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DATABASE SECURITY
UNIT-1
INTRODUCTION:
INTRODUCTION TO DATA BASE SECURITY PROBLEM
IN DATABASE SECURITY CONTROLS CONCLUSIONS:
Database security is a growing concern evidenced by an increase in the number of
reported incidents of loss of or unauthorized exposure to sensitive data. As the
amount of data collected, retained and shared electronically expands, so does the
need to understand database security. The Defence Information Systems Agency
of the US Department of Defence (2004), in its Database Security Technical
Implementation Guide, states that database security should provide controlled,
protected access to the contents of a database as well as preserve the integrity,
consistency, and overall quality of the data. Students in the computing disciplines
must develop an understanding of the issues and challenges related to database
security and must be able to identify possible solutions.
At its core, database security strives to insure that only authenticated users
perform authorized activities at authorized times. While database security
incorporates a wide array of security topics, notwithstanding, physical security,
network security, encryption and authentication, this paper focuses on the
concepts and mechanisms particular to securing data. Within that context,
database security encompasses three constructs: confidentiality or protection of
data from unauthorized disclosure, integrity or prevention from unauthorized data
access, and availability or the identification of and recovery from hardware and
software errors or malicious activity resulting in the denial of data availability.
In the computing discipline curricula, database security is often included as a topic
in an introductory database or introductory computer security course. This paper

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presents a set of sub-topics that might be included in a database security

component of such a course. Mapping to the three constructs of data security,
these topics include access control, application access, vulnerability, inference,
and auditing mechanisms. Access control is the process by which rights and
privileges are assigned to users and database objects. Application access addresses
the need to assign appropriate access rights to external applications requiring a
database connection. Vulnerability refers to weaknesses that allow malicious users
to exploit resources. Inference refers to the use of legitimate data to infer unknown
information without having rights to directly retrieve that information. Database
auditing tracks database access and user activity providing a way to identify
breaches that have occurred so that corrective action might be taken. As the
knowledge base related to database security continues to grow, so do the
challenges of effectively conveying the material. This paper addresses those
challenges by incorporating a set of interactive software modules into each subtopic. These modules are part of an animated database courseware project
designed to support the teaching of database concepts. The courseware covers.
INTRODUCTION
Database technologies are a core component of many computing systems. They
allow data to be retained and shared electronically and the amount of data
contained in these systems continues to grow at an exponential rate. So does the
need to insure the integrity of the data and secure the data from unintended access.
The Privacy Rights Clearing House (2010) reports that more than 345 million
customer records have been lost or stolen since 2005 when they began tracking
data breach incidents, and the Ponemon Institute reports the average cost of a data
breach has risen to $202 per customer record (Ponemon, 2009). In August 2009,
criminal indictments were handed down in the United States to three perpetrators
accused of carrying out the single largest data security breach recorded to date.
These hackers allegedly stole over 130 million credit and debit card numbers by
exploiting a well known database vulnerability, a SQL injection ( Phifer , 2010).
The Verizon Business Risk Team, who have been reporting data breach statistics
since 2004, examined 90 breaches during the 2008 calendar year. They reported
that more than 285 million records had been compromised, a number exceeding

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the combined total from all prior years of study (Baker et al., 2009). Their
findings provide insight into who commits these acts and how they occur.
Consistently, they have found that most data breaches originate from external
sources, with 75% of the incidents coming from outside the organization as
compared to 20% coming from inside. They also report that 91% of the
compromised records were linked to organized criminal groups. Further, they cite
that the majority of breaches result from hacking and malware often facilitated by
errors committed by the victim, i.e., the database owner. Unauthorized access and
SQL injection were found to be the two most common forms of hacking, an
interesting finding given that both of these exploits are well known and often
preventable. Given the increasing number of beaches to database systems, there is
a corresponding need to increase awareness of how to properly protect and
monitor database systems.
At its core, database security strives to insure that only authenticated users
perform authorized activities at authorized times. It includes the system,
processes, and procedures that protect a database from unintended activity. The
Defence Information Systems Agency of the US Department of Defence (2004),
in its Database Security Technical Implementation Guide, states that database
security should provide controlled, protected access to the contents of your
database and,in the process, preserve the integrity, consistency, and overall quality
of your data (p. 9). The goal is simple, the path to achieving the goal, a bit more
complex. Traditionally database security focused on user authentication and
managing user privileges to database objects (Guimaraes, 2006).
This has proven to be inadequate given the growing number of successful
database hacking incidents and the increase in the number of organizations
reporting loss of sensitive data. A more comprehensive view of database security
is needed, and it is becoming imperative for students in the computing disciplines
to develop an understanding of the issues and challenges related to database
security and to identify possible solutions.
Database security is often included as a topic in an introductory database course or
introductory computer security course. However as the knowledge base related to
database security continues to grow, so do the challenges of effectively conveying

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the material. Further, many topics related to database security are complex and
require students to engage in active learning to fully comprehend the fundamental
nature of database security issues. This paper presents a set of subtopics for
inclusion in a database security component of a course. These sub-topics are
illustrated using a set of interactive software modules.
As part of a National Science Foundation Course, Curriculum and Laboratory
Improvement Grant (#0717707), a set of interactive software modules, referred to
as Animated Database Courseware (ADbC) has been developed to support the
teaching of database concepts. ADbC consists of over 100 animations and
tutorials categorized into four main modules (Database Design, Structured Query
Language [SQL], Transactions and Security) and several sub modules. Interactive
instructional materials such as animations can often be incorporated into the
instructional process to enhance and enrich the standard presentation of important
concepts. Animations have been found to increase student motivation, and
visualizations have been found to help students develop understanding of abstract
concepts which are otherwise considered to be invisible (Steinke, Huk, & Floto,
2003). Further, software animations can be effective at reinforcing topics
introduced in the classroom as they provide a venue for practice and feedback.
Specifically, the Security module and corresponding sub-modules will be covered
in this paper. These sub-modules cover six areas: access control,

row level

security, application security as portrayed in a security matrix, SQL injections,

database inference, and database auditing.
Database Security Topics:
The following presents an organizational structure for presenting database security
concepts in a course in which database security is one of many topics. As such the
focus is limited and material introductory. While database security incorporates a
wide array of security topics, not withstanding, physical security, network
security, encryption and authentication, this paper focuses on the concepts and
mechanisms particular to securing data. Database security is built upon a
framework encompassing three constructs: confidentiality, integrity and
availability (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). Confidentiality or secrecy refers to the
protection of data against unauthorized disclosure, integrity refers to the

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prevention of unauthorized and improper data modification, and availability refers

to the prevention and recovery from hardware and software errors as well as from
malicious data access resulting in the denial of data availability (Bertino, Byun &
Kamra, 2007).
Mapping to these three constructs, a database security component in any course
needs to cover access control, application access, vulnerability, inference, and
auditing mechanisms. The primary method used to protect data is limiting access
to the data. This can be done through authentication, authorization, and access
control. These three mechanisms are distinctly different but usually used in
combination with a focus on access control for granularity in assigning rights to
specific objects and users. For instance, most database systems use some form of
authentication, such as username and password, to restrict access to the system.
Further, most users are authorized or assigned defined privileges to specific
resources. Access control further refines the process by assigning rights and
privileges to specific data objects and data sets. Within a database, these objects
usually include tables, views, rows, and columns. For instance, Student A may be
given login rights to the University database with authorization privileges of a
student user which include read-only privileges for the Course_ Listing data table.
Through this granular level of access control, students may be given the ability to
browse course offerings but not to peruse grades assigned to their classmates.
Many students, today, inherently understand the need for granularity in granting
access when framed in terms of granting friends access to their Facebook site.
Limiting access to database objects can be demonstrated through the
Grant/Revoke access control mechanism.

DATABASE VULNERABILITY
A Vulnerability Database is a platform aimed at collecting, maintaining, and
disseminating information about discovered vulnerabilities targeting real
computer systems. Currently, there are many vulnerabilities databases that have
been widely used to collect data from different sources on software vulnerabilities
(e.g., bugs). These data essentially include the description of the discovered
vulnerability, its exploitability, its potential impact, and the workaround to be
applied over the vulnerable system. Examples of web-based vulnerabilities

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databases are the National Vulnerability Database and the Open Source
Vulnerability Database.

Security breaches are an increasing phenomenon. As more and more databases are
made accessible via the Internet and web-based applications, their exposure to
security threats will rise. The objective is to reduce susceptibility to these threats.
Perhaps the most publicized database application vulnerability has been the SQL
injection. SQL injections provide excellent examples for discussing security as
they embody one of the most important database security issues, risks inherent to
non-validated user input. SQL injections can happen when SQL statements are
dynamically created using user input. The threat occurs when users enter
malicious code that tricks the database into executing unintended commands.
The vulnerability occurs primarily because of the features of the SQL language
that allow such things as embedding comments using double hyphens (- -),
concatenating SQL statements separated by semicolons, and the ability to query
metadata from database data dictionaries. The solution to stopping an SQL
injection is input validation. A common example depicts what might occur when a
login process is employed on a web page that validates a username and password
against data retained in a relational database. The web page provides input forms
for user entry of text data. The user-supplied text is used to dynamically create a
SQL statement to search the database for matching records. The intention is that
valid username and password combinations would be authenticated and the user
permitted access to the system. Invalid username and passwords would not be
authenticated. However, if a disingenuous user enters malicious text, they could,
in essence, gain access to data to which they have no privilege. For instance, the
following string, ' OR 1=1 -- entered into the username textbox gains access to the

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system without having to know either a valid username or password. This hack
works because the application generates a dynamic query that is formed by
concatenating fixed strings with the values entered by the user.
For example, the model SQL code might be:
SELECT Count(*) FROM UsersTable
WHERE UserName = contents of username textbox
AND Password = contents of password textbox;
When a user enters a valid username, such as Mary and a password of qwerty,
the SQL query
becomes:
SELECT Count(*) FROM UsersTable
WHERE UserName=Mary
AND Password=qwerty;
However, if a user enters the following as a username: OR 1=1 -- the SQL query
becomes:
SELECT Count(*) FROM UsersTable
WHERE UserName= OR 1=1 - -
AND Password=;
The expression 1 = 1 is true for every row in the table causing the OR clause to
return a value of true. The double hyphens comment out the rest of the SQL query
string. This query will return a count greater than zero, assuming there is at least
one row in the users table, resulting in what appears to be a successful login. In
fact, it is not. Access to the system was successful without a user having to know
either a username or password. Another SQL injection is made possible when a
database system allows for the processing of stacked queries. Stacked queries are
the execution of more than one SQL query in a single function call from an
application program. In his case, one string is passed to the database system with

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multiple queries, each separated by a semicolon. The following example

demonstrates a stacked query. The original intent is to allow the user to select
attributes of products retained in a Products table. The user injects a stacked query
incorporating an additional SQL query that also deletes the Customers table.
SELECT * FROM PRODUCTS; DROP CUSTOMERS;
This string when passed as an SQL query will result in the execution of two
queries. A listing of all information for all products will be returned. In addition
the Customers table will be removed from the database. The table structure will be
deleted and all customer data will be lost. In database systems that do not allow
stacked queries, or invalidate SQL strings containing a semicolon this query
would not be executed.
The ADbC courseware sub-module for SQL injections demonstrates the insertion
of malicious code during the login process. The sub-module steps through the
process by first showing the entry of valid data and then demonstrating entry of
malicious code, how it is injected into a dynamically created SQL statement and
then executed. Figure 5 shows the step where malicious code is entered. Figure 6
shows the dynamically created SQL command and the resulting display of all the
data in the user table. Additional steps present code resulting in the modification
or deletion of data.

