
individualist epistemologynecessary
forregimetheoryto realize itsfullpromise.8Regimescannotchangeidentities
and interestsifthe latterare takenas given.Because of thisrationalistlegacy,
despiteincreasingly numerousand richstudiesof complexlearningin foreign
policy,neoliberalslack a systematictheoryof howsuchchangesoccurand thus
must privilegerealist insightsabout structurewhile advancing their own
insightsaboutprocess.
The ironyis thatsocial theorieswhichseek to explainidentitiesand interests
do exist.Keohane has called them"reflectivist";9because I wantto emphasize
theirfocuson the social construction and minimizetheirimage
of subjectivity
problem,followingNicholas Onuf I will call them "constructivist."" Despite
importantdifferences, cognitivists, standpointand postmod-
poststructuralists,
ern feminists,rule theorists,and structurationists share a concernwiththe
basic "sociological" issue bracketed by rationalists-namely,the issue of
identity-and interest-formation. Constructivism's potentialcontribution to a
strongliberalismhas been obscured, however,by recent epistemological
debates betweenmodernistsand postmodernists, in whichScience disciplines
Dissent for not defininga conventionalresearch program,and Dissent
celebratesitsliberationfromScience.1"Real issues animatethisdebate,which
6. See Nye, "Nuclear Learningand U.S.-Soviet SecurityRegimes"; Robert Jervis,"Realism,

Game Theory,and Cooperation,"WorldPolitics40 (April 1988),pp. 340-44; and RobertKeohane,
"InternationalLiberalismReconsidered,"in JohnDunn, ed., The Economic Limitsto Modem
Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1990),p. 183.
7. Rationalistshave givensome attentionto the problemof preference-formation,althoughin
so doingtheyhave gone beyondwhatI understandas the characteristicparametersof rationalism.
See, forexample,JonElster,"Sour Grapes: Utilitarianism and theGenesis ofWants,"in Amartya
Sen and Bernard Williams,eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press,1982),pp. 219-38; and Michael Cohen and RobertAxelrod,"CopingwithComplexity: The
AdaptiveValue ofChangingUtility,"American EconomicReview74 (March 1984),pp. 30-42.
8. FriedrichKratochwiland JohnRuggie,"InternationalOrganization:A StateoftheArton an
ArtoftheState,"IntemationalOrganization 40 (Autumn1986),pp. 753-75.
9. Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions."
10. See Nicholas Onuf,Worldof Our Making(Columbia: Universityof South Carolina Press,
1989).
11. On Science,see Keohane,"InternationalInstitutions";and RobertKeohane, "International
Relations Theory:Contributionsof a FeministStandpoint,"Millennium18 (Summer 1989), pp.
245-53. On Dissent, see R. B. J. Walker,"Historyand Structurein the Theoryof International
Relations,"Millennium18 (Summer1989), pp. 163-83; and RichardAshleyand R. B. J.Walker,

With respect to the substance of international

also divides constructivists.
relations,however,bothmodernand postmodernconstructivists are interested
in how knowledgeablepracticesconstitutesubjects,whichis not farfromthe
strongliberal interestin how institutionstransform interests.They share a
cognitive,intersubjectiveconceptionof process in whichidentitiesand inter-
ests are endogenousto interaction, ratherthana rationalist-behavioral one in
whichtheyare exogenous.
My objectivein thisarticleis to build a bridgebetweenthese twotraditions
(and, by extension,between the realist-liberaland rationalist-reflectivist
debates) bydevelopinga constructivist argument,drawnfromstructurationist
and symbolicinteractionistsociology,on behalf of the liberal claim that
internationalinstitutionscan transformstate identitiesand interests.12 In
contrastto the "economic" theorizingthat dominatesmainstreamsystemic
international relations scholarship, this involves a "sociological social
psychological"formof systemictheoryin whichidentitiesand interestsare the
dependentvariable.13 Whethera "communitarian liberalism"is stillliberalism
does not interestme here. What does is thatconstructivism mightcontribute
to the strongliberal interestin identity-and interest-formation
significantly
and therebyperhapsitselfbe enrichedwithliberalinsightsabout learningand
cognitionwhichithas neglected.
My strategyforbuildingthisbridgewill be to argue againstthe neorealist
claim that self-helpis given by anarchic structureexogenouslyto process.
Constructivistshavenotdone a goodjob oftakingthecausal powersofanarchy
seriously.This is unfortunate,since in the realist view anarchyjustifies
disinterestin the institutionaltransformation of identitiesand interestsand
thus buildingsystemic theories in exclusively rationalistterms;its putative
causal powers must be challenged if process and institutionsare not to be
subordinatedto structure.I argue that self-helpand power politicsdo not
follow either logicallyor causally fromanarchyand that if today we find
ourselvesin a self-helpworld,thisis due to process,not structure. There is no
"Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in Interna-
tionalStudies,"IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 34 (September1990),pp. 367-416. For an excellent
criticalassessmentof these debates, see Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospectsof
InternationalTheoryin a Post-PositivistEra," IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 33 (September1989),
pp. 235-54.
12. The factthat I draw on these approaches aligns me withmodernistconstructivists, even
thoughI also drawfreelyon thesubstantive workofpostmodernists, especiallyRichardAshleyand
Rob Walker.For a defenseof thispracticeand a discussionof its epistemologicalbasis, see my
earlier article,"The Agent-Structure Problemin InternationalRelations Theory,"Intemational
Organization41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-70; and Ian Shapiro and Alexander Wendt, "The
DifferenceThat Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Consent," forthcoming in
Politicsand Society.Amongmodernistconstructivists, myargumentis particularly indebtedto the
published work of Emanuel Adler, FriedrichKratochwil,and John Ruggie, as well as to an
unpublishedpaper by Naeem Inayatullahand David Levine entitled"Politics and Economics in
Contemporary InternationalRelationsTheory,"SyracuseUniversity, Syracuse,N.Y., 1990.
13. See ViktorGecas, "Rekindlingthe SociologicalImaginationin Social Psychology," Joumal
fortheTheory ofSocial Behavior19 (March 1989),pp. 97-115.

Anarchy 395
"logic" of anarchyapart fromthe practicesthat create and instantiateone

structureof identitiesand interestsratherthan another; structurehas no
existenceor causal powersapartfromprocess.Self-helpand powerpoliticsare
not essentialfeaturesof anarchy.Anarchyis whatstatesmakeofit.
institutions,
examinethe claimsand
In the subsequentsectionsof thisarticle,I critically
assumptionsof neorealism,develop a positiveargumentabout how self-help
and power politicsare sociallyconstructedunder anarchy,and then explore
threewaysin whichidentitiesand interestsare transformed underanarchy:by
the institutionof sovereignty,by an evolutionof cooperation,and by inten-
tionaleffortsto transformegoisticidentitiesintocollectiveidentities.
Anarchyand powerpolitics
Classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans

Morgenthauattributedegoismand powerpoliticsprimarily to humannature,
whereas structuralrealistsor neorealistsemphasize anarchy.The difference
stems in part from differentinterpretationsof anarchy's causal powers.
KennethWaltz's workis importantforboth. In Man, theState,and War,he
definesanarchyas a conditionof possibilityforor "permissive"cause of war,
arguingthat"wars occurbecause thereis nothingto preventthem."14 It is the
humannatureor domesticpoliticsofpredatorstates,however,thatprovidethe
initialimpetusor "efficient"cause of conflictwhich forces other states to
respond in kind.15Waltz is not entirelyconsistentabout this,since he slips
withoutjustificationfromthe permissivecausal claim that in anarchywar is
always possible to the active causal claim that "war may at any moment
occur."'16But despite Waltz's concludingcall for third-imagetheory,the
efficientcauses thatinitializeanarchicsystemsare fromthe firstand second
images.This is reversedin Waltz's Theory Politics,inwhichfirst-
ofInternational
and second-imagetheoriesare spurned as "reductionist,"and the logic of
anarchyseems by itselfto constituteself-helpand powerpoliticsas necessary
featuresofworldpolitics.17
This is unfortunate,sincewhateverone maythinkoffirst- and second-image
theories, they have the virtue of implyingthat practices determinethe
characterof anarchy.In thepermissiveview,onlyifhumanor domesticfactors
cause A to attack B will B have to defend itself.Anarchies may contain
dynamicsthatlead to competitive powerpolitics,buttheyalso maynot,and we
can argueaboutwhenparticularstructures ofidentityand interestwillemerge.
14. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State,and War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1959),
p. 232.
15. Ibid.,pp. 169-70.
16. Ibid., p. 232. This pointis made byHidemi Suganamiin "BringingOrder to the Causes of
War Debates," Millennium19 (Spring1990),p. 34, fn.11.
17. KennethWaltz,Theory Politics(Boston: Addison-Wesley,1979).
ofIntemational

In neorealism,however,therole ofpracticein shapingthecharacterofanarchy

is substantiallyreduced,and so thereis less aboutwhichto argue:self-helpand
competitive powerpoliticsare simplygivenexogenouslybythestructure ofthe
statesystem.
I willnot here contestthe neorealistdescriptionof the contemporary state
systemas a competitive, I willonlydisputeits explanation.I
self-helpworld;18
develop my argumentin three stages. First,I disentanglethe concepts of
self-helpand anarchyby showingthatself-interested conceptionsof security
are not a constitutive propertyof anarchy.Second, I show how self-helpand
competitivepowerpoliticsmaybe producedcausallyby processesof interac-
tionbetweenstatesin whichanarchyplaysonlya permissiverole. In both of
these stagesof myargument,I self-consciously bracketthe first-and second-
image determinants not because theyare unimportant
of state identity, (they
are indeed important), butbecause likeWaltz's objective,mineis to clarify the
"logic" of anarchy.Third,I reintroducefirst-and second-imagedeterminants
to assess theireffectson identity-formation in different
kindsof anarchies.
Anarchy,self-help,and intersubjectiveknowledge
Waltz definespoliticalstructure on threedimensions:orderingprinciples(in
thiscase, anarchy),principlesof differentiation (whichhere dropout), and the
distributionof capabilities.19
By itself,thisdefinitionpredictslittleabout state
behavior.It does not predictwhethertwo stateswill be friendsor foes,will
recognizeeach other'ssovereignty, willhave dynasticties,willbe revisionistor
status quo powers, and so on. These factors,which are fundamentally
intersubjective,affectstates' securityinterestsand thusthe characterof their
interactionunderanarchy.In an importantrevisionofWaltz's theory,Stephen
Waltimpliesas muchwhenhe arguesthatthe"balance ofthreats,"ratherthan
the balance of power, determinesstate action, threatsbeing socially con-
structed.20Put more generally,withoutassumptionsabout the structureof
identitiesand interestsin the system,Waltz's definitionof structurecannot
predictthe contentor dynamicsof anarchy.Self-helpis one such intersubjec-
tivestructureand, as such,does the decisiveexplanatoryworkin the theory.
The questionis whetherself-helpis a logicalor contingentfeatureof anarchy.
In thissection,I develop the conceptof a "structureof identityand interest"
and showthatno particularone followslogicallyfromanarchy.
A fundamentalprincipleof constructivist social theoryis that people act
towardobjects,includingotheractors,on the basis of the meaningsthatthe
18. The neorealist descriptionis not unproblematic.For a powerfulcritique, see David

Lumsdaine,Ideals and Interests:The ForeignAid Regime,1949-1989 (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress,forthcoming).
19. Waltz,Theory ofIntemationalPolitics,pp. 79-101.
Press,1987).
20. StephenWalt,TheOriginsofAlliances(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity

Anarchy 397
objects have for them.21States act differently towardenemies than theydo

towardfriendsbecause enemiesare threateningand friendsare not.Anarchy
and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us whichis which.U.S.
military power has a differentsignificance forCanada than forCuba, despite
theirsimilar"structural"positions,just as Britishmissileshave a different
significanceforthe United States thando Sovietmissiles.The distribution of
powermayalwaysaffectstates'calculations,buthowit does so dependson the
intersubjectiveunderstandingsand expectations,on the "distributionof
knowledge,"that constitutetheirconceptionsof self and other.22If society
"forgets"what a universityis, the powers and practices of professorand
studentcease to exist;if the United States and SovietUnion decide thatthey
are no longerenemies,"the cold war is over." It is collectivemeaningsthat
constitutethestructures whichorganizeour actions.
Actorsacquireidentities-relatively stable,role-specific understandingsand
expectationsabout self-by participating in suchcollectivemeanings.23 Identi-
ties are inherentlyrelational:"Identity,withits appropriateattachmentsof
psychologicalreality,is alwaysidentitywithina specific,sociallyconstructed
21. See, forexample,HerbertBlumer,"The MethodologicalPositionofSymbolicInteractionism,"

in hisSymbolic Interactionism:Perspectiveand Method(EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1969),
p. 2. Throughoutthisarticle,I assumethata theoretically productiveanalogycan be made between
individualsand states.There are at least twojustifications forthisanthropomorphism. Rhetori-
cally,theanalogyis an acceptedpracticein mainstreaminternational relationsdiscourse,and since
thisarticleis an immanentratherthan externalcritique,it should followthe practice.Substan-
tively,statesare collectivitiesof individualsthatthroughtheirpracticesconstituteeach otheras
"persons"havinginterests, fears,and so on. A fulltheoryof stateidentity- and interest-formation
would neverthelessneed to drawinsightsfromthe social psychology of groupsand organizational
theory,and forthatreasonmyanthropomorphism is merelysuggestive.
22. The phrase "distributionof knowledge"is BarryBarnes's, as discussed in his work The
NatureofPower(Cambridge:PolityPress,1988); see also PeterBergerand ThomasLuckmann,The
Social Construction of Reality(New York: Anchor Books, 1966). The concernof recentinterna-
tionalrelationsscholarshipon "epistemiccommunities"withthe cause-and-effect understandings
of the world held by scientists,experts,and policymakersis an importantaspect of the role of
knowledgein worldpolitics;see Peter Haas, "Do Regimes Matter?EpistemicCommunitiesand
MediterraneanPollutionControl,"IntemationalOrganization 43 (Summer1989),pp. 377-404; and
ErnstHaas, WhenKnowledgeIs Power.My constructivist approach would merelyadd to thisan
equal emphasison howsuchknowledgealso constitutes thestructures and subjectsof social life.
23. For an excellentshortstatementof how collectivemeaningsconstituteidentities,see Peter
Berger,"Identityas a Problemin the Sociologyof Knowledge,"EuropeanJoumalofSociology, vol.
7, no. 1, 1966,pp. 32-40. See also David Morganand Michael Schwalbe,"Mind and Selfin Society:
LinkingSocial Structureand Social Cognition,"Social Psychology Quarterly 53 (June 1990), pp.
148-64.In mydiscussion,I drawon thefollowing texts:GeorgeHerbertMead, Mind,
interactionist
Self and Society(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Bergerand Luckmann,The Social
Construction ofReality;SheldonStryker, Symbolic Interactionism:A Version(Menlo
Social Structural
Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1980); R. S. Perinbanayagam,Signifying Acts: Structure and
Meaningin Everyday Life(Carbondale: SouthernIllinoisUniversity Press,1985); JohnHewitt,Self
and Society:A SymbolicInteractionist Social Psychology(Boston: Allyn& Bacon, 1988); and Turner,
A Theoryof Social Interaction.Despite some differences, much the same points are made by
structurationists such as Bhaskar and Giddens. See Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism
(AtlanticHighlands,N.J.: HumanitiesPress, 1979); and AnthonyGiddens, CentralProblemsin
Social Theory(Berkeley:University ofCaliforniaPress,1979).

world," Peter Berger argues.24Each person has many identitieslinked to

institutionalroles,such as brother,son, teacher,and citizen.Similarly, a state
may have multiple identitiesas "sovereign,""leader of the free world,"
"imperial power," and so on.25The commitmentto and the salience of
particularidentitiesvary,but each identityis an inherently social definitionof
the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectivelyhold about
themselvesand one anotherand whichconstitutethe structureof the social
world.
Identitiesare the basis of interests.Actors do not have a "portfolio"of
intereststhat theycarryaround independentof social context;instead,they
definetheirinterestsin the process of definingsituations.26 As Nelson Foote
puts it: "Motivation... refer[s]to the degree to whicha humanbeing,as a
participantin the ongoingsocial processin whichhe necessarilyfindshimself,
definesa problematicsituationas callingforthe performanceof a particular
act, with more or less anticipatedconsummationsand consequences, and
therebyhis organismreleases the energyappropriateto performingit."27
Sometimessituationsare unprecedentedin our experience,and in thesecases
we have to constructtheirmeaning,and thusour interests, byanalogyor invent
them de novo. More oftenthey have routinequalities in which we assign
meaningson the basis of institutionally defined roles. When we say that
professorshave an "interest"in teaching,research,or goingon leave, we are
sayingthatto functionin the role identityof "professor,"theyhave to define
certainsituationsas callingforcertainactions.This does not mean thatthey
will necessarilydo so (expectationsand competence do not equal perfor-
mance),but iftheydo not,theywillnot get tenure.The absence or failureof
roles makes definingsituationsand interestsmore difficult, and identity
24. Berger,"Identityas a Problemin theSociologyofKnowledge,"p. 111.

25. While not normallycast in such terms, foreignpolicy scholarship on national role
conceptions could be adapted to such identitylanguage. See Kal Holsti, "National Role
Conceptionsin the Studyof ForeignPolicy,"IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 14 (September1970),
pp. 233-309; and Stephen Walker,ed., Role Theoryand ForeignPolicyAnalysis(Durham, N.C.:
Duke UniversityPress, 1987). For an importanteffortto do so, see Stephen Walker,"Symbolic
Interactionism and International Politics: Role Theory's Contribution to International
Organization,"in C. Shih and Martha Cottam,eds., Contending Dramas: A Cognitive Approachto
Post-WarIntemationalOrganizationalProcesses(New York: Praeger,forthcoming).
26. On the "portfolio"conceptionof interests,see BarryHindess,PoliticalChoice and Social
Structure(Aldershot,U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 2-3. The "definitionof the situation"is a
centralconceptin interactionist
theory.
27. Nelson Foote, "Identificationas the Basis for a Theory of Motivation,"American
SociologicalReview16 (February1951), p. 15. Such stronglysociologicalconceptionsof interest
have been criticized,with some justice, for being "oversocialized"; see Dennis Wrong,"The
OversocializedConceptionof Man in Modern Sociology,"AmericanSociologicalReview26 (April
1961), pp. 183-93. For useful correctives,which focus on the activationof presocial but
nondetermining humanneeds withinsocial contexts,see Turner,A Theory ofSocial Interaction,
pp.
23-69; and ViktorGecas, "The Self-Conceptas a Basis fora Theoryof Motivation,"in Judith
Howard and Peter Callero, eds., The Self-SocietyDynamic (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press,1991),pp. 171-87.

Anarchy399
confusionmayresult.Thisseemsto be happening todayin theUnitedStates

and theformer SovietUnion:without thecoldwar'smutualattributions of
threatand hostility todefinetheiridentities,thesestatesseemunsureofwhat
their"interests"shouldbe.
An institution is a relativelystableset or "structure" of identitiesand
interests.
Such structures are oftencodifiedin formalrulesand norms,but
thesehave motivational forceonlyin virtueof actors'socialization to and
participationincollective knowledge. Institutions
arefundamentally cognitive
entities
thatdo notexistapartfromactors'ideasabouthowtheworldworks.28
Thisdoes notmeanthatinstitutions are notreal or objective, thattheyare
"nothingbut"beliefs.As collective knowledge, theyareexperienced as having
an existence"overand abovetheindividuals whohappento embodythemat
themoment."29 In thisway,institutionscometoconfront individuals as moreor
lesscoercivesocialfacts,buttheyarestilla function ofwhatactorscollectively
"know."Identities andsuchcollective cognitionsdo notexistapartfromeach
other;theyare "mutually constitutive."30
On thisview,institutionalization is a
processofinternalizing newidentities and interests,
notsomething occurring
outsidethemand affecting onlybehavior;socializationis a cognitiveprocess,
notjusta behavioral one.Conceivedin thisway,institutions maybe coopera-
tiveor conflictual, a pointsometimeslost in scholarship on international
regimes, which tendsto equate institutions withcooperation.There are
important differences betweenconflictual and cooperative institutionsto be
sure,butall relatively stableself-otherrelations-eventhoseof"enemies"-
aredefined intersubjectively.
Self-helpis an institution,one ofvariousstructures ofidentity and interest
thatmayexistunderanarchy. Processesofidentity-formation underanarchy
are concerned firstand foremost withpreservation or "security" oftheself.
Conceptsofsecurity therefore intheextenttowhichandthemannerin
differ
whichtheselfis identified withtheother,31
cognitively and,I wanttosuggest, it
28. In neo-Durkheimianparlance,institutions are "social representations."See Serge Moscov-

ici, "The Phenomenonof Social Representations,"in Rob Farr and Serge Moscovici,eds., Social
Representations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984), pp. 3-69. See also Barnes, The
Natureof Power.Note thatthisis a considerablymore socialized cognitivism than thatfoundin
muchof therecentscholarshipon theroleof"ideas" inworldpolitics,whichtendsto treatideas as
commoditiesthat are held by individualsand intervenebetween the distribution of power and
outcomes.For a formofcognitivism closerto myown,see Emanuel Adler,"CognitiveEvolution:A
DynamicApproach for the Studyof InternationalRelations and Their Progress,"in Emanuel
Adler and BeverlyCrawford, eds.,Progress
inPostwarInternational Relations(New York: Columbia
University Press,1991),pp. 43-88.
29. Bergerand Luckmann,TheSocial Construction ofReality,p. 58.
30. See Giddens,CentralProblemsinSocial Theory;and AlexanderWendtand RaymondDuvall,
"Institutionsand InternationalOrder,"in Ernst-OttoCzempiel and JamesRosenau, eds., Global
Changesand Theoretical Challenges(Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1989),pp. 51-74.
31. Proponentsof choice theorymightput this in termsof "interdependentutilities."For a
usefuloverviewof relevantchoice-theoretic discourse,mostof whichhas focusedon the specific
case of altruism,see Harold Hochman and Shmuel Nitzan,"Concepts of ExtendedPreference,"

is upon thiscognitivevariationthatthemeaningofanarchyand thedistribution

of power depends. Let me illustratewith a standardcontinuumof security
systems."
At one end is the "competitive"securitysystem,in whichstates identify
negativelywitheach other'ssecurityso thatego's gain is seen as alter'sloss.
Negativeidentification under anarchyconstitutessystemsof "realist" power
politics:risk-averseactors that inferintentionsfromcapabilitiesand worry
about relativegains and losses. At the limit-in the Hobbesian war of all
againstall-collective actionis nearlyimpossiblein sucha systembecause each
actormustconstantly fearbeingstabbedin theback.
In the middle is the "individualistic"securitysystem,in which states are
indifferent to the relationshipbetween theirown and others' security.This
constitutes"neoliberal" systems:states are still self-regarding about their
securitybut are concernedprimarily withabsolute gains ratherthan relative
gains. One's position in the distributionof power is less important,and
collectiveaction is more possible (thoughstillsubjectto free ridingbecause
statescontinueto be "egoists").
Competitiveand individualisticsystemsare both "self-help" formsof
anarchyin the sense that statesdo not positivelyidentifythe securityof self
withthatof othersbut insteadtreatsecurityas the individualresponsibility of
each. Giventhe lack of a positivecognitiveidentification on thebasis ofwhich
to build securityregimes,power politicswithinsuch systemswill necessarily
consistofefforts to manipulateothersto satisfyself-regarding interests.
Thiscontrastswiththe"cooperative"security system,inwhichstatesidentify
positivelywithone anotherso that the securityof each is perceivedas the
responsibilityof all. This is not self-helpin any interestingsense, since the
"self" in termsof which interestsare defined is the community;national
interestsare internationalinterests.33In practice,ofcourse,theextentto which
JoumalofEconomicBehaviorand Organization 6 (June1985),pp. 161-76.The literatureon choice

theoryusuallydoes not linkbehaviorto issues of identity.For an exception,see AmartyaSen,
"Goals, Commitment, and Identity,"JoumalofLaw, Economics,and Organization1 (Fall 1985),
pp. 341-55; and Robert Higgs, "Identityand Cooperation: A Commenton Sen's Alternative
Program,"JoumalofLaw, Economics,and Organization 3 (Spring1987),pp. 140-42.
32. Securitysystemsmightalso varyin theextentto whichthereis a functionaldifferentiation or
a hierarchicalrelationshipbetweenpatronand client,withthe patronplayinga hegemonicrole
withinits sphereof influencein definingthe securityinterestsof itsclients.I do not examinethis
dimensionhere;forpreliminary discussion,see AlexanderWendt,"The StatesSystemand Global
Militarization,"Ph.D. diss.,Universityof Minnesota,Minneapolis,1989; and AlexanderWendt
and Michael Barnett,"The InternationalSystemand Third World Militarization,"unpublished
manuscript, 1991.
33. This amountsto an "internationalizationof the state." For a discussionof thissubject,see
RaymondDuvall and AlexanderWendt,"The InternationalCapital Regimeand the Internation-
alization of the State," unpublishedmanuscript,1987. See also R. B. J. Walker,"Sovereignty,
Identity,Community: Reflectionson theHorizonsof Contemporary PoliticalPractice,"in R. B. J.
Walkerand Saul Mendlovitz,eds., Contending Sovereignties(Boulder,Colo.: LynneRienner,1990),
pp. 159-85.

