G.R. No.

83260

April 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Augusta J. Salas for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and his co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged
in Criminal Case No. 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in
relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, in an information which reads:
That on or about May 4, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away
to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell, deliver or
give away to and other the following:
1. One (1) cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana;
2. Two (2) cigarette foil wrapper (sic) containing marijuana which are prohibited drugs.
Contrary to law.1
The accused, who were assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on May 26, 1987.
On August 18, 1987, trial on the merits started, with the prosecution thereafter presenting as its witnesses
P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy, P/Capt. Luena Layador, T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, and S/Sgt.
Armando Isidro. On its part, the defense presented both accused, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat as
its witnesses.
The court a quo, in a comparative evaluation of evidence, painstakingly summarized the clashing factual
versions of the prosecution and defense, as follows:
. . . On its part, the prosecution alleged that after receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their
informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a
team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante
Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at
Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 4, 1987 to catch the
pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy
marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the
scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated (with) on the purchase and when Arcoy
told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo
Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and
delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana,
Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head and his teammates
who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as
NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill
(Exhibit C-1) used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with two
aluminum foils and containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3").

Traversing this version is that of the defense which, in brief, consists of a denial to (sic) the
prosecution's theory and the claim that accused Juan de la Cruz, who was then suffering from
loose bowel movement, was all the time in bed at their place at 3034 Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila;
that he never left their place throughout that day of May 4, 1987; that he never had a visitor on that
day and that he was never engaged in the sale of marijuana. The NARCOM agents raided his
place without search warrant or without first securing his previous permission. One searched
thoroughly his place, the second acted as a guard posted at the door of De la Cruz' place and the
third agent was a mere observer. His place was ransacked and he was even bodily searched. As
regards accused Reynaldo Beltran, he was arrested by the same group (prior to the arrest of Juan
de la Cruz) while he was playing "pool" at Aling Ely's place along Maliclic St. that afternoon and
that without much ado, he was taken because he was fingered by one Arnel to be engaged in
selling marijuana. Both accused were brought to a parked vehicle of the raiding team, From there,
they were taken to NARCOM headquarters for investigation where for the first time they came to
know that they were being charged of selling marijuana. 2
Finding the version of the prosecution more worthy of credit, the court a quo rendered its decision3 on March
15, 1988, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the accused, JUAN DE
LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the Violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, both of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1675 and as charged in the Information, and, accordingly, hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,with the accessory penalties provided by law; to
pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs.
The three (3) aluminum foils containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" to "B-4") placed in an empty
Marlboro pack (Exhibit "B-1") are hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government and once this Decision shall become final and executory, the same shall be turned
over to the Dangerous Drugs Board through the Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Manila,
for proper disposition while the P10.00 bill (Exhibit "C-1") bearing Serial No. F-215962 shall be
returned to T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas.
Furnish copy of this Decision to the Honorable Supreme Court through the Honorable Court
Administrator. 4
From this decision, accused Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban
interposed the instant appeal.
In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated March 3, 1989, 5 the Court was informed of the death of
accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales on February 21, 1989. Counsel de oficio having thereafter
submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate of the accused 6 as directed by the Court, the criminal
case against said accused-appellant was dismissed in our resolution of September 25, 1989. 7
The present appellate proceeding is, therefore, limited only to appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban who now
faults the trial court with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Buy-Bust Operation being done to enforce Republic Act 6425 is unconstitutional and any
evidence acquired under such method should not be admissible in court.
2. The Buy-Bust Operation should be declared illegal for it breeds corruption of police and military
officers through planting of evidence for purposes of extortion.
3. The Court erred in giving probative value to the confiscated marijuana sticks despite the fact
that no civilian or other neutral person signed as a witness to its taking. If it were true, there must
be at least one civic-minded citizen who could easily be convinced by the police to witness it.

4. The Court erred in considering the evidence, Exhibits "B-2," "B-3" and "B-4", as the very ones
confiscated.
If they were the very ones taken from the accused, the original receipt prepared at the scene of the
crime would not have been thrown away by the very agent who acted as the buyer. Exhibit "E"
should have been given no probative value for having been executed by someone who did not
actually confiscate the marijuana.
5. The Court erred in giving probative value to the Buy-Bust Operation when even the alleged
marked money utilized in the operation could not be identified by the leader, T/Sgt. Jaime
Raposas.
6. The Court erred in not giving value to the testimony of the two disinterested witnesses for the
defense, namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, whose testimony corroborated
substantially that of the accused.
7. The Court erred in concluding that there was no motive for the military to manufacture
evidence.1wphi1 It is common knowledge that apprehensions of this kind are made to fill up a
quota of arrest in cases handled to comply with standard operating procedure and efficiency
reports. 8
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Appellant assails, unconstitutional, the manner in which the so-called buy-bust operation is conducted in order
to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act. He stigmatizes it as no different from seizure of evidence from one's
person or abode without a search warrant. He argues that this procedure is pregnant with opportunities, and
gives rise to situations, for corrupting our law enforcers.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the common modus operandi of narcotic agents in utilizing poseur-buyers
does not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it
is susceptible of mistakes as well as harassment, extortion and abuse. 9 By the very nature of this antinarcotics operation, the possibility of abuse is great. 10
We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of narcotics agents whose task, as it is, is already
formidable and attended with great risk, lest their dedicated efforts for the apprehension and successful
prosecution of prohibited drug violators be unduly hampered. The proliferation of drug addiction and trafficking
has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous
operations. Our experience has proven entrapment to be an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers
as exemplified by this case.
The Solicitor General explains that a buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither
instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. 11 Entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated.
Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. 12
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a
search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful
arrest. 13 A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. 14 It is a matter of judicial
experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors
were invariably caught red-handed. 15 There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
Appellant castigates the prosecution for not having presented any civilian or other neutral person who could
attest that the foils of marijuana were indeed confiscated from him. The absence of any civilian witness should
not undermine the case for the prosecution. The natural reaction of a civilian to inhibit himself from being a
witness to a crime is understandable. A criminal proceeding entails a lot of unavoidable inconveniences, aside

from the time involved in attendance as a witness in investigations and hearings. Adding to this the inherent
fear of reprisal, we have the natural reticence and abhorrence of most people to get involved in a criminal
case.
At any rate, the testimony of other witnesses in this case would only be cumulative or corroborative as they
would only be repeating the facts already amply testified to by the government witnesses. Credence should be
accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. 16
Appellant maintains that the court below should have rejected Exhibit E, which evidences the receipt of
marijuana from appellant and which was prepared by Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, in the absence of the original
receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy who was the poseur-buyer.
We agree with the Solicitor General, since this is borne out by the records, that Exhibit E is actually based on,
as it is merely a clearer copy of, the receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy. Since the draft
receipt had to be prepared hurriedly at the scene in order that the accused could be brought to the Narcotics
Command, such draft receipt was not clearly written, so Sgt. Vicente Jimenez mechanically transferred the
written entries of P/Pfc. Arcoy into a more legible copy. 17 Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Sgt. Jimenez, a
member of the team, had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in both receipts, being an eyewitness to the
events that had transpired.
The testimony of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, the team leader who gave P/Pfc. Arcoy the money to pay for the
marijuana, is challenged in that he failed to identify the marked money utilized in the operation. Appellant
insists that the marked money must be recorded, if not photographed in order to be admissible as evidence.
This is clutching at evidentiary and argumental straws.
As found by the trial court, the money was in the possession of P/Pfc. Arcoy who had been assigned as the
poseur-buyer.1wphi1 In the ensuing transaction, the foil of marijuana was handed to Arcoy by appellant and
then Arcoy gave the money to accused Juan dela Cruz. 18
Suffice it to say that even if the money given to De la Cruz was not presented in court, the same would not
militate against the People's case. 19 In fact, there was even no need to prove that the marked money was
handed to the appellants in payment of the goods. The crime could have been consummated by the mere
delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited
to, the act of delivering. In the latter case, the act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally
or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. 20
On the trial court's rejection of the testimony of the alleged two disinterested witnesses for the defense,
namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, we find no reason to disturb its ruling. We reiterate the timehonored principle that on the issue of which version to accept, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are given great weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. Subject to
exceptions which do not obtain in the present case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. 21
Appellant imputes insidious motives on the part of the military to manufacture evidence, theorizing that a buybust operation is for the purpose either of extorting money or, in line with alleged internal policies, complying
with a quota of arrests. 22 These are bare unsupported allegations. From the evidence of record, we find no
reason why the prosecution witness should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime. The defense has not established any cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge the
accused with peddling marijuana. As found by the trial court, there is not even a breath, much less an
accusation by the defense, that the military and police personnel involved were indeed engaged in such
nefarious activities. 23
Finally, appellant reproaches the prosecution for not presenting the civilian informer as a witness. 24 It is settled
that the non-presentation of a certain witness by the prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible defense. If the
accused believes that the testimony of said witness is important to his cause, he should avail thereof, even by
compulsory judicial process if necessary. Furthermore, the non-presentation of some prosecution witnesses
does not detract from the prosecution's case, since the number of such witnesses who should be called to
testify is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers. 25

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 87-54417, insofar as
accused-appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban is concerned, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

special training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the
remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto
Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive result for marijuana
(Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas
by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same
were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:

G.R. No. L-63630

April 6, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL
TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana
leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City, without
authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated by
the trial court as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2, 1982,
Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with
Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not
only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be
engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers; that it was around
9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was acting
suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to
open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and
weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said
place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City
to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his
Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio
Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had

The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10, 1982;
that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is
engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to conduct his
business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and whenever he is in
Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in Manila; that he never left his
residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to collect a balance of
P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in
the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a drinking spree with Nena's
son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take
the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and because he was
tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at the
Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila;
that while thus waiting for a bus, a man whom he came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and
asked him if he has any residence certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet
and took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him that he'll be taken
to the municipal building for verification as he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a
policeman, identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that
Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners
inside the jail may get the same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took
the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him; that he was
thereafter placed under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with possession of
marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that when he was visited
by his wife, he told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to
complain anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died.
Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy
Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter
complied and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA
LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER
AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)

It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search
without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated,
still, we cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive
results for marijuana.

This contention is devoid of merit.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore
falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco V. Pao, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of
the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case
the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening,
approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying.
Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence
since it was seized illegally. The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case
before us, which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear
that they had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as
carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling
inAminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers,
illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was
never authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that
the marijuana package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination
did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo
testified that he gave the marijuana package together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic
chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request
and said letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of
evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was
satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.

Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful and
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented
before the lower court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This
Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely
corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September
1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988];
People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the
appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had first
hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and
the defense at the time of their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v.
Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and
sufficiently clean to show the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution
witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused. The
knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of their
duties and then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies
deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the possession of the accused were
marijuana leaves were corroborated by the examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the
PCCL, with station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo, p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the money
from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise
he will be "salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for interrogation
and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is unnatural. And
this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never
returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any money from the accused and that the marijuana
leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that
expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which contained the marijuana in
question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution in this case were all
based on personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their
official duties and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any
prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through
compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was
presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and
uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution
witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the lower court, is
an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo, more or less. The
intent to transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other
things, that when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused) is bringing the
marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the

possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place
where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been
clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically denied in court,
that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be
true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that the
accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as
the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently
waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People
v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to
admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full
adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a
trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding extracted a
clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the information
stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves
testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to
conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested
at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely
severe penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this
case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his
actual session.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84079 May 6, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NESTOR KALUBIRAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:p
The accused-appellant is questioning his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City of selling
marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to
the evidence of the prosecution, in violating his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and in not according him the presumption of innocence.
Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on July 12, 1985, at about nine o'clock in the evening, at Real Street in
Dumaguete City, by elements of the Narcotics Command stationed in that city. His arrest was the result of a

"buy-bust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team members lay in wait
to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant, who was with a
group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying
marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously
marked P 5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran.
Dorado frisked the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of
marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben
Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station.
The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were
analyzed, with positive results, as reported and later testified on by Forensic Chemist Myrna Arreola. The
above-named Narcotics agents all testified and corroborated each other in narrating the "buy-bust" operation.
As might be expected, the defense had a different version of the accused-appellant's arrest. Kalubiran said he
and his friends were in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic that evening of July 12, 1985, when a jeep stopped
in front of them and several persons alighted. One of themwhom he subsequently identified as Quindo
approached and frisked him. Finding nothing on him, Quindo went back to the jeep, and he for his part left for
his house. However, he was called back by another person he later came to know as Villamor. He was told at
gunpoint to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was released the
following day with the help of a lawyer his girl friend, Norma Diez, had contacted. He denied having sold
marijuana and insisted that the 19 sticks of marijuana and the marked bill never came from him.
Norma Diez corroborated Kalubiran. So did the other defense witness, Bob Reloj, except that he testified he
was also frisked and likewise taken to PC headquarters and later to the police station, where he and Kalubiran
were detained for three days.
After examining and evaluating the evidence of the parties, Judge Enrique C. Garrovillo found in favor of the
prosecution, declared Kalubiran guilty as charged, and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P 20,000.00
fine and the costs. It is from this judgment that Kalubiran has filed this appeal.
This Court places much reliance upon the factual findings of the trial judge who has the advantages of directly
observing the witnesses on the stand and to gauge by their demeanor whether they are being true to their
oath or lying in their teeth. Such an opportunity is not available to the appellate judge, who must depend on
the inanimate record that cannot reveal the tell-tale signs by which the truth may be discerned and the
falsehood exposed. Lacking any showing of arbitrarinessand there is none in the case at barsuch findings
of the trial court cannot be faulted by this Court.
There are indeed some inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but we do not find
them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration of Kalubiran's arrest as it actually
happened. We have said often enough that such imperfections may in fact bolster rather than emasculate a
person's credibility as one cannot be expected to remember a particular incident with unerring accuracy in
every minute detail.
It is the defense evidence that in fact suffers from the defects it would impute to the prosecution. While it has
not been shown that the Narcotics agents were acting with ulterior motives rather than merely pursuing their
duties, Norma Diez's testimony is reasonably suspect as she is the girl friend of Kalubiran and can be
expected to be loyal to him, to the point of even lying for him. As for Reloj, his inconsistency with Kalubiran's
testimony is not merely insignificant but loudly proclaims its own falsity. It is noted that Reloj said he was also
arrested with the accused-appellant and the two of them were detained at the police station for three days.
The accused- appellant said he was the only one arrested and that he was released the following morning.
The defense argues that Kalubiran would not have sold marijuana at a public place and in plain view of the
people as this would be contrary to human nature and caution. We are not impressed. The people he was with
at the time were his own group, friends who were probably aware of his unlawful trade and did not care much
what he did. Moreover, it is to be expected that he did not sell the marijuana openly or with reckless fanfare
but with appropriate furtiveness, as befitted him shameful trade.
At any rate, we have already observed in People vs. Paco, 1 that:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal
transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of
other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even

serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling
illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986,142 SCRA 329; People vs.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan, supra)
along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People vs. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in
front of a house (People vs. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as
a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

The defense posture that Kalubiran's arrest and search violated the Bill of Rights demonstrates an
unfamiliarity with the applicable rules and jurisprudence. The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante
delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing
a warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a
lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the aforecited Rules, there is
abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and seizures under the conditions established in this
case. 2

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada
to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip
to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From
Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. 1

The argument that the marijuana and the marked money were not sufficiently identified must also be rejected.
The exhibits were placed in a steel cabinet by Villamor for safekeeping before he personally took the
marijuana to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. It was also Villamor who had also earlier initiated the
P5.00 bill and later identified it at the trial as the money paid to the accused-appellant in exchange for the two
sticks of marijuana.
The Court notes that Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on
his person at the time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the second offense
because he has not been impleaded in a separate information for violation of Section 8 of the said law.
It is futile for Kalubiran to invoke the constitutional presumption of innocence because it has been overcome
with overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt. His defense is not only weak; what is worse for him is that
the prosecution is clearly strong and has proved his offense beyond the whisper of a doubt.
Persons like the accused-appellant deserve the severe sanctions of the law for the misery they spread among
our people, especially the youth, many of whom have forfeited their future because of the evil influence of
drugs. The strong arm of the law must never weaken against the onslaughts of this terrible affliction.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the
rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging
object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed
four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the
wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to
also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects
of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is
a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal
search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next
ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:p
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the
accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification
papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among
others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion
who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was

hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around
his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.

warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of
each case. 9

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to
raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office,
he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It
was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership
of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. 12

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado;
Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as
amended.
SO ORDERED. 4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues
that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence
against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause that will justify a

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came
down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic
of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was
held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time
to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where
accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when
one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused
was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered
to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is
it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led
the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with
hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to
present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January
16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convincing
petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Petitioner was charged under the following information:

That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law
to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed
flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14,
1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and
Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen,
and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found
ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court
issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the
articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for
examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was awakened
only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law
Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation
and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense as a "mere afterthought" and found the version of the prosecution
"more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y
Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board without delay.

absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the
defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by
reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious
crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty which provides:
. . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are policemen
engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire to extort money
or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of
proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant,
as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, . . . , must prevail over the selfserving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed. 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended that
he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there.
Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing
evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged informant in court cast a
reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution to
produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to establish
the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the
policemen who apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as
the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no compelling
reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for
the prosecution, was straightforward spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if credible
and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed
committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.

SO ORDERED. 5

Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision
of the trial court in toto.

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

Hence, this petition.

a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the following: (a)
the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity, (c) he was denied the constitutional right of
confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant
and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to
reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better
position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust
operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs
within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible
in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do
not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua,

12

this Court held:

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it
apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not
armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the
same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that
which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was
admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his
house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to
a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of
marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision, the
penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the
imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of
marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the
amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the
penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," accusedappellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.: Missc

CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," a Hong Kong national, was found guilty by the trial court on 22 August 1997 of
delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit 999.43 grams of shabu;[1]and, having in his custody,
possession and control 5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. [2] He was meted two (2) death sentences,
one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended).[3] He was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first case,
andP12,000,000.00 in the second.[4] He is now before us on automatic review.
The antecedent facts: Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements of the Special Operation Unit,
Narcotics Command, apprehended a suspected drug courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a
transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM
agents. When questioned, Mabel Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government agents and revealed the
name of accused Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs. Misspped
On 27 June 1996 the Narcotics Command deployed a team of agents for the entrapment and arrest of Che
Chun Ting. The team was composed of Major Marcelo Garbo, a certain Captain Campos, [5] P/Insp. Raymond
Santiago, SPO3 Renato Campanilla, and a civilian interpreter. The members of the NARCOM team were in
two (2) vehicles: a Nissan Sentra Super Saloon driven by Mabel with P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla
as passengers; and the other vehicle, with Major Garbo, Captain Campos and the civilian interpreter on board.
At around 7 oclock in the morning they proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden in Pasay City where Che
Chun Ting was and had the place under surveillance. Later, they moved to the McDonalds parking lot where
the civilian interpreter transferred to the Nissan car. Mabel then called Che Chun Ting through her cellular
phone and spoke to him in Chinese. According to the interpreter, who translated to the NARCOM agents the
conversation between Mabel and Che Chun Ting, Mabel ordered one (1) kilo of shabu.
At around 10:30 oclock in the morning of the same day, Mabel received a call from the accused that he was
ready to deliver the stuff. She immediately relayed the message to the NARCOM agents. After receiving the
go-signal from Major Garbo, P/Insp. Santiago, SPO3 Campanilla and Mabel proceeded to the Roxas Seafront
Garden. The other vehicle followed but trailed behind within reasonable distance to serve as a blocking force.
Upon arriving at the Roxas Seafront Garden, Mabel honked twice and went to Unit 122. The two (2) NARCOM
agents, who waited inside the car parked two (2) meters away, saw the door of the unit open as a man went
out to hand Mabel a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents
immediately alighted and arrested the surprised man who was positively identified by Mabel as Che Chun
Ting. Then the agents radioed their superiors in the other car and coordinated with the security guard on duty
at the Roxas Seafront Garden to make a search of Unit 122. During the search SPO3 Campanilla seized a
black bag with several plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the second
floor. The bag was examined in the presence of Major Garbo, the accused himself, and his girlfriend Nimfa
Ortiz. The accused together with the evidence was then brought to Camp Crame where Forensic Chemist
P/Sr. Inspector Julita T. de Villa after conducting laboratory tests found the white crystalline substance to be
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[6] Spped
The defense has a different version. Nimfa Ortiz narrated that she sent her brother Noli Ortiz to meet Mabel
Cheung Mei Po in front of the Allied Bank at the EDSA Extension to help the latter find a lawyer and at the
same time get the laser disc she lent to Mabel. Noli testified that when he got inside the car of Mabel a
policeman sitting at the back of the car suddenly hit him on the head. The car then proceeded to McDonalds
at Roxas Boulevard near the Roxas Seafront Garden where he was moved to another car, a green Nissan
Sentra, with Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and a certain Palma (perceived to be the civilian interpreter) on
board. Mabel stayed behind at McDonalds until she was brought back to Camp Crame.
Noli Ortiz, Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and Palma went to the Roxas Seafront Garden where they parked
the car five (5) to seven (7) meters away from Unit 122. Noli rang the doorbell of the unit. When Nimfa opened
the door, two (2) NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched the premises. Noli denied
having seen any black bag seized by SPO3 Campanilla; instead, what he saw was his sister's video camera
being carted away by the NARCOM agents. He further testified that when his sister was made to sign a
certification on the conduct of the search on Unit 122 she was frightened and crying. He claimed that accused
Che Chun Ting was then asleep at the second floor of the unit.
The defense presented documents showing that the owner of Unit 122 was Nimfa Ortiz and not accused Che
Chun Ting who lived at 1001 Domingo Poblete St., BF Homes, Paranaque. [7]This information, according to the
defense, was vital for purposes of ascertaining the legality of the search on Unit 122 as well as the seizure
therein of a black bag containing several plastic bags of shabu. Finally, the defense assailed the lower court
for relying on the testimony of Mabel who turned hostile witness in the course of the trial. [8]

Accused Che Chun Ting now contends that the trial court erred: (a) in convicting him on the basis of
the shabu seized inside Unit 122, which was constitutionally inadmissible as evidence since it was seized
without a search warrant; (b) in failing to recognize that the testimony of Mabel Cheung Mei Po, who turned
hostile witness in the course of the trial, has discredited the prosecution case and cast doubt on the
testimonies of P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla; and, (c) in assuming that the entire white crystalline
substance seized is positive formethylamphetamine hydrochloride. Jospped
We resolve. The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Thus The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [9]
It further mandates that any evidence obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[10]
The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. For instance, a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense, without a search warrant. [11] The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the permissible area or surroundings within his immediate control. [12]
The issue is whether this case falls within the exception.
The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag
of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. Moreover, it is borne by the records that Unit 122
was not even his residence but that of his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein.
Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of the house constituted a permissible area within his reach
or immediate control,[13] to justify a warrantless search therein. Sppedjo
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the
same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the
warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized
from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with
the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the
arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, [14] or the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting officer against physical
harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the
person arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach. [15] The exception therefore should not be
strained beyond what is needed in order to serve its purposes, as what the Solicitor General would want us to
do.
We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu do not
fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for being violative of ones basic constitutional right and guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the "fruit of a
poisonous tree." However, objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be
returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM
operatives which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and must be retained by the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the 5,578.68 grams of shabu in evidence does not totally exonerate the
accused. The illegal search in Unit 122 was preceded by a valid arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante
delicto as a result of an entrapment conducted by NARCOM operatives on the basis of the information
provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po regarding the accused's illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago
and SPO3 Campanilla saw him handing over a bag of white crystalline substance to Mabel Cheung Mei Po.

His arrest was lawful and the seized bag of shabu weighing 999.43 grams was admissible in evidence, being
the fruit of the crime. Miso
The second assigned error hinges on the credibility of witnesses. As we have consistently stressed in the
majority of appeals in criminal cases, appellate courts give weight, and at times even finality, to the findings of
the trial judge who is in a better position to determine the credibility of witnesses, as he can observe firsthand
their demeanor and deportment while testifying. Appellate courts have none of the judges advantageous
position; they rely merely on the cold records of the case and on the judges discretion.
As mentioned earlier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness in the course of the trial. The defense
capitalized on such fact and hammered the prosecution on this point, arguing that Mabels testimony during
her cross-examination virtually belied the prosecutions factual theory of the case and cast doubt on the
testimony of the NARCOM agents.
But we are not persuaded. Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness understandably because of her
adverse interest in the case. She was separately charged for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, [16] although
she was subsequently acquitted by the trial court on reasonable doubt. [17] It is therefore to be expected that
she would be extremely cautious in giving her testimony as it might incriminate her. At any rate, the testimony
of the police informant in an illegal drug case is not essential for the conviction of the accused since that
testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative. [18] Hence, even if we concede that Mabel Cheung
Mei Pos testimony was discredited on account of the dismissal of the criminal case against her, the
prosecution could still rely on the testimonies of the arresting officers and secure a conviction on the basis
thereof.
Further, the attempt of the accused to downgrade the testimonies of the NARCOM agents is bereft of
substantial basis since it has not been shown that they had an improper motive for testifying as they did. It
would not be amiss to point out that NARCOM agents are not just ordinary witnesses but are law enforcers. As
compared to the baseless disclaimers of the witnesses for the defense, the narration of the incident of the
police officers is far more worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have
regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.[19] From the evidence at hand, we find no
reason to denigrate their declarations.
Indeed, there is no doubt from the records that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto, i.e., in the act of
delivering shabu. The evidence for the prosecution is both substantial and convincing. At its core is the
testimony of P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla who categorically pointed to the accused as the person
who handed to Mabel a plastic bag of white crystalline substance which, upon forensic examination, was
found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As can be gleaned from the assailed decision
of the trial court, the narration of events by the police officers is positive, credible and entirely in accord with
human experience. It bears all the earmarks of truth that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to give
credence to it. They testified in a clear, precise and straightforward manner, and even the rigid crossexamination by the defense could not dent the essence of their testimonies.Nexold
As regards the third assigned error, the accused questions the accuracy of the laboratory tests conducted by
the forensic chemist on the seized articles. He contends that the PNP Crime Laboratory should have
subjected the entire 999.43 grams and 5,578.66 grams of white crystalline substance taken from him, to
laboratory examination and not merely representative samples thereof in milligrams.
The argument is untenable. Primarily, there is no law or rule of evidence requiring the forensic chemist to test
the entire quantity of seized drugs to determine whether the whole lot is really prohibited or regulated drugs as
suspected. On the contrary, it has always been the standard procedure in the PNP Crime Laboratory to test
only samples of the drugs submitted for laboratory examination. A sample taken from a package may be
logically presumed to be representative of the whole contents of the package. [20]
Moreover, we held in one case that chemical analysis is not an indispensable prerequisite to establish whether
a certain substance offered in evidence is a prohibited drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be
acquired without any knowledge of chemistry to such an extent that the testimony of a witness on the point
may be entitled to great weight. Such technical knowledge is not required, and the degree of familiarity of a
witness with such drugs only affects the weight and not the competency of his testimony.[21] Manikx
At any rate, it was up to the defense to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the findings of the forensic
chemist were erroneous. In the absence of such evidence, the positive results of the tests conducted by the
chemist should be accepted as conclusive. After all, she has in her favor the presumption that she regularly

performed her official duty, which was to carry out those tests in accordance with the accepted standard
procedure.[22]
All told, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt in Crim. Case No. 96-8932. Accordingly, he must suffer for his serious crime of poisoning the health and
future of this nation. However, we refrain from imposing the capital punishment. As amended by RA 7659, Sec.
20, Art. IV of The Dangerous Drugs Actnow provides in part that the penalty in Sec. 15, Art. III, shall be applied
if the dangerous drug involved is, in the case of shabu or methylampethamine hydrochloride 200 grams or
more and the delivery or distribution of regulated drugs without proper authority is penalized with reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Thus the law prescribes two (2)
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. Pursuant to Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code, since
there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending accused's violation of the law, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.
The legislature never intended that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated
in Sec. 20, the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is
there a provision from which such a conclusion may be drawn. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded in People v. Gatward[23] that RA 7659 did not amend Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code, and the
rules therein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity
provided in Sec. 20.[24]Maniksx
With respect to Crim. Case No. 96-8933, since the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated, which rendered the evidence against him inadmissible, he is acquitted of
the offense charged.
Finally, we take this opportunity to remonstrate the law enforcement agencies regarding respect for the
constitutional rights of persons suspected of committing crimes. As the phalanx of our united efforts to stem
the surging tide of drug-trafficking in this country, the police force is not only expected to be well-trained and
well-equipped in the detection and apprehension of drug pushers, but more importantly, it must also be aware
that arrests, searches and seizures should at all times and in all instances be done within the context of the
Constitution. While we encourage an active and vigorous law enforcement, we nevertheless defer to and
uphold the sacredness of constitutional rights. In the instant case, while the penalty of reclusion
perpetuaimposed by this Court on the accused may be sufficient to put him away for good, it is nonetheless
lamentable that he will walk away unpunished in the other case of possession of more than 5,000 grams of
illegal narcotics on account of a blunder which could have easily been avoided had the NARCOM officers
faithfully adhered to the requirements of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 96-8932 convicting accused CHE CHUN TING
alias "DICK" for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended) is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The accused is ordered to pay a fine in the increased amount of P2,000,000.00, and the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 96-8933, accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt the evidence against him being inadmissible.
The 999.43 grams and 5,578.68 grams of shabu, subject of Crim. Case Nos. 96-8932 and 96-8933 are
FORFEITED in favor of the government to be turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board and the
National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable search
and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot
be held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein.

The Case
Antonio C. Estella appeals the August 25, 1998 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales
(Branch 69) in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I. The trial court found him guilty of violating Section 8, Article II
of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2143-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The Sheriff is
directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition.
In Criminal Case No. RTC 2144-I, accused Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and the Information dated 07
January 1997 filed against him for violation of P.D. 1866 is dismissed with costs de oficio.
The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and four (4) live ammunitions, subject of the offense, are
ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives
Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. [2]
The Information dated January 7, 1997, charged appellant thus:
That on or about the 20th day of November, 1996 at about 11:15 oclock in the morning, at Purok Yakal,
Barangay Baloganon, in the Municipality of Masinloc, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, custody and control, [o]ne (1) tin can labeled CLASSIC containing twenty (20) small bricks
of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 589.270 grams each wrapped with a piece of reading
material; [o]ne (1) tin can labeled CLASSIC containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 41.126 grams;
[t]wo (2) white sando plastic bag each containing one (1) [brick] of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of 1.710 kilograms each wrapped with a piece of newspaper; [o]ne (1) white sando plastic bag
containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of 1.820 kilograms each
wrapped with a piece of newspaper, all in the total of 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana, without any authority
to possess the same.[3]
After the Information had been read to him in Filipino, a language he fully understood, [4] appellant, assisted by
his counsel de parte,[5] pleaded not guilty when arraigned on March 11, 1997. After due trial, the RTC
convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana), but acquitted him of illegal
possession of firearms. On November 4, 1998, his counsel filed a Notice of Appeal. [6]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:
Prior to November 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued
a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay
Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.
In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Bulor[o]n, then Intelligence and
Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special
Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with
the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay
Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain
Barnaceha accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place
mentioned in the search warrant.
On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2)
meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of appellant, and being rented by appellants live-in
partner, named Eva. They approached appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed
appellant the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if indeed he
had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty.

While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried marijuana fruiting
tops. One can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of
appellant and his live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained four
(4) big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized
the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items.
Barangay Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the
receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested appellant and brought him to San
Marcelino, Zambales.

As to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, the lower court ruled that the search warrant did not cover
the seized firearm, making it inadmissible against appellant. He was thus acquitted of the charge.

At their office in San Marcelino, Zambales, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca placed their markings on the
seized items for purposes of identification. SPO1 Arca kept the seized items under his custody. The next day,
SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca brought the seized items to San Antonio, Zambales, where Police Senior
Inspector Florencio Sahagun examined the suspected marijuana dried leaves. Inspector Sahagun prepared a
certification of field test.

A. The trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the conjectural and conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses;

On November 29, 1996, the suspected marijuana dried leaves were delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
Camp Olivas for further examination. Senior Inspector Daisy Babor, a forensic chemist, examined the
suspected marijuana dried leaves and issued Chemistry Report No. D-768-96 stating that the specimens are
positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Specimen A weighed 1.710 kilograms, while Specimen D weighed
1.820 kilograms.[8] (Citations omitted)

C. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged has
been prove[n] beyond reasonable doubt, instead of judgment of acquittal demanded by the constitutional
presumption of innocence[.][11]

Version of the Defense

For his version of the facts, appellant merely reproduced the narration in the assailed RTC Decision as
follows:
Accused Antonio C. Estella [I]s married to Gloria Atrero Estella. They have three (3) children, namely:
Carmen Estella (8 years old), Antonio Estella, Jr. (5 years old) and Roen Estella (3 years old). Since 1982,
Antonio Estella has been [a] resident of Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.
On 20 November 1996 between 10:30 oclock and 11:00 oclock in the morning, while accused was talking
with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and
about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The group introduced themselves
as policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant
issued against him. Accused identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from the accused as to
where his house is located and accused told them that his house is located across the road. The police did
not believe him and insisted that accuseds house (according to their asset) is that house located about 5-8
meters away from them. Accused told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to
where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk
shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they
had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to the accused. They photographed the accused and brought
him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Accused Antonio Estella was investigated a[t] San Marcelino,
Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by
Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan.
Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and likewise having
any firearm.
Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years, identified the house depicted on a
photograph as that house belonging to the accused. [9] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
In finding appellant guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, the court a quo relied heavily on the testimony
of the prosecutions principal witness, Intelligence and Investigation Officer SPO1 Antonio Buloron. He was
among the members of the police team that searched appellants alleged house. Since the defense failed to
present proof of any intent on the part of SPO1 Buloron to falsely impute to appellant such a serious crime, the
trial court accorded full faith and credence to the police officers testimony.
Moreover, the RTC held that no less than the barangay captain of the place named in the search warrant led
the police to the house. Thus, appellant could not deny that he owned it.

Hence, this recourse.[10]

The Issues
In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

B. The trial court gravely failed to consider the serious contradictions in the facts and evidences adduced
by the prosecution;

Though not clearly articulated by appellant, the pivotal issue here is the legality of the police search
undertaken in the hut where the subject marijuana was seized.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Legality of the Search Undertaken
Once again, this Court is confronted with a situation that involves a well-enshrined dogma in our Constitution:
the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches
and seizures.[12] The exclusionary rule prescribed by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of this right. [13]
The conviction or the acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity of the police officers search and
seizure, as well as the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof. Without that evidence, the
prosecution would not be able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ownership of the Subject House
Appellant claims that the hut,[14] which was searched by the police and where the subject marijuana was
recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another house[15] as his real residence. To support his claim,
he presents a document[16] that shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother Leonardo C. Estella by one
Odilon Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that just because appellant has another house in a
place away from the hut that was searched does not necessarily mean that the hut is not occupied by him or
under his full control.[17] The prosecution cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that
place, to show that the hut in question belongs to appellant.
The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is that it was bought by his brother
Leonardo a.k.a. Narding Estella. [18] We cannot sustain the OSGs supposition that since it was being rented
by the alleged live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control of it. In
the first place, other than SPO1 Bulorons uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in partner of appellant -- if he indeed
had any. Moreover, the testimony of Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the position of the
prosecution. We quote from his testimony:
Q Do you know who is the owner of that house?
A

What I know is that Narding Estella bought that house, sir.

Who is that Narding Estella?

The brother of Tony Estella, sir.

And you know that that has been rent[ed] to people?

And you saw him and then the search warrant was presented, isnt it?

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

Now, so far how many people [rented] that place or that house?

And when it was presented what did Tony Estella do?

I do not have any information about that[,] sir.

A What they did they show to Tony the search warrant and I also read the contents of the search warrant,
sir.

Why did you know that that place was rented?

Because when I asked Eva she replied that they [were] only renting that house, sir.

Q And when Tony was shown that search warrant what did he do immediately after being shown that search
warrant?

How long has Eva been renting that house?

He just [sat] and then he stood up, sir.

I do not have any information about that[,] sir.

And when he stood up what else did he do?

Do you know who was living with Eva?

Nothing, sir. The NARCOM g[o]t inside the house, sir.

No, sir.

And where did Antonio Estella go when the police entered the house?

So, what you know is that Eva lives alone in that house?

He was just outside the house, sir.

Yes, sir.

And how far is that house from Antonio Estella?

And you do not know anybody who is renting that house?

INTERPRETER:

I have no information, sir.

Witness estimating the distance of about five (5) meters.

And you do not know if the accused was renting [it] or not?

COURT:

I dont have any information, sir. [19]

Do the prosecution and defense agree to 5 meters?

At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut was bought by Narding Estella and rented by someone
named Eva. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was under his full control, is
merely conjectural and speculative. We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses
mere suspicion or conjecture.[20] To lead to conviction, evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility
or even probability of guilt.[21] It must engender moral certainty.

BOTH COUNSEL:

Neither do we find merit in the OSGs argument that appellant cannot deny ownership or control of the hut,
since he was found in front of it, sitting on a rocking chair and drinking coffee. [22] Indeed, to uphold this
proposition would be to stretch our imagination to the extreme.

And when the police entered the house did not Tony go with them?

I did not notice, sir.[26]

The OSG maintains that when appellant was shown the search warrant and asked about the existence of
prohibited drug in his possession, appellant went inside the hut, took his stock of marijuana and turned it [over]
to the police officers.[23] This, according to the prosecution, clearly showed that he was not only occupying the
hut, but was in fact using it to store the prohibited drug. [24]

It is undisputed that even before arriving at the hut, the police officers were already being assisted by
Barangay Captain Barnachea. Thus, it was highly improbable for him not to see personally appellants alleged
voluntary surrender of the prohibited drug to the authorities. And yet, his testimony completely contradicted
the policemens version of the events. He testified that appellant, after being served the search warrant,
remained outside the hut and did nothing. In fact, the former categorically stated that when the police officers
had gone inside the hut to conduct the search, appellant remained seated on a rocking chair outside.
[27] Barnacheas statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1 Bulorons claim that, after being apprised of
the contents of the search warrant, appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the police. [28]

It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from assessing the probative value of witnesses testimonies
on the basis of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs). [25]
In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court erred in adopting the prosecutions dubious story. It failed to
see patent inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies about the search undertaken.
A review of the TSNs shows that SPO1 Buloron, the prosecution's principal witness, testified that appellant
had allegedly gone inside the hut; and that the latter had done so to get his stock of illegal drugs, which he
turned over to the police. Ironically, Captain Barnachea, who was purposely presented by the prosecution to
corroborate SPO1 Buloron's story, belied it when he testified thus:

Yes, Your Honor.

PROS. QUINTILLAN:

Apart from the testimony of Barnachea -- which contradicted rather than validated the story of SPO1 Buloron -no other evidence was presented to corroborate the latters narration of the events. Without any independent
or corroborative proof, it has little or no probative value at all.
In a criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable, and in harmony
with the usual course of human experience -- not by mere conjecture or speculation. [29] While the guilty should
not escape, the innocent should not suffer.[30]

PROS. QUINTILLAN:
Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
Q

When the police officer showed that search warrant what did Antonio Estella said, if any, if you hear[d]?

What I saw is that Tony Estella is sitting in the rocking chair outside the house drinking coffee, sir.

The OSG argues that [e]ven assuming that appellant was not the occupant of the hut, the fact remains that he
voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. After appellant had surrendered the prohibited

stuff, the police had a right to arrest him even without a warrant and to conduct a search of the immediate
vicinity of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful objects as an incident to the lawful arrest. [31]

There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an
arrest occurs or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed
areas in that room itself.[35]

The above argument assumes that the prosecution was able to prove that appellant had voluntarily
surrendered the marijuana to the police officers. As earlier adverted to, there is no convincing proof that he
indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecutions story.

The purpose of the exception is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. [36]

Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a
search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within appellants
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a
lawful arrest.

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

The Presence of the Accused or the

Witnesses During the Search

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule
112.
Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject
prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed
or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there
could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers,
and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the
confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can
reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy.[32] The prevailing rule is that the arresting
officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latters person -- that
which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner
with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
[33]

In the leading case Chimel v. California,[34] the Supreme Court of the United States of America laid down this
rule:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise,
the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestees person and the area
within his immediate control construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellants ownership, control of or residence in the subject
hut, we hold that the presence of appellant or of witnesses during the search now becomes moot and
academic.
Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search if he was neither the owner nor the lawful
occupant of the premises in question. Besides, as we have noted, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses regarding these crucial circumstances were contradictory. They erode SPO1 Bulorons credibility
as a prosecution witness and raise serious doubts concerning the prosecutions evidence. This Court is thus
constrained to view his testimony with caution and care.
With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken -- during which the
incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered -- we hold that the search was illegal. Without the badge of
legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible.
Objections to the
Legality of the Search
Finally, the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to object to the legality of the search
and the admissibility of the evidence seized through that search because, during the trial, he did not raise
these issues.
On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality of the search. In fact, when SPO1
Buloron was presented as a prosecution witness, the formers counsel objected to the offer of the latters
testimony on items allegedly confiscated during the search. Appellants counsel argued that these items,
which consisted of the marijuana and the firearm, had been seized illegally and were therefore inadmissible. [37]
Further, in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits, [38] appellant once again questioned the
legality of the search conducted by the police, a search that had yielded the evidence being used against him.
Finally, on October 21, 1997, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence [39] reiterating his objection to the search and to
the eventual use against him of the evidence procured therefrom.
All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
with moral certainty.[40] Not only did its evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it
has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the
accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. [41] To overcome such presumption, the
prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates that if the
prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional
duty of the court to set them free.[42] This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio
C. Estella for insufficiency of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and
to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement. Costs de oficio.

The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October
23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that
the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. [4]

SO ORDERED.

For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that in the evening of
October 19,1996, she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial
Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she
boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was
flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer
invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly
containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She also
denied sitting beside the appellant in the passengers seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a
male passenger behind the driver.

[G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA
NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. [1] For their conviction, each
was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:
That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 oclock dawn, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping with one another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a
transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and
a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief,
held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle,
would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay
Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3
Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a
passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant
Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga.[3] In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black
bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to
Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the
black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3
Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the
appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in
plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated
that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to
sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to
have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present.

Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The latter marked and
submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2
Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident
was recorded in the companys logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that the
woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II,
Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she assigned the following
errors:
1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of
accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers who arrested
both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of the accused to
custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the
accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecutions witnesses which inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention and version of
the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and considered the documentary
and object evidence of the prosecution not formally offered amounting to ignorance of the law. [6]
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She
contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but
was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal
as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is
permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only
on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [7]
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded
by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. [8]
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search
and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of
moving vehicles.[9] Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.[10] Peace officers in such cases, however, are
limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. [11] When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction.[12]
In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive
odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; [13] (b) where an informer positively
identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; [14] (c) where the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said
accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; [15] (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed
to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; [16] (f) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep
penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the
accused belong -- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; [17] (g) where the arresting
officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was
established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying
shabu with him;[18] (h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a
suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; [19] and (i) where the
appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian
asset.[20]
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence
Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded
the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big
bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that
night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a
suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned
it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and
seizure of appellants bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making
a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules
of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person
to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:
Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x.[21] (emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated
her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel
of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered
inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her custodial
investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the
relevant portion of its decision:
Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to
accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit C) is
inadmissible because they were not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds
the postulate to rest on good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from both accused as
evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of
the police interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be
resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecutions evidence, both accused can be
convicted.[22] (emphasis supplied)
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary
evidence of the prosecution despite the latters failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she
argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they
have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case.[23] All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified,
presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. [24] Even without their formal offer,
therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and
their testimonies are recorded.[25] Furthermore, appellants counsel had cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses who testified on the exhibits.[26]
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She first cites the
inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who
opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was
already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police officers failure to
remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is
improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details
and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do
not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her coaccused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on
important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. [27] The identity of the person who opened
the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of
witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may
have different recollections of the same incident. [28]
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember the name of the
tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in
complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption.[29] In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on
the part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.

Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and alibi
cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can
just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30] It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. [31] The sole proof
presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement,
which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A.
No. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.

certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian
informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So
Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a
NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian
informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned
over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga
inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt.
Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00
(with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh.
"L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A prearranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he
had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target
site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team
leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990, 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing
dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest
of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100
meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani
and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out
of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani
gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went
back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents.
Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions
and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles,
sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his
house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later
came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team
returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife,
slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the
P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was
and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped
away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it
somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the
NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaperwrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against
the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the
NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner
and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the
prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian,
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a

In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari
Musa gave his true name Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two
newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped
marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana
(which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime
Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana
specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated December
14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory
(Exh. "B-1") on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,
examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All
submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of
marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry

Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at
the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen
written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the
one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989,
through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report
(Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)

After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:

T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his
initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on
Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with
SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to
the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the
stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1"). 4

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R.
Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at
Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his
one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About
1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the
one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari
Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to
enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM
agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search
warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red
plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if
the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was
handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for
clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at
Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by
one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or
document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the
marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa
refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was
not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the
NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and
his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and
Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was
outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination
Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by
three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and
he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari
Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM
agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of
marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to
his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and
that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and

a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling
marijuana before. 5

WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed
without subsidiary imprisonment. 6

The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the
buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or
vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the
appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a testbuy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He
reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted
a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and
a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian
Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members
were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be
used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani
approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him
for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house
and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position,
Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of
raising his right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the
arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him where it was.
The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust
operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be
direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves
credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each
other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the
appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter
to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has
held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties
to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana. 17

The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the appellant
to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the
crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from
the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed
in People v. Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant
case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given
him some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The
appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the
appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between
marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt.
Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani
can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion
were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the
appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Bian testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana
cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from
those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on
those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more
or less 10 to 15 meters. 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over
marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The
relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach
the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a
distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former
"something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the
appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct
evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material
points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant
at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their
office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3)
T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December
14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt.
Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the
arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant
while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant
met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally,
the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to
see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to
the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of
the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which
the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged
signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They
searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he
gave the marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and
noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found
dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the
marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches
and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt.
Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded
to the house near the road and he was met by one person and
later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short
pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him,
thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house
and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.

Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares
inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions
to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to
the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to
make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was
used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buybust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money
found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house
but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag
hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in
the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the
defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey
to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The
defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through
the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package
containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was
challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the
officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the
discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed
before him in full view. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal
on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the
prosecution's evidence. 44

doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this
case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no
clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to
the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the
object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the
other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani
and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces
of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of
the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 46

[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]

ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not
justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain
view" of the object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve
the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the
plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the
appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1)

One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;

"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;
"(3)

One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and

"(4)

Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver." [1]

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 [2] thru the following
Information:[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120
with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and
eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but granted his application for bail.[6] During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, [7] upon advice
of counsel,[8] to make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the
case.[10]
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner
of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".[11] Petitioner filed his
notice of appeal on April 28, 1994.[12] Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, [13] the SolicitorGeneral, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to
cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent
court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, [14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and
furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance
Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City,
is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be
immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED."[15]
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. [16] On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" [17] but the same was denied by respondent court in its
September 20, 1995 Resolution,[18] copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The
next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with application for
bail[19] followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, [20] a "second supplemental
petition"[21] and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the SolicitorGeneral[22] sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated
on July 31, 1996.[23] The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on
the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply.[24] However, after his vigorous resistance and
success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of
petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete
turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. [25]
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence by
respondent court, is as follows:[26]
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez
were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the
heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 56, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi
Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa
naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the
restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a
vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p.
8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been
right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).

"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder
of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the
Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio
controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the
call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north (p.
11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and
chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as
PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p.
34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run
accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second
radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p.
20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake
Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and
SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves
near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid).
It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p.
9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7
of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN,
March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO
Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with
plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident, even
passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo
church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the
car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew
Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No.
3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23,
1993). He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon
learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came
from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured
in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15,
1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and
he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February
23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers
boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept
the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda
went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C.
Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that
moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p.
14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short
leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun
(Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt
protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand
alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun
really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming
appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p.
17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the
gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).

"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2
Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO
Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p.
13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing
and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead,
played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand
saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed
a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw
this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a
rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his
vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit
D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semiautomatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered
angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid)
where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in
its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also
voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short
magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the
Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City
Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio
(pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating
that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum
receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino,
PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The
Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP
131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued
by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla
(p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he
is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject
firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records[27]of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime
charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant
was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge
illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

[28]

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.
[29]
Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It
must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense,
but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." [30] As testified
to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle
in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda
already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.[31]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. [32] We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek
the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who ,
in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to
contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that
the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and
unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which
has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need
to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, [34] a fleeing suspect, a moving
vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and
delay improvident.[35] The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in
criminal activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith
& Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again
actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the
presence of a peace officer.[37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he
had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the
Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching
Pajero of petitioner,[38] its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood
and railings thereof.[39]These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the
arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. [40]
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea.[41] Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his
failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him
in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42]Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects.[43]
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility
in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, [44] are as follows:
1.
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
2.

Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]

(a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b).

the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c).

the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d).

"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [48]

3.
search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. [50]
4.

consented warrantless search, and

5.

customs search.

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. [51] The seizure of the Smith & Wesson
revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. [52] Thus it has been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing
their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti."[53]
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant."[54]
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police.[55] This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure[56], and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.[57]
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities
on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified
under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police
may undertake a protective search[58] of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle [59] which are
within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. [60] This satisfied the two-tiered test
of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of
immediate control[61] and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. [62] The products of that search
are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving
vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as
in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.[63]
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because
he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as
evidenced by a Mission Order[64] and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the
deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of
the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess.[65] The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions[66] were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered
in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of

the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles
City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were
prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority to possess and carry
the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any proper document
showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have
produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial
presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged
against him. Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the
subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no allegation of a
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James Neneng to whom a
subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court
but was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found
Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994." [67]
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt
if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the
subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential Security
Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their
irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab
the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself
from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the
Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement units/personnels such as
PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without
resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will be carried out
through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this
Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such violation."[68]
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the
dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his behalf.
[69]
His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." [70] In addition, only Unit
Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts
under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.[71] PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued
petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but
a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 112-Baguio City,"[72] areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval "by
next higher Headquarters" [73] which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently
provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding certification from
the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been

officially taken up in that units property book, and that report of such action has been reported to higher
AFP authority."

"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present the
corresponding certification as well.

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of
Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.

What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP,
does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of
the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel. [74] The
implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside
residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the
agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and
that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major
services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of command." [75]
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:

That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is accentuated
all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and
Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in
the name of the petitioner.[76] Thus:
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm pistol, Smith
and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked whether it is registered or
not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm
with the same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one
Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith
and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of the accused in
this case?
"A. Yes, sir.[77]
xxx

xxx

And the certification which provides as follows:

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120

Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y, licensed/registered to one
Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:

"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents
included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving
regular compensation for the service they are rendering."

xxx

"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per verification from
available records on file this Office as of this date:

(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch"

[78]

In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm.
[79]
In People vs. Tobias,[80] we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no
license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess
was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of
the evidence[81] that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated
firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, [82] as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no
doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to
depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by
the Court with respect and finality.[83]
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience
(sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous
laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists.[84] He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of
firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. [85]
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to
apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones. [86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it
stands.[87] And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the
previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a
penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE

Camp Crame, Quezon City
"PNPFEO5

28 November 1992

"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,

the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' " [88]

dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of
the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment,
though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.[89]

"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured
shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of
the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication,[90] as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld
twice by this Court.[91] Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . ."[92] Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of
the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret
and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the
same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian[93] where the Court en banc provided that the
indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following explanation by the Court:
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In accordance
with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon,[94] although Presidential Decree No.
1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said
Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty
for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said
Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an
unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan,
Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.[3] The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's
hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a
reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay,
SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector
Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same. [4]
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for
the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had
his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters
from appellant's hut.[5]PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his.[6] The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms.[7] The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. [8] Appellant was then
arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.[9] Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory
forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing
calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. [10] She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:

"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not merely
imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate
sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.[95]

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white
sack with markings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by
the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT
that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."[11]

SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]

xxx

The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of
Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
[12]
This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of
the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.[13]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision[1] promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela
Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No.
6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about September
25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante
delicto and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate
and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which

As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September
25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he
does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." [14] This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut.[15] Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then
asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2
Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. [16]Appellant was so nervous and
afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. [17]
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to
uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing
next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. [18] The police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied
the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's
illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad

situation."[19] At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants
seized by the police.[20]
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of
his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.[21] The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito)
Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana
plants were found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's. [22]

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no
search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question
were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were,
in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants
were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless
lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that:

The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's
claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. [23] Tipay presented a sketch he
made,[24] which showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant,
as well as the closest neighbor.According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the
old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua. [25] Tipay admitted on crossexamination that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the measurements. [26] He further stated that his
basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him
by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants. [27]
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and
ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants
punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to
death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[28]
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA
PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II

"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to
make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search
warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the
dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon
discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by
the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was,
therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was required." [30]
The Constitution[31] lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.[32]Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.[33]
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at
least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to
them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that
the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against
illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants.[34] The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their
intentions.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUSDELICTI AND THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For
the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:

III

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON
APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE
MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA.[29]
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more
than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot
does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He
relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not
places.

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [35]
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant
was arrested without a warrant.[36] Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.[37] Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of
SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the
illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search"
was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The
"plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches
by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of
one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. [39] The guarantee refers to "the
right of personal security" [40] of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected

against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. [41] To conclude otherwise would not only mean
swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against
unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private
place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his
bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure,
be used as evidence against appellant.They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a
reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as
evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against
appellant, we must now address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices
to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made
in the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police
verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative
of the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without
any counsel."[42]
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used
against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the
trial court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the
police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana
plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent
counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of
the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to
apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his
constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under
custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to
competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute
any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.[43] An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. [44] The moment the police try to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at
that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. [45]
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as
the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police
operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to
appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police
was no longer a general inquiry.[46]
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so
we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just
asking him..."[47] In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a

suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had
not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."[48] As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay
peace officer and three other armed policemen. [49] All had been dispatched to arrest him. [50] From these
circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant
way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly
pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession
to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
[51]
The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission
allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his
arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to
counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.[52] Even if the confession or admission were "gospel
truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the
confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.[53]
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the
author thereof.[54] The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,
[55]
it must likewise be credible and competent. [56] Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.
[57]
Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it,
that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." [58]
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense
charged. These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of
ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence
presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part
to have admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict
him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having
been conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes
that the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for
the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said
marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional
guarantees against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful
search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police
during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights.The purported confession was
made without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said
confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a
suspect in a criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel during such
investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of
ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional
competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved..."[59] To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or
fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. [60] Absent
the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.[61] In this case, the seized
marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities,
which render these inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." [62] Nor can the confession obtained
during the uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him.[63] Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did

not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the
presumption of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are
declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law."[64]
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death
penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 124442. July 20, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA, accusedappellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 (known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses ARMANDO COMPACION y Surposa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Bagonbon,
San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, of the crime of VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659 committed as follows:
"That on or about 1:30 oclock A.M., July 13, 1995, at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or culture two (2) full
grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, more or less eleven (11) feet tall, in gross
violation of Section 9, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659."
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
On January 2, 1996, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREAS, the Court finds the accused ARMANDO COMPACION Y SURPOSA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Violation of Section 9, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 whereof he is charged in the information in the
instant case and sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of half a million (P500,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency. The portion of the backyard of his residence in the poblacion proper of Brgy. Bagonbon
this City and Province, in which the two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, subject-matter of this case, were
planted, cultivated and cultured, is hereby ordered confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, pursuant to
the aforequoted Sec. 13 R.A. 7659.
It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the instant case for having planted, cultivated and
cultured just two (2) marijuana plants is extremely harsh. But there is nothing in the law which allows the
Court to impose a lesser penalty in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular
case. Hence, dura lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law.

The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a nonchalant or cavalier attitude towards
dangerous prohibited drugs. They should not dabble in it as if they were a flippant thing. These dangerous
and prohibited drugs are a terrible menace to the minds and morality of our people for their distortive and
pervertive effects on them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the government wants this evil
exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the accused instead of helping the government in this drive,
in his capacity as barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting, cultivating and culturing
said two (2) marijuana plants himself.
A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of reflection forced upon him by the result of his
own act in violating the law. It is time for him to humbly submit to the compassion of God and of his only
begotten Son, whose birth on earth to become the Saviour of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to change
and transform his own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that with a changed life, God might be
gracious enough to move the heart of His Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him
walk out of prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read Gods Word daily while in prison for his
guidance, comfort and hope.
Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the information in the instant case.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks the Court to reverse the same on
the following grounds, viz:
The lower court erred:
1. In holding that Exhibit F of the prosecution, consisting of two marijuana plants wrapped in plastic, is
admissible in evidence against the accused as the corpus delicti in the instant case, inspite of the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove that the specimens of marijuana (Exhibit F) examined by the forensic chemist
were the ones purportedly planted and cultivated by the accused, and of the fact that the prosecution failed to
establish the evidences chain of custody; and
2. In holding that the warrantless search of the residence of the accused at 1:30 oclock in the morning of July
13, 1995 at Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, and seizure of two eleven feet tall, more
or less, full grown suspected Indian Hemp, otherwise known as Marijuana plants, leading to the subsequent
arrest of the accused, were valid on the ground that the accused has committed the crime of cultivating the
said marijuana plants in violation of Sec. 9, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by RA 7659
in open view, inspite of the fact that they had to enter the dwelling of the accused to get to the place where the
suspected marijuana plants were planted, and in admitting in evidence the said plants, later marked as Exhibit
F, against the accused, inspite of the fact that the said plants were the fruits of the poisonous tree. [3]
The relevant facts are as follows:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating
marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard
of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants. [4]
SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief
of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence
Division Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force. Two
members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were also included in the
composite team.
On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge Bernardo
Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the matter.[5] The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around
six-thirty in the evening, then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search
warrant. They were not able to do so because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They
were told by the judge to go back in the morning. [6]

Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in
the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accusedappellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the
accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4
Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the
use of his wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for
violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then
uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the
Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result. [7]
On July 15, 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory,
Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector
Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other
was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the
microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results.[8]
On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he
and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with
him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military,
entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered
the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living
room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his
permission to search his house and the premises. [9]
After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the
backyard. One of the military men said: Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your backyard to which
accused-appellant replied: I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they
are medicinal plants for my wife who was suffering from migraine. [10]
After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and
themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the military men spent the night. [11]
At around ten oclock that same morning, they brought him with them to the city hall. Accused-appellant saw
that one of the two (2) service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the
military men that said plants were marijuana.[12] Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met with the mayor and
then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with
the alleged marijuana as back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF Headquarters.
[13]

A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 was filed
against accused-appellant.
Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, we now consider his allegation that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities.
The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. xxx

It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily ones home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. What is sought to be guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his
residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not
as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy
must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards.[15]
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search
and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision. [16]Evidence secured
thereby, i.e., the fruits of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17]
The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the conduct of a
search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several instances when the law recognizes
exceptions, such as when the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; [18] when the
owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; [19] when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest;[20] when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; [21] when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; [22] when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view;[23] when it involves a stop and frisk situation; [24] when the search is under
exigent and emergency circumstances; [25] or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. [26] In these instances, a search may be validly made
even without a warrant.
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accusedappellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any
of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellants right against unreasonable search and
seizure was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure
conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be
waived either expressly or impliedly,[27] such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his
premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when
members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.[28] The case of People v. Burgos,[29] is instructive. In Burgos, the Court ruled that the accused is not to
be presumed to have waived the unlawful search simply because he failed to object. There, we held:
xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v.
Locsin (supra);

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.

xxx

Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy
and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v. Querubin,[14] underscored their importance:

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

xxx

xxx

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. [30]
Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of accused-appellants premises
by invoking the necessity and urgency of the situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team
that the residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance following a tip from a
confidential informant. The surveillance was conducted on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants
were seized four (4) days later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have
first secured a search warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellants premises. In fact, they earlier
had approached then Executive Judge Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined to issue one on the ground
that the matter was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive Judge Javellana of San
Carlos City in the evening of July 12, 1995 who asked them to come back in the morning as it was already
nighttime and outside of office hours. However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on the
pretext that information of his impending arrest may be leaked to him, the team proceeded to go to his
residence to arrest him and seize the alleged marijuana plants. The teams apprehension of a tip-off was
unfounded. It is far-fetched that one could have gone to accused-appellants place before the following
morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is an isolated and difficult to reach
mountain barangay. The road leading to it was rough, hilly and eroded by rain and flood. [31] A few hours delay
to await the issuance of a warrant in the morning would not have compromised the teams operation.
In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on July 13, 1995, the trial court ruled that
the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana
plants which was easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused. [32] Thus, the trial court
concluded that:
xxx (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, were the very corpus delicti of the crime the accused has
been committing since the time he planted them in the backyard of his residence for whatever reason
a corpus delicti which the NARCOM agents saw with their very own eyes as the same were in plain view when
they made a surveillance in the accuseds place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti has remained on the
spots in accuseds backyard where they had been growing since the time they were planted there and,
therefore, any peace officer or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said plants and recognized
them as marijuana, was by law empowered and authorized to arrest the accused even without any warrant of
arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the
time of his arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest, was valid.
- People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993)
226 SCRA 299, at p. 300
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants,
Exh. F, in the backyard of his residence, which the NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the time they
arrested and apprehended him. Under said circumstances, a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest were not
legally needed before the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest of the accused. [33]
As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure without a warrant.[34] It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [35] Thus,
the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified were seizure of evidence without further search. [36]
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellants premises without
the latters consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of
accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they
allegedly came in plain view of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13,
1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search
warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across
the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellants
residence.

In People v. Musa,[37] the Court held:

The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of
the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]
It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved herein were
indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on said
plants by using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana plants.
[38]
Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations
to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana. [39]
Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure, the same is tainted
and illegal and should therefore be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. [40]In People v.
Aruta,[41] we held that:
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly
liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is he only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on the
justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may
be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is
less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not
allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
[42]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 58 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S. Compacion is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for some other
legal grounds. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139301

September 29, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Metro Manila,
Branch 259, convicting the appellants of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
The Case for the Prosecution
Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) under the Department of
Interior and Local Government received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry
Lao,2 and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen
also learned that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug
trafficking activities of Lao and Chan.3 PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted
surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband
and wife. They once spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo
Street, Ermita, Manila, late in the evening. On another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the
appellants, at the Celicious Restaurant along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m. They were
spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 4 The police operatives also verified
that Chan and Lao resided at Room Nos. 1245 and 1247, Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati
City, and in a two-storey condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque,
Metro Manila.5

bedroom where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. 15 Ferias awakened appellant Zhen Hua and identified
himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised. 16
Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the masters bedroom about six feet high. He stood on a chair, opened
the cabinet and found two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu, 17 a feeding bottle, a
plastic canister18 and assorted paraphernalia.19 Inside the drawer of the beds headboard, Anciro, Jr. also
found assorted documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards,
passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. 20 Anciro, Jr. asked appellant Lee who was the owner of the
crystalline substance, but the latter did not respond because she did not know English. 21 Anciro, Jr. asked
Margallo for instructions on what to do with the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep the same
for future reference,22 and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal drug transactions. 23 Anciro, Jr.,
Pangan and Margallo later showed the seized articles to the other members of the team. 24
Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC
headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the masters
bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu.25
The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following articles were found and
confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit:
a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) Kilo each of white crystalline granules later
tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu;
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu .
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu,
Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.; 26

On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search Warrant No. 96-801 for violation
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No.
96-802, for violation of Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from Judge William M.
Bayhon, Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila.6 Senior Police Inspector Lucio Margallo supervised the
enforcement of Search Warrant No. 96-801 at the Cityland Condominium at about 11:00 p.m. on October 29,
1996. With him were PO3 Anciro, Jr., PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3 Roger Ferias and seven other policemen of
the PARAC, who were all in uniform, as well as a Cantonese interpreter by the name of Chuang. While no
persons were found inside, the policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly
known as shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently used for the production
of fake credit cards.7

Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box. 27 The appellants were then brought to the
PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Pangan signed a Certification 28 that the search conducted by
the policemen had been orderly and peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the transparent plastic bags and
their contents, the transparent baby feeding bottle and the plastic cannister and their contents. On October 26,
1996, he and Ferias29 brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination30 along with the letter-request31 thereon.

Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu at the
Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the corner of Dasmarias and Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen
rushed to the area on board their vehicles. It was 2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The policemen saw Chan
and Lao on board the latters Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and
introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the members of the
raiding team and the two suspects. Chan and Lao were shot to death during the encounter. The policemen
found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Laos car.