Figure 6: ADbC SQL Injection Sub-Module: Result of SQL Injection using

Malicious Code

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Figure 6: ADbC SQL Injection Sub-Module: Result of SQL Injection using

Malicious Code
SQL injection vulnerabilities result from the dynamic creation
of SQL queries in application programs that access a database system. The SQL
queries are built incorporating user input and passed to the database system as a
string variable. SQL injections can be prevented by validating user input. Three
approaches are commonly used to address query string validation: using a black
list, using a white list, or implementing parameterized queries. The black list
parses the input string comparing each character to a predefined list of nonallowed characters. The disadvantage to using a black list is that many special
characters can be legitimate but will be rejected using this approach. The common
example is the use of the apostrophe in a last name such as OHare. The white list
approach is similar except that each character is compared to a list of allowable
characters. The approach is preferred but special considerations have to be made
when validating the single quote. Parameterized queries use internally defined
parameters to fill in a previously prepared SQL statement. The importance of
input validation cannot be overstated. It is one of the primary defense mechanisms
for preventing database vulnerabilities including SQL injections.

DATABASE INFERENCE
A subtle vulnerability found within database technologies is
inference, or the ability to derive unknown information based on retrieved
information. The problem with inference is that there are no ideal solutions to the

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problem. The only recommended solutions include controls related to queries

(suppression) or controls related to individual items in a database (concealing). In
other words, sensitive data requested in a query are either not provided or answers
given are close but not exact, preventing the user from obtaining enough
information to make inferences. Neither of these represents ideal solutions as they
are restrictive in nature. However, it is important for students to understand the
risks of inference and how it might occur. Examples are the best way to
demonstrate inference.

The ADbC inference sub-module includes three animations that demonstrate how
users might be able to put together (infer) information when data is available to
those with a higher security access level or when they are only given access to
aggregate data. Inference often happens in cases where the actual intent is for
users to generate or view aggregate values when they have not been given access
to individual data items. However, because they are exposed to information about
the data, they are sometimes able to infer individual data values. Take for example
a scenario where a worker desires to find out their co-worker Goldbergs salary In
this organization, salary data is confidential. The worker has rights to generate
aggregate data such as summarizing organizational salary data averaged across
specific criteria (i.e., salary averaged by gender). Although the worker does not
have access to individual data items, he or she does possess particular and unique
details about Goldberg; specifically that Goldberg is a female and has 11
dependents. Based on this information, the worker can derive an aggregate
function such as

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SELECT AVG (Salary) FROM EMPLOYEES WHERE Gender = F and

Dependents = 11.
This will return Goldbergs salary because the average is taken from an
aggregated data set of one. The ADbC inference sub-module animation for this
scenario is illustrated in Figure 7. The SQL-command window depicts the
construction of the requested query to ascertain salary averages. Employees Table
data is shown in the upper left and underneath is the result of the query

Figure 7. ADbC Inference Sub-module: Using Aggregate Data to Infer

Information
Inference can also occur when users are able to ascertain information from data
accessible to them at their security level even though that specific information is
protected at a higher security access level. It is difficult to explain this without the aid
of a demonstration. The second example in the ADbC Inference sub-module provides
a scenario where specific data, in this case company product prototype data, is not
made accessible to junior employees. However, junior employees are given access to
update the Storage table that tracks the contents in company storage areas. When
perusing this table, the junior employee is not able to read any rows containing
prototype products. The problem occurs if the employee tries to update a protected
row. This triggers an error message. Based on the error message, the junior employee

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could surmise that information was being hidden and might infer that something of a
secretive nature was being stored in the storage compartment referenced in the update
request. Figure 8 depicts an error being generated when a junior employee issues a
query against a protected row of data. The table on the top right shows all of the data
contained in the Storage table. The table on the bottom shows the data accessible to
junior employees. Notice that Compartment B containing ProductX is not displayed in
the lower table. A possible solution to this inference problem is polyinstantiation.
Polyinstantiation allows a database to retain multiple records having the same primary
key; they are uniquely distinguished by a security level identifier. If polyinstantiation
were enacted in the proceeding scenario, the insert would be successful. However,
this does not prevent the double booking of the storage compartment area.

Figure 8. ADbC Inference Sub-module: Security Level Access Error Leading to

Inference
Developing technological solutions to detecting database inference is complex.
Much of the work done in this area involves revoking access to specific database
objects based on a users past querying history (Staddon, 2003). The problem with
inference detection, especially when done at query processing time, is that it
results in a significant delay between the time the query is executed and the results

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are presented. As with other approaches to mitigating database security

vulnerabilities, trade-offs must be made. The protection of highly sensitive data
requires an examination of what situations could lead to exposure to unauthorized
users and what monitoring policies should be implemented to insure appropriate
responses are enacted.

AUDITING
Database auditing is used to track database access and user activity. Auditing
can be used to identify who accessed database objects, what actions were
performed, and what data was changed. Database auditing does not prevent
security breaches, but it does provide a way to identify if breaches have occurred.
Common categories of database auditing include monitoring database access
attempts, Data Control Language (DCL) activities, Data Definition Language
(DDL) activities, and Data Manipulation Language (DML) activities (Yang,
2009). Monitoring access attempts includes retaining information on successful
and unsuccessful logon and logoff attempts. DCL audits record changes to user
and role privileges, user additions, and user deletions. DDL audits record changes
to the database schema such as changes to table structure or attribute datatypes.
DML audits record changes to data. In addition, database errors should be
monitored (Yang, 2009).

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Database auditing is implemented via log files and audit tables. The real
challenge of database auditing is deciding what and how much data to retain and
how long to keep it. Several options exist. A basic audit trail usually captures user
access, system resources used, and changes made to the structure of a database.
More complete auditing captures data reads as well as data modifications. The
ADbC auditing sub-module provides step-by-step examples for creating audits of
user sessions, changes to database structure, and modifications to data. Figure 9
shows an example of code required to implement and trigger an audit of a user
login. Data recorded includes the username and the date and time of the user login

and
Figure 9. ADbC Database Audit Sub-module: Monitoring User Logins
An audit trail provides a more complete trace recording of not only user access but
also user actions.
This type of facility is included with many database management systems. The most
common items that are audited include login attempts, data read and data
modifications operations, unsuccessful attempts to access database tables, and
attempts to insert data that violates specific constraints. Figure 10 shows an example
audit trail of user access and user actions as demonstrated in the Audit Command
animation in the ADbC Database Audit sub-module. The SQL Commands window
displays the SQL statement used to retrieve data from the audit table.

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Figure 10. ADbC Database Audit Sub-module: Example Database Audit Trail
Auditing plays a central role in a comprehensive database security plan. The
primary weakness of the audit process is the time delay between when data is
recorded and when analysis is performed. Consequently, breaches and other
unauthorized activities are identified after the fact, making it difficult to mitigate
adverse effects in a timely manner. However, solutions are being introduced that
allow for real-time monitoring of database activity looking for patterned events
indicative of potential breaches and enacting real-time notification to database
administrators when such actions occur. Whatever the case, database auditing is a
necessary process, and students must be made aware of the need for continuous
monitoring of database log files.

CONCLUSION
The need to secure computer systems is well understood and securing data must
be part of an overall computer security plan. Growing amounts of sensitive data
are being retained in databases and more of these databases are being made
accessible via the Internet. As more data is made available electronically, it can be
assumed that threats and vulnerabilities to the integrity of that data will increase as

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well. Database security is becoming an increasingly important topic and students

need to develop core understandings in this area. The primary objectives of
database security are to prevent unauthorized access to data, prevent unauthorized
tampering or modification of data, and to insure that data remains available when
needed. The concepts related to database security are multifaceted. This makes it
challenging to teach the material when database security is included as just one
component of a larger course. However, this is how most students are exposed to
the topic. This paper suggested a set of sub-topics in a database security course
component and introduced a set of interactive software modules mapped to each
sub-topic presented. Engaging students in interactive learning activities enhances
the learning experience and provides the opportunity for students to further
explore database security issues and identify practical implementation methods to
database security mechanisms and strategies.

Secure Data Handling

Data handling related to when you view, update, delete, transfer, mail, store, or
destroy data. It also relates to how you transfer the data from one location to
another. Data is not always stored electronically. Occasionally it could be paper
stored in a filing cabinet or in a binder.
Complying

with

secure

best

practices

when

identifying,

transmitting,

redistributing, storing or disposing of restricted data.

Authentication: The process of identifying an individual, usually based on a

username and password. In security systems, authentication is distinct from
authorization , which is the process of giving individuals access to system
objects based on their identity. Authentication merely ensures that the
individual is who he or she claims to be, but says nothing about the access
rights of the individual.

Encryption: Encryption is the conversion of data into a form, called a

ciphertext, that cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people.
Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its original
form, so it can be understood.

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The use of encryption/decryption is as old as the art of

communication. In wartime, a cipher, often incorrectly called a code, can be
employed to keep the enemy from obtaining the contents of transmissions.
(Technically, a code is a means of representing a signal without the intent of
keeping it secret; examples are Morse code and ASCII.) Simple ciphers include
the substitution of letters for numbers, the rotation of letters in the alphabet, and
the "scrambling" of voice signals by inverting the sideband frequencies. More
complex ciphers work according to sophisticated computer algorithms that
rearrange the data bits in digital signals.
In order to easily recover the contents of an encrypted signal,
the correct decryption key is required. The key is an algorithm that undoes the
work of the encryption algorithm. Alternatively, a computer can be used in an
attempt to break the cipher. The more complex the encryption algorithm, the more
difficult it becomes to eavesdrop on the communications without access to the
key.
Encryption/decryption is especially important in wireless
communications. This is because wireless circuits are easier to tap than their hardwired counterparts. Nevertheless, encryption/decryption is a good idea when
carrying out any kind of sensitive transaction, such as a credit-card purchase
online, or the discussion of a company secret between different departments in the
organization. The stronger the cipher -- that is, the harder it is for unauthorized
people to break it -- the better, in general. However, as the strength of
encryption/decryption increases, so does the cost.
In recent years, a controversy has arisen over so-called strong
encryption. This refers to ciphers that are essentially unbreakable without the
decryption keys. While most companies and their customers view it as a
means of keeping secrets and minimizing fraud, some governments view
strong encryption as a potential vehicle by which terrorists might evade
authorities. These governments, including that of the United States, want to set
up a key-escrow arrangement. This means everyone who uses a cipher would
be required to provide the government with a copy of the key. Decryption keys
would be stored in a supposedly secure place, used only by authorities, and

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used only if backed up by a court order. Opponents of this scheme argue that
criminals could hack Into the key-escrow database and illegally obtain, steal,
or alter the keys. Supporters claim that while this is a possibility,
implementing the key escrow scheme would be better than doing nothing to
prevent criminals from freely using encryption/decryption.