Anarchy 401
withthecommunity
states'identification varies,fromthelimitedformfoundin
"concerts"to thefull-blown formseen in "collectivesecurity"arrangements.34
Dependingon howwell developedthe collectiveselfis, itwillproducesecurity
practices that are in varyingdegrees altruisticor prosocial. This makes
collectiveaction less dependent on the presence of active threatsand less
prone to free riding.35 Moreover, it restructureseffortsto advance one's
objectives,or "power politics,"in termsof shared normsratherthan relative
power.36
On this view, the tendencyin internationalrelationsscholarshipto view
power and institutionsas two opposing explanationsof foreignpolicy is
thereforemisleading,since anarchyand the distribution of power onlyhave
meaningforstateactionin virtueof the understandings and expectationsthat
constituteinstitutionalidentitiesand interests.Self-helpis one suchinstitution,
constituting one kind of anarchybut not the only kind. Waltz's three-part
definitionof structurethereforeseems underspecified.In order to go from
structureto action,we need to add a fourth:the intersubjectively constituted
structure ofidentitiesand interestsin thesystem.
This has an importantimplicationforthewayinwhichwe conceiveof states
in the state of naturebeforetheirfirstencounterwitheach other.Because
statesdo not have conceptionsof self and other,and thus securityinterests,
apart fromor priorto interaction,we assume too much about the state of
nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy,"international
political systems,like economic markets,are formedby the coaction of
self-regardingunits."37We also assume too muchifwe argue that,in virtueof
34. On the spectrumof cooperativesecurityarrangements, see Charles Kupchan and Clifford

Kupchan, "Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,and the Future of Europe," International Security16
(Summer 1991), pp. 114-61; and Richard Smoke, "A Theoryof Mutual Security,"in Richard
Smoke and Andrei Kortunov,eds., Mutual Security(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp.
59-111. These maybe usefullyset alongsideChristopherJencks'"Varietiesof Altruism,"in Jane
Mansbridge,ed.,BeyondSelf-Interest (Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress,1990),pp. 53-67.
35. On the role of collectiveidentityin reducingcollectiveactionproblems,see Bruce Fireman
and WilliamGamson,"UtilitarianLogic in theResourceMobilizationPerspective,"in MayerZald
and JohnMcCarthy,eds., TheDynamicsofSocial Movements (Cambridge,Mass.: Winthrop,1979),
pp. 8-44; RobynDawes et al., "CooperationfortheBenefitofUs-Not Me, or MyConscience,"in
Mansbridge,BeyondSelf-Interest, pp. 97-110; and Craig Calhoun, "The Problemof Identityin
CollectiveAction," in Joan Huber, ed., Macro-MicroLinkagesin Sociology(BeverlyHills, Calif.:
Sage, 1991),pp. 51-75.
36. See Thomas Risse-Kappen,"Are DemocraticAlliancesSpecial?" unpublishedmanuscript,
Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 1991. This line of argumentcould be expanded usefullyin
feministterms.For a usefuloverviewof the relationalnatureof feministconceptionsof self,see
Paula England and Barbara Stanek Kilbourne,"FeministCritiquesof the SeparativeModel of
Self: ImplicationsforRational Choice Theory,"Rationality and Society2 (April 1990),pp. 156-71.
On feministconceptualizationsof power,see Ann Tickner,"Hans Morgenthau'sPrinciplesof
Political Realism: A FeministReformulation,"Millennium17 (Winter 1988), pp. 429-40; and
ThomasWartenberg,"The ConceptofPowerin FeministTheory,"PraxisInternational 8 (October
1988),pp. 301-16.
37. Waltz,Theory ofInternationalPolitics,p. 91.

anarchy,statesin thestateofnaturenecessarilyface a "staghunt"or "security

dilemma."38 These claimspresupposea historyof interactionin whichactors
have acquired"selfish"identitiesand interests;beforeinteraction(and stillin
abstractionfromfirst-and second-imagefactors)theywould have no experi-
ence upon which to base such definitionsof self and other. To assume
otherwiseis to attributeto statesin the stateof naturequalitiesthattheycan
onlypossess in society.39 nota constitutive
Self-helpis an institution, featureof
anarchy.
What,then,is a constitutive featureofthestateofnaturebeforeinteraction?
Two thingsare left if we strip away those propertiesof the self which
presuppose interactionwith others. The firstis the material substrateof
agency,includingits intrinsiccapabilities.For humanbeings,thisis the body;
for states, it is an organizationalapparatus of governance.In effect,I am
suggesting forrhetoricalpurposesthattherawmaterialout ofwhichmembers
of the statesystemare constitutedis createdbydomesticsocietybeforestates
enterthe constitutive althoughthisprocess
process of internationalsociety,40
impliesneitherstable territoriality nor sovereignty, whichare internationally
negotiatedtermsof individuality (as discussedfurther below). The second is a
desire to preservethis material substrate,to survive.This does not entail
"self-regardingness," however, since actors do not have a self prior to
interaction withan other;howtheyviewthemeaningand requirements ofthis
survivalthereforedepends on the processes by which conceptionsof self
evolve.
This mayall seem veryarcane,but thereis an importantissue at stake: are
theforeignpolicyidentitiesand interestsofstatesexogenousor endogenousto
thestatesystem?The formeris the answerof an individualistic or undersocial-
ized systemictheoryfor which rationalismis appropriate;the latteris the
answerof a fullysocializedsystemictheory.Waltz seemsto offerthelatterand
38. See Waltz,Man, theState,and War; and Robert Jervis,"Cooperation Under the Security
Dilemma," WorldPolitics30 (January1978),pp. 167-214.
39. My argumenthere parallels Rousseau's critiqueof Hobbes. For an excellentcritiqueof
realistappropriationsof Rousseau, see Michael Williams,"Rousseau, Realism,and Realpolitik,"
Millennium18 (Summer1989), pp. 188-204. Williamsargues thatfarfrombeing a fundamental
startingpointin the stateof nature,forRousseau the staghuntrepresenteda stage in man's fall.
On p. 190,WilliamscitesRousseau's descriptionofman priorto leavingthestateof nature:"Man
onlyknowshimself;he does not see his own well-beingto be identifiedwithor contraryto thatof
anyoneelse; he neitherhates anythingnor loves anything; but limitedto no more than physical
he is no one, he is an animal."For anothercritiqueof Hobbes on the stateof naturethat
instinct,
parallelsmyconstructivist readingof anarchy,see Charles Landesman,"Reflectionson Hobbes:
Anarchyand Human Nature,"in Peter Caws, ed., The Causes of Quarrel(Boston: Beacon, 1989),
pp. 139-48.
40. Empirically,this suggestionis problematic,since the process of decolonizationand the
subsequentsupportofmanyThirdWorldstatesbyinternational societypointto waysinwhicheven
the raw materialof "empiricalstatehood" is constitutedby the societyof states. See Robert
Jacksonand Carl Rosberg,"WhyAfrica'sWeak StatesPersist:The Empiricaland theJuridicalin
Statehood,"WorldPolitics35 (October 1982),pp. 1-24.

Anarchy 403
proposes two mechanisms,competitionand socialization,by whichstructure

conditionsstateaction.4' The contentof his argumentabout thisconditioning,
however,presupposesa self-helpsystemthatis not itselfa constitutive
feature
of anarchy.As JamesMorrowpointsout, Waltz's two mechanismscondition
behavior,notidentityand interest.42
This explainshowWaltzcan be accused of
both "individualism"and "structuralism."4' He is the formerwithrespectto
systemicconstitutionsof identityand interest,the latter with respect to
systemicdeterminations ofbehavior.
Anarchy and the social constructionofpower politics

If self-helpis not a constitutive
featureof anarchy,it mustemergecausally
fromprocessesin whichanarchyplaysonlya permissiverole.' This reflectsa
second principleof constructivism: thatthe meaningsin termsofwhichaction
is organizedarise out of interaction.45This being said, however,the situation
facingstatesas theyencounterone anotherforthe firsttimemaybe such that
only self-regarding conceptionsof identitycan survive;if so, even if these
conceptions are socially constructed,neorealists may be rightin holding
identitiesand interestsconstantand thusin privileging one particularmeaning
of anarchicstructureover process. In thiscase, rationalistswould be rightto
argue for a weak, behavioral conceptionof the differencethat institutions
make, and realistswould be rightto argue thatany internationalinstitutions
which are created will be inherentlyunstable,since withoutthe power to
41. Waltz,Theory ofInternational Politics,pp. 74-77.

42. See JamesMorrow,"Social Choice and SystemStructurein WorldPolitics,"WorldPolitics
41 (October 1988), p. 89. Waltz's behavioraltreatmentof socializationmaybe usefullycontrasted
withthemorecognitiveapproachtakenbyIkenberry and theKupchansin thefollowingarticles:G.
John Ikenberryand Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International
Organization 44 (Summer1989), pp. 283-316; and Kupchan and Kupchan,"Concerts,Collective
Security,and the Future of Europe." Their approach is close to my own, but they define
socializationas an elite strategyto induce value change in others,ratherthan as a ubiquitous
featureofinteractionin termsofwhichall identitiesand interestsgetproducedand reproduced.
43. Regardingindividualism, see RichardAshley,"The Povertyof Neorealism,"International
Organization 38 (Spring1984),pp. 225-86; Wendt,"The Agent-Structure Problemin International
RelationsTheory";and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" Inter-
nationalOrganization 43 (Summer1989),pp. 441-74. Regardingstructuralism, see R. B. J.Walker,
"Realism, Change, and InternationalPoliticalTheory,"International StudiesQuarterly 31 (March
1987), pp. 65-86; and MartinHollis and StevenSmith,Explainingand Understanding International
Relations(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1989). The behavioralismevidentin neorealisttheoryalso
explainshow neorealistscan reconciletheirstructuralism withthe individualism ofrationalchoice
theory.On the behavioral-structural characterof the latter,see Spiro Latsis, "SituationalDeter-
minismin Economics,"British Journalfor thePhilosophy ofScience23 (August1972),pp. 207-45.
44. The importanceof the distinctionbetween constitutiveand causal explanationsis not
sufficientlyappreciatedin constructivistdiscourse.See Wendt,"The Agent-Structure Problemin
International RelationsTheory,"pp. 362-65;Wendt,"The StatesSystemand Global Militarization,"
pp. 110-13; and Wendt, "Bridgingthe Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in InternationalRelations,"
ReviewofInternational Studies17 (October 1991),p. 390.
45. See Blumer,"The MethodologicalPositionofSymbolicInteractionism," pp. 2-4.

transform identitiesand intereststheywillbe "continuingobjectsofchoice" by

exogenouslyconstitutedactors constrainedonly by the transactioncosts of
behavioralchange.46 Even in a permissivecausal role,in otherwords,anarchy
may decisivelyrestrictinteractionand thereforerestrictviable formsof
systemictheory.I address these causal issues firstby showinghow self-
regardingideas about securitymightdevelop and then by examiningthe
conditionsunderwhicha keyefficient cause-predation-may disposestatesin
thisdirectionratherthanothers.
Conceptionsof selfand interesttendto "mirror"thepracticesof significant
others over time. This principleof identity-formation is captured by the
symbolicinteractionist notionofthe"looking-glassself,"whichassertsthatthe
selfis a reflectionof an actor'ssocialization.
Considertwo actors-ego and alter-encounteringeach otherforthe first
time.47 Each wantsto surviveand has certainmaterialcapabilities,but neither
actorhas biologicalor domesticimperativesforpower,glory,or conquest(still
bracketed),and thereis no historyof securityor insecurity betweenthe two.
What should theydo? Realistswould probablyargue thateach should act on
thebasis ofworst-caseassumptionsabouttheother'sintentions, justifying
such
an attitudeas prudentinviewofthepossibility ofdeathfrommakinga mistake.
Such a possibility alwaysexists,even in civilsociety;however,societywouldbe
impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case
possibilities.Instead,most decisionsare and should be made on the basis of
probabilities, and theseare producedbyinteraction, bywhatactorsdo.
In the beginningis ego's gesture,which may consist,for example,of an
advance,a retreat,a brandishing of arms,a layingdownof arms,or an attack.48
For ego, thisgesturerepresentsthebasis on whichit is preparedto respondto
alter.Thisbasis is unknownto alter,however,and so itmustmake an inference
or "attribution"about ego's intentionsand, in particular,given that this is
anarchy,about whetherego is a threat.49 The contentof this inferencewill
largelydepend on two considerations.The firstis the gesture's and ego's
46. See RobertGrafstein,"Rational Choice: Theoryand Institutions," in KristenMonroe,ed.,

TheEconomicApproachtoPolitics(New York: Harper Collins,1991),pp. 263-64. A good example
of the promiseand limitsof transactioncost approaches to institutionalanalysisis offeredby
RobertKeohane in hisAfter Hegemony(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1984).
47. This situationis not entirelymetaphoricalin worldpolitics,since throughout historystates
have "discovered"each other,generatingan instantanarchyas it were. A systematicempirical
studyoffirstcontactswouldbe interesting.
48. Mead's analysisof gesturesremainsdefinitive. See Mead's Mind,Self and Society.See also
the discussionof the role of signalingin the "mechanicsof interaction"in Turner'sA Theoryof
pp. 74-79 and 92-115.
Social Interaction,
49. On the role of attribution processesin the interactionist
accountof identity-formation,see
Sheldon Strykerand Avi Gottlieb,"AttributionTheoryand SymbolicInteractionism," in John
Harvey et al., eds., New Directionsin Attribution Research,vol. 3 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum, 1981), pp. 425-58; and Kathleen Crittenden,"Sociological Aspects of Attribution,"
Annual Reviewof Sociology,vol. 9, 1983, pp. 425-46. On attributionalprocesses in international
relations,see Shawn Rosenbergand GaryWolfsfeld,"InternationalConflictand the Problemof
Attribution,"JournalofConflict Resolution21 (March 1977),pp. 75-103.