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to enforce Search Warrant No. 96802. When the policemen arrived at the place, they coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of
security in the building.8 The men found that the Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao under the name
Henry Kao Tsung. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the
condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise,
knocked on the door.9 Appellant Lee peeped through the window beside the front door.10 The men introduced
themselves as policemen,11 but the appellant could not understand them as she could not speak
English.12 The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed
their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and allowed the
policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the condominium unit. 13 The policemen brought appellant Lee
to the second floor where there were three bedrooms a masters bedroom and two other rooms. When
asked where she and Lao slept, appellant Lee pointed to the masters bedroom. 14 Anciro, Jr., Margallo and
PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched the masters bedroom, while Ferias and Pangan went to the other

On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cario signed Chemistry Report No. D-1243-96 which
contained his findings on the laboratory examination of the items which were marked as Exhibits "A" to "A-4,"
viz:

Exh. "A" One (1) "must de Cartier Paris" carton containing the following:
Exh. "A-1" One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white crystalline
substance.
Exh. "A-2" One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.10 grams of white crystalline
substance.
Exh. "A-3" One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover containing 18.52
grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. "A-4" One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline
substance.
NOTE: The above-stated specimen were allegedly taken from the residence of the above-named subjects. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens, Exhs. "A-1" through "A-4" gave POSITIVE
result to the test for Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx 32
The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest.33 Pangan and the two security guards signed a certification
stating that nothing was destroyed in the condominium unit and that the search was orderly and
peaceful.34 The policemen also accomplished an inventory of the articles seized during the search. 35
The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, in an Information
filed in the RTC of Paraaque, Metro Manila, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in their possession and under their control and custody, the following
to wit:
A. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white crystalline substance;
B. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.1 grams of white crystalline substance;
C. One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle with pink cover containing 18.52 grams of white
crystalline substance;
D. One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline substance
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.36
Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29, 1992, and pleaded not guilty to
the charge.
The Case for the Appellants
Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of Kwantong, China, a college
graduate who could not speak nor understand English. She was once employed in a real estate firm. One of
her co-employees was Huang Zhen Hua. 37 She met Henry Lao in China sometime in 1995,38 and he brought
her to Belgium that same year. Lao also helped her procure a Belguim passport, for he explained that if she
only had a Chinese passport, it would be difficult to secure visas from countries she wanted to go to and visit;
whereas many countries did not require a Belgian passport holder to secure visas before allowing entry
therein. In the process, he and Lao fell in love and became lovers.
Upon Laos invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the first time in April 1996. Lao met
her at the airport, and she was, thereafter, brought to a hotel in Manila where she stayed for less than a
month.39She returned to the Philippines a second time and was again billeted in a hotel in Manila. All her
expenses were shouldered by Lao, who was engaged in the garlic business. 40 As far as she knew, Lao was
not engaged in any other business. 41 In June 1996, she invited her friend, appellant Huang Zhen Hua to visit
the Philippines to enjoy the tourist spots. 42 They were then in China.
In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines on a tourist visa. She was fetched
by Lao, and she was brought to his condominium unit at No. 19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio,
Paraaque. She had been residing there since then. She and Lao used to go to the shopping malls 43 and she
even saw Chan once when he cleaned his Nissan car in Laos garage.
On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and was met by Lao at the airport.
He tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but Lee told him that he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen
Hua was brought to the Villa where he had been staying since then. The appellants had made plans to visit
Cebu.
At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the masters bedroom at the
condominium unit. She had closed all the windows because she had turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen

Hua was sleeping in the other bedroom in the second floor beside the masters bedroom. Laos Honda Civic
car and Chans Nissan car were in the garage beside the condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard someone
knocking on the bedroom door. When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the bedroom and at the
room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was not among the men. Lee did not hear the
policemen knock at the main door before they entered. 44 The policemen were accompanied by Chuang, a
Cantonese interpreter, who told her that the policemen were going to search the house. 45 Appellant Lee saw a
policeman holding two papers, but no search warrant was shown to her.46 She was so frightened.
The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the masters bedroom. Appellant Lee
went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and when she returned to the masters bedroom, she saw shabu on
the bed.47 The policemen took her ring, watch and the P600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier been placed
in the cabinet, her papers and documents, and those of Laos as well. She had never seen any shabu in the
room before the incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC headquarters
where they were detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter, informed her that shabu had been found in the
condominium unit and that the policemen were demanding P5,000,000 for her release. She was also told that
if she did not pay the amount, she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that the leader of the group who
arrested her would be promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no money. Since she could not pay
the amount, she was boarded on a PARAC owner-type jeep and returned to the condominium unit where the
policemen took all the household appliances, such as the television, compact discs, washing machine,
including laundry detergent. Only the sofa and the bed were not taken. About ten (10) days later, the
appellants secured the services of counsel.
Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the condominium unit but that no
one responded. He shouted, "Sir Henry," referring to Lao, but there was no response from inside the
condominium. After about three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they entered the
house. They went to the second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.
Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen. He learned that shabu had
been found and taken from the condominium unit only when he saw someone holding up the substance on
television during the daily news program TV Patrol. 48
Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of appellant Lee that upon her
invitation, he arrived in the Philippines on a tourist visa on October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see
Anciro, Jr. in the condominium unit when policemen arrived and searched the house. He testified that aside
from the PARAC policemen, he was also investigated by policemen from Taiwan.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both appellants of the crime charged.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and considering the
absence of any aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The properties seized in accordance with the
search warrants issued relative to this case are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the
Clerk of Court of this Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, the drugs and
paraphernalia subject hereof for proper disposition.
The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of both accused Jogy
Lee and Huang Zhen Hua from the Paraaque City Jail to the Bureau of Correccions (sic) in Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.49
The Present Appeal
On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:
First. The evidence for the prosecution, as a whole, is so far as self-contradictory, inherently improbable and
palpably false to be accepted as a faithful reflection of the true facts of the case;
Second. Appellant Huang Zhen Huas conviction was based merely on the trial courts conclusion that he "is
not an epitome of first class tourist and that he appeared nonchalant throughout the proceedings;"

Third. In convicting said appellant, the court below completely disregarded the glaring facts and admissions of
the prosecutions principal witnesses that no regulated drug was ever found in his possession;
Fourth. The trial court, likewise, ignored the fact that the appellants arrest was illegal and in violation of his
constitutional and basic rights against arrest without probable cause as determined by a Judge and that his
arraignment did not constitute a waiver of such right;
Fifth. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the presumption of regularity of performance of the police
officers who took part in the search had been overcome by prosecution's own evidence, thereby wrongly
giving such presumption substance over and above the constitutional presumption of innocence of the
appellant.50
For her part, appellant Lee contends that:
1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE ROOMS IN THE TOWNHOUSE
RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY PLANTED BY PARAC OPERATIVES;
1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS AND
UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF
THE ROOM TO BE SEARCHED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER TO ASSIST AND GUIDE JOGY
LEE, WHO NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, DURING THE SEARCH AND
EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE UPON THE GROUND THAT
HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.51
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant Zhen Hua should be acquitted on
the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of appellant Lee should be affirmed.
The Courts Ruling
We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee
sequentially.
On Appellant Zhen Hua
The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove appellant
Zhen Huas guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, thus:
Huang Zhen Hua denies having anything to do with the bags of "shabu" found in the townhouse unit of Henry
Lau. He claims that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on October 22, 1996, upon the invitation of Jogy
Lee. Allegedly, at the time of his arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely four days. He claims that he
was just temporarily billeted as a guest at the townhouse where Jogy Lee was staying. And that he had no
control whatsoever over said townhouse. He puts emphasis on the fact that the search of his room turned out
to be "negative" and that the raiding team failed to seize or confiscate any prohibited or regulated drug in his
person or possession. He, therefore, prays for his acquittal.
The People submits that Huang Zhen Hua is entitled to acquittal. The prosecutions evidence fails to meet the
quantum of evidence required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; thus, regardless of
the supposed weakness of his defense, and his innocence may be doubted, he is nonetheless entitled to an
acquittal (Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335 (1980), cited in People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602,
March 15, 2000). The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary
importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution.
In the instant case, as pointed out by appellant Huang Zhen Hua, the trial court erred when it did not give
much weight to the admission made by the prosecution witnesses that no regulated drug was found in his
person. No regulated drug was also found inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc.
Thus, he had no actual or constructive possession of the confiscated "shabu."
Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country for barely four (4) days at the
time when he was arrested. The prosecution was unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua
committed acts which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lau and Peter Chan. It

was not even shown that he was together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. As for Huang
Zhen Hua, therefore, there is no direct evidence of any culpability. Nor is there any circumstantial evidence
from which any culpability may be inferred.52
We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People vs. Tira, 53 ruminated and
expostulated on the juridical concept of "possession" under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, and the evidence necessary to prove the said crime, thus:
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is
found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala
prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidende) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exits
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused
cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive
possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove
that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the
drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed
from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion,
or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. 54
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had actual or constructive
possession of the regulated drug found in the masters bedroom where appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the
appellant had accessed the said room at any given time; or that he had knowledge of the existence of shabu
in appellant Lees bedroom. Appellant Zhen Hua had arrived in the Philippines upon the invitation of appellant
Lee only on October 22, 1996 or barely four (4) days before the arrival of the policemen and the search
conducted in the condominium unit leased by Henry Lao. He was a mere visitor of appellant Lee. There is no
evidence that appellant Zhen Hua was aware of the alleged illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry
Lao, Peter Chan and appellant Lee. The policemen did not find any regulated drug in the room where
appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping when they made their search.
The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove conspiracy between him, appellant Lee and Chan or Lao.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. 55 Conspiracy
cannot be presumed.56 Conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the
conspiracy.57 Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused,
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design. 58
The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant Zhen Hua from China, and before the
search conducted in Laos condominium unit, appellant Zhen Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and
appellant Lee. Having dinner or lunch at a restaurant does not constitute sufficient proof that he had conspired
with them or with any of them to possess the subject-regulated drug. Mere association with the principals by
direct participation or mere knowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not suffice. 59 Anciro, Jr. even
admitted that during his surveillance, he could have mistaken appellant Zhen Hua for another group of
Chinese persons who were also being watched. 60 Appellant Zhen Hua should, thus, be acquitted.
On Appellant Lee
Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and implementation of Search
Warrant No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the policemen who implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to
show to her the said warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their presence in the condominium unit;
(b) the policemen gained entry into the condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and (c) articles and
personal effects owned by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by the policemen, although not specified in
the search warrant.

The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the occasion of the search of the
condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because the policemen planted the
regulated drug on her bed even before they searched the bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen
Hua to find out if he was already awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her
bed. She avers that the sole testimony of Anciro, Jr., that he found the regulated drug in the masters
bedroom, is incredible because he was not with the policemen who barged into the bedroom. She notes that
even Pangan, the caretaker of the Villa, testified that he did not see any illegal drug confiscated by the
policemen.
According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime charged, considering that Lao
and Chan were the suspects identified in the search warrants, not her. She avers that she had no knowledge
of the alleged illegal drug transactions of her lover Lao. She contends that there was no probable cause for
her arrest as her mere presence in the condominium unit does not render her liable for the shabu found in the
masters bedroom of the condominium unit leased by Lao. She further avers that the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution are inconsistent; hence, barren of probative weight. The appellant also asserts
that she was deprived of her right to due process when the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese
interpreter to assist her.
The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties. Based on the
testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee was shown the search warrant, through the window, and the policemen
identified themselves through their uniforms. The security guards of the condominium also explained the
search warrant to the appellant. Although she was, at first, reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later
voluntarily opened the door and allowed them entry into the unit. There was no evidence of forcible entry into
the unit and no breakage of any door. The OSG further avers that the appellant had been in the country for
quite sometime already and could not have gotten around without understanding English. In fact, the OSG
argues that when Anciro, Jr. told the appellant to get some of her clothes since she would be brought to the
police headquarters in Quezon City, she did as she was told and took her clothes from the cabinet where the
shabu were found by the policemen.
The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the subdivision who was a witness for
appellant Lee, even testified that the search was orderly. The OSG contends that there was probable cause
for the appellants arrest because an informant had tipped off the arresting officers that the appellant was a
member of a syndicate dealing with illegal drugs, and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. The
appellant was not a victim of frame-up because she was present when the policemen searched the masters
bedroom where she was sleeping and where she kept her clothes, and witnessed the discovery of the
regulated drugs and paraphernalia.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional proscription against unreasonable search
and seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens temporarily residing in the country. The rule against
unreasonable search and seizure forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or
known to be offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the
guarantee of the other fundamental rights of the citizens. 61 All owes the duty for its effective enforcement lest
there shall be an impairment of the right for the purpose for which it was adopted. 62
Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any
person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their authority, and demand that they
be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the
search warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed
search. This is known as the "knock and announce" principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The
method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as important
considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search and/or arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.63 In Gouled v. The United States,64 it was held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of
a reasonable search. A search would violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by
force, by illegal threat or mere show of force.

The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing that "if a person takes the
beasts of another and causes them to be driven into a castle or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand
for the deliverance of the beasts, and if the person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the
king shall cause the said castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery." Common law courts
appended an important qualification:
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors , for
the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the
habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no
default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it is to be presumed
that he would obey it65
Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking open doors if the possession be not
quietly delivered.66 The principle was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law and in the Fourth
Amendment in the United States Federal Constitution. It is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment as held in Wilson v. Arkansas. 67
Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify themselves to the
accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them
the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect
known to and understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of
the substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of words is required. It is
sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of the search and the
object to be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection
of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being of the officers
serving and implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and
whose property is to be searched is notified of the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person
serving the warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression
on his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even to the life of
the officer implementing the warrant for which he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real
possibility that the police serving and implementing the search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or
address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations. Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright,
shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced intrusion. 69 Indeed, a lawful entry is the
indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show
of force or obtained by stealth, or coercion. 70
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the
possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of
the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest
belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence
of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity
which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.
Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. 71 However, the exceptions
above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of
the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion into the premises.
Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was
without prior announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish the reasonableness of an
unannounced entry.72Indeed, there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances. 73 In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the
existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had reason to believe and
the time of the entry.74 In Richards v. Wisconsin,75 it was held that:
[1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This
standardas opposed to a probable-cause requirementstrikes the appropriate balance between the
legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy
interest affected by no-knock entries.76
As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida, 77 what constitutes breaking includes the lifting of a latch, turning
a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the
house, even a closed screen door.78 However, entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished

without force is not a "breaking" requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because the
reasons behind the rule are satisfied there was no real likelihood of violence, no unwarranted intrusion or
privacy and no damage to the residence of the accused.79
As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before breaking open any door cannot be
distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an
examination of all the circumstances. 80 The proper trigger point in determining, under the "knock and
announce" rule, whether the police waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is
when those inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant. 81
In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police
officers were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were
police officers and had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were
going to search the condominium unit.82 The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of the policemen,
who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose. Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant,
in English, to bring some clothes with her as she was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such
request being interpreted to the appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some clothes from the
cabinet atop the headboard. 83
The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door before entering the
condominium unit, and after a while, the appellant opened the door and allowed the policemen and Pangan to
enter. Anciro, Jr. testified, thus:
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards who helped you or assisted you in
implementing said search warrants at Grand Villa Subdivision?
A The OIC of the Home Owners Association, Antonio Pangan, and the OIC of the Security Agency and two (2)
other security guards.
Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr. Witness?
A I can hardly recall their names.
Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers and the OIC of the Home Owners
Association, what did you do next?
A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key and also knock and introduce ourselves,
knock on the said condominium.
Q Did they do that, the request?
A Yes, Sir.

Q And then after that?

A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic) the window of the kitchen and asked who
we are in a sign language.
Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window I withdraw. Were you able to have a good
look on that female person who showed herself thru the window?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?
A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.84
The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain entry into the condominium unit.
She could have asked the court for an ocular inspection to show the door which was allegedly broken into by
the policemen, or at least adduce in evidence pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant failed to do
so. The testimony of the appellant is even belied by Pangan, who was a witness for the appellant, who
certified, along with three other security guards, that nothing was destroyed and that the search was
conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner.85
We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked the outer door to gain entry into
the condominium unit, which testimony is seemingly in derogation of his certification. However, Pangan
admitted that the policemen did so only after knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5) minutes and after he
had called Lao in a loud voice and received no response from the appellants:
Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being required according to your security
guards?
A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as police operatives.
Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police authorities?
A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19, that is what they told me.
Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct the search?
A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I dont know what time was that.
Q When they conducted the search, were you there?
A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is not present.

Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa?

Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of that unit occupied by Henry Kau
Chung?

A Yes, Sir.

A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they pushed the door and the door was opened.

Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to implement said search warrants, what
happened next, if any? What did you do after that?

Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened it?

A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody there because the Home Owners
Association doesnt have any key for the door. We asked them to knock also because they are the ones who
have access with the tenants.
Q And after knocking, what happened next?

A Kaya naman po ginawa yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker, wala naman pong masamang
mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po ang namamahala.
Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time that the police operatives forcibly break
open the door, how many minutes had elapsed?

A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By that time, we thought they were still
asleep.

A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, "Mr. Henry, pakibuksan nyo ang pinto, would you mind
to open the door, kasi merong mga police officers na gustong ma-search itong unit mo. Then, when nobody
was answering, they forcibly opened the door.

Q And then after that what did you do, if any?

Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that unit at that time?

A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another security guard to try to knock on the
kitchen which is on the back door.

A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion whom I do not know.

Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door, there was no one who responded, is that
correct?

Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by Huang Zhen Hua, were you present then?
A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.

A Pardon, Sir?
Q How about the other guards?
Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no one who responded to your knocking at
the door?

A They were also outside.89

A Nobody was answering, Sir.

For his part, Ferias declared:

Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door forcibly?

Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?

A Yes, Sir.86

A No, Sir.

Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?

COURT:

A Yes, Sir.

From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed before the police officer broke open the
door?

Q What happened next?

A Matagal din po.

Q For how long?
A Maybe for about three to five minutes.
Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the door?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Continue.87
The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her contention that Anciro, Jr. placed the
shabu on her bed before he continued his search in the bedroom, and that she was a victim of frame-up by the
policemen. She relied on her testimony and those of Pangan and Ferias that they did not see Anciro, Jr.
discover and take custody of the shabu in the cabinet.
The appellants defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such defense cannot and should not always be
considered as contrived, nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to
prove. Police officers are, after all, presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official
functions, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-will. 88
It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and take custody of the
shabu subject of this case. However, as explained by Pangan, he remained in the ground floor of the
condominium unit while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant Lee and her lover
Lao, and Ferias proceeded to the room occupied by appellant Zhen Hua where he conducted his search.
Thus, Pangan testified:
Q When the masters bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then, according to you, sleeping, did you
accompany the PARAC members?
A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.
Q What about the members of the security force?
A They were outside, Sir.
Q During the search made on the masters bedroom?
A Yes, Sir.

A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?
A He was surprised.90

Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?

A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?
A He was surprised.91
Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the second floor of the condominium
unit, he did not see them bring in anything:
Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the unit, you did not see them bringing
anything with them, they were all empty-handed?
A I did not see, Sir.92
No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the security guards of the subdivision,
who accompanied the policemen in implementing the search warrants, certified that, what was found inside
the condominium unit and confiscated by the policemen were two plastic bags which contained white
crystalline powder substances suspected to be shabu.93
The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the policemen were there. She claimed that
the policemen placed the plastic bag on the bed before they started the search and that she noticed the shabu
only after he returned from the room of appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was already awake is hard to believe.
First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the appellants bed, in her full view, for
which the latter could be prosecuted for planting evidence and, if convicted, sentenced to death under Section
19 of Rep. Act 7659:

SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and Members of Police Agencies and
the Armed Forces, Planting of Evidence. The maximum penalties provided for [in] Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6,
7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if
those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees or officers, including
members of police agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs
punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in
the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same
penalty as therein provided.
Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of evidence by the policemen; if she
had done so, for sure, the said counsel would have prepared her affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in
court for the suppression of the things/articles seized by the policemen.
Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence before or after she was charged
of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or policemen who allegedly planted the
evidence.
The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr. and Ferias, the articles and
substances found and confiscated from the condominium unit of Lao and appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at
the Cityland condominium unit of Lao and Chan were itemized as follows:
a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) kilo each of white crystalline granules later
tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu;
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Canister also containing undetermined amount of suspected Shabu
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for sniffing shabu,
Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;

a. TWO (2) Kettles/Pots containing more or less 1 kilos of Raw Shabu or Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;
b. Two (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing more or less Two (2) Kilos of Shabu;
c. Three (3) Plastic Basins, small, medium, large, used for containers of finished/cooked Shabu;
c. Several pieces of Plastic Strainers used for draining out liquids from finished Shabu;
e. One (1) Plastic Container with liquid chemical of undetermined element;
f. Several pieces of Spoons and ladles with traces of raw Shabu used in stirring mixtures
g. One (1) Electric Cooking Stove w/one coil burner;
h. One (1) Unit Card Making Machine;
i. One (1) Unit Card Stamping Machine;
j. Several pieces of Credit Cards and Telephone Cards; 94
Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline powder which were found and
confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the company of Ferias, delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination, per the request of Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman, the chief of the PARAC.

We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in the search warrants. However,
such fact did not proscribe the policemen from arresting her and charging her of violation of Rep. Act No.
6425, as amended. There was, in fine, probable cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that found by
Judge William Bayhon when he issued the search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the
condominium units at Atlantic Drive and Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the premises being searched when
the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information
are sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is
being committed.95 It has been held that:
Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present at the time the officers entered the
apartment to arrest her husband, was nevertheless present at the time of her arrest. Upon their entry and
announcement of their identity, the officers were met not only by George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who was
emerging from the kitchen. Officer Berman immediately walked to the doorway from which she emerged and,
without entering, observed the brick-shaped package of marijuana in plain view. Even assuming that her
presence in a small room with the contraband in a prominent position on the kitchen sink would not alone
establish a reasonable ground for the officers belief that she was in joint possession with her husband, that
fact was accompanied by the officers information that Ker had been using his apartment as a base of
operations for his narcotics activities. Therefore, we cannot say that at the time of her arrest there were no
sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as well as her husband, were committing the offense
of possession of marijuana in the presence of the officers. 96
In Draper v. United States,97 it was held that informations from a reliable informant, corroborated by the police
officers observations as to the accuracy of the description of the accused, and of his presence at a particular
place, is sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, the police officers received reliable information
and verified, after surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and proceeds of the illegal
drug trafficking activities of Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that the appellant occupied the bedroom and
slept in the same bed used by Lao. The appellant took her clothes from the same cabinet where the subject
shabu and paraphernalia were found by Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same condominium
unit with Lao since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996. Along with Lao, the appellant thus
had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found
therein. Such facts and circumstances are sufficient on which to base a reasonable belief that the appellant
had joint possession of the regulated drugs found in the bedroom along with Lao, her live-in partner, in line
with our ruling in People v. Tira.98 For the purpose of prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law,
possession can be constructive and need not be exclusive, but may be joint. 99
Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao which
were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does
not render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in
evidence such articles which were described in the warrant and seized pursuant thereto. Moreover, it bears
stressing that Anciro, Jr. saw the unlisted articles when he and the other policemen implemented the search
warrants. Such articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was
authorized to seize the said articles because of their close connection to the crime charged. As held in
Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire:100
An example of the applicability of the plain view doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to
search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of
incriminating character.
Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a
warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.
Thus, the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And an
object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under
existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally, the plain view doctrine has been applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. 101
It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the
policemen have an intimate nexus with the crime charged or, at the very least, incriminating. The passport of
the appellant would show when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and
bank book would indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or

earned the same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her
relationship to Lao and Chan.102
Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed to provide an interpreter when she
testified. The records show that a Cantonese interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The
Rules of Court does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial.
An interpreter is required only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a
deaf- mute. The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own expense.

1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR. RABE averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR.
ERNESTO ISIP and that the said premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building,
are being used to manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was
already patented by UNILAB since 1985;
3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-story structure, with an
additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It has a tight security arrangement wherein nonresidents are not allowed to enter or reconnoiter in the premises;

Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of her guilt of
the crime charged. She and Lao, her lover, had joint possession of the shabu which the policemen found and
confiscated from her bedroom.

4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and has a new address
as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that the area of counterfeiting operations are the first and second
floors of Shalimar Building;

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, convicting him of the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The said appellant is ACQUITTED of said charge. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby
directed to release the said appellant from detention unless he is detained for another cause or charge, and to
submit to the Court, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a report of his compliance with the directive of the
Court.

5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures of the area especially the
places wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations were being held. At a peril to his well-being and
security, the Asset was able to take photographs herein incorporated into this Search Warrant Application. [6]

The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, convicting her of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the search
warrant. After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application and issued
Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a
search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the following items:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON
multivitamins;

[G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005]

UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or
OCCUPANTS, Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application,
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and
second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip;
and for the seizure of the following for violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8203:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON
multivitamins;

b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of
accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of
counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[7]
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true inventory thereof
executed under oath.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and
Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon multivitamins were found; instead,
there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the
NBI agents in the presence of respondent Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT
792 Bottles

b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of
accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of
counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[1]
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search Warrant Case No. 044916 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were the following: (1) a sketch [2] showing the
location of the building to be searched; (2) the affidavit [3] of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and
Security Agency hired by United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production
and/or distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of
UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the
monitoring of the unauthorized production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure;
(4) the letter-complaint[4] of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and Safety Group; and (5) the
joint affidavit[5] of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the following allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE AND SECURITY AGENCY
named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since November 2003, at the said premises located at No.

30 Boxes (100 pieces each)

DESCRIPTION
Disudrin 60 ml.
Inoflox 200 mg.[8]

NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he declared that the
search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
the premises described in the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of
Search Warrant,[9] alleging that no other articles/items other than those mentioned in the warrant and inventory
sheet were seized. The agent prayed that of the items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one
box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. [10] The
court issued an order granting the motion, on the condition that the turn over be made before the court, in the
presence of a representative from the respondents and the court. [11]
The respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence. [12] They
contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth
floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in open display were
allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in
the search warrant, the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox
products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant.

UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search was limited to the first and
second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. They averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application, Rabes affidavit,
as well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the search was conducted was
located at No. 1571, Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524
Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address, and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the warrant was not implemented in any other place. [13]

PRODUCT NAME

Manufacturer

L.N.

E.D.

FINDINGS

1.Phenylpropanolamine (Disudrin)

Unilab

21021552

3-06

-Registered, howe
label/physical app
not conform with th
approved label/ re
specifications.

In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in the search warrant.
They also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in
the sketch of the premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court. [14] In accordance with the ruling of
this Court in People v. Court of Appeals,[15]the respondents served a copy of their pleading on UNILAB. [16]

2.Ofloxacin (Inoflox)

Unilab

99017407

3-05

-Registered, howe
label/physical app
not conform with th
approved label/ re
specifications.[24]

On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order [17] granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground
that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search warrant. On
March 16, 2004, the trial court issued an advisory[18] that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in
evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the
reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not
that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The
respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear
for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be
stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were contained in
boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and
were not apparently incriminating on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and
itemized in the search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. The respondents
emphasized that the Shalimar Laboratories is authorized to manufacture galenical preparations of the
following products:
Products:
-

Povidone Iodine

Chamomile Oil

Salicylic Acid 10 g.

Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution

Aceite de Alcamforado

Aceite de Manzanilla[19]

In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, and
insisted that it was not authorized to appear before the court under the Rules of Court, and to file pleadings.
They averred that the BFAD was the authorized government agency to file an application for a search warrant.
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the motion for reconsideration
because it was the one which sought the filing of the application for a search warrant; besides, it was not
proscribed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings and
filing pleadings. The only parties to the case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State or public
prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party, or the holder of a license to operate, may intervene
through counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the NBI officers. [20] In their
rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was the option to look forward to. [21] However,
no such ocular inspection of the said premises was conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the Disudrin and Inoflox
samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar Building. On its examination of the actual
component of Inoflox, the BFAD declared that the substance failed the test. [22] The BFAD, likewise, declared
that the examined Disudrin syrup failed the test.[23]The BFAD had earlier issued the following report:

12.5 mg./5mL Syrup

200 mg. tablet.

On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order [25] denying the motion for reconsideration filed by UNILAB.
The court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of finished
or unfinished products of United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents
evidencing the counterfeit nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the
warrant does not, however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized products
are imitations of UNILAB items is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the
proceedings on the application for search warrant relative to the seized products.
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be sustained. [26]
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where the
following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200 mg. are INADMISSIBLE
as evidence against the respondents because they constitute the fruit of the poisonous tree or,
CONVERSELY, whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the plain
view doctrine and, hence, the same are legally admissible as evidence against the respondents in any and all
actions?[27]
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court quashed the search
warrant for a ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in their motion to quash the warrant. As
such, it argues that the trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists that by so
doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to due process. The petitioner asserts that the description in the search
warrant of the products to be seized finished or unfinished products of UNILAB is sufficient to include
counterfeit drugs within the premises of the respondents not covered by any license to operate from the BFAD,
and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals,[28] the petitioner asserts that the products seized
were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The petitioner posits that the respondents
themselves admitted that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of
the implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have been filed before the Court
of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are raised. They also assert that the petitioner has no locus
standi to file the petition involving the validity and the implementation of the search warrant. They argue that
the petitioner merely assisted the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it should have
impleaded the said government agencies as parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because under the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the government and its officers charged in their
official capacity in cases before the Supreme Court. The respondents further assert that the trial court may
consider issues not raised by the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the just determination of
the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes so fast even before
respondent Isip could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta.
Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street,
Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 as stated in the search warrant. They assert that the ruling of

the Court in People v. Court of Appeals[29] is applicable in this case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to
prove the factual basis for the application of the plain view doctrine. [30]

a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order
granting such motion to quash.[46]

In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-interest to defend the validity
of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its instance that the application for a search
warrant was filed by the NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No. 8203
from filing a criminal complaint against the respondents and requesting the NBI to file an application for a
search warrant. The petitioner points out that the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically prohibit a
private complainant from defending the validity of a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a state
prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all, the petitioner insists, the proceedings for the
application and issuance of a search warrant is not a criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place
sought to be searched was sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building on the
two parcels of land described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is located, the place searched by the
NBI officers.[31] It also asserts that the building is located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue,
Sta. Cruz, Manila.[32]

In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents motion to quash the search
warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply and opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto
Alejandro, Jr.[47] The court a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and
its counsel.

The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the boxes were found
outside the door of the respondents laboratory on the garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the
members of the raiding team precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The
boxes in which the items were contained were themselves so designated to replicate true and original UNILAB
boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes [33] the letters
ABR under the words 60 ml, appeared to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with
genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that ABR is the
acronym for amber bottle round describing the bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for children) is
contained.
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own license plates which were instituted as
among its internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate that the items within are, supposedly,
Disudrin. The NBI officers had reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data
appearing on their supposedly distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that although some of the
boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo were, indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the
original because these, too, were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its
pleading pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched showing respondent Isip; [34] the boxes
seized by the police officers containing Disudrin syrup; [35] and the boxes containing Inoflox and its contents. [36]
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at
bench; (2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court; and (3) whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the
Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and
Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a
criminal action[37] or the commencement of a prosecution.[38] The proceeding is not one against any person, but
is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is
commonly known as John Doe proceedings. [39] While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a
criminal action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to
procure relevant evidence of crime.[40] It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public
prosecutions.[41] A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must
issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. [42]
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or
maintaining mere private rights.[43] It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action
involving the rights of private persons.[44] It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. [45]
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency
charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file
pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by
the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private
party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse
order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG.
However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] the Court allowed a private
corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed
by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of
the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is
that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears
to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the
private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives
this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the
Solicitor General.[49]
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases,
the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it. [50] In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition,
considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue of whether the Disudrin and Inoflox
products were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the respondents in the court a quo. Truly,
the respondents failed to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant; in their reply, however,
they averred that the seized items were not included in the subject warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully
seized by the raiding team. They also averred that the said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives
and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search. [51] In their Opposition/Comment filed on
March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a legal basis to
quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the articles allegedly
seized during the implementation of the search warrant Disudrin and Inoflux products were not included in
the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as
it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful
search, or being in plain view or some such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the
Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondents place were counterfeit. All the relevant
presumptions are in favor of legality.[52]
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the respondents never
raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11, 2004 Order of the court a
quo on the following claims:
2.01
The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the alleged failure to
particularly describe in the search warrant the items to be seized but upon which NO challenge was then
existing and/or NO controversy is raised;
2.02
The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that finished or unfinished products of UNILAB cannot
stand the test of a particular description for which it then reasons that the search is, supposedly unreasonable;
and,

2.03
The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully inadmissible against
respondents.[53]
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it before finally resolving to
deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the petitioner was denied its right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court, likewise,
rejects the contention of the petitioner.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search
warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not
to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. [54]
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be
seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant
cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law
enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which
he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.[55]
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification whether
it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate
reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately
incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it,
regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It
would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant. [56] Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of
a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.
The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the
facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the objects incriminating evidence. [57] In other
words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officers instantaneous sensory
perception of the object.[58] The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the
object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the
search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure.[59]
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have known in advance
of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it. [60] Discovery is not anticipated.[61]
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating
character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object
and criminal activity.[62]
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a
person.[63]
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the
officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely
than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.
The evidence thus collected must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.[64]
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among
the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize
counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture
and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said

vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized
sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and
Disudrin.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized
based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the
NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for
the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or at the very least,
during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The
immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception relied upon by the petitioner and
the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In
fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the
petitioners representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the
enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the
warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and
that they were immediately apparent.[65] There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of
the sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential
requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed orders of the
Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975
HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries
Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for petitioners.
J. C. Yuseco and A.R. Narvasa for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing
his order dated October 18, 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction thereunder issued.
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case docketed as
No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel
Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner
Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with respondent
court, but said prayer was, however, denied.
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted
respondent company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus,
respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the
abovesaid writ.
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case No. 56701 for failure of
therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute as well as for failure of therein defendants
(petitioners herein)to appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie
however, remained in the possession of respondent company.

On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels
Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of
some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.

in case the two vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the reach of the Government, thus
frustrating their forfeiture as instruments of the crime (pp. 103-109, rec.).1wph1.t
On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the said motion for reconsideration (p. 110, rec.).

On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught
with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels.
On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal
charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels.

WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same.
I

On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the court of First Instance of Palawan a couple of informations,
one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI both
for violations of Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e., for illegal
fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in
custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and cabled the Fisheries
Commissioner to detain the vessels (p. 56, rec.).
On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the
boats in custody.
On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against herein
petitioners. Among others, it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same
were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of
compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were
settled.

When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal
(pp. 54, 55, rec.), directing the Philippine Navy to detain (pp. 108, 109, rec.) said vessels, which are subject to
forfeiture as instruments of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 for
illegal fishing pending in said court (pp. 54-55, rec.). The said vessels were seized while engaging in
prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Palawan (pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.) and hence within the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in obedience to the rule that "the place where a criminal offense was
committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction"(Lopez vs.
Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616, 619). The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the Palawan
Court of First Instance cannot be interfered with by another Court of First Instance. The orders of October 2
and 4, 1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the Philippine Navy "to hold in custody"
the two vessels and that "same should not be released without prior order or authority from this Court" (pp.
108, 109, rec.). Only the Palawan court can order the release of the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be turned
over to private respondent without risking contempt of court.

On October 9, 1965, petitioners, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the above-mentioned
complaint, alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of the writ would disrupt the status quo of the parties
and would render nugatory any decision of the respondent court favorable to the defendant; (2) that the
vessels, being instruments of a crime in criminal cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed with the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, the release of the vessels sans the corresponding order from the above-mentioned court
would deprive the same of its authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the Provincial Fiscal
would not be able to utilize said vessels as evidence in the prosecution of said cases; (3) that as petitioners
herein were in possession of one of the vessels in point, they cannot now be deprived of the legal custody
thereof by reason of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 56701; (4) that petitioner Fisheries Commissioner has the
power to seize and detain the vessels pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3215 in relation to Sections
903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code; (5) that respondents herein have not exhausted
administrative remedies before coming to court; (6) that the compromise agreement approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and indorsed to the Fisheries Commissioner is never a bar to
the prosecution of the crime perpetrated by the crew members of the vessels belonging to respondent
company.

The grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge was heightened by the fact that he did not
reconsider his order of October 18, 1965 after he was informed by petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration filed on October 19, 1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance had already issued the two
orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 directing the Philippine Navy to hold in custody the fishing boats until
further orders.

And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed their memorandum praying for the denial of the
application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed
an urgent motion to submit additional documentary evidence.

As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were already in custodia legis under the sole control of the
Palawan Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of First Instance cannot interfere with and change that
possession (Hacbang vs. Leyte Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, supra).

On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in said Civil Case No. 62799, filed their answer to the
complaint with affirmative defenses, reiterating the grounds in their opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and adding that herein private respondent admitted committing the last
violation when it offered in its letter dated September 21, 1965 to the Acting Commissioner of Fisheries, to
compromise said last violation (Exh. 12, pp. 60-61, rec.).

It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the Philippine Navy basin in Manila; for the same in no way
impugns the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court, which has custody thereof through the Philippine
Navy. This is analogous to the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L-27124, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186,
188-9), wherein We ruled "where the illegal possession of firearms was committed in the town where the Court
sits, the fact that the firearms were confiscated from the accused in another town does not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court" (pp. 186, 189).

On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by private
respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels(pp. 95-102, rec.).
On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary
writ on October 18, 1965 on the ground, among others, that on October 18, 1965 the Philippine Navy received
from the Palawan Court of First Instance two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring the Philippine Navy
to hold the fishing boats in custody and directing that the said vessels should not be released until further
orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly insufficient to cover the Government's losses

It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the judgments, orders or decrees of another court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction; because if coordinate
courts were allowed to interfere with each other's judgments, decrees or injunctions, the same would obviously
lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice (Ongsinco, etc. vs. Tan, et al., 97
Phil. 330; PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib vs.
Insular Drug Company, 64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Auto Bus Company, et al., G.R. No. L17907, May 30, 1963, 8 SCRA, 103, 107-109; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, G.R. No. L-15763, Dec. 22, 1961,
3 SCRA, 646, 648; Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Araneta & Uy vs. Commonwealth Insurance
Company, 55 OG 431; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1970 ed., p. 64).

It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents were not notified by the herein petitioners of the
seizure of the questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because such previous notice is not required by law.
II
The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil Case No. 56701 by the Court of First Instance of Manila
had the necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued therein
on April 28, 1964, directing the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (pp. 156-157, rec.). Such a preliminary writ,

like any other interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it was but an incident; because "an
ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the dismissal of the main petition"
(National Sugar Workers' Union, etc., vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, et al., L-23569, May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA
104, 109; Lazaro vs. Mariano, 59 Phil. 6Z7, 631; Saavedra vs. Ibaez, 56 Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji vs. Phil. Sugar
Estate and Development Company, 50 Phil. 592, 594).1wph1.t
Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 28, 1964 in Civil Case No. 56701 was directed
against the detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for violations committed prior to August 5, 1965, and therefore
cannot and does not extend to the seizure and detention of said vessel for violations on August 5 or 6, 1965,
which violations were not and could not possibly be the subject-matter of said Civil Case No. 56701 which was
filed on April 3, 1964 (p. 12, rec.).
III
Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the seizure of the vessels of private respondent for illegal
fishing by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to
carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, to make searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives in
accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as ... dynamites and the like ...; including fishery
products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws";
and "to effectively implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."
Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine
Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs,
Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters ..."
Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with
dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76 thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00
nor more than P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and six (6) months nor more
than five (5) years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles, apparel,
furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same
Fisheries Law provides that "in case of a second offense, the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture
and stores shall be forfeited to the Government."
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that "the possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting
caps and other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption that the said dynamite and/or
blasting capsand explosives are being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and that the
possession or discovery in any fishing boat or fish caught or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives,
under expert testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if present in the fishing boat, or the
fishing crew have been fishing with dynamite or other explosives." (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea
fishery without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 Article V of the Fisheries Act or any
other order or regulation deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not
more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the
Court;Provided, That in case of an association or corporation, the President or manager shall be directly
responsible for the acts of his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with his knowledge;
otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the
absence of a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in charge of such vessel shall be
responsible for any violation of this Act: and Provided, finally, That in case of a second offense,
the vessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores shall be forfeited to the Government"
(Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of December 23, 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies
in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to ... fishing ..." (46 OG 5905, 5911).
Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34 of October 27, 1972, authorized any
official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel
or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on board for
any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws.

When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965
the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie,
these vessels were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing
with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47,
rec.).1wph1.t
The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28, 1964
issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final determination of the case against it for illegal fishing
with explosives on January 21, 1964 (p. 34, rec.) and remained suspended until its apprehension on August 5
or 6, 1965 (p. 46, rec.).
For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23, 1963, the renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex VI
was suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored at Pier 14 at North Harbor, Manila, without
prejudice to the institution of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator, pursuant to the order dated
May 19, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 35-36, rec.), the motion for reconsideration of
which order was denied by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated August 17, 1964 (pp. 41-42, rec.).
For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28, 1963, the operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the
Commissioner of Fisheries in an order dated April 1, 1963 (p. 62, rec.).
For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25, 1963, the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its tackle,
apparel, furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing was ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on its owners-operators, without prejudice to
the filing of the necessary criminal action, pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 of the Commissioner of
Fisheries(pp. 37-38, rec.).
Again, for comitting the same violation on June 19, 1963, a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on
the owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to the order of June 4, 1964 issued by the
Commissioner of Fisheries (pp. 39-40, rec.)..
It appears, therefore, that since January 28, 1964, the fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended from operating
and was ordered moored at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila (pp. 34, 46-47, rec.); and that the fishing vessel
Tony Lex VI was suspended for one year from May 24, 1964 and was actually ordered forfeited to the
Government pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 for repeated violations of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act
(pp. 37- 38. rec.).1wph1.tAs a matter of fact, when apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965, both vessels
were found to be without any license or permit for coastwise trade or for fishing and unlawfully fishing with
explosives, for which reason their owners and crew were accordingly indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan for illegal fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license (pp. 48-53, rec.).
As heretofore intimated, the two fishing boats were apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing with
dynamite from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964, which violations private respondent, as owner-operator,
sought to compromise by offering to pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all said prior violations.
Such previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing boats,
Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, from March 28, 1963 until August 5 or 6, 1965, rendered the said vessels subject
to forfeiture under Sections 76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended.
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have
been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such
warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure
can be constitutionally effected (Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 774; Caroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972
ed., p. 225; Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p. 300).
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast
Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a
search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando, The Bill of
Rights, 1972 ed., p. 224). Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a

warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his
presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or
(c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary
detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6,
Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were
caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension
without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its
equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
DATED OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED
THEREUNDER AND THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND
VOID, WITH COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13,
1965 (pp. 63-64, 158-159, rec.) cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise referred
to about thirty violations of the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March 28, 1963 to
March 11, 1964. The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by reason of which these vessels
were apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were
committed on August 5 or 6, 1965.

G.R. Nos. 119772-73 February 7, 1997

Moreover, the power to compromise would exist only before a criminal prosecution is instituted; otherwise the
Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries
law a mere mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to sustain the viewpoint that the
Department Secretary can compromise criminal cases involving public, not private, offenses after the
indictment had been instituted in court. The fishing vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites
found therein are not only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also subject to forfeiture in favor of the
Government as instruments of the crime (Art. 45, Revised Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003, as amended).
Section 80(j) of Act No. 4003, as amended, precludes such a compromise the moment the Fisheries
Commissioner decides to prosecute the criminal action in accordance with Sections 76 and 78 of the other
penal provisions of the fisheries law. Furthermore, any compromise shall be upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i], Act No. 4003), which did not recommend such a compromise for the
violation on August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section 12 in relation to Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended.
On the contrary, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Provincial Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp.
43-45, rec.) and the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
3416 and 3417 on September 30, 1965 against the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels (pp.
48-53, rec.).
It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated September 13, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approving the compromise fine of P21,000.00 for the various violations committed previous
to August 5 or 6, 1965 (pp. 34-42, 47, 58-64, 149-155, 158-159, rec.), the Department Secretary "believes that
the offer made by the company was an implied admission of violations of said provisions of the Fisheries Law
and regulations, ..." (pp. 63, 158, rec.). The said approval was granted after the private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources disapproving the offer by private respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise.
There can be no dispute that the term fishing boat (employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. Even private respondent refers to said
fishing boats as fishing vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing" in paragraph IV of its
complaint in Civil Case No. 62799 (p. 18, rec.), as well as in its various communications to the Fisheries
Commissioner (pp. 60-61, 65, 82, rec.).1wph1.t The two fishing vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI
likewise fall under the term vessel used in Sections 17, 76 and 78, as well as the term boats utilized in the
second paragraph of Section 76 of the Fisheries Act. They can also fall under the term fishing
equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512; because a fishing equipment is never complete
and cannot be effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the fishing boat or fishing vessel itself.
And these two vessels of private respondent certainly come under the term fishing vessels employed in
paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries Commission.
Hence, no useful purpose can be served in trying to distinguish between boat and vessel with reference to
Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI. As a matter of fact, the accepted definition of vessel includes "every description
of water craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water" (Cope
versus Vallete, etc., 199 U.S. 625; U.S. vs. Holmes, 104 Fed. 884; Charles Barnes Co. vs. One Dredge Boat,
169 Fed. 895; and Yu Con vs. Ipil, 41 Phil. 780).
The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft (Monongahela River Construction, etc. vs.
Hardsaw, 77 NE 363, 365). The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the
meaning of the term vessel used in Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Castro (Chairman,), Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD, and U AUNG WIN, accused.
NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
The accession into our statute books on December 31, 1993 of Republic Act No. 7659, 1 which authorized the
re-imposition of the death penalty and amended certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, raised the level of expectations in the drive against criminality. As was to be
expected, however, some innovations therein needed the intervention of this Court for a judicial interpretation
of amendments introduced to the dangerous drugs law. 2
The same spin-off of novelty, this time by the new provision fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua which
theretofore had not been spelled out with specificity in the Revised Penal Code, produced some conflicting
constructions, more specifically on whether such penalty is divisible or indivisible in nature. That is actually the
major issue in these cases, the factual scenario and the culpability of both accused having been relegated to
secondary importance for lack of any controversial features.
The antecedents being undisputed, and with a careful review and assessment of the records of this case
having sustained the same, we reproduce hereunder the pertinent parts of the decision of the trial court jointly
deciding the criminal cases separately filed against each of the accused. Although only one of them, Nigel
Richard Gatward, has appealed his conviction to us, for reasons hereinafter explained we shall likewise
include the disposition by the court a quo of the case against U Aung Win.
1. The lower court stated the cases against the accused, the proceedings therein and its findings thereon, as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 94-6268, the accused is charged with violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, allegedly in this manner:
"That on or about the 31st (sic) day of August 1994, in the vicinity of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Pasay City, . . ., the above-named accused not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously transport heroin (2605.70 grams and 2632.0 grams) contained in separate carton envelopes
with a total weight of 5237.70 grams which is legally considered as a prohibited drug." (Information dated
Sept. 14, 1994)
In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, the accused is indicted for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, purportedly in this way:
"That on or about the 30th day of August 1994, at the arrival area of Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay
City, x x x, the above-named accused not being authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously import and bring into the Philippines 5579.80 grams of heroin which is legally considered as a
prohibited drug." (Information also dated Sept. 14, 1994)
Accused Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 pleaded not guilty of the charge when
arraigned.
On the other hand, accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, assisted by Atty. Willy Chan of the
Public Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice, entered a plea of guilty of the crime charged upon his

arraignment. Since it is a capital offense, the Court asked searching questions to determine the voluntariness
and the full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea. The accused manifested that he
was entering a plea of guilty voluntarily without having been forced or intimidated into doing it. The nature of
the charge was explained to him, with emphasis that the offense carries with it the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and his pleading guilty of it might subject him to the penalty of death. The accused
answered that he understood fully the charge against him and the consequences of his entering a plea of
guilty. The defense counsel likewise made an assurance in open court that he had explained to U Aung Win
the nature of the charge and the consequences of his pleading guilty of it.
Having been thus apprised, the accused still maintained his plea of guilty of the offense charged against him.
Since the offense admitted by him is punishable by death, the case was still set for trial for the reception of the
evidence of the prosecution to prove the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused and that of the
defense to establish mitigating circumstances.
Upon motion of the prosecution without any objection from te defense, these two cases were consolidated and
tried jointly, since the offenses charged arose from a series of related incidents and the prosecution would be
presenting common evidence in both.
At about 3:30 in the afternoon of August 30, 1994, accused U Aung Win, a passenger of TG Flight No. 620 of
the Thai Airways which had just arrived from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a travelling bag about
20 inches in length, 14 inches in width and 10 inches in thickness, for examination to Customs Examiner
Busran Tawano, who was assigned at the Arrival Area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in
Pasay City. The accused also handed to Tawano his Customs Declaration No. 128417 stating that he had no
articles to declare. When Tawano was about to inspect his luggage, the accused suddenly left, proceeding
towards the direction of Carousel No. 1, the conveyor for the pieces of luggage of the passengers of Flight No.
620, as if to retrieve another baggage from it.
After having inspected the luggages of the other incoming passengers, Tawano became alarmed by the failure
of U Aung Win to return and suspected that the bag of the accused contained illegal articles. The Customs
Examiner reported the matter to his superiors. Upon their instructions, the bag was turned over to the office of
the Customs Police in the NAIA for x-ray examination where it was detected that it contained some powdery
substance. When opened, the bag revealed two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between
its partitions. Representative samples of the substance were examined by Elizabeth Ayonon, a chemist of the
Crime Laboratory Service of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at the Arrival Area of the NAIA, and
by Tita Advincula, another chemist of' the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, and found to be
positive for heroin. The two chemists concluded that the entire substance, with a total weight of 5,579.80
grams, contained in the two packages found in the bag of U Aung Win, is heroin.
A manhunt was conducted to locate U Aung Win. The personnel of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
in the NAIA were asked to place the accused in the hold order list. The offices of the different airlines in the
airport were also alerted to inform the Enforcement and Security Service and the Customs Police Division of
the NAIA of any departing passenger by the name of U Aung Win who would check in at their departure
counters. A team was likewise sent to the Park Hotel in Belen St., Paco, Manila, which accused U Aung Win
had indicated in his Customs Declaration as his address in the Philippines. But the accused was not found in
that hotel.
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same date of August 30, 1994, Rey Espinosa, an employee of the Lufthansa Airlines,
notified the commander of the NAIA Customs Police District Command that a certain Burmese national by the
name of U Aung Win appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as a departing passenger. Immediately, a
team of law enforcers proceeded to the Departure Area and apprehended the accused after he had been
identified through his signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
Arrival Card. Customs Examiner Tawano also positively identified the accused as the person who left his bag
with him at the Arrival Area of the NAIA.
During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs Police and the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) gathered the information that the accused had a contact in Bangkok and that there were other
drug couriers in the Philippines. Following the lead, a team of lawmen, together with U Aung Win, was
dispatched to the City Garden Hotel in Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, to enable U Aung Win to communicate with
his contact in Bangkok for further instructions. While the police officers were standing by, they noticed two
persons, a Caucasian and an oriental, alight from a car and enter the hotel. U Aung Win whispered to
Customs Police Special Agent Edgar Quinones that he recognized the two as drug couriers whom he saw
talking with his contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau. The members of the team were able to establish the
identity of the two persons as accused Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing, a Thailander, from the

driver of the hotel service car used by the two when they arrived in the hotel. It was gathered by the law
enforcers that Gatward and Zaw Win Naing were scheduled to leave for Bangkok on board a KLM flight.
On August 31, 1994, operatives of the NAIA Customs Police mounted a surveillance operation at the
Departure Area for Gatward and Zaw Win Naing who might be leaving the country. At about 7:45 p.m. of the
same date, Special Agent Gino Minguillan of the Customs Police made a verification on the passenger
manifest of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Flight No. 806, bound for Amsterdam via Bangkok, which was scheduled
to depart at about 7:55 that evening. He found the name "GATWARD/NRMR" listed therein as a passenger for
Amsterdam and accordingly informed his teammates who responded immediately. Customs Police Captain
Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM airline at the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward
disembark from the aircraft and to have his checked-in luggage, if any, unloaded. The manager acceded to the
request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as the plane was about to depart and
to do so would unduly delay the flight. However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would be returned
immediately to the Philippines on the first available flight from Bangkok. Upon his disembarkment, Gatward
was invited by the police officers for investigation.
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 1, 1994, Gatward's luggage, a travelling bag almost of the
same size as that of U Aung Win, was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai Airways,
pursuant to the request of Erece which was telexed in the evening of August 31, 1994, to the KLM airline
manager in Bangkok. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the
presence of accused Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery
substance. Inside the bag were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each containing the powdery
substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the bag, one at the side in between
a double-wall, the other inside a partition in the middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and
Advincula pursuant to the request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery
substance contained in the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams, was found to be
heroin. 3
The court below made short shrift of the defense raised by herein appellant. Apart from the well-known rule on
the respect accorded to the factual findings of trial courts because of the vantage position they occupy in that
regard, we accept its discussion thereon by reason of its clear concordance with the tenets of law and logic.
Again we quote:
Accused Gatward denied that the bag containing the heroin was his luggage. However, that the said bag
belongs to him is convincingly shown by the fact that the serial number of the luggage tag, which is KL
206835, corresponds to the serial number of the luggage claim tag attached to the plane ticket of the accused.
Moreover, as testified to by Manager Erece of the KLM airline, the luggage of Gatward located in Container
No. 1020 of KLM Flight No. 806 was the same luggage which was returned to the NAIA on September 1,
1994, on board Thai Airways TG Flight No. 620, pursuant to the request made by him to the KLM manager in
Bangkok. The testimony of Erece should be given weight in accordance with the presumption that the ordinary
course of business has been followed. (Sec. 3(q), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). No circumstance
was shown by the defense which would create, a doubt as to the identity of the bag as the luggage of Gatward
which he checked in for KLM Flight No. 806 for Amsterdam with stopover in Bangkok.
Accused Gatward was present during the opening of his bag and the examination of its contents. He was also
interviewed by some press reporters in connection with the prohibited drug found in the bag. Gatward did not
then disclaim ownership of the bag and its heroin contents. His protestations now that the bag does not belong
to him should be deemed as an afterthought which deserves no credence.
Gatward posited that he checked in a different bag when he bearded KLM Flight No. 806, explaining that upon
his apprehension by the agents of the NAIA Customs Police, he threw away the claim tag for the said luggage.
He alleged that the said bag contained, among other things, not only important documents and papers
pertaining to his cellular phone business in the pursuit of which he came to the Philippines, but also money
amounting to 1,500.00. Gatward stressed that the bag did not have any illegal articles in it. If this were so, it
was unusual for him, and certainly not in accordance with the common habit of man, to have thrown away the
claim tag, thereby in effect abandoning the bag with its valuable contents. Not having been corroborated by
any other evidence, and being rendered unbelievable by the circumstances accompanying it as advanced by
him, the stand of accused Gatward that his luggage was different from that which contained the 5,237.70
grams of heroin in question commands outright rejection. 4
The trial court was also correct in rejecting the challenge to the admissibility in evidence of the heroin retrieved
from the bag of appellant. While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when appellant
checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight No. 806 he thereby agreed to the

inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict
observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise
without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag,
or in flagrante delicto.
The conviction of accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269 is likewise unassailable. His culpability
was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of
which was required by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his
having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination
upon his arrival at the international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was authorized by law to
import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so.
2. It is, however, the penalties imposed by the trial court on the two accused which this Court cannot fully
accept. This is the presentation made, and the rationalization thereof, by the court below:
According to Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
penalties for the offenses under Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved, with reference to heroin, is 40 grams or more. Since the heroin subject of each of these two cases
exceeds 40 grams, it follows that the penalty which may be imposed on each accused shall range
from reclusion perpetua to death.
To fix the proper penalty, it becomes necessary to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance had attended the commission of the offenses charged against the accused. With respect to
Gatward, no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was shown which might affect his criminal liability.
Relative to U Aung Win, no aggravating circumstance was likewise established by the prosecution. However,
the voluntary plea of guilty of the said accused, which was made upon his arraignment and therefore before
the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution, should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the rules for the application of indivisible
penalties, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser
penalty shall be applied, if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of
the crime, or if the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance.
However, this rule may no longer be followed in these cases, although the penalty prescribed by law
is reclusion perpetua to death, since reclusion perpetua, which was an indivisible penalty before, is now a
divisible penalty with a duration from 20 years and one (1) day to 40 years, in accordance with Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Consequently, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" should at present be deemed to fall within the
purview of the "penalty prescribed" which "does not have one of the forms specially provided for" in the
Revised Penal Code, the periods of which "shall be distributed," applying by analogy the prescribed rules, in
line with Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to this principle, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to
death" shall have the following periods: Death, as the maximum; thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years, as the medium; and twenty (20) years and one (1) day to thirty (30) years, as the minimum.
As there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance shown to have attended the commission of the offense
charged against Gatward, the penalty to be imposed on him shall be within the range of the medium period.
On the other hand, since U Aung Win is favored by one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to be taken against him, the penalty which may be imposed on him shall be within the range of
the minimum period. (Art. 64(1) & (2), Revised Penal Code)
The accused in these cases may not enjoy the benefit of Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for
under Section 2 of the said Act, its provisions shall not apply to those convicted of offenses punished with life
imprisonment, which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as similar to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as far as the non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is concerned. (People vs. Simon,
G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994) 5
On those considerations, the trial court handed down its verdict on March 3, 1995 finding both accused guilty
as charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-6268, accused Nigel Richard Gatward is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority therefor, 5,237.70 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug,
in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance shown to have

attended the commission of the crime, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for thirty-five (35)
years of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-6269, accused U Aung Win is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of importing or
bringing into the Philippines 5,579.80 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, without being authorized by law to do
so, contrary to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659; and in view of the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for twenty-five (25) years of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
The heroin involved in these cases is declared forfeited in favor of the government and ordered turned over to
the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.
With costs de oficio. 6
It is apropos to mention at this juncture that during the pendency of this appeal, and while awaiting the filing of
appellant's brief on an extended period granted to his counsel de parte, the Court received on September 5,
1995 a mimeographed form of a so-called "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal." It bears the signature of
appellant but without the assistance or signature of his counsel indicated thereon. No reason whatsoever was
given for the desired withdrawal and considering the ambient circumstances, the Court resolved on September
27, 1995 to deny the same for lack of merit. 7
On June 10, 1996, a letter was received from one H.M. Consul M.B. Evans of the British Embassy, Consular
Section, Manila, seeking an explanation for the aforesaid resolution and with the representation that "a
convicted person who did not, on reflection, wish to continue with an appeal would not need to prove merit but
could simply notify the courts of his wish to withdraw and that would be the end of the matter." To be sure, this
is not the first time that members of foreign embassies and consulates feel that they have a right to intrude into
our judicial affairs and processes, to the extent of imposing their views on our judiciary, seemingly oblivious or
arrogantly disdainful of the fact that our courts are entitled to as much respect as those in their own countries.
Such faux pas notwithstanding, a reply was sent to Mr. Evans informing him that, while there is no
arrangement whereby a foreign consular officer may intervene in a judicial proceeding in this Court but out of
courtesy as enjoined in Republic Act No. 6713, the unauthorized pleading of appellant was made under
unacceptable circumstances as explained in said reply; that it is not mandatory on this Court to dismiss an
appeal on mere motion of an appellant; that the Court does not discuss or transmit notices of judicial action
except to counsel of the parties; and that, should he so desire, he could coordinate with appellant's counsel
whose address was furnished therein. 8
In a resolution dated June 19, 1996, appellant's counsel was ordered to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held for contempt for his failure to file appellant's brief. On July 24, 1996, said
counsel and the Solicitor General were required to comment on the aforestated motion of appellant to
withdraw his appeal, no brief for him having yet been filed. Under date of September 6, 1996, the Solicitor
General filed his comment surprisingly to the effect that the People interposed no objection to the motion to
withdraw appeal. Appellant's counsel, on the other hand, manifested on November 4, 1996 that he was willing
to file the brief but he could not do so since appellant asked for time to consult his pastor who would later
inform said counsel, but neither that pastor nor appellant has done so up to the present.
It would then be worthwhile to restate for future referential purposes the rules in criminal cases on the
withdrawal of an appeal pending in the appellate courts. The basic rule is that, in appeals taken from the
Regional Trial Court to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the same may be withdrawn and
allowed to be retracted by the trial court before the records of the case are forwarded to the appellate
court. 9 Once the records are brought to the appellate court, only the latter may act on the motion for
withdrawal of appeal. 10 In the Supreme Court, the discontinuance of appeals before the filing of the appellee's
brief is generally permitted. 11 Where the death penalty is imposed, the review shall proceed notwithstanding
withdrawal of the appeal as the review is automatic and this the Court can do without the benefit of briefs or
arguments filed by the appellant. 12
In the case at bar, however, the denial of the motion to withdraw his appeal by herein appellant is not only
justified but is necessary since the trial court had imposed a penalty based on an erroneous interpretation of
the governing law thereon. Thus, in People vs. Roque, 13 the Court denied the motion of the accused to
withdraw his appeal, to enable it to correct the wrongful imposition by the trial court of the penalty of "reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua" for the crime of simple rape, in clear derogation of the provisions of Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Similarly, in another case, 14 the motion to

withdraw his appeal by the accused, whose guilt for the crime of murder was undeniable and for which he
should suffer the medium period of the imposable penalty which isreclusion perpetua, was not allowed;
otherwise, to permit him to recall the appeal would enable him to suffer a lesser indeterminate sentence
erroneously decreed by the trial court which imposed the minimum of the penalty for murder, that is,reclusion
temporal in its maximum period.
In the cases at bar, the same legal obstacle constrained the Court to deny appellant's motion to withdraw his
appeal. The trial court had, by considering reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, imposed an unauthorized
penalty on both accused which would remain uncorrected if the appeal had been allowed to be withdrawn. In
fact, it would stamp a nihil obstantium on a penalty that in law does not exist and which error, initially
committed by this Court in another case on which the trial court relied, had already been set aright by this
Court.
3. As amended by Republic Act No. 7569, the respective penalties imposable under Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, in relation to Section 20 thereof, would range from reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 if the quantity of the illegal drug involved, which is heroin in this case,
should be 40 grams or more. In the same amendatory law, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is now accorded
a "defined duration" ranging from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, through the
amendment introduced by it to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code.
This led the trial court to conclude that said penalty is now divisible in nature, and that "(c)onsequently, the
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" should at present be deemed to fall within the purview of the "penalty
prescribed" which "does not have one of the forms specially provided for" in the Revised Penal Code, and the
periods of which "shall be distributed" by an analogous application of the rules in Article 77 of the Code.
Pursuant to its hypothesis, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death shall have the following periods: death,
as the maximum; thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, as the medium; and twenty (20) years
and one (1) day to thirty (30) years, as the minimum." 15
We cannot altogether blame the lower court for this impasse since this Court itself inceptively made an
identical misinterpretation concerning the question on the indivisibility of reclusion perpetua as a penalty.
In People vs.Lucas, 16 the Court was originally of the view that by reason of the amendment of Article 27 of the
Code by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7569, there was conferred upon said penalty a defined duration of 20
years and 1 day to 40 years; but that since there was no express intent to convert said penalty into a divisible
one, there having been no corresponding amendment to Article 76, the provisions of Article 65 could be
applied by analogy. The Court then declared that reclusion perpetua could be divided into three equal portions,
each portion composing a period. In effect, reclusion perpetua was then to be considered as a divisible
penalty.
In a subsequent re-examination of and a resolution in said case on January 9, 1995, occasioned by a motion
for clarification thereof, 17 the Court en banc realized the misconception, reversed its earlier pronouncement,
and has since reiterated its amended ruling in three succeeding appellate litigations. 18 The Court, this time,
held that in spite of the amendment putting the duration of reclusion perpetua at 20 years and 1 day to 40
years, it should remain as an indivisible penalty since there was never any intent on the part of Congress to
reclassify it into a divisible penalty. This is evident from the undisputed fact that neither Article 63 nor Article 76
of the Code had been correspondingly altered, to wit:
Verily, if reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
would lose its reason and basis for existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended
R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved
are of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable
because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for
determining when either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be
no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the attendant
modifying circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63 assumes serious proportions
since it does not involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory sections of R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason by a Filipino (Section 2), qualified piracy
(Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder (Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8),
robbery with homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section 10), rape committed under certain
circumstances (Section 11), and plunder
(Section 12).

In the same resolution, the Court adverted to its holding in People vs. Reyes, 19 that while the original Article
27 of the Revised Penal Code provided for the minimum and the maximum ranges of all the penalties therein,
from arresto menor to reclusion temporal but with the exceptions of bond to keep the peace, there was no
parallel specification of either the minimum or the maximum range of reclusion perpetua. Said article had only
provided that a person sentenced to suffer any of the perpetual penalties shall, as a general rule, be extended
pardon after service thereof for 30 years. Likewise, in laying down the procedure on successive service of
sentence and the application of the three-fold rule, the duration of perpetual penalties is computed at 30 years
under Article 70 of the Code.
Furthermore, since in the scales of penalties provided in the Code, specifically those in Articles 25, 70 and
71,reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately higher than reclusion temporal, then its minimum range
should by necessary implication start at 20 years and 1 day while the maximum thereunder could be coextensive with the rest of the natural life of the offender. However, Article 70 provides that the maximum period
in regard to service of the sentence shall not exceed 40 years.
Thus, the maximum duration of reclusion perpetua is not and has never been 30 years which is merely the
number of years which the convict must serve in order to be eligible for pardon or for the application of the
three-fold rule. Under these accepted propositions, the Court ruled in the motion for clarification in the Lucas
case that Republic Act No. 7659 had simply restated existing jurisprudence when it specified the duration
of reclusion perpetua at 20 years and 1 day to 40 years.
The error of the trial court was in imposing the penalties in these cases based on the original doctrine in Lucas
which was not yet final and executory, hence open to reconsideration and reversal. The same having been
timeously rectified, appellant should necessarily suffer the entire extent of 40 years of reclusion perpetua, in
line with that reconsidered dictum subsequently handed down by this Court. In passing, it may be worth asking
whether or not appellant subsequently learned of the amendatory resolution of the Court under which he stood
to serve up to 40 years, and that was what prompted him to move posthaste for the withdrawal of his appeal
from a sentence of 35 years.
4. The case of U Aung Win ostensibly presents a more ticklish legal poser, but that is not actually so. It will be
recalled that this accused was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua supposedly in its minimum period, consisting of imprisonment for 25 years, and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00. He did not appeal, and it may be contended that what has been said about the corrected
duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua which we hold should be imposed on appellant Gatward,
since reclusion perpetua is after all an indivisible penalty, should not apply to this accused.
Along that theory, it may be asserted that the judgment against accused U Aung Win has already become
final. It may also be argued that since Section 11(a) of Rule 122 provides that an appeal taken by one accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter, our present disposition of the correct duration of the penalty imposable on appellant
Gatward should not affect accused U Aung Win since it would not be favorable to the latter. To use a trite and
tired legal phrase, those objections are more apparent than real.
At bottom, all those postulations assume that the penalties decreed in the judgment of the trial court are valid,
specifically in the sense that the same actually exist in law and are authorized to be meted out as
punishments. In the case of U Aung Win, and the same holds true with respect to Gatward, the penalty
inflicted by the court a quo was a nullity because it was never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The
penalties which consisted of aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are self-contradictory in terms
and unknown in penal law. Without intending to sound sardonic or facetious, it was akin to imposing the
indivisible penalties of public censure, or perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death in their
minimum or maximum periods.
This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting a penalty higher or lower than the
one imposable under the law but with both penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid
punishments. An erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment. 20 But a judgment which
ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which is an impossible version of that in
the roster of lawful penalties is necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of the penalty and
does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof. Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final
and executory.
Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case was reopened in order that a
higher penalty may be imposed on him. There is here no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is
being affirmed but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it conformable to law,

pursuant to a duty and power inherent in this Court. The penalty has not been changed since what was
decreed by the trial court and is now being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua which, unfortunately, was imposed by the lower court in an elemental form which is non-existent in
and not authorized by law. Just as the penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the accused,
neither has it been increased so as to be prejudicial to him.
Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the imposition upon him of the corrected
duration, inherent in the essence and concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence
with an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial legislation and unequal protection of
the law. He would thus be the victim of an inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not only of the
judgment and the penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have served. Far from
violating any right of U Aung Win, therefore, the remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion
protect him against the risk of another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the.court a quo, specifically with regard to the penalty imposed on accusedappellant Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 and that of accused U Aung Win in Criminal
Case No. 94-6269, is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that both accused are sentenced to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and full extent. In all other respects, said judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED, but with costs to be assessed against both accused in all instances of these cases.
SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident
of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June
16, 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with
Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. [4]
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to
fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the
traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day,
June 26, 1998.[5]
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure
area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs,
prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.[6]
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via
Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs.
Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result
of an ectopic pregnancy.[7]
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying
Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.) She was
directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accusedappellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside.[8]

[G.R. No. 138881. December 18, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accusedappellant.

Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her
stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked
her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez
then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room. [9]

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City,
finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[3] whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo
Embile, duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented accused-appellant
who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:

The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance
which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. [10]
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st
RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her
luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. [11]
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she
was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the
womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that
nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her
passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was
issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo. [12]
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages
on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership
of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken
before a fiscal for inquest.[13] She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26
until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of
her relatives in the Philippines.[14]
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: [15]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and
hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits G, C-2
and C-3) are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered
to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the
pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.

they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

SO ORDERED.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search,
they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) despite failure of the prosecution in proving
the negative allegation in the information; (2) despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride; (3) despite violation of her constitutional rights; and (4) when guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional
rights. She argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced
to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1 st RASO office, without the assistance
of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded from the evidence. [17]
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention
and used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III,
12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a
valid search made on her person.

Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been
obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor
General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to
affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their
testimony to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage,
and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken
from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:

The trial court held:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation
but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:

(a)

Subject of the offense;

(b)

Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

(c)

Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.

(a)
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

(b)
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:

(Underscoring supplied)

Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The
Crime The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16
of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

xxxx
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as the questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in
any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule
above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being
accurate.[18]

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to
the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. [19] Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity
of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. [20] Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or

8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements as
determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings conducted for
the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.

Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the

substance contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI
forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to establish
its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved.

The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also that the scientifically
correct method of obtaining an accurate representative sample had been obtained. [24] At any rate, as the
Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results, it would have been a
simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by another chemist. This she
did not do.

This contention is likewise without merit.

The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the presence of
impurities if there were any. He testified:

Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the information
that she did not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides:

PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will be
discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic
examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions
of Section 20 hereof.

WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles or the same as
the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample

Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,a regulated

drug, is not unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or prescription. She
points out that since the prosecution failed to present any certification that she is not authorized to possess or
use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction.

....

The contention has no merit.

PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have examined,
in chemical examination, what color it will register, if any?

The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan Toco.[25] The accused in that
case was charged with smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the information on the
ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed
and practicing physician.

WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the reagent, therefore it
will not dissolve. In my examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir.
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in laymans term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas.
....
COURT

In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen?

WITNESS None, your Honor.

....
ATTY. AGOOT
I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed
with 200 grams of tawas, you will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your findings, negative or
positive, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
ATTY. AGOOT

That is qualitative examination.

WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate.[21]

A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis requires the
determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a qualitative
identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative
analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine. [22]
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C3. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. It is
particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime lab. For
example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any material that is at the disposal of the
drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective customers. Hence,
the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the aid of chromatographic
methods to first separate the mixture into its components. [23]

This Court denied the motion and said:

The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in
these Islands. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of
smokers who smoked under the advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence
where one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the Opium Law, it is more logical as well as
more practical and convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a physician, that he should
set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove that every smoker,
charged with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or prescription. Indeed, when it is considered
that under the law any person may, in case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a physician to use
opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is
or can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the
prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of a
physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so without
the advice or prescription of a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the
defendant himself, while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in
establishing the fact that he used it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so.
[26]

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he
may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do, he has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a certification that accused-appellant has
no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a license or permit under the law to possess
the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to
support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.

Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the
part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court accords great respect to the findings of
the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness
in its findings.[27]
It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was presented in her
behalf. Her denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. [28] As has been
held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts
with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29]
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with and
convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, have been
complied with by the prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law.[30] Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams of shabu were confiscated
from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-appellant
guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is
reduced to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accusedappellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148825

December 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with
the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended, under an Information1 whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her
possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809)
GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or
license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene
Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution witness Mylene
Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness stand.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. 2 When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a
civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying "Excuse me maam, can I search you?" 3 Upon frisking SUSAN,
Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN,
pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules. 4 When
Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked
SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith
reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort
room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Mylene touched something
in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged.
Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape,
which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. 6 The first was taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the second,
from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh. 7 Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4
De los Reyes.8 The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the
incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened
the same and found that they contained white crystalline substances 9 which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. 10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no
investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN. 11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles
seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2)
one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock
control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles.12 He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional
rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. 13 Yet he told her that she had
the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. 14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest
and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person. 15
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision 16 finding SUSAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, 17 alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1)
giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it was not
presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a
police officer; (3) making statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the
accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also
assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized items were not
in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial. 18
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellants Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order 19 on 26 November 2001
denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to SUSANs counsel the effects of the filing
of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter chose to magnify the judges statement which was uttered in jest;
(2) SUSANs conviction was not based on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3) there was
no violation of SUSANs constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her detention without
counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and were
therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial court
the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of
probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the "Terry search"
doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the
records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence,

and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of
the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson. 20
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies room
was constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest could not be said to have
been made before the search because at the time of the strip search, the arresting officers could not have
known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray
tape. At that point then, they could not have determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The
strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught
flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 21 such stop
and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether
she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal
area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in
the ladies room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel, which was violative of Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the medical report
executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson 22 because of its sweeping statement allowing
searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the safety interests
involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should have been Katz v. United States, 23 which upholds the
Fourth Amendment of the United States of America that "protects people and not places."
In its Appellants Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante
delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within
the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted
herself to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for
further inspection by airport security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride
seized from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that
SUSANs conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that she was
caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Consequently, it
supports SUSANs conviction but recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSANs conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the
arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State

intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this case were
incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed
while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former.
In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose
of ascertaining what were the packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived
of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."lawphi1.et
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport security personnel had
no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was
being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white
crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The
search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process
cannot be reversed.26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons
under the "Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person
who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed
under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others
the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search
for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to
board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted
by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All
Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is
clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to
search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery
of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the
discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her
obviously false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that
SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited
materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into
the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and
facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be
to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." 28 Thus, the strip search
in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.

III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.

The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to the present case.
That case involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing passenger bound for the
United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then the frisker on duty, whose task was to
frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband
goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila, the former felt something hard on the latters abdominal area.
Upon inquiry, Leila explained that she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an
operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to
her superior, who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest womens room for inspection. In the comfort
room, Leila was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and brought out three plastic
packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This Court ruled
that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore admissible in evidence against Leila.
Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon
the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to
the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S.29 is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case are entirely
different from the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by telephone. During the trial, the
government was permitted, over the accuseds objection, to introduce evidence of accuseds end of telephone
conversations, which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of
America reversed the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the instant
case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved. It ruled that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and mandates not to
unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.30 There being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we
cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN
resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon
examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such
warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime,
the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v.
Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only
when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody interrogation." 31 Custodial investigation refers
to the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 32 This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from
him.33 And the right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial
investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles
seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any
event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no
statement was taken from her during her detention and used in evidence against her.36 Hence, her claim of
violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical report on the
physical and medical examination conducted upon appellants request, which contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative. She related that she was an
illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I
was young and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost control, I want my money back. I owe
other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the
money." She denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances. (Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not
properly identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellants conviction will stand, as the
courts finding of guilt was not based on that document.
VII. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do not hesitate to rule
that that the three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in evidence against her.
Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, her conviction must inevitably
be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended,
provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions
of Section 20 hereof.


SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.-The penalties for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article
III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the following quantities:

otherwise use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control 1.9 kilos or 1,900 grams, more or less, of marijuana which is a
prohibited drug, in violation of the aforementioned laws.
Acts contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial followed.

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

The prosecution presented P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. of the Police Aviation Security Command
(PASCOM), PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao, also of the PASCOM, and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM), all of Bacolod City. Their testimonies, woven together, established the following facts:

As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For possession of
regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the trial courts imposition of fine in the
amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.

Sometime in November, 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all Chiefs of Narcotics
Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within their respective areas of responsibility,
following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to coordinate with local airport
authorities and the PASCOM.

VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.

In the morning of April 12, 1994, while the prosecution witnesses were in their respective stations, appellant
and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport
Terminal. Appellant was bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small
traveling bag and a box marked Bongbongspiaya.[4] At the pre-departure area, upon the advice of Corazon
Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM, appellant proceeded to the walk-through metal detector, a
machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or
object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic
substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Poyugao to frisk him
bodily. Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed it through
the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered appellant to go to the handcarried luggage inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were
present. SPO1 Casugod requested appellant to open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant and started
to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented, saying in faltering English, open, open.
SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found therein eighteen (18) small packs, seventeen (17) of which were
wrapped in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which looked like
marijuana. Upon seeing this, appellant ran outside the pre-departure area but he was chased by PO3
Poyugao, SPO1 Linda and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM.

Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation of the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
,
Clearly, the seizure of SUSANs passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted
provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.37
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in
Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation
of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the
costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellants passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be
returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 120670. October 23, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HEDISHI SUZUKI, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case
No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi Suzuki, appellant, of illegal possession of marijuana, defined and penalized
under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6525, as amended, [2] and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00.
The Information[3] against appellant reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1994, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess, prepare, administer or

They apprehended appellant near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the PASCOM office. They
also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with
appellant in drug trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived, the
police apprised appellant of his constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same. The total weight of the
suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a confiscation receipt
which appellant, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over
appellant to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and his companions were brought to the prosecutors office for inquest and placed
under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office. The box with its contents was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Inspector Villavicencio conducted three tests on the specimen samples
which proved positive for marijuana.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness whose testimony is as follows: On April 9, 1994, he and
Takeshi Koketsu arrived in Manila from Osaka, Japan. The purpose of his trip was to collect from
Takeshi Y2.5 million or P500,000.00 which the latter owed him. Waiting for them at the airport was Takeshis
wife, Lourdes. On the same day, the three flew toBacolod City. Appellant stayed at the house of Takeshi.
Two days later, appellant asked Takeshi to pay. When Takeshi admitted he had no money, appellant got angry
and went to the Casino Filipino where he stayed until 10:30 in the evening. Upon leaving the casino, he met
Pinky who enticed him to have sex with her. They then proceeded to the Moonlight Motel. Moments later,
Pinky left, while appellant stayed there for the night. He told her he was leaving the following morning.

The following day or on April 12, 1994, appellant went to the airport. Pinky, who was there waiting, gave him a
box of Bongbongs piaya as pasalubong from Bacolod City. He did not ascertain the contents of the box
since he trusted Pinky although he just met her the previous night.
Appellant found and joined Takeshi and Lourdes at the coffee shop. Takeshi apologized for his failure to pay
his debt, assuring him that he would settle his obligation next month.
When it was time to leave, appellant, accompanied by Takeshi, proceeded to the pre-departure area. When
he passed through the metal detector, a policeman frisked him, got the box and placed it inside the metal
detector. The machine produced a red light, hence, the policeman brought the box to the inspection table,
with appellant following him. Thereafter, the policeman, whom he later knew as SPO1 Arturo Casugod,
pointed to the box uttering something appellant did not understand. Appellant said, wait a minute, (in
Japanese) and went outside to ask Takeshi and Lourdes to interpret for him, but they did not respond. When
PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao called him back to the pre-departure area, he found Takeshi near the table and the
box containing something wrapped in aluminum foil already opened. Takeshi told him that he was carrying
marijuana. He replied it was given to him by a woman that morning. Then he and SPO1 Casugod went to the
PASCOM office where the latter weighed the contents of the box. He did not sign the Confiscation Receipt
presented to him. They then proceeded to the NARCOM office with C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, SPO1
Linda, PO3 Poyugao, and three other officers. From the NARCOM office, appellant was brought to the
Bacolod Police Station.
Shortly thereafter, they went to the Nagoya Restaurant owned by Takeshi where appellant saw C/Inspector
Alcantara and Lourdes talking. When he inquired from Takeshi what was going on, he was told they needed
money in dealing with the police. Appellant was then brought to the prosecutors office. There Takeshi told
him to keep silent as he would make a deal with the prosecutor. Then they went to Takeshis house where
appellant stayed for two days.
On April 14, 1994, C/Inspector Alcantara and SPO1 Linda brought appellant to the Bacolod City Jail. Takeshi
visited him twice, advising him to ask someone from Japan to send him money and be discreet, otherwise he
would be killed; and to admit he has in his possession less than 750 grams of marijuana so he could post
bail. However, he refused.
Five days later, appellant, escorted by the police, went to Takeshis house to retrieve his money
(Y120,000 equivalent to P30,000.00), but Takeshi told him that it was already spent for the food and drinks of
the NARCOM agents and the airport policemen.
On December 7, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused HEDISHI SUZUKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00), and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of Republic Act No.
7659, let the 1,547.07 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, subject matter of this case, be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be
disposed according to law.
SO ORDERED.
Hence the instant mandatory review.
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT AGENTS HAD THE LEGAL
AUTHORITY WHEN THEY OPENED AND SEARCHED THE SMALL CARTON IN QUESTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR
THE OPENING AND SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AND IN DECLARING LEGAL AND VALID THE
SEIZURE OF SAID CARTON AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE APPELLANT.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA CONTENTS OF
THE SUBJECT CARTON AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE CARTON IN QUESTION
WAS INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE SUBJECT CARTON WAS
MADE UNDER THE EXCEPTION OF SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT WAS VALID
AS HE WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS UNQUALIFIED, VOLUNTARY AND
AUTHORITATIVE CONSENT GIVEN BY THE APPELLANT TO THE OPENING OF THE CARTON.
VIII
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE APPELLANT WAS CAUGHT IN POSSESSION
OF MARIJUANA, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
IX
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF
THE CARTON IN QUESTION (CONTAINING MARIJUANA), THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANT INTENDED TO POSSESS SAID PACKS OF MARIJUANA.
X
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS PETITION TO BE RELEASED ON
BAIL CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF ANY IRREGULARITY ATTENDING HIS ARREST AND ESTOPS HIM
FROM QUESTIONING ITS VALIDITY.
XI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT, CONSIDERATION AND CREDIT TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AND IN DECLARING THE SAME SELF-SERVING AND NOT
AMPLY PROVEN.
XII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION WHICH CREATE REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT.
XIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION CONVICTING APPELLANT.
XIV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF
DEATH AND IMPOSING A FINE OF TEN MILLION PESOS.

XV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT WAS PROVEN
BY THE PROSECUTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM.
Considering that the above assigned errors are interrelated, they will be discussed jointly.
Appellant invokes his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, contending that: (1) the
authority to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes under Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6235[5] does not apply to PASCOM and NARCOM agents but is limited only to aircraft companies or operators
of aircraft for hire; (2) he did not consent to be searched by the authorities; (3) the prohibited substances
confiscated by the authorities were not actually in their plain view; and (4) the search they conducted was not
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which reads:
SECTION 8.
Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft
which are for hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in the
presence of the owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if present, in order to help the
authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his
representative refuses to have the same opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse
the loading thereof.
In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court correctly upheld the PASCOMs authority to open packages and
cargoes, thus:
This Court does not subscribe to the contention of the accused. The Police Aviation Security Command
(PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a
creation of Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 399, dated April 28, 1976.
On February 18, 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National Defense, the
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of Justice, the Director General,
National Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of Finance was signed. The purpose was to
establish a working arrangement among cognizant agencies, set up guidelines and procedures for the security
of the airport complex throughout the Philippines particularly handling, coordination and disposition of
hijacking and other criminal incidents that may occur thereat (PAFM 3-9, page 1-3).
Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the following
functions and responsibilities:
1.

Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation;

2.

Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;

3.
Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport security
operations;
4.
Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and provide other pertinent
public safety services within the airports;
xxx
One of its guidelines before the passenger can enter the sanitized area (pre-departure area) is to check the
hand-carried luggage and personal effects of passengers (PAFM 3-9, page 2-3).
Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag or attach case with the following limitation:
a.

xxx

xxx

b.

xxx

xxx

c.

It can be readily opened for inspection (PAFM 3-9, page 2-4).

Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in relation to R.A. 6235, the
PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or handcarried bags.
Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference,
particularly paragraph 3.6.4 when x-ray inspection is not possible or when the x-ray image of a bag gives
rise to suspicion, x x x, a manual search must be carried out (Memorandum of the Prosecution, pp. 15-16;
underscoring supplied).
The prosecution correctly argued that the PASCOM established a system of checkpoint at the predeparture area of the Bacolod Airport to quickly inspect or screen persons or hand-carried baggages for
illegal items pursuant to said Memorandum of Agreement, which in turn derived its life from LOI 399. In short,
the setting up of checkpoint at the Bacolod Airport on April 12, 1994 does not have only jurisprudential basis
(Valmonte vs. De Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83288, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 211, more popularly known as
the checkpoints cases) but also statutory basis.
Moreover, to sustain the stand of the accused exclusively limiting the authority to open and search
suspicious luggages would result to absurdity. It would deprive law enforcers of their authority to perform
their duty of maintaining order, preserving peace, protecting life and property and other police works such as
crime detection, while within the airport premises. The construction given by the accused conveniently
omitted the phrase found in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which reads in order to help the authorities
in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. The word authorities evidently refers to police officers
and other law enforcers such as the PASCOM officers. It follows that in allowing or authorizing aircraft
companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are for hire, to open and investigate
suspicious packages and seizures, the authors of the law does not disallow or prohibit law enforcement
agencies of the government from assisting or conducting the opening and investigation of suspicious
packages and cargoes. Otherwise, they will be remiss in their sworn duty of protecting the public in general
and more particularly those in the aviation industry. x xx. It becomes crystal-clear that the PASCOM officers
and personnel had the legal authority when they opened and investigated the box in the presence of the
accused and his counsel.
This is not the first time we recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedure as an
exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In People vs. Canton,[6] and People vs. Johnson,
[7]
we validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and the consequent seizure of
the shabu found in their persons, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited materials or
substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area, as
claimed by appellant, is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence
and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society.[8]
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protectionor waiving his right by
giving consent to the search or seizure. [9]
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents. The testimony
of SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. is quite revealing, thus:

Q And when the said carton box was passed for the second time thru the walk-through machine it indicated
this metallic element by flashing a red light, is that correct?

A When I opened the box, sir, I found out that it contained suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops wrapped
in an aluminum foil, sir, and transparent cellophane.

Yes, sir.

x x x.[10]

And because of that, what did you do?

Rhodelin Poyugao put the box on top of the inspection table.

That appellant gave his consent when PO1 Casugod asked him to open the box was confirmed by SPO1
Linda and PO3 Poyugao.[11] As succinctly found by the trial court, appellant cannot deny that he consented by
feigning ignorance of the English language, thus:

What happened then?

A And then our non-uniformed personnel, Mr. Donato Barnezo, asked the passenger Mr. Hedishi Suzuki,
saying, kindly open your box for inspection.
Q

What happened after he asked the accused to open the box?

Mr. Hedishi Suzuki refused to open, sir. He signaled no, no.

What happened then?

A At that juncture, sir. I advised the said passenger, Mr. Hedishi Suzuki: Very sorry, sir, we need to open
your luggage because it indicated a red light.
Q

When you say open the luggage you are referring to the box?

Referring to the small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.

What happened then?

Mr. Hedishi Suzuki tried to get outside of the pre-departure area instead of opening the box.

Where did Mr. Suzuki go if he went away?

Before he could get out of the door of the pre-departure area I called his attention to come back.

Did he come back?

A He came back and I explained to him again, sir, that we are very sorry but we need to open your small
carton marked Bongbong Piaya. I told him, I am very sorry, sir, but we need to open your small carton marked
Bongbong Piaya.
Q

And what did Mr. Suzuki do?

Mr. Suzuki answered me, open.

What did you do?

I said kindly open your carton and he repeated, open.

For the second time?

Yes, sir.

What did you do then because he said open?

I explained to him, sir, and I asked him again, sir, I am going to open this and he told me you open.

Then, what did you do?

A I got hold of the carton and opened it by means of cutting the masking tape that bound both ends of the
carton.
Q

And what did you find inside the said box?

Accused through counsel would want this Court to believe that the opening of the carton containing marijuana
fruiting tops was without the consent of the accused. The defense relied on the alleged inability of the
accused to understand nor speak the English language because he is a Japanese national. It made capital on
the presence of Japanese interpreters, Tsuyushi Tsuchida and Hideo Agarie, who assisted during the trial.
The Court has no doubt in the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their categorical
declaration that accused Hedishi Suzuki gave his consent not only nodding his head but also by saying
Open. Open. Open. There was even a third-party consent given by his Japanese companion Takeshi
Koketsu.
The allegation of the accused that he does not understand English is indeed incredible to believe. As aptly
observed by Assistant City Prosecutor Rafael Guanco, the trial prosecutor, the accused might not be able to
speak straight English yet he might understand English (Memorandum of the Prosecution, page 21). The
prosecution witnesses categorically declared that accused Hedishi Suzuki was speaking English during the
airport encounter with the PASCOM and NARCOM operatives and while being investigated at the PASCOM
Office. While it may be true that Lourdes Linsangan participated on some occasions, her participation merely
facilitated the conversation.
The Court cannot believe accuseds protestation of ignorance of the English language. There are several
indications that accused understand the English language. It may be noted that in filing a motion to terminate
the legal services of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa, it appeared that accused caused its preparation or filing without
the assistance of a lawyer (Motion To Terminate Services of Counsel, page 53,expediente). The accused
testified that his wife is proficient in English. Accused was able to play games in the casino, the night before
the airport incident. He was able to give direction to the driver from the motel to the airport. He has traveled
to the Philippines about ten (10) times. He claims to be an owner and manager of a company where some
clients or customers are non-Japanese such as Germans and Americans. During the trial accused appeared
to be an intelligent witness and this Court has keenly observed that accused had shown eagerness and
readiness to answer the questions propounded in the English language even before the Japanese
translation. Above all, accused answered in the affirmative when queried by the Court whether he was able to
attend English classes while in college. In short, the Court was literally taken for a ride when initially made to
believe that the accused could not read, speak and understand the English language.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.[12] Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted
by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught
in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.[13] The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible
as evidence against appellant. [14]
Nonetheless, we find the trial courts reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine finds
application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the plain view of the police officer. [15] Here, it
is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box of piaya, wrapped in aluminum
foil and not immediately apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time of the
search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be a lawful
arrest before the search can be made. [16]
At this point, it bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a license or permit under the law to possess the
prohibited drug.[17] Here, appellant failed to prove that he has a license to possess the marijuana. In People
vs. Bongcarawan,[18] we held that such possession constitutes prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.

Appellant vigorously contends that the trial court should have sustained his unrebutted testimony that he was
a victim of frame-up contrived by Takeshi in connivance with the arresting officers, especially C/Inspector
Ernesto Alcantara, accused in several criminal charges.
It is noteworthy that aside from appellants testimony, not a shred of evidence was presented by the defense to
prove his claim that he was framed-up. Not even Pinky who allegedly gave him the box of piaya containing
marijuana was presented as a witness to confirm his story. We have ruled that clear and convincing evidence
is required to prove the defense of frame-up because in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the
police authorities to falsely impute such crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty stands.[19] Also, allegations of frame-up are easily fabricated, making it the
common and standard line of defense in prosecutions involving the Dangerous Drugs Law. [20]
We are not swayed by appellants reference to C/Inspector Alcantaras criminal records. Suffice it to state that
he is neither an accused in this case or a prosecution witness.

in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names.
The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside
clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three
into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall
with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer
garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged
with carrying
[2]

We have carefully reviewed the records and found no cogent reason to overthrow the findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the trial court. That this is a matter exclusively within its competence, since it had the
unique opportunity of observing the witnesses and their manner of testifying during trial, had long been
established. Hence, its findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, except when there
is a clear showing that facts of weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the case have been
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.[21] This exception is not present here.

concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the
prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied
the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to
believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the
officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe
that they might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between
a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton
were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.

However, the trial court imposed the wrong penalty.

Held:

Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana or
Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.[22] Section 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied in the absence
of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. [23]

1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as much to the citizen on
the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. Pp. 8-9.

In the case at bar, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, appellants possession of 1,547.70
grams[24] of marijuana does not merit the supreme penalty of death but only reclusion perpetua.
[25]

While the imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal drugs, we,
however, reduce the fine imposed by the trial court to P1,000,000.00, considering that courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 9416100 finding appellant Hedishi Suzuki guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and fined One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.

2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility against
petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. P. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and restrained police
investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other
than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here. Pp. 16-20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized"
that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search"
under that Amendment. P. 16.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his
safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed
by him to be armed and dangerous

Terry v. Ohio
[3]
No. 67
Argued December 12, 1967
Decided June 10, 1968
392 U.S. 1
Syllabus
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years,
observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did
for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a
corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of
"casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away

regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that
the individual is armed. Pp. 20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that
procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat is required. P. 20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular
circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the
action taken was appropriate. Pp. 21-22.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided
to approach petitioner and his companions. P. 22.

(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine whether
that person is carrying a weapon. P. 24.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies of the situation. Pp. 25-26.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger before
being possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp. 26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search which he made were
reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. Pp. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis that they were
contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 28.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were
armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was
confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 29-30.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him, since the search which
led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 30-31.
Terry v. Ohio
No. 67
Argued December 12, 1967
Decided June 10, 1968
392 U.S. 1
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the
street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances.
Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to the statutorily prescribed
term of one to three years in the penitentiary. [Footnote 1] Following
[5]
the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence two revolvers and a number
of bullets seized from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, [Footnote 2] by Cleveland Police Detective
Martin McFadden. At the hearing on the motion to suppress this evidence, Officer McFadden testified that,
while he was patrolling in plain clothes in downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of
October 31, 1963, his attention was attracted by two men, Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron
Road and Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say precisely what
first drew his eye to them. However, he testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for
35, and that he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets
for 30 years. He explained that he had developed routine habits of observation over the years, and that he
would "stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day." He added: "Now, in
this case, when I looked over, they didn't look right to me at the time."
His interest aroused, Officer McFadden took up a post of observation in the entrance to a store 300 to 400 feet
[6]
away from the two men. "I get more purpose to watch them when I seen their movements," he testified. He
saw one of the men leave the other one and walk southwest on Huron Road, past some stores. The man
paused for a moment and looked in a store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and

walked back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He rejoined his
companion at the corner, and the two conferred briefly. Then the second man went through the same series of
motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking on a short distance, turning back,
peering in the store window again, and returning to confer with the first man at the corner. The two men
repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece -- in all, roughly a dozen trips. At one point,
while the two were standing together on the corner, a third man approached them and engaged them briefly in
conversation. This man then left the two others and walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and Terry resumed
their measured pacing, peering, and conferring. After this had gone on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men
walked off together, heading west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken earlier by the third man.
By this time, Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. He testified that, after observing their
elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window on Huron Road, he suspected the
two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," and that he considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate
further. He added that he feared "they may have a gun." Thus, Officer McFadden followed Chilton and Terry
and saw them stop in front of Zucker's store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier on
the street corner. Deciding that the situation was ripe for direct action, Officer McFadden approached the three
men, identified
[7]
himself as a police officer and asked for their names. At this point, his knowledge was confined to what he had
observed. He was not acquainted with any of the three men by name or by sight, and he had received no
information concerning them from any other source. When the men "mumbled something" in response to his
inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two,
with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast
pocket of Terry's overcoat, Officer McFadden felt a pistol. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was
unable to remove the gun. At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer ordered all
three men to enter Zucker's store. As they went in, he removed Terry's overcoat completely, removed a .38
caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands raised. Officer
McFadden proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and the third man, Katz. He discovered another
revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but no weapons were found on Katz. The officer testified that
he only patted the men down to see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the
outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. So far as appears from the record, he never
placed his hands beneath Katz' outer garments. Officer McFadden seized Chilton's gun, asked the proprietor
of the store to call a police wagon, and took all three men to the station, where Chilton and Terry were formally
charged with carrying concealed weapons.
On the motion to suppress the guns, the prosecution took the position that they had been seized following a
search incident to a lawful arrest. The trial court rejected this theory, stating that it "would be stretching the
facts beyond reasonable comprehension" to find that Officer
[8]
McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the men before he patted them down for weapons. However, the
court denied the defendants' motion on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the basis of his experience, "had
reasonable cause to believe . . . that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some
interrogation should be made of their action." Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the
right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable cause to believe might be armed.
The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer
clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it held, was essential to the
proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for, without it, "the answer to the police officer may be
a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible."
After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty. The
court adjudged them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District, Cuyahoga County,
affirmed. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed
their appeal on the ground that no "substantial constitutional question" was involved. We granted certiorari,
387 U.S. 929 (1967), to determine whether the admission of the revolvers in evidence violated petitioner's
rights under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643 (1961). We affirm the conviction.
I

The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." This inestimable right of
[9]
personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in
his study to dispose of his secret affairs. For as this Court has always recognized,
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251
(1891).
We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347, 351 (1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," id. at 361
(MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of
course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted.
For "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and
seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S.
89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); United
States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The question is whether,
in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an
unreasonable search and seizure.
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and
troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity -- issues which have never before been
squarely
[10]
presented to this Court. Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments
pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to "stop and frisk" -- as
it is sometimes euphemistically termed -- suspicious persons.
On the one hand, it is frequently argued that, in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous
situations on city streets, the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation
to the amount of information they possess. For this purpose, it is urged that distinctions should be made
between a "stop" and an "arrest" (or a "seizure" of a person), and between a "frisk" and a "search." [Footnote
3] Thus, it is argued, the police should be allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning
upon suspicion that he may be connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed,
the police should have the power to "frisk" him for weapons. If the "stop" and the "frisk" give rise to probable
cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make a
formal "arrest," and a full incident "search" of the person. This scheme is justified in part upon the notion that a
"stop" and a "frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and petty indignity," [Footnote 4] which can
properly be imposed upon the
[11]
citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police officer's suspicion. [Footnote 5]
On the other side, the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the
law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment.
[Footnote 6] It is contended with some force that there is not -- and cannot be -- a variety of police activity
which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen, and yet which stops short of an
arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument
runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal security,
coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the
commands of the Constitution. Acquiescence by the courts in the compulsion inherent
[12]

in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is urged, would constitute an abdication of judicial control
over, and indeed an encouragement of, substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police
officers whose judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in "the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). This, it is argued, can
only serve to exacerbate police-community tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation's cities. [Footnote 7]
In this context, we approach the issues in this case mindful of the limitations of the judicial function in
controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the street. The
State has characterized the issue here as "the right of a police officer . . . to make an on-the-street stop,
interrogate and pat down for weapons (known in street vernacular as 'stop and frisk'). [Footnote 8]" But this is
only partly accurate. For the issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. Ever since its inception, the rule
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of
discouraging lawless police conduct. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 391-393 (1914). Thus, its
major thrust is a deterrent one, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 629-635 (1965), and experience has
taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that, without it, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere "form of words." Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961). The rule also serves another vital function -- "the imperative of judicial
integrity." Elkins
[13]
v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental
use of the fruits of such invasions. Thus, in our system, evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the
judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial control. It cannot properly be invoked to
exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that much conduct which is
closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections. Moreover, in some contexts,
the rule is ineffective as a deterrent. Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich
in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile
confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are
not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the
injection of some unexpected element into the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide
variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime. [Footnote 9]
Doubtless some
[14]
police "field interrogation" conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to
condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how
effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, [Footnote 10] it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is invoked demands a constant awareness of
these limitations. The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority
groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, [Footnote 11] will not be
[15]
stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the
exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact
a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime. No judicial opinion can comprehend the
protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before us. Nothing we say
today is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under
our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is
overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary
justification which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the

judiciary, and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials. And, of course, our approval of
legitimate and restrained investigative conduct undertaken on the basis of ample factual justification should in
no way discourage the employment of other remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which
that sanction may prove inappropriate.

security as he did. [Footnote 16] And, in determining whether the seizure and search were "unreasonable," our
inquiry

Having thus roughly sketched the perimeters of the constitutional debate over the limits on police investigative
conduct in general and the background against which this case presents itself, we turn our attention to the
quite narrow question posed by the facts before us: whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize
a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.

is a dual one -- whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.

[16]

If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to
ascertain whether "probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is
not the case. We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389
U. S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964); Chapman v. United States,365 U. S. 610 (1961), or
that, in most instances, failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); cf. Preston v. United
States, 376 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1964). But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct -- necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat -- which historically has not
been, and, as a practical matter, could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct
involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. [Footnote 17]

Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional limitations
upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.
II
Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. That is,
we must decide whether and when Officer McFadden "seized" Terry, and whether and when he conducted a
"search." There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as "stop" and "frisk" that such police conduct is
outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a "search" or
"seizure" within the meaning of the Constitution. [Footnote 12] We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite
plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the
stationhouse and prosecution for crime -- "arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that,
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of
the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
"search." Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure
[17]
performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands
raised, is a "petty indignity." [Footnote 13] It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. [Footnote 14]
The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between a "stop" and an "arrest," or "seizure" of the
person, and between a "frisk" and a "search," is twofold. It seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the
initial stages of the contact between the policeman and the citizen. And, by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing
model of justification and regulation under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope,
as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation. [Footnote 15] This Court has
held, in
[18]
the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its
intolerable intensity and scope. Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
[19]
United States, 282 U. S. 344, 356-358 (1931); see United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 586-587 (1948). The
scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring); see, e.g.,
Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30-31 (1925).
The distinctions of classical "stop-and-frisk" theory thus serve to divert attention from the central inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment -- the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
of a citizen's personal security. "Search" and "seizure" are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions that
the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop
short of something called a "technical arrest" or a "full-blown search."
In this case, there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden "seized" petitioner and subjected him to a
"search" when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. We must decide
whether, at that point, it was reasonable for Officer McFadden to have interfered with petitioner's personal

[20]

III

Nonetheless, the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause
remain fully relevant in this context. In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a
general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon
[21]
the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests
of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535, 536-537 (1967). And, in justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. [Footnote 18] The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that, at some point, the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a
particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. [Footnote 19] And, in making that
assessment, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
[22]
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96-97 (1964). [Footnote 20] Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, supra; Rios v. United States, 364 U. S.
253(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959). And simple "'good faith on the part of the arresting
officer is not enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the
discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 97.
Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent of the governmental interests
involved. One general interest is, of course, that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest. It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was
discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and
Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which, taken together, warranted
further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps
waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people
[23]

in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made
to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for an
extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or
anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store
window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference
between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who
leaves swiftly, and where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It would
have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from
stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.

arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation. Warden v. Hayden,387 U. S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring). Thus, it must be
limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a "full" search, even though it
remains a serious intrusion.

The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to investigate
petitioner's suspicious behavior, but, rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's invasion of Terry's
personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now concerned
with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.
American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.

A second, and related, objection to petitioner's argument is that it assumes that the law of arrest has already
worked out the balance between the particular interests involved here -- the neutralization of danger to the
policeman in the investigative circumstance and the sanctity of the individual. But this is not so. An arrest is a
wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests
each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It
is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future
interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.
[Footnote 22] The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that, because an officer may
lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has
committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making
any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long
before the officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for

[24]

[27]

Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.
[Footnote 21]

the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Petitioner's reliance on cases which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to "seizures" constituting arrests and searches incident thereto is thus misplaced.
It assumes that the interests sought to be vindicated and the invasions of personal security may be equated in
the two cases, and thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of
conduct under the Fourth Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court, supra.

In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an
arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating
at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in
fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights which must be
accepted if police officers are to be conceded the right to search for weapons in situations where probable
cause to arrest for crime is lacking. Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a
severe,
[25]
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating experience. Petitioner contends that such an intrusion is permissible only incident to a
lawful arrest, either for a crime involving the possession of weapons or for a crime the commission of which
led the officer to investigate in the first place. However, this argument must be closely examined.
Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain from making any investigation of suspicious
circumstances until such time as he has probable cause to make an arrest; nor does he deny that police
officers, in properly discharging their investigative function, may find themselves confronting persons who
might well be armed and dangerous. Moreover, he does not say that an officer is always unjustified in
searching a suspect to discover weapons. Rather, he says it is unreasonable for the policeman to take that
step until such time as the situation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest. When
that point has been reached, petitioner would concede the officer's right to conduct a search of the suspect for
weapons, fruits or instrumentalities of the crime, or "mere" evidence, incident to the arrest.
There are two weaknesses in this line of reasoning, however. First, it fails to take account of traditional
limitations upon the scope of searches, and thus recognizes no distinction in purpose, character, and extent
between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons. The former, although justified in part
by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, Preston
v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore involve
a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to
[26]

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there
must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless
of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man, in the circumstances,
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89,
91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 174-176 (1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642, 645
(1878). [Footnote 23] And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due
weight must be given not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Cf. Brinegar v.
United States supra.
IV
We must now examine the conduct of Officer McFadden in this case to determine whether his search and
seizure of petitioner were reasonable, both at their inception
[28]
and as conducted. He had observed Terry, together with Chilton and another man, acting in a manner he took
to be preface to a "stick-up." We think, on the facts and circumstances Officer McFadden detailed before the
trial judge, a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed, and thus
presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The actions of
Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight
robbery -- which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons -- and nothing in
their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a
police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis. Although the trio had departed the original
scene, there was nothing to indicate abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at some point. Thus, when
Officer McFadden approached the three men gathered before the display window at Zucker's store, he had
observed enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed, and nothing in their response to
his hailing them, identifying himself as a police officer, and asking their names served to dispel that reasonable
belief. We cannot say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product
of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the record evidences
the tempered act of a policeman who, in the course of an investigation, had to make a quick decision as to
how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so.

The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as
whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon the

While I unreservedly agree with the Court's ultimate holding in this case, I am constrained to fill in a few gaps,
as I see them, in its opinion. I do this because what is said by this Court today will serve as initial guidelines for
law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this important new field of law develops.

[29]
scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation. Compare Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 354-356 (1967). The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend
to limit the quest itself." United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (C.A.2d Cir.1930); see, e.g., Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 629-635 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States,364 U. S.
206, 216-221 (1960). Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and
search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring).
We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon
a protective seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete
factual circumstances of individual cases. See Sibron v. New York, post, p. 40, decided today. Suffice it to note
that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to
prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364,
367 (1964). The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and
others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.
The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these standards. Officer
McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his hands in
their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had
[30]
felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz' person
beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been
a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the
men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general
exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.
V
We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time he
seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take
swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman
carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought.
Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold today that, where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.

A police officer's right to make an on-the-street "stop" and an accompanying "frisk" for weapons is, of course,
bounded by the protections afforded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court holds, and I
agree, that, while the right does not depend upon possession by the officer of a valid warrant, nor upon the
existence of probable cause, such activities must be reasonable under the circumstances as the officer
credibly relates them in court. Since the question in this and most cases is whether evidence produced by a
frisk is admissible, the problem is to determine what makes a frisk reasonable.
If the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could, on articulable suspicion less than probable
cause, forcibly frisk and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I would have little doubt
that action taken pursuant to such authority could be constitutionally reasonable. Concealed weapons create
an immediate
[32]
and severe danger to the public, and though that danger might not warrant routine general weapons checks, it
could well warrant action on less than a "probability." I mention this line of analysis because I think it vital to
point out that it cannot be applied in this case. On the record before us, Ohio has not clothed its policemen
with routine authority to frisk and disarm on suspicion; in the absence of state authority, policemen have no
more right to "pat down" the outer clothing of passers-by, or of persons to whom they address casual
questions, than does any other citizen. Consequently, the Ohio courts did not rest the constitutionality of this
frisk upon any general authority in Officer McFadden to take reasonable steps to protect the citizenry,
including himself, from dangerous weapons.
The state courts held, instead, that, when an officer is lawfully confronting a possibly hostile person in the line
of duty, he has a right, springing only from the necessity of the situation, and not from any broader right to
disarm, to frisk for his own protection. This holding, with which I agree and with which I think the Court agrees,
offers the only satisfactory basis I can think of for affirming this conviction. The holding has, however, two
logical corollaries that I do not think the Court has fully expressed.
In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the
officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person,
including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a
right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him, but to
be in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address
questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person
[33]
addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk
for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon
the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.
Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for
the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. Just as a full search incident to a lawful
arrest requires no additional justification, a limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must often be rapid and
routine. There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious
crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.

[31]
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly
be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment and the opinion except where the opinion quotes from and
relies upon this Court's opinion in Katz v. United States and the concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

The facts of this case are illustrative of a proper stop and an incident frisk. Officer McFadden had no probable
cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would reasonably lead an
experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. His
justifiable suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of
movement briefly, and addressing questions to him, and Officer McFadden did so. When he did, he had no
reason whatever to suppose that Terry might be armed, apart from the fact that he suspected him of planning
a violent crime. McFadden asked Terry his name, to which Terry "mumbled something." Whereupon
McFadden, without asking Terry to speak louder and without giving him any chance to explain his presence or
his actions, forcibly frisked him.

I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same reasons the Court relies on. I would, however,
make explicit what I think is implicit in affirmance on

of "probable cause" is deeply imbedded in our constitutional history. As we stated in Henry v. United
States, 361 U. S. 98, 100-102:

[34]

"The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general warrant, in which the
name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis
inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion.
Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of 'probable cause' before a magistrate was
required."

the present facts. Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy
arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or
investigate a crime. Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to take suitable
measures for his own safety followed automatically.

"* * * *"
Upon the foregoing premises, I join the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, reserving judgment, however, on some of the Court's general remarks about the
scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule which the Court has fashioned in the process of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment.
Also, although the Court puts the matter aside in the context of this case, I think an additional word is in order
concerning the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop. There is nothing in the Constitution which
prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the
person approached may not be detained or frisked, but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However,
given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may be briefly detained
against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it
may alert the officer to the need for continued observation. In my view, it is temporary detention, warranted by
the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the protective frisk for weapons. Perhaps the frisk itself, where
proper, will have beneficial results whether questions are asked or not. If weapons are found, an arrest will
follow.
[35]
If none is found, the frisk may nevertheless serve preventive ends because of its unmistakable message that
suspicion has been aroused. But if the investigative stop is sustainable at all, constitutional rights are not
necessarily violated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the process.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I agree that petitioner was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I also agree that frisking
petitioner and his companions for guns was a "search." But it is a mystery how that "search" and that "seizure"
can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards unless there was "probable cause" [Footnote 1] to
believe that (1) a crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being committed or (3) a
crime was about to be committed.
The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of "probable cause." If loitering were in issue and that
[36]
was the offense charged, there would be "probable cause" shown. But the crime here is carrying concealed
weapons; [Footnote 2] and there is no basis for concluding that the officer had "probable cause" for believing
that that crime was being committed. Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate would, therefore, have been
unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if there is a showing of "probable cause." We hold today that the
police have greater authority to make a "seizure" and conduct a "search" than a judge has to authorize such
action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again. [Footnote 3]

"That philosophy [rebelling against these practices] later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the
early American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report,
suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. And that
principle has survived to this day. . . ."
". . . It is important, we think, that this requirement [of probable cause] be strictly enforced, for the standard set
by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is
protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. . . . And while a search without a warrant is,
within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental
search, it must be made with probable cause. . . . This immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without
jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen."
The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure" of a person can only be "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment if we require the police to possess "probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line draws a
meaningful distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's personal
knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a particular crime. "In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175.
To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps
such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate
choice of the people through a constitutional amendment.
[39]
Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth, [Footnote 4] is rewritten, the person and the
effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to
believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched.
There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water
down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably
never been greater than it is today.
Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut
of his jib, if they can "seize" and "search" him in their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter
it should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.
[G.R. No. 119220. September 20, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NILO SOLAYAO accused-appellant.
DECISION

[37]

ROMERO, J.:

In other words, police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants
only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable
cause. At the time of their "seizure" without a warrant, they must possess facts concerning the person arrested
that would have satisfied a magistrate that "probable cause" was indeed present. The term "probable cause"
rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as "reasonable suspicion." Moreover, the meaning

Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition [1] defined and penalized under Presidential Decree
No. 1866.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 9,
1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan,

Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to
verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. [2]
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met
the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they
observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or
a jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. [3]
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he
seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long
homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to
carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered
that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned
him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with
illegal possession of firearm.[4]
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was
only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut
leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves
since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to
him after the others had been used up.[5] Accused-appellant's claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano
that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in
coconut leaves.[6]
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearm under
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one
aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law.[7] It found that accused-appellant did not contest the
fact that SPO3 Nino confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the
same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's submission that he was in possession of the firearm only
by accident and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes
Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his
companions.[8]
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:

arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then
an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful,
for being contrary to law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardly
tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as
the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit [13] and that upon espying the peace
officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. [14]
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals[15] where this
Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri
bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought about by the
suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was a probable
cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as a
government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming
around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had
aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which
accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without
first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions
fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly
have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor
was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.

"II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in the imposition of the
maximum penalty against the accused-appellant." [9]

As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the second element, that is, the
absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor
General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary
permit or license to possess the subject firearm.[17]

This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati[10] ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and
(b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same.

Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense
of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the
prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[18]

In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his
person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides, inter alia:

In People v. Tiozon,[19] this Court said:

"I.

The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence for
being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." [11] As such, the prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the
accused-appellant acquitted.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al.[12] where this Court
declared: " emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful

"It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be invoked to support
the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance
to him of a license to possess the firearm, but we are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the
offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if
'it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged,' the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case
to prove that the firearm used by appellant in commtting the offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court
(now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no 'license or permit to possess' the .45 caliber pistol
mentioned therein. Thus is seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative
fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the
accused was charged with 'having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the

qualifications required to be a voter. It was there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a
voter was an essential element of the crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another
case (People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine
because he had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from
whom he received monetary compensation, without having previously obtained the proper certificate of
registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this
Court held that if the subject of the negative averment alike, for instance, the act of voting without the
qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under
such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case
before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon
which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this
view as follows:
'The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged, should
not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges
a fact must be assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged
it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a business, such
as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired
no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can,
with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the want
of the license to prove the allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies
peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the
prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.' (6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition,
p. 8)."
Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law on this
question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling:[20]
"We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the prosecution to prove all
the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in an information, which allegation must perforce
include any negative element provided by the law to integrate that offense. We have reiterated quite recently
the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the offense charged, then
it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the elements it has thus alleged."
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-appellant
admitted before Police Officer Nio at the time that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or
license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had one. [21] In other words, the prosecution relied
on accused-appellant's admission to prove the second element.
Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the corresponding license? Corollary to the above
question is whether an admission by the accused-appellant can take the place of any evidentiary means
establishing beyond reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading and which forms an
essential ingredient of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an "admission is the mere
acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the
speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." [22] In other words, it is a "statement by defendant of
fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove
guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." [23] From the above principles, this Court can
infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt thecommission of
the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Court which states:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same
case does not require proof."
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely
bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.

This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the prosecution was able to establish
the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter
being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that
he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the
prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and
convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned." [24]
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the
establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party,
then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." [25]
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that
accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released unless
there are other legal grounds for his continued detention, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses
like "stop-and-frisk" which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the
lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights
against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated
January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988, 1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan
City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly
committed as follows: 2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited
drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 3 With the agreement of
the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. 4 After trial in due course, the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19,
1989 a decision 5 convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads: 6

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal
Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant remained on provisional liberty. 7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
Appeal 8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court 9 promulgated its assailed Decision,
denying the appeal and affirming the trial court: 10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs
against appellant.
Respondent Court 11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:

April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F"). 14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according
to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also
found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final
Report of her examinations (Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it.
(Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl.
Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of
Kalookan City. (Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the
cemetery when he was apprehended. 15

ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.

Version of the Defense
The Facts
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows: 16
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: 12
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan
City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver
named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of
Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the
area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.

At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at
A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered
the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of
marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the
policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point,
the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused)
was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The
policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at
Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced
upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked
the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked
the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and
allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.

On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the latter to follow him. The
neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the
accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The
policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana.
However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of
the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later
told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and
was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.
Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was led
to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The
policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat.
Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call his parents and
he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the
same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of
paper was marked as Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper.
(Exhibit "E-4").

At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest
Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the
accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a
chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint
Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit
"D") to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical
analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana
residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen which
she identified. (Exhibit
"E") 13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in her Certification dated

Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were
stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found
nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his
pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that
tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery. 17
The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the
arresting officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and disinterested" witnesses,
testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted that the
appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana
residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up," because the
appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation
before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the
appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the
narration. It further found petitioner's contention that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of
marijuana residue to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were
marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the
accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the purpose of
extorting money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent with both
innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the
credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of
extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were
products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as
memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence.

He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was
incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark
case of Terry vs. Ohio, 18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in
the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken. 19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention
and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make
an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that
case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately
about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same
store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an
officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what
justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge. 20Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of
the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute. 21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure." 22 In People vs. Encinada, 23 the Court
further explained that "[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the
essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best,
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged;
or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched."

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search
and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-andfrisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying
a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of
live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of
the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a
search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a
situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.

Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant
had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high."
The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs.
During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession: 25

A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.

A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?

A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini Street
in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during
the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search,
requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person
waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. 26Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In
the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation
before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases
where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner.
Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. 27

xxx xxx xxx

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez,
what happened, if any?

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained" contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.

A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his
attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police officers in
a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx

We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and
respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it.
Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule. 28

Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?

We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:

A That person seems like he is high on drug.

(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their
narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that "As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight
differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.

FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?

Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.

However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas'
contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit 29 signed by both arresting
policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is
immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet
in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This shows that such
contradiction is minor and does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.30
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 31
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be
crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His
awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the
policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior
clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.

Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the
extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting
officers or present any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame
and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26,
1988. 32Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the
police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct
and fabricate. 33

That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the
necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment[3] on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.

The Proper Penalty

At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2, [4] while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at
the time they arrested petitioner.[5]

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed
fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:

At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the
arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the
grenade.

Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)

Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.[6]

Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act,
except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line. [7] Yus companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan
were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander.[8]

The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana:

On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims
was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the
previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to
detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his
companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and
Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August
1990. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and
his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from
petitioner.[9]

Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years. 34

[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]

Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan
were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla[10] for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two
suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent
counsel. Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions
even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners uncounselled confession (Exh. E),
there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter,
Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over
the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for
examination.[11]

SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners confession knowing it was inadmissible in
evidence.[12]

DECISION

Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things,
the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March
1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed
an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During
the preliminary examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler
and fuse assembly [were] all present, and concluded that the grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding.
On even date, he issued a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11
August 1991.[13]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as
maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866,[2] as follows:

Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at
the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza
Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand
aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their
possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he
was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained
and shouted at petitioner [i]to ang tama mo sa akin. This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into
petitioners mouth and said, [y]ou are the one who shot me. Petitioner denied the charges and explained
that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade
only in court when it was presented. [14]
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where
a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is
either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information.[15] Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed,
however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been
premature.[16] The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence [17] and the officers [h]ad
to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw
the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of
which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
without fear of violence.[18]
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and
since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In its decision[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found
petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA, as maximum.

grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was
lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was attempting to commit an
offense, thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of
other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political
tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit
an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site
especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an
offense, Malacats posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu
chased petitioner two days prior to the latters arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his
companions acted suspiciously, the accumulation of which was more than sufficient to convince a
reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to
mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several
innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot
conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in
saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but
rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal
technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, [26] which petitioner relied upon,
was inapplicable in light of [c]rucial differences, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy
street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public
clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence
reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted
foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the
police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased
Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors:

On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal [20] indicating that he was appealing to this
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R.
CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. [21]

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.

In his Appellants Brief [22] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM WAS AN APPROPRIATE
INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND
ILLEGAL SEARCH.

In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless
arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was attempting to commit a
crime, as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was standing at the corner of Plaza
Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that come (sic)
nearer (sic) to them. Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People
v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.

In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions
provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote.[23] As such, the search
was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.

In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its
decision be affirmed in toto.[24]

The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by
the trial court was:

In its decision of 24 January 1996,[25] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner
abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was planted by the police officers; and
second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioners possession was not
raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand

[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as
maximum.

For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.

The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the
minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty isreclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom
should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129),[27] in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, [28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII
of the Constitution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. [30] The term life imprisonment as
used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to
include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect
the same.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to
those effected without a validly issued warrant,[32] subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless
arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial courts decision to this Court, yet
the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and
consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioners Brief for
the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the
memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***

Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish
petitioners guilt with moral certainty.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;[33] (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest;[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]

First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from
petitioners possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to
him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the commander was
not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by
police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not
immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was
no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his
testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated
from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did
not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement
authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to
detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then
considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police
officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity
to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to
petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by
police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present
and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then
available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to
counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were
invalid, as will be discussed below.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one
"in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of
the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion
on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. [36] In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. [37] At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. [38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment ***[39]
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," [40] it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person

detained has weapons concealed about him.[41] Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility
as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since
Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably
dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q

And what were they doing?

They were merely standing.

You are sure of that?

Yes, sir.

And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion?

None, sir.

Neither did you see them create commotion?

None, sir.[42]

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front
waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by
the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. [43]
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in
Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable
doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and
petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from
detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27360

February 28, 1968

HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner
of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as
Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago
and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for
the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were
seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which
were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any
manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing
the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal
effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of
the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements
of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of
the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo,
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging,
among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta.
Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to
transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the
goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago
that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs
Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods
were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even
assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531
of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without

knowledge that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police
Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless
restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence,
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the
above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the
goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual,
moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the
respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case before this Court from opening
the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on
November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had
already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila
Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496,
including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of
the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their
"Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of
the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and
affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that
the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had
jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs
had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that
the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not
unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect
search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ
could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for;
that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code,
would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the
restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the
case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an
inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of
the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the
goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation,
the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that
may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court
had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over
the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore,
subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging
that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property
proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On
January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges
due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an
urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent
Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said
respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of
the seizure proceedings.

Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for
prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners alleged,
among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent
Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no
cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the
negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by
respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In
their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court
presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification
proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that
petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been
paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of
Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that
those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was
affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of
seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not
being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because
they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action
because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the
release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable;
and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect
all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing
under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs;
and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in
the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed
terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be
paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the
duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is
stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to
P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and
other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been
assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the
quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example,
Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters,
whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42
dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands
(white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal
watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it
appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale
No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine
bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5)
of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected
contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture. 8

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs
area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting
under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods.
Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured
to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the
custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil
Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by
the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037,
decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it
appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of
assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of
Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods
where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them
for further verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be different from the declaration in the
cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs
authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local
purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods
came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the
port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no
jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for
duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands
of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its
(Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964,
the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On
December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in
the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause
of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held
resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy
Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs sought
the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court
of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and
mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said
customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and
institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was filed (on
October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12,
1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify
whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964,
Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu
Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these
are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).

The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and
customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have
been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the
proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v.
Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court
of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit
recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective
the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals
of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia,supra, Republic Acts
1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of
Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later
enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs
actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction
over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was
only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court
presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition
for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired
jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could
not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of
the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures,
and arrests,11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff
laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when
he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected
of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G.
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff
and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and
seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened precisely in the
case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the
nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace. . . ."17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the
court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as
follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in
the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made lawful
for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was
merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary
to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into
the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act
was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28,
1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this
section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was
thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061, Comp. Stat. 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161.
Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, that
section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219,
27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to
make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended
petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a
search. 18All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W.,
389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by
defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search
warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of
the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant,
as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a
judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the
circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of
crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their
advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a

serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is
itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises,
the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to
which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge.
Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether
search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances
under which it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in
question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over
the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do
not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the
parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge
Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and1wph1.t
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY, presided by HON. ULPIANO
SARMIENTO, JESSIE HOPE and MONINA MEDINA, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
This original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Order dated August 20, 1975 issued by District Judge
Ulpiano Sarmiento in Criminal Case No. Q-3781 which stalled the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Jessie C.
Hope and Monina Medina for the alleged violation of section 3601 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The order
declared as inadmissible in evidence the allegedly smuggled articles obtained by apprehending agents in the
course of a warrantless search and seizure. Dispositively, the order decreed:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with Article IV, Sec. 4, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution, the boxes and
the watches and bracelets contained therein seized from the car of the accused Sgt. Jessie C. Hope, are
hereby declared inadmissible in evidence in this case; likewise, the pictures taken of said items attempted to
be presented as evidence in the instant case is hereby declared in admissible as evidence against the
accused.
SO ORDERED.
The records disclose that one week before February 9, 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center
(RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be

transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur
Manuel and Macario Sabado, on the aforesaid date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations
Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North
Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City.

were opened at Camp Aguinaldo. As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of
respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his decision in
the seizure cases on April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the car are not subject of
forfeiture. The dispositive portion of this decision reads:

At about 6:45 A.M. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate No. 21-87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie
Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped
away towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his
whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North
Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents
succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes
showed their Identification cards to respondents and introduced themselves as RASAC agents.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the subject motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859, Serial No. W357348361, File
No. 2B-1884, with Plate No. EH 21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it is hereby
declared released to its registered owner, Jessie C. Hope, upon proper Identification. Relative to Seizure
Identification No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the subject matter thereof to wit: 4,606 pcs. of
assorted brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets and 100 pcs. of tools be,
as they are hereby likewise declared released to the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon payment
of the levitable duties, taxes and other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and
taxes thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the assessable duties, taxes and other
charges owing from the aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision becomes final and
unappealable, the same shall be deemed abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner provided for by law.

The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were,
Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Further, respondents were asked where they were bringing the boxes, to
which respondent Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los
Santos. Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with respondents while Agent Manuel took their own car and
both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col.
Abad by telephone.
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who
according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called
off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 A.M.
(Respondents' Memorandum, records, pp. 180-183).
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear seat
and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the same
order of the intelligence officer, the boxes were opened before the presence of respondents Hope and Medina,
representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC and photographers of
the Department of National Defense. The contents of the boxes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist
watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands" (based on a later
inventory), supposedly untaxed.
As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did
issue the same on February 12, 1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending agents arrested
respondents and brought them together with the seized articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the
former were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure.
In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector of Customs, seizure
proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure Identification No. 14281 against the wrist watches and
watch bracelets pursuant to Section 2530 (m) 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure Identification
No. 14281-A against the Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of the same Code. 2
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases, respondents disclaimed ownership of the seized articles.
Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. The claimantintervenor testified that he bought the watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales
invoice certified to be authentic by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No. 6 of Quezon City, which transaction
was entered in the book of accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same articles were brought to a buyer in
Angeles City, but when the sale failed to materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to
transport back the boxes to Manila for a consideration of P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof
which claimant simply represented as PX goods; that when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he
presumed that the corresponding duties have already been paid, only to be surprised later on when he was
informed that the same were seized for non-payment of taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at the time of apprehension, he had no
knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew that these
are untaxed commodities that he consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car
upon request of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present when the boxes were
loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of respondent Monina Medina,
she testified that what she did was only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the
boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price;
that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1974, after the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
finding the existence of a prima facie case against respondents Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case No. Q3781 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on April 23, 1974, respondents
pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on January 28, 1975 and while the prosecution through its first witness,
Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as evidence the pictures of the eleven (11) boxes containing the
assorted watches and watch bracelets, counsel for respondents objected to the presentation of the pictures
and the subject articles on the ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant, and therefore
inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the New Constitution. After the parties have argued
their grounds in their respective memoranda, respondent trial court issued the questioned order of August 20,
1975 as cited earlier. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1975. Hence,
this petition which was treated as a special civil action in Our Resolution of May 5, 1976.
The substantive issue as urged in the petition is whether or not the seizure of the merchandise in a moving
vehicle by authorized agents commissioned to enforce customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the
constitutional immunity against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such merchandise are
inadmissible in evidence. Corollary to the issue is, has the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding the
affirmative?
The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing search and seizure had been liberalized when a
moving vehicle is the object of the search and the necessity of a prior warrant has been relaxed on the ground
of practicality, considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on
impossibility in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity. Petitioner vigorously contends that contraband may be seized without
necessity of a search warrant since the Constitution does not guaranty immunity to smugglers and that a
warrantless seizure of contraband in a moving vehicle is justified by the traditional exception attached to the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and such exception must be adopted in interpreting the relevant
provision in the new Philippine Constitution.
As counter argument, respondents maintain that the decision of the Collector of Customs in their seizure
cases which has now become final and unappealable has made no pronouncement that the subject articles
are smuggled items. More so, the decision has entirely cleared respondents of any liability or responsibility in
the alleged smuggling activity and as a consequence, the decision has the direct effect of deciding finally that
the watches and bracelets are not smuggled and that respondents have not violated the customs and tariff
laws as charged in the criminal complaint. Respondents argue further that the interception of accused Jessie
Hope's car by RASAC Agents while in the course of a normal trip without any order of the court and without
having shown that the interception was necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, is an impairment of the liberty of travel under section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Finally, they
claim that the agents had one week's time before the date of apprehension to secure the necessary warrant
but since they failed to get this court order, the search of Hope's car and the spontaneous seizure of the boxes
loaded therein and the contents thereof is a violation of the constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable
searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose" under section 3, Article IV of the fundamental
law.

We find for petitioner. The opposing counsel's attempt to draw an Identity between the seizure cases and the
present criminal action to the ultimate end that the decision in the former should be made decisive of the issue
of criminal liability must be overruled. It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings
that the articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was that the prosecution failed to present the
quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles (Pages 128 and 130 of Annex
"E", Records, p. 109). In a general sense, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling. But if
the aim of a confirmation that the goods are indeed smuggled, is to draw an inference to tie up respondents'
criminal liability, the Collector is not duty bound, nor is there any need for him to arrive at such a conclusion. It
is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in
nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in
section 3601 of the Code 3. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as
those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to
enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate
possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be
imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. 4
In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns
the resrather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These
merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being
assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and
satisfied either in the form of fines or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of them in
accordance with law. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty
befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot
be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the
articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in
respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the
strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in
a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of
its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law, the authority of persons duly commissioned to
enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of
goods suspected to have been introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws. This Court had
occasion to recognize this power granted to persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Code,
who in order to discharge their official duties more effecttively
... may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or inclosure of any warehouse, store or other
building not being a dwelling house. (Section 2208, emphasis supplied)
... (to) go aboard any vessel or aircraft within the limits of any collection district, and to inspect, search and
examine said vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope on board, and search any person on
board the said vessel or aircraft and to this end to hail and stop such vessel or aircraft if under way. to use all
necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall appear that any breach or violation of the customs and
tariff laws of the Philippines has been committed, whereby or in consequence of which such vessels or
aircrafts, or the article, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel or aircrafts, is hable to
forfeiture to make seizure of the same or any part thereof.
The power of search herein above given shall extend to the removal of any false bottom, partition, bulkhead or
other obstruction, so far as may be necessary to enable the officer to discover whether any dutiable or
forfeitable articles may be concealed. (Section 2210)
or,
... (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has reasonable
cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or articlesintroduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected
of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid (Section 2211, emphasis supplied)
As enunciated in the leading case of Papa v. Mago 5, in the exercise of the specific functions aforecited, the
Code does not mention the need of a search warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the peace),
upon swom application showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and

person or thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that case expressed the considered view
that "except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll v. United States 6 wherein
an imprimatur against constitutional infirmity was stamped in favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such
nature as in the case at bar. On this stable foundation We refute the constitutional charge of respondents that
the warrantless seizure violated Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth
Amendment of the American Constitution 7
The Carroll doctrine arose from the indictment and conviction of George Carroll and partner for transporting in
an automobile intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. They assailed the conviction on the
ground that the trial court admitted in evidence two of the sixty-eight bottles found by searching the automobile
and eventual seizure of the same allegedly in violation of the 4th Amendment, and therefore that the use of the
liquor as evidence was improper. 8 To paraphrase the significant views of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, the legislative
history of the Act clearly established the intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a
search warrant in the search of private dwellings and that of automobiles and other road vehicles in the
enforcement of the Act. This distinction is consistent with the 4th Amendment since the latter does not
denounce an searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable. Searches and seizures without
warrant are valid if made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction. 9 Similarly, other statutes of the Union such as the Act of 1789, Act of August 4, 1790,
and Act of March 3, 1815, among others, construed in the light of the 4th Amendment had recognized the
distinctive feature of a warrantless search of a ship motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 10 In such a situation, what appears to the measure of legality
of the seizure was formulated in this sense: "that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause
for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being
illegally transported. " Therein the guarantee of the 4th Amendment was fulfilled. Where seizure is impossible
except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court
probable cause. 11
The counsel for the State is candid enough to admit that the Anti-Smuggling Action Center tries its best to
follow-up the more promising tips and information from informers, but ever often, the information proves false
or the smugglers are forewarned. 12 It is quite true the ASAC received one such information several days or a
week before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed to obtain a warrant in spite of the time allowance
is not a sign that they have been remiss in their duty. The records hardly reveal anything certain and
confirmatory of the report during the said period except the general knowledge that some highly dutiable
goods would be transported from Angeles City to Manila in a blue Dodge automobile. Not even the trial court
has made any findings that ASAC has established with exactitude the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized. Lacking this essential determination, the agents could not have possibly secured a valid
warrant even if they had foreseen its compelling necessity. For one thing, the information could have been just
another false alarm. Providentially, however, things turned out differently when in the morning of February 9,
1974, the undisclosed Informer himself went along with the agents to the rendezvous point where at the
appointed time he positively Identified an approaching car as the one described by him a week earlier to be
the suspected carrier of untaxed merchandise. Clearly therefore, the agents acted not on the basis of a mere
hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy of belief and probable cause enough for them to adopt
measures to freeze the fleeting event.
We need not argue that the subjective phase of the police action taken by the ASAC Agents to effect the
apprehension of the suspected violators can be anything less than the ensuing interception and stoppage of
respondents' vehicle after a short chase. Neither can We sustain the argument that in doing so, the agents
violated respondents' constitutional "liberty of travel". To recall again Mr. Chief Justice Taft: "(B)ut those
lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption
or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." 13 What followed next in the scene was a simple
inquiry as to the contents of the boxes seen inside the car. Respondents' baffled denial of knowledge thereof
could not but only heighten the suspicion of a reasonable and inquisitive mind. Thus, the probable cause has
not been any less mitigated.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation

when attempted. 14 The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace
and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. 15 The constitutional
inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is more closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his
personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best of causes and reasons. We draw from
the context of the Constitution that an intended search or seizure attains a high degree of propriety only when
a probable cause duly determined is branded on a warrant duly issued by a judge or other responsible person
as may be authorized by law. Not invariably, however, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
interference is not wholly defendent on the presence of a warrant or the lack of it. In the ordinary cases where
warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules
of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus, in the
extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure
becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. 16

applicability of the classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision must be
upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional guarantee has not been violated and the
respondent court gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as inadmissible evidence the
items or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any search warrant, as well as the
pictures of said items attempted to be presented as evidence against the accused.