Transaction security:

Audit trail: A record showing who has accessed a computer system and what
operations he or she has performed during a given period of time. Audit trails
are useful both for maintaining security and for recovering lost transactions.
Most accounting systems and database management systems include an audit
trail component. In addition, there are separate audit trail software products
that enable network administrators to monitor use of network resources.

Physical security: Physical security describes security measures that are

designed to deny access to unauthorized personnel (including attackers or even
accidental intruders) from physically accessing a building, facility, resource,
or stored information; and guidance on how to design structures to resist
potentially hostile acts.[1] Physical security can be as simple as a locked door
or as elaborate as multiple layers of barriers, armed security guards and
guardhouse placement

Secure storage: Storage security is the group of parameters and settings that
make storage resources available to authorized users and trusted networks - and
unavailable to other entities. These parameters can apply to hardware,
programming, communications protocols, and organizational policy.
Several issues are important when considering a security
method for a storage area network (SAN). The network must be easily accessible
to authorized people, corporations, and agencies. It must be difficult for a
potential hacker to compromise the system. The network must be reliable and
stable under a wide variety of environmental conditions and volumes of usage.
Protection must be provided against online threats such as viruses, worms,
Trojans, and other malicious code. Sensitive data should be encrypted.
Unnecessary services should be disabled to minimize the number of potential

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security holes. Updates to the operating system, supplied by the platform vendor,
should be installed on a regular basis. Redundancy, in the form of identical (or
mirrored) storage media, can help prevent catastrophic data loss if there is an
unexpected malfunction. All users should be informed of the principles and
policies that have been put in place governing the use of the network.
Two criteria can help determine the effectiveness of a storage
security methodology. First, the cost of implementing the system should be a
small fraction of the value of the protected data. Second, it should cost a potential
hacker more, in terms of money and/or time, to compromise the system than the
protected data is worth.
Data backup: Database backup is the process of making a complete secondary
copy of a database or database server for the purpose of recovering the database
following a disaster. Businesses who rely upon databases to conduct business
operations and/or provide services are especially susceptible to the loss of
database information, and therefore generally invest in some form of database
backup. Most database management systems (DBMSs) feature the ability to create
a backup of a given instance locally; however, local data remains susceptible to
loss or damage from accidental deletion, drive or partition errors, or physical
damage due to hardware failure or disaster. A properly conducted database backup
ensures that the most recent copy of operational data is available for recovery.
Backup service providers such as CRC offer the ability to
make complete backups offsite of common database servers such as SQL Server,
Oracle and DB2. In addition, CRC allows users to perform a database backup
without taking the database server offline, a critical consideration when database
functionality is critical to core business tasks.
Databases are also regularly backed up for reporting and
compliance purposes, since regulations imposed by the Federal goverment require
many types of organizations to maintain access to electronic records.
Database backup from providers like CRC also involve
information lifecycle management (ILM), transferring inactive or less frequentlyaccessed data to tiered storage, reducing the amount of time involved in a backup

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while freeing up resources to improve the performance of database-driven

applications.

Secure Connection
a) Wired and wireless:
Wired: why would you use it?
A wired home network is when you connect your computer or other compatible
device to your Virgin Media Hub or Super Hub with an Ethernet cable. With the
introduction of wireless routers, its less common these days for a home to only
use a wired network.
The best thing about a wired connection is the reliability and speed it gives you
(wired is faster than wireless). This makes it ideal for things that use a lot of
bandwidth, like playing online games on your Xbox.
Whats great about wired?

Faster and more reliable than wireless connections

Less risk of others being able to access your broadband connection

Easy to set up and troubleshoot

No extra wireless equipment is needed

Whats not?

Not so flexible when positioning computers and devices because

you need to be connected to your Hub using an Ethernet cable

Not so convenient for users of laptops and other mobile devices

Supports fewer connections than a wireless.

Wireless: why would you use it?

A wireless network is when your computer (or other wireless compatible device) is
connected to your Virgin Media Hub or Super Hub without any wires.

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Want to check your emails on your laptop in the garden? No problem. Want to tell
your friends what youve been up to on Facebook? You can do that too.
And because you can connect lots of different devices to the web, everyone in your
home can go online at the same time.

Whats great about wireless?

No wires! So you can connect wherever you want

Ideal for users of laptops and other mobile devices

You can connect more devices than via a wired connection

Very secure when used with the highest strength security settings (WPA
encryption - which comes as standard on our Super Hub)

You can connect your smartphone to your wireless network for faster
browsing

Whats not?

Performance can be affected by thick walls, electrical interference etc

It can be up to 30% slower than wired connections

Un authorised users might try to use your connection (which is why security is
so important)

If you have an older computer, a wireless USB adapter may be needed

b) Protocols: An agreed-upon format for transmitting data between two devices.

The protocol determines the following:

the type of error checking to be used

data compression method, if any

how the sending device will indicate that it has finished sending a message how
the receiving device will indicate that it has received a message
There are a variety of standard protocols from which programmers can choose.
Each has particular advantages and disadvantages; for example, some are simpler
than others, some are more reliable, and some are faster.

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From a user's point of view, the only interesting aspect about protocols is that
your computer or device must support the right ones if you want to communicate
with other computers. The protocol can be implemented either in hardware or in
software.
c) Monitor for attacks: Local cellular operators monitor traffic in a bid to pick
up and stop distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, before they have a
major impact on service levels to subscribers.
DDOS attacks make use of multiple compromised systems, often infected with
a Trojan, to target a single system, which leads to a denial of service attack.
Victims of these attacks include the end targeted system and all systems
maliciously used and controlled by the hacker.
The only way to pick up the intrusion is to monitor the traffic in real-time to
detect unusual patterns, says Fryer. He adds that most mobile operators and
Internet service providers have deployed a DDOS mechanism, which forms
part of a global DDOS monitoring centre.
Most of the deployments have updated blacklisting capabilities to fend off
attackers, says Fryer. He adds that real-time monitoring is more effective, and
allows Vodacom to block the source IP, although hackers then come back with
a different address.
d) Virus: A computer virus is a computer program that can replicate itself and
spread from one computer to another. The term "virus" is also commonly, but
erroneously, used to refer to other types of malware, including but not limited
to adware and spyware programs that do not have a reproductive ability.
Malware includes computer viruses, computer worms, ransomware, trojan horses,
keyloggers, most rootkits, spyware, dishonest adware, malicious BHOs and other
malicious software. The majority of active malware threats are usually trojans or
worms rather than viruses. Malware such as trojan horses and worms is sometimes
confused with viruses, which are technically different: a worm can exploit security
vulnerabilities to spread itself automatically to other computers through networks,
while a trojan horse is a program that appears harmless but hides malicious
functions. Worms and trojan horses, like viruses, may harm a computer system's
data or performance. Some viruses and other malware have symptoms noticeable

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to the computer user, but many are surreptitious or simply do nothing to call
attention to themselves. Some viruses do nothing beyond reproducing themselves.
Denial of service :

In computing, a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) or

distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) is an attempt to make a

machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. Although the
means to carry out, motives for, and targets of a DoS attack may vary, it generally
consists of efforts to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend services of a
host connected to the Internet.
Perpetrators of DoS attacks typically target sites or services hosted on high-profile
web servers such as banks, credit card payment gateways, and even root
nameservers. This technique has now seen extensive use in certain games, used by
server owners, or disgruntled competitors on games such as Minecraft. The term is
generally used relating to computer networks, but is not limited to this field; for
example, it is also used in reference to CPU resource management.
One common method of attack involves saturating the target machine with
external communications requests, so much so that it cannot respond to legitimate
traffic, or responds so slowly as to be rendered essentially unavailable. Such
attacks usually lead to a server overload. In general terms, DoS attacks are
implemented by either forcing the targeted computer(s) to reset, or consuming its
resources so that it can no longer provide its intended service or obstructing the
communication media between the intended users and the victim so that they can
no longer communicate adequately.
Denial-of-service attacks are considered violations of the Internet Architecture
Board's Internet proper use policy, and also violate the acceptable use policies of
virtually all Internet service providers. They also commonly constitute violations
of the laws of individual nations.
Man in the middle: The man-in-the-middle attack (often abbreviated MITM,
MitM, MIM, MiM, MITMA, also known as a bucket brigade attack, or sometimes
Janus attack) in cryptography and computer security is a form of active
eavesdropping in which the attacker makes independent connections with the
victims and relays messages between them, making them believe that they are

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talking directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire
conversation is controlled by the attacker. The attacker must be able to intercept
all messages going between the two victims and inject new ones, which is
straightforward in many circumstances (for example, an attacker within reception
range of an unencrypted Wi-Fi wireless access point, can insert himself as a manin-the-middle).
This maneuver precedes computers. A fictional example of a "man-in-the-middle
attack" utilizing a telegraph is featured in the 1898 short story The Man Who Ran
Europe by Frank L. Pollack.
A man-in-the-middle attack can succeed only when the attacker can impersonate
each endpoint to the satisfaction of the other it is an attack on mutual
authentication (or lack thereof). Most cryptographic protocols include some form
of endpoint authentication ecifically to prevent MITM attacks. For example, SSL
can authenticate one or both parties using a mutually trusted certification
authority.
f) Trusted IP addresses: When you set up your secure zone you can add trusted
IP addresses to is by selecting 'Trusted IP Addresses' menu item. When you
trust one or more IP addresses, any visitor accessing secure content inside
your secure zone will gain instant access to that content without needing to be
registered or log in. Its a great feature for intranet setups such as internal
faculty and staff pages in universities, or even corporate directories.
g) Role-based security: Role-based security is a principle by which developers
create systems that limit access or restrict operations according to a users
constructed role within a system. This is also often called role-based access
control, since many businesses and organizations use this principle to ensure
that unauthorized users do not gain access to privileged information within an
IT architecture.
There are many ways to develop a role-based security system. All of them
start with the definition of various roles and what users assigned to those roles
can and cant do or see. The resulting levels of functionality must be coded
into the system using specific parameters.