Anarchy 405
physicalqualities,whichare in part contrivedby ego and whichinclude the

directionof movement,noise, numbers,and immediateconsequences of the
gesture.50The second considerationconcernswhatalterwould intendbysuch
qualitieswere it to make such a gestureitself.Altermaymake an attributional
"error"in itsinferenceabout ego's intent,but thereis also no reason forit to
assume a priori-before the gesture-that ego is threatening, since it is only
througha processof signalingand interpreting thatthecostsand probabilities
ofbeingwrongcan be determined.5" Social threatsare constructed, notnatural.
Consideran example.Would we assume,a priori,thatwe were about to be
attackedifwe are ever contactedby membersof an alien civilization?I think
not. We would be highlyalert,of course,but whetherwe placed our military
forceson alertor launchedan attackwoulddepend on howwe interpreted the
importof their firstgesture for our security-if only to avoid makingan
immediateenemyout ofwhatmaybe a dangerousadversary.The possibility of
error,in otherwords,does notforceus to act on theassumptionthatthealiens
are threatening: actiondependson theprobabilitieswe assign,and theseare in
keypart a functionof what the aliens do; priorto theirgesture,we have no
systemic basis forassigningprobabilities.Iftheirfirstgestureis to appearwitha
thousandspaceships and destroyNew York, we will definethe situationas
threateningand respondaccordingly.But if theyappear withone spaceship,
sayingwhatseems to be "we come in peace," we willfeel"reassured"and will
probablyrespondwitha gestureintendedto reassurethem,evenifthisgesture
is notnecessarilyinterpreted bythemas such.52
This process of signaling,interpreting,and respondingcompletesa "social
act" and beginsthe process of creatingintersubjective meanings.It advances
thesame way.The firstsocial act createsexpectationson bothsides about each
other's futurebehavior: potentiallymistakenand certainlytentative,but
expectationsnonetheless.Based on thistentativeknowledge,ego makesa new
gesture,again signifying the basis on whichit will respondto alter,and again
alterresponds,addingto thepool ofknowledgeeach has about the other,and
so on over time.The mechanismhere is reinforcement; interactionrewards
actorsforholdingcertainideas about each otherand discouragesthemfrom
holdingothers.If repeated long enough,these "reciprocaltypifications" will
createrelatively stableconceptsofselfand otherregardingtheissue at stakein
theinteraction.53
50. On the "stagecraft"involvedin "presentationsof self,"see ErvingGoffman,ThePresenta-

tionofSelfin EverydayLife(New York: Doubleday,1959). On therole ofappearance in definitions
of the situation,see GregoryStone, "Appearance and the Self," in Arnold Rose, ed., Human
Behaviorand Social Processes(Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1962),pp. 86-118.
51. This discussionof the role of possibilitiesand probabilitiesin threatperceptionowes much
to StewartJohnson'scommentson an earlierdraftofmyarticle.
52. On therole of "reassurance"in threatsituations,see RichardNed Lebow and JaniceGross
Stein,"BeyondDeterrence,"JournalofSocialIssues, vol. 43, no. 4, 1987,pp. 5-72.
53. On "reciprocaltypifications," see Bergerand Luckmann,TheSocial Construction ofReality,
pp. 54-58.

INSTITUTIONS PROCESS
State A with identities .(1) Stimulus requiring

and interests \action
of
(2) StatesA's definition |
l the situationl
Intersubjective
and
understandings (3) StateA's action
expectations
possessed
{
ofA andB
byandconstitutive
\ ~~~(4)
State B's interpretation
\ ~~~of
A's action and
it of
B's owndefinition
\/ the situation
StateB withidentities \l
andinterests (5) StateB's action
FIGURE 1. ofinstitutions
Thecodetermination andprocess
It is throughreciprocalinteraction,in other words, that we create and

instantiatetherelatively in termsofwhichwe define
enduringsocial structures
our identitiesand interests.
Jeff Coultersumsup theontologicaldependenceof
structureon process thisway: "The parametersof social organizationthem-
selves are reproducedonly in and throughthe orientationsand practicesof
membersengagedin social interactions overtime.... Social configurationsare
not 'objective'like mountainsor forests,but neitherare they'subjective'like
dreams or flightsof speculativefancy.They are, as most social scientists
constructions."54
concede at thetheoreticallevel,intersubjective
The simple overall model of identity-and interest-formation proposed in
no less than to cooperativeones.
Figure 1 applies to competitiveinstitutions
Self-helpsecuritysystemsevolvefromcyclesof interactionin whicheach party
acts in ways that the other feels are threateningto the self, creating
expectationsthat the other is not to be trusted.Competitiveor egoistic
ifthe otheris threatening,
identitiesare caused by such insecurity; the selfis
forcedto "mirror"such behaviorin itsconceptionof the selfs relationshipto
54. JeffCoulter,"Remarks on the Conceptualizationof Social Structure,"Philosophyof the

Social Sciences12 (March 1982),pp. 42-43.

Anarchy 407
thatother.55 Being treatedas an objectforthegratification

of othersprecludes
the positiveidentificationwith othersnecessaryfor collectivesecurity;con-
versely,beingtreatedbyothersin waysthatare empathicwithrespectto the
securityofthe selfpermitssuchidentification.56
Competitivesystemsof interactionare prone to security"dilemmas," in
whichthe efforts of actorsto enhance theirsecurityunilaterallythreatensthe
securityof the others,perpetuatingdistrustand alienation. The formsof
identityand interestthatconstitutesuch dilemmas,however,are themselves
ongoingeffectsof,notexogenousto,theinteraction;identitiesare producedin
and through"situated activity."57 We do not beginour relationshipwiththe
aliens in a securitydilemma;securitydilemmasare not givenby anarchyor
nature. Of course, once institutionalizedsuch a dilemma may be hard to
change(I returnto thisbelow), but the pointremains:identitiesand interests
are constitutedby collectivemeaningsthatare alwaysin process.As Sheldon
Stryker emphasizes,"The social processis one ofconstructingand reconstruct-
ing self and social relationships."58If states findthemselvesin a self-help
system,thisis because theirpracticesmade it thatway.Changingthepractices
willchangetheintersubjective knowledgethatconstitutesthesystem.
Predator states and anarchy as permissivecause

The mirrortheoryof identity-formation is a crude account of how the
process of creatingidentitiesand interestsmightwork,but it does not tell us
whya systemofstates-such as, arguably,our own-would have ended up with
self-regarding and not collective identities.In this section, I examine an
efficient
cause, predation,which,in conjunctionwithanarchyas a permissive
cause, maygeneratea self-helpsystem.In so doing,however,I show the key
role thatthe structureof identitiesand interestsplaysin mediatinganarchy's
explanatory role.
The predatorargumentis straightforward and compelling.For whatever
reasons-biology, domestic politics,or systemicvictimization-some states
55. The followingarticlesby Noel Kaplowitz have made an importantcontributionto such

thinkingin internationalrelations:"PsychopoliticalDimensionsof InternationalRelations: The
ReciprocalEffectsof ConflictStrategies,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly
28 (December 1984), pp.
373-406; and "National Self-Images,PerceptionofEnemies,and ConflictStrategies:Psychopoliti-
cal Dimensionsof InternationalRelations,"PoliticalPsychology11 (March 1990),pp. 39-82.
56. These argumentsare commonin theoriesof narcissismand altruism.See Heinz Kohut,
Self-Psychology
and theHumanities(New York: Norton,1985); and MartinHoffmann, "Empathy,
Its Limitations,and Its Role in a ComprehensiveMoral Theory,"in WilliamKurtinesand Jacob
Gewirtz,eds., Morality,Moral Behavior,and Moral Development(New York: Wiley, 1984), pp.
283-302.
57. See C. Norman Alexander and Mary Glenn Wiley, "Situated Activityand Identity
Formation," in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph Turner, eds., Social Psychology:Sociological
Perspectives
(New York: Basic Books, 1981),pp. 269-89.
58. Sheldon Stryker, "The Vitalizationof SymbolicInteractionism,"
Social Psychology Quarterly
50 (March 1987),p. 93.

maybecome predisposedtowardaggression.The aggressivebehaviorof these

predatorsor "bad apples" forcesotherstatesto engage in competitivepower
politics,to meet firewithfire,since failureto do so may degrade or destroy
them.One predatorwillbest a hundredpacifistsbecause anarchyprovidesno
guarantees.This argumentis powerfulin partbecause itis so weak: ratherthan
makingthe strongassumptionthatall statesare inherently power-seeking(a
purely reductionisttheoryof power politics), it assumes that just one is
power-seeking and thatthe othershave to followsuitbecause anarchypermits
theone to exploitthem.
In makingthisargument,it is importantto reiteratethatthe possibilityof
predationdoes notin itselfforcestatesto anticipateit a prioriwithcompetitive
power politicsof theirown. The possibilityof predationdoes not mean that
"war mayat anymomentoccur"; it mayin factbe extremely unlikely.Once a
predatoremerges,however,it mayconditionidentity- and interest-formation
in thefollowingmanner.
In an anarchyof two,ifego is predatory,altermusteitherdefineitssecurity
in self-helptermsor pay the price. This follows directlyfromthe above
argument,in whichconceptionsof self mirrortreatmentby the other.In an
anarchyof many,however,the effectof predationalso depends on thelevelof
collectiveidentity alreadyattainedin thesystem.If predationoccursrightafter
thefirstencounterin thestateofnature,itwillforceotherswithwhomitcomes
in contactto defendthemselves,firstindividually and thencollectively ifthey
come to perceivea commonthreat.The emergenceof sucha defensivealliance
willbe seriouslyinhibitedifthestructure ofidentitiesand interestshas already
evolvedinto a Hobbesian worldof maximuminsecurity, since potentialallies
will stronglydistrusteach otherand face intensecollectiveaction problems;
suchinsecureallies are also morelikelyto fallout amongstthemselvesonce the
predator is removed. If collective securityidentityis high, however,the
emergenceof a predatormaydo muchless damage.If thepredatorattacksany
memberof the collective,the latterwill come to the victim'sdefenseon the
principleof "all forone, one forall," even if the predatoris not presentlya
threatto othermembersof the collective.If the predatoris not strongenough
towithstandthecollective,itwillbe defeatedand collectivesecurity willobtain.
But if it is strongenough,the logic of the two-actorcase (now predatorand
collective)willactivate,and balance-of-power politicswillreestablishitself.
The timingof the emergence of predation relative to the historyof
identity-formation in the community is thereforecrucialto anarchy'sexplana-
toryrole as a permissivecause. Predationwill alwayslead victimsto defend
themselves, butwhetherdefensewillbe collectiveor notdependson thehistory
ofinteraction withinthepotentialcollectiveas muchas on theambitionsofthe
predator.Will the disappearance of the Soviet threatrenew old insecurities
amongthe membersof the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization?Perhaps,but
notiftheyhave reasonsindependentofthatthreatforidentifying theirsecurity
withone another.Identitiesand interestsare relationship-specific, notintrinsic

Anarchy 409
attributes of a "portfolio";statesmaybe competitivein some relationshipsand

solidaryin others."Mature" anarchiesare less likelythan"immature"ones to
be reduced by predationto a Hobbesian condition,and maturity, whichis a
proxyforstructures ofidentityand interest,is a functionof process.59
The sourceof predationalso matters.If it stemsfromunit-levelcauses that
are immuneto systemicimpacts(causes such as human natureor domestic
politics taken in isolation), then it functionsin a manner analogous to a
"genetictrait"in theconstructedworldof the statesystem.Even ifsuccessful,
thistraitdoes notselectforotherpredatorsin an evolutionary sense so muchas
it teachesotherstatesto respondin kind,but sincetraitscannotbe unlearned,
the otherstateswillcontinuecompetitivebehavioruntilthe predatoris either
destroyedor transformed fromwithin.However,in the morelikelyeventthat
predationstemsat least in partfrompriorsystemicinteraction-perhapsas a
resultof beingvictimizedin the past (one thinkshere of Nazi Germanyor the
SovietUnion)-then it is more a responseto a learned identityand, as such,
mightbe transformed byfuturesocial interactionin theformof appeasement,
reassurancesthat securityneeds will be met, systemiceffectson domestic
politics,and so on. In thiscase, in otherwords,thereis morehope thatprocess
can transform a bad apple intoa good one.
The role of predationin generatinga self-helpsystem,then,is consistent
witha systematic focuson process.Even if the source of predationis entirely
exogenousto thesystem,itis whatstatesdo thatdeterminesthequalityoftheir
interactions underanarchy.In thisrespect,itis notsurprising thatit is classical
realistsratherthanstructural realistswho emphasizethissortofargument.The
former'semphasison unit-levelcauses of powerpoliticsleads moreeasilyto a
permissiveview of anarchy'sexplanatoryrole (and thereforeto a processual
viewof international relations)thandoes thelatter'semphasison anarchyas a
"structuralcause";60 neorealistsdo not need predationbecause the systemis
givenas self-help.
This raises anew the question of exactlyhow much and what kind of role
human nature and domesticpoliticsplay in world politics.The greaterand
more destructivethisrole, the moresignificant predationwillbe, and the less
amenableanarchywillbe to formation ofcollectiveidentities.Classical realists,
of course,assumed thathumannaturewas possessed by an inherentlust for
poweror glory.My argumentsuggeststhatassumptionssuchas thisweremade
fora reason: an unchangingHobbesian man providesthe powerfulefficient
cause necessaryfora relentlesspessimismabout worldpoliticsthat anarchic
structurealone, or even structureplus intermittent predation,cannotsupply.
One can be skepticalof such an essentialistassumption,as I am, but it does
59. On the "maturity"of anarchies,see BarryBuzan, People, States,and Fear (Chapel Hill:
University ofNorthCarolinaPress,1983).
60. A similarintuitionmaylie behindAshley'seffort to reappropriateclassicalrealistdiscourse
for criticalinternationalrelationstheory.See Richard Ashley,"Political Realism and Human
Interests,"International
StudiesQuarterly38 (June1981),pp. 204-36.