The ultimate question then, if any, that should confront the actuations of the ASAC Agents in this case is
whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted by them is lawful or not. We have already seen that
what they did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code directing
them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed, issued or
procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct interest. The official capacity of the
agents has never been questioned by respondents. Neither did respondents raise an issue on the
constitutionality of the law giving the agents the power to act as mandated. There 'is no question that the
Agents have not exceeded their authority nor have they acted so licentiously to bear upon respondents moral
embarrassment or substantial prejudice beyond what is necessary. The purpose of the search and seizure is
more than clear to Us, hence, We rule out the suspicion that the intention is only to elicit evidence to be used
against respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded for further trial
and reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for such action as the
prosecution may take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove directed.

We do not see strong justification for the trial court's failure to recognize the circumstances at bar as among
the "rare cases" which it admittedly conceded to be exempted from the requirement of a warrant. 17 The lapse
lies on the dismal gap in the trial court's developmental treat- ment of the law on arrest, search and seizure. It
missed the vital distinction emphatically laid down in Boyd v. United States 18 which was cited in Carroll with
"particular significance and applicability." Thus, We quote Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd:
... The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the
payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers
for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him, The two
things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the
other it is not. The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited
for a breach of the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by
English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizure have been authorized by our revenue acts
from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of
duties, the Act of July 31, 1789. 1 State at L. 29, 43, chap. 5, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was
passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original Amendments to the Constitution, it is
clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable' and
they are not embraced within the prohibition of the Amendment. So also the supervision authorized to be
exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture of custody of excisable articles, and the entries
thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of
unreasonable searches and seizures. So also the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles
and things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition,
such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc. are not within this
category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met 329. Many other things of this character might be enumerated.
(Emphasis supplied).
Recently, in Viduya v. Berdiago 19 " this Court reiterated the controlling force of the Papa v. Mago ruling
hereinbefore cited and the persuasive authority of the leading decision in Carroll v. U.S., supra, and in
explaining the rationale of the doctrine significantly said that "(i)t is not for this Court to do less than it can to
implement and enforce the mandates of the customs and revenue laws. The evils associated with tax evasion
must be stamped out without any disregard, it is to be affirmed, of any constitutional right ...
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search and
seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to the

Notwithstanding the reversal and setting aside of the order of respondent judge assailed herein, thereby
allowing the introduction and admission of the subject prohibited articles in the trial of the accused Jessie C.
Hope and Monina Medina for alleged smuggling, in the interest of speedy justice, the prosecution is directed
forthwith to re-assess and re-evaluate the evidence at its disposal, considering the lapse of time since the trial
commenced on June 28, 1975 and was thus delayed due to the filing of the instant certiorari petition and that
on April 1, 1975, after seizure proceedings initiated by the Collector of Customs, the said articles were ordered
released upon payment of the leviable duties, taxes and other charges due thereon plus a fine equivalent to
100% of the duties and taxes thereof. After such re-assessment and re-evaluation, the prosecution must
promptly take the necessary action on the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all parties
concerned.

This judgment is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88017

January 21, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y
SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street parlance as
"shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were
charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only appellant and
co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. They were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P25,000.00 each, and to pay the costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness.
The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or
transport 56 teabags of Metamphetamine, a regulated drug.
Contrary to law. 1
The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the
importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the

information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the
suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out to
infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter
referred to as Tia).
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by another confidential
agent named George on August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire a male travelling companion for his
business nips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. In the course of those
meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant), whom Tia found out to be the
person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the suspected
criminal syndicate. Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain Luisito Palmera, filed
with his superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's
activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before they
departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the
Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two o'clock in the afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the
People's Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few hours. The
pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of tea. Tia saw the paper tea
bags when the cans were opened for examination during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel.
Appellant kept the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him.
Upon entering, he saw two other men with appellant. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning
substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and sniffed
the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the
Philippines. He was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs. Tia stayed in the room for about
twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant had with him his
red traveling bag with wheels. Before departing from Guangzhou however, customs examiners inspected their
luggage. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of appellant. The contents of the cans
were not closely examined, and appellant was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila International Airport, on
schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant, while Tia, upon being
instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their conversation, the latter hailed a
taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the
vehicle. Lim followed in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on the tip given
by Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera notified the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a briefing, the operatives
were ordered to take strategic positions around the arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the
arrival area were the first ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the other
members of the team that the suspects were in sight. Appellant was pulling along his red traveling bag while
Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along
Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path
forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to
escape. The operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the
baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The
operatives requested from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of
the red traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open,
pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white
powder resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined

its contents more closely. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling
bags opened for inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the one
previously opened. Nothing else of consequence was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were
taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon
City. Lim was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of appellant were
opened and examined. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline powder
inside instead of tea leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside the tea
bag yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. Samples from each of the
fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The tests were also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the
three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the government
anti-narcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED AS
ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING, DISPATCHING OR
TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE PROSECUTION.

We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made against
the accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS
officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been informed of the date
and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The
fact that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues, does not
automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of the well-known exception to the
rule of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the anti-narcotics
agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.
The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions
thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 these are: [1] a search incidental to an
arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The
circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle.
Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the appellee's
brief, that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction
of the issuing judgea requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the
use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 4

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought." 5
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to
enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and convicted under
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which reads:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispose, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused is left to the sound discretion of
the lower court.1wphi1 The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by
the rule exist.9 In the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of the conditions for the discharge had
not been met by the prosecution. Therefore, the discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.
Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts surrounding the
commission of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. The allegation is
baseless. Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the testimony of the discharged
accused. The fact of corroboration of the testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely
because paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the testimony be substantially
corroborated in its material points. The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the
claim of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Tia.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005]

The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags
containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby implying that the
accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be
convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the
facts of the case. It is also argued that "dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or
disposed of drugs. As for "transporting," appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor
because the act of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non- existent under
the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and his coaccused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught
appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term "transport" is
defined as "to carry or convey from one place to another." 6 The operative words in the definition are "to carry
or convey." The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting
was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument
of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co- accused did not intend to bring the
metamphetamine anywhere, i.e.they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the search
and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced.
Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts of delivery, dispatch or transport,
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so included is sufficient for conviction
under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense
under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot
be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished
and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of
criminal intent. 7
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify for the
prosecution on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. Appellant argues that deep penetration
agents such as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their actions." 8 The argument is
devoid of merit. The discharge of accused Tia was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which
reads in part:
Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged with
the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may directone
or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state . . .
(emphasis supplied).

TOMAS SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is the petition for review on certiorari [1] filed by Tomas Salvador assailing the Decision[2] dated August 9,
2000 and Resolution dated January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 20186.
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador, then aircraft
mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF)
for possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than
half a million pesos.
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City with violation
of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The Information
reads:
That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and unlawful
importation of the following items:
198 pieces of means watches P187,110.00
76 pieces of mens diving watches

8,640.00

32 pieces of ladies watches

11,600.00

1600 grams of assorted jewelry.

322,000.00

with a total market value of P537,500.00 FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREEE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS, more or less, Philippine Currency, without authority or permit from proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned, all the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued.
The prosecution established the following facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, headed by Major
Gerardo B. Pagcaliuangan and composed of Sgts. Rodolfo A. Teves, Geronimo G. Escarola, Virgilio M. Sindac

and Edwin B. Ople, conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on
reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel.
Major Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to keep close watch on the second airplane parked
inside the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus 300 with tail number RPC-3001. It arrived at
the NAIA at 10:25 in the evening of June 3, 1994 from Hong Kong as Flight No. PR-311. After its passengers
disembarked and its cargo unloaded, it was towed by the PAL ground crew and parked at the ramp area of the
Domestic Airport terminal.

$2,600.00
24

pcs.

Seiko 5 Ladies watches with blue dial with white

metal bracelet (-1) x $25
600.00

16

pcs.

Seiko Divers Watch Mens- Black dial with rubberized

bracelet (-1) x $50
800.00

At around 11:30 that same evening, Sgt. Teves reported over his radio that three (3) persons had boarded the
Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance.
At 12:15 a.m. the following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three (3) persons who earlier boarded
the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck
with its lights off.
The PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima
Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified
himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later identified as Tomas Salvador,
petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the tow truck.

At around 8:00 oclock the following morning, Emilen Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs, arrived
at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, she
proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the accused. She then prepared an inventory of the
items seized and listed the weight of the packets.[4] Thereafter, she brought the seized packets to the In-Board
Section, Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where their contents were identified and appraised. The Bureau of
Customs found 248 pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat (14K) gold jewelries valued as follows:

pcs.

Citizen L-watches with white dial (4) x $20

62

pcs.

Seiko 5 Mens watches with yellow dial with gold

metal bracelet (1) x $25

UNIT

DESCRIPTION

10

pcs.

Half-bangles with Charms Tricolors

122.8 gms.

pcs.

Bracelet with Charms Tricolors

52.4 gms.

pcs.

Bracelet (Tricolor)

64.2 gms.

pcs.

Bangles (3 pcs./set) Tricolor

155.3 gms.

Babys Bangles with charm

18.2 gms.

L-Bangles with charm

68.5 gms.

L-Bangles

112.3 gms.

L-Creolla Earrings

901.56 gms.

TOTAL GRAMS

+P 299,052.00

Assorted Watches
204

pcs.

Citizen M watches with black dial with gold metal

bracelet
(-1) x $25

80.00

1,550.00
pcs.

Seiko 5 Mens watches with black dial with gold

metal bracelet (1) x $25
850.00

____

pcs.

248

$6,580.00

The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted an inquest and thereafter recommended that petitioner and his
co-accused be charged with violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Accordingly, the
Information, mentioned earlier, was filed with the RTC.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Joint Demurrer to Evidence.

In an Order dated October 12, 1995, the trial court denied the demurrer and directed the accused to present
their evidence.
APPRAISED VALUE
All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were framed-up by the military.

QTY.

1,495 x P200.00/gm.

Seiko 5 Ladies watches with yellow dial with gold

metal bracelet (1) x $25
100.00

34
Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandins uniform was partly open, showing a girdle.
While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting
that the package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to his teammates, Positive! Thereupon, the
rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without a fight. The team
searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing
packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4)
each. The team confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.

pcs.

Danilo Santos testified that on the night of June 3, 1994, he was assigned to the Airbus 300 with tail No. RPC3001, joining three junior mechanics who were then working on said aircraft. He was conducting a visual
check of the plane when a tow truck arrived on its way to Nichols Airfield. He told one of the junior mechanics
that he would take a break and be back in an hour. He then boarded the tow truck. When it was near the
Lima Gate, a jeep with four (4) men in civilian attire aboard approached him. The four pointed their firearms at
him and, after searching him for drugs, he was frisked but nothing was found. He was nonetheless brought by
the men to the PAFSECOM Office, then to Villamor Airbase Hospital for a medical examination and alcohol
test. Thereafter, he was brought back to the PAFSECOM Office. There, another military man arrived and
brought out a box containing packets. Then he and his companions were told to put on their mechanics
uniforms and to wear girdles. The packets were placed on their bodies, after which they were photographed.
He further testified that he was asked to sign a certain paper but was not allowed to read it thoroughly. During
the investigation, he was not apprised of his rights nor assisted by a counsel.
Petitioner Tomas Salvador likewise denied any knowledge of the questioned items seized from him. He
testified that during the incident in question, he only boarded the tow truck to take a break at the PAL canteen.
He saw a box on the tow truck but was not aware of its contents. After his arrest, he was made to sign a
document under duress.
Aurelio Mandin also denied committing the offense charged. He declared that after his arrest, he was made to
sign a document by the PAF personnel, the contents of which he was not able to read. He signed it because
he was struck with a .45 caliber handgun by one of the military men and threatened him with summary
execution if he would not do so. He was not informed of his rights nor given the services of counsel during the
investigation.

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting all the accused of the offense charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Aurelio Mandin y Liston, Danilo Santos y
Antonio and Tomas Salvador y Magno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court sentences each of the accused to an indeterminate
term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P8,000.00), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The court also orders the forfeiture of the
confiscated articles in favor of the Government.

personnel working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came out with bulging
waists. They then stopped and looked around and made apparent signals. All these acts were sufficient to
engender a reasonable suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to something illegal. Moreover,
the search and seizure was conducted in connection with the enforcement of customs law when the petitioner
and his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at the vicinity of Lima
Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally,
the petitioner and his companions agreed to the search after one of them was caught with a suspiciouslooking packet. Under these circumstances, the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are
admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.

SO ORDERED.[5]
All the accused then seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20186.
On August 9, 2000, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision, thus:
We cannot see any justification for the setting aside of the contested Decision.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001. [7]
Only Tomas Salvador opted to elevate his case to this Court by way of the instant petition for review
on certiorari. He submits for our consideration the following assignments of error:
I
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION LIKE UNLAWFUL
IMPORTATION, POSSESSION OF UNLAWFULLY IMPORTED ARTICLES AND CONSPIRACY IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE SAME, WERE NEVER PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE PERSONS OF THE
ACCUSED.
III
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES, AS WELL AS ALL ITS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE UNLAWFUL.
IV
THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE CONCURRENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WERE ALSO WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.[8]
The above assignments of error boil down to these issues: (1) whether the seized items are admissible in
evidence; and (2) whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the PAF
operatives is illegal. Citing People v. Burgos,[9] he maintains that at the time he and his co-accused were
stopped by the PAF law enforces, they were unaware that a crime was being committed. Accordingly, the law
enforcers were actually engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure. Thus, the seized items should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that under the factual circumstances of the case at bar,
there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his
companions. They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other PAL

As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a persons body, personal effects or
residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Thus, Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3.
xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
x x x.
The above Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully
be effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2)
search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations;
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.[10]
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to
conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking andsmuggling by certain PAL personnel in
the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused
was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a
search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.[11]
In Papa vs. Mago[12] involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any
article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have
been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the
case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by
importers who evade payment of customs duties. The Governments policy to combat the serious malady of
smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty
has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individuals private papers and
effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which we have continued to affirm. [13]
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused were on board a moving PAL
aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A search warrant
may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But
it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor
vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.

[14]

Verily, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the articles involved in
the instant controversy were validly seized by the authorities even without a search warrant, hence, admissible
in evidence against petitioner and his co-accused.
On the second issue, petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for readily sustaining the trial courts finding that
the witnesses for the prosecution were credible, notwithstanding that their testimonies contain glaring
inconsistencies which tend to detract from their veracity. Petitioner submits that these inconsistencies create
serious doubt which should have been resolved in his favor.

G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

We are not persuaded.

Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.

After a careful examination of the purported inconsistencies mentioned by petitioner, we find that they do not
relate with the elements of the offense charged. Rather, they tend to focus on minor and insignificant matters
as for instance: which PAF operative was in possession of the hand-held radio; how the girdles (garters) were
removed; and what time the aircraft in question arrived.

REGALADO, J.:

It bears stressing that these inconsistencies detract from the fact that all members of the special PAF team
who conducted the search positively identified the petitioner and his co-accused as the same persons who
boarded the PAL plane; stayed therein for a significant length of time; disembarked in a manner which stirred
suspicion from the team; and with unusually bulging uniforms, rode an aircraft tow truck towards Lima Gate
where they were caught in flagrante delicto.
As a rule, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to trivial and insignificant details do not
destroy their credibility.[15] Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the
prosecutions case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby
negating any misgivings that the same were perjured. [16]

The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by
ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in
Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of
November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the
Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel
4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay
occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1

Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in part:

Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103.

SEC. 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or
assist in so doing, any article contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, seal or in any manner facilitate the
importation, concealment or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling

In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose true
names and identities have not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, allegedly committed as follows:

xxx

That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, PHILIPPINES, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in their possession, custody and control, the following to wit:

When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have had possession of the article in
question, possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the
defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court: Provided, however, That payment
of the tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this section.
Smuggling is thus committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the Philippines or
assists in importing or bringing into the Philippines any article, contrary to law, or (2) receives, conceals, buys,
sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation,
knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.[17] Importation commences when the carrying vessel
or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges due upon the articles and the legal permit for withdrawal has
been issued, or where the articles are duty-free, once the articles have left the jurisdiction of the customs. [18]
In the instant case, the prosecution established by positive, strong, and convincing evidence that petitioner
and his co-accused were caught red-handed by a team from the PAF Special Operations Squadron, while in
the possession of highly dutiable articles inside the premises of the airport. The contraband items were taken
by petitioner and his co-accused from a PAL plane which arrived from Hong Kong on the night of June 3,
1994. Petitioner and his colleagues then attempted to bring out these items in the cover of darkness by
concealing them inside their uniforms. When confronted by the PAF team, they were unable to satisfactorily
explain why the questioned articles were in their possession. They could not present any document to prove
lawful importation. Thus, their conviction must necessarily be upheld. Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed
no reversible error in affirming the trial courts Decision convicting petitioner and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 20186 are AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites

Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the proper authorities, and
armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed
upon by them and prompted by common designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of
rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly taking arms against the duly constituted
authorities, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, disrupting and
jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or parts thereof. 2
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and
several John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in
Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of
attempted homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to possess any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there
was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989. 4
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of

the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team
composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt.
Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was
conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the
Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his
surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment
near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked
towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the
approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed
by the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team,
which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was
able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders
might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio
Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th
Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right
portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia
inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the
only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a
result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were
janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding
team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm
later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy"
therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30, 1989,
he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales
Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales
Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building.
According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the
building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano when the raiding team barged in
and that he had explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military raided the office, he was
ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who
were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know anything about the explosives and insists that
when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's
involvement in the 1987coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had no
job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for them.
From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw ako ni
Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin
natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a
recommendation that "(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders
and pursuant to the spirit contained in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that
Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that
he did not have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess
the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were
found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in
behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to
possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not
present in the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition
or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and
safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives,
and which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable
resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the
transitional government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws
such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or
acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.
I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to illegally
possess firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What
the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. 6 This has to be so if the manifest
intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the
object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query
assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a
special law, 8in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. 9
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended
to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate
the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must
still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. 11 Such
intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may
have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit
an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess
the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be

considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of
having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license or
authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to
enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing
in the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant
denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was
no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano.
His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in
the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is
a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from the service for
going on absence without leave
(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable
about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the
military from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in
his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the
explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be
stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and be
suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of selling cars and
which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually
intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
While the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of advertence
thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the raiding team,
considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted and the penalty sought
to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search
warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used
as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein
the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do
so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun
store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity
of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there
was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the
surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his
court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.
The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in People vs.
Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of
each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came
down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic
of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was
held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time
to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where
accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when
one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused
was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered
to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is
it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led
the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search
even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness
in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing nonviolent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant
is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government
and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the

exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly
so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and
until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession
of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in
furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating or
executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano
(whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known),
is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept
this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a basis
in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be made clear
that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses
with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide,
arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the
course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of
illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the
Court has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is
penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the
prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the presence of the requisite elements in
each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate
prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the
first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal
Code, 24 with variant elements.
It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal Code
in this prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its recommendation for
executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail term of five years with
good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the President whose decision
thereon should be insulated against any tenuous importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De
Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time. In
the words of the court a quo:
2. the nature and quantity of the items 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16 ammo and 100
bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by the military that the Eurocar Sales Building was
being used by the rebels was not without basis. Those items are clearly not for one's personal defense. They
are for offensive operations. De Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar
Sales Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office is not credible for:
(a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col. Matillano on November 30, 1989 many
soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which self-evidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his
boss, was still very much at home and constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of November
30, 1989 to December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person tasked
with caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly trusted right-hand man of Col.
Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of
the AFP intelligence agents. 25

Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was
committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in
connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation therein
for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
(ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling
and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are
all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of
the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the
air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he
was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make
searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances
have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been

presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed
specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right
(ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of
their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the
Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not
all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered
as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court
may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers,
not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which
all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is howeverreasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review
and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by
the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit
the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause
and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice,
hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to
death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine
measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed
at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who
in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It
is incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the
barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the
existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the
Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III,
sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be left alone on which the regime of law and
constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort
and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain command of the
Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day
by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another
martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit,
repressive measures, the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for
liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to
the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt,
aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the
incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches
unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become
"search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case."
(Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is
(are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.

Separate Opinions

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is
Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve
routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the
beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would
sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must

no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your
face. I have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore
correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a
warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra)
First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it
a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of
democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass
its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would
sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must
yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit
the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause
and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice,
hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to
death, if he resists.

martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit,
repressive measures, the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for
liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to
the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt,
aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the
incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches
unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become
"search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case."
(Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is
(are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is
Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve
routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the
beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with
no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your
face. I have witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore
correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a
warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra)
First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it
a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine
measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed
at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who
in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It
is incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of
democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass
its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the
barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the
existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the
Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III,
sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be left alone on which the regime of law and
constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort
and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain command of the
Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day
by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another

I vote then, to grant the petition.

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.
Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following resolutions of
the Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being unconstitutional, and
Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal
and factual bases.
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May
1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise
referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of

firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period. 1Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for
the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the
return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the
request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick
up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed
by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20)
meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down
the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms
neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended
and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return
them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did
not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City
Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. 4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in
Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's
statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did
not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to
Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner
be also dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q),
of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and
petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings
as well as the filing of the information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and regulations of an
administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election Code provides for the
disqualification of any person/candidate from running for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has
either been declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning, using or
transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or
spirit of the provisions of the Code; that the resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before
the commission of certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be
disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending
criminal case, and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to the requisite quantum of
proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the
fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the

elections that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge against him on
his qualification to run for public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly prosecuted
for instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the search. According to him,
without a warrant and without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car.
The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in
their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded the
evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary investigation
before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently, making him a
respondent in the criminal information would violate his constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for public
office during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of security
personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a civilian
employee assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner further argues,
Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in compliance with the directive of its
Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the
petition 13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the position of COMELEC and
prayed instead to be excused from filing the required comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P.
Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised Penal
Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that
Arellano brought the firearms in question outside petitioner's residence, submitting that his right to be heard
was not violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's
possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation about the incident. Finally,
COMELEC claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No. 2327 since
this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority.
However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, 17 as well as the search
conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that
the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they
were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did
not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP
to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report regarding any nervous,
suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these
circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as
well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched.19 The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of
each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee. 21

We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior
confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a
confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the time of their
arrest; 22where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an undercover "deep penetration"
agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where the information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in
accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his passport and other identification papers; 24 where
the physical appearance of the accused fitted the description given in the confidential information about a
woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously
quiet and nervous when queried about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier was already
established by police authorities who received confidential information about the probable arrival of accused
on board one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the
Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential
report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their
informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as
adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered
the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of
petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded
into petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver of
petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines shall
be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation of this
authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation
with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No.
2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January
1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that news of impending
checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the same have been announced in
the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the
public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling
whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search
passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any
attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest
the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As conceded
by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed
policemen conducting the operation, 29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not
have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the
vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary
investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure
established by law should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the
City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact
submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due
process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in support of his defense. 31 Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural

rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals, 33 we held
that
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in
fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally
at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened
criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of
the full measure of his right to due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the
latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so
that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself.
Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation
against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City
Prosecutor.
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC cannot
be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion itself
expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon as he learned
of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his motion for
reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition against carrying firearms bears the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without probation and with
disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Against such strong stance,
petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National
Police on 13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be
used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829
dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in the
case ofValmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:
The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and
fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority
of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and
seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less
the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at "establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and

political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped
and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice
of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect to
petitioner Aniag, Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside, not because of an
unconstitutional warrantless search but by reason of the fact that he was not actually charged as a respondent
in the preliminary investigation of the case.

xxx xxx xxx

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the
barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on checkpoints
and finally dismantle them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.
VITUG, J., concurring:
The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to accept and
subordinate themselves to authority.
When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but, to the
contrary, reserved for themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.
One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole conceded proviso to
this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of arrest is lawfully issued. There are, to be sure, known
exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons, when warrantless searches and seizures
are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio decidendi of the Court in Valmonte vs. De Villa (178
SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the installation of checkpoints, the Court clearly has based its decision
on the existence at the time of what has been so described as an "abnormal" situation that then prevailed.
Evidently, the Court did not have the intention to have its ruling continue to apply to less aberrant
circumstances than previously obtaining.
The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the one hand,
and the constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should be held to prevail?
There is no choice to my mind not for any other reason than because there is, in the first place, utterly no need
to make a choice. The two are not incompatible; neither are they necessarily opposed to each other. Both can
be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength of the other.
There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of constitutional
mandates or an abuse on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer. It might pay to listen to the words
of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back
to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."
It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the Court has
expressed:
This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized even during the days of
the absolute monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and
majesty clothed the King, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend
from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.
The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but
are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that in the private
respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not
authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the omission for they
could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.
While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, in
hisponencia, I would express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above constitutional aspect, the
petition could rightly be granted.
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner in the
present recourse, the nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him and redounds to
his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that the majority opinion thereby reinstate the resolution of the Office of
the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I concur in that result.
However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the rationale
submitted therefor, that is, that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a warrant. The pertinent
facts stated by the majority readily yield the conclusion that there was consent on the part of Arellano to the
search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage compartment where the firearms were
discovered. As held inPeople vs. Excela, et al., 1 consent to a search may be given expressly or impliedly, and
as early as People vs. Malasugui, 2 the settled rule is that a search may be validly conducted without a warrant
if the person searched consented thereto.
I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was acting
in obedience to what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the instructions of his
employer, petitioner Aniag, who was himself acting upon and in compliance with Resolution No. 2323 of
respondent commission which was implemented by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives.
The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can be given
suppletory effect to special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10 of the same Code.
There is no prohibition therefor in the cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to R.A. No. 7166, nor is there
any legal impossibility for such suppletory application whether by express provision or by necessary
implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be considered as illegal, Arellano acted thereon in
good faith 3 and under a mistake of fact as to its legality, hence his exculpation is ineludibly dictated. Ignorantia
facti excusat.
It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no error was
committed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto Arellano for lack of
sufficient grounds to engender a well founded belief that a crime had been committed and that he was
probably guilty thereof, 4 respondent commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at a contrary
conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 92-0829.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.
Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the majority
opinion, are whether (a) COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is unconstitutional, and
(b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999, dated 23 April 1992, have legal
and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific disposition declaring (a) illegal the warrantless
search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13 January 1992, (b) inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless search, and
(c) unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution
No. 92-0829.
1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution
No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first paragraph,
page 10, Ponencia), this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot checkpoints
authorized to be established thereunder. And whether the warrantless search conducted by the PNP at the
checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been, provided there existed a probable cause
therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case is either procedurally premature, or one which
this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the obvious paucity of the facts before it. The most
the majority opinion can state is that "[t]here was no evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so
because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing
special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more could be expected at this
stage since the records of the proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the COMELEC

are not before this Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the inadmissibility in
evidence of the firearms seized would thus be premature.
It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms, which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms involved were
licensed and were duly issued to the petitioner by the House of Representatives, but for the violation of the
gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and
recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution), its statutory authority to have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, and honest elections (Section 52, Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate
rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the
COMELEC is required to enforce and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to
paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms outside the
residence or place of business during the election period unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC, and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or
other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle, or public
conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the same during the election period, unless
authorized in writing by the COMELEC.
In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the Sergeant-at-Arms
of the House of Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that on 13 January 1992, he
instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his (petitioner's) house at Valle Verde and
to return them to the House of Representatives. That day was already within the election period, which
commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314 (In The Matter of Fixing The
Schedule of Activities in Connection With the Elections of National and Local Officials on May 11, 1992),
promulgated on 20 November 1991. Considering then that the offense for which he was to be charged was for
the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No.
7166, which, in view of his aforesaid admissions, renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized
firearms, I fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling on the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of
unconstitutionality. It simply directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano for the
violation
of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, and
directed the petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and 35 of R.A. No. 7166 and
paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Insofar as Arellano is concerned, he is not a
petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was nothing more than a disapproval of the
recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint against him. As against the
petitioner, there was no denial of due process because the petitioner was later heard on his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, the right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not a creation of the
Constitution; its origin is statutory (Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang
Bayan ng Muntinglupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 [1992]).
The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the petitioner despite
the fact that he was never formally charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor. There was only an
"'unofficial' charge imputed against" him. The COMELEC then acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to want or excess of jurisdiction.
I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in directing the filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of paragraph (q),
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.
[G.R. Nos. 129756-58. January 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIAN DEEN ESCAO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA
and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused.
VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case No. 95-936 with violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,[1] as amended. Escao and Usana were also charged in Criminal Case No.
95-937 and No. 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866.
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-936 reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all
of them mutually helping and aiding one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport 3.3143 kilograms of "HASHISH", a prohibited drug, in
violation of the above-cited law.[2]
The charge against accused Julian D. Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937 reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control one (1) pc. of cal. .45 pistol, government model
with Serial No. 990255, with magazine containing 7 live ammos and two (2) more magazines for cal. .45 pistol
containing 7 live ammos each, without first securing the necessary license or permit from the proper
government authorities and which firearm and ammunitions he carried outside of his residence. [3]
The accusatory portion of the information against Virgilio Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control One (1) pc. of rifle carbine with Serial No.
7176644 with a banana type magazine loaded with 28 live ammunitions without first securing the necessary
license or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearms and ammunitions he carried
outside of his residence.[4] Es-mso
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
In its Decision of 30 May 1997,[5] which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court convicted Escao
and herein appellants in Criminal Case No. 95-936, Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937, and appellant Usana
in Criminal Case No. 95-938.
Escao filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation and Withdrawal
of Appeal,[6] which was granted by the trial court in its Order of 17 July 1997. [7]
Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997, [8] manifesting therein that they were appealing to
this Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties imposed, the decision in Criminal Case No.
95-936 was appealed to this Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from Criminal
Case No. 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997,[9] the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the
transmittal of the record in Criminal Case No. 95-936 to this Court and the record of Criminal Case No. 95-938
to the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-936 that is now before this Court.
Due to the differing versions of the parties, there is a need to narrate each of the testimonies of the key
players in this case.
The prosecution has this version of the events: On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban,
some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan
de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico,[10] were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat
Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).[11] They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping
those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they
stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493. [12] PO3 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person
seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as
Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao,

upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were search for more
weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. [13]

explained at the police station. He was also asked to step out. No firearm was, however, found in his
possession.[31]

The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3
Nonato.[14] Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los
Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk. [15] Escao readily agreed and
opened the trunk himself using his key.[16] They noticed a blue bag inside it,[17] which they asked Escao to
open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, [18] which, upon examination by National Bureau of
Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms.
[19]
lex

When confronted about the guns, Escao tried to intercede for his two companions and said that "... these two
dont know anything about it, I just took them for a drive." They subsequently went to police station Block 5. A
certain Toto, a policeman, drove the Kia Pride to Block 5. [32]

A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) to the effect that Escao was not a licensed/registered firearms holder of any kind and caliber.
Usana, however, according to the same certification is a licensed/registered holder of a pistol Colt .45 caliber
with license issued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996. Usana also has an application for a pistol
Uzi Cal. 9mm. Neither of the two guns seized were licensed/registered with the NAPOLCOM. [20]
For his part, Escao (or Jovy) testified that on the 4th of April 1995, between 11:00 and 11:30 in the morning,
he was at the lobby of Legend Hotel, at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, to meet with his business partners,
including Usana and Lopez. He saw his friend and erstwhile co-employee at Philippine Airlines, Ramon
Cabrera, who had borrowed his wifes car. Since it was his wifes birthday the following day, he asked Cabrera
if he could get back the car. Cabrera readily gave him the keys of the car.[21]
He left the hotel at around 11:45 in the evening with Usana and Lopez. Using his wifes car, they cruised
southward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and turned right at Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. They
stopped before crossing SLEX because the traffic light turned red. From the other side of SLEX, he could see
a group of policemen. Upon crossing SLEX, they were flagged down by one of the policemen, so he slowed
down and stopped. PO3 Nonato asked him to roll down the window and demanded to see his license. He
asked if he had committed any violation, but PO3 Nonato accused him of being drunk, which he denied. The
policemen persisted in asking for his license, but he did not budge and instead reiterated that there was no
reason for him to surrender his license for he had not committed any violation. A verbal tussle ensued resulting
in the drawing of firearms by the policemen which prompted Usana to suggest that they go to the police station
because the policemen were carrying guns and they have not done anything wrong. [22] Jjj uris
He stated further that he was the one who drove to the police station along Dian St. with his companions. He
parked the car then they were brought to the office of the Deputy Station Commander, Lieutenant Eco. [23] The
policemen asked if they could search his car. He then inquired if he was not entitled to a lawyer and why they
needed to conduct a search when they had not even told him what he had violated. Apparently, he thought
they were there only for verification purposes. Lt. Eco explained that that was the reason why they were going
to search his car, to see if he had done anything illegal. Although the police were insistent in asking for the
keys to his car, he continuously refused. Lt. Eco asked his men to usher the trio into the detention cell. [24]
After two hours, he was brought back to Lt. Ecos office. Lt. Eco pointed to a bag, a rifle, a pistol and a
package wrapped in masking tape or packing tape on his desk, and said these items constituted evidence of
illegal possession of firearms and transporting of drugs. He was surprised that they found those items from his
car because his key had been with him all the time. He was handcuffed, brought to his car, and again was
surprised to see its trunk open.[25]
On the other hand, Lopez had a different story. He claimed he was the mechanic of Usana and they lived in
the same subdivision.[26] On 4 April 1995, he was working on Usanas pick-up truck at the latters house when
Escao dropped by at around 4:30 in the afternoon looking for Usana who was then working in Forbes Park.
[27]
At around 5:30 p.m., they left Usanas house in Escaos metallic gray Kia Pride. Inside the car, he saw a .
45 caliber pistol and two spare magazines tucked in the right side and left side of Escaos waist. He also saw
a carbine under the right passenger seat. When he inquired about the guns, Escao replied that such did not
pose any problem since they were licensed. Before going to Usana, they went to Pasay City to see a certain
Jerry.[28] They met Usana at the Sen. Gil Puyat Station of the LRT at around 9:00 p.m. He gave his seat to
Usana but was unaware if the latter noticed the rifle beneath the seat. [29] Lexj uris
They went home via Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue but were stopped at a checkpoint after crossing SLEX. The
policemen directed their flashlights at them and one opened the front passenger door. [30] The latter saw the
rifle under Usanas seat. Usana and Escao were ordered to get out of the car. PO3 Nonato immediately saw
the gun tucked in Escaos waist and asked if he was a policeman. Escao replied that everything would be

Upon reaching the police station, Escao was immediately brought to the office of Lt. Eco while he and Usana
were asked to sit on the bench. After a few minutes, PO3 de los Santos came out of the office of Lt. Eco to talk
to him. He told him that all he knew about Escao is that he was a wealthy flight attendant with military
connections. After returning to Lt. Ecos office, PO3 de los Santos went out of the police station with Lt. Eco
and Escao. The three came back with a blue bag which he had never seen before. The bag was opened
before the three suspects. Escao reiterated that his two companions had nothing to do with the bag. [33]
He and Usana stayed overnight in their cell and only saw Escao in the morning of April 5. At around 4:00
p.m., they were transferred to the CID and stayed in the office of a certain Inspector Sipin. Escao admitted he
owned the bag/case.[34]
For his part, Usana testified that he was a duly licensed architect who was gainfully employed by Rolando de
Asis and Taytay Management Corporation. [35] He admitted owning a licensed .45 caliber pistol. [36]In March
1995, he hired as mechanic Lopez, who lives in Bernabe Subdivision Phase II where he also lives. Escao on
the other hand, was introduced to him by a certain Roberto Samparado, a neighbor of Lopez. Escao, an
international flight attendant of Philippine Airlines and a businessman who owns Verge Enterprises, also
supplied materials to the Philippine Army and planned to engage in a construction business. [37]
On 4 April 1995, at around 7:30 p.m., he paged Escao to talk about the materials for the five prototype
gunship helicopters they were supposed to supply. They talked on the phone, agreeing to meet between 8:30
and 9:00 p.m. at the Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Station of the Light Rail Transit, [38] and met at around a quarter past
nine. Escao was on board a metallic Kia Pride with Lopez on the passenger seat. Lopez vacated the seat for
him. They went to Magallanes Village to meet a certain Norman Garcia and talk about the
documents[39] relating to the helicopter gunship of the Air Force. They arrived there at 11:30 p.m. While they
were talking with Garcia, he noticed a gun and magazines tucked in Escaos waist. Upon inquiry, Escao
said it was not a problem and only for his protection. [40] On their way to Roxas Boulevard, they were stopped at
a checkpoint along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Policemen knocked on the car windows so he and Escao rolled down
their windows. A person in civilian clothes suddenly opened the right door, took something from the side of his
seat and shouted, "Theres a gun." He was surprised because he did not carry anything when he boarded the
car; neither did he see anything inside the car because it was dark and he was not wearing his eyeglasses.
[41]
The person who took the gun asked if he was a policeman, and he said he was an architect. He was then
asked to alight from the car, then frisked. Escao was also asked to alight from a car. They saw a gun tucked
in his waist, so they asked if he was a policeman, and Escao answered in the negative. Lopez was then
ordered to get out of the car by the person in civilian clothes and was also searched. They rode the Anfra
service vehicle of the police. One of the policemen asked Lopez to handcuff him and Escao. The policeman
who asked Escao to get out of the car drove the Anfra van to Block 5 where they arrived at 1:30 in the
morning of 5 April.[42] J lexj
He and Lopez waited outside the office of Lt. Eco while Escao was inside with the arresting officers. Lt. Eco
came out of his office and urged Lopez to tell the truth. He heard Lopez say that they were both just with
Escao and that they knew nothing about the guns; neither do they own any. SPO4 de los Santos entered the
office of Lt. Eco and came out five minutes later with Escao, Lt. Eco, and the other arresting officers, Nonato,
Suba and Erwin Eco, the person in civilian clothes. All six went out to the parking area and returned after
about five minutes. Lt. Eco was carrying a bag which he placed on top his desk. Lopez and Escao were
asked about the contents of the bag. The two replied it was the first time they saw that bag. Lt. Eco opened
the bag before them. They all saw something in brown paper. He and Lopez simultaneously exclaimed that
they knew nothing about the contents of the bag, and they implored Escao to tell the police that they had
nothing to do with it.[43]
The trial court found the prosecutions version more credible than that of any one of the accused, and ruled
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused as charged. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 95-936, accused JULIAN ESCAO y DEEN, VIRGILIO USANA y TOME and JERRY
LOPEZ y CASABAAN are GUILTY as charged and are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors
or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the
situation demands.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board the 3.314 kilograms of
Hashish (marijuana) for its appropriate disposition in accordance with law; and

We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of
checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are
operated.[49]

2. In criminal Cases Nos. 95-937 and 95-938, accused JULIAN ESCAO y DEEN and VIRGILIO USANA y
TOME are GUILTY as charged in the two separate informations respectively filed against them and are
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term from TEN (10) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR maximum, as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
maximum as maximum.[44] Court
The firearms and ammunitions subject matter of these cases which are still with the City Prosecutors Office
are forfeited in favor of the Government are directed to be turned over to the Firearms and Explosive Unit,
PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for its appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.

[45]

Accused-appellants Usana and Lopez anchor their appeal on the following arguments:
1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the hashish seized without search warrant when the police
officers already had the opportunity to secure a search warrant before searching the bag found at the baggage
compartment at the back of the car;
2. Assuming that the hashish is admissible in evidence, the trial court erred in finding appellants to have
conspired with Escao in transporting the hashish when the evidence clearly shows that the hashish was
owned and possessed solely by Escao;
3. The trial court erred in convicting appellants of illegal possession of hashish despite the fact that they were
neither in actual nor constructive possession of the illegal drug; and
4. The trial court erred in not considering the exculpatory testimony of Julian Escao in favor of appellants.
Before going any further, some words are in order regarding the establishment of checkpoints.
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that
the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also complain of
its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution [46] imposing a gun ban during the election
period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday of the
month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the election period. Supreme
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. [47] For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicles
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact,
these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. [48]
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of
pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a
gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against
illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious,
such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At

Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in convicting the three accused for
violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police of the trunk of the
car. Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search
incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs searches; (5)
consented warrantless search;[50] and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.[51]
Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the
vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escao was consented to by him. Both
Lopez and Usana testified that Escao was with the police officers when they searched the car. [52] There was
no apparent objection made by Escao as he seemed to have freely accompanied the police officers to the
car. PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escao readily agreed to open the trunk," upon request of
SPO4 de los Santos.[53] But according to Escao, he refused the request of the police officers to search his
car.[54] We must give credence to the testimony of PO3 Suba. Not only is it buttressed by the testimony of
Usana and Lopez that Escao freely accompanied the police officers to the car, it is also deemed admitted by
Escao in failing to appeal the decision. The findings of fact of the trial court are thus deemed final as against
him. Esmsc
Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao;
(2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for
firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4)
the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5)
after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the possession and
control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the
trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime
after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to
the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana
and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was
seized.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is concerned with regard to accused-appellants
VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRY C. LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No
6425, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING their immediate release from confinement at the
New Bilibid Prison, unless their further detention is justified for any lawful ground. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of said accused-appellants within five (5)
days from notice of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN
WATES, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 16, finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, they lodged
the present appeal.

On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother Teofanis to shoulder
the medical expenses of his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking of snacks at Teofanis residence,
appellants left for Davao City.

The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN
RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, without being
authorized by law, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transported, delivered and possessed 1.7 kilos dried
marijuana leaves which are prohibited drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police officers were manning a
checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the
COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. [2] One of the police
officers blew his whistle[3] and ordered them to return to the checkpoint.
Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong
(SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped away
to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in
front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is a member of the army.[4] When
asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however, offer any. At this point,
the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was
observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously.[5] SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked
Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were. Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and
proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however, returned it to Vinecario. [6]
Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse, following
which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed
something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit
reiterating that it was only a mat.

Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecarios former co-employee at Emerson Plywood where he
previously worked, blocked the motorcycle. [17] Vinecario thus alighted from the motorcycle and shook hands
with Datolarta[18] who asked where they were headed for and requested that he ride with them. Vinecario
turned Datolarta down as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle. Datolarta then asked if he
(Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas, Tagum. Without
examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolartas bag and left with his co-appellants. [19]
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a checkpoint, [20] sped past
it. When they were about 50 to 60 meters away from the checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting Wates to
tap Vinecario, telling him that the whistle came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble to go back to
the checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed them to alight from the
motorcycle. One of the officers asked Vinecario who he was, and Vinecario identified himself as a member of
the Philippine National Police.[21] The officer asked for identification and when Vinecario could not produce any,
the former got the backpack slung on Vinecarios shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario acquiesced, two officers
opened the bag upon which they shouted that it contained marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the backpack to
confirm if there was indeed marijuana. At that instant, the police officers held his hands and brought him,
together with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later to Camp Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which
they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. [22]
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of all three
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and
Gerlyn Wates, pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep. Act
7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal
injection, under Rep Act 8177 in the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act
7659, amending Art. 81 of the Revised Penal Code.

SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, [7] resulting to the
tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air.

Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16 Davao City, is ordered to
elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court, Supreme Court Manila, for the automatic review
of this Decision, after its promulgation.

Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong let us talk about this, [8] but the latter ignored Vinecario and instead
called his Commanding Officer and reported to him that marijuana was found in Vinecarios possession.

SO ORDERED.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants along with two bundles of
marijuana, the backpack and the motorcycle to the battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao City and were
turned over to one PO2 Cabalon, an investigator of Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to said
battalion office, however, the incident was blottered [9] by PO3 Edward Morado at the Buhangin Police Station.
[10]

On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual Padasay brought the
confiscated suspected marijuana to the camps crime laboratory for examination [11] which determined it to
weigh 1,700 grams[12] and to be indeed positive therefor.[13]
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine army
stationed at Pagakpak, Pantukan, [14] approached motorcycle driver Wates at a terminal in Andile, Mawab and
requested him to bring him to his elder brother at Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which he paid.
[15]
The two thus proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble to alternate with Wates as driver,
and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang.[16]

By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the imposition of the penalty
against all accused, even if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic) through his counsel de officio, will apply to
all accused since there exists conspiracy of all in the commission of the offense charged.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and reconsidered, only insofar as the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection under Republic Act No. 8177, is concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead sentence (sic) to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 21, in relation to Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, as decided by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben Montilla G.R. No. 123872
dated January 30, 1998.

However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the offense charged, is (sic)
sustained. The corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all accused through their counsel for their
acquittal of (sic) the offense charged, is denied, for lack of merit.

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS (sic)
VALID.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL
SEARCH.

[25]

The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 1995 of the above-mentioned
Order of the trial court, it arguing that the commission of the offense charged against appellants was attended
by an aggravating circumstance in that it was committed by an organized or syndicated crime group, thus
warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal [26] on September 15, 1999. Vinecario followed
suit and filed his Notice of Appeal.[27]
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecutions Motion.
In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURTS OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE CONSPIRED WITH
VICTOR VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA FROM PARANG, MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE
BY THE EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD AND SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
MISAPPREHENDING FACTS IF NOT A COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH
DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL.
2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-ONG AND VICENTE CARVAJAL THAT
BOTH APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE WERE NOT NERVOUS AND APPREHENSIVE AT THE TME (sic)
OF THE OPENING OF THE MILITARY PACK CONTAINING MARIJUANA NEAR THE CHECKPOINT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE MERELY HIRED BY VICTOR VINECARIO TO
BRING HIM TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO FOR A FEE OF P500.00 WITH FREE FOOD AND GASOLINE.
4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF P500.00 WHICH VINECARIO
PAID TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE] AS INADEQUATE BY TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
BUS FARE OF P268.00 FROM MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO SUN WAY CROSSING, MAGUINDANAO
DOWN TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO.[28]

III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN GIVING THE POLICEMEN THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE THE APPARENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE MANNER OF
ARRESTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[32]
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by the police officers was
incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been deemed to have consented to the search as any such
consent was given under intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed no probable cause to
justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence, it being a
product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to inform him of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his choice, thereby violating Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution.[33]
The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be conducted without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution so ordains:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of the
right of the people under Section 2 shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted with unity of purpose and in
the execution of any unlawful objective with Vinecario. [29] They assert that they had no prior knowledge of
Vinecarios plan to meet with a man who would give the backpack containing marijuana; that prosecution
witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajals declaration that they (appellants Wates and Roble) were not
nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when the backpack was opened buttresses their claim that they did not
conspire with Vinecario; and that the prosecutions theory of conspiracy was merely based on the testimony of
PO1 Carvajal that they acted nervously when the backpack was ordered opened for inspection; that there was
a great variance in the testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in the direct examination and their
testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that transpired on April 10, 1995, thus casting serious doubts on the
trial courts findings of guilt.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions,
however. Search and/or seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. [34]

On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, [30] stating that he is practically
satisfied with the decision of the trial court; that he would not waste anymore the effort of the honorable
Supreme Court Justices in further reviewing his case; and that as he was driven by the sincerest desire in
renewing his life, he irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal. On even date, Roble and Wates
likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,[31] stating that they admit the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted; that they are satisfied with the decision of the trial court; and that they are already
serving the penalty for their offense and realize the overt admittance of guilt as the only vehicle in [their]
gradual renewal.

x x x [Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of
organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.

By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants and directed Vinecario to file
his brief within forty-five days from notice of the resolution.
In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the trial court:

Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. [35] For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. [36]

xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological
beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one
must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program
of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the
equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The
checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.

Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage
without interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during
which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. x x x

A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing yellow t-shirt who stood up and
when asked about his name answered that he is Victor Venecario).
xxx

These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme
Court:
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with
legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may
obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint
operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner
in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not
chosen by officers in the field, but by official responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective
allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a
checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field officers may stop
only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than
there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in
locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review. [37]
Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735 imposing a gun ban during an
election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
[38]
The national and local elections in 1995 having been held on May 8, the present incident, which occurred
on April 10, 1995, was well within the election period.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched
when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the
motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. [39]
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of
each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. [40] (Emphasis
supplied).
That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at the checkpoint is gathered
from the following testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:
Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when these three persons
approached?
A:

We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded away.

Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification papers to show that he is really a
member of the army?
A:

We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.

Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?

A:

Venecario.

xxx
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask
him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid and different
reactions (sic).
Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A:

Yes.

Q: That is what you have observed from their faces?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that backpack?
A:

He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion.

Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to whom did he pass it on?
A:

He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble.

Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him?

A:

Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario.

Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one person to another?
A:

My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter.

Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident prior to that checkpoint?
A:

Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will be bombed.

Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away?

Q: Prior to that was there any incident?

A:

xxx

One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic).

xxx

A:

Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened?

Q: If you recall when was that?

A:

A:

When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away?

In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4.

April 4 of the same year.

Q: What did they answer?

Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter, what happened next?

A:

A:

One of them said that he is a member of the army.

Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you point to him?

I ordered Venecario to open the backpack.

Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open?

A:

They opened the backpack..[41]

A:

He placed it in (sic) his shoulder.

Q: What did he do with the backpack?

SPO1 Goc-ongs testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal:

A:

Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any unusual incident while you
were conducting that checkpoint?

Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion?

A:

A:

When asked he passed it to his other companions.

Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his other companion.

Yes, sir.
Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he do?

Q: What was that incident all about?

A:

He returned back (sic) to Venecario.

A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle passing and flagged them to
stop and there were three (3) persons and one was manning and they briefly stopped but speeded away.

Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario?

xxx

A:

Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened?

xxx

A:

Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he got hold of that backpack
what happened?

The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.

Yes, sir.

xxx
A:

He opened the backpack.

Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced himself as an army man, what did
you do?

Q: Who told him to open the backpack?

A:

A:

I asked for an ID.

Q: Who among you asked for an ID?

A:

Sgt. Goc-ong.

Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?
A:

I was behind him because I backed him up.

Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID?

Sgt. Goc-ong.[42]

In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged
down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the
backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an
attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to
justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the
contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.

Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that he was an army man?

As to Vinecarios allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation
conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his conviction. [43] In the case at bar, the trial court
convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of SPO1
Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.

A:

Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:

A:

He answered that he has no ID.

Our other companion moved closer as security.

Q: Why?

Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident that took place?

A:

A:

We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in uniform.

Yes, sir.

Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing?

Q: What was that?

A:

A:

He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic).

The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us.

xxx

Q: Where?

Q: After that what happened?

A:

A:

Q: Coming here to Davao?

We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag.

Parang Highway.

Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the contents of the bag?

A:

A:

Q: What happened after Crossing Parang?

He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes.

Q: Before that what did Venecario do?

A:

Yes.

There was a person who blocked us.

Q: A former companion of yours?

Q: He mentioned the name?

A:

A:

Yes.

Yes, Merly.

Q: A former soldier?

Q: What is the family name?

A:

A:

No, sir.

He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum.

Q: You said your former companion, am I correct?

Q: Where in Tagum?

A:

A:

Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood.

Roxas, Tagum.

Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion?

Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum?

A:

A:

Yes.

I asked him what was (sic) the contents?

Q: You are familiar with him?

Q: What did he answer you?

A:

A:

I know him very well.

He answered clothes.

Q: He was your close friend?

Q: What did you do?

A:

A:

Yes.

Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder.

Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you?

Q: You did not become suspicious?

A:

A:

Abdul Karim Datolarta.

Q: He was alone when he stopped you?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you?
A:

When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and shook hands with him.

Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to stop?

No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic) that time. [44]

Vinecarios account - that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-appellants were cruising along
the highway, a person whom he failed to recognize but who turned out to be an acquaintance, Abdul Karim
Datolarta, flagged down [45] the motorcycle, and as requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to bring a
backpack to Datolartas cousin without checking its contents - is incredible, contrary to human experience, and
taxes credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented at the trial, thus further eliciting serious
doubts on Vinecarios tale.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily
be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
[46]

A:

My friend.

Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours?

A:

Not yet.

Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting?

A:

He asked me where I was heading.

Q: What was your answer?

A:

I told him that I am going back to Davao.

Q: What else did he tell you?

A:

He told me if he can also ride with us.

Q: What did you tell him?

A:

I told him we were already three.

Q: What happened next?

A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the name of that cousin of his in
Tagum.

The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1
Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus
then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the same fails.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it.[47] Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. [48] To exempt himself from criminal liability, the
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit
the crime.[49]
In People v. Concepcion,[50] this Court held:
x x x Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is
not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting
out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in unlawfully transporting the subject
marijuana. Roble, who was driving the motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away upon seeing
the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by the police officers. When asked as to the contents of

the backpack by SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed the same to one another, indicating that they knew its
contents. These circumstances manifest appellants concerted efforts and cooperation towards the attainment
of their criminal objective.
Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, they
contending that these witnesses contradicted their testimonies-in-chief when they subsequently testified on
rebuttal that appellants were not nervous or apprehensive at all when they were being inspected by the
policemen.
It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal referred
to by Roble and Wates on their deportment pertain to different stages of the checkpoint inspection as a
scrutiny of the records reveals. Thus, in his direct examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as follows:

It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other vehicles passed through the
checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter could not have sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1 Gocong did not give any testimony that other vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the appellants
arrived. On the contrary, he testified there was no other vehicle ahead of the appellants at the checkpoint
when the latter arrived on their motorcycle (TSN, June 17, 1999, p.7).
It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the checkpoint just because SPO1 Gocong made no mention of using reflectorized objects at the checkpoint. As described earlier in his Brief, this
witness explained that the checkpoint was visible because it had a sign board at the middle of the road that
read, COMELEC GUN BAN (TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is no way for appellants not to have
noticed the checkpoint.[55]
In fine, appellants defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or transporting marijuana.

Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask
him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid and different
reactions (sic).
Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A:

Yes.

Q: That is what you observed in their faces?

A:

Yes, sir.[51]

PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ongs observations on appellants deportment upon

returning to the checkpoint:
Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and stopped you said you noticed
one of them was nervous, did I get you right?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q: Only one was nervous?

A:

All of them.

Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were trembling?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct?

A:

Yes.

Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00 oclock in the evening?
A:

There was light.

Q: The place was well-lighted?

A:

Yes, sir.[52]

The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or transporting illegal
drugs. Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: to carry or convey from one
place to another. When accused-appellant used his vehicle to convey the package containing marijuana to an
unknown destination, his act was part of the process of transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in
the crime of transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of transporting a
prohibited drug, like in the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a
special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes the offense and is sufficient to validly charge and
convict an individual committing the act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was caught
transporting marijuana, the crime being mala prohibita, accused-appellants intent, motive, or knowledge,
thereof need not be shown.[56] (Underscoring supplied)
A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall transport any prohibited drug. Section 20, Article IV of
the same act provides that the penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied if the dangerous drug is, with
respect to marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed 1,700 grams.
Since the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code [57] is
necessary. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the trial court. A fine of P500,000.00
should, however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidumin accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 3523395 finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegally transporting marijuana under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and solidarity pay a fine of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL
and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or apprehensive when he flagged them
down as they crossed the checkpoint.[53]

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervous as Vinecarios backpack
was being opened.[54]

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following arguments of the Office of
the Solicitor General, which are quoted with approval, should dispose of the same:

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.

HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD,
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY
RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila,
P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because
of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at
liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that
the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to
liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or
instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which provides:

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an
offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful
arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas
corpushave been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member
of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in
the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February
1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of
the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as
T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information
charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was
recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal,
Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto
Umil,Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988
and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15
February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and
they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned,

is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor
of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his
arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:

some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and Transportation
Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and
Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino
located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a
safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August
1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a
search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal
Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the
course of the search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;

From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is,
therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the
nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was
well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant
is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government
and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so
in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3

f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for
"Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988,
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was
actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was
read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced
by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court,
he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpusor now has a civil action for damages against the
person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to
set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without
warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters
to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a
member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of
the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;

g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;

h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a
staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department
of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the
house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military
agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka
Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also
admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among
the items taken from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone number
of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the
lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next
day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying
themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the
military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of
the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals,
vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live
ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition
for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the
house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia

Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other
occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were
released from custody.

The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no
previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.

On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the AntiSubversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for want of a
preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:

An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715.
Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and
Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in
the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his
behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the
National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners.
The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest,
without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without
warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of
ammunitions without license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without
warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC
and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive materials,
and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo
T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina,
which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist
lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show
their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence,
they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live
ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5)
live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the
CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to the
Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively.
No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and
that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and
preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the
respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.

Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the
basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of nonavailability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail
as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor
made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and
signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on the
evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them in
court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules,
since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on
12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila,
conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya
arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45
cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to
the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to
possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera,
on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny
Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a
preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a
warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant
and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule
112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V

The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were
arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang
Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.

The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the other
hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in
these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases
do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and
Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on
the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition,
but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the
petitioners in the rebel movement.

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping in his
home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told
him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo
Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz
Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the
lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was
not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military
surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the underground subversive organizations.
That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino
when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members of his group were
coming to his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's arrest,
petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and
searched by the military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a
cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was
interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the
respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter
brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police
Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85,
charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since
petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988,
during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go
on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to
believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it
unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who
should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable
Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was
to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?

Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the
lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and
symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to
say:

As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest without warrant
considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra
had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of
jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession?
Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and
brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, place and
circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest,
incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their
possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested
in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister
plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who
is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to
Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi
binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya
sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec.
5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the
competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail
as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we
reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso
Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about
8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the
corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the
killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view
thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police
headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January
1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo

Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court
in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel
Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and
on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989
and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the
motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).

Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of
thehabeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order
of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales,
Jr. vs. Enrile,15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes
upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at
bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases ofhabeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving
deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail
bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna are based upon the facts and
the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the
police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his
co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds
exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process
or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of
an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis
supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its
pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is
filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court
where said information has been filed. 14The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed down
during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present
democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people.
Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons
despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed
before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide
behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom
and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of
the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that subversion is a continuing
offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has
been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be
arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper,
or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of subversion.
Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even
now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the
disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given every support in
our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of
Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely
what we are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions for Habeas Corpus. At the same
time, I have some reservations concerning certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et
al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states categorically that: "the crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes." The majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The
majority there made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to examine the basis,
scope and meaning of such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses
which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses"

(121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per
curiam opinion has in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious blanket of the majority opinion in GarciaPadilla, at least for purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner Deogracias
Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting to sedition" is defined in Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do
distinguish between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the
press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code. Precisely because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting
to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit
that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos)
constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court
below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in
the case of Rolando Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a
warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does
not appear strictly necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid information
filed with the competent court, which court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and
considering further that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine of "continuing crimes" as
applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future
case where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.
Cortes, J., concurs.

Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested." 3
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been
guilty of subversion the offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest
subversion was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account of the slay of the two CAPCOM
soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was
not arrested while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident." 5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in case of subversion in the
absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law,
means "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversion association as defined in
sections two and three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural, at the time he
was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because he was not performing any over act that he was
truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification" 6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the
underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing subversion when
he was arrested, assuming that he was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the [accused]," 7 indicating intent to
accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the
overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or
after the act, provided that the peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty. (second
paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations
Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I do
not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is
hearsay.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful under the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. 1
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of

The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its language, it may be exercised only in
the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is
purely and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that the majority has set a very
dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick
up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a
continuing offense.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a
hasty statement. It has yet to be established that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's military
arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be
innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because Dural has been convicted and is
serving sentence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment
already final." 10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ.

11

Vindication of due process is its historic office.

12

G.R. Nos. 84581-82

In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that
that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my
opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed
strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-free.

There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a public interest. In one case 14 we
denied a motion to withdraw a petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I
do not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons
who think and believe differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were ranking officers of the Communist
Party of the Philippines. According to the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (the National United
Front Commission) is a naked contention of the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view,
does not justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military, this very
Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of
firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Aonuevo and Ramon Casiple to be contrary to law. That they
are "admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and
unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's cases, barren claims of
the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong language (that Aonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF
officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in judgment. I
think we should be the last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the
presumption of innocence accused persons enjoy.
G.R. No. 83162
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards the same conclusion. There
was basis at the outset to say that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have
observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed or
having been committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted
by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still possible under a supposed
democracy.
G.R. No. 85727
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under arrest. For the life of me, I can
not figure out how one can be picked upon in one's own home and held moments later without a warrant of
arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech delivered in a press conference at the
National Press Club on November 21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988.
Under these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court, Espiritu's detention, is allegedly
justifiable. The question is whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the
Rules, an information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to keep one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held the fatal shooting of Romulo Bunye II was
committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a
suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how
Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the
existence of the circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The
crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as doctrines that have lost their luster:

1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a continuing offense;
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the fundamental rights of the petitioners
under the Constitution in the authorities' handling of the petitioners' cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present Constitution. Two reasons persuade me.
First, it is repugnant to due process of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves
the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency],
the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which, incidentally,
includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the
people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only
trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 )
Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of emergency
powers, with Congress. 24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted
whether it could stand up under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand
scrutiny under the 1987 Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was handed down, the Court
promulgatedMorales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in my view has significantly whittled down GarciaPadilla's very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
xxx xxx xxx
16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint or information against him must
be filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law. . .
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125,
Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ
of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1) informed of their right to remain silent;
and (2) to have competent and independent counsel. 27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the military that the petitioners
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Aonuevo, and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed organization. The question
that has not been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a
warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were apprised of their
constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because as we held in one
case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28
According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of
the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong
in the volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were held
by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
filing of an Information against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
them" 31 ) without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the
issuance of a warrant).itc-asl As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an
information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation (examination).
process of law . 33

32

It forms part and parcel of due

I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, inapt and untenable. In that case,
the accused had been served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the
Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that the judge who issued it did

not examine the complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic, because the accused had
already pleaded, and the case had entered the trial stage.
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I submit that in that event, the
petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the writ of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of arrests and detention in the
country without the sanction of a judicial decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it,
although with much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had stood for:
repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular government, restored its
honored institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom.
I feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so painstakingly
built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny.
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of Philippine law on warrantless
arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may
seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part forged by years of experience and
sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom and justice toward men and women who challenge
settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to
posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.

curiam opinion has in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious blanket of the majority opinion in GarciaPadilla, at least for purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner Deogracias
Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting to sedition" is defined in Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do
distinguish between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the
press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code. Precisely because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting
to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit
that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos)
constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court
below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in
the case of Rolando Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun.

I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.

Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a
warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does
not appear strictly necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid information
filed with the competent court, which court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and
considering further that he is entitled to bail.

Separate Opinions

There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine of "continuing crimes" as
applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future
case where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.

CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:

Cortes, J., concurs.

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that subversion is a continuing
offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has
been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be
arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper,
or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of subversion.
Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even
now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the
disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given every support in
our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of
Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely
what we are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful under the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions for Habeas Corpus. At the same
time, I have some reservations concerning certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et
al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states categorically that: "the crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes." The majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The
majority there made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to examine the basis,
scope and meaning of such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses
which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses"
(121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. 1
"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army (NPA),
an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested." 3

As I said, I beg to differ.

do not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons
who think and believe differently from the rest of us.

First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been
guilty of subversion the offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest
subversion was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account of the slay of the two CAPCOM
soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was
not arrested while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident." 5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in case of subversion in the
absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law,
means "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversion association as defined in
sections two and three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural, at the time he
was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because he was not performing any over act that he was
truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification" 6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the
underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing subversion when
he was arrested, assuming that he was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the [accused]," 7 indicating intent to
accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the
overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or
after the act, provided that the peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty. (second
paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations
Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I do
not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is
hearsay.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its language, it may be exercised only in
the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is
purely and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that the majority has set a very
dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick
up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a
continuing offense.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a
hasty statement. It has yet to be established that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's military
arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be
innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because Dural has been convicted and is
serving sentence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment
already final." 10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ.

11

Vindication of due process is its historic office.