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Object-oriented programming often involves treating a role as an object

relative to certain code modules or functions. In a Microsoft programming
setting, a developer might use a PrincipalPermission object in .Net to examine
an object containing a role designation and to perform security checks. In
other cases, information about an object can be passed to a method for a
security check.
Any role-based security system depends on the code's ability to correctly and
thoroughly control a given user by his or her assigned role and therefore guard
against unauthorized use of proprietary identifiers of a specific role.
Alternative models include mandatory access control, where certain specifics
are coded into an operating system, and discretionary access control, where
some elements of security may be more flexible. For example, a more
privileged user may be able to "pass" access to another user in a simple
discretionary event or process.
h) Port monitorng: Port mirroring is a method of copying and sending network
packets transmitted as input from a port to another port of a monitoring
computer/switch/device. It is a network monitoring technique implemented on
network switches and similar devices.
Port mirroring is implemented in local area networks (LAN), wireless local
area networks (WLAN) or virtual local area networks (VLAN) to identify,
monitor and troubleshoot network abnormalities. It is configured at the
network

switch

by

network

administrator

(NA)

or

network

monitoring/security application. When enabled, the traffic that emerges to and

from a specific port number is automatically copied and transmitted to a
monitoring/destination port. Typically, the destination port is part of the
monitoring software or security application that analyzes these data packets.
The port mirroring process is generally hidden from the source and other
nodes on the network.
Port mirroring is also known as switched port analyzer (SPAN) and roving
analysis port (RAP).

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Security Policies: Security policy is a definition of what it means to be secure for

a system, organization or other entity. For an organization, it addresses the
constraints on behavior of its members as well as constraints imposed on
adversaries by mechanisms such as doors, locks, keys and walls. For systems, the
security policy addresses constraints on functions and flow among them,
constraints on access by external systems and adversaries including programs and
access to data by people.

Organization-wide implementation: There is a great need for organizational

leaders to provide data-based evidence that a program or initiative makes a
difference. The authors describe findings from a survey designed to gather
baseline data about changes organizations experience after implementing the
Clinical Practice Model framework, and report how the Clinical Practice
Model Resource Center staff used the survey findings to build the capacity of
individuals accountable for implementing this integrated, interdisciplinary
professional practice framework into the organization's operations.

People buy-in for enforcement:

Periodic review of policies in place: This work provides a comprehensive

analysis of a general periodic review production/inventory model with random
(variable) yield. Existence of an order point whose value does not depend on
yield being random is proved in the single period case without specifying the
yield model and using a very general cost structure. When yield is a random
multiple of lot size, the nonorder-up-to optimal policy is characterized for a
finite-horizon model. The finite-horizon value functions are shown to
converge to the solution of an infinite-horizon functional equation, and the
infinite-horizon order point is shown to be no smaller than when yield is
certain.

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UNIT-2
SECURITY MODEL-1
2.1 ACCESS MATRIX MODEL:
The access matrix model is the policy for user authentication,
and has several implementations such as access control lists (ACLs) and capabilities.
It is used to describe which users have access to what objects.
The access matrix model consists of four major parts:
A list of objects
A list of subjects
A function T which returns an object's type
The matrix itself, with the objects making the columns and the subjects making
the rows In the cells where a subject and object meet lie the rights the subject has
on that object. Some example access rights are read, write, execute, list and delete.
Example Access Matrix:

Objects
Subjects

index.htmlfile

Java VM
Virtual Machine

John Doe

rwld

Sally Doe

rl

An access matrix has several standard operations associated with it:

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i.

Entry of a right into a specified cell

ii.

Removal of a right from a specified cell

iii.

Creation of a subject

iv.

Creation of an object

v.

Removal of an subject

vi.

Removal of an object

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Implementation:
The two most used implementations are access control lists and capabilities.
Access control lists are achieved by placing on each object a list of users and their
associated rights to that object. An interactive demonstration of access control lists
can be seen here. For example, if we have file1, file2 and file3, and users (subjects)
John and Sally, an access control list might look like:
Objects (Files)
Users

File1

File2

File3

John

RWX

R-X

RW-

Sally

---

RWX

R--

The rights are R (Read), W (Write) and X (Execute). A dash indicates the user does
not have that particular right. Thus, John does not have permission to execute File3,
and Sally has no rights at all on File1.
Users
John file1:RWX

file2:R-X

file3: RW-

Sally file1: ---

file1:RWX file1: R--

Capabilities are accomplished by storing on each subject a list of rights the subject has
for every object. This effectively gives each user a keyring. To remove access to a
particular object, every user (subject) that has access to it must be "touched". A touch
is an examanition of a user's rights to that object and potentially removal of rights.

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This brings back the problem of sweeping changes in access rights. Here is what an
implementation of capabilities might look like, using the above example:
Access restrictions such as access control lists and capabilities sometimes are not
enough. In some cases, information needs to be tightened further, sometimes by an
authority higher than the owner of the information. For example, the owner of a top
secret document in a government office might deem the information available to
many users, but his manager might know the information should be restricted further
than that. In this case, the flow of information needs to be controlled -- secure
information cannot flow to a less secure user.

2.2 TAKE-GRANT MODEL:

The take-grant protection model is a formal model used in the field
of computer security to establish or disprove the safety of a given computer system
that follows specific rules. It shows that for specific systems the question of safety is
decidable in linear time, which is in general un decidable.
The model represents a system as directed graph, where vertices are either subjects or
objects. The edges between them are labelled and the label indicates the rights that the
source of the edge has over the destination. Two rights occur in every instance of the
model: take and grant. They play a special role in the graph rewriting rules describing
admissible changes of the graph.
There are a total of four such rules:
i.

Take rule allows a subject to take rights of another object (add an edge
originating at the subject)

ii.

Grant rule allows a subject to grant own rights to another object (add an
edge terminating at the subject)

iii.

Create rule allows a subject to create new objects (add a vertex and an
edge from the subject to the new vertex)

iv.

Remove rule allows a subject to remove rights it has over on another

object (remove an edge originating at the subject)

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Preconditions for take(o,p,r): subject s has the right Take for o. object o has the right r
on p.
Preconditions for grant(o,p,r): subject s has the right Grant for o. s has the right r on p.
Using the rules of the take-grant protection model, one can reproduce in which states
a system can change, with respect to the distribution of rights. Therefore one can
show if rights can leak with respect to a given safety model.
The Take-Grant protection model is a formal access control model, which represents
transformation of rights and information between entities inside a protection system.
This model was presented first by Jones et al. [8] to solve the Safety Problem. They
showed that using Take-Grant model, the safety problem is decidable and also can be
solved in linear time according to the number of subjects and objects of the system.
In this model the protection state is represented as a directed finite graph. In
the graph, vertices are entities of the system and edges are labeled. Each label
indicates the rights that the source vertex of the corresponding edge has over the
destination vertex. Entities could be subjects (represented by ), objects (represented
by ) or play the both roles (represented by ). The set of basic access rights is
denoted as R={t,g,r,w} which t, g, r and w respectively stand for take, grant, read, and
write ac- cess rights. To model the rights transfer, Take-Grant protection model uses a
set of rules called de-jure rules. These rules transfer the Take-Grant graph to a new
state which reflects the modification of protection state in an actual system. The dejure
(VTG)

Network Vulnerability Analysis Through Vulnerability Take-Grant Model

rules are take, grant, create and remove. The take and grant rules are

described briefly as:

1. Take rule: Let x, y, and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G0 and let
x be a subject. Let there is an edge from x to y labeled where t , an edge from y to
z labeled . Then the take rule defines a new graph G1 by adding an edge to the
protection graph from x to z labeled , where . Fig 1.(a) shows the take rule
graphically.
2. Grant rule: Let x, y, and z be three distinct vertices in a protection graph G0 and
let x be a subject. Let there is an edge from x to y labeled where g , an edge from
x to z labeled . Then the grant rule defines a new graph G1 by adding an edge to the

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protection graph from y to z labeled , where . Fig.1(b) shows the grant rule
graphically.
Having the take right over another subject or object means that its owner can achieve
all rights of the associated subject or object unconditionally. However, obtaining the
rights through the grant rule requires cooperation of the grantor.

Fig. 1. (a) take rewriting rule. (b) grant rewriting rule.

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UNIT-3
SECURITY MODEL-2
3.1 BELLLAPADULA MODEL:
The BellLaPadula Model (abbreviated BLP) is a state
machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military
applications. It was developed by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula,
subsequent to strong guidance from Roger R. Schell to formalize the U.S. Department
of Defence (DoD) multilevel security (MLS) policy. The model is a formal state
transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control
rules which use security labels on objects and clearances for subjects. Security labels
range from the most sensitive (e.g."Top Secret"), down to the least sensitive (e.g.,
"Unclassified" or "Public").
The BellLaPadula model is an example of a model where there is no clear distinction
of protection and security

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FEATURES:

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The BellLaPadula model focuses on data confidentiality and

controlled access to classified information, in contrast to the Biba Integrity Model

which describes rules for the protection of data integrity. In this formal model, the
entities in an information system are divided into subjects and objects. The notion of a
"secure state" is defined, and it is proven that each state transition preserves security
by moving from secure state to secure state, thereby inductively proving that the
system satisfies the security objectives of the model. The BellLaPadula model is
built on the concept of a state machine with a set of allowable states in a computer
network system. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition
functions.
A system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects
to objects are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific
access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of
the object (more precisely, to the combination of classification and set of
compartments, making up the security level) to determine if the subject is authorized
for the specific access mode. The clearance/classification scheme is expressed in
terms of a lattice. The model defines two mandatory access control (MAC) rules and
one discretionary access control (DAC) rule with three security properties:
i.

The Simple Security Property - a subject at a given security level may not read
an object at a higher security level (no read-up).

ii.

The -property (read "star"-property) - a subject at a given security level

must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down).

iii.

The Discretionary Security Property - use of an access matrix to specify the

discretionary access control.

The transfer of information from a high-sensitivity document to a lower-sensitivity

document may happen in the BellLaPadula model via the concept of trusted subjects.
Trusted Subjects are not restricted by the -property. Untrusted subjects are. Trusted
Subjects must be shown to be trustworthy with regard to the security policy. This
security model is directed toward access control and is characterized by the phrase:
"no read up, no write down." Compare the Biba model, the Clark-Wilson model and
the Chinese Wall model.

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With Bell-LaPadula, users can create content only at or above their own security level
(i.e. secret researchers can create secret or top-secret files but may not create public
files; no write-down). Conversely, users can view content only at or below their own
security level (i.e. secret researchers can view public or secret files, but may not view
top-secret files; no read-up).
The BellLaPadula model explicitly defined its scope. It did not treat the following
extensively:
i.

Covert channels. Passing information via pre-arranged actions was described

briefly.

ii.

Networks of systems. Later modeling work did address this topic.

iii.

Policies outside multilevel security. Work in the early 1990s showed that MLS
is one version of boolean policies, as are all other published policies.

Strong Property
The Strong Property is an alternative to the -Property, in which subjects may
write to objects with only a matching security level. Thus, the write-up operation
permitted in the usual -Property is not present, only a write-to-same operation. The
Strong Property is usually discussed in the context of multilevel database
management systems and is motivated by integrity concerns.[6] This Strong
Property was anticipated in the Biba model where it was shown that strong integrity in
combination with the BellLaPadula model resulted in reading and writing at a single
level.