producedeterminateresultsat the expenseof systemictheory.A concernwith

systemicprocess over structuresuggeststhatperhaps it is time to revisitthe
debate overtherelativeimportanceoffirst-, second-,and third-image theories
ofstateidentity-formation.6"
Assumingfor now that systemictheories of identity-formation in world
politicsare worthpursuing,let me conclude by suggestingthat the realist-
rationalistalliance "reifies"self-helpin the sense of treatingit as something
separatefromthepracticesbywhichitis producedand sustained.PeterBerger
and Thomas Luckmanndefinereificationas follows:"[It] is the apprehension
of the productsof humanactivityas iftheywere somethingelse than human
products-such as factsof nature,resultsof cosmiclaws,or manifestations of
divine will. Reificationimplies that man is capable of forgettinghis own
authorshipof the humanworld,and further, thatthe dialecticbetweenman,
theproducer,and his productsis lostto consciousness.The reifiedworldis ...
experiencedbyman as a strangefacticity, an opusalienumoverwhichhe has no
controlratherthan as the opuspropriumof his own productiveactivity."62 By
denyingor bracketingstates' collective authorshipof their identitiesand
interests,in otherwords,the realist-rationalistalliance denies or bracketsthe
factthatcompetitivepower politicshelp create the very"problemof order"
theyare supposed to solve-that realismis a self-fulfillingprophecy.Far from
beingexogenously given,theintersubjective
knowledgethatconstitutes compet-
itiveidentitiesand interestsis constructedeverydaybyprocessesof"social will
formation."63 It is whatstateshave made of themselves.
Institutionaltransformations
ofpowerpolitics
Let us assumethatprocessesof identity- and interest-formationhave createda

worldinwhichstatesdo notrecognizerightsto territory or existence-a warof
all againstall. In thisworld,anarchyhas a "realist"meaningforstateaction:be
insecureand concernedwithrelativepower.Anarchyhas thismeaningonlyin
virtueof collective,insecurity-producing practices,but if those practicesare
61. Waltz has himselfhelped open up such a debate withhis recognitionthatsystemicfactors

conditionbut do not determinestate actions. See Kenneth Waltz, "Reflectionson Theoryof
International
Politics:A Response to MyCritics,"in RobertKeohane, ed.,Neorealismand Its Critics
(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 322-45. The growingliteratureon the
observationthat"democraciesdo notfighteach other"is relevantto thisquestion,as are twoother
studies that break importantground towarda "reductionist"theoryof state identity:William
Bloom's PersonalIdentity, National Identityand IntemationalRelations(Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress,1990) and Lumsdaine'sIdeals and Interests.
62. See Berger and Luckmann,The Social Construction of Reality,p. 89. See also Douglas
Maynardand Thomas Wilson,"On the Reificationof Social Structure,"in ScottMcNall and Gary
Howe, eds., Current Perspectives
in Social Theory,
vol. 1 (Greenwich,Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), pp.
287-322.
63. See Richard Ashley, "Social Will and InternationalAnarchy,"in Hayward Alker and
Richard Ashley,eds., AfterRealism,work in progress,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology,
Cambridge,and ArizonaStateUniversity, Tempe, 1992.

Anarchy 411
relativelystable,theydo constitutea systemthatmayresistchange.The fact

thatworldsof powerpoliticsare sociallyconstructed, in otherwords,does not
guaranteetheyare malleable,forat least tworeasons.
The firstreasonis thatonce constituted, anysocial systemconfronts each of
its membersas an objectivesocial factthat reinforcescertainbehaviorsand
discouragesothers.Self-helpsystems, forexample,tendto rewardcompetition
and punish altruism.The possibilityof change depends on whetherthe
exigenciesof such competitionleave room foractions that deviate fromthe
prescribedscript.If theydo not, the systemwill be reproducedand deviant
actorswillnot.64
The second reason is thatsystemicchange mayalso be inhibitedby actors'
interestsin maintainingrelativelystable role identities.Such interestsare
rootednotonlyin thedesireto minimizeuncertainty and anxiety,
manifestedin
effortsto confirmexistingbeliefsabout the social world,but also in the desire
to avoid the expectedcostsof breakingcommitments made to others-notably
domesticconstituenciesand foreignallies in thecase of states-as partof past
practices.The level of resistancethatthese commitments inducewill depend
on the "salience" of particularrole identitiesto the actor.65
The UnitedStates,
for example, is more likely to resist threatsto its identityas "leader of
anticommunist crusades" than to its identityas "promoterof humanrights."
But foralmostanyrole identity, practicesand information thatchallengeit are
likelyto createcognitivedissonanceand even perceptionsof threat,and these
maycause resistanceto transformations of the selfand thusto social change.66
For bothsystemicand "psychological"reasons,then,intersubjective under-
standingsand expectationsmayhave a self-perpetuating quality,constituting
path-dependenciesthatnew ideas about selfand othermusttranscend.This
does not change the fact that throughpractice agents are continuously
producingand reproducingidentitiesand interests,continuously"choosing
nowthepreferences[they]willhave later."67 But itdoes mean thatchoicesmay
not be experiencedwith meaningfuldegrees of freedom.This could be a
constructivist forthe realistpositionthatonlysimplelearningis
justification
64. See Ralph Turner,"Role-Taking:Process Versus Conformity," in Rose, Human Behavior

and Social Processes,pp. 20-40; and JudithHoward, "From ChangingSelves Toward Changing
Society,"in Howard and Callero,TheSelf-Society Dynamic,pp. 209-37.
65. On the relationshipbetweencommitmentand identity,see Foote, "Identificationas the
Basis for a Theoryof Motivation";Howard Becker, "Notes on the Concept of Commitment,"
AmericanJoumalof Sociology66 (July1960), pp. 32-40; and Stryker, SymbolicInteractionism.On
role salience,see Stryker,ibid.
66. On threatsto identity and thetypesofresistancethattheymaycreate,see GlynisBreakwell,
CopingwithThreatened Identities
(London: Methuen,1986); and TerrellNorthrup,"The Dynamic
of Identityin Personaland Social Conflict,"in Louis Kreisberget al., eds.,Intractable
Conflicts
and
TheirTransfornation (Syracuse,N.Y.: SyracuseUniversityPress, 1989), pp. 55-82. For a broad
overviewofresistanceto change,see TimurKuran,"The Tenacious Past: TheoriesofPersonaland
CollectiveConservatism," JournalofEconomicBehaviorand Organization 10 (September1988),pp.
143-71.
67. James March, "Bounded Rationality,Ambiguity,and the Engineeringof Choice," Bell
JournalofEconomics9 (Autumn1978),p. 600.

412 International
Organization
possiblein self-help
systems. The realistmightconcedethatsuchsystems are
sociallyconstructedandstillarguethatafterthecorresponding identities
and
interestshavebecomeinstitutionalized, theyare almostimpossible to trans-
form.
In theremainder ofthisarticle,I examinethreeinstitutional
transformations
ofidentityandsecurityinterest through whichstatesmight escapea Hobbesian
worldoftheirownmaking. In so doing,I seekto clarify
whatitmeansto say
that"institutions
transform identities andinterests,"emphasizingthatthekey
tosuchtransformations is relativelystablepractice.
Sovereignty,recognition,and security
In a Hobbesianstateof nature,statesare individuated by the domestic
processesthatconstitutethemas statesandbytheirmaterial capacity to deter
threatsfromotherstates.In thisworld,eveniffreemomentarily fromthe
predations ofothers,statesecuritydoes nothaveanybasisin socialrecogni-
tion-in intersubjective
understandings ornormsthata statehas a right to its
existence,territory,and subjects.Securityis a matterof nationalpower,
nothingmore.
The principle ofsovereignty transforms thissituationbyproviding a social
basisfortheindividuality and securityofstates.Sovereignty is an institution,
and so it existsonlyin virtueof certainintersubjective understandings and
expectations;thereis no sovereigntywithout an other.Theseunderstandings
andexpectations notonlyconstitutea particular kindofstate-the"sovereign"
state-butalso constitute a particular
formofcommunity, sinceidentitiesare
relational.The essenceof thiscommunity is a mutualrecognition of one
another'srightto exerciseexclusive
politicalauthoritywithin territoriallimits.
Thesereciprocal "permissions"68constitutea spatially
ratherthanfunctionally
differentiatedworld-a worldin whichfieldsof practiceconstitute and are
organizedaround"domestic"and "international" spacesratherthanaround
the performance of particularactivities.69
The locationof the boundaries
betweenthesespacesis ofcoursesometimes contested,warbeingonepractice
through whichstatesnegotiatethetermsoftheirindividuality. Butthisdoes
notchangethefactthatitisonlyinvirtue ofmutualrecognition thatstateshave
68. Haskell Fain, NormativePoliticsand the Community of Nations (Philadelphia: Temple

University Press,1987).
69. This is the intersubjectivebasis for the principleof functionalnondifferentiation among
states,which "drops out" of Waltz's definitionof structurebecause the latterhas no explicit
intersubjective basis. In internationalrelationsscholarship,the social productionof territorial
space has been emphasizedprimarily bypoststructuralists.See, forexample,RichardAshley,"The
Geopoliticsof Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics,"
Alternatives12 (October 1987), pp. 403-34; and Simon Dalby, Creatingthe Second Cold War
(London: Pinter,1990). But the idea of space as both productand constituentof practiceis also
prominent in structurationist
discourse.See Giddens,CentralProblemsinSocial Theory;and Derek
Gregoryand JohnUrry,eds.,Social Relationsand SpatialStructures (London: Macmillan,1985).

Anarchy 413
This recognitionfunctionsas a formof "social

"territorialpropertyrights."70
closure" thatdisempowersnonstateactorsand empowersand helps stabilize
interactionamongstates.71
Sovereignty normsare now so takenforgranted,so natural,thatit is easyto
overlooktheextentto whichtheyare bothpresupposedbyand an ongoingarti-
factof practice.When statestax "their""citizens"and not others,when they
"protect"theirmarketsagainstforeign"imports,"whentheykillthousandsof
Iraqis in one kindofwar and thenrefuseto "intervene"to killevenone person
in anotherkind,a "civil"war,and whentheyfighta globalwar againsta regime
that soughtto destroythe institutionof sovereignty and then give Germany
back to the Germans,theyare actingagainstthe backgroundof,and thereby
reproducing, sharednormsaboutwhatitmeansto be a sovereignstate.
If statesstoppedactingon thosenorms,theiridentityas "sovereigns"(ifnot
necessarilyas "states") would disappear. The sovereignstate is an ongoing
accomplishmentof practice,not a once-and-for-allcreation of normsthat
somehow exist apart frompractice.72Thus, sayingthat "the institutionof
sovereignty transformsidentities"is shorthandforsayingthat"regularprac-
tices produce mutuallyconstitutingsovereignidentities(agents) and their
associatedinstitutionalnorms(structures)."Practiceis thecore ofconstructiv-
istresolutionsoftheagent-structure problem.This ongoingprocessmaynotbe
politicallyproblematicin particularhistoricalcontextsand, indeed, once a
communityof mutual recognitionis constituted,its members-even the
disadvantagedones73 mayhave a vestedinterestin reproducingit.In fact,this
is part of what havingan identitymeans. But this identityand institution
remaindependenton what actors do: removingthose practiceswill remove
theirintersubjectiveconditionsofexistence.
70. See JohnRuggie,"Continuityand Transformation in theWorldPolity:Towarda Neorealist

Synthesis,"WorldPolitics35 (January1983), pp. 261-85. In Mind,Self,and Society,p. 161,Mead
offersthefollowing argument:"Ifwe say'thisis myproperty, I shallcontrolit,'thataffirmationcalls
out a certainset ofresponseswhichmustbe thesame in anycommunity in whichpropertyexists.It
involvesan organizedattitudewithreferenceto property whichis commonto all membersof the
community. One musthave a definiteattitudeof controlof his own propertyand respectforthe
property ofothers.Those attitudes(as organizedsetsofresponses)mustbe thereon thepartofall,
so thatwhenone sayssuch a thinghe calls out in himselfthe responseof the others.That which
makessocietypossibleis suchcommonresponses."
71. For a definitionand discussionof "social closure," see RaymondMurphy,Social Closure
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1988).
72. See Richard Ashley,"Untyingthe SovereignState: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique,"Millennium17 (Summer1988), pp. 227-62. Those withmoremodernistsensibili-
ties will findan equally practice-centric
view of institutionsin Blumer'sobservationon p. 19 of
"The MethodologicalPosition of SymbolicInteractionism":"A gratuitousacceptance of the
conceptsof norms,values,social rulesand the like should notblindthe social scientistto the fact
thatanyone ofthemis subtendedbya processofsocial interaction-a processthatis necessarynot
onlyfortheirchangebut equallywell fortheirretentionin a fixedform.It is the social processin
grouplifethatcreatesand upholdstherules,nottherulesthatcreateand upholdgrouplife."
73. See, forexample,MohammedAyoob, "The Third World in the Systemof States: Acute
Schizophreniaor GrowingPains?" International StudiesQuarterly 33 (March 1989),pp. 67-80.