12

G.R. Nos. 84581-82

In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that
that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my
opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed
strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-free.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a public interest. In one case 14 we
denied a motion to withdraw a petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I

Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were ranking officers of the Communist
Party of the Philippines. According to the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (the National United
Front Commission) is a naked contention of the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view,
does not justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military, this very
Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of
firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Aonuevo and Ramon Casiple to be contrary to law. That they
are "admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and
unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's cases, barren claims of
the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong language (that Aonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF
officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in judgment. I
think we should be the last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the
presumption of innocence accused persons enjoy.
G.R. No. 83162
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards the same conclusion. There
was basis at the outset to say that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have
observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed or
having been committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted
by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still possible under a supposed
democracy.
G.R. No. 85727
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under arrest. For the life of me, I can
not figure out how one can be picked upon in one's own home and held moments later without a warrant of
arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech delivered in a press conference at the
National Press Club on November 21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988.
Under these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court, Espiritu's detention, is allegedly
justifiable. The question is whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the
Rules, an information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to keep one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held the fatal shooting of Romulo Bunye II was
committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a
suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how
Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the
existence of the circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The
crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as doctrines that have lost their luster:
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a continuing offense;

2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20

The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I submit that in that event, the
petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the writ of liberty.

I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the fundamental rights of the petitioners
under the Constitution in the authorities' handling of the petitioners' cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present Constitution. Two reasons persuade me.
First, it is repugnant to due process of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves
the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency],
the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which, incidentally,
includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the
people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only
trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 )
Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of emergency
powers, with Congress. 24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted
whether it could stand up under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand
scrutiny under the 1987 Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was handed down, the Court
promulgatedMorales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in my view has significantly whittled down GarciaPadilla's very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:

xxx xxx xxx

The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of arrests and detention in the
country without the sanction of a judicial decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it,
although with much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had stood for:
repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular government, restored its
honored institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom.
I feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so painstakingly
built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny.
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of Philippine law on warrantless
arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may
seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part forged by years of experience and
sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom and justice toward men and women who challenge
settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to
posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
G.R. No. 83260

April 18, 1990

xxx xxx xxx

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, accused-appellants.

16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint or information against him must
be filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law. . .

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Augusta J. Salas for accused-appellants.

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125,
Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ
of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1) informed of their right to remain silent;
and (2) to have competent and independent counsel. 27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the military that the petitioners
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Aonuevo, and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed organization. The question
that has not been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a
warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were apprised of their
constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because as we held in one
case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28
According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of
the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong
in the volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were held
by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
filing of an Information against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
them" 31 ) without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the
issuance of a warrant).itc-asl As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an
information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation (examination).
process of law . 33

32

It forms part and parcel of due

I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, inapt and untenable. In that case,
the accused had been served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the
Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that the judge who issued it did
not examine the complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic, because the accused had
already pleaded, and the case had entered the trial stage.

REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and his co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged
in Criminal Case No. 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in
relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, in an information which reads:
That on or about May 4, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away
to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell, deliver or
give away to and other the following:
1. One (1) cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana;
2. Two (2) cigarette foil wrapper (sic) containing marijuana which are prohibited drugs.
Contrary to law.1
The accused, who were assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on May 26, 1987.
On August 18, 1987, trial on the merits started, with the prosecution thereafter presenting as its witnesses
P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy, P/Capt. Luena Layador, T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, and S/Sgt.
Armando Isidro. On its part, the defense presented both accused, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat as
its witnesses.
The court a quo, in a comparative evaluation of evidence, painstakingly summarized the clashing factual
versions of the prosecution and defense, as follows:
. . . On its part, the prosecution alleged that after receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a
"buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt.
Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo

Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of May 4, 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel
as his companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo
Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated (with) on the purchase and when
Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran
to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After
ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to
his teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity,
converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and
Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill (Exhibit C-1) used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz
together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3").
Traversing this version is that of the defense which, in brief, consists of a denial to (sic) the prosecution's
theory and the claim that accused Juan de la Cruz, who was then suffering from loose bowel movement, was
all the time in bed at their place at 3034 Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila; that he never left their place throughout
that day of May 4, 1987; that he never had a visitor on that day and that he was never engaged in the sale of
marijuana. The NARCOM agents raided his place without search warrant or without first securing his previous
permission. One searched thoroughly his place, the second acted as a guard posted at the door of De la Cruz'
place and the third agent was a mere observer. His place was ransacked and he was even bodily searched.
As regards accused Reynaldo Beltran, he was arrested by the same group (prior to the arrest of Juan de la
Cruz) while he was playing "pool" at Aling Ely's place along Maliclic St. that afternoon and that without much
ado, he was taken because he was fingered by one Arnel to be engaged in selling marijuana. Both accused
were brought to a parked vehicle of the raiding team, From there, they were taken to NARCOM headquarters
for investigation where for the first time they came to know that they were being charged of selling marijuana. 2
Finding the version of the prosecution more worthy of credit, the court a quo rendered its decision3 on March
15, 1988, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the accused, JUAN DE LA CRUZ y
GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section
4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, both of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675 and as charged in the Information,
and, accordingly, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,with the
accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs.
The three (3) aluminum foils containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" to "B-4") placed in an empty Marlboro pack
(Exhibit "B-1") are hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government and once this Decision
shall become final and executory, the same shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board through the
Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, for proper disposition while the P10.00 bill (Exhibit "C-1")
bearing Serial No. F-215962 shall be returned to T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas.

3. The Court erred in giving probative value to the confiscated marijuana sticks despite the fact that no civilian
or other neutral person signed as a witness to its taking. If it were true, there must be at least one civic-minded
citizen who could easily be convinced by the police to witness it.
4. The Court erred in considering the evidence, Exhibits "B-2," "B-3" and "B-4", as the very ones confiscated.
If they were the very ones taken from the accused, the original receipt prepared at the scene of the crime
would not have been thrown away by the very agent who acted as the buyer. Exhibit "E" should have been
given no probative value for having been executed by someone who did not actually confiscate the marijuana.
5. The Court erred in giving probative value to the Buy-Bust Operation when even the alleged marked money
utilized in the operation could not be identified by the leader, T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas.
6. The Court erred in not giving value to the testimony of the two disinterested witnesses for the defense,
namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, whose testimony corroborated substantially that of the
accused.
7. The Court erred in concluding that there was no motive for the military to manufacture evidence.1wphi1 It
is common knowledge that apprehensions of this kind are made to fill up a quota of arrest in cases handled to
comply with standard operating procedure and efficiency reports. 8
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Appellant assails, unconstitutional, the manner in which the so-called buy-bust operation is conducted in order
to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act. He stigmatizes it as no different from seizure of evidence from one's
person or abode without a search warrant. He argues that this procedure is pregnant with opportunities, and
gives rise to situations, for corrupting our law enforcers.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the common modus operandi of narcotic agents in utilizing poseur-buyers
does not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act as it
is susceptible of mistakes as well as harassment, extortion and abuse. 9 By the very nature of this antinarcotics operation, the possibility of abuse is great. 10
We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of narcotics agents whose task, as it is, is already
formidable and attended with great risk, lest their dedicated efforts for the apprehension and successful
prosecution of prohibited drug violators be unduly hampered. The proliferation of drug addiction and trafficking
has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous
operations. Our experience has proven entrapment to be an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers
as exemplified by this case.

The Solicitor General explains that a buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither
instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. 11 Entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated.
Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. 12

In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated March 3, 1989, 5 the Court was informed of the death of
accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales on February 21, 1989. Counsel de oficio having thereafter
submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate of the accused 6 as directed by the Court, the criminal
case against said accused-appellant was dismissed in our resolution of September 25, 1989. 7

While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a
search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful
arrest. 13 A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. 14 It is a matter of judicial
experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors
were invariably caught red-handed. 15 There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.

Furnish copy of this Decision to the Honorable Supreme Court through the Honorable Court Administrator.
From this decision, accused Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban
interposed the instant appeal.

The present appellate proceeding is, therefore, limited only to appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban who now
faults the trial court with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Buy-Bust Operation being done to enforce Republic Act 6425 is unconstitutional and any evidence
acquired under such method should not be admissible in court.
2. The Buy-Bust Operation should be declared illegal for it breeds corruption of police and military officers
through planting of evidence for purposes of extortion.

Appellant castigates the prosecution for not having presented any civilian or other neutral person who could
attest that the foils of marijuana were indeed confiscated from him. The absence of any civilian witness should
not undermine the case for the prosecution. The natural reaction of a civilian to inhibit himself from being a
witness to a crime is understandable. A criminal proceeding entails a lot of unavoidable inconveniences, aside
from the time involved in attendance as a witness in investigations and hearings. Adding to this the inherent
fear of reprisal, we have the natural reticence and abhorrence of most people to get involved in a criminal
case.

At any rate, the testimony of other witnesses in this case would only be cumulative or corroborative as they
would only be repeating the facts already amply testified to by the government witnesses. Credence should be
accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. 16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Appellant maintains that the court below should have rejected Exhibit E, which evidences the receipt of
marijuana from appellant and which was prepared by Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, in the absence of the original
receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy who was the poseur-buyer.
We agree with the Solicitor General, since this is borne out by the records, that Exhibit E is actually based on,
as it is merely a clearer copy of, the receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy. Since the draft
receipt had to be prepared hurriedly at the scene in order that the accused could be brought to the Narcotics
Command, such draft receipt was not clearly written, so Sgt. Vicente Jimenez mechanically transferred the
written entries of P/Pfc. Arcoy into a more legible copy. 17 Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Sgt. Jimenez, a
member of the team, had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in both receipts, being an eyewitness to the
events that had transpired.
The testimony of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas, the team leader who gave P/Pfc. Arcoy the money to pay for the
marijuana, is challenged in that he failed to identify the marked money utilized in the operation. Appellant
insists that the marked money must be recorded, if not photographed in order to be admissible as evidence.
This is clutching at evidentiary and argumental straws.

Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province
of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, acting as a pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to
another and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without
authority of law have in his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four
(4) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo,
Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a customer. (Rollo, p. 9)

As found by the trial court, the money was in the possession of P/Pfc. Arcoy who had been assigned as the
poseur-buyer.1wphi1 In the ensuing transaction, the foil of marijuana was handed to Arcoy by appellant and
then Arcoy gave the money to accused Juan dela Cruz. 18

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense
charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:

Suffice it to say that even if the money given to De la Cruz was not presented in court, the same would not
militate against the People's case. 19 In fact, there was even no need to prove that the marked money was
handed to the appellants in payment of the goods. The crime could have been consummated by the mere
delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited
to, the act of delivering. In the latter case, the act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally
or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. 20

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug
under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his
sentence with the period for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of
this judgment. All the items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State.
(Rollo, p. 41)

On the trial court's rejection of the testimony of the alleged two disinterested witnesses for the defense,
namely, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, we find no reason to disturb its ruling. We reiterate the timehonored principle that on the issue of which version to accept, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are given great weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. Subject to
exceptions which do not obtain in the present case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. 21

From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this appeal, assigning the following
as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:

Appellant imputes insidious motives on the part of the military to manufacture evidence, theorizing that a buybust operation is for the purpose either of extorting money or, in line with alleged internal policies, complying
with a quota of arrests. 22 These are bare unsupported allegations. From the evidence of record, we find no
reason why the prosecution witness should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime. The defense has not established any cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge the
accused with peddling marijuana. As found by the trial court, there is not even a breath, much less an
accusation by the defense, that the military and police personnel involved were indeed engaged in such
nefarious activities. 23
Finally, appellant reproaches the prosecution for not presenting the civilian informer as a witness. 24 It is settled
that the non-presentation of a certain witness by the prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible defense. If the
accused believes that the testimony of said witness is important to his cause, he should avail thereof, even by
compulsory judicial process if necessary. Furthermore, the non-presentation of some prosecution witnesses
does not detract from the prosecution's case, since the number of such witnesses who should be called to
testify is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers. 25
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 87-54417, insofar as
accused-appellant Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban is concerned, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE
SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE OF
PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P
20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente
Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro,
because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain
Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel.
Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be
marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he
handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came
out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this instance that Pat.
Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to

continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a
third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi
and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan
Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a
tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he
bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police
team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police
recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante, The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado,
Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of
marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without warrant of the
accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to
apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the
activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take place and while
positioned at a street comer, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street
about forty to fifty meters away from them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati,
who, thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants
in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies were based on
their actual and personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not
have been within hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed
tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer.
Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v. Agapito,
G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself
knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's
activities only three days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that after
Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is
possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised
him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable information given by some informants that
selling was going on everyday, he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without
warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472
[1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the activities
of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from
Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to
some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three
times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to
P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing
the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant
clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed
an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which
monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police officers
have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case
of People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to
enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search
without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at
bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable
cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting
officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that the evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the
requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.
Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for testifying could
be merely to escape prosecution.

We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:

The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his
willingness to testify in court against the accused. But this does not necessarily taint the evidence that
proceeds from his lips. As explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are
usually their customers, especially if as in this case, there is no other direct evidence of the selling except the
testimony of the buyer. We accept this observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users
are, and should be employed by law enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who are the
real felons in our society. We have observed the demeanor of the witness in court, and found him to be
straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention
and disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)
Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and
importance, it being acknowledged. that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial,
is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, et al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4,
1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v.
Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]).
Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public officers Fulgencio and
Seraspi.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive than to
accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the presumption being that
police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec.
3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483
[1986]).
The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that the items seized
were all positive for marijuana.
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's defense is alibi which is
unavailing considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person from whom he bought
marijuana.
Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and cousin distributing
handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he
was present in the vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to
meet Macabante on the street.
It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the appellant as the seller
of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681
[1989])

weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore
the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in
evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if
admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to
the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two
men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because
the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be
the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the
chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police
headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to
the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort
to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon
had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over
the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to
Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of
its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as
an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected
without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's
house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.

The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense
charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of
the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the

Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This
is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case
the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the
wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the
case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were
lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he
was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a)
or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is
at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's
acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense?
What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have
been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason
to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at
that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was
all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of
the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were
about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked
suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection,
turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed

the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before
him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He
then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that
probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other
than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused
was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less
innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously.
In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they
had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at
the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement
therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered
this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners
nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in
his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of
such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the
officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case
of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.

There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is
sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his
illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial
evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in
the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the
constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation
of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their overzealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of
persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not
been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

said no. The police officers asked accused-appellant for his drivers license and the registration papers of the
vehicle, but he was unable to produce them. When accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took
the ID card and found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of
glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he had
these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk the matter over,
and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police
headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an attach case from the car and opened it. There were two black
clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in
cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.
The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct, they
turned over the attach case together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator
found eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the
attach case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an
improvised burner, magazines and newspapers. [1]
Consequently, two Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C,
charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as
follows:

[G.R. No. 116001. March 14, 2001]

That on or about October 22, 1992 at Brgy. I, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba, province of Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized/permitted by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody 750
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a regulated drug, in violation of the abovestated law.[2]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUISITO GO y KO alias KING LOUIE, accusedappellant.

The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, charged accused-appellant with violation of
P.D. 1866, committed as follows:

[G.R. No. 123943. March 14, 2001]

That on or about October 22, 1992, at Flamingo Beerhouse, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named not being licensed or
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) caliber .9mm marked WALTHER with serial number 006784 with one (1) magazine loaded
with ten (10) live ammunitions of same caliber, in violation of the aforementioned law. [3]

SO ORDERED.

LUISITO GO y CO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3 Candido
Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at
Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and
reported to them that he saw accused-appellant Luisito Go, also known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo
Disco House with two women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-appellants
waist. Together, the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred meters
away from the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were conducting an
Operation Bakal, whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told
a waiter to accompany them. They went up to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights,
and the police officers saw accused-appellant and his lady companions seated at a table. They identified
themselves and asked accused-appellant to stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun
tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but accused-appellant was unable to
produce any. Instead, accused-appellant brought out the drivers license of a certain Tan Antonio
Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, Serial Number
006784, with a magazine containing ten (10) rounds of live ammunition. Accused-appellant was invited to the
police precinct for questioning.
On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car, which was parked
outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his car, a Honda Civic with license plate
number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National Police identification
card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant if he was a member of the PNP, and he

After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant in the two criminal cases, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused in Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C, to be
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having in his possession of 750.39 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug. He is hereby sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS; and in Criminal Case
No. 3309-92-C, the accused is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearm, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Considering that the accused appears to be detained at the Makati Police Station, jailer, Makati Police Station
is hereby ordered to commit the accused to the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Correction, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. The bond posted by the accused in Criminal Cases No. 3308-92-C & 3309-92-C, are hereby ordered
cancelled.[4]
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C directly to this Court, considering
that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, which appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 116001.
On the other hand, accused-appellant brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C
before the Court of Appeals.[5] In an Amended Decision dated February 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed accused-appellants conviction but modified the penalty imposed by the trial court by sentencing him,
in addition to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, to pay a fine of six thousand
pesos (P6,000.00), citing Section 8 of R.A. 6425, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. [6]Hence,
this petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 123943.
The two cases were consolidated. [7]

Accused-appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for the two crimes. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the arrest and subsequent seizure were legal. A review of the
records at bar shows no reason to depart therefrom.

license. And on appeal, he could only submit for the first time and for unknown reasons an alleged photocopy
of a purported license. The only plausible conclusion that can be drawn is that there was no such license in
the first place. Hence, his guilt of illegal possession of firearm was duly established.

The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest having been
issued prior thereto,[8] is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional
cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. [9] Among these are when, in the presence of a
peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Accused-appellants guilt for illegal possession of shabu has likewise been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The white crystalline substance found in his possession, upon laboratory examination, were positively
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. [25]

In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly
visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for
the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the
recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as
provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. [10] The subsequent
discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu,
though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have
been made during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause,
which states that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for
any purposes in any proceeding.[11] Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects
found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as
evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search
is admissible in evidence.[12]
Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime is the accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or possess
firearm, ammunition, or explosive. Possession by itself is not prohibited by law.[13] In prosecutions for illegal
possession of firearm, the element of absence of license to possess the firearm may be established through
the testimony of or a certification from a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Bureau [14]of the
Philippine National Police (FEB-PNP), attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm. [15] In this case, a
representative of the FEB-PNP testified that accused-appellant was not a holder of any gun license.
[16]
Moreover, a certification[17]to that effect was presented to corroborate his testimony. These pieces of
evidence suffice to establish the second element of the offense of possession of unlicensed firearms.
[18]
However, in a vain attempt to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presented for the first time an alleged
firearm license, which was described as Annex 2 of his petition. Accused-appellants counsel admitted that
said document was not presented below for some reason. [19] Whatever those reasons are, he did not
specify. The document, however, is dubious. It is too late in the day for accused-appellant to proffer this very
vital piece of evidence which might exculpate him. First, the reception of evidence is best addressed to the
trial court because it entails questions of fact. It should be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts.
[20]
Second, the document marked as Annex 2 of the petition in G.R. No. 123943 is not the license referred to,
but an order of the trial court resetting the date of arraignment. [21] Third, there is attached to the petition a
firearm license[22] which is a mere photocopy and, as such, cannot be appreciated by this Court. Indeed,
considering that this was the one piece of evidence which could spell accused-appellants acquittal of the
unlicensed firearm charge, and assuming that, as shown in the face of the license, it was issued on October 7,
1992, there should be no reason for its non-production during the trial. Fourth, and most importantly, the
genuineness of the purported license becomes all the more suspect in view of the Certification issued by the
FEO-PNP that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder.
Anent the certification issued by the FEO-PNP to the effect that Luisito Go y Ko was not a licensed gun holder,
accused-appellant claims that he was not the person alluded to therein because the correct spelling of his
middle name is not Ko but Co. Whatever the correct spelling of his name is, the fact remains that he had no
license on the day the gun was found in his possession. All that he could present then was a photocopy of his
application for gun license,[23] which is not the equivalent of a license. Appellant testified that he presented a
firearm license to the police,[24] but he could not produce that alleged license in court. If appellant was indeed
a licensed gun holder and if that license existed on October 22, 1992, he could have easily presented it to the
police when he was asked for his papers inside the disco, or if the alleged license was in his car, he could
have easily shown it to them when they went to his car. Otherwise, he could have easily asked his lawyer or
relative to bring the license to the police precinct when he was being investigated. Despite several
opportunities to produce a license, he failed to do so. In fact, during trial, he never presented any such

The bulk of accused-appellants defense revolves around the factual findings of the trial court. It should be
recalled that factual findings of the trial court, if supported by evidence on record, and particularly when
affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court. [26] As discussed above, the records substantiate the
trial courts and the appellate courts findings as to accused-appellants culpability. There is no reason to
depart from these findings as no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded which, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the case. [27] Moreover, questions as to
credibility of witness are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court because of its unique opportunity
of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the reviewing tribunal. [28]
In the case at bar, the trial court found:
The narration of the incident by the police is far more worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers
who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties and were not demonstrated to have been unduly
biased against the accused.[29]
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that:
(T)he findings of fact of the trial court are generally respected by the appellate court, unless they are found to
be clearly biased or arbitrary. We do not find any in these cases.[30]
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, committed in 1992, regardless of whether the firearm is low
powered or high powered, was punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as provided in P.D.
1866. However, under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1997, [31] the penalty was lowered toprision
correcional in its maximum period and a fine of P30,000.00, if the firearm [32] is classified as low powered. In
this case, the unlicensed firearm found in appellants possession was a 9mm Walther pistol, which under the
amendatory law, is considered as low powered. Inasmuch as the new law imposes a reduced penalty and is,
thus, more favorable to accused-appellant, the same may be given retroactive effect. [33] Therefore, accusedappellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00.
On the other hand, the crime of illegal possession of regulated drug, under the law in force at the time of the
commission of the offense in this case, was punished by imprisonment of from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, [34] regardless of the amount of drugs
involved. Hence, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00. The decision
of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 750.39
grams of shabu and drug paraphernalia, is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P12,000.00. The shabu and subject drug paraphernalia seized from appellant shall be
destroyed as provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130644 October 27, 1997
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his mother MARGARITA G.
LARRANAGA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer
or person."

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:
On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamuswith writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the information
for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranaga alias Paco, filed
in the RTC 1 of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a consequence thereof. Petitioner as an
alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order 2 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying
Larranaga's motion for a regular preliminary investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors
from the Office of the State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve her son from his alleged
illegal confinement or to grant him bail.
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary Arts located
at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru
his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The police did not carry out
the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17,
1997 for preliminary investigation.
On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation.
He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of the complaint against his client and
that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt to file the defense affidavit.
The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention
prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in
person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his client's right to a preliminary
investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty.
Armovit's verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.
On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing the actuations of
the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 3 However, Larranaga's effort to
stop the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said
prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a
Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's
arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila
Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranaga's counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to
its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals' dismissed Larranaga's
petitions, hence, the case at bar.
On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we temporarily restrained the presiding judge of
Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from becoming moot.
On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that ". . . it is within petitioner's constitutional and
legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be conducted before
resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations against him." He asked that ". . . the petition be given
due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation." He further recommended that
". . . during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from detention."
We agree.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary investigation. Section 7 of
Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's inquest investigation. Said section clearly provides that
"when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." For one the petitioner was not arrested on
September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the
preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting
officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two
(2) months before. So we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz: 4
Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within
the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when (the
shooting had) in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. . . . When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the
killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition
that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to
be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of Rule 112
cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would not be
allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner's counsel was far
from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished copies of the
affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days to submit
defense affidavit. As well pointed out by petitioner's counsel, the precipitate denial of his motion ". . . prevented
petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and
security guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify that:

 during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his classmates were all in their school
at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates took their midterm exams;
following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioner's Quezon City apartment until
about 9 o'clock in the evening, and then repaired to a Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan Avenue where they
stayed on until 3 o'clock in the morning of July 17; they even had pictures taken of their party;
indeed petitioner's July 16 examination papers and that of a classmate are ready for submission as
evidence, along with petitioner's grades for the term's end in September 1997;
two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing petitioner at their
Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;
petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until term's end in September 1997;
petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since June 1997, particularly
including July 16 and 17;
petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No. PR833, as shown by his plane
ticket and boarding pass.
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case should have
been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon, 5 we emphasized that "attuned to the times,
our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed
a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.
As this Court emphasized inRolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 'the right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or
some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.' A preliminary investigation
should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can
be protected from any material damage."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of petitioner and to order the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation of the petitioner in accord
with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the Order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case issued by
Executive Judge Priscila Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order
the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to order the Presiding Judge
of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in
Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the result of petitioner's preliminary investigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BALTAZAR BONGALON y MATEOS, accusedappellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case involves the unlawful sale of 250.70 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated
drug, in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The crime was allegedly committed as follows:[1]
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused (Baltazar Bongalon), not being
lawfully authorized by law, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag/sachet
containing brown crystalline substance weighing 250.70 grams, which was found positive to the test
forMethamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (emphases ours)
When arraigned, the accused pled not guilty.[2] Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses, to wit: (1) PO3 Noel Castaeto, the poseur-buyer; (2) PO3
Rogelio Galos, member of the buy-bust operation team; and (3) Police Senior Inspector Julita de Villa, the
forensic chemist. The presentation of PO2 Felipe Metrillo, member of the buy-bust team, was dispensed with
after the prosecution and the defense had stipulated at the trial that he would merely corroborate the testimony
of PO3 Galos.
The prosecution evidence reveals that in the morning of December 7, 1994, a confidential informant reported
to the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo Papa,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, that a certain Baldo (the accused) was engaged in selling shabu, a regulated
drug. Police Senior Inspector Franklin Moises Mabanag immediately formed a buy-bust operation team with
PO3 Noel Castaeto as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Rogelio Galos and PO2 Felipe Metrillo as members. [3]
That same day, the confidential informant contacted the accused through a mobile phone and introduced PO3
Castaeto to him as a friend who wanted to buy shabu. The accused and PO3 Castaeto negotiated the
terms of the transaction over the mobile phone. PO3 Castaeto told the accused that he needed 250 grams
of shabu. The accused pegged the cost at P1,000/gram ofshabu, for a total sum of P250,000.00. The
accused then instructed PO3 Castaeto to call the following morning to confirm the sale. [4]
P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag briefed the buy-bust operation team members on their respective roles in the sting and
gave to PO3 Castaeto two (2) P500.00 bills bearing serial numbers BT423424 and BQ352570 and five (5)
bundles of boodle money to be used as buy-bust money. P03 Castaeto affixed his signature at the bottom
right corner of each bill for identification purposes. [5] They placed one genuine P500.00 bill on top, and another
one at the bottom, of the boodle money. The bundles were first secured with money straps with
markings P50,000.00, United Coconut Planters Bank and wrapped in a transparent plastic then placed inside
a brown envelope.[6]
At 9:00 a.m., December 8, 1994, PO3 Castaeto talked again to the accused through the mobile phone to
confirm if their transaction would push through. The appellant told him that they would meet at 3:30 p.m. that
same day, near the Burger Machine stall along Doa Soledad in Better Living, Paraaque. [7]
PO3 Castaetos team and the confidential informant arrived at the designated place at 3:00 p.m. using a
private vehicle. He and the confidential informant parked their car near the Burger Machine stall and waited
for the accused to arrive. P03 Galos and P02 Metrillo, on the other hand, parked just a few meters behind the
car used by PO3 Castaeto.[8]
At 3:30 p.m., the red Nissan Sentra sedan driven by the accused, with plate No. TPL 488, parked in front of
the car of PO3 Castaeto. The accused was alone. The confidential informant and PO3 Castaeto
approached the Nissan Sentra and talked to the accused. After a brief conversation, the accused asked for the
money. PO3 Castaeto showed him the buy-bust money.[9]Satisfied, the accused immediately handed over to
PO3 Castaeto a package wrapped in a newspaper. After PO3 Castaeto had checked out that the package
contained the suspected regulated substance, he gave the pre-arranged signal to his team by waiving his
hand. The back-up team members immediately announced that they were NARCOM agents and arrested the
accused.[10] They informed the accused of his constitutional rights and brought him to Camp Papa for
investigation.[11]
On December 9, 1995, the confiscated substance was brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination.[12] P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Services, conducted a physical, chemical and chromatographic examination on the substance to determine
the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The result is as follows:[13]
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. A- One (1) light blue China Station bag containing one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag marked
as Exh. A-1 with 250.70 grams of brown crystalline substance. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examinations conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu).

P/Sr. Insp. De Villa testified that the package containing the shabu was completely sealed when she received
it and she was the one who opened it to examine its contents. [14]

one knew that he was going to Boyets house in Syria Street. He claimed he would lodge a complaint against
the arresting officers for his unlawful arrest and the illegal search of his house once his case is finished.

For its part, the defense presented the accused himself, Baltazar Bongalon. He tried to refute the claim of the
prosecution witnesses that he was alone when the NARCOM agents arrested him for the alleged unlawful sale
of shabu. Allegedly, the buy-bust operation was bogus and the NARCOM agents framed him for extortion.

Thereafter, with the courts approval, the defense and the prosecution stipulated that, if called on the stand,
the following witnesses, to wit: (1) Melchor Bongalon, brother of the accused; (2) Nonoy Ducca, a construction
worker who allegedly witnessed the arrest of the accused; (3) Hilda Capuslanan, housemaid of the Bongalons;
and (4) Marcela Bongalon, wife of the accused, would testify as follows:

The accused testified that in the morning of December 8, 1994, he was cleaning his house in United
Paraaque. Just before noon that same day, his brother, Melchor Bongalon, arrived and told him that their
friend, Boyet, rang him and asked to tell the accused to return the Sega tapes he borrowed. Boyet, whose
real name is Juancho Tangsengco, lives in Syria Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque. Melchor
Bongalon, on the other hand, lives in Tondo, Manila. [15]
As the accused had previously planned to take his then 4-year old son, Mark Anthony, to Star City, he decided
to go to Better Living at 2:00 p.m. to return the Sega tapes first. Melchor allegedly accompanied the accused
and his son to Boyets house. They used the red Nissan Sentra sedan owned by their sister.[16] The accused
was at the drivers seat, Melchor was at the passenger side in front and Mark Anthony was at the back. He
passed via Doa Soledad and Russia Streets. While cruising along Russia Street, he slowed down a bit
because he had to turn right to United Nations Street. Suddenly, about eight (8) men in civilian clothes
bearing armalite automatic rifles and .45caliber firearms intercepted him.[17] (He learned later that the armed
men were NARCOM agents led by PO3 Castaeto). The firearms were pointed at the car he was driving. He
rolled down the cars window and asked what his violation was and if they had a warrant of arrest against
him. They ignored him and instead, ordered them to get out of the car. He persisted in verifying what his
violation was but did not get any reply from them. Thereafter, they were ordered to board the car again. Two
(2) men boarded his carPO3 Galos sat at his left side, taking the drivers seat, while the other sat at his right
sideand sandwiched him. PO3 Castaeto and PO2 Metrillo also boarded the car and sat at the back seats,
beside Melchor and Mark Anthony. The rest of the arresting team headed towards their vehicle. [18]
The accused and his alleged companions were taken to Camp Papa for investigation. When told that he was
carrying shabu in his car, he asked if he could see the substance. Allegedly, the NARCOM agents
refused. After the investigation, P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag asked him if they could go to their house to check if he
stashed any shabu in his house. He agreed.[19] They reached his house in United Paraaque by 7:00 p.m. that
same night. About seven (7) policemen entered his house. PO3 Galos was left in the car to guard him and his
son. His brother, Melchor, was left in the custody of NARCOM in Camp Papa. [20]
Fifteen (15) minutes later, the police let the accused and his son enter their house as the NARCOM agents
continued searching his house. His wife and his son were seated beside him in the living room. His wife
asked for a search warrant which elicited a cold reply from the NARCOM agents that it was not
necessary (hindi na uso yon). The search lasted for two (2) hours and yielded negative results. The
NARCOM agents tried to take the wife of the accused to Camp Papa, but she became hysterical. They left
her behind and instead brought the accused and his son back to the camp. [21]

Melchor Bongalon would testify that, on December 8, 1994, he went to the house of the accused and told the
latter to return the Sega tapes that the accused borrowed from their friend, Boyet; that he and the son of the
accused accompanied the latter in going to Boyets house in Better Living, Paraaque; that NARCOM agents
intercepted their vehicle at the corner of Ethi(o)pia Street and Doa Soledad Avenue; that there were no
prohibited drugs taken from the accused; that they were brought to the NARCOM office in Bicutan and that in
the evening of December 8, 1994, the NARCOM agents went to the house of the accused. [25]
Nonoy Ducca would testify that at about 3:00 p.m., on December 8, 1994, he was taking a snack along Russia
Street in Better Living, Paraaque; that he was a worker at a nearby construction site; that he noticed armed
men pointing their firearms at a vehicle and they forced its occupants to alight; that the occupants of the
vehicle were asked again to board the same and one (1) of the armed men took the wheel and sped away;
that he was twenty (20) meters away from the incident and that he recognized the driver of the vehicle who
was intercepted by the armed men. [26]
Hilda Capuslanan would testify that on the night the accused was arrested, the NARCOM agents went to the
house of the accused and ransacked the same; that they returned to the house of the accused on December
10, 1994 and did the same thing and that a case was then filed against the NARCOM agents before the PLEB.
[27]

Marcela Bongalon, the wife of the accused, would testify that on December 8, 1994, at about 7:00 p.m., she
was in their house when her husband, the accused, and the NARCOM agents arrived; that the NARCOM
agents ransacked their house and took their personal belongings; that said officers returned on December 10,
1994 and did the same thing but she was not around at that time; that on December 8, 1994, Melchor
Bongalon came to inform the accused to return the Sega tapes and that her son, the accused and Melchor
Bongalon left their house after lunch.[28]
Finally, the defense presented as documentary exhibits the sketches of the scene of the incident prepared by
PO3 Castaeto, PO3 Galos and the accused, marked as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Thereafter, the
defense rested its case.
After the trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer the death
penalty and ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00. The dispositive portion of its decision[29] reads:

At Camp Papa, the accuseds son was handed over to Melchor as the accused was brought to another
room. It was already late in the evening when his mother arrived at the camp. His son and his brother were
allowed to leave with his mother.[22]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused BALTAZAR
BONGALON y MATEOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 15, Article III, of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, Section 15 in relation to number 3 Section 20 thereof, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00)
PESOS and to pay the costs.

The accused claimed that the NARCOM agents were trying to extort money from them but he told his mother
not to report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation because he feared for his life. He also alleged
that several agents had threatened him that P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag would kill if the latter could not get what he
wanted. He accused them of manhandling him. He allegedly sustained abrasions and contusions, but the
NARCOM agents denied his request for a medical treatment. [23]

The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) confiscated from the accused is ordered forfeited in favor of the
Government and the Clerk of Court is directed without delay to turn over said item to the Dangerous Drug
Board.

On December 13, 1995, he was brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City. Again, he requested for medical
treatment. His request was also denied because, according to the police, he already had a medical certificate,
referring to the one that was taken before he was mauled. [24]
The accused denied that he talked to the confidential informant and to PO3 Castaeto at 5:00 p.m. on
December 7, 1994. He claimed they could not have talked to him because he did not own a mobile phone
and he did not have a telephone in his house. Allegedly, at that time, he was driving the red Nissan Sentra
along MIA Road which he borrowed from his sister. He also denied that he gave the shabu to or received any
money from PO3 Castaeto because he did not know the latter or any of the NARCOM agents prior to his
arrest. He insisted that he was intercepted at the corner of Russia and United Nations Streets, and not along
Doa Soledad. He could not, however, think of any reason why they did so. Allegedly, except for Boyet, no

SO ORDERED.
The accused filed a Notice of Appeal. [30] Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial to present
additional witnesses that included his 4-year old son, Mark Anthony.[31] The motion was denied by the trial
court on the ground that the additional witnesses he offered to present were available during the trial proper of
the case.[32] Subsequently, the accused filed several motions,[33]including a motion to inhibit,[34] but they were all
denied. The trial court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court for automatic review. [35]
In the meantime, the accused filed a MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL with this Court. [36] Pursuant to our directive,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.[37] After considering their pleadings, we denied the motion
for new trial for lack of merit.[38] The accuseds motion for reconsideration was also denied. [39] Finally, the
appellant and the Solicitor General filed their respective briefs. [40]

The appellant contends that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS A BUY-BUST OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE NARCOM AGENTS AGAINST BONGALON
AND THAT IT WAS A VALID ONE.
A.
THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES NOEL CASTAETO AND ROGELIO GALOS
ON THE BUY-BUST OPERATION AGAINST BONGALON ARE NOT CREDIBLE.
B.
THE EVENTS AS BORNE OUT BY THE RECORDS OF THE CASE BELIE THE EXISTENCE OF A
VALID BUY-BUST OPERATION.
C. THERE WAS NO SHABU CONFISCATED FROM BONGALON AT THE TIME OF HIS UNLAWFUL
WARRANTLESS ARREST.
D. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF BONGALON IS (sic) UNLAWFUL AND THE TWO SEARCHES
MADE ON HIS HOUSE ARE (sic) ALSO UNLAWFUL.
E.
THERE WAS NO BUY-BUST OPERATION BUT ONLY A PLAN TO EXTORT MONEY FROM
BONGALON AND HIS FAMILY AND ROB THEM OF THEIR VALUABLES.
F.
THE PRESENCE OF MELCHOR BONGALON AND MARK ANTHONY BONGALON AT THE TIME OF
THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF BONGALON BELIE THE CLAIM OF THE NARCOM AGENTS THAT
BONGALON WAS DEALING SHABU AT THE TIME OF SUCH ARREST.
G. THE TESTIMONY OF BONGALON IS CREDIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS GIVEN IN A
STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BONGALON OF THE VIOLATION OF SECTION
15,ARTICLE III, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7659.
A.
THE SHABU ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED FROM BONGALON AT THE TIME OF HIS UNLAWFUL
WARRANTLESS ARREST IS INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
B.
THE ACTS OF THE NARCOM AGENTS CONSTITUTE INSTIGATION RATHER THAN AN
ENTRAPMENT.
C. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF
FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE IN ORDER THAT BONGALONS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION/NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY A NEUTRAL AND IMPARTIAL
JUDGE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE APPROVED THE CONDUCT OF A NEW TRIAL IN ORDER THAT
THE FACTS EVIDENCING THE EXTORTION AND ROBBERY PLAN OF MABANAG AND HIS MEN COULD
HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING THE GUILT OF BONGALON.
V.
THE PENALTY OF DEATH AND FINE OF P1 MILLION IMPOSED BY THE HONORABLE COURT
ON BONGALON ARE NOT THE PROPER PENALTIES TO BE IMPOSED.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, with modification as to the fine imposed.
The appeal hangs mainly on the alleged lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the frame-up-forextortion theory.
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.[41]
To discredit the NARCOM agents involved in the buy-bust operation, the appellant points to certain facts that
would allegedly prove that the operation was bogus, to wit:

(1) There was no prior transaction between him and the poseur-buyer for him to immediately trust and do
business with the latter, particularly when it involved a huge quantity of shabu.
(2) The meeting place chosen, Doa Soledad Street, was very risky for a drug-dealer because it is a very busy
street where people could easily observe and report to the police the exchange ofshabu for money and the
counting of money.
(3) The NARCOM agents did not take certain measures in the conduct of the buy-bust operation, namely: (a)
the buy-bust operation was not entered in NARCOMs blotter to prove that such plan exists; (b) there was no
documentary proof that the informant and the poseur-buyer transacted with him through his mobile phone; (c)
and despite the fact that the NARCOM agents had ample time to prepare for the operation, the buy-bust
money was not treated with ultra-violet powder, thus, there was no fool-proof evidence of his receipt of the
money.
(4) The NARCOM agents who conducted the buy-bust operation committed material inconsistencies in their
testimonies, particularly on the following: (a) the respective positions of their cars during the operation and
how many vehicles were actually used; and (b) the buy-bust money used.
(5) It was inconsistent with human behavior for him (the appellant) not to count the money at the time of the
exchange since he had no prior transaction with the poseur-buyer and, conversely, for the poseur-buyer to just
touch the package and conclude that it was shabu.
(6) In his Affidavit, PO3 Castaeto stated that the operation in Doa Soledad was planned on December 7,
1994, however, in his testimony in court, he claimed that the meeting place and time was only set on
December 8, 1994.
(7) He was not alone during the arrest, thus negating the NARCOM agents claim that he was dealing drugs at
that time.
The factual issues raised by the appellant would not exculpate him.
At the outset, bare denials cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the
appellant as the person who was in possession of, and who delivered themethamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) to the poseur-buyer.[42] The prosecution witnesses, namely, PO3 Castaeto and PO3 Galos, testified
that the Narcotics Command in Camp Ricardo Papa in Taguig received a report from an informant that the
appellant was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu. Acting on the said tip, PO3 Castaeto was designated by
P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag to lead the buy-bust operation team against the appellant. With the informants help,
PO3 Castaeto negotiated with the appellant the possible purchase of 250 grams
of shabu for P250,000.00. The next day, PO3 Castaeto called the appellant to confirm if their transaction
would push through and the latter agreed to deliver the subject 250 grams of shabu. The appellant set their
meeting place and time. As PO3 Castaeto did not know the appellant before the buy-bust operation, the
informant accompanied him to the meeting place. The informant identified the red Nissan Sentra sedan driven
by the appellant. It parked right in front of their car. The informant and PO3 Castaeto approached the
appellant, had a brief conversation with the latter and, upon his request, showed him the money. The appellant
gave the package containing the shabu to PO3 Castaeto upon receiving the boodle money. The sale of
the shabu was consummated. PO3 Castaeto then gave the pre-arranged signal by waiving his left hand to
the other members of the buy-bust team who immediately apprehended the appellant. Clearly, the appellant
was arrested by virtue of a valid buy-bust operation.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons in the
execution of their criminal plan. The operation is sanctioned by law and has consistently proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. [43]
We reject the frame-up theory of the appellant. It is incredible. The appellant did not offer any satisfactory
explanation on why the NARCOM agents would single him out from among the many vehicles that
passed via Doa Soledad and Russia Streets on that particular day just to frame him up and extort money
from him. The records show that there was no prior surveillance conducted against the appellant. No
evidence was presented if the NARCOM agents knew before his arrest that he could give a huge sum of
money for the agents alleged extortion activity. What was established was that PO3 Castaeto became
aware of the appellants illegal trade only a day before the buy-bust operation. In fact, the informant had to
introduce first PO3 Castaeto to the appellant before the said poseur-buyer managed to negotiate

the shabu deal with him. Even the appellant admitted that he did not know the NARCOM agents prior to his
arrest. There was, therefore, no motive for them to frame him up. Without proof of motive to falsely impute
such a serious crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the appellants claim of having
been framed.[44]
Even the claim that the appellant went to Better Living Subdivision in Paraaque to return the Sega tapes to
his friend, Boyet, is unbelievable. In these times of electronic gizmos, the appellant would like us to believe
that his brother, Melchor, came all the way from his house in Tondo just to tell him that Boyet, whose house
was just a few minutes away from the appellants, would like to have his Sega tapes back. Although the
appellant denied that he owned a mobile phone or a phone landline in his house, he admitted he has a
pager. Inexplicably, Boyet opted to contact Melchor to relay the message to the appellant instead of just
relaying it straight to the latter. The same holds true for Melchor, assuming that he did go to the appellants
house.
We note, too, that despite the claim that Melchor was also in the car during the buy-bust operation, Melchor
was inexplicably not charged in court along with his brother, the appellant. More perplexing is the allegation
that the NARCOM agents would also take the appellants 4-year old son in Camp Papa while the latter was
under investigation and, after they had searched his house, the NARCOM agents again took the child to Camp
Papa and not leave the child with his mother. To be sure, the appellants scenario was so contrived that it
goes against standard human behavior and experience.
As shown in the records, the prosecution has established with moral certainty all the elements necessary in
every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, namely, (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration, and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The use of dusted
money is not indispensable to prove the illegal sale of shabu. In fact,the absence of marked money does not
create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided that the prosecution has adequately proved the
sale.[45] Moreover, the fact that the appellant did not count the money first when he gave the shabu to PO3
Castaeto does not necessarily mean that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The NARCOM agent
explained that after showing the boodle money with the genuine P500 bills to the appellant, the latter was
satisfied that he readily gave the package of shabu to the former. The trial court correctly believed the
NARCOM agent. We are convinced that what actually took place during the operation was, in street parlance,
a kaliwaan. There was nothing unusual about how the said transaction was consummated. It was done
hurriedlythe giving of the shabu upon receipt of the moneyprecisely because the place of the exchange
was a busy street and it would arouse the suspicion of bystanders and passersby if the appellant would be
seen counting a huge sum of money.
For his exculpation, the appellant also points out that it was only in the morning of December 8, 1994 when
PO3 Castaeto got the information on the price of the shabu and the place and time of the delivery. Thus, it
was allegedly incredible that P/Sr. Insp. Mabanag could already organize the buy-bust team on December 7,
1994 and give details about the operation to be held in Doa Soledad on December 8, 1994. The appellant
also focuses on certain inconsistencies in the sketches [46] drawn by PO3 Castaeto and PO3 Galos as to
where they parked their respective cars and how many were used during the operation.
The appellant fails to persuade us. The records show that the December 8 conversation between the
appellant and PO3 Castaeto was just a confirmation of their agreement regarding the sale of
the shabu. Prior to that, the confidential informant had been talking to PO3 Castaetos superior officer, P/Sr.
Insp. Mabanag, regarding the illegal trade of the appellant and, on account of such report and the initial
negotiations between the appellant and PO3 Castaeto, the buy-bust team was formed and briefed
accordingly.[47]
As for the locations of the vehicles used by the NARCOM agents when it parked along Doa Soledad Street,
such is a trivial matter that would not affect the their credibility. Such a minor inconsistency strengthens, rather
than weakens, the credibility of the witnesses as it erases any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[48] We
deemed it more important that the prosecution witnesses testimonies tallied on material points.
The appellant also cannot assail the validity of his arrest on account of the absence of a warrant. He was
caught in flagrante delicto[49] selling shabu.[50] There was, therefore, no need for a warrant to effect his arrest
pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. [51] Said section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawfulA peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to
quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[52]Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless
arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to
arraignment without objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding
warrant of arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the defect of that detention. [53]
Next, the appellant claims that the search conducted in his house was unlawful. He also laments that the
NARCOM agents robbed him of his personal properties during the search and they received money from his
relatives after his arrest. This Court need not tarry on the validity of the said search for the appellant
consented to the search. He admitted that he voluntarily accompanied the policemen to his house. [54] As for
the charges of robbery and extortion, as in the alleged unlawful search made in his house, those incidents
transpired after his arrest. Whether true or not, his liability for the unlawful sale of shabu remains.
As we have earlier stated, the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice
of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a
defense that has been viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be concocted, hence, commonly used
as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We
realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-being of
society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemens alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance
this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed exists.[55]
The third and fourth issues need not be discussed at length as the same were already passed upon by this
Court when it denied the appellants Motion for New Trial for lack of merit. [56] We reiterate that the trial court did
not err in denying the motion for new trial. Section 14, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 14. Motion for new trial.At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and
before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense, the motion to conform to the
provisions of Section 4, Rule 121.
A motion for new trial must be based on newly discovered evidence, [57] that is, the following must concur:
(a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching and of such weight that, if admitted, could probably change the
judgment. As aptly stated by the trial court, the testimony of the witness sought to be presented would serve
only as impeaching and corroborative evidence. A new trial is justifiably denied where only impeaching
evidence is sought to be introduced as the court had already passed upon the issue of credibility at the trial
and where only corroborative evidence is to be offered as it would not change the result of the case. [58]
The fifth issue refers to the correctness of the death penalty imposed against the appellant. To avoid any
injustice, we re-read the voluminous records of the case. We find that the records support the findings of the
trial court.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides:
Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport
or distribute any regulated drug.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 was amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659. It now provides as
follows:

xxx

Caloocan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery after posing as customers and armed with
unlicensed handguns entered Sabungan Fastfood & Videoke and once inside, without any provocation from
anyone suddenly, unexpectedly and in totally senseless and surprising act or rampage attacked, assaulted
and shot five (5) customers, namely: Benjamin E. Valdez, Rodolfo O. Ortega, Augusto A. Billodo, Ruperto S.
San Juan and Renato T. Cleofas, Sr., thereby hitting and mortally wounding the said five (5) persons causing
their instantaneous death."3

xxx

In Criminal Case No. 57209 -"That on or about 1:00 to 3:00 A.M. or thereabout, on July 28, 1999 in Caloocan
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused had in their
possession, custody and control the following firearms/handguns loaded with ammunitions to wit:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime.The
penalties for offenses under xxx Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx
3.

xxx
200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

xxx

xxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
It was established that the appellant sold 250.70 grams of shabu. The crime, according to the Information,
was committed with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. [59] It has been established that the
appellant used a car in going to their meeting place and to transport the subject substance thus facilitating the
commission of the crime.[60] There was no mitigating circumstance. Applying Section 15 in relation to Section
20 of R.A. No. 7659 and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 should be imposed upon the appellant. Considering the quantity of
the shabu involved in the case at bar, the fine of P1,000,000.00 is reduced to P500,000.00.[61]

a. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-760006;

b. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-51 900;
c. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-51952;
d. One (1) Cal. 38 Squires Bingham SN-1095906;
e. One (1) Pistol 9mm Noringco SN-861406966;
f. Fifty-two (52) pcs. Cal. 38 live ammunitions;

Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed accordingly.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque (Branch 258) in Criminal Case No.
95-0973, sentencing appellant Baltazar Bongalon y Mateos to death for violating Section 15, Article III of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED, with modification that the fine imposed shall be reduced
to P500,000.00. Costs against the appellant.
Pursuant to Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this
Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 141943-45

November 13 ,2002]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DIOSDADO RECEPCION Y PALASO (deceased), FELIPE DELA CRUZ Y REYES,
AUDIE DONA Y BINAN, ALFREDO BARACAS Y CONCEPCION, EDUARDO PALACPAC Y ROSALES,
BERNARDO RANARA Y MORATALLA (at large),
JOEMARI DELOS REYES Y CONCEPCION,
DOMINADOR RECEPCION Y PALASO and ROBERT ALFONSO Y MARTIZANO, appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Five innocent men met their sudden death at a not-so-forlorn corner of Caloocan City when a group of
malefactors, without apparent provocation or reason, had cast their terror on the early morning of 28 July
1999.
Eight1 persons were charged with multiple murder, violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, 2 and
robbery in band in three separate accusatory Informations that read:
In Criminal Case No. 57208
"That on or about 1:15 oclock a.m. of July 28, 1999 in

g. Twenty eight (28) pcs. 9 MM live ammunitions;

h. Eight (8) pcs. Cal. 38 empty shells,
"without the necessary license or authority as required by law and which firearms were used in the
commission of multiple murder (killing of five persons, namely: Benjamin E. Valdez, Rodolfo D. Ortega,
Augusto A. Billodo, Ruperto S. San Juan and Renato T. Cleofas, Sr. at Sabungan Fastfood & Videoke, which
is within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court)." 4
In Criminal Case No. 57210
"That on or about 1:15 A.M. on July 28, 1999 in Caloocan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above-named accused, acting in concert, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent of gain, by means of force, threats, violence or intimidation, and immediately after
accused totally unprovoked and unexpected shooting rampage, which resulted in the death of several
customers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of their unlicensed firearm,
forcibly and violently take, divest, and carry away from LENY GATICA, FREDEBERT DADON, DENNIS
SERRANO and RODEL FESARIT, the following cash and personal belongings, namely: a lady bracelet worth
P3,500.00, three (3) men wristwatches worth P7,500.00 and the establishment earnings of P5,000.00, to the
loss, damage and prejudice of the above-named owner/s." 5
The indictees, when arraigned, pled "not guilty" to all the charges. The cases were tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution Marie Flamiano was a waitress at "Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke Pub," located along Samson Road, in
Caloocan City. At about one-thirty on the morning of 28 July 1999, she was attending to customers when
seven men, she identified to be Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo
Ranara, Dominador Recepcion, Robert Alfonso and Audie Dona, entered the pub while one was tailing behind
at the entrance. The men occupied table 12 and ordered beer from waitress Eliza Bautista. A few minutes
later, three men from the group transferred to table 10. Just as Marie was approaching table 13 to get the
microphone from a customer, one of the men stood up and fired his gun at another customer. Marie identified
this gunman to be Alfredo Baracas.
Eliza Bautista, the waitress who served the group, among them Diosdado Recepcion, Robert Alfonso, Audie
Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Joemari delos Reyes and Dominador Recepcion, saw another
man pull out a gun and shot a customer, Rodolfo Ortega, while on his knees. The women later identified the
gunman to be Diosdado Recepcion. Rosalia Juanica, a co-waitress who had meanwhile dashed out and hid at

the nearby "St. Joseph Store," saw Rodolfo Ortega, kneeling with both hands raised in plea, but one of the
men, she likewise identified to be Diosdado Recepcion, fired his gun at pointblank range.
Jojo Paraiso was with his co-security guards having a drinking spree when a group of armed men, started
shooting. Some of the men shouted, "dapa," but Jojos companion, Benjamin Valdez, unfortunately took a
bullet shot before he could get the chance to heed the warning. Jojo identified the person who fired at Valdez
to be Robert Alfonso. He hid under the table and could only watch the men gone berserk. The last of the
gunmen who left the pub, still firing his gun, was Joemari delos Reyes.
Jhosa Reyes, a waitress at the A & E Kitchenette just across the Sabungan, saw the gunmen and their cohorts
scamper away after the shooting incident. She recognized three of the gunmen, Robert Alfonso, Joemari delos
Reyes and Eduardo Palacpac, as being "regular" customers at the A & E Kitchenette. Shortly before the
shooting, Alfonso, delos Reyes, Palacpac and another companion were drinking at the kitchenette but soon
headed towards the alley near the pub.
Found sprawled on the floor, when the shooting finally stopped, were the lifeless bodies of five men - Benjamin
Valdez, Augusto Billodo, Renato Cleofas, Rodolfo Ortega and Ruperto San Juan.
Ruben Labjata, a jeepney driver, was waiting for passengers at Dagohoy Street, Caloocan City, when he
heard gunshots. He was about to leave with only a few passengers when, unexpectedly, three men arrived
and ordered all the passengers to get off the vehicle. The men menacingly pointed their guns at Labjata and
ordered him to drive. Moments later, five more men boarded his jeepney. Three of the men stayed with the
driver at the front seat while the other five sat at the rear. The group directed Labjata to drive towards
Monumento and then to EDSA. After stopping briefly at Petron Station to refuel, the group proceeded to
Quezon City. At a "7-11" convenience store in Tandang Sora, some of the men alighted from the vehicle. More
gunshots were fired. Boarding once again the jeepney, the men told Labjata to go north until they finally
reached, hours later, Paniqui, Tarlac. At Paniqui, the men debated on the drivers fate. After hearing one
suggest that he should be killed ("tumba"), Labjata panicked and begged the group to spare him -"maawa po
kayo, may pamilya po ako." One of the men allowed him to go home with a warning that he should not report
the incident to the police. In open court, he identified the malefactors to be Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas,
Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and
Robert Alfonso.
Conrado Marquez, a tricycle driver, was waiting for passengers along the highway of Paniqui, Tarlac, when he
saw a group of men alight from a dirty jeepney. Four of the men rode in his tricycle, while the other four took
two more tricycles. Marquez brought the group to Brgy. Coral, Ramos, Tarlac.
Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, the Bulacan Police invited Ruben Labjata for questioning. Taken by police
authorities to Tarlac, he pointed to the exact place where the armed men got off from his vehicle. Conrado
Marquez, likewise invited by the police for interrogation, readily informed the police of the place where he
brought the men who hired his tricycle. The police promptly cordoned the area and the group, along with FO1
Felipe dela Cruz, surrendered after several calls by the police. Taken into custody were Felipe dela Cruz,
Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Robert Alfonso,
and Dominador Recepcion. Diosdado Recepcion, then a special agent of the Narcotics Command, was
intercepted at the national highway of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on board a tricycle. At the Tarlac Police Station,
Labjata identified his passengers, namely, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo
Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso.
Diosdado Recepcion, Felipe dela Cruz, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara,
Joemari delos Reyes, Dominador Recepcion, and Roberto Alfonso were charged with multiple murder,
violation of P.D. No. 1866, and robbery in band before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region,
Branch 129, Caloocan City. The incident that occurred at the 7-11 convenience store also spawned several
separate criminal informations (not involved in the instant cases under review).
During the trial, Diosdado Recepcion died in an escape attempt, while accused Bernardo Ranara escaped and
remained at large.
The Version of the Defense
The defense interposed alibi.
According to Dominador Recepcion, he was, at the time of the reported shooting incident, fast asleep at
Greenwoods Subdivision in Cainta, Rizal, where he was a construction worker. His co-workers were Eduardo

Palacpac and Robert Alfonso. On the evening of 27 July 1999, the trio went to Pansi, Paniqui, Tarlac, to help
Dominador Recepcions nephew, Joemari delos Reyes, find a job. It was after one oclock in the afternoon
when Joemari brought them to the house of his cousin FO1 Felipe dela Cruz.
Joemari delos Reyes testified that, on the afternoon of 28 July 1999, he was at home when his uncle
Dominador Recepcion arrived with Robert Alfonso and Eduardo Palacpac. He brought his guests to the house
of Felipe dela Cruz where they partook of beer.
Felipe dela Cruz stated that on 28 July 1999, about one oclock in the afternoon, his father fetched him from a
cousins house. When he arrived home, he was met by Joemari delos Reyes along with the latters
companions, namely, Eduardo Palacpac, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador Recepcion. In the evening of the
same day, about eight oclock, he invited his visitors to join him in attending a wake just a few meters away,
and they stayed there until dawn. The following morning of 29 July 1999, policemen arrived and cordoned his
house. He was arrested together with Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona and Alfredo Baracas. During a series
of questioning at the Caloocan Police Station, dela Cruz insisted that he was attending a wake at the time the
shooting incident occurred in Caloocan City.
Audie Dona said that on 28 July 1999, he and his friend Alfredo Baracas, went to Pansi, Ramos, Tarlac, to visit
his cousin Joemari delos Reyes and to get some fresh fish and vegetables. When he did not find Joemari at
his house, he and Baracas proceeded to the place of dela Cruz where they were invited to join the group of
Felipe dela Cruz, Joemari delos Reyes, Eduardo Palacpac, and Dominador Recepcion in a drinking spree.
Dona and Baracas stayed until nine oclock in the evening when they repaired to the house of Joemari to
spend the night. On 29 July 1999, he and Baracas went back to see dela Cruz but found Joemari still sleeping.
The two dozed off while waiting for Joemari to wake up until they all found themselves surrounded by the
police.
When the trial was over and weighing the evidence before it, the court a quo found the several accused guilty
in Criminal Case No. C-57208 for multiple murder but acquitted them in Criminal Case No. C-57209 for the
charge of illegal possession of firearm and Criminal Case No. 57210 for robbery in band because of
insufficiency of evidence. The trial court adjudged thusly:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the following accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Multiple Murder in Criminal Case No. C-57208, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659:
1. Audie Dona
2. Alfredo Baracas
3. Bernardo Ranara (escaped)
4. Eduardo Palacpac
5. Dominador Recepcion
6. Joemari delos Reyes
7. Robert Alfonso
"Accordingly, the 7 above-named accused shall each serve the penalty of DEATH FIVE (5) TIMES
OVERcorresponding to the 5 victims they murdered.
"By way of civil liabilities, the 7 above-named accused shall jointly and severally pay the following amounts of
money to the following complaining witnesses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency:
1. Divina Ortega a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00
b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
c) Funeral expense - 20,000.00
T O T A L - 170,000.00

2. Virginia Cleofas a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00

b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
c) Funeral expense - 20,000.00
TOTAL - 170,000.00
3. Jocelyn Valdez a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00
b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
c) Funeral expense - 36,000.00
TOTAL - 186,000.00
4. Estella Ablong San Juan a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00
b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
c) Funeral expense - 17,500.00
TOTAL - 167,500.00
5. Heirs of Augusto Billodo a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00
b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
TOTAL - 150,000.00
"or the aggregate amount of P843,500.00.
"Considering that the accused Diosdado Recepcion is now deceased, he is hereby dropped from these cases,
pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Considering also that the accused Bernardo Ranara is now at large after having escaped on November 22,
1999, let an Order of Arrest be issued against him for the service of his sentence in Criminal Case No. C57208 for Multiple Murder.
"As an Accessory to Multiple Murder under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused FOl Felipe dela
Cruz shall serve the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory
penalties under the law and shall pay the costs.
"Criminal Case No. C-57209 for Illegal Possession of Firearms is ordered dismissed, the filing thereof being
unnecessary, pursuant to Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.
"Criminal Case No. C-57210 for Robbery in Band is likewise ordered dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
"The Branch Clerk of this Court shall now issue the corresponding Commitment Order to the Director, Bureau
of Corrections, thru the City Jail Warden of Quezon City.
"Pursuant to Section 22 of Rep. Act 7659, the Branch Clerk shall elevate the complete records of this case to
the Honorable Supreme Court within 20 days but not earlier than 15 days after this promulgation, for automatic
review."6

The capital punishment having been imposed on herein appellants for the crime of multiple murder, the case
was elevated to this Court for automatic review. In their brief, appellants ascribed to the trial court a number of
alleged errors but, by and large, they focused on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and the imposition of
the death penalty.
Appellants argue that the witnesses presented by the prosecution have committed several inconsistencies,
mainly on the identities of the gunmen, said to be well enough to discredit their testimony. The poor lighting
condition of the pub, they claim, could have easily blurred the vision of the witnesses frustrating any clear
identification of the assailants. The defense also belabors the finding of conspiracy and, in general, of their
conviction by the trial court.
In criminal cases, particularly where the capital punishment is imposed, this Court takes a most painstaking
effort to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the convicted accused. Nevertheless, it has long been a standing
rule that the findings on the credibility of witnesses by the trial court are hardly disturbed on appeal. The
appellate court adheres to such deference in view of the vantage that a trial court enjoys in its reception of
testimonial evidence, It is only when there evidently are matters of substance that have been overlooked that
an appellate court would feel justified to ignore the evaluation and assessment made by the trial court on such
evidence. Looking closely at the records, nothing significant is disclosed to warrant a reversal of the rule.
Observe thusly Testimony of Eliza Bautista
"Q Miss Bautista, you said you are a waitress of Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And as such, one of your duties is to serve food, drinks or whatever to your customers?
"A Yes, sir.
"Fiscal Daosos
"Q Did you recall if you reported for work sometime at around 12 to 1:00 oclock midnight at Sabungan
Fastfood on July 28, 1999?
"A Yes, sir. I was there, sir.
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xxx

"Fiscal Daosos
"Q Alright. You said you have 2 customers in the name of San Juan and Ortega. And then, you said also you
pointed to the group of the accused and you said that they were [y]our last customers. Alright, more or less,
what time did [these] new customers or last customers of yours arrived?
"A 1:15 a.m., sir.
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"Q Now, when you saw them entering the Sabungan Restaurant, what if any did you do being a waitress?
"A After they entered together, they ordered 7 beers. So, I served 7 beers and then occupied a table and after
occupying the table, the 3 transferred to another table, sir.
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"Q Lets go back Miss Bautista to your last customers. You said that you served beer to 7 customers and you
said they were your last and in fact, you just pointed them because they are here, is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Interpreter
Witness pointing to the accused.

"Fiscal Daosos

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Alright. How are you so sure that they were the last customers on that early morning of July 28, 1999 at
around 1:20 in the morning?

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xxx

"Court
"A Because I was the one serving them and I was able to talk to them, sir.
Teka, isa-isahin mo. Sige.
"Q Can you recall who among the 7 whom you talked with first?
"Interpreter
"A That one, sir.
"Interpreter

"As witness pointing to Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Audie Dona, Robert Alfonso, Eduardo
Palacpac, Joemari delos Reyes, Dominador Recepcion.

As witness pointing to the person who identified himself as Robert Alfonso when asked.

"Fiscal Daosos

"Fiscal Daosos

"Q Thank you Miss Witness. Alright, Miss Bautista, do you recall if all or anyone of these 7 customers that you
have just identified were old or former customers of Sabungan Restaurant?

"Q Was he also the one who ordered beer from you?
"A Not our former customers, sir."7
"A That one, sir. He was the one who ordered the 7 beers.
Testimony of Marie Flamiano
"Interpreter
"Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
As witness pointing to the person who ordered 7 beers and identified himself as Audie Dona.
xxx

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Ms. Witness, you said you are a waitress at Sabungan Restaurant, how long have you been a waitress
thereat?

"Fiscal Daosos

"A For 7 months, now, sir.

"Q Is there anything unusual that happened?

"Q Do you remember having reported for work on the evening of July 27, 1999?

"Court

"A Yes, sir.

Answer.

"Q And what is your working hours at the Sabungan Restaurant?

"A I did not notice anything unusual when I served beer, sir. Because after I gave them a bottle of beer, after
that they have put their beers on a glass, sir.

"A From 6:00 p.m., sir.

"Q In the evening of July 27, 1999?

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"A 6:00 p.m., sir.

"Q After pouring beer to their glass, what else happened?

"Q Up to what time?
"A Nothing happened, sir. They just sat [there].
"A Up to 2:00 a.m., sir.
"Q Alright. You said that Ortega and San Juan [were] shot dead. Now, would you know or recall who shot
Ortega and San Juan?

"Q In the early morning of July 28, 1999 at about 1:20, do you recall of any unusual incident that occurred in
Sabungan Restaurant?

"A I know who shot Ortega. But I dont know who shot San Juan, sir.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Alright, who shot Ortega?
"Q What was that incident?
"A That man, sir.
"A They shot somebody, sir.
"Interpreter
"Q Who shot somebody?
Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Diosdado Recepcion when asked.
"A They are here in Court, sir.
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"Q Whom did you see shooting somebody at that time?

"Fiscal Daosos
"A Para silang walang awang namaril..
"Q Alright. We go back Miss Witness to the 7 customers that you served beer. Now, [these] 7 customers that
you [said] became your last customer[s] that evening, would you be able to identify or recognize their faces if
you see them again?

"Atty. Ongteco

Your Honor, the answer is irresponsive.

"Q In other words, when you scampered outside, you did not see with particularity the accused shooting the
victim, is that correct?

"Court
"A While I was running, I saw them, they were shooting the victims, sir.
Let it remain, just answer what is being asked of you.
"Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano

"Q You mean to tell me that during the time you were running outside, your head was turning back to where
the accused were situated shooting?

You said that there were persons who shot individuals in Sabungan, how many were they?