TRANQUILITY PRINCIPLE:
The tranquility principle of the BellLaPadula model states
that the classification of a subject or object does not change while it is being
referenced. There are two forms to the tranquility principle: the "principle of strong
tranquility" states that security levels do not change during the normal operation of
the system. The "principle of weak tranquility" states that security levels may never
change in such a way as to violate a defined security policy. Weak tranquility is
desirable as it allows systems to observe the principle of least privilege. That is,

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processes start with a low clearance level regardless of their owners clearance, and
progressively accumulate higher clearance levels as actions require it.

LIMITATIONS:
i.

Only addresses confidentiality, control of writing (one form of integrity), property and discretionary access control

ii.

Covert channels are mentioned but are not addressed comprehensively

iii.

The tranquility principle limits its applicability to systems where security

levels do not change dynamically. It allows controlled copying from high to
low via trusted subjects.

2.2 THE BIBA MODEL:

The Biba Model or Biba Integrity Model developed by
Kenneth J. Biba in 1977,[1] is a formal state transition system of computer
security policy that describes a set of access control rules designed to ensure
data integrity. Data and subjects are grouped into ordered levels of integrity.
The model is designed so that subjects may not corrupt objects in a level
ranked higher than the subject, or be corrupted by objects from a lower level
than the subject.

In general the model was developed to circumvent a weakness in the Bell

LaPadula model which only addresses data confidentiality.

FEATURES:
`

In general, preservation of data integrity has three goals:

i.

Prevent data modification by unauthorized parties

ii.

Prevent unauthorized data modification by authorized parties

iii.

Maintain internal and external consistency (i.e. data reflects the real
world)

This security model is directed toward data integrity (rather than

confidentiality) and is characterized by the phrase: "no read down, no write
up". This is in contrast to the Bell-LaPadula model which is characterized by
the phrase "no write down, no read up".

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In the Biba model, users can only create content at or below

their own integrity level (a monk may write a prayer book that can be read by
commoners, but not one to be read by a high priest). Conversely, users can
only view content at or above their own integrity level (a monk may read a
book written by the high priest, but may not read a pamphlet written by a
lowly commoner). Another analogy to consider is that of the military chain of
command. A General may write orders to a Colonel, who can issue these
orders to a Major. In this fashion, the General's original orders are kept intact
and the mission of the military is protected (thus, "no read down" integrity).
Conversely, a Private can never issue orders to his
Sergeant, who may never issue orders to a Lieutenant, also protecting the
integrity of the mission ("no write up").
The Biba model defines a set of security rules similar to the
Bell-LaPadula model. These rules are the reverse of the Bell-LaPadula rules:
i.

The Simple Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given level of

integrity must not read an object at a lower integrity level (no read
down).

ii.

The * (star) Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given level of

integrity must not write to any object at a higher level of integrity (no
write up).

SEA VIEW MODEL

The Sea View formal security policy model admits a range of
designs for a multilevel secure relational database system. The requirement for a nearterm implementation suggests that the design should utilize existing technology to the
extent possible. Thus the design uses an existing database management system ported
to an existing TCB (trusted computing base) environment. A pre processor translates
key constructs of the Sea View multilevel relational data model to those of the
standard relational model used by the commercial database system. The underlying
reference monitor enforces mandatory and basic discretionary controls with A1
assurance. By combining single-level data into a multilevel view, it is possible to use

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a commercial database system and classify data at the relation level to implement the
Sea View model, with element-level classification.
In Sea View the design approach is built on the notion of a
reference monitor for mandatory security. Sea View provides the user with the basic
abstraction of a multilevel relation in which the individual data elements are
individually classified. This design approach implements multilevel relations as views
stored over single level relations, transparent to the user. The single-level relations are
stored in segments managed by an underlying mandatory reference monitor. This
underlying mandatory reference monitor performs a label comparison for subjects and
the segments for which they request access, to decide whether to grant access. The
access class of any particular data element in a multilevel relation is derived from the
access class of the single-level relation in which the data element is stored, which in
turn matches the access class of the segment in which it is stored, which is known to
the reference monitor. Thus, labels for each individual data element do not have to be
stored, as was supposed prior to Sea View
In Sea View, every database function is carried out by a
single-level subject. Thus, a database system subject, when operating on behalf of a
user, cannot gain access to any data whose classification is not dominated by the
user's clearance. The use of only single-level subjects for routine database operations
provides the greatest degree of security possible and considerably reduces the risk of
disclosure of sensitive data. This approach means that there must be at least one
database server instance for each active access class. Thus, the database system
consists of multiple database server instances that share the same logical database.

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UNIT -4
SECURITY MECHANISM
4.1 INTRODUCTION

IDENTIFICATION AND

AUTHENTICATION OF USERS
Identification is the process whereby a network element recognizes a valid
user's identity. Authentication is the process of verifying the claimed identity of a
user. A user may be a person, a process, or a system (e.g., an operations system or
another network element) that accesses a network element to perform tasks or process
a call. A user identification code is a non-confidential auditable representation of a
user. Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user can be based on a
password, Personal Identification Number (PIN), smart card, biometrics, token,
exchange of keys, etc. Authentication information should be kept confidential.
If users are not properly identified then the network element is potentially
vulnerable to access by unauthorized users. Because of the open nature of ONA, ONA
greatly increases the potential for unauthorized access. If strong identification and
authorization mechanisms are used, then the risk that unauthorized users will gain
access to a system is significantly decreased.
Section describes the threat of impersonating a user in more detail.
The exploitation of the following vulnerabilities, as well as other identification and
authentication vulnerabilities, will result in the threat of impersonating a user.
Weak authentication methods are used;
The potential exists for users to bypass the authentication mechanism;
The confidentiality and integrity of stored authentication information is not
preserved, and Authentication information which is transmitted over the network is
not encrypted.
Computer intruders have been known to compromise PSN assets by gaining
unauthorized access to network elements. It is possible for a person impersonating an

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authorized user to cause the full range of threats described in section . Impacts on the
PSN caused by the threat of impersonating a user include the full range of impacts to
NS/EP telecommunications described in section . The severity of the threat of
impersonating a user depends on the level of privilege that is granted to the
unauthorized user.

4.2 MEMORY PROTECTION:

Many embedded systems operate with a multitasking operating system
which provides a facility to ensure that the task currently executing does not disrupt
the operation of other tasks. System resources and the code and data of other tasks are
protected. The protection system typically relies on both hardware and software to do
this. In a system with no hardware protection support, each task must work in a
cooperative way with other tasks and follow rules.
In contrast, a system with dedicated protection hardware will check and
restrict access to system resources, preventing hostile or unintentional access to
forbidden resources. Tasks are still required to follow a set of OS rules, but these are
also enforced by hardware, which gives more robust protection.
ARM provides many processors with this capability, using either a memory
protection unit (MPU) or a memory management unit (MMU). This Applications
Note is about MPU based processors. These provide hardware protection over a
number of software-programmed regions, but stop short of providing a full virtual
memory system with address translation, which requires an MMU.
An ARM MPU uses regions to manage system protection. A region is a set
of attributes associated with an area of memory. The processor core holds these
attributes in CP15 registers and identifies each region with a number. A regions
memory boundaries are defined by its base address and its size. Each region possesses
additional attributes which define access rights, memory type and the cache policies.
Because peripherals are memory-mapped in ARM systems, the same protection
mechanism is used for both system peripherals and task memory.
In the Cortex-R4 and Cortex-R5 processors, the presence of the MPU is
optional although generally included. If present, there may be either 8, 12 or 16 such

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regions (defined by the hardware implementer at RTL configuration stage). The

smallest length (size) of a region is just 32 bytes. If a region is of 256 bytes or more, it
may be divided into 8 sub-regions. Although the Cortex-R4 and Cortex-R5 processors
have a Harvard view of memory, the regions are common to both instruction and data
accesses. However, it is possible to use the Execute Never (XN) attribute to
disallow instructions execution from a peripheral or data region.

Figure MPU Region configuration with background region

Cache Maintenance Recommendations:

As we have seen, it will sometimes be necessary to perform cache
maintenance operations (clean and/or invalidate) when changes are made to MPU
region attributes.
Specifically, for the Cortex-R4 and R5 processors, it is changing from a less
restrictive to a more restrictive attribute that will require cache maintenance, e.g.
when changing a regions resolved attribute from cacheable to non-cacheable.
Therefore, in the case of Cortex-R4 and R5 it is possible to identify changes to
attributes 1 through 3 which would not necessitate cache maintenance.

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However, it is strongly recommended that cache is always maintained when

changes are made to attributes 1 through 3 in order that programs remain platform
independent. Additional implications may also exist in the level-2 memory system
which are outside the domain of the processor and are system-specific.
Overall it is strongly recommended practice for any given memory location to
have fixed values for attributes 1 through 3, and that these be independent of the
currently executing context.
Failure to guarantee this will mean that the OS must explicitly manage the
mismatched attributes, which will

involve cache maintenance

and other

considerations. It should be emphasized that in most systems, attribute changes which

require cache maintenance (changes to memory type or cache ability) do not typically
occur after system start-up.

4.3

RESOURCE

PROTECTION

CONTROL

FLOW

MECHANISMS:
Resource protection is a de-facto requirement that must be
advocated by every enterprise, organisation, and government entity. The importance
of this requirement is further escalated when the entities are performing transactions
in an online environment. Information security has been long considered as a crucial
factor for e-commerce transactions. It is important to note that lack of sufficient
security protection may limit the expansion of e-commerce technology. However,
although several e-commerce security mechanisms have been proposed and debated
over a number of years, current internet technology still poses a number of incidents
pertinent to the loss of information, unauthorized use of resources, and information
hacking.

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These incidents generate an excruciating cost for the ranging from the loss of revenue
to the damage of their reputation. A recent survey shows that the average cost resulted
from the worst incident at about 280k - 690k per incident for a large organisation
and 27.5k - 55k per incident for a small and medium organisation. Similarly,
Digital Ecosystem (DE) faces the identical issues due to its open environment where
information and resources are exchanged over the network. With possibly thousands
of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that form series of communities in a DE
environment, protecting enterprise resources and acknowledging which entities are
trusted to access the resources become extensive tasks for each enterprise. While
ensuring security protection is all about upholding the confidentiality, integrity,
availability and non-repudiation of information, it is evident that the most consistent
and effective way to ensure the preservation of these security properties is through
the implementation of authentication, authorisation, encryption, and access control
mechanisms. Additionally, the provision of an efficient mechanism to measure the
trustworthiness of entities will further strengthen the information and resource
protection. While authentication ensures only the right entities that are allowed to
consume the resources, authorisation restricts the access over multiple hosted
resources based on each entitys privileges. Nevertheless, current research in these
areas for a DE environment is still very much limited or not attempted. This research
gap further becomes our main motivation to focus our work in. The remainder of this
paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides an introduction of Digital Ecosystem and its security challenges.

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Section 3 provides an overview of our proposed solution.