This may tell us somethingabout how institutions of sovereignstates are

reproduced throughsocial interaction,but it does not tell us why such a
structureof identityand interestwould arise in thefirstplace. Two conditions
would seem necessaryfor this to happen: (1) the densityand regularityof
interactionsmustbe sufficiently highand (2) actorsmustbe dissatisfiedwith
preexisting formsofidentity and interaction.Giventheseconditions,a normof
mutualrecognitionis relativelyundemandingin termsof social trust,having
the form of an assurance game in which a player will acknowledge the
sovereignty of the othersas long as theywillin turnacknowledgethatplayer's
own sovereignty.Articulatinginternationallegal principlessuch as those
embodiedin thePeace ofAugsburg(1555) and thePeace ofWestphalia(1648)
mayalso help byestablishingexplicitcriteriafordetermining violationsof the
nascent social consensus.74 But whethersuch a consensusholds depends on
whatstatesdo. If theytreateach otheras iftheyweresovereign,thenovertime
theywill institutionalize that mode of subjectivity; if theydo not, then that
mode willnotbecome thenorm.
Practicesof sovereignty willtransformunderstandings of securityand power
politicsin at least threeways.First,stateswill come to definetheir(and our)
securityin termsof preservingtheir"propertyrights"over particularterrito-
ries.We now see thisas natural,but the preservationof territorial frontiersis
not,in fact,equivalentto the survivalof the stateor itspeople. Indeed, some
states would probably be more secure if they would relinquish certain
territories-the"Soviet Union" of some minority republics,"Yugoslavia" of
Croatia and Slovenia, Israel of the West Bank, and so on. The fact that
sovereignty practiceshave historicallybeen orientedtowardproducingdistinct
spaces, in otherwords,affectsstates'conceptualizationofwhatthey
territorial
must"secure" to functionin thatidentity, a processthatmayhelp accountfor
the"hardening"ofterritorial boundariesoverthecenturies.75
Second, to the extentthatstatessuccessfully internalizesovereignty norms,
theywill be more respectfultoward the territorialrightsof others.76This
restraintis not primarily because of the costs of violatingsovereignty norms,
althoughwhen violatorsdo get punished (as in the Gulf War) it reminds
everyoneofwhatthesecostscan be, butbecause partofwhatit means to be a
74. See WilliamCoplin,"InternationalLaw and AssumptionsAbout the State System,"World

Politics17 (July1965),pp. 615-34.
75. See AnthonySmith,"States and Homelands: The Social and GeopoliticalImplicationsof
NationalTerritory," Millennium10 (Autumn1981),pp. 187-202.
76. This assumesthatthereare no other,competing,principlesthatorganizepoliticalspace and
identityin the internationalsystemand coexistwithtraditionalnotionsof sovereignty;in fact,of
course, there are. On "spheres of influence"and "informalempires," see Jan Triska, ed.,
DominantPowersand Subordinate States(Durham,N.C.: Duke University
Press,1986); and Ronald
Robinson,"The ExcentricIdea ofImperialism,Withor WithoutEmpire,"in WolfgangMommsen
and JurgenOsterhammel,eds., Imperialismand After:Continuities and Discontinuities(London:
Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 267-89. On Arab conceptionsof sovereignty, see Michael Barnett,
"Sovereignty, and Identity:From Pan-Arabismto the Arab State System,"unpub-
Institutions,
lishedmanuscript, UniversityofWisconsin,Madison,1991.

Anarchy 415
''sovereign''state is that one does not violate the territorialrightsof others

without"just cause." A clear exampleof such an institutional effect,convinc-
inglyargued by David Strang,is the markedlydifferent treatmentthatweak
states receivewithinand outside communitiesof mutualrecognition.77 What
keeps theUnitedStatesfromconqueringtheBahamas,or Nigeriafromseizing
Togo, or AustraliafromoccupyingVanuatu? Clearly,power is not the issue,
and in thesecases eventhecostofsanctionswouldprobablybe negligible.One
mightargue thatgreatpowerssimplyhave no "interest"in these conquests,
and thismightbe so, butthislack ofinterestcan onlybe understoodin termsof
theirrecognition ofweak states'sovereignty.
I haveno interestin exploitingmy
friends, notbecause oftherelativecostsand benefitsofsuchactionbutbecause
theyare myfriends.The absence of recognition,in turn,helps explain the
Westernstates' practicesof territorialconquest,enslavement,and genocide
against Native American and Africanpeoples. It is in thatworld that only
powermatters,nottheworldof today.
Finally,to theextentthattheirongoingsocializationteachesstatesthattheir
sovereignty dependson recognition byotherstates,theycan affordto relymore
on the institutionalfabric of internationalsociety and less on individual
national means-especially militarypower-to protect their security.The
intersubjective understandings embodied in the institution of sovereignty,in
otherwords,mayredefinethemeaningof others'powerforthe securityof the
self.In policyterms,thismeansthatstatescan be less worriedaboutshort-term
survivaland relativepower and can thus shifttheir resources accordingly.
Ironically,it is the greatpowers,the stateswiththe greatestnationalmeans,
thatmayhave the hardesttimelearningthislesson; smallpowersdo not have
the luxuryof relyingon nationalmeans and maythereforelearn fasterthat
collectiverecognitionis a cornerstoneofsecurity.
None of this is to say that power becomes irrelevantin a communityof
sovereignstates. Sometimes states are threatenedby others that do not
recognize their existence or particularterritorialclaims, that resent the
externalitiesfromtheireconomic policies, and so on. But most of the time,
thesethreatsare playedoutwithinthetermsofthesovereignty game.The fates
of Napoleon and Hitlershowwhathappenswhentheyare not.
Cooperation among egoists and transformationsof identity

We began this sectionwitha Hobbesian state of nature.Cooperationfor
joint gain is extremelydifficultin this context,since trustis lacking,time
horizonsare short,and relativepowerconcernsare high.Lifeis "nasty,brutish,
and short." Sovereigntytransformsthis systeminto a Lockean world of
(mostly)mutuallyrecognizedpropertyrightsand (mostly)egoisticratherthan
77. David Strang,"Anomalyand Commonplacein European Expansion: Realist and Institu-

tionalAccounts,"IntemationalOrganization
45 (Spring1991),pp. 143-62.

competitiveconceptionsof security, reducingthe fearthatwhatstatesalready

have willbe seized at anymomentbypotentialcollaborators,therebyenabling
themto contemplatemoredirectformsof cooperation.A necessarycondition
forsuchcooperationis thatoutcomesbe positively interdependentin thesense
thatpotentialgains existwhichcannotbe realized byunilateralaction.States
such as Brazil and Botswanamayrecognizeeach other'ssovereignty, but they
need furtherincentivesto engage in joint action. One importantsource of
incentivesis the growing"dynamicdensity"of interactionamong statesin a
world with new communicationstechnology,nuclear weapons, externalities
fromindustrialdevelopment,and so on.78Unfortunately, growingdynamic
densitydoes not ensurethatstateswill in factrealizejoint gains; interdepen-
dence also entailsvulnerability and the riskof being "the sucker,"whichif
exploitedwillbecome a sourceofconflictratherthancooperation.
This is therationaleforthefamiliarassumptionthategoisticstateswilloften
findthemselvesfacingprisoners'dilemma,a game in which the dominant
strategy,if played only once, is to defect. As Michael Taylor and Robert
Axelrodhave shown,however,giveniterationand a sufficient shadow of the
future,egoists using a tit-for-tat strategycan escape this result and build
cooperativeinstitutions.79 The storytheytell about thisprocesson the surface
seems quite similar to George Herbert Mead's constructivist analysis of
interaction, partof whichis also told in termsof "games."8"Cooperationis a
gestureindicatingego's willingnessto cooperate; if alter defects,ego does
likewise,signalingits unwillingnessto be exploited;over time and through
reciprocalplay,each learns to formrelativelystable expectationsabout the
other'sbehavior,and throughthese,habitsofcooperation(or defection)form.
Despite similarconcernswithcommunication, learning,and habit-formation,
however,there is an importantdifferencebetween the game-theoreticand
constructivist analysisof interactionthatbears on how we conceptualizethe
causal powersofinstitutions.
In the traditionalgame-theoretic analysisof cooperation,even an iterated
one, the structureof the game-of identitiesand interests-is exogenousto
interactionand, as such, does not change.8'A "black box" is put around
identity- and interest-formation, and analysisfocusesinsteadon the relation-
78. On "dynamicdensity,"see Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation in the World Polity";

and Waltz, "Reflectionson Theoryof IntemationalPolitics." The role of interdependencein
conditioningthe speed and depthof social learningis muchgreaterthanthe attentionto whichI
have paid it. On the consequences of interdependenceunder anarchy,see Helen Milner,"The
Assumptionof Anarchyin InternationalRelations Theory:A Critique,"Reviewof Intemational
Studies17 (January1991),pp. 67-85.
79. See Michael Taylor,Anarchyand Cooperation(New York: Wiley, 1976); and Robert
Axelrod,TheEvolutionofCooperation(New York: Basic Books, 1984).
80. Mead, Mind,Self and Society.
81. Strictlyspeaking,thisis not true,since in iteratedgames the additionof futurebenefitsto
currentones changesthepayoff ofthegame at Ti, in thiscase fromprisoners'dilemmato
structure
an assurancegame. This transformation of interesttakesplace entirelywithinthe actor,however,
and as such is nota functionof interaction
withtheother.

Anarchy 417
ship betweenexpectationsand behavior.The normsthatevolvefrominterac-

tion are treatedas rules and behavioralregularitieswhichare externalto the
actorsand whichresistchangebecause of thetransactioncostsofcreatingnew
ones. The game-theoreticanalysisof cooperation among egoists is at base
behavioral.
A constructivistanalysisof cooperation,in contrast,would concentrateon
howthe expectationsproducedbybehavioraffectidentitiesand interests.The
process of creatinginstitutions is one of internalizingnew understandings of
self and other,of acquiringnew role identities,not just of creatingexternal
constraintson the behaviorof exogenouslyconstitutedactors.82Even if not
intended as such, in other words, the process by which egoists learn to
cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing theirinterestsin
termsof shared commitments to social norms.Over time,this will tend to
transform a positiveinterdependenceof outcomesinto a positiveinterdepen-
dence ofutilitiesor collectiveinterestorganizedaroundthe normsin question.
These normswillresistchangebecause theyare tiedto actors'commitments to
their identitiesand interests,not merelybecause of transactioncosts. A
constructivistanalysisof "the cooperationproblem,"in otherwords,is at base
cognitiveratherthanbehavioral,since it treatsthe intersubjective knowledge
that defines the structureof identitiesand interests,of the "game," as
endogenousto and instantiated byinteractionitself.
The debate over the futureof collectivesecurityin WesternEurope may
illustratethe significanceof this difference.A weak liberal or rationalist
analysiswould assume thatthe European states' "portfolio"of interestshas
notfundamentally changedand thatthe emergenceof newfactors,such as the
collapse of the Soviet threat and the rise of Germany,would alter their
cost-benefit ratiosforpursuingcurrentarrangements, therebycausingexisting
institutionsto break down.The European statesformedcollaborativeinstitu-
tionsforgood, exogenouslyconstitutedegoisticreasons,and the same reasons
maylead themto rejectthoseinstitutions; thegameofEuropean powerpolitics
has not changed. A strongliberal or constructivist analysisof this problem
would suggestthat four decades of cooperation may have transformeda
positiveinterdependenceof outcomesintoa collective"European identity"in
termsofwhichstatesincreasingly Even ifegoistic
definetheir"self"-interests.83
reasons were its startingpoint,the process of cooperatingtends to redefine
those reasons by reconstituting identitiesand interestsin terms of new
intersubjective understandings and commitments. Changes in the distribution
ofpowerduringthelate twentieth centuryare undoubtedlya challengeto these
new understandings, but it is not as if West European states have some
ofnormsis a real possibility

82. In fairnessto Axelrod,he does pointout thatinternalization that
mayincreasethe resilienceof institutions.My pointis thatthisimportantidea cannotbe derived
froman approachto theorythattakesidentitiesand interestsas exogenouslygiven.
83. On "European identity,"see BarryBuzan et al., eds., The EuropeanSecurityOrderRecast
(London: Pinter,1990),pp. 45-63.

inherent,exogenouslygiveninterestin abandoningcollectivesecurityif the

priceis right.Theiridentitiesand securityinterestsare continuously
in process,
and if collectiveidentitiesbecome "embedded," theywill be as resistantto
change as egoistic ones.84Through participationin new formsof social
knowledge,in otherwords,theEuropean statesof 1990mightno longerbe the
statesof 1950.
Critical strategictheoryand collective security