"A Yes, sir. (Witness is pointing as to the direction of the door of the restaurant)

"A Seven (7), sir.

"Q With that distance you are pointing to, to the corner of this room, you could have not ascertain[ed] Mr.
Diosdado Recepcion holding a gun and shooting at somebody, is that correct?

"Q Now, if they are here in Court, will you be able to recognize them?

"A I saw him, sir.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Will you point to them if they are here in Court? "Interpreter
Witness is pointing to 7 male persons inside this Courtroom, who when asked their names, answered.
.Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo Ranara, Dominador Recepcion,
Robert Alfonso and Audie Dona.

"Q In fact in your testimony, you cannot identify whether it was a short gun or a long gun?
"A Yes, sir, I could not identify the kind of guns they were using.
"Q Because you became very scared, frightened and nervous that is why you scampered outside?
"A Yes, sir.

"Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano

These 7 persons whom you identified, do you know what particular acts they did at the Sabungan incident?

"Q And also because of that nervousness and fright that you experienced, you are in doubt whether it was
really Diosdado Recepcion whom you saw?

"A They were shooting.

"A I saw him sir. (Siya po).

xxx

"Q That incident on July 28, 1999 was the first time that you saw this person whom you pointed as Diosdado
Recepcion, is that right?

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"Q Aside from the fact that you saw them with guns, what else did you see?
"A I saw the dead person outside, that person was already kneeling and begging for life but they still killed that
person.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q And do you know who shot that person who was already kneeling?

"Q So, how can you be very sure that it was him who was holding a gun and shooting at somebody when you
said that was the first time that you saw him and your distance was quite far and likewise you cannot
determine or ascertain whether he was holding a long gun or short gun?

"A The first person I pointed out in Court.

"A Because I saw them standing, sir.

"Q And you are referring to?

"Q You mean to tell me that aside from Diosdado Recepcion, all the 7 accused were all standing?

"A Diosdado Recepcion, sir."8

"A Yes, sir, they were all standing.

On cross-examination, this witness elaborated:

"Q And you also would like to impress before this Court that all the 7 accused were holding a gun and were all
standing and were all shooting at somebody?

"Q And what could be your basis in pointing to Diosdado Recepcion as well as to accused Alfredo Baracas
and the rest, when you did not see who shot whom?

"A I am not sure but all of them stood up and shot somebody." 9

"A Because I saw them, sir.

Testimony of Jojo Paraiso

"Q How far were you from these two accused that I mentioned during the shooting incident?

"Q Now, on the said date, July 28, 1999 at around 1:30 in the morning, do you still remember your
whereabouts?

"A About 7 to 8 meters, sir.

"Q At that time the shooting incident occurred, what was your duty, if ever?
"A Because it was almost our closing time, I was just sitting, I have nobody to serve.
"Q When these 7 persons entered, were there other customers in the establishment?

"Q Where were you?

"A I was at Sabungan Restaurant, sir.
"Q Accordingly, you were on duty on said date, July 28, 1999. Why were you at Sabungan Fastfood?

"A Yes, sir.

xxx

"A Yes, sir.

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xxx

"A I was already off-duty at that time, sir.

"Q Now, who were with you at Sabungan Restaurant, if any?

"A We were 5, sir.

"A 7, sir.

"Q Please tell us their names or some of them?

"Q And what were [these] non-customers doing inside the Sabungan Restaurant?

"A Our Asst. OIC, Benjamin Valdez, Fisaret, Daniel Aycardo, Jimmy Serrano and myself, sir.

"A They also ordered beer and they also posed as customers, sir.

"Q Would I get from you that all these companions of yours were also security guards?

But they were not able to drink beer and when they ordered they already fired their guns, sir.

"A Yes, sir.

"Fiscal Bajar

"Fiscal Bajar

"Q Now, where were [these] other non-customers who were ordering beers situated inside the Sabungan
Restaurant in relation to where you were seated?

While you and your 4 other companions were inside the Sabungan Restaurant on July 28, 1999 at around
1:30 in the early morning, do you remember any unusual incident that happened inside or outside thereat?

"A They positioned themselves at the center of the videoke machine but at first they were together and then
they ordered, the 3 separated from the group, sir.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q And how far was your table from this table of the non-customers?
"Q But before that, what were you and your other 4 companions doing at the Sabungan Restaurant on the
wee-hours of July 28, 1999?

"A About 3 meters away from our table, sir.

"A We were having a drinking spree, sir.

xxx

"Q What was that unusual incident that happened inside the Sabungan Restaurant?

"Fiscal Bajar

"A A shooting incident suddenly took place and then we dropped ourselves on the ground because of that
shooting incident, sir.

"Q Okay. Now, after the group parted ways and the 3 occupied another table, what happened?

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xxx

"A 3 minutes after, the 3 separated from the group and the shooting started, sir.
"Q But before that shooting incident, do you recall what particular place inside the Sabungan Restaurant were
you seated?

"Q And where did the shooting come from?

"A Yes, sir.

"A From the 3 persons who separated from the group, sir.

"Q Where were you particularly seated?

"Q Why did you say that it came from the 3 persons?

"A Near the side of the Sabungan Fastfood and we were in front of the videoke machine, sir.

"A Because after hearing the first shot, I looked at that direction, sir.

"Q When you said in front you were just very near?

"Q And were you able to see the firearms used in firing the shots?

"A Yes, sir.

"A I saw a light or spark that came out from the nozzle of the gun after I heard the shot, sir.

"Q Now, [was] there any other persons inside the Sabungan Fastfood aside from you and your companions?

"Q And to what direction does the firing directed or pointed to?

"A Yes, sir.

"A To the persons they shot, sir.

"Q How many, if you remember?

"Q Where were [these] persons firing located?

"A We were 9, sir.

"A They were seated because they were also drinking, sir.

"Court

"Q In relation to where you were seated and drinking, where were these persons located?

And aside from the 5 of them?

"A They were at the side of the restaurant and near the table who fired the shots, sir.

"A There were 9 customers in all in that restaurant, sir.

"Q And how many table[s] were [occupied by these] persons and to where the firing was directed?

"Court

"A Only one (1), sir.

"Q Including you or excluding you?

xxx

"A Including me, sir. We were 9 customers.

"Fiscal Bajar

"Fiscal Bajar

"Q Now, how many shots did you hear?

"Q How about the non-customers?

"A Many, sir. And I could not count it, sir.

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"Q And how about you, what did you do when you heard this successive shots from the table of this 3
persons?

"Interpreter
Witness tapped the shoulder of Robert Alfonso.

"A One of them shouted dapa, that is why I hid myself under the table, sir.
xxx

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xxx

"Q Now, how about your other 4 companions, what did they do after you dropped yourself [on] the ground?
"Q Could you recognize anyone of them?
"A The other one who was shot remained seated in front of his table. But my other 3 companions docked on
the table, sir.

"A The one who shot our companions and he was with the 4 persons in that table, sir.

"Q And what happened to that person who was shot? That [lone] person that according to you who was shot?

"Q So, the question is if you have recognized anyone of the persons who remained in the table?

"A He died, sir.

"A Yes, sir. The one who came out last after the shooting, sir. But when he came out he fired a gun.

"Q And after you have yuko, did you notice what happened next?

"Q If that last person you saw was on their way out from the Sabungan Restaurant is in Court, can you point to
him? Please step down and tap the shoulder if he is around?

"A I looked outside, sir. And then I found out that my [companion was] shot and then the one beside him was
shot next, sir.
"Q Now, where did this person who shot your companions come from because, according to you, you were
looking outside?
"A That person who shot my companion was near the table of my other companion that was shot and the
distance of my companion from the one who shot him was only about a meter away, sir.
"Q When you said companion who was shot, you referring to the one who transferred to another table?
"A Yes, sir. Our companion, sir.
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"A Yes, sir. This one, sir.

"Interpreter
As witness stepped down from the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of the accused Joemari Delos
Reyes.
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"Q Now, please demonstrate to us how your companion was shot by Robert Alfonso?
"A Like this, sir. The accused was in the standing position when he fired [at] my companion at a distance of
one (1) meter. And after shooting my companion, that gun man fired again at a man beside my companion, sir.

"Q So, after you saw your companions shot, what did you do, if any?

"Q And what was the position of your companion when he was fired upon?

"A I remained there under the table but sometimes I would look and sometimes I would bow my head.

"A He was seated, sir. -

"Q And to whom were you looking at?

"Q And what was then your position when you saw your companion being shot?

"A To our companions, sir.

"A I was under the table but I was looking at their direction, sir." 10

"Q And do you remember how many times [you performed] that yuko, tingin, yuko, tingin?

On cross-examination, Paraiso continued:

"A Whenever I noticed that they were looking at me, I [would] look down or bow my head, sir.

"Q Mr. Witness, you said that the shooting incident happened at 1:30 in the early morning of July 28, 1999.
What time did you start drinking at the Sabungan Restaurant?

"Court
"A About 12:45 a.m., sir.
What do you mean they?
"Q How many bottles of what were you drinking?
"A The one who [shot] my companions, your Honor.
"A Beer, sir.
"Fiscal Bajar
"Q How many bottles of beer have you already consumed?
"Q And how far was this person who [shot] your companions from you who was looking at him and to the one
who looked at you?
"A About 4 meters, sir.

"A During the shooting incident 2 bottles, sir.

"Q Now, according also to you it was the 3 men who separated from the larger group [who] transferred to
another table?

"Q Now, if that person is in Court, would you be able to identify him?
"A Yes, sir.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And it was after about 15 minutes that one of them started shooting?
"Q Please point to him if he is around? You [tap] his shoulder, if you want?
"A Yes, sir.
"A Yes, sir. This one, sir.
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"Q How did you position yourself when you hid yourself under the table? How did you position yourself? Did
the table completely cover you?

"Q What were they doing when they [went] to your place?
"A They [drank], sir.

"A The table completely covered me, sir.

"Q How many are these persons, if your can remember?
"Q Could you say that you were not shot because you were not seen by the gunman?
"A Yes, sir. I know that they did not notice me there under the table, sir. Maybe if they noticed me that I was
there under the table looking at them, maybe they would shoot me, sir.

"A Because the 3 persons used to go to our place but recently they were 4 already but the other one was not
drinking, sir, just [went] back and forth.

"Q So, we can presume that you were not shot because you were not seen by the gunman?

"Q These customers whom you said were the ones who started shooting at Sabungan, who were these
persons, if you know?

"A Yes, sir.

"A I was able to recognize Ricky, Edwin.

"Q You were not seen because the table was about 3 x 3 ft. Do you mean to tell us Mr. Witness that 3 ft. x 3 ft.
table was able to accommodate all 5 of you?

"Q Who else? I thought you said there were 4 of them. "Court
The question [was], who fired the gun?

"A Yes, sir.

"FISCAL MARIANO
"Q Now, you were also not seen by the gunman because the table was covered by the table cloth?
"Q Who were these persons who fired the gun?
"A No cover, sir.
"Court
"Q You felt that at that time that you present yourself under the table was not detected by the gunman because
none of them noticed you under the table?
"A I know that I was [not] noticed by them, sir. Because they have noticed me under the table and they know
that I was looking at them, they will shoot me, sir." 11
Testimony of Jhosa Reyes

Ricky, Edwin, sino pa?

"Witness
Those are the only two but almost all of them, Your Honor.
"Fiscal Mariano

"Q In the early morning of July 28, 1999, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened at your
place of work?

If they are in Courtroom, will you be able to identify them?

"A Yes, sir.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q What was that incident, if you can still recall?

"Q Please point them out.

"A There was a shooting incident, sir.

"Atty. Ongteco

"Q Where was that shooting incident?

May we request that the witness tell the Court who is Ricky, Edwin?

"A In Sabungan, sir, in front of the place where I work.

"Court

"Q How far is that Sabungan from your place of work?

Unahin si Ricky. Tumayo ang itinuro.

"A Across the highway, sir.

"Mr. dela Cruz

"Q Do you know who were the persons who fired their guns at Sabungan?

Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Robert Alfonso.

"A Yes, sir.

"Court

"Q Why do you know these persons?

Sino pa? Iyong bumaril, ha?

"A Because the persons who fired their guns were our customers first before they transferred to Sabungan, sir.

"Mr. dela Cruz

"Q How often do you see these persons at your dining place?

Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name answered to the name of Joemari delos Reyes.

"A Twice, sir.

"Court

"Q When was the first time that you saw them?

Sino pa?

"A Every week, sir.

"Mr. dela Cruz

Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his name answered to the name of Eduardo Palacpac." 12

Testimony of Ruben Labiata

"Witness

"Q Mr. Labjata, will you tell this Honorable Court where were you in the early morning of July 28, 1999?

When they told me to start the jeep, there were some persons who boarded the jeep, sir.

"A I was in Dagohoy with my jeepney waiting for passengers, sir.

"Fiscal Daosos

"Q More or less, what time was that when you were with your jeep and waiting for passengers?

"Q Can you also tell the Honorable Court briefly what was the condition of this other group who also boarded?

"A Between twelve and one a.m., sir.

"A They were also holding guns, sir.

"Q Do you recall, Mr. Labjata, of any unusual incident that occurred while waiting for passengers inside your
jeepney?

"Q More or less, how many of them, the one[s] that boarded again?
"A When I start[ed] the engine or already driving the jeep I saw 8, sir.

"A While my jeep was parked there, I heard gunshots, sir.

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xxx

"Q What else, if any, happened?

"Fiscal Daosos
"A I was about to leave then and I have already passengers when some people suddenly arrived, sir.
"Q When you were ordered to go, what did you do, if any?
xxx

xxx

xxx
"A I drove the jeep and then we made a turn near the Monumento Circle and proceeded to Edsa, sir.

"Q Did you, if you did notice if the 3 men who ordered immediately to let your passengers get off the jeep, if
they were armed?

"Q While you were proceeding to Edsa, did you notice anything unusual again?
"A Yes, sir, I noticed something unusual because while they were conversing to each other, I heard somebody
said that hindi ako ang bumaril.

"Atty. Ongteco
The same objection.

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"Court
"Q From Petron Gas Station after you have gassed up, where did you go, if you went somewhere else?
Same ruling, you are practically telling the witness that they were armed.
"A We proceeded to the highway and then when we were already far from Petron, we made a left turn, sir.
"Fiscal Daosos
"Q In what direction was this left [turn] going towards?
"Q Alright, while the 3 ordered you, did you notice anything, if you did any?
"A I am not familiar with that route, sir.
"A They were armed with guns, sir.
"Q By the way, who among the group ordered you to what direction you [were] going to?
"Q What kind of guns, are they long arms or short arms?
"A The one on my left side, sir.
"A Short arms, sir.
"Q At that point of time, did the group tell you where you [were] going?
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xxx
"A I do not know where to go but they ordered me and I followed them.

"Q Other than the 3 were there other persons who boarded your jeep?
"Atty. Ongteco

"Q Now, as a jeepney driver from Bulacan, can you tell the Honorable Court to what direction or route you
were going?

Same objection.

"A After making a left turn, we passed by a 711 store, sir.

"Court

xxx

I will allow that.

"Q While you were driving your jeep from Caloocan City to Tarlac, was there a time whether one of the group
told you what to do?

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xxx

"Atty. Ongteco
"A Yes, sir. They poked a gun at me and told me to follow them whatever they wanted me to do, sir.
But that is the same banana because according to the witness, the 3 persons ordered the other passengers of
the jeep to alight.
"Court
That was ordering the passengers to alight. The question now is, were there other persons who boarded your
jeep. I will allow that. Answer that.

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xxx

xxx

"Q While you were so scared because you were ordered and you realized that you reached Paniqui, was there
at any moment while driving your jeep that you [felt] that you might be killed by this armed men?
"Atty. Ongteco

Leading.

"Q More or less, what time was that already?

"Fiscal Daosos

"A About past eight in the morning, sir.

I am asking for his feelings.

"Q You said that at around past eight, you saw the group again who commandeered your jeep. How did you
know that they were the same persons who commandeered your jeep that early morning of July 28, 1999?

"Court
"A Because I was able to recognize the faces of the others, sir.
Did you ever feel that you might be killed? I will allow it.

Because when we arrived [at] Tarlac, I heard one of them said tumba.

"Q Mr. Witness, if you can see the faces of this group of persons who commandeered your jeep and who
threatened to kill you and who ordered you to stop at Paniqui, Tarlac, and which you saw again the following
day in the morning at Paniqui, Tarlac, would you be able to recognize their faces again if you will see these
people?

xxx

"A Yes, sir.

"Witness

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"Court
What did you do after hearing tumba? Witness may answer.

"Q Now, will you please stand, Mr. Witness, and look around this courtroom and then point to the faces of
those people whom you said commandeered your jeep in that early morning?
"Mr. Nestor dela Cruz

"Witness
I told them, Sir, maawa naman po kayo.

The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Audie Dona.
"Fiscal Daosos

"Fiscal Daosos
"Q To whom did you address your words?
"A I just said, Maawa naman po kayo, huwag ninyo po akong itumba because, I have a family.
"Q After you told the group of the accused that, Sir, huwag naman ninyo akong itumba, what else transpired?
"A One of them said, in behalf of your family, bubuhayin ka namin for the sake of your family. (Alang-alang sa
pamilya mo).

Who else?
"Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Alfredo Baracas.
"Fiscal Daosos
Who else?

"Q What else, if any, after one of them told you that for the sake of your family, we will not kill you.

"Mr. dela Cruz

"A They told me that after reaching Tarlac, I will return back and without turning my head and do not report to
the police or else they will shoot me.

The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Diosdado Recepcion.

"Q So, after you received those orders, what did you do, if any?
"A When they alighted from the jeep, I did not look at them. Once they alighted, I proceeded or went back to
Bulacan, sir.
"Q You said that after hearing their orders and reaching Paniqui, Tarlac, they went down. They alighted. Did all
of them alight at the same time?

"Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
"Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Bernardo Ranara.
"Fiscal Daosos

"A They alighted one after the other, sir.

Who else?
"Q After they have alighted, what else if any transpired?
"Mr. dela Cruz
"A I left at a place where they alighted and then I went back to Bulacan, sir.
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Eduardo Palacpac.
xxx

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xxx
"Fiscal Daosos

"Q When did you see them again?

Who else?
"A After they were arrested from their hideout, sir.
"Mr. dela Cruz
"Q Where exactly did you meet them at Paniqui, Tarlac?
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Dominador Recepcion.
"A At the Municipal Hall of Paniqui, Tarlac, sir.
"Fiscal Daosos

Who else?
"Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Joemari delos Reyes.

The trial court has convicted FOl Felipe dela Cruz as an accessory. This Court, however, finds no evidence to
convict him as such accessory. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the actual knowledge of the
commission of the crime is an important element to being an encubridor, and the records are bereft of sound
proof that dela Cruz has had knowledge of any or all of the nefarious deeds earlier committed by his guests.

"Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
"Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of his name, answered to the name of Robert Alfonso."

accusatory information and shown in evidence that the crimes were indeed perpetrated with the use of
unlicensed firearms. Pursuant to Republic Act 8294 22 (amending Presidential Decree No. 1866), which was
already in effect when the killing spree occurred, if "homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance."

13

The eyewitnesses categorically identified the malefactors. The alleged discrepancies in the testimony of the
witnesses could easily be explained by the fact that they saw the incident from different angles of the shooting.
The impact of events, as well as the unconscious working of the mind, it is said, could readily warp the human
perception in varying ways and degrees. Empiric data is yet to be found in order to accurately measure the
value of testimony of a witness other than its conformity to human behavior and the common experience of
mankind.14
The defense of alibi proffered by appellants is much too weak against the positive identification made by the
eyewitnesses. It is not enough for an alibi to prosper to prove that the person raising it has been somewhere
else when the crime is committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that it would have been physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 15 Where there is the least chance to be present at the locus
criminis, alibi will not hold much water.16 The bare evidence given by appellants to vouch their individual claims
and establish alibi is far from being iron-clad against the possibility of their having been at the crime scene.
17

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, makes a person guilty
of murder if the killing is attended by, among other circumstances (but not here appurtenant), treachery or
evident premeditation. An essence of treachery is not only the swiftness and the surprise in the attack upon an
unsuspecting victim but also the attendance of two concurring conditions, i.e., that the malefactor must have
employed means, method or manner of execution that would insure his safety from the retaliatory act of the
victim, and such means, method or form of execution are consciously and deliberately adopted by the
malefactor. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, on the other hand, requires that the
execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 18 Evident premeditation needs
proof of the time when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of the accused, the motive
which gives rise to it, and the means which are beforehand selected to carry out that intent. All such facts and
antecedents which make notorious the pre-existing design to accomplish the criminal purpose must be proven
to the satisfaction of the court.19
A scrutiny of the facts in evidence would indicate a scanty showing of the requirements to qualify the
senseless killing of the five victims, either by treachery or by evident premeditation, to murder. While the attack
upon the victims could be described as being unexpected, somehow voiding any risk to the perpetrators
thereof, there, is, however, insufficient evidence to indicate that the means adopted by the appellants have
consciously been adopted. Mere suddenness of the attack is not enough to show treachery; it should also be
shown that the mode of attack has knowingly been intended to accomplish the wicked intent. 20 Neither would
evident premeditation qualify the offense to murder in the absence of clear substantiation that the appellants
have definitely resolved to commit the offense and have reflected on the means to bring about the execution
following an appreciable length of time.
The trial court, however, correctly appreciated conspiracy. The presence of conspiracy could be revealed by
the acts done before, during and after the commission of the crime that made evident a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. 21 The several acts of appellants during and after the shooting
rampage disclosed a unison of objectives. Not one tried to stop the other in the perpetration of the crime. All
were clearly in it together, performing specific acts with such closeness and coordination as would
unmistakably show a common scheme. The attendance of treachery would thus render it unnecessary for the
prosecution to show who among the conspirators actually hit and killed their victims, each of them being
equally liable with the other in the perpetration of the crime.
Without proof of any circumstance that would qualify it, the killing could not amount to murder. Appellants
should thus be held liable only for homicide for the death of each of the victims. It was alleged in the

The arrest of appellants has been made in "hot pursuit," an exception from the rule that warrantless arrests
are illegal. In any event, appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their arrest since such a claim has not
been brought up before or during the arraignment. The failure to timely move for the quashal of the Information
on this basis operates as a waiver of the right to question the supposed irregularity of the arrest. 23
The crime of homicide is punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal with a
duration of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants may be
held to suffer imprisonment, as minimum, of anywhere within the full range of prision mayor of from 6 years
and 1 day to 12 years and, as maximum, to anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of "use of an unlicensed firearm," of from
14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
The damages awarded by the trial court accord with prevailing jurisprudence except for the grant of
P100,000.00 moral damages to the heirs of each of the victims which amount should be reduced to
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo convicting appellants is AFFIRMED subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
Appellants Dominador Recepcion, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara,
Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso are all hereby found guilty of homicide, on five counts, and each of
them shall suffer five imprisonment terms, each for the death of their five victims, of the indeterminate penalty
of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, as maximum, and shall pay, jointly and severally, the sums adjudged by the trial court except
that the P100,000.00 moral damages to each victim is reduced, correspondingly, to P50,000.00.
Appellant Felipe dela Cruz is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO, AccusedAppellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE; RULE. The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no
person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by
virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation
of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw
virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN EXCEPTION. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence
in plain view. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion
to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had
probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance
as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to
search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since
there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of
said search is admissible againstAccused-Appellant.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt.
Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above
the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually
happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts,
they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.
The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result, which We do not find in the instant case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR. As to the alleged
discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which contained the
marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit
tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecutions case since it was shown by the
Receipt of Property Seized, which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken
from her at the time of her arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE; RULE; SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION; REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE;
NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the
accused on the basis alone of an information they received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly
hair, and 52" or 53" in height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately
made on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female,
and whether or not their physical appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the
alleged information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a
perplexing thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who

appeared to answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana. Moreover, the accused
was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they allegedly found
the marijuana. From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only
fishing for evidence when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused.
They had no probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana
alluded to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal
effects of herein accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable
cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless
search was inadmissible in evidence.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received
information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair,
and with a height of 52" or 53", would be transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this piece of
information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent
proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 oclock that same
morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from
the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board. 2
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and
body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and
thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were
going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began
inspecting the bags in the front. 3
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the
driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas
inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The
bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the
NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman was then identified
as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found
positive for marijuana. 6
Accused-appellants defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and
selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at
Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria
Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for
her sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same and
began inspecting the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the
marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning the
bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with them

for investigation as she fits the description of the would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM
informer. She denied having anything to do with the marijuana found on the bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library
To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor
Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a
bag from the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the passengers who
among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the time looking at
the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated at the rear of
the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus. 7
During Yangkins cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan
were brought by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa Station
in Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not seek out the
alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also testified that none of the passengers approached him and
offered to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to accused-appellants testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a
quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he gave all the requisite details of
the entrapment operation they conducted based on an information provided by a coordinating individual. His
testimony reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of the accused. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the carrying out of his
official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 495)."
9
The trial court brushed aside the defenses observation that there were discrepancies between the testimony
of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from accusedappellant and the kind of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the
defenses contention that the evidence against accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of Property Seized 10
and her signature thereon, 11 and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and her signature thereon, 13 were
inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, since these were not confessions or extra-judicial statements.
Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of accused-appellant and her witness Nestor
Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana from accusedappellants lap. Moreover, the court a quo observed that there was a discrepancy between the testimonies of
accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that
the former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the marijuana leaves found in the bag taken
from her was inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion was denied
by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging that the court a quo erred (1) in not finding the
warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in admitting the
illegally obtained evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected
to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant
or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 14 The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right
shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,
15 and the seizure of evidence in plain view. 16
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. 17
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the
north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant
that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up
north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course
of said search is admissible against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility of the
evidence against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a
waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained therefrom.
19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence. 20
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing
the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above
the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually
happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts,
they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial.
21 The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, 22 which We do not find in the instant case.
Moreover, Accused-appellants defense was weakened by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin
contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at the
time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its fare,
but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a
man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one on the
bus offered to pay for the same.cralawnad
In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must generally be given to the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the denials of the Accused-Appellant. 23
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of Nestor
Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellants reason for
being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers, then the
only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio City to sell the marijuana found in her
possession.

of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.

As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which
contained the marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or
marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecutions case since it was
shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very
items taken from her at the time of her arrest.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where
they allegedly found the marijuana.
From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for
evidence when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused. They had no
probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the
information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal effects of herein
accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause and therefore,
null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in
evidence.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Melo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Although there is a similarity in the factual circumstances of the case at bar with those of the Malmstedt case
(GR No. 91107, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 101) where the Court upheld the validity of the warrantless search,
however, in the present case, I am of the view that the information alone received by the NARCOM agents,
without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the accused, did not give rise to a probable cause
justifying the warrantless search made on the bag of the accused.
In the Malmstedt case, it will be recalled that no extensive search was immediately made of the Personal
effects of the accused. It was only after the NARCOM agents noticed a bulge on the waist of the accused
(causing them to suspect that he was carrying a gun) and only after he failed or refused to present his
passport when required to do so, that a warrantless search was made of the personal effects of the accused.
In other words, the information received by the NARCOM agents that a certain Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying prohibited drugs together with the suspicious failure or refusal of the
accused to present his passport, supplied the probable cause that reasonably led the NARCOM agents to
believe that the said accused was then and there committing a crime. Thus
"Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because
of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee."cralaw virtua1aw library
x

"The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led
the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with
hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accuseds own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to
present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." (198 SCRA 401).
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an information
they received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 52" or 53" in height would be
transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers
of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their physical
appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the alleged information. If there really
was such an information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to
search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to answer the description

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN
ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS
COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow
block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If
they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT
TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful
because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to
be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S.
143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual
being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all
unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. There is no
merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated
with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on
the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a

mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it.
That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for
when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was
proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a
hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in
giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.

she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly
seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue,
papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)

4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. The Solicitor General correctly
pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace
should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a
report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital
where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The
cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman
Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas
where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and
two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw
the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.

DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which
found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No.
10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum,
and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his
preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The
Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justification, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil
with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with Murder
in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) others who are
still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed
with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the
said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3,
Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with
Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the
appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house
on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the
same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo
Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit
him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the
victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of
the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig
against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two
cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of
Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution;
and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence
of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of
his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were
seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him

to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after
he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated
by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid
arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

"(1)

One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;

"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with
ammunitions;
"(3)

One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and

"(4)

Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver." [1]

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 [2] thru the following
Information:[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120
with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and
eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the same.

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's
Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person,
or within his immediate control may be seized."

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and
cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the
fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.

After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner
of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".[11] Petitioner filed his
notice of appeal on April 28, 1994.[12] Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, [13] the SolicitorGeneral, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to
cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent
court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, [14] the dispositive portion of which reads:

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on
the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two coconspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes,
that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they
attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in
People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity awarded
to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but granted his application for bail.[6] During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, [7] upon advice
of counsel,[8] to make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the
case.[10]

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and
furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance
Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City,
is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be
immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED."[15]
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. [16] On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" [17] but the same was denied by respondent court in its
September 20, 1995 Resolution,[18] copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The
next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review oncertiorari with application for
bail[19] followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, [20] a "second supplemental
petition"[21] and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again, the SolicitorGeneral[22] sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated
on July 31, 1996.[23] The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on
the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply.[24] However, after his vigorous resistance and
success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of
petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete
turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal. [25]

FRANCISCO, J.:

The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence by
respondent court, is as follows:[26]

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner
Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:

"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez
were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the

heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 56, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi
Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis na, mumuran pa
naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7,ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the
restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a
vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p.
8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been
right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder
of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the
Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio
controller of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the
call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north (p.
11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11,ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and
chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as
PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p.
34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run
accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second
radio call flashed the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p.
20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake
Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and
SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves
near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid).
It took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p.
9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7
of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN,
March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO
Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with
plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident, even
passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo
church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the
car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew
Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No.
3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23,
1993). He approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon
learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came
from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured
in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15,
1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and
he followed it (p. 15,ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February
23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers
boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept
the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda
went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12,ibid). The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C.
Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that
moment, Borja noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p.
14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was wearing a short

leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun
(Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt
protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand
alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun
really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming
appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p.
17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the
gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2
Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO
Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p.
13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing
and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead,
played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand
saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed
a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw
this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a
rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his
vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle(Exhibit
D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semiautomatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered
angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32,ibid)
where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in
its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also
voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short
magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the
Traffic Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City
Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio
(pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating
that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum
receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino,
PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The
Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP
131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued
by Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla
(p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he
is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject
firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records[27]of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime
charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant
was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge
illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: [28]
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, [44]are as follows:
1.
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
2.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]

(a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.
[29]
Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It
must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense,
but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." [30] As testified
to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle
in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda
already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.[31]

(b).

the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c).

the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d).

"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [48]

4.

consented warrantless search, and

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. [32] We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek
the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who ,
in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to
contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that
the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and
unsolved crimes.

5.

customs search.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which
has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need
to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, [34] a fleeing suspect, a moving
vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and
delay improvident.[35] The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
than mere "reasonable and articulable"suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again
actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the
presence of a peace officer.[37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he
had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the
Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching
Pajero of petitioner,[38] its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood
and railings thereof.[39] These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the
arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. [40]
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea.[41] Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his
failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him
in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42] Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
irregularities and defects.[43]
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility
in evidence of which, we uphold.

3.
search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. [50]

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. [51] The seizure of the Smith & Wesson
revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. [52] Thus it has been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing
their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti."[53]
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even
without a warrant."[54]
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police.[55] This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the
alleged search and seizure[56], and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.[57]
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities
on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified
under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police
may undertake a protective search[58] of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle [59] which are
within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. [60] This satisfied the two-tiered test
of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of
immediate control[61]and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. [62] The products of that search
are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving
vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as
in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.[63]
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because
he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as
evidenced by a Mission Order[64] and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the
deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of
the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess.[65] The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions[66] were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered
in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the
prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of
the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order
were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles
City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were
prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority to possess and carry
the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any proper document
showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have
produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial
presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged
against him. Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the
subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no allegation of a
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James Neneng to whom a
subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court
but was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found
Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January 13, 1994." [67]
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt
if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the
subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential Security
Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their
irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab
the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself
from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the
Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement units/personnels such as
PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without
resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will be carried out
through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this
Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such violation."[68]
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the
dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his behalf.
[69]
His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." [70] In addition, only Unit
Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts
under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.[71] PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued
petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but
a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 112-Baguio City,"[72] areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval "by

next higher Headquarters" [73] which is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently
provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding certification from
the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been
officially taken up in that units property book, and that report of such action has been reported to higher
AFP authority."
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present the
corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP,
does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of
the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel. [74] The
implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms outside
residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the
agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project
proposal or special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and
that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major
services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of command." [75]
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents
included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving
regular compensation for the service they are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is accentuated
all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and
Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in
the name of the petitioner.[76] Thus:
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm pistol, Smith
and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked whether it is registered or
not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm
with the same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one
Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith
and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of the accused in
this case?
"A. Yes, sir.[77]
xxx

xxx

And the certification which provides as follows:

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

xxx

FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE

temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a
penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

Camp Crame, Quezon City

"PNPFEO5

28 November 1992
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of
Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per verification from
available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y, licensed/registered to one
Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch"

[78]

In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm.
[79]
In People vs. Tobias,[80] we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no
license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess
was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed with in the light of
the evidence[81] that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated
firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, [82] as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no
doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to
depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by
the Court with respect and finality.[83]
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience
(sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous
laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer
exists.[84] He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of
firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. [85]
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to
apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones. [86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it
stands.[87] And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the
previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges fromreclusion

"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' " [88]
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of
the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment,
though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.[89]
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of
the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication,[90] as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld
twice by this Court.[91] Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . ." [92] Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of
the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret
and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the
same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian[93] where the Court en banc provided that the
indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following explanation by the Court:
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In accordance
with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon,[94] although Presidential Decree No.
1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said
Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty
for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said
Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not merely
imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate
sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in
degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.[95]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by
the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT
that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. Nos. 113511-12. July 11, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO SINOC, y SUMAYLO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In a decision handed down on October 7, 1993 by Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Danilo Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two cases jointly tried: [1]one, of the special complex
crime of kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 [2] and 48[3] of the Revised Penal
Code) -- in Criminal Case No. 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of kidnapping with frustrated murder

(under Articles 267, 248, 6,[4] and 48 of the same Code) -- in Criminal Case No. 3565. In each case, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on him.[5]

of the attorneys there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinocs statement in writing in his
office. Sinoc asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an affidavit of confession.

The amended informations under which Sinoc was tried and convicted, both dated January 23, 1992, included
five (5) other accused, namely: Vicente Salon @ Dodong, Benjamin Espinosa @ Benji, Jaime Jornales @
James, Victorino Delegencia @ Jun-Gren, and one Roger Doe @ Ram (at-large). [6] However, only Sinoc
and Vicente Salon were arraigned, on July 14, 1992, the other accused being then at large, as they still
appear to be to this day. Assisted by their respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not
guilty and were thereafter jointly tried. The joint trial resulted in Salons acquittal in both cases. The court
agreed with him that none of the witnesses presented by the prosecution remotely implicate** (him in) the
crimes charged, and that (i)ndeed, the only piece of evidence pointing to ** (him[Salon]) as the mastermind is
contained in the affidavit of confession of accused Danilo Sinoc, hence, conspiracy not having been proved,
the case against Salon has to be dismissed. Only Sinoc, therefore, is concerned in the appeal at bar.

Atty. Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and to remain silent. Sinoc said he
wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and be assisted by Jalad in doing so. The latter then had Sinoc
narrate the occurrence in question in Cebuano/Visayan, a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar. That done,
Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him anything for the affidavit he would execute. Sinoc said
no. Only then did the CIS officers commence to take Sinocs statement, typing their questions and Sinocs
answer -- as well as the initial appraisal of his constitutional rights -- on a typewriter in Atty. Jalads office.

Respecting the essential facts constituting the corpus delicti, there appears to be no serious dispute. It
appears that on September 20, 1991, at about 6 oclock in the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito
Mining Corporation, was motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte) to
Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero(with Plate No. DFX-397), driven by
Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were
stopped by several armed men. The latter, identifying themselves as members of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte,
the armed men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound behind their back, to a
coconut grove some six meters from the road, and after making them lie face down on the ground, shot them
several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the spot.
These facts set forth in, among others, a sworn statement given to the police by Sinoc, infra, and an affidavit
executed and sworn to by Viacrusis on October 17, 1991, about a month later.[7] In that affidavit, Viacrusis
described the armed men who had kidnapped and shot him and Guijapon. The only malefactor he was able to
identify by name, however, was Danilo Sinoc who, he said, had curly hair, (was) known as Colot (Danilo
Sinoc), (and was known to ) driver Tarcing **.
Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of the consolidated cases: Marlyn Legaspi a
resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao del Sur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, also of Barangay
San Vicente.
Marlyn testified that she was startled by the sound of gunshots that morning of September 20, 1991. She ran
towards the direction of the gunfire and as she neared the place, heard the moaning of a man. She moved
quickly to the highway and saw a blue Pajero parked at the barangay road, its engine idling; and moments
later, she saw the same vehicle running fast towards San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. She lost no time in
reporting the incident to Brangay Councilor Terencio Jamero.
Jamero testified that on receiving Marlyn's report, he and another Councilor, Alberto Saliling, at once
proceeded to the place indicated. There they came upon the slain driver, and Isidoro Viacrusis, lying on the
ground, sorely wounded, crying out for help. With the assistance of policemen of Barobo, they brought
Viacrusis to the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay. Timely medical attention enabled Viacrusis to
recover from his grievous wounds.
The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of the following day, September 21,
1991, at about 7 oclock, a secret informant (known as a civilian asset) named Boyet reported to the Police
Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen (carnapped) Pajero was parked behind the apartment
of a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the Station
Commander, a police team[8] went to the place. They saw the Pajero and, their initial inquiries having yielded
the information that the man who had brought it there would return that morning, posted themselves in such a
manner as to keep it in view. Some three hours later, at about 10:30 oclock, they saw a man approach the
Pajero who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the man, identified
as Danilo Sinoc, of Surigao del Norte,[9] had the key of the Pajero, and was acting under instruction of certain
companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered
Pajero, the police officers brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no
longer there. They later turned over Sinoc to the 459(th) Mobile Force, together with the Pajero.
Four months afterwards, in the afternoon of January 21, 1993, SPO1 Roger A. Basadre and two other officers
(of the CIS) brought Danilo Sinoc to the Public Attorneys Office at Curato Street Butuan City. They asked one

In his sworn statement,[10] Sinoc declared that he knew the victims, Isidoro Viacrusis and Tarcisio Guijapon
because he was formerly working at Taganito Mining Company (TAMICO); that in June, 1991, he learned
that Benjamin Espinosa (@ Benji), Jaime Jornales (@ James), Victorino Delegencio (@ Jun-Gren), and a
certain Ram had been monitoring the activities of TAMICO Manager Viacrusis whom they planned to kidnap
and rob of his Pajero, and make it appear to be an act of the NPA; that the criminal undertaking was planned
by a certain Vicente Salon (@ Dodong), who made available the needed funds and two (2) hand guns; that in
September, 1991, at a meeting of the group at the boarding house of Jun-Gren to which he (Sinoc) was
invited, Sinoc was offered P20,000.00 to join in the kidnapping and carnapping operation; that he agreed
because of poverty; that in the morning of September 20, 1991, at about 6:30 oclock, he, Ram and
Benjamin Espinosa stopped the Pajero driven by Tarcisio Guijapon in which Viacrusis was riding,
brandishing two .35 caliber revolvers, and a piece of wood shaped like a rifle; that they boarded the vehicle,
identifying themselves as NPA (soldiers of the New Peoples Army) and had the driver proceed towards
Surigao City; that at the bridge of Tres de Mayor, they had the Pajero stop to pick-up two other companions,
James (Jaime Jornales) and Jun-Gren (Victor Delegencia); that Ram took over the wheel and drove
towards Butuan City; that at San Vicente, Barobo, Ram turned into a feeder road and stopped about seven
(7) meters from the highway; that there, Viacrusis and Guijapon, whose hands had been tied behind their
back, were made to get down; that James Jornales shot Viacrusis four times after which Jun-Gren
Delegencia, Jr. fired at Guijapon four times , too; that when Sinoc remonstrated at the shootings, he was told it
was on Dodong Salons orders; that the malefactors then proceeded to the Bliss Housing Project at Monkayo
where they left the Pajero, this being the place where the mastermind, Vicente Salon, was supposed to get
the vehicle and pay Sinoc the promised sum of P20,000.00; that they then all went to Tagum; that on the
following day, Sinoc was instructed by Jun-gren and James to return to Monkayo with the key of the Pajero
and deliver it to Ram, and that when he arrived at the place at about 9 o clock in the morning, he was
apprehended by soldiers and brought to the 459(th) PNP Mobile Company.
During the entire period of Sinocs interrogation, which commenced at about 3:00 P.M., Atty. Jalad remained
seated beside him; and at its conclusion, Jalad read to Sinoc the contents of his statement from beginning to
end. The statement was thereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described as witness to
signature.[11]
Sinoc was next brought to the home of Butuan City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy so that he might take oath
on his statement. This was about 7:00 P.M. After going over the statement, City Fiscal Brocoy told Sinoc that
it was very damaging, briefly discussing the contents thereof in Cebuano. The latter stood by his answers,
however, averring that they have been voluntarily given. Evidently satisfied of the authenticity and
voluntariness of the statement, Brocoy administered the oath to Sinoc, and signed the certification typed at the
left hand margin of page 4 thereof, reading: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21 st day of
January 1992, at Butuan City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I personally examined the herein affiant and
that I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed and understood his statement." He also initialed every page of
the statement.[12]
While under detention at the Provincial Jail, awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two (2) letters to the Trial Judge dated
June and July, 1992, in both of which he asked that he be transferred to the City Jail because he had heard
that Vicente Salon, who had been arrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had made plans to kill him.
He sent the Judge a third letter -- dated August 11, 1993, consisting of four (4) pages -- which is described by
His Honor as substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavit of confession. All the letters were
handwritten in block letters in the Cebuano dialect.[13]
Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi. His claim, as summarized by his counsel, was that on September 19,
1991, he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur together with his wife and prepared on that early morning to sell
tableya (native chocolate) in Tagum, Davao del Norte. On the same day they reached Tagum and they sold
tableya and on the same day they were not able to sell the tableya; on September 20, 1991 they were again
selling tableya in Tagum, Davao del Norte. It was while in Tagum that ** (they met) a certain Darves, they did
not know exactly the name, he offered to them the money to accompany the said driver of Darves who is

name(d) Ram. He was offered ** money to accompany this Ram in prior (sic) to allegedly get the Pajero
vehicle from Moncayo together with Ram, and while in Moncayo he was first apprehended by the police and
detained at Moncayo, first ** (by) the 459 Mobile Force of ** Moncayo and on January 14, 1992 to January 24,
1992 he was detained by the CIS authorities in Butuan City.
Elaborating, Sinoc testified that he saw Darves with three companions at a certain restaurant in Tagum; that
Darves introduced himself, and offered to give him P1,000.00) if he would accompany his driver to get a
vehicle at Moncayo; that he agreed, and at 6 o clock in the morning of September 21, 1991 he went to the
Star Lodge where Darves was staying; that there, he was introduced to the latters driver, Ram,
given P1,000.00, and told to go with Ram; and that he went out of the Star Lodge, gave his wife P800.00, and
then went with Ram to Moncayo on board a bus.
In Moncayo, they went to where the Pajero was parked. Sinoc went towards the vehicle. Ram lagged behind,
having paused to buy some cigarettes. When Sinoc reached the Pajero, five persons suddenly pointed guns
at him, searched him, and found on him the key to the Pajero which Darves had given to him. The five
persons, who were led by Sgt. Michael Aringgo of the PNP, brought him to the Moncayo police station where
they investigated him without informing him of his constitutional rights.
In the afternoon of that day, September 21, 1991, he was surrendered to the 459 th Mobile Force Company
which detained him until January 14, 1992. On this date he was taken by CIS personnel and brought to the
CIS Compound at Butuan City, at which place he was confined up to January 24, 1992, and subjected to
interrogation without being informed that he had a right to remain silent. He was told, however, that he had the
right to counsel, but although he told the investigators that his lawyer was Atty. Gavino Samontina, they never
called the latter.
The investigators wish him to sign an affidavit. When he refused, they maltreated him by repeatedly
submerging his head in a toilet bowl full of excrement, as well as by tying him on a bed, raising the bed on one
end so that his feet were up and his head down, and keeping him in that position for hours.
On January 20, 1992, his wife and Efren Dak-ang came to see him at the CIS Compound. He talked to them
and revealed what was being done to him while under investigation.
On January 21, 1992, after having been interrogated the whole night, he finally agreed to sign the affidavit
because the CIS officers told him, (We) will kill you or salvage you. In fact, the night before, police officers
had brought him to an uninhabited place near the bridge and, with guns pointed at his head, commanded him
to run. He refused, of course. So, in the afternoon of that day, at around 4 o clock, he was brought to the
office of Public Attorney Jalad, where the police investigators hurriedly typed his affidavit and made him sign
it. He denied that Atty. Jalad informed him of his constitutional rights. He asserted that when he told Jalad he
had his own lawyer, Jalad merely remarked, Never mind, all attorneys are just the same as long as it is
attorney. He was next brought to Fiscal Brocoy who, without talking to him, right away signed that document
(his confession).
Sinoc also explained how he had come to write the letter of August 11, 1992 to the judge some seven months
after his confession. That letter -- it will be recalled and as is evident from a comparison of both documents -was described by the latter as substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavits of confession, supra.
[14]
He said: (T)here were persons who visited me while at the Provincial Jail and told me to accept the crime
** because if I will not accept the crime my wife and my children (and) my parents, they will liquidate all of
them **.
Sinocs wife, Jovita, testified for the defense, and sought to corroborate his testimony. She affirmed that she
had seen her husband at the CIS on September 20, 1992, at about 8:30 in the evening, and he had told her to
keep ** silent, not to tell anybody that he will be accompan(ied) by the CIS. Efren Dak-ang also gave
corroborating testimony.
For some undisclosed reason, the surviving victim, Isodoro Viacrusis, did not testify; this, despite the fiscals
assurances to the Trial Judge that he was very interested in giving evidence. Obviously because of
Viacrusis failure to testify, his affidavit of October 17, 1991 was not formally offered, being obviously hearsay,
although it is attached to the record.
Be this at it may, the Trial Court was satisfied that the evidence actually presented by the Government sufficed
to establish Sinocs guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the two felonies with which he stood charged.

Sinoc has taken an appeal to this Court and ascribes to the Trial Court the following errors: (1) convicting him
of the offenses charged although conspiracy had not been independently proven to exist among him and the
other persons named in the indictment; (2) not rejecting the evidence obtained after he had been arrested
without any warrant of arrest, and (3) not rejecting his confession after he had been illegally arrested and had
thereafter been under custodial investigation ..without a counsel of choice from September 21, 1991 to
January 20, 1992, first by the Monkayo 459 th Mobile Force, and later by the C.I.S., Butuan City.
As regards Sinocs claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected
by a peace officer, inter alia When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. [15]
There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an offense had just been committed:
i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a Pajero belonging to a private company had been stolen (carnapped)
and its driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of death. Nor is
there any doubt that an informer (asset) had reported that the stolen Pajero was at the Bliss Housing
Project at the Moncayo. It was precisely to recover the Pajero that a team composed of SPO1 Micheal
Aringo and joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and Monkayo Police Stn. Led by Insptr. Eden T. Ugale, went to
that place and, on taking custody of the Pajero, forthwith dispatched a radio message to Higher
Headquarters advising of that fact.[16]
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached the place where the Pajero
was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle was parked,
that the man who had brought the Pajero would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus described did in
fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as the one who rode on that car
pajero;'[17] just as there is no question that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the
stolen Pajero and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take possession of it (after having arrived
by bus from Tagum together with another suspect, Ram). Sinocs link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the
kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take possession of
the Pajero. His arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers clear duty to
apprehend him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
Sinocs assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantless arrest, because conducted
without advice to him of his constitutional rights, is pointless. It is true that, as candidly admitted by the
arresting officers, their initial interrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told of his corresponding
rights. This is inconsequential, for the prosecution never attempted to prove what he might have said on that
occasion.
The confession made by him some time afterwards at the Public Attorneys Office at Butuan City is altogether
a different matter, however. The record adequately shows it to have been executed voluntarily and under
applicable safeguards, apart from being confirmed by, or consistent with, other evidence.
Sinoc does not dispute that he was taken to the Public Attorneys Office; that he spoke to Atty. Alfredo Jalad
and it was in the latters office that his confession was prepared by the CIS investigator. Nor does he deny
that he was then brought to the home of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy who certified that the confession
had been subscribed and sworn to before him and that he was satisfied that Sinoc had voluntarily executed
and understood his statement. Sinoc nonetheless claims that he was under intimidation at that time and never
advised of his constitutional rights.
After carefully considering the evidence, this Court is convinced that the Trial Judge was correct in accepting
the account of the execution of Sinocs confession (Exhs. K, K-1 to K-5) narrated by Public Atty. Alfedo Jalad
and City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy, to the effect that the confession was voluntarily given after he had been
duly informed of his constitutional rights. No reason whatever is discernible in the record for these Government
officials to give false evidence against Sinoc, or testify otherwise than to the truth.
Sinocs confession of January 21, 1992 is confirmed by the letter he admittedly wrote to the Trial Judge more
than a year later, on August 11, 1993,[18] the contents of which are, as observed by the Trial Judge,
substantially identical with those of the confession. In said letter, in which he narrates in no little detail the
same story contained in his confession, he apologizes for bothering you again at this time (obviously
referring to his prior letters to the Judge of June and July 1992), and gives his reasons for writing the latest
letter: to ask for the Judges assistance and take account of his allegation that his agreement with his coaccused was only to stop the "Pajero," that it was poverty that impelled him to join the plotters (Vicente Salon,

et al.); to see that Tarcisio Guijapon and Viacrucis be given justice; and to plead that the Judge take pity on
him, and not give him too heavy a penalty.

nature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous character, or the number, of the killings in
connection with the robbery.[23]

The confession is also consistent with Sinoc's testimony at his trial in which he admitted that he had indeed
traveled from Tagum to Monkayo where he was arrested; and that he had made the trip, together with his coaccused, Ram, precisely to get the stolen Pajero the key of which he had on his person at the time. It
contains details (e.g., the use of two (2) hand guns and a wooden rifle, the bringing of the Pajero from the
scene of the killing to Moncayo, the identities of the individual malefactors who shot the victims) which is
improbable to think were conjured out of thin air by the police investigators or deduced from other
evidence. The confession is consistent, too, with the other proofs, particularly the testimony of Marlyn Legaspi
and Barangay Councilor Jamero as regards the time and place of the shooting of the hapless victims.

On the other hand, the wrongful acts actually proven to have been committed by the defendants in Criminal
Case No. 3565 are: (1) robbery, of course, as above described, and (2) frustrated murder on the occasion
thereof -- gunshot wounds having been inflicted on Isidoro Viacrusis, while bound and prostrate on the ground,
utterly unable to put up any defense, the wounds being of such a nature as would have resulted in his death
were it not for timely medical intervention. Obviously, these acts do not fall within the ambit of article 294,
which treats of the special complex crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, but NOT
robbery with attempted orfrustrated homicide (or murder), although the law does punish the crime
of attempted and frustrated robbery with homicide.[24]

In any event, the Trial Judge appears to have carefully assessed the demeanor of the witnesses for the
prosecution and those for the defense, in relation to the documents on record, and on this basis and from his
vantage point, found that the prosecutions proof were more credible than the defense, and that their
combined weight established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants culpable participation in the crimes
charged.

Neither do the crimes come within the operation of Article 48 of the Criminal Code which, speaking of complex
crimes, provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Actually in this case, the two crimes of carnapping
and frustrated murder did not result from a single act. Nor was either offense a necessary means for
committing the other. The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the carnapping; indeed, at the
time the victim was shot, the carnapping had already been consummated. And, of course, the cannapping
which, according to the evidence, was the conspirators principal objective, was not necessary to perpetrate
the shooting.

It must additionally be pointed out that apart from Sinocs protestations that his extrajudicial confession was
the result of torture and threats, no competent evidence exists on record to substantiate that claim. He made
no such claim to either Public Attorney Alfredo Jalad or City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy although there is
absolutely nothing in the record to indicate any cause for him to distrust either government officer, much less
believe they were in conspiracy with the police officers to concoct a case against him. In fact, although he
professes to have disclosed his supposed maltreatment to his wife when she visited him at the place of his
detention, the latter made no mention of it in her testimony, nor did she ever attempt to have him medically
examined to confirm such a revelation, if it had been made. Moreover, the counsel he said he wanted to
represent him during his interrogation at Public Attorney Jalads office, Atty. Gavino Samontina, was never
presented to confirm his statement.
While the evidence does show that Sinoc became embroiled in a criminal conspiracy [19] -- he agreed (out of
poverty, he says) to join in a crime being planned by certain men named by him and decided to commit it with
them -- the agreement, as far as he was concerned, was to waylay Viacrusis, the Manager of the Tagum
Mining Company, and rob him of his Pajero, for which his share would be P20,000.00; but it did not include
the shooting of Viacrusis or any one else. In fact, he raised a protest when Viacrusis and Guijapon were
shot. In other words, as far as Sinoc understood it, and as far as may in fact be deduced from the evidence,
the plan was not so much to capture Viacrusis and deprived him of liberty, even less to assassinate him, but
to steal his Pajero by violent means. The kidnapping was not the principal objective; it was merely
incidental to the forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by reason or on the occasion of the seizure of the
Pajero -- and (as far as the proofs demonstrate) without foreknowledge on Sinocs part -- its driver was killed,
and the lone passenger seriously injured.
There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code -- the
essential object of which is to kidnap, or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty. The idea of kidnapping in this case appears to have been the result of the continuous but
uninformed use of that term by the peace officers involved in the investigation, carelessly carried over into the
indictments and the record of the trial, and even accepted by His Honor.[20]
The offense actually committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 -- where the killing of Tarcesio Guijapon
accompanied the taking of the Pajero-- is that defined and penalized by Article 294 of the Criminal Code,
[21]
viz.:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons-- Penalties.-- Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
***

***

It follows then that the malefactors felonious acts in Criminal Case No. 3565 cannot be regarded as juridically
fused into a complex crime under Article 48. They should be considered separate offenses, separately
punishable.
Now, Sinoc admittedly entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused; but he insists that as far as he was
concerned, the conspiracy was to carnap the Pajero, and did not include any killing or assault against
persons. His theory is that the slaying of the driver and passenger might conceivably have been contemplated
from the outset by one or some or all his co-conspirators; But Sinoc himself never had that intention. Indeed,
he says he had no inkling that the shooting would take place; had no opportunity to prevent it, and could only
remonstrate about it after it was done; and he invokes the doctrine that conspirators may only be held
accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal agreement; and as regards felonious acts not included, only
the author thereof would be liable. [25]
Sinocs disclaimers notwithstanding, it is this Courts view that the crime that may properly be ascribed to him
in Case No. 3564 is robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. For unfortunately for
him, there is no avoiding the fact that a homicide -- although not agreed to or expected by him -- was
committed on the occasion of the robbery of the Pajero; and he could not but have realized or anticipated the
possibility of serious harm, even death, being inflicted on the person or persons in the Pajero targeted for
robbery, since two of his companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to repeat, his agreement with
them did not include killing.[26] The most that can be conceded is to credit him with the mitigating circumstance
of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. [27]
Sinoc may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as regards
Viacrusis, for the reasons already mentioned; in this particular case, the evidence shows that he agreed only
to the plan to carnap the Pajero, but not to any assault or killing. [28] Nor is it logical to convict him twice of
robbery of the same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not be pronounced responsible
for the separate offense of robbery of the same Pajero, in addition to being declared guilty of robbery (of that
same Pajero) with homicide under Article 294.
The penalty imposable on Sinoc is that provided in Article 294 of the Penal Code, which isreclusion
perpetua to death. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that done, the penalty that should be applied to him is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3564, appellant Danilo Sinoc, being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of robbery with homicide defined and punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Criminal Case No. 3565 is DISMISSED as to him.

***."
SO ORDERED.

It is germane to observe that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as important or primordial an objective
as the asportation of the Pajero, the kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with homicide; [22] and that
the term, homicide, is used in the quoted article in the generic sense-- i.e., as also including murder, the

[G.R. No. 132671. November 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISANTO BAULA, RUBEN BAULA, ROBERT
BAULA and DANILO DACUCOS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In an Information, dated 07 August 1996, accused-appellants were charged with murder before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The accusatory portions of the Information against the
indictees read:
"That on or about the 13th day of December 1995, in the evening, in barangay Sioasio West, Municipality of
Sual, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a bolo (tabas), with abuse of
superior strength, treachery and evident premeditation and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab Patrocenia Caburao, inflicting upon her the following:
1. Hacking wound - 3 inches in length; 2 inches deep Rt. Occipital region (nape area) exposing brain tissue;
2. Hacking wound - 4 inches in length; 2 inches deep at mid occipital area exposing damage brain tissue;
3. Hacking wound - 4 inches in length; 1/2 inch deep facial area running across the Rt. Cheek and left cheek
including the nasal area;
4. Hacking wound - 2 inches in height; 1 inch deep at the vertex (top of the head);
5. Abrasion; confluent at the back area.
Cause of death - Brain tissue injury secondary to mortal wounds above which injuries directly caused her
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Patrocenia Caburao.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code." [1]
When arraigned, the accused all entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Trial shortly thereafter
ensued.
The relevant facts and events that transpired, according to the prosecution, were briefly narrated in the
People's Brief.

found hanging on the wall a bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo,
together with the victim's dried blood samples, [3] were sent on the same day to the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, [4] for forensic examination. The results of the
examination[5] disclosed that the bloodstains[6] found in the bolo,[7]the bloodstains[8] on the polo shirt[9] and the
bloodstains[10] on the pair of short pants[11] had the same type "O" blood as that of the victim.
The defense had another version of the incident.
Wilson Radovan, the barangay captain of Siwasiw, Sual, Pangasinan, testified that on 13 December 1995, at
around eight o'clock in the evening, while he and the other barangay officials were at their outpost, they heard
the cry of a woman asking for help. Rushing out, they saw Teofila Uson, a barangay mate, who told them that
she and Patrocinia Caburao were being pelted with stones. Teofila Uson said that it was too dark to be able to
identify the person who had attacked them. When the group proceeded to the place of the incident, they saw
the lifeless body of Patrocinia Caburao, beside the road, near the creek. Radovan testified that he did not
notice any other person in the place where the incident occurred. He requested Gene Macatiao, the son-inlaw of the victim and one of those who first arrived in the scene, to inform their relatives and the police.
Ruben Baula testified that in the morning of 13 December 1995, he, together with his co-accused and other
companions, namely, Pepito Ramos, Amber Pagudpod, Francis Amistad and Reny, were harvesting palay, at
Sitio Binabalian, Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, on the land being tenanted by Crisanto Baula. He
recounted that they were there until 4:55 in the afternoon at about which time Crisanto Baula invited the group
to eat "merienda" in the nearby canteen of Brigida Tumamang. He noticed that when they arrived at the store,
there were three other persons partaking of drinks. At about twilight, they left the store of Brigida Tumamang
and proceeded to their respective residences, leaving behind the three persons who continued with their
drinking spree. At about three o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1995, while he was asleep, four
policemen and several barangay officials arrived and asked him if he knew who had killed Patrocinia
Caburao. Although he denied any knowledge about the killing, the policemen, nevertheless, invited him to
accompany them to the house of Robert Baula. Arriving thereat, the policemen likewise questioned the latter
about the killing of Patrocinia Caburao. Robert Baula, like his co-accused Ruben Baula, denied any
knowledge of the killing. After the interrogation, the police authorities allowed them to go. Ruben and Robert
Baula both vehemently denied that the police ever took any clothing from them.
Accused-appellants, Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos, corroborated the testimony of their co-accused,
Ruben and Robert Baula, in its material points, claiming that in the morning of 13 December 1995, they went
to Sitio Binabalian to harvest palay; that in the afternoon, they took their merienda at the store of Brigida
Tumamang; and that, thereafter, they went home leaving behind the three persons still indulging in drinks at
the store of Brigida Tumamang.

On 13 December 1995, at around eight oclock in the evening, Jupiter Caburao, decided to follow his mother,
Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle
her due obligations at a store, about one-and-a-half kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida
Tumamang. While traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter noticed a commotion near the creek about
ten meters away from him. He focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and
saw accused-appellants Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was lying on
the ground, while accused-appellants Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault lasted
for about four minutes. Accused-appellants fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he
were to divulge the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be
his own mother. Her head and face sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her brain
tissues. Jupiter rushed home and brought his niece and nephew to the house of a neighbor for their
safety. For fear of reprisal from accused-appellants and believing that the police would be able to solve the
gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the carnage to either his relatives or the police.

The trial over, the court a quo rendered its judgment on 17 November 1997, convicting accused-appellants of
the crime charged; thus:

About two o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1995, the police authorities, led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande,
went to the locus criminis, and took pictures of the body of the victim.[2] The investigation revealed that before
the victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that accused-appellants were also at the
store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between seven o'clock and eight o'clock in the
evening, and that, fifteen minutes later, accused-appellants also left.

c. moral damages of P75,000.00;

SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the respective houses of accused-appellants. The
policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the
murder. Ruben Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his
bloodstained polo shirt. The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group

Accused-appellants contend in the instant appeal that the trial court has erred (1) in giving full credence to the
belated eyewitness account of Jupiter Caburao ascribing to herein accused-appellants authorship of the crime,
and (2) in admitting in evidence the bolo, polo shirt, and short pants taken by the policemen from accusedappellants in violation of their constitutional rights.

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Danilo
Dacucos, Crisanto Baula, Ruben Baula and Robert Baula, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Pursuant thereto and in relation to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2 of the same code, all the aforenamed
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Patrocinia Caburao the following:
a. P50,000.00 for the death of Patrocinia Caburao;
b. P15,000.00 for funeral expenses;

d. to pay proportionally the costs.

SO ORDERED."[12]

In convicting accused-appellants, the trial court found the explanation of Jupiter for his delay in reporting what
he knew of the gruesome killing not to be without valid reasons. After all, the court said, he was threatened
and he felt that the authorities could solve the crime even without revealing what he knew.
True, the rule has generally been that where the culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimony, the assessment made by the trial court thereover is
entitled to a great degree of respect and, absent strong justifications to the contrary, it will not be disturbed on
appeal.[13] The reason is simple. A trial court gets an opportunity, not equally open to an appellate court, to
observe the expression of witnesses at the stand, including their demeanor under questioning, that makes up
a most significant factor in the proper evaluation of testimonial evidence. Obviously, however, this rule will not
apply where one judge hears the testimony of the witnesses and another judge pens the decision for, in such a
case, the thesis for the rule is not in the least extant. [14]
In the case under review, such as in People vs. Capilitan[15] and People vs. Villapana,[16] the decision was
rendered by the judge who did not conduct the trial and hear the evidence. The Court in acquitting Capilitan of
rape, quoted with approval its previous pronouncement in Villapana similarly acquitting the accused
therein, viz:
Additionally, we have to take note that in this case, the judge who heard the evidence for the prosecution is
not the same judge who decided the case. It was Judge Serafin Salvador who heard the testimonies of
complainant and her witness before his retirement. Whereas, it was Judge Romulo Quimbo who decided the
case relying solely on the transcripts of stenographic notes in appreciating Macaranas and her witness
testimonies. Even as this Court has consistently been guided by the precept that findings of trial courts on
credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and must not be disturbed as it was the trial judge who had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying, this case should be an
exception in view of the fact that the Judge who decided the case is NOT the same judge who heard the
evidence (see People vs. Escalante, et al., G.R. No. L-371457, August 22, 1984, 131 SCRA 237). Thus, the
Court should all the more exercise utmost care in evaluating the evidence presented in the instant case so as
to render justice not only to the accused, but also to the complainant and the State as well. [17]
Here, it was Judge Antonio M. Belen who heard the testimony given at the trial, but it was Judge Emilio V.
Angeles who wrote the decision, dated 17 November 1997, solely on the basis of the records of the
case. Having neither personally heard the testimony of the witnesses nor observed their deportment and
manner of testifying, his assessment on the credibility of witnesses would have to be received with caution on
appeal.[18]
Verily, it is not uncommon for a witness to show some reluctance about being immersed in a criminal
case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved is, in fact, of judicial notice. [19]Thus, it is
recognized that the delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the
credibility of witnesses for, more often than not, such a delay can be satisfactorily explained. [20]
In this instance, however, the Court cannot help but doubt as being highly suspect, the belated revelation of
Jupiter on the identity of the assailants. His claim that he did not immediately report the matter to the police
relying on a supposition that the crime could anyway be solved even without his own disclosure appears to be
a bit flimsy. Unlike previous cases where we have ruled otherwise, Jupiter is not just an innocent bystander
but the son of the victim. The raging passion and anger of a son who has just lost a mother in such a brutal
manner would have impelled him to immediately report the crime to the authorities even with an alleged threat
upon his life.
It can be accepted that there is yet no real test or a hard and fast rule in ascertaining the truth of the testimony
of a witness to an accurate degree. Nevertheless, testimony that conforms to human knowledge, observation,
and experience is often deemed reliable and that which is repugnant to such standards belongs to the
miraculous and outside of judicial cognizance.[21] The Court finds that Jupiter's response to the events is far
from the natural reaction of a son who has just witnessed the grisly murder of his own mother. What he has
said to have done is simply not in accord with human nature. With all the bitterness and indignation expected
of a person similarly situated, it is quite odd that he would keep the matter to himself and fail to disclose his
knowledge of the crime to the police authorities, or even to any of his relatives, despite his presence during
their investigation of the case. His belated declaration of the identity of his mother's assailants, some two
months after the killing, can but accentuate the difficulty that the Court would have to face if it were to rely
almost completely on his testimony.
A careful reading of the records of this case additionally would reveal significant flaws in the testimony of
Jupiter.