Section 4 provides an implementation of our proposed solution.
Section 5 presents an security analysis on the proposed solution.
Section 6 which shows the results of performance and scalability testing on our
solution. To conclude the paper,
Section 7 summarizes our present work and demonstrates several future works.

4.4 SECURITY BY ISOLATION

Because of the problems with effectively implementing Security by
Correctness approach, people, from the very beginning, has also taken another
approach, which is based on isolation. The idea is to split a computer system into
smaller pieces and make sure that each piece is separated from the other ones, so that
if it gets compromised/malfunctions, then it cannot affect the other entities in the
system. Early UNIX's user accounts and separate process address spaces, things that
are now present in every modern OS, are examples of Security by Isolation.

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Simple as it sound, in practice the isolation approach turned out to be very

tricky to implement. One problem is how to partition the system into meaningful
pieces and how to set permissions for each piece. The other problem is
implementation - e.g. if we take a contemporary consumer OS, like Vista, Linux or
Mac OSX, all of them have monolithic kernels, meaning that a simple bug in any of
the kernel components (think: hundreds of 3rd party drivers running there), allows to
bypass of the isolation mechanisms provided by the kernel to the rest of the system
(process separation, ACLs, etc).
Obviously the problem is because the kernels are monolithic. Why not
implement Security by Isolation on a kernel level then? Well, I would personally love
that approach, but the industry simply took another course and decided that
monolithic kernels are better then micro-kernels, because it's easier to write the code
for them and (arguably) they offer better performance.

Many believe, including myself, that this landscape can be changed by the
virtualization technology. Thin bare-metal hypervisor, like e.g. Xen, can act like a
micro kernel and enforce isolation between other components in the system - e.g. we
can move drivers into a separate domain and isolate them from the rest of the system.
But again there are challenges here on both the design- as well as the implementationlevel. For example, we should not put all the drivers into the same domain, as this
would provide little improvement in security.

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4.5 FUNTIONALITIES IN SOME OPERATING SYSTEM:

Operating system security is provided by gates that users must
pass through before entering the operating system environment, and permission
matrixes that determine what they are able to do once inside. In some contexts, secure
RPC passwords have been referred to as network passwords.
The overall system is composed of four gates and two permission matrixes:
Dialup gate:

To access a given operating system environment from the outside

through a modem and phone line, you must provide a valid login ID
and dial-up password.

Login gate:

To enter a given operating system environment you must provide a

valid login ID and user password.

Root gate:

To gain access to root privileges, you must provide a valid root user
password.

Secure RPC gate

In an NIS+ environment running at security level 2 (the default), when you try to use
NIS+ services and gain access to NIS+ objects (servers, directories, tables, table
entries, and so on) your identity is confirmed by NIS+, using the secure RPC process.
Entering the secure RPC gate requires presentation of a secure RPC password.
Your secure RPC password and your login password normally are identical. When
that is the case, you are passed through the gate automatically without having to reenter your password. (In some contexts, secure RPC passwords have been referred to
as network passwords. See the Administering NIS+ Credentials section in the AIX
5L Version 5.3 Network Information Services (NIS and NIS+) Guide for
information about handling two passwords that are not identical.)
A set of credentials is used to automatically pass your requests through the
secure RPC gate. The process of generating, presenting, and validating your
credentials is called authentication because it confirms who you are and that you have

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a valid secure RPC password. This authentication process is automatically performed

every time you request NIS+ service.
In an NIS+ environment running in NIS-compatibility mode, the protection
provided by the secure RPC gate is significantly weakened because everyone has read
rights for all NIS+ objects and modify rights for those entries that apply to them
regardless of whether or not they have a valid credential (that is, regardless of whether
or not the authentication process has confirmed their identity and validated their
secure RPC password). Because this situation allows anyone to have read rights for all
NIS+ objects and modify rights for those entries that apply to them, an NIS+ network
running in compatibility mode is less secure than one running in normal mode. (In
secure RPC terminology, any user without a valid credential is considered a member
of the nobody class. See Authorization classes for a description of the four classes.)
File and directory matrix
Once you have gained access to an operating system environment, your ability to
read, execute, modify, create, and destroy files and directories is governed by the
applicable permissions.
NIS+ objects matrix
Once you have been properly authenticated to NIS+, your ability to read, modify,
create, and destroy NIS+ objects is governed by the applicable permissions. This
process is called NIS+ authorization.

4.6 TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA:

Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) is a
United States Government Department of Defence (DoD) standard that sets basic
requirements for assessing the effectiveness of computer security controls built into a
computer system. The TCSEC was used to evaluate, classify and select computer
systems being considered for the processing, storage and retrieval of sensitive or
classified information.
TCSEC is divided in four parts: A, B, C, and D, where 'A'
describes systems with the highest security and 'D' describes untrusted/untrustworthy
systems. Each of these is further subdivided into "classes". Microsoft received "C2"

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certification for Windows NT. This mean the government certified the system as to
conforming to class 2 of division C. Contrast: TCSEC is designed around the concept
of trusted employees accessing local systems. It was not designed for todays open
Internet access. Hackers do not approach security from the TCSEC point of view.
TCSEC doesn't deal with types of threats hackers pose. What this means is that the
TCSEC approach is irrelevent when trying to defend your e-commerce site against
hackers. However, it is extremely useful in protecting internal systems from internal
people. Remember that the biggest threat is from your own internal employees, and
that most cybercriminals were convicted for having abused trust placed in them.

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UNIT-5
SECURITY SOFTWARE DESIGN:
5.1

METHODOLOGICAL

APPROACH

TO

SECURITY

SOFTWARE DESIG:
Software design is the process of implementing software solutions to one or more
set of problems. One of the important parts of software design is the software
requirements analysis (SRA). It is a part of the software development process that lists
specifications used in software engineering. If the software is "semi-automated" or
user centered, software design may involve user experience design yielding a story
board to help determine those specifications. If the software is completely automated
(meaning no user or user interface), a software design may be as simple as a flow
chart or text describing a planned sequence of events. There are also semi-standard
methods like Unified Modeling Language and Fundamental modeling concepts. In
either case, some documentation of the plan is usually the product of the design.
Furthermore, a software design may be platform-independent or platform-specific,
depending on the availability of the technology used for the design.
Software design can be considered as creating a solution to a problem in hand with
available capabilities. The main difference between Software analysis and design is
that the output of a software analysis consist of smaller problems to solve. Also, the
analysis should not be very different even if it is designed by different team members
or groups. The design focuses on the capabilities, and there can be multiple designs
for the same problem depending on the environment that solution will be hosted. They
can be operations systems, webpages, mobile or even the new cloud computing
paradigm. Sometimes the design depends on the environment that it was developed,
whether if it is created from with reliable frameworks or implemented with suitable
design patterns).
When designing software, two important factors to consider are its security and
usability.

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DESIGN CONCEPTS:
The design concepts provide the software designer with a foundation from
which more sophisticated methods can be applied. A set of fundamental design
concepts has evolved. They are:
Abstraction - Abstraction is the process or result of generalization by reducing the
information content of a concept or an observable phenomenon, typically in order to
retain only information which is relevant for a particular purpose.
Refinement - It is the process of elaboration. A hierarchy is developed by
decomposing a macroscopic statement of function in a step-wise fashion until
programming language statements are reached. In each step, one or several
instructions of a given program are decomposed into more detailed instructions.
Abstraction and Refinement are complementary concepts.
Modularity - Software architecture is divided into components called modules.
Software Architecture - It refers to the overall structure of the software and the ways
in which that structure provides conceptual integrity for a system. A good software
architecture will yield a good return on investment with respect to the desired
outcome of the project, e.g. in terms of performance, quality, schedule and cost.
Control Hierarchy - A program structure that represents the organization of a
program component and implies a hierarchy of control.
Structural Partitioning - The program structure can be divided both horizontally and
vertically. Horizontal partitions define separate branches of modular hierarchy for
each major program function. Vertical partitioning suggests that control and work
should be distributed top down in the program structure.
Data Structure - It is a representation of the logical relationship among individual
elements of data.
Software Procedure - It focuses on the processing of each modules individually

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Information Hiding - Modules should be specified and designed so that information

contained within a module is inaccessible to other modules that have no need for such
information
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS:
There are many aspects to consider in the design of a piece of software. The
importance of each should reflect the goals the software is trying to achieve. Some of
these aspects are:
Compatibility - The software is able to operate with other products that are designed
for interoperability with another product. For example, a piece of software may be
backward-compatible with an older version of itself.
Extensibility - New capabilities can be added to the software without major changes
to the underlying architecture.
Fault-tolerance - The software is resistant to and able to recover from component
failure.
Maintainability - A measure of how easily bug fixes or functional modifications can
be accomplished. High maintainability can be the product of modularity and
extensibility.
Modularity - the resulting software comprises well defined, independent
components. That leads to better maintainability. The components could be then
implemented and tested in isolation before being integrated to form a desired software
system. This allows division of work in a software development project.
Reliability - The software is able to perform a required function under stated
conditions for a specified period of time.
Reusability - the software is able to add further features and modification with slight
or no modification.
Robustness - The software is able to operate under stress or tolerate unpredictable or
invalid input. For example, it can be designed with a resilience to low memory
conditions.

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Security - The software is able to withstand hostile acts and influences.

Usability - The software user interface must be usable for its target user/audience.
Default values for the parameters must be chosen so that they are a good choice for
the majority of the users.

MODELING LANGUAGE
A modeling language is any artificial language that can be used to express
information or knowledge or systems in a structure that is defined by a consistent set
of rules. The rules are used for interpretation of the meaning of components in the
structure. A modeling language can be graphical or textual. Examples of graphical
modeling languages for software design are:
i.

Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) is an example of a Process

Modeling language.

ii.

EXPRESS and EXPRESS-G (ISO 10303-11) is an international standard

general-purpose data modeling language.

iii.

Extended Enterprise Modeling Language (EEML) is commonly used for

business process modeling across a number of layers.

iv.

Flowchart is a schematic representation of an algorithm or a step-wise process,

v.

Fundamental Modeling Concepts (FMC) modeling language for softwareintensive systems.

vi.

IDEF is a family of modeling languages, the most notable of which include

IDEF0 for functional modeling, IDEF1X for information modeling, and
IDEF5 for modeling ontologies.

vii.

Jackson Structured Programming (JSP) is a method for structured

programming based on correspondences between data stream structure and
program structure

viii.

LePUS3 is an object-oriented visual Design Description Language and a

formal specification language that is suitable primarily for modelling large
object-oriented (Java, C++, C#) programs and design patterns.

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ix.

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Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a general modeling language to

describe software both structurally and behaviorally. It has a graphical
notation and allows for extension with a Profile (UML).

x.

Alloy (specification language) is a general purpose specification language for

expressing complex structural constraints and behavior in a software system. It
provides a concise language based on first-order relational logic.

xi.

Systems Modeling Language (SysML) is a new general-purpose modeling

language for systems engineering.