The transformation of identityand interestthroughan "evolution of
cooperation"faces two importantconstraints.The firstis thatthe process is
incrementaland slow. Actors' objectivesin such a process are typicallyto
realize joint gainswithinwhat theytake to be a relativelystable context,and
theyare thereforeunlikelyto engage in substantialreflectionabout how to
changetheparametersofthatcontext(includingthestructure ofidentitiesand
interests)and unlikelyto pursue policies specifically designedto bringabout
such changes. Learningto cooperate may change those parameters,but this
occurs as an unintendedconsequence of policies pursued for other reasons
ratherthanas a resultofintentionalefforts to transcendexistinginstitutions.
A second,morefundamental, constraintis thatthe evolutionofcooperation
storypresupposes that actors do not identifynegativelywith one another.
Actors mustbe concernedprimarilywithabsolute gains; to the extentthat
antipathyand distrustlead themto definetheirsecurityin relativistic terms,it
will be hard to accept the vulnerabilitiesthat attend cooperation.85 This is
importantbecause it is preciselythe "centralbalance" in the statesystemthat
seems to be so oftenafflicted withsuch competitivethinking, and realistscan
thereforeargue that the possibilityof cooperationwithinone "pole" (for
example,theWest) is parasiticon thedominanceofcompetitionbetweenpoles
(the East-West conflict).Relations between the poles may be amenable to
some positivereciprocity in areas such as armscontrol,but the atmosphereof
distrustleaves littleroom forsuch cooperationand its transformative conse-
quences.86The conditionsof negativeidentification thatmake an "evolutionof
cooperation"mostneeded workpreciselyagainstsucha logic.
This seemingly intractablesituationmaynevertheless be amenableto quite a
different logic of transformation, one drivenmoreby self-consciousefforts to
change structuresof identityand interestthan by unintendedconsequences.
Such voluntarismmay seem to contradictthe spiritof constructivism, since
84. On "embeddedness,"see JohnRuggie,"InternationalRegimes,Transactions,and Change:

Embedded Liberalismin a Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner,IntemationalRegimes,pp.
195-232.
85. See Grieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsof Cooperation."
86. On the difficulties
of creatingcooperativesecurityregimesgivencompetitiveinterests,see
Robert Jervis,"SecurityRegimes," in Krasner,IntemationalRegimes,pp. 173-94; and Charles
Lipson,"InternationalCooperationin Economicand SecurityAffairs,"WorldPolitics37 (October
1984),pp. 1-23.

Anarchy 419
would-berevolutionaries are presumablythemselveseffectsof socializationto

structures of identityand interest.How can theythinkabout changingthatto
whichtheyowe theiridentity? The possibility
lies in thedistinctionbetweenthe
social determinationof the self and the personal determinationof choice,
betweenwhat Mead called the "me" and the "."87 The "me" is thatpart of
subjectivitywhichis definedin termsof others;the characterand behavioral
expectationsof a person'srole identityas "professor,"or of the United States
as "leader of the alliance,"forexample,are sociallyconstituted.Roles are not
played in mechanicalfashionaccordingto precise scripts,however,but are
"taken" and adapted in idiosyncratic waysby each actor.88Even in the most
constrainedsituations,roleperformance involvesa choicebytheactor.The "I"
is the partof subjectivityin whichthisappropriationand reactionto roles and
itscorresponding existentialfreedomlie.
The factthatrolesare "taken" meansthat,in principle,actorsalwayshave a
capacityfor"characterplanning"-for engagingin criticalself-reflection and
choicesdesignedto bringaboutchangesin theirlives.89 Butwhenor underwhat
conditionscan thiscreativecapacitybe exercised?Clearly,muchof the timeit
cannot:ifactorswereconstantly reinventingtheiridentities,social orderwould
be impossible,and the relativestabilityof identitiesand interestsin the real
worldis indicativeof our propensityforhabitualratherthan creativeaction.
The exceptional,conscious choosingto transform or transcendroles has at
least two preconditions.First,theremustbe a reason to thinkof oneselfin
novel terms.This would most likelystem fromthe presence of new social
situationsthat cannot be managed in termsof preexistingself-conceptions.
Second, the expectedcostsof intentionalrole change-the sanctionsimposed
byotherswithwhomone interactedin previousroles-cannot be greaterthan
itsrewards.
When these conditionsare present,actorscan engage in self-reflection and
practicespecificallydesigned to transform theiridentitiesand interestsand
thus to "change the games" in which they are embedded. Such "critical"
strategictheoryand practice has not received the attentionit meritsfrom
studentsof world politics (another legacy of exogenouslygiven interests
perhaps), particularlygiven that one of the most importantphenomena in
contemporary worldpolitics,MikhailGorbachev'spolicyof"New Thinking,"is
87. See Mead, Mind, Self and Society.For useful discussions of this distinctionand its
implicationsfor notions of creativityin social systems,see George Cronk, The Philosophical
Anthropology of GeorgeHerbertMead (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 36-40; and Howard,
"From ChangingSelves TowardChangingSociety."
88. Turner,"Role-Taking."
89. On "characterplanning,"see JonElster,SourGrapes:StudiesintheSubversion ofRationality
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1983), p. 117. For otherapproachesto the problemof
change,see HarryFrankfurt,
self-initiated "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,"
JoumalofPhilosophy 68 (January1971),pp. 5-20; AmartyaSen, "Rational Fools: A Critiqueofthe
BehavioralFoundationsofEconomicTheory,"Philosophy and PublicAffairs
6 (Summer1977), pp.
317-44; and Thomas Schelling,"The IntimateContestforSelf-Command,"ThePublicInterest 60
(Summer1980), pp. 94-118.

arguablypreciselythat.90 Let me thereforeuse thispolicyas an exampleofhow

states mighttransform a competitivesecuritysysteminto a cooperativeone,
dividingthetransformative processintofourstages.
The firststage in intentionaltransformation is the breakdownof consensus
aboutidentity commitments. In theSovietcase, identity commitments centered
on the Leninisttheoryof imperialism,withits belief that relationsbetween
capitalistand socialiststates are inherentlyconflictual,and on the alliance
patternsthat thisbelief engendered.In the 1980s,the consensuswithinthe
Soviet Union over the Leninisttheorybroke down for a varietyof reasons,
principalamong which seem to have been the state's inabilityto meet the
economic-technological-military challenge fromthe West, the government's
declineofpoliticallegitimacy at home,and thereassurancefromtheWestthat
it did not intendto invade the Soviet Union, a reassurancethatreduced the
externalcosts of role change.9"These factorspaved the way for a radical
leadershiptransitionand for a subsequent"unfreezingof conflictschemas"
concerningrelationswiththeWest.92
The breakdownof consensus makes possible a second stage of critical
examinationof old ideas about self and other and, by extension,of the
structures of interactionbywhichthe ideas have been sustained.In periodsof
relativelystable role identities,ideas and structuresmaybecome reifiedand
thustreatedas thingsthatexistindependently ofsocial action.If so, thesecond
stage is one of denaturalization,of identifying the practicesthat reproduce
seeminglyinevitableideas about selfand other;to thatextent,it is a formof
"critical"ratherthan"problem-solving" theory.93The resultof such a critique
should be an identification of new "possible selves" and aspirations.94 New
90. For usefuloverviewsofNew Thinking,see MikhailGorbachev,Perestroika: New Thinking for

Our Country and theWorld(New York: Harper & Row, 1987); Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert
Cruickshank,ThinkingNew About Soviet "New Thinking"(Berkeley:Instituteof International
Studies,1989); and Allen Lynch,Gorbachev'sIntemational Originsand Political
Outlook:Intellectual
Consequences(New York: InstituteforEast-West SecurityStudies,1989). It is not clear to what
extentNew Thinkingis a consciouspolicyas opposed to an ad hoc policy.The intensetheoretical
and policydebate withinthe Soviet Union over New Thinkingand the frequently statedidea of
takingawaythe Western"excuse" forfearingthe SovietUnion bothsuggesttheformer, but I will
remainagnostichere and simplyassumethatitcan be fruitfully interpreted"as if' it had the form
thatI describe.
91. For useful overviewsof these factors,see Jack Snyder,"The Gorbachev Revolution:A
Waningof Soviet Expansionism?"WorldPolitics12 (Winter1987-88), pp. 93-121; and Stephen
Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinkingon Security,"
Intemational Security13 (Fall 1988),pp. 124-63.
92. See Daniel Bar-Tal et al., "ConflictTermination:An EpistemologicalAnalysisof Interna-
tional Cases," PoliticalPsychology 10 (June 1989), pp. 233-55. For an unrelatedbut interesting
illustrationof how changingcognitionsin turnmake possible organizationalchange, see Jean
Bartunek,"ChangingInterpretive Schemes and OrganizationalRestructuring: The Example of a
ReligiousOrder,"Administrative ScienceQuarterly29 (September1984),pp. 355-72.
93. See RobertCox, "Social Forces,States and WorldOrders:BeyondInternationalRelations
Theory,"in Keohane, Neorealismand Its Critics,pp. 204-55. See also Brian Fay, CriticalSocial
Science(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press,1987).
94. Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius,"Possible Selves,"AmericanPsychologist 41 (September
1986),pp. 954-69.

Anarchy 421
Thinkingembodiessuchcriticaltheorizing.Gorbachevwantsto freetheSoviet
Union fromthe coercivesocial logic of the cold war and engage the West in
far-reaching cooperation.Toward thisend, he has rejectedthe Leninistbelief
in the inherentconflictof interestbetweensocialistand capitaliststatesand,
perhapsmoreimportant, has recognizedthe crucialrole thatSovietaggressive
practicesplayedin sustainingthatconflict.
Such rethinking paves the way for a thirdstage of new practice.In most
cases, itis notenoughto rethinkone's ownideas aboutselfand other,sinceold
identitieshave been sustainedby systemsof interactionwithother actors,the
practicesofwhichremaina social factforthetransformative agent.In orderto
changetheself,then,itis oftennecessaryto changetheidentitiesand interests
of the othersthat help sustainthose systemsof interaction.The vehicle for
inducingsuch change is one's own practiceand, in particular,the practiceof
"altercasting"-a techniqueof interactorcontrolin whichego uses tacticsof
self-presentationand stage managementin an attempt to frame alter's
definitions of social situationsin waysthatcreate the role whichego desires
alterto play.95 In effect,in altercasting
ego triesto inducealterto takeon a new
identity (and therebyenlistalterin ego's effort to changeitself)bytreatingalter
as ifit alreadyhad that identity.The logic of this followsdirectlyfromthe
mirrortheoryof identity-formation, in whichalter'sidentityis a reflectionof
ego's practices; change those practices and ego begins to change alter's
conceptionofitself.
What these practicesshould consistof depends on the logic by whichthe
preexistingidentitieswere sustained. Competitivesecuritysystemsare sus-
tainedbypracticesthatcreateinsecurity and distrust.In thiscase, transforma-
tivepracticesshould attemptto teach otherstatesthatone's own statecan be
trustedand shouldnotbe viewedas a threatto theirsecurity. The fastestwayto
do this is to make unilateral initiativesand self-bindingcommitmentsof
sufficient significancethat another state is faced with "an offerit cannot
refuse."96 Gorbachevhas triedto do thisbywithdrawing fromAfghanistan and
Eastern Europe, implementing asymmetric cuts in nuclear and conventional
forces,callingfor"defensivedefense,"and so on. In addition,he has skillfully
cast the West in the role of beingmorallyrequiredto giveaid and comfortto
the Soviet Union, has emphasized the bonds of commonfate between the
Soviet Union and the West, and has indicated that furtherprogress in
95. See Goffman,The Presentationof Self in EverydayLife; Eugene Weinstein and Paul
Deutschberger,"Some Dimensionsof Altercasting," Sociometry 26 (December 1963), pp. 454-66;
and WalterEarle, "InternationalRelations and the Psychologyof Control:AlternativeControl
Strategiesand TheirConsequences,"PoliticalPsychology 7 (June1986),pp. 369-75.
96. See Volker Boge and Peter Wilke,"Peace Movementsand UnilateralDisarmament:Old
Conceptsin a New Light,"ArmsControl7 (September1986), pp. 156-70; Zeev Maoz and Daniel
Felsenthal,"Self-BindingCommitments, the Inducementof Trust,Social Choice, and theTheory
of InternationalCooperation,"IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 31 (June1987), pp. 177-200; and V.
Sakamoto,"UnilateralInitiativeas an AlternativeStrategy,"WorldFutures,vol. 24, nos. 1-4, 1987,
pp. 107-34.