Jupiter testified that he was able to recognize all the accused being barangaymates but failed to recognize the
victim because he was quite distant from the place where the assault took place. He remembered well the
number of times the accused Crisanto and Danilo had allegedly hacked the victim, yet, on further questioning
by the trial court, he could not tell which part of the body of the victim was struck. On direct examination,
Jupiter would insist that he approached the victim after the accused had fled. When asked by the court
whether he went close to the place of the incident, he answered in the negative, stating that he was shocked
and frightened. Jupiter testified that the incident had lasted for four minutes and that he focused his flashlight
on the commotion four times, at intervals of five seconds each, but, again, when queried by the court why he
had waited for four minutes before focusing his flashlight, Jupiter kept silent and did not answer the question.
It would seem unlikely that after Jupiter focused his flashlight on them, accused-appellants would continue
hacking the victim and for the two lookouts, who were supposed to precisely warn their co-accused of the
presence of witnesses, to simply do nothing about it. The most common response of persons committing a
crime would be to flee upon being discovered. Indeed, there should be greater reason for them to do so when
that witness happened to be the son of their victim.
Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself which, by common experience and observation, could lead to the inference of at least its
probability under the circumstances. [22] In a criminal prosecution the accused is confronted with the full might
of state authority. The evidence of the prosecution must thus be strong to pierce the shield of presumptive
innocence.[23]
Accused-appellants also take exception to the admissibility of the evidence consisting of the bloodstained
bolo, polo shirt and short pants arguing that, even on the assumption that these articles did belong to accusedappellants, their seizure without a valid warrant has violated their constitutional rights.
Admittedly, the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were taken, sans any search warrant, from
accused-appellants Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben Baula, respectively, at a time when the police
started to question them about the killing of Patrocinia Caburao.
Section 2, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The above constitutional mandate is complemented by Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution providing
that "Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" a rule pronounced by the Court in Stonehill vs. Diokno.[24] The plain import of the fundamental law is thus to
say that between the State and the people stands the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power
to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[25] The protection means that the State cannot
simply intrude indiscriminately into houses, or conduct search and seizure thereat or on the person of an
individual, and it puts up an almost impenetrable shield to protect privacy and accord sanctity against this
unlawful form of restraint.[26]
The above proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not absolute, of course, and the Court
has had occasions to rule that a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid under certain
circumstances. There can, for instance, be a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rules 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; or seizure of evidence in
"plain view," its elements being extant; [27] or search of a moving vehicle;[28] or consented search; or customs
search.[29] The situation here in question, however, can hardly come within the purview of any of the
established exceptions.
In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself must have to be effected under the
circumstances enumerated by law. One such case is when an offense has in fact just been committed, and
the peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. [30]

Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were allegedly taken from
them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the death of
Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus
likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure.

A. Yes, sir. We exerted our efforts to look for these people, sir.

SPO4 Fermin Mirande testified:

Witness:

Fiscal:

A. The four (4) suspects were the four (4) accused now, Crisanto Baula, Danilo Dacocos, Ruben Baula and
Robert Baula and they were the one engaged in this drinking spree at the said place, sir.

Q. What have you found in the scene of the incident?

Fiscal:
Q. Have you ascertain the identities of the persons who were drinking at the store?

Court:

Witness:

Q. All the accused?

A. We were able to see the bloodied body of Patrocinia Caburao, sir.

Court:

Witness:
A. And some other unidentified persons, sir.

Q. Dead already?

Fiscal:

Witness:
A. Yes, sir, due to multiple hack wounds.

Q. After you ascertain the four (4) accused and some other which were not identified were the one have
drunk at the said store, what transpired next in your investigation?

Fiscal:

Witness:

Q. What have you and your companions done there?

A. We tried to look for these persons, identified persons, sir.

Witness:

Court:

A. Since at the time we arrived at the place, we did not immediately gather such evidence to pin point
any suspect. We tried our very best to conduct further investigation as to the place where this victim came
from and we were able to establish that she came at the place where at the place of one store, sir.

Q. What happened?

Court:

A. And we were able to locate them at their respective houses, sir.

Q. Store of?

Fiscal:

Witness:

Q. Now, what transpired when you located the four (4) accused at their respective houses?

A. I could no longer.....

Witness:

Q. In Siwasiw?

A. We examined their persons if they are really drank at that time but the same no sign that they were
drank but we made on suspicion that one of the accused to where we requested to present his clothes
during the night that he wore during their engagement at the drinking spree in the store, sir.

A. Yes, sir. From that place, according to the information given by the owner of the store, nobody had seen
what is really happened to the victim, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fiscal:

Witness:

Court:
Q. Who is this accused?
Witness:

Q. After you proceeded to the store and you have gathered that information, what transpired next in that
store?

A. I have not bring with me the record, sir.

Witness:

Fiscal:

A. Since there is an information that there were persons who were drinking at the said store, sir.

Q. Can you identify that suspect, if you can see him again?

Court:

Witness:

Q. Drinking wine you mean?

A. One of the Baulas, sir.

Witness:

Q. How many Baulas?

A. Three (3), sir.

Q. Now, tell us if there was occupants of this hut of Danilo Dacocos when you saw this bloodstain on
that bolo?

Q. Can you identify by his face?

Witness:
Atty. Palma:
A. At the time we discovered the bolo there is no occupant but he was the one living at the said hut, sir.
Already testified, he cannot.
Q. Why do you know that it was Danilo Dacocos was the one living in that hut?
Court:
A. During the interview he admitted that he is living there, sir.
Q. You look at the accused?
Q. Now, what transpired next after going to this hut of Danilo Dacocos?
Witness:
A. We took the bolo and sent to the NBI, sir. [31] (Emphasis supplied.)
A. So far, as of now, I could not exactly identify him, sir, but the moment I could see on my records, I have to
consult my record.

Clearly, the police officers acted on a mere suspicion that accused-appellants could be responsible for the
commission of the crime and only because of their being at the store where the victim was last seen.

Q. What record?
Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged. [32] An illegal search cannot be
undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search. [33]

A. The one presented our transmittal to the NBI, sir.

Q. NBI, Dagupan City?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Regarding what?
A. To determine as to whether the suspected bloodstains of the clothing that is of the victim, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fiscal:

The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been
voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty.[34] This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors. [35]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and all the accused-appellants are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered to be immediately released from custody unless
detained for some other lawful reason. Costs de oficio.

Q. Now, you said the clothing which you have requested from one of the accused Baula to give to you which
he wore that evening when there was drinking spree in the store, now, what part of the clothing was stained
with blood?

SO ORDERED.

Witness:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN, JR., accusedappellant.

A. I could no longer remember, sir.

Q. Now, what else have you done after you had requested this one of the accused Baula to present his
clothes wore at the night of the drinking spree?

[G.R. No. 136267. July 10, 2001]

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

A. One of the persons who were engaged in the drinking spree was Danilo Dacocos, sir. We tried to look
for him and we were able to see him at his hut almost one (1) kilometer away from the store, sir, and we were
able to see one (1) bolo which was hang on the wall of the hut.

This case is here on automatic review of the decision, [1] dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of murder and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of death.

Court:

The information against accused-appellant alleged:

Q. Was the bolo has bloodstained?

That on or about August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with an unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith and
Wesson caliber .38 revolver, with no serial number, with intent to kill, acting with treachery and evident
premeditation and taking advantage of the darkness of [the] night, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, assault, attack and shoot with the aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain HENRY PECHO
PIAMONTE, hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the head which caused the latters
instantaneous death.

Witness:
A. There is again a suspected bloodstain, sir, and that cause us to turn over for examination to the NBI, sir.
Q. And this is one of the specimen you sent?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Fiscal:

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
xxx

xxx

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon trial on the merits ensued.
Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M. Malinao, Jr., Enrico A. Rosal,
Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr., and Virgilio L. Pilapil, all of whom belong to the Cavite City Police Department;

National Bureau of Investigation ballistician Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr.; NBI Forensic Chemist II Juliet GelacioMahilum; Dr. Regalado D. Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of
Health (DOH) in Cavite City; and Danet D. Garcellano, a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio, Cavite
City. The testimony of Police Chief Inspector Edwin G. Nemenzo, Chief of the Records, Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was dispensed with
in view of his certification, dated October 7, 1997 (Exh. N), [3] that accused-appellant is not a
licensed/registered holder of firearm of any kind and caliber.

Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health in Cavite
City, conducted a postmortem examination of the cadaver and prepared an autopsy report (Exh. O) [17]which
showed the following findings:

The prosecution evidence is to the following effect:

A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric state with gunshot wounds . . .
described as follows:

At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station,
received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San
Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy,
Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his
tricycle which was then parked on the road. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene
(Exhs. A, A-1, A-2, and A-3)[4] showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. [5] PO3 Rosal testified
that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant and the victim were last
seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City,
about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to
the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe. [6] The other policemen at the
police station called up City Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Garcellano told the
police investigators that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe at about 12:00 midnight and
drink beer; that at about 2:30 a.m., the victim arrived and joined accused-appellant; that the two stayed in the
cafe until 3:30 a.m.; and that she did not know if they left together as she was serving other customers.
Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a
white t-shirt and brown short pants. [7]
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellanos description
fitted a person known as alias Jun Dulce. Armando Plata, who knew where accused-appellant lived, led PO3
Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to accused-appellants house in Garcia Extension, Cavite
City. The policemen knocked on the door for about three minutes before it was opened by a man who
answered the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. The police
operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting
near the cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
then asked permission to enter and look around the house. [8]
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the brand name
Hanes (Exh. H)[9] and the name Dhenvher written in the inner portion of the shirts hemline, placed over a
divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found it to be bloodied." When he picked
up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he
conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
accused-appellant to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was
positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victims companion. The police investigators asked accusedappellant where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said accused-appellant refused to tell him where he hid
the gun so he sought his (accused-appellants) permission to go back to his house to conduct a further
search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3
Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. [10] Inside the house, they saw accused-appellants 11-year old son
Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade
Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number (Exh. F). He found the gun
loaded with five live bullets (Exhs. M, M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his
initials RDE (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3
Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant in the
sala.[11] The .38 caliber gun (Exhs. B, B-1), [12] the white Hanes t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), [13] and the two
spent .38 caliber shells (Exhs. B-2, B-2-B)[14] were all photographed. Accused-appellant was then taken to the
police station, where he was photographed (Exh. B-3) [15] along with the things seized from him.
SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division, testified that on August 26, 1997,
the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho Piamonte was forwarded to him by PO3 Rosal together with the
evidence consisting of a bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt, a .38 revolver with five live ammunitions, and two
deformed slugs. After an evaluation of the evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against
accused-appellant. He took blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory
examination.[16]

AUTOPSY REPORT
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

= Gunshot wound, 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., oval in shape with powder burns more on top of the wound to 2.5 cms.
elevation/height located at the angle of the right jaw and/or 5 cms. below the inferior level of the right ear. The
wound has irregular and inverted borders. It is directed inwards fracturing the lower edge of the angle of the
right mandible and the lead slug is embedded at the right lateral portion of the first (1st) cervical vertebrae
hence extracted.
= Gunshot wound, 1 cm. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders located at the left frontal region 5 cms.
above the temporal end of the left eyebrow. It is directed inwards and downwards fracturing the bone (frontal)
underneath into [the] intracranial cavity.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
=

Presence of circular complete fracture, 0.8 cm. in d[iameter] at the left frontal region.

= The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is enveloped with liquid and clotted
blood.
=

The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.

= The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the area is severely hematomatous
and explored until a lead slug [was] found at the 1st cervical vertebrae at the right side.
=

Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell.

Other internal organs are significantly normal.

Slugs extracted:
1. 0.6 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed. The length of the slug is 1.6 cms.
Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug.
2. A 0.7 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug . . . roundly/ovally deformed [on] one end. The length of the slug is 1.8
cm.
Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug.
Dr. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. R), [18] the first one located on the right
jaw below the ear while the second wound located at the left temporal side above the left eyebrow. The slug
from the first gunshot wound remained at the base of the neck, near the spinal column. There were powder
burns, called tatooing, surrounding the first wound which showed that the victim was shot point-blank. The
second slug was also embedded at the front lobe of the brain. [19] Dr. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death
(Exh. Q) that the victim died of shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot
wounds.[20]
Upon written request (Exh. C)[21] of Prosecutor Lu, the NBI conducted a ballistics examination to determine
whether the two slugs taken from the body of the victim were fired from the firearm recovered from accusedappellant.
Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., an NBI ballistician, conducted on September 10, 1997 a comparative examination of
the two evidence bullets, marked as HPP-1 (Exh. E) and HPP-2 (Exh. E-1), which had been recovered
from the victims head and the three test bullets (Exhs. G, G-1, G-2) fired from the seized .38 caliber
firearm. The tests showed that the evidence bullets were fired from the subject firearm. [22] The empty shells

from the three test bullets fired were duly marked (Exhs. G-3, G-4, G-5). No photographs were
taken. Silvestres findings were confirmed by four other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar,
Supervising Ballistician Ernie Magtibay, Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded, and, Flor Landicho, another
ballistician. The two .38 caliber empty shells recovered from accused-appellant were no longer examined. [23]
Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. J)[24] for a laboratory examination of the bloodstains on the
white Hanes t-shirt of accused-appellant to determine whether such were identical to the blood of the victim.
Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, NBI Forensic Chemist II, testified that on September 26, 1997, she conducted three
kinds of laboratory examinations, namely, (a) benzidine test, to determine the presence of blood; (b) precipitin
test, to determine if the bloodstains came from human or animal blood; and (c) ABO grouping test, to
determine the blood group. When tested and matched together, the bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt and the
blood sample of the victim yielded positive results for human blood belonging to blood type O (Exh. K). [25]
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself, his son Jhumar, and his sister Yolanda
Cubcubin Padua.
Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. testified that he enlisted in the Philippine Constabulary as a
soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being AWOL. He said he left for Saudi Arabia where he worked
as a driver and came back in 1979. He was later employed as a driver by a friend, who owned a junk shop in
Cavite City. He admitted knowing the victim whom he addressed as Kuya. Accused-appellant testified that
from 10:00 in the evening to 12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997, he and some friends played a card game
called tong-its on Molina Street, Cavite City. Afterwards, he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had some
drinks while waiting for food to be served. Henry Piamonte, a tricycle driver, arrived and had drinks with
him. After a while, the victim left as a passenger was waiting to be given a ride. The victim came back to the
restaurant before 1:00 a.m. and had another bottle of beer with accused-appellant. At about 1:30 a.m., the
victim again left to transport another passenger. After that, the victim did not come back anymore. [26]
Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a.m. and took a tricycle home to 1151 Garcia
Extension, San Antonio, Cavite City. He was sleeping on the sofa in his bedroom when he was awakened by
the arrival of three policemen, two of them he recognized as SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Estoy, Jr., who
pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down. He said he was handcuffed while the policemen
searched his room, turning the sala set upside down and opening the cabinets. His son, Jhumar, stood beside
him. Before leaving, the policemen took from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son
Denver. Accused-appellant said that he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was afraid
they would maltreat him. He denied the claim of the policemen that the white t-shirt had blood stains. He
claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when they took him into
custody. Nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. He
also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol car for almost two hours before he was brought inside the
police station. He denied owning the .38 caliber revolver presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 Pilapil
or that the same had been recovered from his house. He also denied the prosecutions claim that he was
taken to the Sting Cafe where he was allegedly identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen with the
victim before the latter was killed.[27]
Jhumar Cubcubin, son of accused-appellant, testified that at about 4:00 in the morning of August 26, 1997, he
was sleeping on the second floor of the house when he was roused from his sleep by loud knocks on the
door. When he opened the door, he saw three policemen who were looking for his father. He told them that
his father was not around, but he was shoved away. They proceeded upstairs to the room of his father where
they took from the clothes stand a white Hanes t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. They put his father in
a police patrol car waiting outside. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt, Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, and
reported to her what had happened. He went back to the house and saw some policemen still conducting a
search. As the policemen were about to leave, a van with some other policemen on board arrived. They
asked him where the water container was located. They went inside the house and, when they came out, one
of them announced that he had found a gun, which was then photographed. Jhumar said that while his father
was inside the police patrol car, his aunt was arguing with the policemen. At that instance, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
spread the t-shirt and told Jhumars aunt Eto, puro dugo damit niya, although the t-shirt had no
bloodstains. He said that he and his father never gave permission to the policemen to search their house.[28]
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, accused-appellants sister, testified that at about 5:30 in the morning of August 26,
1997, she was told by her nephew, Jhumar, that accused-appellant had been apprehended by some
policemen. She and Jhumar then went to the police patrol car where she saw her brother in handcuffs. She
said she protested to the policemen that there was no evidence that accused-appellant had killed the
victim. Yolanda said she saw the confiscated white Hanes t-shirt, but she claimed the same did not have any

bloodstain on it. She went back to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Trias, Cavite to let her know what
had happened. She then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar, who told her that some
policemen were searching accused-appellants house and found a gun. [29]
On October 5, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder. It based
its finding on circumstantial evidence, to wit: (1) That Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the Sting Cafe, saw
accused-appellant arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997 and drink beer, while the victim arrived at
about 2:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997 and joined accused-appellant in drinking beer at the bar. She said that
she served them beer and they stayed for about an hour, that the two later had an argument as accusedappellant wanted to have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for, and that at about 3:30 a.m., the
victim and accused-appellant left and boarded the victims tricycle; (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
testified that they saw the lifeless body of the victim, with bullet wounds on his head, slumped on the handle of
his tricycle, that the crime scene was about 50 meters away from the house of accused-appellant, and that
when they were told by an unidentified tricycle driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving
the Sting Cafe together, they went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who described the
appearance of the victims companion. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as
the person being described by Garcellano, accompanied the policemen to the house of accused-appellant; (3)
That after SPO1 Malinao, Jr. was allowed to enter the house, he found a white Hanes t-shirt with bloodstains
on it and also recovered two spent .38 caliber shells; (4) That when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting
Cafe, he was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victims companion moments prior to his death;
(5) That when the investigators returned to the house of accused-appellant, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found a .38 caliber
revolver placed on top of a plastic water container located outside the bathroom; (6) That laboratory
examination conducted by the forensic chemist, Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, showed that the bloodstains on the
white Hanes t-shirt were human blood, type O, which matched the blood type of the victim; and (7) That per
ballistic examination of NBI ballistician, Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., the two slugs recovered from the head of the
victim were fired from the .38 caliber revolver seized from accused-appellants house.
The trial court rejected accused-appellants alibi, giving full credence to the testimonies of Danet Garcellano
and the police investigators whom it found to have no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant. It
admitted the prosecution evidence consisting of the white Hanes t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber
revolver, on the ground that these items had been seized as incident to a lawful arrest. It ruled that since Dr.
Sosa testified that the victim was shot point-blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the
assailant, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present, not to mention that the victim was unarmed
and thus totally defenseless. The trial court theorized that while the victim was on his tricycle, the assailant
went around and shot him on the left temple. It held that the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing the victim
constituted an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder and
accordingly imposed on him the penalty of death. Hence, this appeal.
On April 18, 2000, the Court received a letter, dated April 5, 2000, [30] from Victoria Abrenica Dulce, mother of
accused-appellant, with an attached affidavit of desistance entitled Sinumpaang Salaysay ng PagUurong, dated November 14, 1997,[31] executed by Marilou B. Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that
accused-appellant had been mistakenly identified as the assailant, and, by reason thereof, sought the
dismissal of the criminal case against him. In her letter, Dulce said that the affidavit of desistance was
supposed to be submitted to the trial court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, but, for
unknown reasons, the same was not done by accused-appellants counsel. This affidavit of desistance,
however, not being formally offered before the trial court, has no probative value.
We now consider accused-appellants assignment of errors.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26, 1997 without a warrant, was
illegal. On this point, Rule 113, 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just
committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal knowledge of
facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. [32]
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question,
therefore, is whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers,
to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. The two did not have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of
the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based
entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio,
Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along
Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim
coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen
with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown
short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by
Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias Jun Dulce and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived
and accompanied them to accused-appellants house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied
on information given to them by others.
In an analogous case,[33] the police was informed that the accused was involved in subversive activities. On
the basis of this information, the police arrested the accused and, in the course of the arrest, allegedly
recovered an unlicensed firearm and some subversive materials from the latter. This Court held that the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their information came entirely from an informant. It was
pointed out that at the time of his arrest, the accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in
subversive activities. His arrest without a warrant could not be justified under 5(b).
In another case,[34] the accused, in a case of robbery with rape, were arrested solely on the basis of the
identification given by one of the victims. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for lack of personal knowledge
of the arresting officers. More recently, in Posadas v. Ombudsman,[35] this Court, in declaring the arrest
without warrant of two University of the Philippines students to be illegal, held:
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this
case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners
who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just
been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that [the students] were
probably guilty.
....
[T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after the commission of the
crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably
guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses,
which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
Indeed, at the time [the victim] was killed, these [NBI] agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When
[the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the students], the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing
anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, [they], under
the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the
campus.
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-appellant to be guilty of
the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber revolver, and two spent .38
caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing anything overtly
criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came after his arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the
objects allegedly seized from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.

Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a warrant. The
records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on November 11, 1997. It is true that on
August 28, 1997, he filed a petition for reinvestigation in which he alleged that he had been illegally detained
without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. In its order, dated September 9, 1997, the trial court granted his
motion and ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit his findings within
thirty (30) days thereof.[36] On October 7, 1997, City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu moved for the resetting of
accused-appellants arraignment from October 8, 1997 to the first week of November, 1997 on the ground that
the findings on the laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been received from the NBI. [37]Accusedappellant did not object to the arraignment. The City Prosecutors request was, therefore, granted and the
arraignment was reset to November 11, 1997.[38] Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on
the ground that his arrest was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person. Instead,
on November 11, 1997, at the scheduled arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.[39] On the same day, the trial court issued an order stating that, as a result of
accused-appellants arraignment, his motion for preliminary investigation had become moot and academic
and, accordingly, set the case for trial. [40] Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his
arrest.[41]
Second. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the arresting police
officers to search his house and, therefore, the Hanes t-shirt, the two spent slugs, and the .38 caliber
revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution, on the other hand, insists
that accused-appellant consented to the search of his house.
To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence
of an actual intention to relinquish the right. A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search
cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For as Justice Laurel explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia
v.Locsin,[42] As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law.
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot
invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the
search was unconsented. It is noteworthy that the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, SPO1
Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the search show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave
them permission to search his house. At every turn, even when they were not being asked, they said the
search was made with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, the lady doth protest too
much, methinks. Indeed, not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he ever consented to the search
of his dwelling but the prosecution has not shown any good reason why accused-appellant might have agreed
to the search.
The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming the
warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allows only
the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from
destroying evidence or from using the weapon against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this
case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accusedappellants immediate control. In fact, according to the rosecution, the police found the gun only after going
back to the house of accused-appellant.
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the plain view doctrine. As this Court held
in People v. Musa:[43]
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification
for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another

object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course,
the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d
583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]

Here, the search of accused-appellants house was illegal and, consequently, the things obtained as a result
of the illegal search, i.e., the white Hanes t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible
in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence. After
bringing accused-appellant to the Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet
Garcellano as the victims companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked accused-appellant where he hid
the gun used in killing the victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when accused-appellant refused to answer,
he sought accused-appellants permission to go back to his house and there found the .38 caliber revolver on
top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun was purposely sought by the police
officers and they did not merely stumble upon it.

ATTY. BAYBAY:

Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white Hanes t-shirt placed on top of the divider in plain
view as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to
conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was
not bloodied which could have directed his attention to take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the tshirt (Exh. B-2), it is not visible that there were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt (Exh. H) merely had some small
specks of blood at its lower portion.
Third. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. Danet Garcellano said that
accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25, 1997; that the victim joined him at about 2:30 a.m.;
and that although both left the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a.m., she really did not know if they left together. Thus,
Danet testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:

Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other?

A When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer, they talked and afterwards, I
already left them and I served the other customers.
Q

A No, Sir, what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two bottles of beer which were
paid by Piamonte inside, Sir.
....

The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30?

Yes, Sir.

Now, how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people at that time?

That is only my estimation, Sir.

You only estimated?

Yes, Sir.

Q And, what was the basis of your estimation?

A

Because at that time there were only few customers in that place, Sir.

Q So, you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You also did not see him leave?
A No, Sir.[45]

....
Q

Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left?

Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe?

A They were about to leave already at that time because they were already bringing with them the two
bottles of beer, Sir.
Q

But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe?

When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe, Henry boarded a tricycle, Sir.

How about Cubcubin, how did he leave the Sting Cafe?

He followed Henry, Sir.

How did he follow Henry, on foot, on board a vehicle or what?

I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served the other customers inside.[44]

....
On cross-examination, Danet said:
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q

When he left, he left alone?

I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served inside.

In People v. Gallarde,[46] it was explained that positive identification refers essentially to proof of identity and
not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. A witness may identify a
suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. Or, he
may not have actually seen the crime committed, but is nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as
the perpetrator of the crime, as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.
This rule, however, cannot be applied in the present case because Danet Garcellano did not actually see
accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting Cafe together. There is thus serious doubt as to whether
accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim. Her testimony is insufficient to place
accused-appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form part of the chain of circumstantial evidence to show
that accused-appellant committed the crime. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence
being proof beyond reasonable doubt.[47]
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant
testified that he could not have killed the victim because the latter was his friend whom he considered his
kuya or elder brother.[48] There is no showing that the killing of the victim was by reason of a supposed
altercation they had as to who would pay for the two bottles of beer ordered while they were at the Sting
Cafe. The beer was later paid for by the victim. Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may express the motive
or from which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred. [49]
Rule 133, 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the following in order to sustain a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was committed by accused-appellant in
view of the following: (1) As already stated, Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the Sting Cafe, did not actually

see accused-appellant and the victim leaving the cafe together at about 3:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997; (2) PO3
Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that when they arrived at the scene of the crime, they were informed by
a tricycle driver that the victim and the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together, but the
tricycle driver was not presented to confirm this fact; (3) SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that the white Hanes tshirt was bloodied, but the evidence shows that it had some bloodstains only on its lower portion (Exh. H),
while the photograph of the t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), supposedly taken at the time of the search,
shows that it had no bloodstains and this discrepancy was not explained by SPO1 Malinao, Jr.; (4) The fact
that the t-shirt was tested positive for type O blood does not necessarily mean that the bloodstains came
from the victim who also had a type O blood; (5) Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to
determine if he was positive for gunpowder nitrates; (8) The .38 caliber gun allegedly found in his house was
not examined for the possible presence of accused-appellants fingerprints; and (9) The allegation that the gun
was placed on top of a water container in accused-appellants house is unbelievable as it is improbable that
accused-appellant could be so careless as to leave the fatal weapon there when he could have hidden it or
thrown it away.
Nor can we rest easy on the prosecutions claim as to where the two empty shells and the t-shirt were
allegedly found. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that these were placed beside the white Hanes t-shirt and fell
when he took the shirt. On direct examination, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q

What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time?

A We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the house, then after entering the
same, while we were in the sala near the kitchen we saw the white Hanes t-shirt there, Sir, that was near the
kitchen.
Q

Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the same?

A
Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that house and there is a table
there and that t-shirt was placed on the table.
Q

Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house?

Yes, Sir.

Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?

A Before I got the t-shirt, I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-shirt, Sir, and he even
gave me the permission to get the same, after getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and
I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains.
Q

This white t-shirt, can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt?

Hanes, Sir.

How about the blood spot or blood stains, can you tell us how many, if you can remember?

We were in a hurry, I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were blood stains on the t-shirt, Sir.

Q How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt, can you describe to us these 2 empty
shells?
A

Empty shells of .38 cal. bullets, Sir.

What did you do with the empty shells?

I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him, Sir.[50]

However, on cross-examination, he said he found the empty shells on top of a cabinet (tokador) in the
bedroom on the second floor of the house. Thus, he testified:
ATTY. BAYBAY:

Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it?

In the kitchen area, Sir.

Where in the kitchen area, on the floor or on the wall?

It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider anymore, Sir.

And that t-shirt was immediately near the door, on the floor?

Yes, Sir.

What did you do after that, when you saw the t-shirt there?

I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt, Sir.

And you said, you looked at it?

Yes, Sir.

When you said, you looked at it, how did you look at it?

I spread it out in front of him, Sir.

And when you spread it out in front of him, did you ask him whose t-shirt is it?

I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him, Sir.

What did he say?

According to him, the t-shirt does not belong to him, Sir.

You also testified that you found two empty shells?

Yes, Sir.

Where did you find these two empty shells?

From the bedroom upstairs, Sir.

Bedroom upstairs?

Yes, Sir.

You mean, it is a two-storey house?

Yes, Sir, there is a bedroom upstairs.

You found it when you went up?

A I first asked his permission to look around inside the house, Sir, because I was asking him also about the
whereabouts of the firearm he had.
Q

And he allowed you?

He allowed me, sir.

And when you went upstairs, you found the two empty shells?

Yes, Sir, they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a curtain.

Q In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN, you stated that you got the t-shirt and
when you lifted the t-shirt, two empty shells fell off?
A

After finding the two empty shells for a .38 caliber, Sir, I placed them together with the t-shirt.

Q What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs, you found two empty shells and you put them
together with the t-shirt, that is what you are telling us now?
A After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt, I put it on the original place where it was, Sir, and after finding
the two empty shells, it so happened that the investigator was behind me so after that, I showed to him the tshirt as well as the empty shells.[51]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant
Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful
cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

....
SO ORDERED.
Q Also in your previous testimony, you got the t-shirt and you asked the permission to get the t-shirt, after
getting the t-shirt, there were 2 empty shells which fell. The question is, do you remember that this happened?
A

These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs, sir, I placed them on top of the t-shirt.

You said, when you got the t-shirt, something fell, in your direct testimony?

A While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me, Sir, I got the t-shirt, I spread it out and nothing fell yet at that
time, then I asked him about the firearm that he used.

G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

....
Q

Do you remember having been asked this particular question:

REGALADO, J.:

Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?

A Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-shirt, Sir, and he even
gave me the permission to get the same, after getting the t-shirt there were even 2 empty shells which fell, and
I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains.
A

Yes, Sir, I remember it.

I am just referring to two empty shells that fell, which you said, is that true?

A Yes, Sir, there were empty shells that fell, but I first placed them on top of the t-shirt because I was
planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt.
Q

You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front door of the house, is that true?

Yes, Sir.

And you were referring to the time that you entered the house?

Yes, Sir.

And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you got it?

A What I said before was that, I got the t-shirt, I lifted it, after that, I placed it on its original place, Sir, and I
asked him about the firearm but he was not commenting anything on that, so I asked permission from him to
go upstairs to look around.
Q When you said you placed that from the place where you found it, how did you put it on the place where
you found it?
A I placed it there the way I saw it before, the way it was previously placed there, Sir, because I was
planning to bring the t-shirt.[52]
Thus, caught in his own contradiction, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. prevaricated but in the process committed more
contradictions. He said he found the empty shells on top of the tokador on the second floor of the house,
brought them downstairs, and then placed them on the t-shirt. When he got the t-shirt, the empty shells fell on
the floor. But how could he have gotten the shells from the second floor if, according to him, he found them by
accident when they fell from the t-shirt which he found immediately after entering accused-appellants house
and before going up to the second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said
he found the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen, he later said he found it on the floor.

On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, finding accusedappellant Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. 1
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution of criminal cases,
recommends the acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of
Appellee's Brief) filed with the Court. We have reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary
evidence in this case and we find said recommendation to be well taken.
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel Segovia and
Antonio Lonceras, with allegedly having in their custody and possession 100 grams of marijuana leaves and
for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00.

During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. At the trial, the
prosecution and the defense presented several witnesses after which the court a quo rendered judgment
acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras but convicting and penalizing herein appellant as
hereinbefore stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their headquarters at the
Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio
Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a
confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas,
Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was given P200.00
in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur
buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas
alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find Don and
where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he was accompanied by a man
who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant. 3
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by
Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a
certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor.
Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of
marijuana. 4

Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects.
In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga,
Albay and arrested appellant, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however,
armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused. The arrestees were brought to the
headquarters for investigation. 5
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza, father of appellant. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate
dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any
search warrant. 6
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but appellant was detained. An
affidavit, allegedly taken from and executed by him, was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor.
Appellant had no counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation. The
arrestees were also examined by personnel of the PCCL and were found positive for ultraviolet powder. 7
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987 listening to the radio. Later,
he ate his merienda and then went out to buy cigarettes from the store. While he was at the store, a jeep
stopped behind him. Several armed men alighted therefrom and ordered him to get inside the jeep. He refused
but he was forced to board the vehicle. He was even hit by the butt of a gun. 8
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated and was repeatedly asked
regarding the whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was manhandled by the NARCOM agents and was detained
while inside the camp. He was then made to hold a P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he was
taken to the PCCL and examined he was found positive of the ultraviolet powder. He was also made to sign
some papers but he did not know what they were all about. 9
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi
City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told
him that their father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Appellant went to Camp Bagong
Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked
if he knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like
Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From
that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order
to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. 10
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting in evidence
the sworn statement of appellant which was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) convicting
appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves allegedly bought
from him were not properly identified; (3) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the
evidence for the prosecution is weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of selling or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the
afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In disposing of this case,
however, we feel that the issues raised by appellant should properly be discussed seriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug
dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or
posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification.
Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana
leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his
custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust
operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been subjected to the sanctions
imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.

2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was squarely placed in issue and,
as correctly pointed out by the defense, said sworn statement is inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel during custodial examination. He was also asked if he was waiving his
right to be assisted by counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person under
custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently but also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. 13 In the present case, the waiver
made by appellant being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient to invalidate said
sworn statement. 14
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting in evidence against appellant
the articles allegedly confiscated during the raid conducted in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. 15 True, in some instances, this Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the
owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; 16 when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest; 17 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; 18 when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; 20 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a search may be validly made even without a search
warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza
was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the
aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.
The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation
because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because
they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves
and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what
were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were
the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic
bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored
plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.

Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe. 22
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves
that became the basis of appellant's conviction. 23 In People vs. Rubio, 24 this Court had the occasion to rule
that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime.
As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be
fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness will not affect his credibility.
It even enhances such credibility because it only shows that he has not been rehearsed. 25 However, when the
inconsistencies pertain to material and crucial points, the same detract from his overall credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are tainted with serious flaws and material inconsistencies
rendering the same incredible. 26

Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused was also revealed during
the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and Hospicio Segovia, father of
Samuel Segovia, testified that Sgt. Molinawe, who has since been reportedly dismissed from the service,
asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange for the liberty of the accused. 29 This allegation was
never refuted by the prosecution. Hence, the rule laid down by this Court that the statements of prosecution
witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit 30 has no application in the case at bar.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly shown by the
evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence
accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and
imaginary imputations against him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It is hereby ordered that he
be immediately released from custody unless he is otherwise detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of the place where the
buy-bust operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he did not even know the exact place and
the identity of the person from whom he was to buy marijuana leaves. Thus:
FISCAL TOLOSA

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional
Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Q What place in Tagas were you able to go (to)?

WITNESS

FELICIANO, J.:

A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in Tagas, although we occasionally passed there.

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan
was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner
entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At
the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell
and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do that afternoon?
A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have already been conducted (sic) surveylance (sic) in the
vicinity.
Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the suspect?
A By the road, sir.
Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you arrived at Tagas?
A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.
Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?
A According to him, we could get some. 27
The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct examination, he declared that they
arrested the three accused all at the same time on the fateful night of July 1, 1987. But, in his crossexamination and as corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 28 submitted by him and Molinawe, it appeared
that Lonceras and Segovia were arrested on different times and that appellant Don Rodrigueza was not
among those who were arrested. Instead, it was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a
much later time.
With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more credibility to the testimony of
appellant Rodrigueza. While it is true that appellant's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest
defense in a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in his
testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his testimony that he was not among those who
were arrested on the night of July 1, 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza
was not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come
from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The
police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake
shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as
the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the
police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he
was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in
court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the
accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no
objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
5

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same
date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released
that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that
petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro,
who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a
copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1)
the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the
Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release
and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23
July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court
assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion
was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on
23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to
admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In
view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court
then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October;
and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in
view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse
of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his
arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision
petitions, on the following grounds:

14

dismissing the two (2)

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had
been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up at
the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police
Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right
to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had
the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by
the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the
Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also
filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court
issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below
until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether
petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been
validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2
July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at
the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one
of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen
(14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the
Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because
petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was
legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers
who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal
knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to
preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this
case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the
ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an
outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was
arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in
time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the
basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of nonavailability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for
bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
(Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not
state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had
slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112
was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover,
since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith
subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we
note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As
earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation.
The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not
with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary

investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be
predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by
the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for
murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner
was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo
v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or
not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to
due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a reinvestigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the
trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's
omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a
preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation,
and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of
Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be
held to have been substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to
due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant
case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment.22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment.At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of
Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being
forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right
to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case,
petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus
motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash

bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply
waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court
asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal
justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was
equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was
not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order
granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly
arbitrary considering that no evidence at all and certainly no new or additional evidence had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before.
It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the
merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon,
firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail?
Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against
him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that
the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable
cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence
on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to
undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to
the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did
so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23
August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear
petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an
obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with
counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel
once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made
of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of
his detention. 30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was
because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run
the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial
process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released
on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the
reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of
petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence
on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to
bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the
deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission
and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to
require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn
out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any
case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of
its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial
court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of
the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of
fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial
Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the
trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano but am at a loss for reasons why
an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and
notwithstanding the recommendations of the Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had
faithfully followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is really guilty, then he
may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to go back to square one.
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to
public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly
but faithfully inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and
sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give
the appearanceof complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of
a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of
those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case
who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media
coverage may be presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence, the
importance of the court always following the Rules.
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the foregoing observations
because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's decision.
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had waived the right to preliminary
investigation because he freely participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. A closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the proceedings footnoted in
theponencia, reveals that he had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had
reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if
he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually

compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one, so to speak, but that is not the
petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly
observed. The delay entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the Government
and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his precipitate and illegal action.
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the
impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person.
Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering
instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.

GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point, after four (4) prosecution
witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who
shot Eldon Maguan inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate number of the
gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of
which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by
filing the information against him, presumably believed to be so).
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return the case to the Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be
supererogatory.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage,
led to the identification of the suspect who, seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police
station to verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering the station, he was
positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who was being interrogated by the police to ferret more
clues and details about the crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July 8,
1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for frustrated homicide against him. As
the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor,
instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on July 11, 1991 in the
Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion for preliminary investigation and
release on bail (which was erroneously filed with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of
P100,000 for his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.

The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on
bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the
application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary
investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed for it will
accomplish a double purpose. The parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the
evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally
foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an application for bail by one accused of a
capital offense, "the judge is under a legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs.
Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472; Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for persons charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987
Constitution). In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for having granted the
motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to
comment or file objections thereto.
Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to
present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of
the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued
upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of discretion that
would call for the remedy of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail for it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the "petitioner was not arrested at all" (p.
12) and that "petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the
person into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1,
Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go
walked into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan,
he was actually and effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA
377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).

Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly after he had issued: (a) his
order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16,
1991 granting the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu propio issued on July
17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for
bail.

I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.

The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that the trial of the case should be
suspended and that the prosecutor should now conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with
this case. In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA 1024, the trial of
the criminal case had not yet commenced because motions to quash the information were filed by the
accused.Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego vs. Hernandez, 24
SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary
investigations had in fact been conducted before the informations were filed in court.

Separate Opinions

It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not
a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177
SCRA 354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information (Rodis vs.
Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront
witnesses (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano but am at a loss for reasons why
an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and
notwithstanding the recommendations of the Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had
faithfully followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is really guilty, then he
may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to go back to square one.

I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to
public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly
but faithfully inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and
sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give
the appearanceof complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of
a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of
those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case
who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media
coverage may be presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence, the
importance of the court always following the Rules.
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the foregoing observations
because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's decision.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage,
led to the identification of the suspect who, seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police
station to verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering the station, he was
positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who was being interrogated by the police to ferret more
clues and details about the crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July 8,
1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for frustrated homicide against him. As
the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor,
instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on July 11, 1991 in the
Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion for preliminary investigation and
release on bail (which was erroneously filed with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of
P100,000 for his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly after he had issued: (a) his
order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16,
1991 granting the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu propio issued on July
17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for
bail.

I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had waived the right to preliminary
investigation because he freely participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. A closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the proceedings footnoted in
theponencia, reveals that he had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had
reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if
he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually
compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.

The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that the trial of the case should be
suspended and that the prosecutor should now conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with
this case. In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA 1024, the trial of
the criminal case had not yet commenced because motions to quash the information were filed by the
accused.Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego vs. Hernandez, 24
SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary
investigations had in fact been conducted before the informations were filed in court.

It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one, so to speak, but that is not the
petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly
observed. The delay entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the Government
and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his precipitate and illegal action.

It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not
a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177
SCRA 354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information (Rodis vs.
Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront
witnesses (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).

It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the
impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person.
Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering
instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.

GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point, after four (4) prosecution
witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who
shot Eldon Maguan inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate number of the
gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of
which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by
filing the information against him, presumably believed to be so).
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return the case to the Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be
supererogatory.

The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on
bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the
application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary
investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed for it will
accomplish a double purpose. The parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the
evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally
foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an application for bail by one accused of a
capital offense, "the judge is under a legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs.
Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472; Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for persons charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987
Constitution). In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for having granted the
motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to
comment or file objections thereto.
Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to
present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of
the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued
upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of discretion that
would call for the remedy of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail for it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the "petitioner was not arrested at all" (p.
12) and that "petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the
person into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1,
Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go
walked into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan,
he was actually and effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA
377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).
I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.
[G.R. No. 123980. August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL CALIMLIM y MUYANO, accusedappellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the joint decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch
46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant Manuel Calimlim guilty of four (4) counts of rape based
on similarly-worded informations in the following criminal cases:
Criminal Case No. U-8525:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality of Manaoag, province of
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Criminal Case No. U-8638:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality of Manaoag, province of
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. U-8639:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality of Manaoag, province of
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. U-8640:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1995, at the Poblacion of the municipality of Manaoag, province of
Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, a minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits followed.
The prosecutions case was mainly based on the testimony of private complainant, LANIE S. LIMIN. According
to her, she was fourteen (14) years old and had been living with the family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and
Cresencia Ferrer (Ferrers) for the past three years. The night of April 2, 1995, she was left alone in one of the
two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions, the sons of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the
night. The Ferrers were in the other house about 15 meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened
when she heard somebody, later identified as appellant, enter her room. Appellant immediately poked a knife
at the left side of her neck and said, Accompany me because I killed my wife. [6] She was then dragged to the
pig pen, about 8-9 meters away from the place where she slept. Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back
to her room, then to her cousins room and to the kitchen. In each of these places, appellant forcibly had
sexual intercourse with her while he poked a knife against her neck. According to her, she first recognized
appellant while they were in the kitchen when she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. She stated
that she knew appellant because she had seen him always following her whenever she went to school. After
the fourth intercourse, appellant threatened that he would kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite the
threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer,[7] who then reported the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived
nearby.[8] On cross-examination, complainant stated that she did not struggle nor shout nor resist because she
was afraid that appellant might kill her.[9]
The second witness was CRESENCIA FERRER, who testified that the victim was her niece. Lanies
grandmother was the sister of her mother. Cresencia testified that Lanie was born in Sexmoan, Pampanga,
on June 13, 1981, and became her ward starting October 25, 1993. On the evening of April 2, 1995, Cresencia
said she was in her shop in front of their house. Lanie was left alone in the other house because her usual
companions, the children of the Ferrers, all went to a disco. The other children, Christian and Manicris, were
inside their shop with her and her husband. Cresencia recalled that she was still awake at 11:30 P.M. working
on some clothing materials. She did not see or notice anything unusual that night. The following morning, she
tried to get Lanie to rise but the latter did not want to. Lanie was crying so she decided to leave Lanie
alone. At around 8:00 A.M., Cresencias daughter Manicris called her from outside the shop to inform her that
Dr. Quinto was there to talk to her. Dr. Quinto and Manicris told Cresencia that Lanie had been raped.
Cresencia said that when she confronted Lanie about it, Lanie narrated her ordeal and pointed to appellant as
her rapist. The women brought Lanie to the Community Hospital in Baritao where she was medically
examined. Then they reported the matter to the police. [10]
On cross-examination, Cresencia recalled that around 3:00 A.M., April 3, 1995, the wee hours after the alleged
rape, she heard their gate opening because of the arrival of her three sons from the disco. [11]
SPO1 MARIO SURATOS testified that he was the duty officer when the rapes were reported to their station by
Kagawad Ferrer.[12] It was not the victim herself who reported the rapes. [13]
DR. RICARDO FERRER, who conducted the physical examination on Lanie, testified that there was minimal
vaginal bleeding and there were lacerations in the hymen, the positions of which were at 9:00 oclock, 6:00
oclock and 3:00 oclock, all fresh, indicating that there were insertions within the past 24 hours. There was
also a whitish vaginal discharge which was found positive for spermatozoa. [14]
During cross-examination, Dr. Ferrer stated that the lacerations found inside the complainants vagina could
have been caused by hard objects other than a penis. He said the lacerations could have also been caused
by fingers or a thumb, but would unlikely be the victims since she would have stopped once she felt the pain.
The doctor also stated that it was possible that the spermatozoa was artificially placed inside the vagina, but
that it was not possible to determine the identity of the person who emitted it. [15]
Appellant MANUEL CALIMLIM denied the accusations. He claimed that he was in his house on the evening of
April 2, 1995, and that he went to sleep at 10:00 P.M. He recalled that he even had sex with his wife in the
early morning of April 3, 1995. He averred that he was just being used as a scapegoat by the Ferrers who
hated him since he did not vote for Ferrer who was a candidate during the last elections. He also surmised
that the Ferrers could have been irked when appellant allowed the construction of a waiting shed in front of his
house. He asserted that as a hollow blocks maker, a physically draining job, he was often tired and weak and
had little strength to engage in sex for more than once a month. [16]
ERLINDA PIMENTEL CALIMLIM, wife of accused, testified that on the night of April 2, 1995, she was with the
accused, who slept from 10:00 P.M. until 5:00 A.M. the following morning. [17]
MARLENE P. CALIMLIM, daughter of appellant, testified that her father was with them on the evening of April
2, 1995 until the following morning. She remembered that her parents slept at 10:00 P.M. that night and she

sensed they even engaged in sexual intercourse at around 2:00 A.M. of April 3, 1995. She added that it was
possible the Ferrers were angry at her father because her father did not vote for Ferrer during the last
elections and also because of their disagreement about the waiting shed. [18]

THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WAS GROSSLY MISTAKEN IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE MAIN DEFENSE OF SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT THE NARRATION OF FACTS AS
ORCHESTRATED AND TESTIFIED TO BY ALLEGED VICTIM DEFIES IMAGINATION

On November 17, 1995, the trial court rendered its joint decision finding appellant guilty of all
charges. Appellant was sentenced to death for each count of rape. The similarly-worded dispositive portions of
said decision reads as follows:

IV

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused MANUEL CALIMLIM y Muyano:

WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8525:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659,
the offense having been committed with the attendant circumstance of with the use of a deadly weapon and
with the generic aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and disguise, hereby sentences him to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the complainant LANIE S. LIMIN the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, and
to pay the costs.
IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8638:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659,
the offense having been committed with the attendant circumstance of with the use of a deadly weapon and
with the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and disguise, hereby sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the offended party LANIE S. LIMIN the amount of P50,000.00 as
damages, and to pay the costs.
WITH REGARDS TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8639:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659,
the offense having been committed with the attendant circumstance of with the use of a deadly weapon and
with the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and disguise, hereby sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, to pay the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the
costs.
AS TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8640:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659,
the offense having been committed with the attendant circumstance of with the use of a deadly weapon and
with the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and disguise, hereby sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to pay the complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to
pay the costs.
The law is harsh, but that is the law.
Dura lex, sed lex, it is said.
SO ORDERED.[19]
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THAT THE SAID HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
ACCUSED NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED
II
THAT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT MISCONVICTED SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FOUR (4) COUNTS OF RAPE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN WHO
PHYSICALLY EXAMINED THE ALLEGED VICTIM THAT IF EVER THERE WAS A CRIME OF RAPE
COMMITTED IT COULD ONLY BE ONCE
III

AND THE FOREMOST, THE HONORABLE COURT OVERLOOKED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, SUCH AS THE REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A CHANCE TO ACCUSEDAPPELLANT TO FILE COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS AND THAT OF HIS WITNESSES; HIS BEING IMMEDIATELY
ARRESTED WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF ARREST; AND WHEN ARRESTED, WAS NOT
ACCORDED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN BROUGHT TO THE PNP INVESTIGATIVE BODY [20]
In sum, the issues here involve the credibility of witnesses, the denial of appellants constitutional rights, the
sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction, and the propriety of the death sentence imposed on him.
Appellant raises the defense of denial and alibi while he challenges complainants credibility. He insists that
he was at home during the time the alleged crimes were perpetrated. He also argues that complainants story
is unlikely because a man like him would not be able to consummate four (4) rapes in just one night and within
a short time. He asserts that he is just being made a fall guy by complainants guardians who hold a grudge
against him. Appellant also points out that the testimony of complainant shows that she did not exert any
tenacious resistance, implying that if there was intercourse, she had consented to it. Appellant also claims he
was denied his right against warrantless arrests, his right to remain silent, and his right to due process. For
example, he was not allowed to submit any counter-affidavit during the investigation of his case. [21]
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, stresses that the testimony of complainant deserves full faith
and credit. There is no showing that she was impelled by any improper motive in filing her complaint. A young
barrio lass would not fabricate a charge of sexual abuse and subject herself to the humiliation of a public trial
unless she was motivated by a strong desire to bring her abuser to justice. The victim did not show tenacious
resistance since, being a young girl, she was easily awed and overpowered by appellant. Her lack of
resistance could also be attributed to paralyzing fear she felt at the time of her rape. Contrary to appellants
claim, there was no impossibility nor improbability about complainants story. The findings and evaluation of
the trial court regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be given great respect since the trial
court was in the best position to observe the demeanor, attitude and manner of the witnesses. Finally, said the
OSG, the defense of denial and alibi presented by the appellant cannot prevail over the positive identification
made by the complainant that appellant was the rapist.
The OSG recommends, however, that the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua, and not death,
because the informations charging appellant of rape did not allege the qualifying circumstance of use of a
deadly weapon. The OSG also recommends an increase in the damages to be awarded to the complainant.
[22]

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has three guiding principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2)
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit, and the prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.[23]
Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.[24] In evaluating the credibility of witnesses, much weight and great respect is
given to the findings made by the trial court [25] since it has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses first-hand under grilling cross-examination. Hence, findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. [26]
In this case, we find that complainant has no reason to falsely accuse appellant. Appellant avers that
complainant was influenced by the Ferrers to falsely accuse him. He also insinuates that complainant was
protecting the real offenders, the children of the Ferrers, out of blind loyalty to them. However, both averment
and insinuation are not sufficiently backed up by persuasive proof. They are mere darts in the dark, pathetic
ploys that remain preposterous propositions offered up by the defense. It is rather unseemly as well as
unnatural for complainant to subject herself to public ridicule, exonerate her real ravishers, and vent her fury
only against appellant. It would have been easier for her to endure her shame in silence rather than invent a

sordid story if it were not true. As we have consistently held, a young girl would not concoct a rape charge,
allow the examination of her private parts, then publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused, if her
motive were other than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her. [27] That she was
prevailed upon by the Ferrers to fabricate the rape charge, just to get even with appellant because he did not
vote for Ferrer, is too inane a tale to inspire belief. Complainants testimony on record is too candid and
straightforward to be mere fabrication. She bared details which could not be concocted easily even by an
ingenious or imaginative narrator. She cried for several minutes,[28] while she testified, enhancing her
testimonys credibility.[29] Absent any ill-motive to falsely accuse appellant, we hold that complainants
testimony deserves full faith and credence. [30]
The defense capitalizes on the fact that complainant did not tenaciously resist the assault on her. Physical
resistance, however, need not be established in rape when the victim is intimidated, threatened by a knife.
[31]
Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape and not by any hard and fast rule. [32] In this case, the victim was a minor while
her attacker was an armed man boasting he had just killed his wife. Indeed a rape victim need not show that
she would fight unto death,[33] resisting a brutal crime. What is essential in this prosecution of her ravisher, is
evidence showing that she did not consent to the sexual act, while he had used force and intimidation in
achieving his evil desire.[34]
Further, the defense wants to make us believe that it was not possible for appellant to consummate four (4)
acts of rape in just one night. This proposition deserves scant consideration. Rape is an act of depravity and
lust. There is no rhyme nor reason for beastly acts. But negative testimony on mere possibilities cannot
outweigh positive testimony of complainant on the number of sexual violations she endured.
Now we come to the defense of alibi which appellant offers coupled with outright denial. Corroborated mainly
by his close relatives, this defense is less than persuasive and piteously dubious. [35] It is not credible because
it is tainted with bias, especially in this case where the witnesses are the wife and the daughter of appellant.
[36]
Worse, the testimonies of said witnesses were not even consistent with one another. Note that the wife,
Erlinda, testified that the appellant slept from 10:00 P.M. of April 2, 1995 until 5:00 A.M. the following morning.
[37]
But the daughter, Marlene, testified that her parents were awake and perhaps made love at around 2:00
A.M. of April 3, 1995.[38] Erlinda said she did not know if her husband woke up during the night, after she
mentioned she had a light sleep and would have noticed if he did. [39] Inconsistency in the statements of the
defense witnesses, while not necessarily an indication that they were lying, suggests that both mother and
daughter could not recall with precision what happened during the crucial hours of the night of April 2 to early
morning of April 3, 1995, but merely included the events that normally happen at around those hours in their
household. Ranged against complainants positive identification of her rapist and her candid, straightforward
and convincing testimony, the defense of alibi raised by appellant must surely fall for lack of merit.
More substantially, appellant avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, [40] since his arrest was made
one day after the crime was committed, but without any judicial warrant, although the police had ample time to
get one. This he claims is also in violation of Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. [41] But here it will be noted
that appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had
effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the
unlawful restraint of his liberty.[42] This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure:[43]
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objectionsexcept those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of this
Rule. (Underlining supplied)
Given the circumstances of his case now, the exceptions do not apply here and we are constrained to rule that
appellant is estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.[44] The defenses claim of warrantless arrest which is
illegal cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellant, nor
can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability. [45]
However, we find one point in appellants favor. As recommended by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
penalty imposable on the appellant for the rapes committed should not be capital punishment. The qualifying
circumstance, concerning use of deadly weapon, was not alleged in the four informations against the

appellant. Even if proved during trial, still that circumstance could not be used to aggravate appellants crime,
not having been included in the informations. To do so would violate appellants right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. See People vs. Motos, 317 SCRA 96, 119 (1999), which held that
where neither the complaint nor the evidence introduced show any qualifying circumstance that would make
the offense fall within the category of rape punishable by death, the only penalty that can be properly decreed
is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, in People vs. Pailanco, 322 SCRA 790, 804 (2000), we also held that:
...neither can we impose the death penalty for the second incident of rape when complainant was threatened
with a bolo by accused-appellant. Although under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposable when the rape is committed with the use of
a deadly weapon, however, in the case at bar, the use of a deadly weapon during the second incident of rape
was not alleged in the information... [A] qualifying circumstance may only be taken into account as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance when it is not alleged in the information (citing People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA
162). The next lower penalty to death being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, only the same
may be imposed regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances.
Conformably to law and jurisprudence, appellant herein can only be convicted of simple rapes committed by
using force and intimidation, punishable by reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
Finally, in line with current jurisprudence and considering the need to deter commission of a bestial offense
against a minor, aside from the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each rape, appellant should be made to pay
the additional amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for every
count of rape.[46]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the appellant Manuel Calimlim y Muyano GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, in Criminal Case Nos. U-8525, U-8638, U-8639, and U-8640 is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon the appellant is only reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape. Further, he is ORDERED to pay private complainant Lanie S. Limin the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135542. July 18, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO VIALON Y SAN AGUSTIN and
ARNOLD DEVERA Y MOCALEN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision[1] dated August 13, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 95, finding appellants Reynaldo Vialon y San Agustin and Arnold Devera y Mocalen guilty of
robbery with homicide and sentencing each to suffer the penalty of death.
The appellants were indicted under the following Information:
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said appellants, conspiring,
confederating with other persons whose true names, identities, whereabouts and other personal
circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by
means of violence and intimidation against persons, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob
PO1 Joseph H. Llave of the PNP National Capital Region Command, Norman A. Mapa and Reynaldo B. Elidio
in the following manner, to wit: on the date in the place aforementioned, the said appellants, posing
themselves as passengers boarded a Jell Transport passenger bus with Plate No. PXC-266 and while said
bus was cruising along Commonwealth Avenue near Don Antonio Avenue, Brgy. Old Balara, this City, a public
highway, appellants armed with handguns and bladed weapon announced a hold up and thereafter robbed
and divested them of their personal properties, to wit:
PO1 Joseph H. Llave

1. One (1) firearm, cal. .45 pistol marked Armscor with SN 748966;
2. One (1) mens watch;
Norman A. Mapa
1. Cash money amounting to P5,000.00 representing the days collection.
Reynaldo B. Elidio
1. One (1) Mens watch (Seiko-5)-----------------P1,600.00;
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties within the amount aforementioned;
further that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling the said
appellants to take, steal and carry away the aforementioned articles, the said appellants in pursuance of their
conspiracy, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one PO1 Joseph H.
Llave by then and there shooting him on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter; that likewise on the same
occasion of the robbery appellants shot with the use of handguns Norman A. Mapa hitting him on the face and
Antonio C. Hernandez hitting him on the hip thereby causing them serious physical injuries which have
required medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended parties.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented Jimmy Solomon, the bus driver; Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, a medico-legal officer from
the PNP Crime Laboratory Services; PO3 Pedro Walawala, the investigating officer; Dr. Reynaldo Perez,
examining doctor of victims Norman[3] Mapa and Antonio Fernandez; Reynaldo Elidio, a passenger; and PO3
Bernard Amigo, the arresting officer.
JIMMY SOLOMON testified that on September 24, 1997 at around 1:00 A.M., he was driving a Jell Transport
bus with at least 30 passengers on board going to Fairview, Quezon City. Upon reaching Ever Gotesco in
Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, appellants and two others announced a heist. One of the holdup men, later identified as appellant Arnold Devera, poked an ice pick at Solomon while his cohorts started
divesting passengers of their jewelries and other personal belongings.
According to Solomon, one of the passengers, later identified as PO1 Joseph Llave, engaged the hold-up men
in a shoot-out. PO1 Llave was able to shoot appellant Vialon in the stomach but himself sustained three
gunshot wounds -- two at the head and one at the chest area. Solomon stated that during the shoot-out, stray
bullets hit the bus conductor, Norman Mapa, and one of the passengers, Antonio Fernandez. The hold-up
men then directed him to stop the bus and they all alighted.

REYNALDO ELIDIO, a passenger, corroborated the testimony of Solomon as to the details and sequence of
events. Further, Elidio identified Vialon as the one who poked a gun at him and took his watch. [11] He stated
that out of the other three assailants, he could only identify Devera whom he saw poke an ice pick at the bus
driver.[12] He also stated that he saw Vialon shoot PO1 Llave at the forehead and at the chest [13] with a .45
caliber pistol.[14] According to him, he identified the appellants as their aggressors at the Malvar Hospital where
they brought PO1 Llave.[15] Witness Elidio affirmed that he executed a sworn statement before PO3 Pedro
Walawala.[16]
PO3 BERNARD AMIGO testified that on September 24, 1997, his superior sent him, SPO2 Quinto, and SPO2
Makabarek to check on the hold-up incident.[17] They proceeded to the Malvar General Hospital and later some
of the passengers arrived and pinpointed appellants as the assailants. [18] Vialon was then being treated for a
gunshot wound.[19] After ascertaining their identities, the policemen frisked appellants and found in Vialons
pocket four wristwatches, a wallet with cash, and identification papers belonging to PO1 Llave. [20] Seized from
Devera were three bladed instruments, three gold rings, and a pair of earrings. [21]
For the defense, appellant Reynaldo Vialon, co-appellant Arnold Devera, and Vialons wife, Diory Vialon,
took the witness stand.
Appellant REYNALDO VIALON testified that on September 23, 1997, his wife instructed him to go to
Fairview, Quezon City for her brothers despedida party.[22] At around 10:30 P.M., he boarded a Jell bus bound
for Fairview and dozed off along the way. He was awakened by gunfire and realized he was shot. [23] He
disclaimed taking part in the robbery.[24] He also denied knowing his co-appellant who took him to the Malvar
General Hospital[25] and added that it was his wife who spent for his medical treatment. [26] He claimed that the
case against him was filed without prior investigation.[27]
His wife, DIORY VIALON, corroborated his testimony.[28]
Appellant ARNOLD DEVERA, for his part, testified he was merely a passenger of the bus. He said that he
brought appellant Vialon to the Malvar General Hospital out of pity.[29] He denied poking an ice pick at the bus
driver or being part of the hold-up gang. [30]
On August 13, 1998, the trial court convicted appellants, sentencing them as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) appellants, Reynaldo Vialon y Agustin and
Arnold Devera y Mocalen, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Special Complex Crime of Robbery with
Homicide defined in and penalized by paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, and, there being one aggravating circumstance of Band (paragraph 6, Article 14, Revised
Penal Code) without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH. Both appellants are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late PO1 Joseph H. Llave the
amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
The watch (Exh. I) of Reynaldo B. Elidio, the belongings (Exhs. J to J-2) of the late PO1 Joseph H. Llave
and the other valuables (Exhs. K, L, M, N O & P) including the knife (Exh. Q) shall be kept by the
Court until the final termination of this case.

Solomon added that later, he and the remaining passengers on board proceeded to the Litex Police
Detachment where he gave a statement to the police. [4] From the police station, they brought PO1 Llave to the
Malvar General Hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Both appellants are ordered to pay the costs.

DR. MA. CRISTINA FREYRA conducted an autopsy on the body of PO1 Llave. [5] She testified that she found
gunshot wounds on the forehead, on the right lower portion of the nose, and on the right breast of the
deceased, all of which were fatal.[6] She stated that the cause of Llaves death was hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wounds.

Thus, appellants interposed this appeal seeking reversal of the judgment of the trial court on two grounds, viz.:

The testimony of PO3 PEDRO WALAWALA was dispensed with as both parties admitted that he was the
investigator of the case and that he had no personal knowledge of the incident itself. [7]
DR. REYNALDO F. PEREZ, the doctor who treated passengers Norman Mapa and Antonio Fernandez, [8] no
longer took the witness stand because the parties admitted the contents of the Medico-Legal Certificate he
prepared, showing that Mapa was shot at the left axillary area [9] and Fernandez was shot at the right lateral
pelvic area.[10]

IT IS SO ORDERED.[31]

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WHEN THEIR GUILT HAS NOT PROVED [SIC] BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
STILL THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY AFTER APPRECIATING THE
ATTENDANCE OF THE GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF A BAND IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME.[32]

From appellants discussion of the assigned errors, the following emerge as issues for our consideration: (1)
the validity of the warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incident thereto; (2) the sufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence to convict appellants for the crime of robbery with homicide; and (3) the propriety of the
penalty imposed.
Concerning the first issue, appellants aver that the police conducted the warrantless arrest based upon
unconfirmed suspicion. On this score, we have previously held that a warrantless arrest may be made by
police officers based on their personal knowledge culled from the victim herself who pointed to the suspect as
the assailant at the time of the arrest. [33] In our view, the arrest of appellants done immediately after the
incident was valid for it was made by the arresting officers after the victims of the robbery pointed to appellants
as the malefactors. Accordingly, the search and seizure that ensued are valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
[34]

However, appellants seek to nullify the seizure of the objects allegedly taken from their possession. They
claim they do not constitute admissible evidence as they were not duly receipted nor properly identified at the
time they were taken.
Cited in this regard is the case of People vs. Gesmundo,[35] which stated that the officer seizing the property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the
search and seizure was made. Note, however, that Gesmundo involved a search and seizure made pursuant
to a warrant, and not to a situation of seizure incidental to warrantless arrest, as in the present case. Here,
arresting officer Amigo testified that indeed he seized the disputed items from appellants but he did not issue a
receipt.[36] He claimed that the seized items were entered in the logbook of the security guard of the hospital
where appellants were arrested. But this claim was unsubstantiated, as the logbook was not presented nor
made part of the record of the case. Not only did the credibility of his testimony suffer thereby, but this
circumstance also negated the probative force and value of the said items as evidence for the prosecution.
However, coming to the second issue, we find that appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses and other evidence on record. In the present case, two of the
victims positively identified appellants as the ones who staged the hold-up along with two other John
Does. Solomon, the bus driver, categorically stated that Devera poked a bladed weapon at him and that he
saw his face through the mirror in front of him.[37] He said he had a clearer view of appellants faces when they
alighted from the bus.[38] Elidio, one of the victims whose watch was taken by appellant Vialon, corroborated
Solomons account of the incident on all material points. It is worth noting that these witnesses had no ill
motive to falsely testify against appellants whom they had never met before. Further, the medico-legal report
concerning PO1 Llave dovetailed with Solomons and Elidios testimonies that PO1 Llave was shot in the head
and in the chest.
Appellants defense of denial of any wrongdoing, by claiming that they were just among the passengers of the
bus, is far from convincing. The defense of denial, like alibi, is considered with suspicion and always received
with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated easily.
[39]
Their bare-faced denial cannot prevail over their positive identification as the malefactors by eyewitnesses
who had no motive to falsely testify against them.[40]
The presence of conspiracy between appellants has also been proved amply. It is easily deducible from
Deveras act of poking an ice pick at the driver while Vialon was divesting the passengers of their
valuables. Their acts, collectively and individually executed, demonstrated the existence of a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose and objective: to hold up the bus and divest the
passengers of their cash and other valuables. Conspiracy is also proved by their concerted action in shooting
it out against the police officers and in leaving the vehicle together after divesting the valuables from the
passengers of the bus.
PO1 Llaves slay bears a direct relation and intimate connection to the robbery, for it happened during and on
the occasion of the robbery. Although it was Vialon who pulled the trigger, both appellants are equally liable
in the light of the rule that when a group of malefactors conspire to commit a robbery and arm themselves for
the purpose, no member of the group may disclaim responsibility for any act of violence that is perpetrated by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery.[41] Such violence is always reasonably to be expected, either to
overcome active opposition or to forestall it altogether by disabling the victim at the very outset, or to silence
him completely thereafter.
The penalty imposed on appellants, however, must be modified. The trial court imposed the death penalty
based on its conclusion that the aggravating circumstance of in band [42] attended the commission of the
robbery. This conclusion is negated by the facts at hand.