DESIGN PATTERNS
A software designer or architect may identify a design problem which has been
solved by others before. A template or pattern describing a solution to a common
problem is known as a design pattern. The reuse of such patterns can speed up the
software development process, having been tested and proven in the past.
USAGE
Software design documentation may be reviewed or presented to allow
constraints, specifications and even requirements to be adjusted prior to computer
programming. Redesign may occur after review of a programmed simulation or
prototype. It is possible to design software in the process of programming, without a
plan or requirement analysis,[3] but for more complex projects this would not be
considered a professional approach. A separate design prior to programming allows
for multidisciplinary designers and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to collaborate with
highly skilled programmers for software that is both useful and technically sound.

SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM DESIGN

Most modern information computer systems provide concurrent execution of
multiple applications in a single physical computing hardware (which may contain
multiple processing units). Within such a multitasking, time-sharing environment,
individual application jobs share the same resources of the system, e.g., CPU,
memory, disk, and I/O devices, under the control of the operating system. In order to
protect the execution of individual application jobs from possible interference and

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attack of other jobs, most contemporary operating systems implement some abstract
property of containment, such as process (or task) and TCB (Task Control Block),
virtual memory space, file, port, and IPC (Inter Process Communication), etc. An
application is controlled that only given resources (e.g., file, process, I/O, IPC) it can
access, and given operations (e.g., execution or read-only) it can perform. However,
the limited containment supported by most commercial operating systems (MS
WIndows, various flavors of Unix, etc) bases access decisions only on user identity
and ownership without considering additional security-relevant criteria such as the
operation and trustworthiness of programs, the role of the user, and the sensitivity or
integrity of the data. As long as users or applications have complete discretion over
objects, it will not be possible to control data flows or enforce a system-wide security
policy. Because of such weakness of current operating systems, it is rather easy to
breach the security of an entire system once an application has been compromised,
e.g., by a buffer overflow attack. Some examples of potential exploits from a
compromised application are:
i.

Use of unprotected system resources illegitimately. For example, a worm

ii.

program launches attack via emails to all targets in the address book of a

iii.

user after it gets control in a user account.

iv.

Subversion of application enforced protection through the control of

v.

underneath system. For example, to deface a Web site by gaining the

vi.

control of the Web server of the site, say changing a virtual directory in

vii.

Microsoft IIS.

viii.

Gain direct access to protected system resources by misusing privileges.

ix.

For example, a compromised sendmail program running as root on a

x.

standard Unix OS will result in super user privileges for the attacker and

xi.

uncontrolled accesses to all system resources.

xii.

Furnish of bogus security decision-making information. For example,

xiii.

spoof of a file handle of Suns NFS may easily give remote attackers

xiv.

gaining access to files on the remote file server.

It is not possible to protect against malicious code of an application using existing

mechanisms of most commercial operating systems because a program running under
the name of a user receives all of the privileges associated with that user. Moreover,
the access controls supported by the operating systems are so coarse only two

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categories of users: either completely trusted super users (root) or completely untrusted ordinary users. As the result, most system services and privileged applications
in such systems have to run under root privileges that far exceed what they really
needed. A compromise in any of these programs would be exploited to obtain
complete system control.

DBMS DESIGN SECURITY PACKAGE

The result of database design is a plan for the construction of a database that
captures some of the essential features of the proposed database, but omits a lot of less
important detail. These plans often take the form of data models, and database design
can be learned as the art of constructing a certain kind of data model.
Most databases that capture and manage semi-permanent data operate under
the control of a database management system (DBMS). Prominent DBMS products
are Microsoft's SQL Server, Oracle RDBMS, and IBM's DB2. There are dozens of
others. Many of the questions and answers youll find under this tag relate to one of
these DBMS products, but some design issues are DBMS independent.
The amount of preparation and education youll need before building your
first successful database varies widely depending on many factors. Among other
factors, it depends on how ambitious your database project is and on what prior
experience you bring to bear on the project. Very experienced programmers
sometimes underestimate the amount of material there is to learn about database
design.
Sometimes programmers learn well by trial and error, or by postponing formal
learning until their second or third project. Other times, database design neophytes
make design decisions that lead into pitfalls that are very difficult to reverse.
There are many ways to measure the quality of a database design.
Programmers building their first database are often primarily concerned with
performance. Theres no question that performance is important. A bad design can
easily result in database operations that take ten to a hundred times as much time as
they should.
But dont let performance issues blind you to other aspects of good design. In
particular, future proofing of a database is enormously important. Failure to do this

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can result in a database that traps its users at the first level and prevents their data
from evolving as their needs evolve.
Another aspect involves separating out the hidden features of a database
(sometimes called physical design) from the public features visible across the
application interface (sometimes called logical design). A neat separation of these
features can result a database that can be tweaked and tuned quite a bit with no
changes to application code. A poor separation of these features can result in a
database that makes a nightmare out of application development or database
administration.
Another consideration is whether the proposed database will be embedded
within a single application, or whether it will be an information hub that serves the
needs of multiple applications. Some design decisions will be made very differently in
these two cases.
Yet another consideration is whether the application is going to perform all
data management functions on behalf of its clients, or whether custodial responsibility
for the database and its data is going to be vested in one or more DBAs (database
administrators)

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UNIT-6
STATISTICAL DATABASE
PROTECTION & INTRUSION
DETECTION SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
STATISTICS CONCEPTS AND DEFINATIONS:
Statistics - a set of concepts, rules, and procedures that help us to:

Organize numerical information in the form of tables, graphs, and charts;

Understand statistical techniques underlying decisions that affect our lives and
well-being; and

Make informed decisions.

Statistical databases are databases containing statistical information. Such databases

are normally released by national statistical institutes but, on occasion, they can also
be released by healthcare authorities (epidemiology) or by private organizations (e.g.
consumer surveys). Statistical databases typically come in three formats:
Tabular data, that is, tables with counts or magnitudes, which are the classical output
of ocial statistics;
Queryable databases, that is, on-line databases to which the user can submit
statistical queries (sums, averages, etc.);
Micro data , that is, les where each record contains information on an individual (a
citizen or a company).
The peculiarity of statistical databases is that they should provide useful statistical
information, but they should not reveal private information on the individuals they
refer to (respondents). Indeed, supplying data to national statistical institutes is
compulsory in most countries but, in return, those institutes commit to preserving the

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privacy of respondents. Inference control in statistical databases, also known as

Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC), is a discipline that seeks to protect data in
statistical databases so that they can be published without revealing condential
information that can be linked to specic individuals among those to which the data
correspond. SDC is applied to protect respondent privacy in areas such as ocial
statistics, health statistics, e-commerce (sharing of consumer data), etc. Since data
protection ultimately means data modication, the challenge for SDC is to achieve
protection with minimum loss of the accuracy sought by database users. In, a
distinction is made between SDC and other technologies for database privacy, like
privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) or private information retrieval (PIR): what
makes the dierence between those technologies is whose privacy they seek. While
SDC is aimed at respondent privacy, the primary goal of PPDM is to protect owner
privacy when several database owners wish to co-operate in joint analyses across their
databases without giving away their original data to each other. On its side, the
primary goal of PIR is user privacy, that is, to allow the user of a database to retrieve
some information item without the database exactly knowing which item was
recovered. The literature on SDC started in the 1970s, with the seminal contribution
by Dalenius in the statistical community and the works by Schlrer and Denning in
the database community. The 1980s saw moderate activity in this eld. An excellent
survey of the state of the art at the end of the 1980s is in the 1990s, there was renewed
interest in the statistical community and the discipline was further developed under
the names of statistical disclosure control in Europe and statistical disclosure
limitation in America. Subsequent evolution has resulted in at least three clearly
dierentiated sub disciplines:
Tabular data protection. The goal here is to publish static aggregate information, i.e.
tables, in such a way that no condential information on specic individuals among
those to which the table refers can be inferred. See for a conceptual survey.
Queryable databases. The aggregate information obtained by a user as a result of
successive queries should not allow him to infer information on specic individuals.
Since the late 70s, this has been known to be a dicult problem, subject to the tracker
attack. SDC strategies here include perturbation, query restriction and camouage
(providing interval answers rather than exact answers).

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Microdata protection. It is only recently that data collectors (statistical agencies and
the like) have been persuaded to publish microdata. Therefore, microdata protection is
the youngest sub discipline and is experiencing continuous evolution in the last years.
Its purpose is to mask the original microdata so that the masked microdata are still
analytically useful but cannot be linked to the original respondents.
There are several areas of application of SDC techniques, which include but are not
limited to the following:
Ocial statistics. agencies to guarantee statistical condentiality when they release
data collected from citizens or companies. This justies the research on SDC
undertaken by several countries, among them the European Union (e.g. the CASC
project) and the United States.
Health information. This is one of the most sensitive areas regarding privacy. For
example, in the U. S., the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires the strict regulation of protected health
information for use in medical research. In most western countries, the situation is
similar.
E-commerce. Electronic commerce results in the automated collection of large
amounts of consumer data. This wealth of information is very useful to companies,
which are often interested in sharing it with their subsidiaries or partners. Such
consumer information transfer should not result in public proling of individuals and
is subject to strict regulation.

6.2 TYPES OF ATTACKS INFRENCE CONTROL EVALUTION

CRETERIA FOR CONYROL COMPARISON:
Inference attacks are notoriously hard to mitigate due to the fact that some
data always needs to be made available to legitimate sources. It's difficult to prevent a
determined individual from connecting available non-sensitive data and making
inferences about more sensitive data. With more databases reachable from the web,
this opens numerous opportunities for hackers to gain knowledge about sensitive or
condential data which they should not have.

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Database inference is not easily categorized in any other group of information security
attacks. This is due to the fact that an inference attack leverages the human mind, or
similar logic systems, in order to obtain data that may be considered secure in the
traditional sense There are many definitions of what an inference is, but in the context
of database security it is defined as the act or process of deriving sensitive information
from premises known or assumed to be true. The _premises known or assumed to be
true_ may be freely/publicly available information or information gleaned through
other methods.

DATABASE INFERENCE FOR DATA MINING:

When an attacker attempts inferencing they generally have some idea what
they are looking for. They may start out with that knowledge, or they may not. How
would they initially know what they should be looking for? Data Mining is a
technique used to gather data and find frequent patterns, find associations between
data and build rules for those associations and patterns. For example, data mining
techniques may determine that there are a lot of references to particular words or
phrases in a group of documents stored in a database. It may also determine that there
are associations which can be predicted (if a group of data contains items a and b, it is
highly likely to also contain item c). These predictions can be formed into rules which
can be applied using inferencing techniques to infer missing or restricted data. Data
mining can utilize any collected data, although generally publicly available (via the
web) sources are used. Data may also be found accidentally, or through social
engineering.

n-item k-percent rule violations:

This rule applies to statistical data sets where only aggregate queries have
been allowed. It says that whenever a query is made some number of items (N) should
not represent greater than a certain percentage (k) of the result reported. This is to
ensure that a where clause isn't added to an aggregate query which reduces the rows
calculated to few enough to to infer speci_c data items. The most obvious case is

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where 1-item represents 100-percent of the result. In other words a where clause has
been tailored to return only a single row value which represents the entire result,
therefor defeating the requirement that only aggregate queries be allowed.