422 International
Organization
East-Westrelations is contingent upontheWestassuming theidentitybeing

projected ontoit.Theseactionsarealldimensions ofaltercasting,
theintention
ofwhichis totakeawaytheWestern "excuse"fordistrustingtheSovietUnion,
which,in Gorbachev's view,has helpedsustaincompetitive in the
identities
past.
Yet bythemselves suchpracticescannottransform a competitivesecurity
system, sinceiftheyare notreciprocated byalter,theywillexposeego to a
"sucker"payoff and quickly witheron thevine.In orderforcriticalstrategic
practiceto transform competitive it mustbe "rewarded"byalter,
identities,
whichwillencourage moresuchpractice byego,andso on.97 Overtime,thiswill
institutionalize
a positiveratherthana negativeidentification betweenthe
securityofselfandotherandwillthereby providea firm intersubjective
basis
forwhatwereinitially tentative commitments tonewidentities andinterests.98
Notwithstanding today'srhetoric abouttheendofthecoldwar,skeptics may
stilldoubtwhether Gorbachev (orsomefuture leader)willsucceedinbuilding
an intersubjective
basisfora newSoviet(or Russian)roleidentity. Thereare
important domestic,bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological
sourcesof resis-
tancein bothEast and Westto sucha change,nottheleastofwhichis the
shakinessof the democratic forces'domesticposition.But if myargument
abouttheroleofintersubjective knowledge in creatingcompetitivestructures
of identityand interestis right,thenat leastNew Thinking showsa greater
appreciation-conscious or not-forthedeepstructure ofpowerpoliticsthan
weareaccustomed toininternational relationspractice.
Conclusion
All theoriesof international

relationsare based on social theoriesof the
relationship
betweenagency, process,and socialstructure.
Socialtheoriesdo
notdetermine thecontentofourinternational buttheydo structure
theorizing,
thequestionswe ask aboutworldpoliticsand our approachesto answering
thosequestions.Thesubstantive
issueat stakeindebatesaboutsocialtheory is
whatkindoffoundation offers
themostfruitful setofquestionsandresearch
forexplaining
strategies therevolutionarychangesthatseemtobe occurring in
the late twentiethcenturyinternationalsystem.Put simply,whatshould
systemictheoriesof international relationslook like? How should they
conceptualizetherelationship
betweenstructure andprocess?Shouldtheybe
97. On rewards,see Thomas Milburn and Daniel Christie,"Rewarding in International

Politics,"PoliticalPsychology10 (December 1989),pp. 625-45.
98. The importanceof reciprocity in completingtheprocessof structuraltransformation makes
the logic in thisstage similarto thatin the "evolutionof cooperation."The differenceis one of
prerequisitesand objective:in the former,ego's tentativeredefinition
of selfenables it to tryand
changealterbyacting"as if"bothwere alreadyplayinga new game; in the latter,ego acts onlyon
the basis of given interestsand prior experience,with transformation emergingonly as an
unintendedconsequence.

Anarchy 423
based exclusivelyon "microeconomic"analogies in which identitiesand

interestsare exogenouslygiven by structureand process is reduced to
interactionswithin those parameters? Or should they also be based on
"sociological" and "social psychological"analogies in which identitiesand
interestsand thereforethe meaningof structureare endogenousto process?
Should a behavioral-individualism or a cognitive-constructivism
be thebasis for
systemictheoriesofworldpolitics?
This articlenotwithstanding, thisquestionis ultimatelyan empiricalone in
two respects.First,its answerdepends in part on how importantinteraction
amongstatesis fortheconstitution oftheiridentitiesand interests.On theone
hand, it maybe that domesticor geneticfactors,whichI have systematically
bracketed,are in factmuchmore importantdeterminants of states'identities
and intereststhan are systemicfactors.To the extentthat this is true,the
individualism of a rationalistapproachand theinherentprivileging ofstructure
over process in this approach become more substantivelyappropriatefor
systemictheory(if notforfirst- and second-imagetheory),since identitiesand
interestsare infactlargelyexogenousto interactionamongstates.On theother
hand,ifthebracketedfactorsare relatively unimportant or iftheimportanceof
the internationalsystemvarieshistorically (perhapswiththe level of dynamic
densityand interdependencein the system),thensuch a framework would not
be appropriateas an exclusivefoundationforgeneralsystemictheory.
Second,the answerto thequestionaboutwhatsystemictheoriesshouldlook
like also depends on how easilystate identitiesand interestscan change as a
result of systemicinteraction.Even if interactionis initiallyimportantin
constructing identitiesand interests,once institutionalizeditslogic maymake
transformation extremely If the meaningof structureforstate action
difficult.
changesso slowlythatit becomes a de factoparameterwithinwhichprocess
takes place, then it may again be substantivelyappropriateto adopt the
rationalistassumptionthatidentitiesand interestsare given(althoughagain,
thismayvaryhistorically).
We cannot address these empirical issues, however,unless we have a
framework fordoingsystemicresearchthatmakesstateidentity and interestan
issue forboththeoreticaland empiricalinquiry.Let me emphasizethatthisis
notto saywe shouldnevertreatidentitiesand interestsas given.The framing of
problems and research strategiesshould be question-drivenrather than
method-driven, and ifwe are notinterestedin identity-and interest-formation,
we may findthe assumptionsof a rationalistdiscourseperfectlyreasonable.
Nothingin this article,in other words, should be taken as an attack on
rationalismper se. By the same token, however,we should not let this
legitimateanalyticalstancebecome a de factoontologicalstancewithrespect
to thecontentofthird-image theory,at leastnotuntilafterwe have determined
thatsystemicinteractiondoes not play an importantrole in processesof state
identity-and interest-formation. We should not choose our philosophical
anthropologies and social theories prematurely.By arguingthat we cannot

derive a self-helpstructureof identityand interestfromthe principleof

anarchyalone-by arguingthatanarchyis whatstatesmake of it-this article
has challengedone importantjustification forignoringprocesses of identity-
and interest-formation in world politics.As such, it helps set the stage for
inquiryinto the empiricalissues raised above and thus for a debate about
whethercommunitarian or individualistassumptionsare a betterfoundation
forsystemictheory.
I have triedto indicatebycrudeexamplewhatsuch a researchagenda might
look like. Its objectiveshould be to assess the causal relationshipbetween
practiceand interaction(as independentvariable) and thecognitivestructures
at the level of individualstates and of systemsof states which constitute
identitiesand interests(as dependent variable)-that is, the relationship
betweenwhatactorsdo and whattheyare. We mayhave some a priorinotion
thatstate actorsand systemicstructuresare "mutuallyconstitutive," but this
tells us littlein the absence of an understandingof how the mechanicsof
dyadic,triadic,and n-actorinteractionshape and are in turnshaped by"stocks
of knowledge"that collectivelyconstituteidentitiesand interestsand, more
broadly,constitutethestructures ofinternationallife.Particularlyimportant in
thisrespectis the role of practicein shapingattitudestowardthe "givenness"
of these structures. How and whydo actorsreifysocial structures, and under
whatconditionsdo theydenaturalizesuchreifications?
The state-centrism ofthisagenda maystrikesome,particularly postmodern-
ists,as "depressingly The significance
familiar."99 of statesrelativeto multina-
tionalcorporations, newsocialmovements, transnationals,and intergovernmen-
tal organizationsis clearlydeclining,and "postmodern"formsofworldpolitics
meritmoreresearchattentionthantheyhave received.But I also believe,with
realists,that in the mediumrun sovereignstates will remain the dominant
politicalactorsin the international system.Anytransition to new structuresof
globalpoliticalauthority and identity-to"postinternational" politics-willbe
mediatedby and path-dependenton the particularinstitutional resolutionof
the tensionbetweenunityand diversity, or particularism and universality,that
is the sovereignstate.100
In such a worldthereshouldcontinueto be a place for
theoriesof anarchicinterstatepolitics,alongsideotherformsof international
theory;to thatextent,I am a statistand a realist.I have arguedin thisarticle,
however,thatstatismneed not be bound by realistideas about what "state"
mustmean.Stateidentitiesand interestscan be collectively transformed within
an anarchic context by many factors-individual,domestic, systemic,or
transnational-and as such are an importantdependent variable. Such a
99. Yale Fergusonand Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebrationand Despair: Constructive

SuggestionsforFutureInternationalTheory,"Intermational StudiesQuarterly 35 (December 1991),
p.375.
100. For excellentdiscussionsof thistension,see Walker,"Sovereignty, Identity,Community";
and R. B. J.Walker,"Security,Sovereignty, and the Challengeof WorldPolitics,"Altematives 15
(Winter1990), pp. 3-27. On institutionalpath dependencies,see StephenKrasner,"Sovereignty:
An Institutional
Perspective,"Comparative PoliticalStudies21 (April 1988),pp. 66-94.

Anarchy 425
reconstruction of state-centricinternationaltheoryis necessaryif we are to

theorize adequately about the emergingforms of transnationalpolitical
identitythatsovereignstateswillhelp bringintobeing.To thatextent,I hope
thatstatism,likethestate,can be historically progressive.
I have arguedthattheproponentsofstrongliberalismand theconstructivists
can and shouldjoin forcesin contributing to a process-oriented international
theory.Each grouphas characteristic weaknessesthat are complementedby
the other's strengths.In part because of the decision to adopt a choice-
theoreticapproach to theoryconstruction, neoliberalshave been unable to
translate their work on institution-building and complex learning into a
systemictheorythatescapes the explanatorypriority of realism'sconcernwith
structure.Their weakness, in other words, is a lingeringunwillingnessto
transcend,at the level of systemictheory,the individualistassumptionthat
identitiesand interestsare exogenouslygiven.Constructivists bringto thislack
of resolutiona systematiccommunitarianontologyin which intersubjective
knowledge constitutesidentities and interests.For their part, however,
constructivistshave oftendevotedtoo mucheffort to questionsofontologyand
constitution and notenougheffort to thecausal and empiricalquestionsofhow
identitiesand interestsare producedby practicein anarchicconditions.As a
result,theyhave nottakenon board neoliberalinsightsintolearningand social
cognition.
An attemptto use a structurationist-symbolic interactionistdiscourse to
bridge the two research traditions,neither of which subscribesto such a
discourse, will probably please no one. But in part this is because the two
"sides" havebecome hungup on differences overthe epistemologicalstatusof
social science. The state of the social sciences and, in particular,of interna-
tionalrelations,is such thatepistemologicalprescriptions and conclusionsare
at bestpremature.Different questionsinvolvedifferent standardsofinference;
to reject certain questions because their answers cannot conformto the
standardsof classical physicsis to fall into the trap of method-driven rather
thanquestion-driven social science.By the same token,however,givingup the
artificialrestrictionsof logical positivistconceptionsof inquirydoes not force
us to giveup on "Science." Beyondthis,thereis littlereasonto attachso much
importanceto epistemology.Neither positivism,nor scientificrealism,nor
poststructuralism tells us about the structureand dynamicsof international
life. Philosophiesof science are not theoriesof internationalrelations.The
good news is thatstrongliberalsand modernand postmodernconstructivists
are asking broadly similar questions about the substance of international
relationsthatdifferentiate bothgroupsfromtheneorealist-rationalist alliance.
Strongliberalsand constructivists have muchto learn fromeach otherifthey
can come to see thisthroughthesmokeand heat ofepistemology.


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Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics

Author(s): Alexander Wendt

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

The debatebetweenrealistsand liberalshas reemergedas an axisofcontention

This articlewas negotiatedwithmanyindividuals.If myrecordsare complete(and apologiesif

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

agents generates outcomes. As such, rationalismoffersa fundamentally

3. Behavioral and rationalistmodels of man and institutionsshare a common intellectual

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6. See Nye, "Nuclear Learningand U.S.-Soviet SecurityRegimes"; Robert Jervis,"Realism,

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

With respect to the substance of international

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

"logic" of anarchyapart fromthe practicesthat create and instantiateone

Classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

In neorealism,however,therole ofpracticein shapingthecharacterofanarchy

18. The neorealist descriptionis not unproblematic.For a powerfulcritique, see David

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objects have for them.21States act differently towardenemies than theydo

21. See, forexample,HerbertBlumer,"The MethodologicalPositionofSymbolicInteractionism,"

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world," Peter Berger argues.24Each person has many identitieslinked to

24. Berger,"Identityas a Problemin theSociologyofKnowledge,"p. 111.

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

confusionmayresult.Thisseemsto be happening todayin theUnitedStates

28. In neo-Durkheimianparlance,institutions are "social representations."See Serge Moscov-

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

is upon thiscognitivevariationthatthemeaningofanarchyand thedistribution

JoumalofEconomicBehaviorand Organization 6 (June1985),pp. 161-76.The literatureon choice

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

34. On the spectrumof cooperativesecurityarrangements, see Charles Kupchan and Clifford

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

anarchy,statesin thestateofnaturenecessarilyface a "staghunt"or "security

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

proposes two mechanisms,competitionand socialization,by whichstructure

Anarchy and the social constructionofpower politics

41. Waltz,Theory ofInternational Politics,pp. 74-77.

This content downloaded on Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:40:05 AM

transform identitiesand intereststheywillbe "continuingobjectsofchoice" by

46. See RobertGrafstein,"Rational Choice: Theoryand Institutions," in KristenMonroe,ed.,

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physicalqualities,whichare in part contrivedby ego and whichinclude the

50. On the "stagecraft"involvedin "presentationsof self,"see ErvingGoffman,ThePresenta-

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State A with identities .(1) Stimulus requiring

It is throughreciprocalinteraction,in other words, that we create and

54. JeffCoulter,"Remarks on the Conceptualizationof Social Structure,"Philosophyof the

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thatother.55 Being treatedas an objectforthegratification

Predator states and anarchy as permissivecause

55. The followingarticlesby Noel Kaplowitz have made an importantcontributionto such

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maybecome predisposedtowardaggression.The aggressivebehaviorof these

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attributes of a "portfolio";statesmaybe competitivein some relationshipsand

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producedeterminateresultsat the expenseof systemictheory.A concernwith

Let us assumethatprocessesof identity- and interest-formationhave createda