Unencrypted Index
While secure databases are often encrypted, the indexes fre- quently remain
unencrypted for quicker access. Indexes are used to make searches and certain queries
run more quickly. Encrypting them defeats this purpose to some extent and there- fore
frequently the index are left in plain text. Data from un- encrypted indexes can be
used to piece together closely related data just by noting table names and keys.

What's at Stake?
Database inference is an information security issue. Whenever we talk about
information security we think about the CIA model (Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Availability). Database inferencing is all about compromising confidentiality. The end
result of a successful inference attack is equivalent to a leak of sensitive information.
Even if actual information is not leaked, certain statistics about that information can
provide enough information to make inferences which may still constitute a legitimate
breach. Methods of Attack There are several different methods used for effecting
inference attacks. They can be used individually or more commonly (and most
effectively) in conjunction with each other. Out of Channel Attacks _Out of Channel_
refers to using information from outside sources to attack the target database. Most
inference attacks are affected using at least some out of channel data, but it's not
necessary. Extensive data mining of numerous publicly accessible information
sources and using that data to infer data in a secured database is a good example. Out
of channel attacks are extremely difficult to guard against as frequently the data is out
of the control of the target. The web makes all types of information easily available
and search-able. It's not always possible or feasible to remove these sources of
information.

Direct Attacks
These are attacks directly on the target database. They seek to find sensitive
information directly with queries that yield only a few records. These are the easiest

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to detect and deny. MAC and DAC methods can mitigate these types of attacks by
ensuring data is properly classified. Similarly, triggers can be written to ensure that
queries conform to security policy standards. Direct attacks are most effective when
database security is lax or systems have been misconfigured.

Indirect Attacks
Indirect attacks seek to infer the final result based on a number of intermediate results.
Intermediate result may be obtained by aggregate (Sum, Count, Median, etc) or set
theory. A number of complex and surprisingly effective techniques can be used.
Intersections of sets can be examined. With statistical databases linear systems of
equations can be utilized to solve for missing (sensitive) data values.

Inferencing Categories
Logical Inferences
Uses association rules such as those gleaned from data mining to make logical
assumptions about data. If a, b, c, d and a ,b ,e , d then probably a, b, f _ d. Logical
inferences are most commonly used to make associations between textual data.
Techniques borrowed from data mining such as apriori and clustering. These
generally fall under the category of direct attacks, but can also be considered indirect
when more complex methods are used.

Statistical Inferences
Takes aggregate data and uses math/statistics to derive data pertaining to
individuals in the data set. Statistical inferencing is generally applied to numerical
data sets but can be extended to use with textual data. Textual data can easily be
enumerated or represented as frequencies or counts. The same statistical methods can
then be used to derive associations. These generally fall under the category of indirect
attacks since result are based on a combination (sometimes quite complex) of
intermediate results frequently based on aggregate data.

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UNIT-7
MODELS FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW GENERATION
DATABASE-1
1. A MODEL FOR FRAME BASED SYSTEM:
Frame based systems use entities like frames and their
properties as a modeling primitive. The central modeling primitive is a frame together
with slots. These slots are applicable only to the frames they are defined for. Value
restriction (facets) can be defined for each attribute. A frame provides a context for
modeling one aspect of a domain. An important part of frame-based languages is the
possibility of inheritance between frames. The inheritance allows inheriting attributes
together with restrictions on them. Knowledge base then consists from instances
(objects) of these frames.
An example of the usage of the frame-based model is Open
Knowledge Base Connectivity (OKBC) that defines API for accessing knowledge
representation systems. It defines most of the concepts found in frame-based systems,
object databases and relational databases. The OKBC API is defined in language
independent fashion, and implementations exist for Common Lisp, Java, and C. The
OKBC API provides operations for manipulating knowledge expressed in an implicit
representation formalism called the OKBC Knowledge Model. The conceptualization
in OKBC Knowledge Model is based on frames, slots, facets, instances, types, and
constants. This knowledge model supports an object- oriented representation of
knowledge and provides a set of representational constructs and thus can serve as an
interlingua for knowledge sharing and translation. The OKBC Knowledge Model
includes constants, frames, slots, facets, classes, individuals, and knowledge bases.
For precise description of the model, the KIF language (see section about KIF) is
used.
The OKBC knowledge model assumes a universe of discourse
consisting of all entities about which knowledge is to be expressed. In every domain
of discourse it is assumed that all constants of the following basic types are always
defined: integers, floating point numbers, strings, symbols, lists, classes. It is also

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assumed that the logical constants true and false are included in every domain of
discourse. Classes are sets of entities, and all sets of entities are considered to be
classes.
A frame is a primitive object that represents an entity in the
domain of discourse. A frame is called class frame when it represents a class, and is
called individual frame when it represents an individual. A frame has associated with
it a set of slots that have associated a set of slot values. A slot has associated a set of
facets that put some restrictions on slot values. Slots and slot values can be again any
entities in the domain of discourse, including frames. A class is a set of entities, that
are instances of that class (one entity can be instance of multiple classes). A class is a
type for those entities. Entities that are not classes are referred to as individuals. Class
frames may have associated a template slots and template facets that are considered
to be used in instances of subclasses of that class. Default values can be also defined.
Each slot or facet may contain multiple values. There are three collection types: set,
bag (unordered, multiple occurrences permitted), and list (ordered bag). A knowledge
base (KB) is a collection of classes, individuals, frames, slots, slot values, facets, facet
values, frame-slot associations, and frame-slot-facet associations. KBs are considered
to be entities of the universe of discourse and are represented by frames. There are
defined standard classes, facets, and slots with specified names and semantics
expressing frequently used entities
2. A MODEL FOR THE PROTECTION OF OBJECT ORIENTED
SYSTEM:
Much attention has recently been directed towards the development of
object-oriented programming and object-oriented systems

[COX86]. Its

notion is a natural consequence of modeling any entity in the real world as an

object. Thus, an object could be as simple as an integer or as complex as an
automobile. Object-oriented para- digm has been extended to model database
systems also by providing support for persistence and schema management
among others. Simultaneously, attention is also being directed to the design
and development of secure database systems, including multilevel se- cure
database management systems (MLS/DBMS). Such systems are recognized
as crucial for the secure operation of military appli- cations. In a multilevel
secure database management system, users cleared to different levels an be

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expected to share a database consisting of data at a variety of sensitivity levels.

Until recently MLS/ DBMS research has been focused on the relational model
of Codd [CODD70]. The relational model, although rich in theory, lacks the
flexibility and power of representation of the object model. There- fore, it is
expected that many new generation applications will gradually utilize the
object model [LU87, KONA88].
Security Policy
It is assumed that the multilevel secure object-oriented database
management system (MLS/ODBMS) is hosted on a TCB (Trusted Computing
Base), TCB is the solution proposed for multilevel security in operating
systems. The security policy commonly used by most TCBs is the Bell and
LaPadula security policy [BELL75], This policy consists of the following two
propenies:
l. Simple property: A subject has read access to an object if the subjects security
clearance dominates the sensitivity level of the object (e. g., a secret subject can read
either secret or unclassified objects).
2. *-property: A subject has write access to an object if the subject's clearance level is
dominated by the security level of the object (e.g., an unclassied subject can write
into an unclassied or secret object). A user may assign security levels to classes,
instances, instance variables, and methods. These security levels are assigned via the
mandatory security constraints. After the constraints are defined and stored in the
constraint database, whenever a user requests to create a class, the schema manager
component ofthe DBMS, which is responsible for managing the constraints, will
examine the security constraints and determine the security level of the class. In
addition, the schema manager may determine that some additional classes should also
be created. Ultimately, the security levels are assigned to only the classes. The
instances, instance variables, and methods associated with a class will get the security
level of the class. That is, ifa class is assigned say a secret security level, then all of
its instances, methods, and instance variables are secret.

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UNIT-8
MODELS FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW
GENERATION DATABASE SYSTEMS-2
THE ORION DATA MODE:
The ORION authorization model permits access to data on the basis of
explicit authorizations provided to each group of users. These authorizations are
classified as positive authorizations because they specifically allow a user access to an
object. Similarly, a negative authorization is used to specifically deny a user access to
an object. The placement of an individual into one or more groups is based on the role
that the individual plays in the organization. In addition to the positive authorizations
that are provided to users within each group, there are a variety of implicit
authorizations that may be granted based on the relationships between subjects and
access modes.
Orion 2.0 has two major kinds of attributes uncertain and certain. A database table T
is defined by a probabilistic schema consisting of a schema and dependency
information. The schema is similar to the regular relational schema and species the
names and data types of the table attributes (both certain and uncertain). The
dependency information identifies the attributes in that are jointly distributed (i.e.
correlated). For each dependent set of attributes in the model maintains a history.
Attributes: The uncertainty in many applications can be expressed using standard
distributions. Orion has built-in support for commonly used continuous (e.g.
Gaussian, Uniform) and discrete (e.g. Binomial, Poisson) distributions. These
uncertain values are processed symbolically in the database. When the underlying
data cannot be represented using standard distributions, Orion automatically converts
them to approximate distributions, including histograms and discrete sampling.

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Figure 1: Orion 2.0 Architecture

Correlations and missing data: Correlated attributes in a table T(given by T) are

represented by a single joint distribution. An important feature of Orion is its support
for partial. A partial is a distribution that sums (or integrates) to less than 1. This
feature allows us to represent missing tuples. If the joint of a tuple (obtained by
multiplying the individual of attributes) sums up to x, then 1-x is the probability that
the tuple does not exist in the database.

Historical dependencies: In addition to the for each dependent group of uncertain

attributes present in T , we store its history . While dependency information
expresses intra-tuple dependencies at the schema level, history captures the inter-tuple
dependencies at the instance level. The history of a given set of uncertain attributes
denotes the attribute sets from which it is derived and is used while performing
operations on the tuples to ensure that the results are consistent with PWS.

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Operations: Correct evaluation of select-project join queries under PWS reduces to

three fundamental operations on floor, marginalize, and product. These operations use
the information maintained by dependency sets in T and histories into detect any
correlations and handle them appropriately. The standard relational operations remain
unchanged for the certain attributes in the database.

RETISS system
A real-time security system (RETISS) for threat detection is described, pointing out
security violations in the target system under control. RETISS is based on the
hypothesis that a correlation exists between anomalous user behavior and threats.
Security rules have been enforced to express this correlation and to detect and
evaluate the probability of a given threat, based on the level of danger of the
occurrences of the anomalies symptomatic for the threat. Levels of danger of all the
anomalies are then fuzzy combined to express the probability of the threat. RETISS is
independent of any particular system and application environment. Moreover,
RETISS runs on a machine different from that of the target system in order to be
protected against attacks from users of the target system

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