Robbery is deemed to have been committed by a band when more than three armed malefactors took part in
the commission thereof.[43] While it can be conceded that appellants Devera and Vialon were indeed armed
with an ice pick and a gun respectively, the records, however, are bereft of proof that the two unidentified
muggers were also armed. For one, prosecution eyewitness Solomon testified that he did not see whether or
not the two other hold-up men were armed. [44] Next, while prosecution witness Elidio stated in his affidavit that
all four of the hold-up men were armed when they announced a hold-up (apat na holdaper na armado ng
patalim at baril, at sila ay nagsabi ng Holdap),[45] he, however, admitted during his testimony in court that he
could not identify the two other malefactors nor did he see whether or not they were armed. [46]His testimony on
the witness stand should be held more weighty than his affidavit, for ex parteaffidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to declarations made in open court. [47] Thus, we find that for lack of sufficient proof
the aggravating circumstance of in band must be ruled out. It follows that there being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed should
be reclusion perpetua.[48]
Accordingly, the grant of damages needs to be modified. The sum of P50,000 is properly awarded as civil
indemnity for the wrongful death of PO1 Llave without need of proof other than the fact of death of the victim.
[49]
In addition, another sum of P50,000 for moral damages should be awarded to the heirs of PO1 Joseph
Llave in line with current jurisprudence.[50] The belongings of PO1 Llave should be restored to his heirs, and so
should the valuables now kept in court properly returned to their true owners, while the exhibits were
instruments of the crime should be confiscated for proper disposition according to law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellants Reynaldo Vialon and Arnold Devera are found guilty of robbery with
homicide and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of PO1 Joseph Llave P50,000 as civil indemnity andP50,000 as moral damages,
together with the costs. Let the belongings and valuables now kept in court be returned to their true owners,
including the heirs of the deceased PO1 Joseph Llave and the bus passengers concerned, while those that
are instruments of the crime are confiscated for proper disposition by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 147671. November 21, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENANTE MENDEZ and BABY
CABAGTONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Laoang, Northern Samar, finding
accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong guilty of the crime of rape with homicide
and sentencing each of them to death and to indemnify the heirs of victim Candy Dolim in the amount
of P100,000.00 as damages. Because the record of this case is replete with numerous instances of
procedural and evidentiary lapses, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the trial court and acquit
accused-appellants on the basis of reasonable doubt.
The prosecution in this case began with the filing of an information by Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas on
March 5, 1997. The information alleged
That on or about the 8th day of December, 1996, at about 7:30 in the evening, more or less, at Sitio
Tinotogasan, Brgy. Burabud, Gamay, Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of force and
intimidation, and with lewd design did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the private offended party named CANDY DOLIM, which is against her will and consent; and
that on the occasion of said incident, the above-named accused with intent to kill and without any justifiable
cause, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said CANDY DOLIM, on
the different parts of her body, which wounds caused the instantaneous death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Accused-appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.

The prosecution presented six witnesses: Rico Dolim, Aurea Cabagtong, Ronnie Cabagtong, SPO2 Noli
Cernio, Zosimo Mager Mejica and Dr. Santiago M. Engo, Medical Officer III of Gamay District Hospital,
Gamay, Northern Samar.
Rico Dolim is the father of the victim. (It appears that he and his wife, Erma Ada, were estranged.) He
testified that, in the morning of December 8, 1996, Candy Dolim, then 13 years old, left their house to collect
bets on the PBA ending games from the local residents. When she did not return home that evening, Rico
asked his father Ambrosio and his daughter Jinky to look for Candy, but they did not find her. Information that
Candy was in Mapanas with her mother proved wrong. On December 12, 1996, word reached Rico that a
young girl was found dead in Sitio Tinotogasan. Rico immediately went to the place and found the lifeless
body of Candy. Her panty and shorts were hanging from an ankle, while her shirt was rolled up to her
throat. She had wounds in different parts of her body.
Rico sought the help of the police and Barangay Captain Pedro Gomba. [3] Having heard that a certain Ronnie
Cabagtong[4] was involved in the killing of his daughter, Rico filed a complaint against Ronnie, who was then
investigated by the police. While Ronnie was under investigation at the police headquarters, his mother,
Aurea Cabagtong, came to the station. She told Rico Dolim that she knew what actually happened to Candy
and offered to be a witness.[5] Aurea Cabagtong pointed to accused-appellants Baby Cabagtong [6] and
Renante Mendez as the perpetrators of the crime.
Rico Dolims statement, as well as that of his father, was taken by the police, as were those of Aurea
Cabagtong, Dimas Pugnit, and Ronnie Cabagtong. Rico said he knew accused-appellant Renante Mendez
because he was their neighbor. He was acquainted with accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong because the
latter was also from Barangay Burabud. [7] Rico Dolim claimed he had suffered unbearable loss as a result of
his daughters death and that he had incurred burial and other incidental expenses which he estimated to
be P7,000.00.
For her part, Aurea Cabagtong claimed that, on the night of December 8, 1996, accused-appellants Renante
Mendez and Baby Cabagtong went to her house. They were soaked from the rain. She said that her son
Ronnie, who was already about to sleep, asked her to let the two inside. She said her son talked with
accused-appellants, but she did not understand what they had been discussing. Aurea Cabagtong said she
saw accused-appellants washing their clothes to remove bloodstains on them. The two spent the night in her
house with her son Ronnie. When she woke up the following morning, she found they had already left. [8]
Aurea said she was able to talk to her son about accused-appellants visit only when she went to the police
headquarters while Ronnie was being investigated. She gave a statement, which was reduced in writing,
before SPO2 Noli Cernio.[9] On cross-examination, Aurea said that Ambrosio Dolim had asked her to testify in
this case. According to her, Ambrosio went to her house and paid for her expenses in attending court
sessions.[10]
Ronnie Cabagtong, the third witness for the prosecution, claimed to be an eyewitness to the crime. He said
that, on the night of December 8, 1996, he watched a Betamax show in Kagawad Tesoros house in
Occidental II, poblacion of Gamay. Several people were there, including accused-appellants Renante Mendez
and Baby Cabagtong and the victim Candy Dolim. He said that Candy Dolim left after the first show to solicit
bets for the PBA ending games. Accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong followed. Ronnie
said he left Kagawad Tesoros house five minutes later and met Dimas, who told him that he had seen
accused-appellants with a girl. According to Ronnie, he was about three meters away when he later saw
accused-appellants. Renante Mendez was on top of Candy, having sexual intercourse with her, while Baby
Cabagtong was holding the victims hands. It was raining and there was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he
recognized Renante and Baby because of a lantern which illuminated the place. According to Ronnie, he
proceeded home and, at about 9 oclock that night, he heard someone calling from the outside. It was
accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong. Ronnie said he asked his mother to let the two
inside their house. He noticed that they had bloodstains on their shirts. He said the two washed their clothes
to remove the stains and later slept in his room. They warned Ronnie not to tell anyone about what he saw or
else they would kill him and his family. Ronnie said that he and accused-appellants then went to sleep. The
next morning, accused-appellants left. [11]Ronnie said he later learned that Candy had been killed and she was
buried on December 12, 1996.
That same day, December 12, 1996, Ronnie, together with Renante Mendez, was apprehended by SPO2 Noli
Cernio. Ronnie testified that he did not immediately tell the police or SPO2 Cernio what he knew about the
case because Renante had a cousin who was a policeman. SPO2 Cernio did not put his statement in
writing. Ronnie was later released by the police. In February 1997, he went to Manila to avoid involvement in
this case and to look for a job.[12] He was fetched from Manila by his mother on April 29, 1997 and was later

taken to Catbalogan, where he was investigated by the NBI. [13] According to Ronnie, he finally decided to talk
about this case because he was bothered by his conscience. He said he had been acquainted with accusedappellants for a long time, particularly Renante Mendez, whom he had known since he was a boy. He denied
any relation to Baby Cabagtong and claimed that he had no grudge against accused-appellants. [14]
On cross-examination, Ronnie reiterated that, at around 8 oclock in the evening of December 8, 1996, he saw
accused-appellant Renante Mendez raping Candy. He recognized Renante because of the light from a
lantern. He did not stay long in the area because it was drizzling. Ronnie could not remember what Candy
and Renante were wearing at that time. Neither did he hear cries from the victim. He said he did not tell his
mother about the incident because he went to sleep immediately after eating dinner. When Renante and Baby
went to his house at around 10 oclock in the evening, Ronnie asked his mother to let them in because they
were his acquaintances. He claimed he agreed to testify in this case because Candy was his cousin. [15]
Dr. Santiago M. Engo performed the autopsy on Candy Dolim. He found the body of Candy in a state of
decomposition. In his report,[16] he stated he found five (5) wounds on different parts of Candys body: (1) a
hack wound on the neck, which, according to him, was fatal; (2) an incised wound, 5 inches long, gaping and
1 1/2 inches deep, located at the anterior upper third of the left arm; (3) an incised wound, 3 inches long,
gaping and 2 inches deep, located at the lateral 3 rd of the right forearm; (4) an incised wound, 7 inches long,
gaping and 2 inches deep, located at the anterior upper 3 rd of the right forearm extending up to the lower 3 rd of
the arm of said side; and (5) a lacerated vaginal wound, 2 inches long, located at the 6 oclock position of the
vaginal orifice.[17]
Dr. Engo stated that wounds no. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were caused by a sharp bladed instrument, with the victim
facing his assailant, and that wound no. 4, the vaginal laceration, was caused by a blunt instrument. Only
wound no. 1 (the hack wound in the neck) was serious and could have caused the instantaneous death of the
victim. It was possible that the assailant was on top of the victim and that he was right-handed. By Dr. Engos
estimate, Candy Dolim could have died either on December 7 or December 8, 1996. Due to the
decomposition of the body, Dr. Engo was not able to extract or take any semen samples from the vagina,
although he was able to examine the wound found on it. He said he could not be certain if the victim had been
sexually assaulted.[18]
Farvesio Banawis, also testifying for the prosecution, declared that he owned a coconut plantation in Barangay
Bato, Gamay, Northern Samar. On December 8, 1996, while he was on his way home to Barangay Burabud
from Barangay Bato, where his plantation was situated, he met three persons, one of whom was Candy
Dolim. He knew her to be the granddaughter of a certain Bokoy. He identified accused-appellants in court
as the persons in the company of Candy that night. He said he even talked with Candy Dolim. He asked her
what she was doing, and she answered she was looking for the winner of the PBA ending games. He did not
talk with accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong. [19]
The following day, Farvesio said, he left for Manila. A week later, he learned from his townmates, who had
come from the province, that a little girl had been found dead in Gamay. He thought it might be the girl he had
met near his property. But he stayed long in Manila and only went home to Gamay in May. After he had
verified the news about Candy Dolim, he went to Ambrosio Dolim and told him that he was willing to testify in
this case.
Farvesio was investigated by SPO2 Noli Cernio. He executed a sworn affidavit[20] before the clerk of court of
the Municipal Court of Gamay, Gil Ada. He said that it was possible that accused-appellants raped and killed
Candy because they were the ones following her. He claimed he had no grudge against accusedappellants. He volunteered to be a witness in this case, but, according to him, his affidavit was executed only
when this case was already filed in court because he stayed in Manila for a long time. [21]
The next witness for the prosecution, SPO2 Noli Cernio, testified that he was a member of the PNP of Gamay
assigned as an investigator in the Intelligence Section. In the morning of December 8, 1996, he was informed
that a dead body had been found in Sitio Tinotogasan. For this reason, he went to Barangay Burabud with
Chief of Police Peter Longcop and Dr. Santiago Engo to conduct an investigation. When they arrived in Sitio
Tinotogasan, Barangay Burabud, they found the lifeless body of Candy Dolim. Candys grandfather identified
her body.[22]
SPO2 Cernio found the victim to have been stabbed several times. She was lying on a grassy area with her
panty pulled down to her feet and her upper dress raised up to her neck. Her body was already in a state of
decomposition. The right side of Candys face was unrecognizable. SPO2 Cernio took pictures of the dead
body, which were marked as Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2.

SPO2 Cernio said he questioned Ronnie Cabagtong and accused-appellant Renante Mendez. Ronnie told
him that accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong went to his house at around 10 oclock in
the evening on the day of the incident. SPO2 Cernio said he did not take the sworn affidavit of Ronnie
Cabagtong because the latter denied involvement in the case and claimed that he was in their house on the
night of the incident.[23]
SPO2 Cernio said that Ronnie Cabagtong was released from custody after he had informed the Chief of
Police that he was innocent. Accused-appellant Renante Mendez remained in custody for investigation, while
the Chief of Police ordered accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong to be arrested. SPO2 Cernio investigated
accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong, who denied participation in the incident. The investigation was not put in
writing. Cernio said he also investigated Aurea Cabagtong, Rico Dolim and Ambrosio Dolim. He testified that
he knew accused-appellant Renante Mendez because there were several cases filed against the latter,
including a rape charge which was dismissed after Renante married the complainant. With respect to
accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong, SPO2 Cernio said he too had several complaints against him, but not all
were filed in court. SPO2 Cernio claimed that accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong was a trouble-maker. He
also said that Ronnie Cabagtong and accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong were always
seen together.[24]
On cross-examination, SPO2 Noli Cernio testified that he filed the case against accused-appellants Renante
Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong because he had been informed that they had watched a Betamax show
together with the victim. From other sources, he had learned that the victim and accused-appellants were in
Barangay Burabud on the date and time in question. He investigated Ronnie Cabagtong, but he did not take
down the latters affidavit because he believed his claim that he was at home at the time of the incident. [25]
The defense then presented its evidence. Its theory is that the crime was committed by one Randy Gomba,
and not by accused-appellants, as charged by the prosecution. The first witness, Josefina Bernas, testified
that, on the day of the crime, she and her husband were in Sitio Tinotogasan making copra. While they were
working, they heard a woman crying. When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw a girl being raped by a
man. Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy Gomba. The girl was lying on her back with her legs
raised, her shorts were at her ankle and her blouse was around her neck. She saw Randy Gomba holding the
girl in his arms. She was bleeding profusely. Randy warned her: No such story would come out, otherwise, [I
will] kill [you]. Frightened, Josefina ran fast until she reached her husband. After she had told her husband
what she had witnessed, they hurriedly went home, passing through another route because they were afraid
they might encounter Randy Gomba.[26]
Upon reaching home, Josefina wrote the date and time of the incident and told her husband to watch out as
Randy Gomba might come to their house. Randy in fact went to their house and threatened to harm them if
they told anybody about the incident. Josefina said Randy even askedP20.00 from them for his fare, but they
had no money at that time.[27]
After Randy had left their house, Josefina and her husband went to the house of her in-laws. A few days later,
they asked a neighbor to seek the help of the barangay captain. It was the barangay captains son, July
Gobatana, who came and brought them to his house. They stayed there for almost three weeks, and left the
barangay captains house only when they were informed that Randy had gone to Manila. [28] Josefina said she
gave the note she had made to Eladio Cabagtong. She then sought the help of Isabelo Lucero, a barangay
captain in Laoang and a godfather of the victim. Isabelo Lucero wrote a letter to Erma Ada, the victims
mother. Josefina went with Isabelo Lucero to deliver the letter to Erma, but she did not know its contents.
Josefina said she knew accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Cabagtong and that she did not see
either of them near the area where the incident took place at any time during that day.[29]
On cross-examination, Josefina said that she came forward because she was bothered by her
conscience. She decided to tell what she knew about the case so that justice [would] be [done] to the victim
as well as to accused-appellants, who would suffer imprisonment even though they were innocent. She said
that she blamed herself for not reporting the matter to the authorities until February 1997. [30]
Isabelo Lucero, barangay captain of Barangay Guilaoangi, Laoang, Northern Samar, confirmed that Josefina
Bernas had told him that she had seen a girl raped and killed. The girl was Isabelo Luceros goddaughter,
Candy Dolim. He said that Josefina told him that the assailant was a certain Gomba, whose first name she
could not remember. Josefina Bernas and Isabelo Lucero did not discuss whether accused-appellant Renante
Mendez or Baby Cabagtong were involved in the crime. Isabelo Lucero wrote a letter to the Chief of Police of
Gamay, informing the latter what Josefina had told him and recommending that Gomba be arrested. However,
the Chief of Police did not heed his advice.[31]

Accused-appellant Rene Baby Cabagtong testified in his defense. He said that he was arrested on
December 13, 1996 in his farm in Sitio Pinamihagan, Gamay, Northern Samar, by barangay tanod Mano
Mejica.[32] Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong was on his way home to take his meal when he met Mejica,
who asked him to go with him. When Baby demanded to know why he should do so, Mejica pointed a gun at
him. Baby was taken to the municipal hall of Gamay, where he was investigated by policeman SPO2 Noli
Cernio. A certain Peter Longcop was the sole companion of SPO2 Cernio during the investigation. Cernio
asked him his whereabouts on that particular Sunday when the crime occurred, and Baby answered that he
was at his farm for it was customarily a working day. According to Baby, SPO2 Cernio asked him only one
question. Peter Longcop, on the other hand, asked Baby to testify against accused-appellant Renante
Mendez because they wanted Baby to implicate him, but he refused. [33] He claimed he was told to go
downstairs and was then placed in jail. There were other prisoners inside the jail cell, including accusedappellant Renante Mendez.
Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong said everything Ronnie Cabagtong had said was a lie and that SPO2 Noli
Cernio convinced Ronnie to testify against them as a condition for the latters release. Baby claimed that at
the time of the incident, he was with his parents and siblings in his house at the outskirts of Barangay
Burabud, more than one kilometer, from the scene of the crime. [34]
On cross-examination, accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong testified that he was not aware of an order of the
MCTC of Gamay (Exhibit H), requiring him and Mendez to submit their counter-affidavits. Baby Cabagtong
told the court that he harbored no grudge against Farvesio Banawis, with whom he was acquainted, and Aurea
Cabagtong, who was his aunt, although a distant relative. He also knew Gil Ada, the Clerk of Court of MCTC
of Gamay, and he even appeared in court before him. Gil Ada had required them to sign a waiver which they
did not sign.[35]
Accused-appellant Renante Mendez also took the witness stand. He claimed that in December 1996, he was
in Gamay, helping his father make copra. He was arrested on December 12, 1996 as a suspect in this case,
together with Ronnie Cabagtong, by SPO2 Noli Cernio, Peter Longcop, Gejada and Barredo, all of whom were
members of the PNP of Gamay. He was not shown any warrant when they were arrested. [36]
Accused-appellant Renante Mendez and Ronnie Cabagtong were brought to the municipal hall, where their
pictures were taken. After they were investigated, Renante was locked up in jail and brought downstairs,
while Ronnie Cabagtong was taken upstairs. Renante overheard the police asking Ronnie to testify against
him in this case. Because he agreed, Ronnie was released and later utilized as a witness. [37]
Upon cross-examination, accused-appellant Renante Mendez testified that he was not aware that the
municipal court of Gamay had ordered him to submit counter-affidavits nor was he furnished with a copy of the
charges filed against him. He denied participation in the crime, saying he did not leave his house that evening
of December 8, 1996 because he was sick. He knew the mother of Ronnie, Aurea Cabagtong, as well as
Farvesio Banawis. According to accused-appellant Renante Mendez, he did not harbor any ill will against
Farvesio Banawis, Aurea Cabagtong or Ronnie Cabagtong. [38]
On October 5, 1999, Gil Ada, the Clerk of Court of MCTC of Gamay, Northern Samar, was presented as a
defense witness. Ada said that, as Clerk of Court of MCTC of Gamay, he had issued an order requiring
accused-appellants Mendez and Cabagtong to appear and submit their counter-affidavits, together with those
of their witnesses, in connection with the criminal complaint filed against them. Ada said he had issued the
order on the authority of Judge Espina, now retired, and upon the order of the present judge, Judge Lagrimas,
who conducted the preliminary examination in this case. [39]
On cross-examination, Gil Ada said that it was usual for the court to issue an order for the submission of
counter-affidavits. Ada did not know, however, if accused-appellants submitted their counter-affidavits. On redirect examination, he testified that his purpose in issuing the order was to let accused-appellants answer the
complaint, but he could not say if it was also for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. [40]
The prosecution presented SPO2 Noli Cernio as a rebuttal witness. SPO2 Cernio denied that he taught
Ronnie Cabagtong what to say in court. According to him, Ronnie was not arrested but only invited to the
police headquarters. Aurea Cabagtong informed them that Ronnie was not involved in the case and that
Ronnie would be willing to testify against the perpetrators. He said that accused-appellant Renante Mendez
could not have overheard him promising liberty to Ronnie if the latter agreed to testify. SPO2 Cernio said that
the Chief of Police had ordered the arrest of accused-appellants on the basis of information given by Aurea
Cabagtong. SPO2 Cernio said no pictures were taken of accused-appellants. [41]

On cross-examination, SPO2 Cernio told the court that the arrest of accused-appellant Renante Mendez
without a warrant was based on their knowledge of his guilt. He claimed that they had released accusedappellant Renante Mendez from custody, but he did not want to leave because he was afraid of getting
involved in the case. On the other hand, Magno Mejica arrested Rene Baby Cabagtong, also without a
warrant, based on the citizens arrest law. Mejica knew about the case because he was from Barangay
Burabud and a member of the Citizens Crime Watch and an NPA surrenderee. [42]
Zosimo Mejica, resident of Gamay, Northern Samar, also testified. Mejica declared that he knew accusedappellant Baby Cabagtong because Babys mother was his second cousin. When he learned that Candy
Dolim had been raped and killed, he went to the place where Candys body had been found. There were no
houses near the crime scene, the nearest being, in his estimate, 100 meters away. When he arrived at the
scene, he saw Candy lying face up, with her panty on her ankles and her T-shirt raised up to her
neck. Several people were present at the scene, including SPO2 Noli Cernio. Candys body was taken to her
grandfathers house. Mejica knew that the police conducted an investigation, which, according to him, pointed
to accused-appellants as the ones responsible for the crime. [43]
Mejica recalled that, on December 13, 1996, while he was on his way to Sitio Pinamihagan, he met accusedappellant Baby Cabagtong. He said he collared accused-appellant and told him that he was being arrested as
one of the suspects in the rape-slay of Candy Dolim. According to Mejica, Baby tried to escape but failed. He
took Baby to the headquarters and turned him over to the police. Mejica stated that he did not use a gun in
arresting Baby Cabagtong, but a small bolo belonging to Baby, which he pretended to borrow from the
latter. He turned over the small bolo (tinogon) to the police. Mejica said he was present when the police and
the mayor investigated accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong. According to Mejica, he based his arrest of Baby
from the statement of Aurea Cabagtong. This was not the first time, he said, that he had arrested a suspect in
a case.[44]
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and
his mother, credible and rendered judgment for the prosecution. The dispositive portion of its decision dated
December 22, 2000, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both accused Renante Mendez and Baby
Cabagtong guilty of the offense of Rape with Homicide beyond all reasonable doubt and hereby sentences
them to the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused are further condemned to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the amount of P100,000.00 each as damages.
SO ORDERED.

[45]

Assailing the decision of the trial court, accused-appellants argue that

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES RONNIE CABAGTONG AND AUREA
CABAGTONG.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE MERELY FALL
GUYS TO THE RAPE-SLAY OF CANDY DOLIM.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[46]

FISCAL LAGRIMAS:
Q: That place where Candy Dolim was discovered dead, is it near a trail or street?
A:

It is about 50 meters [from] the trail.

Q: Are there bushes?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: Tall bushes?
A:

Yes, sir, taller than a man standing.

Q: What kind of grass is that?

A:

There were trees and some vines.

Q: So it is not grass, is it a tree?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: Is that a forest?
A:

There are plenty of trees.

Q: Are there houses nearby?

A:

None.

Q: The nearest house from the place where the body of Candy Dolim was discovered is about how far?
A:

More than 100 meters.

If there were no houses near the crime scene, it is cause for wonder how the parol, where the light allegedly
came from, could have been hanged within a distance of five meters from the place where Ronnie claimed he
witnessed the incident. Even if the crime was committed near the trail, and not on the exact spot where
Candys body was found, the nearest house would have to be at least 50 meters away. Ronnie even
embellished his story by claiming that the parol was made of wood with a wick, inside a bottle.[49]
Second. Ronnies behavior after allegedly witnessing the incident belied his pretension. He was supposed to
have witnessed a crime. Yet he went home, took his supper and went to sleep as if nothing had
happened. When accused-appellants went to his house, Ronnie did not show any apprehension but matter of
factly asked his mother to let them in. This is not the normal reaction of a person who supposedly has just
seen a crime committed. Ronnies claim that the victim was his cousin all the more makes his story
incredible. For if this was true, why did he show no concern for her at all? Instead, he showed sympathy for
the assailants. Thus, Ronnie testified:[50]
ATTY. SARMIENTO:

We find the appeal to be meritorious.

Q: After witnessing this act, you went directly home?

I.

A:

First. As already noted, the prosecution is anchored mainly on the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his
mother, Aurea Cabagtong. Upon closer examination, however, certain circumstances make these testimonies
suspect. It is doubtful whether Ronnie really saw accused-appellant Renante Mendez raping Candy, with the
latters hands being held by the other accused-appellant, Baby Cabagtong. Ronnie admitted that it was
raining that evening and that it was dark as there was no moonlight. He claimed, however, that he was
nevertheless able to recognize accused-appellant Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong because of a light
from a lantern (parol) hanging about five meters away from the trail where the crime had been committed.
[47]
His testimony is contrary to the testimony of another prosecution witness, Zosimo Mejica, who categorically
stated that there were no houses near the area where Candys body was found and that it was surrounded by
trees. Mejica testified:[48]

Q: You did not tell your mother what you saw?

A:

Yes, sir.

No, sir.

Q: Why not?
A:

Because I immediately went to sleep.

Q: You were able to sleep at once after having witnessed that lustful act?

A:

I ate first then I went to sleep.

Q: Why was she in the police headquarters?

Q: You mean you were able to eat and sleep after having witnessed this [dastardly] act and this involved your
friends?

A: Because she was there to look after her son because I made [a] complain[t] against him, Ron[nie], the
son of Aurea.

A:

Q: Why did you have Ron[nie] Cabagtong [investigated] in relation to the death of your daughter?

Of course because I was hungry.

Q: Before December 8, 1996, Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong used to go to your house?
A:

A: Because of the rumors circulating around that I must have to [pin] the person the fact that he is Bogoybogoy, he may be involved.

No, sir.
Q: Was he investigated by the police?

Q: They are not your friends?

A:
A:

He was investigated by the police.

No, sir.

Q: Are you sure?

Ronnie Cabagtong was released upon the recommendation of SPO2 Cernio to the Chief of Police. When
asked why he did not take Ronnies statement during the investigation, SPO2 Cernio testified: [53]

A:

ATTY. SARMIENTO:

They are not my friends.

Q: They are your enemies?

Q: You likewise investigated Ron[nie] Cabagtong?

A:

A:

No, sir.

Q: But they are your acquaintances?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: And also Candy Dolim?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: Especially so that Candy Dolim is your cousin?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: That is why you are a witness in this case?

A:

Yes, sir.

The fact is that another key prosecution witness, SPO2 Noli Cernio, testified that Ronnie and accusedappellants, Renante and Baby, were often seen together. In fact, Ronnie and Renante were picked up and
investigated together by the police. [51] If Ronnie was later released, while Renante was detained at the
municipal jail, it was only because his mother, Aurea, went to the police station and pointed to accusedappellants as the perpetrators of the crime. As Rico Dolim, the father of the victim, testified:[52]

Yes, sir, I investigated [him].

Q: All of these witnesses you have mentioned except Ron[nie] Cabagtong executed affidavit[s] which you
took, is that correct?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q: Why did you not take the affidavit or statement of Ron[nie] Cabagtong?
A:

I made an affidavit for his mother instead.

Q: But Ron[n]ie gave his statement to you, but you did not reduce [it] into writing?
A:

Yes, I did not.

Q: Why did you not reduce into writing the statement of Ron[nie]. . . ?
A:

Because Ron[nie] was not present during the incident, He was at home.

Q: Why, [were] these other witnesses present, these witnesses you have listed in the Complaint, [whose
affidavits you have taken], were they present?
A:

No, they were not.

FISCAL LAGRIMAS

Q: Not [one] of them was present during the incident, is that correct?

Q: Did you finally know the persons or perpetrators responsible for the death of your daughter?

A:

A: Yes, I finally [knew] the perpetrators who committed the crime against my daughter from somebody who
told me that [she] would be a witness.

Q: So that the only reason why you did not take the statement of Ron[nie] was that he was not present during
the incident?

Q: Who is this person who told you about the persons responsible for the death of your daughter?

A:

A:

Q: Ron[nie] actually told you that he was not [at] the scene of the incident as he was in his house?

She is Mrs. Aurea Cabagtong.

Yes, sir. Nobody was there.

Yes, sir.

Q: When did she tell you?

A:

A:

Q: You will not change that statement?

After the funeral of my daughter.

Yes, sir.

Q: Where did she tell you?

A:

A:

Thus, SPO2 Cernio took at face value Ronnies word that he was innocent. Ronnie and his mother were only
too willing to testify against accused-appellants in exchange for his liberty. From the time of Ronnies release

At the police headquarters.

Yes, sir.

until the time he gave his statement, Ronnie and his mother had sufficient time to iron out the details of their
testimonies.
It has been held time and again that, to be credible, testimonial evidence should come not only from the mouth
of a credible witness but it should itself be also credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience.
[54]
The testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother Aurea simply do not meet these standards.
If for any reason there is a possibility that a witness might have been prompted to testify falsely, courts should
be on guard in assessing the witness credibility.[55] While we do not want to speculate on Ronnies participation
in the crime, we cannot overlook the ulterior motive that he and his mother had in pointing to accusedappellants as the culprits. For this reason, we cannot accord full faith and credit to their testimonies.
II.
The only evidence left against accused-appellants is circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, to pass muster,
must meet the following criteria: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Such circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one
to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty. The combination of evidence must leave no
room for doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[56]
In this case, Farvesio Banawis said that he met the victim Candy Dolim while he was on his way
home. According to him, he saw accused-appellants following Candy.[57] His testimony merely establishes the
fact that, at one point during the day of the incident, Candy Dolim was in the company of accusedappellants. However, this fact alone does not warrant the conclusion that accused-appellants raped and killed
Candy. It is too dangerous a conclusion to be bridged by this singular event. Farvesio himself admitted that
he was merely thinking that maybe the two guys (referring to accused-appellants) who were following the girl
(Candy) were the [ones] responsible.[58]
On the other hand, the defense presented Josefina Bernas, who claimed to have actually witnessed the
crime. It puzzles the Court why no investigation was conducted to follow up this lead, considering the
persistent efforts shown by the police of Gamay in pursuing accused-appellants. The information was not
insignificant. It was an alleged eyewitness account identifying the perpetrator as a certain Randy Gomba. It
was even reported through Isabelo Lucero, a barangay captain and a godfather to the victim. It would seem,
however, that the police were keen on pinning the blame on accused-appellants, who made for easy targets
because of their reputation in their community. But while SPO2 Cernio testified as to the troublesome nature
of accused-appellants, he offered no proof for his assertion. There is no record of any case previously filed
against them.
Accused-appellants defense is alibi. But it is settled that where the evidence of the prosecution is itself
feeble, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, alibi assumes importance and
acquires commensurate strength. The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was never intended to
change the burden of proof in criminal cases; otherwise, the accused would be put in the difficult position of
having to prove his innocence even where the prosecutions evidence is vague and weak. The prosecution
cannot profit from the weakness of accused-appellants alibi. It must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and establish the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. [59]

There is also an inconsistency between Ronnies testimony and that of SPO2 Cernio. SPO2 Cernio testified
that Ronnie told him the day he was arrested that accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong
went to Ronnies house at around 10 oclock on the night of the incident. But Ronnie denied that he told the
police what he knew of the incident when he was investigated because he feared for his life. The police failed
to record the investigation, and so it is not now possible to determine who was actually telling the truth. It is
clear from the records, however, that accused-appellant Renante Mendez was arrested together with Ronnie
Cabagtong. On the other hand, the only time the police had evidence against accused-appellant Renante
Mendez was when Aurea Cabagtong came forward after her sons arrest and pointed to him (Renante
Mendez) and Baby Cabagtong as the perpetrators. But that was only on December 12, 1996, four days after
the commission of the crime, and it could not justify the arrest of accused-appellants without a judicial warrant.
Accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong, on the other hand, was arrested by Zosimo Mejica, a member of the
Citizens Crime Watch, on the basis of the citizens arrest law. Mejica was neither a police officer nor a witness
to the incident. He was not a member of the investigating team. He did not have any personal knowledge of
the incident. He admitted during cross-examination that he merely based his arrest on the information
supplied by Aurea Cabagtong to the police. [63] This does not constitute personal knowledge to warrant a
citizens arrest.
Finally, the records do not show that accused-appellants were assisted by counsel in the course of the
investigation. During their questioning at the headquarters, only the police investigators were
present. Nowhere in the records was it shown that they were apprised of their rights under the
Constitution. While no confession was obtained from them, their interrogation at that time could nonetheless
have given the police valuable leads into the unsolved crime. Accused-appellants also insist that they did not
receive a copy of the order requiring them to submit counter-affidavits. The Clerk of Court of the MCTC of
Gamay merely testified as to the issuance of said order, but testimony does not confirm that such it was
received by accused-appellants.
The fact that these irregularities were never raised before arraignment, and were therefore considered waived
when accused-appellants entered their pleas, does not justify the short cuts. These procedural lapses clearly
indicate that the police had shut its mind off to the possibility that other parties might have committed the
crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Laoang, Northern Samar, dated December
22, 2000, is REVERSED and accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong are
ACQUITTED of the crime of rape with homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellants unless the
latter are being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from
notice of the action taken herein. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74189 May 26, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ENRILE Y VILLAROMAN and ROGELIO ABUGATAL Y MARQUEZ, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Indeed, unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, an accused is entitled to an acquittal. [60] Only
when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence
be for conviction.[61] We find that the prosecution in this case failed to establish the guilt of accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence presented against them failed to prove that they were responsible for
the crime. While we deplore this gruesome incident and commiserate with the victims family, we cannot
sustain accused-appellants conviction on the wretched testimony of an alleged eyewitness presented by the
prosecution.
Nor can we close our eyes to the palpable violations of the rights of accused-appellants during the period of
their detention. The record shows that accused-appellants were arrested without any warrants from the
courts. Contrary to his claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime
so as to justify the warrantless arrest of Renante Mendez. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant under 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when it is based on actual facts,i.e., when it is supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [62]

Felix O. Lodero, Jr. for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Antonio
Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for convicting him. 1 His co-accused, Rogelio Abugatal,
was killed in an attempted jailbreak and this appeal is dismissed as to him. 2 We deal here only with Enrile.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the evening of October 25, 1985, a buybust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics
Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon
City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself
to pose as the buyer. 3

In their separate testimonies, 4 both policemen said that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over to
Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and
returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached
Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent
laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams. 5
The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera
Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out
and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the marked money
earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425. 6

The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's house and buy marijuana
from him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial confession. With that confession outlawed and the testimony
disowned by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against Enrile to tie him with Abugatal.
It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to Polines.
Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to
Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that
circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless
arrest only under any of the following circumstances :

At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above narration. 7 Enrile refused
to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;.

In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers, who he said
simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of the
marijuana. He claimed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as a dental technician, to a
patient whom he was fitting for dentures. 8 The supposed patient, Alicia Tiempo, corroborated him. 9

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and.

Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that he had a pending application
for probation. He suggested that this could be the reason the policemen sought to implicate him in the new
charge and thus weaken his application. 10
Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that he had not sold any
marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two male teenagers approached him that
evening and told him to buy marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did not have any
marijuana and did not know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's house and to give him the
marked money. He did so because they had a knife. Enrile handed him a plastic bag which was later found to
contain dried marijuana fruiting tops. 11
Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of Abugatal, considering that it
was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation, including the right to the
assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not follow the ruling of this Court
in Morales v. Enrile, 12promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated in People v. Galit, 13 promulgated on March
20, 1985, where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid down the correct procedure, thus:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986, long after the above-cited
decisions had become effective.
Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without the assistance of counsel
could have been sustained. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial
court had to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and consequences of his
confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do so. 14 There is no showing in the record that this
was done, short of the statement in the decision that Abugatal had been informed of his rights and had validly
waived the assistance of counsel.
If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible against Enrile.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who
later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana.
According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the
marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and
immediately arrested him. 15
What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information supplied
by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile.
They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed)
allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The
marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the
warrantless search and seizure.
The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's house is his castle
that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate. There were measures available under the
law to enable the authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was found in possession of
prohibited articles. The police did not employ these measures.
What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the slightest heed to the
injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of the police state, where the minions
of the government place little value on human rights and individual liberties and are obssessed only with the
maintenance of peace and punishment of crime.
These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the cost of
dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual from overzealous law-enforcers who
mistakenly believe that suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the Constitution.
Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to apprehend and punish law-breakers. Such a
practice only leads to further defiance of the law by those who have been denied its protection.
In the light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced that there is enough evidence
to establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of doubt. The paucity of such evidence only strengthens the
suspicion that the marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police officers who were probably
worried that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction as a drug pusher would be thwarted by his
application for probation.
Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating Enrile is inadmissible against
Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found on him as a result of the illegal search. The only remaining

evidence against the appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this has been questioned and discredited by the
prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left without a leg to stand on and must therefore be dismissed.
Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the discharge of their duties is not
enough to build a case against a person charged with a crime. They should build it with painstaking care,
stone by stone of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the accused, before they can hope to
secure a conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 128822

On March 18, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged and, taking into
consideration his educational attainment (he reached only grade IV), imposed the minimum of the imposable
penalty, thus:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered CONVICTING ALBERTO PASUDAG of the crime charged in the
information and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law.
"The 7 fully grown marijuana plants are confiscated in favor of the government.
"The Warden of Urdaneta, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, is hereby ordered to commit the body of
Alberto Pasudag to the National Bilibid Prison immediately upon receipt hereof.

May 4, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ "BERTING, accused-appellant.

"SO ORDERED.

PARDO, J.:

(Sgd. ) MODESTO C. JU ANSON

1

The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Branch 46, Urdaneta finding
accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana 2 and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary penalty and
accessories of the law.
On December 17, 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan Emiliano M. Matro filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta an Information 3 charging accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang with
violation of R.A. No. 6425, Sec. 9, reading as follows:
"That on or about September 26, 1995 and prior dates thereto at barangay Artacho, municipality of Sison,
province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate, and culture seven (7) hills of marijuana in the
land tilled by him and situated beside the house of the accused, without authority or permit to do so.
"Contrary to Sec. 9 of R.A. 6425 as amended."
On February 10, 1997, the trial court arraigned the accused. He pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial ensued.
On September 26, 1995, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip of the PNP Sison, Pangasinan,
went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the
public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana
plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the
house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it. 5
SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero. The latter dispatched
team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3 Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation.
At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team arrived at Brgy; Artacho and went straight to the house of
accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his
backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away.6
Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused
Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants. 7 They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team
brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. 8
At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the
marijuana plants.9 SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report 10 which accused Pasudag signed.11 He kept
the six marijuana plants inside the cabinet in the office of the Chief of Police and brought the tallest plant 12 to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 13
Major Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, receive the specimen 14 on
October 11, 1995. She testified that she took some leaves from the marijuana plant because the leaves had
the most concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol. As per her Chemistry Report No. D-O87-95, 15 the examination
was positive for marijuana (tetrahydrocannabinol). 16

"Done this 17th day of March, 1997, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

Judge"17
Hence, this appeal.18
In his brief, accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding that the marijuana plant submitted
for laboratory examination was one of the seven (7) marijuana plants confiscated from his garden; that the trial
court erred in concluding that the confiscation report was not an extrajudicial admission which required the
intervention of his counsel; and in convicting him on the basis of inference that he planted, cultivated and
cultured the seven (7) plants, owned the same or that he permitted others to cultivate the same. 19
The Solicitor General contended that accused-appellant admitted before the lower court that tile
specimen20 was one of the plants confiscated in his backyard; that appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he signed the confiscation report; and that the inferences deduced by the lower court
strengthened the conviction of accused-appellant..21
We find the appeal meritorious.
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or
seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. 22 The Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." 23 Any evidence obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible.24
In tile case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant.
SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. 25 He was acquainted with marijuana plants and
immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. 26 Time was not
of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old 27 and there was no sufficient
reason to believe that they would be uprooteds on that same day.
In People vs. Valdez28 the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without the requisite judicial warrant
is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's evidence clearly established that the police conducted a search
of accused's backyard garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they failed
to secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity for the warrantless search, or the immediate
seizure of the marijuana plants.
"Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce." 29
"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of
dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous
disregard of the Bill of Rights."30 We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure
is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants." 31 "The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of
high handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions." 32

With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. 33

A: Yes sir.
Q: And according to you, Alberto Pasudag was interrogated by the Chief of Police ?

The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The testimony of SPO3 Jovencio
Fajarito34 reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his constitutional rights, thus: "

A: Yes sir:

Q: In fact, you went to the house of Alberto Pasudag?

Q: In fact the Chief of Police was asking Alberto Pasudag in your presence? who planted the marijuana plants
and according to you, Alberto Pasudag admitted in your presence that he planted the alleged marijuana
plants?

A: Yes sir.

A: Yes sir.

Q: And in fact you invited him to the place where marijuana plants were planted?

Q: Before Chief Inspector Romeo Astrero interrogated Alberto Pasudag, he did not also inform Alberto
Pasudag his constitutional rights, particularly the rights of a person under custodial interrogation?

"ATTY: ESTRADA:

A: Yes sir.
A: What I know, he just asked Alberto Pasudag the veracity whether or not he planted the said plants.
Q: Then and there, you started asking question from him?
A: Yes sir.
Q: In fact you started asking questions to elucidate from him information of admission regarding the ownership
of the plants in question?
A: I only asked who really planted and cultivated the plants sir.
Q: Before you propounded questions to Alberto Pasudag, as according to you, you were already informed that
he was the cultivator by some per sons whose name until now you do not know?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you not inform Alberto , Pasudag his constitutional rights?
A: I did not inform him because only when I will took (sic) his statement in the presence of his counsel and to
be reduced in writing, sir.
Q: What you want to impress, you will inform only a person of his constitutional rights if you take his statement
in writing?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Is that your method?
A: I informed the accused if l have to place it is statement into writing, sir.
Q: According to you, you invited Alberto Pasudag to the alleged place where the marijuana were planted, then
and there, you asked him who planted the same, and according to you, he said he planted the same?
A: Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: According to you, you brought Alberto Pasudag to the Office of the Chief of Police of Sison, Pangasinan?
A: Yes sir.
Q: In fact the Chief of Police was there?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Romeo Ast.rero was the Senior Inspector? ,
A: Yes sir. Q: In other words, SPO2 Calip, Alcantara, Romeo Rasca and Alberto Pasudag were inside the
office of the Chief of Police?

Q: In other words, your answer is, your Chief of Police did not inform Alberto Pasudag his constitutional
rights?
A: No sir." (emphasis supplied)
After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report, 35 which was part of the
investigation.36Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation report.37 In both the interrogation and the signing of
the confiscation receipt, no counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the only civilian present in the Office
of the Chief of Police.38
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when
he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a
person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation
and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission.39 Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house
and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.
"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee." 40 Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was
made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is
inadmissible in evidence.41
In light of the foregoing, we uphold the constitutional right of accused-appellant to a presumption of innocence.
The prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. AccusedappellantALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of the crime charged for lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Director of Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release accused-appellant unless
he is held for another case, and to inform the Court of the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from notice.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and
found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him
away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30
in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected
his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had
also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded
not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted,
and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified
by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an
NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests
on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did
not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come
to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and
spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily
searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he
sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but
to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the
stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may
reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip
they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was
arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying
it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this
matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified
as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25,
1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that
date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer, prior
to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel
Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of
Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of
illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive
daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason and we
cannot Identify the person.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not
really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is
hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under
detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to
the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested
and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in
evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the
Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because
it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also
valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:

A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many
days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the
time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have
reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered information
to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your
intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear
that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search

Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buybust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we
will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain
of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he
is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is
innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple
fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes'
felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and
the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the
warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption
that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is
so ordered.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the
Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception
of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the
petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp.
3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on
the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business
trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant
heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for
the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for
Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at
the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against
Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant
was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered
by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent
of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep.
Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following
issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement"
under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone
conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in
favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in
the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate
the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or
partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue
is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is
whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an
extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to
both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty.
Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as
distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties
gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension
telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the
alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge
against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening.
We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying
the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy
loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are
called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the
details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep.
Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be
criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any
other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would

subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines
to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business
conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use
of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under
the law?

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No.
4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used
instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does
not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius
of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line
probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line
or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United
States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the
Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration
of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or
however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device"
within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone
apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of
telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be
transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the
desired communication corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or
record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they
shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon
which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should
be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other
obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be
restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are
addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend
other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more
than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party
may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one
element of 605, interception, has not occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of
repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no
distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same
purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in
case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device
or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case
of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin
Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63
SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737,
quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an
extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more
concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made
possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the amendment than
without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government
testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and the
government officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the court
would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases,
as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he
could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a
recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could
devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what
this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private
conversations which later on will be used in court.

ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman
kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension
telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August
16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of
Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung
hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina"
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey
yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung
hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the
said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito,
porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

INFORMATION

CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:

ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa
review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka
kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate
in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the
trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an
offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a personother than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19,
1989.

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases
or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in
an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording,
would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's
order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be
used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing
the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge
acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act
4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other
than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of
the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without
his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is
to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape
recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.

We disagree.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would
be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an
injustice. 12

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever
you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that
warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if
you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is
being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it
is unfair.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records
his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but
the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between
one person and another person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations
from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means

of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before
one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In
its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings
or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts
about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,

Petitioners,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Puno,
Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus -

Carpio,

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized
people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Freeconversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of
views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to
be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we
held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those
"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself
explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with
no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA,
SEC. ANGELO REYES, and
SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,
Respondents.

SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION

G.R. No. 160792

Promulgated:

August 25, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA
LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review[1] seeks to nullify the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and
Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael
Pulido (petitioners) on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
(PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) (detainees).
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen.

Narciso Abaya (Gen. Abaya), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser,
because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment
complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced
their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer
took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood
incident.

The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality
of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the
constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The
appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable
under the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of
his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The
violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered
Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made
in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is
hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in
accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure
No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of
the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The
government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 032784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into
custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the
detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE
DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.[5]
The Ruling of the Court

On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12
August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURNof the writ on
Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals
for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon, after which
a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision. [3]
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a return
of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the
scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a
Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and
Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing.
After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition
submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the
appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in
court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are
already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this
case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already
foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the
Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the
detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The
Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the
hearing of the petition.[6] The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention.
[7]
However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by
the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation
of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of
the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the
writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found
that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals,
petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of
their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. [8] The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.[9] If the inquiry reveals that the
detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then
thehabeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error.[10] Neither can it substitute for an appeal.[11]

Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.[12]
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend
the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. [13] Whatever
situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be
sufficient to void the entire proceedings.[14]
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they
dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the
regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from
seeing the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA 7438). [15] Petitioners claim that the
regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to
privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt.
Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees
right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having
contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. [16] However, the fact that
the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. [17] RA 7438, which
specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the
detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and
prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:

Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x

b)
Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate
family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4)
years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any
detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night. However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes
the express qualification that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the
power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and
prevent his escape.

Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective representation when
petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the
detainees rights entitle them to be released from detention.

Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention. The
ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the
regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all
detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial
confinement are permissible.

In Bell v. Wolfish,[18] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related
to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a
restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless.[19] However,Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from
skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities. [20] The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford administrators wide-ranging deference in implementing policies to maintain
institutional security.[21]

In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in
detention centers allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees
safety and prevent his escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the
detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of all detainees.

While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-toface meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right
to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch
break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally
entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of
reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials
to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to
confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in
the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, [22] petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. [23] Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right
to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron
grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress
us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably.
[24]
The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does
not convert those restrictions into punishment. [25] It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that
courts will infer intent to punish.[26] Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be
related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose.
[27]
Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. [28] They must only refrain
from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves. [29]
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a
detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to undertake such
reasonable measures or regulations.

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the essential
objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial. While this interest undoubtedly
justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents
argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the only objective that
may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. If the government
could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their

presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention. The
Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual
is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that go beyond those
that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the
Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no
weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while
awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests
that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition
to ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the
individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial
detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. [30]
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or disability,
and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. [31]Punishment also requires that the harm or disability
be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. [32]

Block v. Rutherford,[33] which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this
practice was reasonably related to maintaining security.The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if
they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and
may have prior criminal conviction.[34] Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail
staff hostage to effect escapes.[35] Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons,
drugs, and other contraband.[36] The restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as
they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons. [37] The security consideration in
the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees. [38]
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal
of internal security.[39] This case reaffirmed the hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of
judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in
deference to administrative expertise.[40]
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron
bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors
prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited
physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict
non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical
contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This
measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and
weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within
the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and
do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are
not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo
Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated
well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable
compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees.
The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention
Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army (NPA)
member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes
and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a
sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of
convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated
escapes.[41] Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and
inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil deaths. [42] Inmates were deemed to

have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was
that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between the inmate
and his lawyer.[43]
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect. [44]
The confidential correspondences could not be censored. [45] The infringement of such privileged
communication was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment rights. [46] A prisoner has a right to
consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison
authorities in the administration of the institution. [47] Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in
plots that threaten prison security.[48]
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates
and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono[49]recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike
convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail
addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be
inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be
inspected or read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,[50] involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates.
However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to
inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under
challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no exception was
made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they
may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue
thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison
authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection
techniques fail to indicate contraband.
x x xx x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney before
opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think it entirely
appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as originating from an
attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. It would also
certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first
identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are actually
from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way
constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the
inmates presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be
enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the letters.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a
flexible test, besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule whereby the
inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the
Constitution requires.[51]
In Hudson v. Palmer,[52] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of
privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of
the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints on
inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to
accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal
security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our
system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction. [53]
The later case of State v. Dunn,[54] citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made
no distinction as to the detainees limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable
jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We
quote State v. Dunn:

[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and
continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We
are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy always yield to what must be
considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that
[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been
blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security risk
than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfishreasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases
be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a
greater risk of escape than convicted inmates. [55] Valencia v. Wiggins[56] further held that it is impractical to
draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security.
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a
genuine threat to jail security.[57] Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged
mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. [58] A pre-trial detainee has
no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail. [59] However, incoming mail from lawyers of
inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but
could not read the contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer.[60] The inspection
of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. [61]

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners
subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement.[67] The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration
of confinement.[68]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78545.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the
present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the
opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection
in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights [62] is a guarantee
that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to
privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have
a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

G.R. No. L-68635 March 12, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO
LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. NO.
68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
RESOLUTION

In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators. [63] The deferential review of such
regulations stems from the principle that:

[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration.[64]
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.[65] The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible
leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial
district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of
War.[66]
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA.
Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in
detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations
adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

PER CURIAM:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina
M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT, (mcorporated herein by reference), in feigned
ignorance of the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through,
at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse
resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part:
Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of addressing you this letter which we do hope you will read very
carefully.
It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635 entitled Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs.
Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. by an untenable minute-resolution although an extended one, dated
14 May 1986 which we consider as an just resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First
Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.
xxx xxx xxx
We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986; and the
third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethic.

xxx xxx xxx

Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes finish to our case before the Supreme
Court (... THIS IS FINAL.) There is nothing final in this world We assure you that this case is far from finished
by a long shot For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where the
members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are
knowingly and deuberat only promulgated. The people deserve to know how the members of the highest
tribunal of the land perform in the task of decision making by affixing their respective signed on judgments that
they render on petitions that they themselves give due course.
Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to
hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minuteresolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with
penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the division members are
above the law.

We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you were with the original First Division
under the chairmanship of then Justice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case before
another forum to hold responsible the members of the Division who participated in the dismissal of the case by
the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for intended objective that your conscience you are aware.
xxx xxx xxx
We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in the promulgation of the minute-resolutions
in question Please do not take this matter rightly for we know justice in the end will prevail. For if we do not
hear from you within a week, we will consider your silence as your admission that you supported the dismissal
of the petition. In this way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The moment we take action in the plans we
are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard
are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.
xxx xxx xxx

In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First
Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why we are
requesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in question. Even we
who are poor are also capable of playing fair even to those who take advantage of our poverty by sheer power
and influence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will
consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly.
(Emphasis supplied).

Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will no doubt cause nationwide
attention, and there should be anyone that will cause me harm personally, may we request you to show this
letter to the authorities concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary.
(Emphasis supplied)

The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap, Chairman of the First Division in
this wise:

On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of the case, found no reason to
take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division 11 as set forth in the latter's resolution
of October 27, 1986. " In this Resolution, the First Division traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice
Yap assumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of dismissal was issued
on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First Division, and that Justice Yap
was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap
inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the
First Division only on 14 July 1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July
1986. The Resolution of the First Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:

As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we received
indicate, did not even have the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself
from participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an extended one, which he should
have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After he is the law partner of
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now the distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that
even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time, the Supreme Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the
case formally Atty. Ordonez has manifested his unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the Canons of
Professional Ethics, to the actuation of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the First
Division of the Supreme Court, an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial
statesmanship, impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications.
(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez already became
the Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordonez in the law firm Salonga, Ordonez Yap, Padian became the Chairman of the Division.
xxx xxx xxx
(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some members of the Division were still busy
putting their respective offices in order and had possibly have no Idea about the Maravilla case.

The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October 1986, were "Noted," and
referred en consulta to the Court en banc.

The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the
interests of a party, does not mean that it is an "unjust decision" or that it has been "railroaded".
This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. YAP, J.,
took no part.
On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz,
(incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which follow:
It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never dreamed that you would rush, as you
did rush for assistance en consults with the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the fact
that the Court en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which to us when considered in
its entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division extended and unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.

Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division members that Maravilla petition is without
merit and since the members the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to the dismissal of
the petition by a minute. resolution an extended one. After all, this was the case of the Solicitor General. If
this is what happened, then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately "had"

Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our
petition under

After ala the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an extended one, does not bear the
signatures of the Division members. The members should have signed the resolution, after ala the Supreme
Court had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur, dissent or otherwise abstain from
voting.

2) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state:

1) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

That was we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were intended merely to give you the highlights
of our case. This is what we wanted to know to properly guide us when we finally bring our case to the other
forum of justice.
Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First Division referred our letters to the
Honorable Court en banc en consults it was all your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate its

unsigned extended minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the newly
reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted themselves as guilty of distorting facts involved
in our petition?

Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit:

This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why.

a) The l4 May l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

xxx xxx xxx

b) The 9 July l986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other forum of justice where we will soon
bring this case beyond the reach of the newly reorganized Supreme Court We are prepared to expose many
more of this kind of judicial performance readily constituting truvesty of justicePonder upon this well because it
is our very firm conviction that the people deserve to know how the distinguished members of the highest
tribunal of the land perform in duties in this most sensitive area of decision making.

c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied).

Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc consults) or not, the situation remains the same.
At the proper time, as we said, we will bring this case before another forum of justicewhere the members of
the First Division, in fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by mere untenable and
unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible members of the First Division
who took part in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended minute-resolution that is not even
signed by any of those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial integrity from its very
inception on 14 May 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva Maravilla Ilustre against the distinguished
members of the First Division, in fact against the entire membership of the newly organized Supreme
Court (because of its en banc unsigned extended minute-resolution that iswithout judicial integrity, dated 28
October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight. Other lawyers, not just by their
mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by their firm conviction that judicial statesmanship must be
maintained at nines in the highest tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free legal services
when the legal confrontation begins.

Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under

True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an
Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal
considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some
Members of this Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad
faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast estates.
Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their
"unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," when their Resolution had in
fact and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro
Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used their power and influence in persuading and
inducing the members of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust extended Minute
Resolution of 14 May 1986."
All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the tribunal of last resort, 1)
upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also as
to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings; and
3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor General Ordonez to
unduly influence the members of the First Division.
The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) was allegedly filed "in my quest for
justice, something that has been closed to me by the Supreme Court forever" and specifically charged:

xxx xxx xxx

CHARGE NO. ONE

Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most fantastic, most unbelievable
picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It states

Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) "persuading, inducing, influencing the members of the
newly organized First Division ... into promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May
1986, knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual hurry promptitude unequaled in the entire history of
the Supreme Court base on insignificant issues and deliberately evading/prevaricating the more important
substantial ones raised in my petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, ... ; and

...When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez
was private respondent's counsel.
The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow this statement hook, line and sinker For
Justice Yap we say. Tell that to the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience of
Justice Yap.
Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure, but we are learning a few as we
promulgated our case within legitimate that we state here that both resolutions that promulgated by the
Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and that promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October 1986, are
nothing but a desperate attempt when both are considered in their respective entirety, to maneuver without
success, some semblance of justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986 extended and unsigned
minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial integrity.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Court en banc think for one minute that
because of their respective 4-page minute but extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of
merit deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we win now give up the fight, just
forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say we are prepared to carry the fight before
another forum of justice. When we do, we shall call for a press conference with TV and radio coverage, so that
we can present to the entire nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller of power and influence and, at
the same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner in which the members of the highest tribunal of
the land perform their respective individual and collective functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of
decision making.

(2) Under the same Section 3, sub-letter (e) of the same Republic Act ... for causing me and the other heirs of
Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their power and influence as Solicitor-General and Associate Justice,
respectively. ...
CHARGE NO. TWO
Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas, members of the then FOURTH
SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate Court
1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in the exercise of their functions
through manifest and evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No. SP-13680, entitled "Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v.
Hon. Antonia Corpus Macandog, et al." in violation of article 204 of the revised Penal Code,2) For causing me and the other heirs such undue injury' by deliberately, knowingly rendering their unjust
RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 ... in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e)
thereof.
CHARGE NO THREE
Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court as
of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro
Yap, ...

1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust extended MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986
dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, ... with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordonez now the distinguished Solicitor General the 'illegal owners' of the vast estates of my aunt
Digna Maravilla ...;
2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, ... for deliberately causing us heirs
of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving us of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because of
their manifest and evident bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust extended minute RESOLUTION of
14 May 1986, deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez, now the Solicitor General
the "illegal owners" of my aunt Digna Maravilla's estates when under the law, these Ordonez clients are not
entitled to own these vast properties whether under testate or intestate succession or mixed succession
(Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in
almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the members who were
charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading
ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES
thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the other respondents were charged with
"graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after
having lost her case thrice in this Court.
On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioner's Complaint and decreed in the
dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein incorporated by reference) that:
WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to dismiss the complaint against Justices
Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will
continue evaluating the complaint against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza,
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez and the private respondents.
The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page:
Copy Furnished:
DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA
Counsel for the Complainant
919 Prudencio Street
Sampaloc, Manila
In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it required:
(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, with in ten (10) days from notice, why she should not be
held in contempt for her aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or
official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the
permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the
Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice.
(pp. 383-384, Rollo).
(1)
In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays that the contempt
proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no intention to affront
the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual Justices were private in
character and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a
constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters

were really contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary proceedings" against her,
and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is now "estopped" from doing so; this citation
for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that
lacks sincerity, taken not in the spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the
Tanodbayan "in my honest behalf that I lost my case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or
of its own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the
newspaper publicity of this case "was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean
Wenceslao Laureta, " who prevailed upon her to call off the press conference with TV and radio coverage; that
she is not a "disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has challenged the validity of the
resolutions of the Court "containing distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly, in that
(a) there is no res judicata, (b) the Court of Appeals in its decision declared that the judgment of the trial Court
had long attained finality, so that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her 11 opponents," clients of Atty. Ordonez,
are not entitled to own her aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate succession or
mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Court's Resolution that the Court of Appeals had denied
intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the statement in the en banc Resolution that some
Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust
resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a pre-judgment over a case over which this Court does not
have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter
body, she has "established not only probable cause but has also proved the collective culpability (of the
Justices concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53 page Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan
is made an integral part of her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is not respondent Ilustre's counsel before
the Tanodbayan and that she has consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the course of
the prosecution of her case, fike Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just
learned from other sources that respondent llustre was planning to bring her case to the Tanodbayan with the
assistance of other lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it was he who dissuaded her from calling
her intended press conference and from circulating copies of her complaint "not only in the performance of
duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president of Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and as a professional lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire
to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest tribunal of the land." He
should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for what he did" instead of taking this disciplinary proceeding
against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a "disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not
prepare respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual Justices, I appearances to the contrary notwithstanding,"
that these letters were "never, at any time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of
this Court, otherwise, "it would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court has lost
its right to consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from
proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so, this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and
character that underlie its present action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of
judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme Court is supreme in the
domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was no disregard intended to the Resolution of the
Honorable Court, as the tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals;"
he is just doing "his duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this regard in their proper light;"
particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its finality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res
judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for
review, (c) the observation in the First Division's extended Resolution of 14 July 1986 that Justice Yap was
unaware that Atty. Ordonez was private respondents' counsel "defies every vestige of human understanding,"
that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself from participating in the case is not borne out by the record of
this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have done
so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty. Ordonez, continued to be
recognized by this Court as counsel for private respondents even as he was the Solicitor General; (b) finally,
"appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, he has not colted acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of
the matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken by him to
protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court.
We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done
nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in the face of attendant
facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige of human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed,
they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7).

Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual

Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and
are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First
Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the Court en banc could pass upon
the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from
issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the
Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their
accusations.
The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justice had promptly announced his
Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme Court will take appropriate steps on the matter upon
its resumption of sessions on the first working day of the year. "
There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It
must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client,
and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustre's letters to the individual
Justices, nor with the com plaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the Motion for Reconsideration, dated June
11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the main petition, he stressed:
10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members. Strangely enough, about one month
later, the Honorable Court promulgated its extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of
the Supreme Court, unequaled in a manner of speaking, ...
In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same phrases
were incanted:
the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 5) unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given due
course is concerned ... (Emphasis given)
Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by respondent Ilustre addressed
to the individual Justices whom respondents have charged. Thus:
We consider the three minute resolutions ... railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial
ethics" ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 2; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 2).
xxx xxx xxx
with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court (Ltr., to Justice
Narvasa, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Herrera, p. 5; Itr., to Justice Cruz, p. 5).
The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the
Tanodbayan (p. 2).
Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta stated:
counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court Corazon Served the following:
(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division?
(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?
(3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the petition to be promulgated by resolution
and who did not, if any?
(4) Who prepared the Resolution? (p.312, Rollo).
Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second letters dated
November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre, thus:

Evidently you misunderstood our point of in our first letter. It is a very simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you
not approve the dismissal of our petition under
1) The l4 May l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No
2) The 9 July l986 minute resoluTion? Yes or No
3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No. (Emphasis supplied) ltr., to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice
Herrera, p. 1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1)
Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerful influence" by Atty. Ordonez and
Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken references"; "untenable minute resolution although
extend. "unjust minute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in
the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration before the
Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta.
The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court that copies of the complaint
filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing
the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he
was following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had control of the proceedings. As
stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should be within his
knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal E times should be reminded him that
'(a) lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the
lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers,
jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client pursuits in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.'
" (In Re: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23)
Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he
appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the members of the First Division of this
Court, by baselessly charging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith," because of
his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been rejected as without merit by the Court's
First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and
broadcast media in bold captions falsely depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of
the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them in a bad light at the
height of the Christmas season.
We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.
They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the
Supreme Court as of May 14,1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly and
deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case
with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez (now the Solicitor General)
the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla (Digna's
eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of their rights over the estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No.
Three before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap (and Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez) of having 11
persuade(ed), inducted(ed) and influence(ed) the members of the newly organized First Division into
promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the
Tanodbayan), which Resolution, (the "Division Resolution, " for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A ".
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in this Court. It cannot be denied,
however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the third time (in
fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy
involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The first was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37
SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court ruled:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna
Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be
returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. ...
As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex " B ", and hereinafter
referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon remand of the
case to the probate Court, she and other children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two

Motions for Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the state involved, therefore, harks back to that
first case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor
Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio E scolin
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was categorically ruled that there was no point to
allowing intervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show any right or interest in the
estate in question. " Thus:
(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for mandamus, seek this Court's
resolution on the petitioners' motion for intervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings and
memoranda, the parties have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be allowed to
intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present case, if only 'to avoid or, at least, minimize
further protracted controversy' between the parties (PCIB vs. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266). A resolution of this
issue should render moot and academic the question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.
We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for failure on
their part to show any right or interest in the estate in question. There is no dispute that the last will and
testament of the late Digna Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a final judgment which the
Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will Digna instituted her
husband Herminio Maravilla as
xxx xxx xxx
The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the
decedent's present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives
of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession.
Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the testatrix had the absolute freedom to institute
the latter as her sole, universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of
any person having capacity to succeed.

Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring defendants therein (private respondents in the
petition under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case to go back to
their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre
herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog Decision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to
the respondent Ilustre, et al., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent
Laureta.
A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties (private respondents in the petition under
review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Court's declaration of default
in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and that
the dismissal of the complaint be ordered. On January 21, 1982, this Court resolved to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact being involved.
In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division)', 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680
(hereafter called the Busran Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari stating in one breath that
"the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment
below had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that petitioners therein had the
remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private respondents in the petition under review),
in that appealed case AC-GR SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) 2 in
its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the BusRan
Decision" and entered another one:
1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its decision dated 11
August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent Court
not to take further action therein.
Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review filed on October 22, 1984. This
is the third case brought before this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an extended
Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following
reasons:

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of
this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.

There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear to have no interest in the estate, to
intervene in the proceedings involving the settlement thereof.

(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was only one
day late besides the fact that when so filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court.

xxx xxx xxx

(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, certiorari may be resorted to when a party
has been illegally declared in 4 default Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos 63 SCRA 300-301
[19751), or where it is necessary to restore order to proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete,
66 SCRA 462-463 [19751).

The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November 9, 1977 and has become
final. That was the second case involving the estate filed before this Court.
Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution "that the Court of Appeals had
denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and intended to
mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become final, also finally foreclosed any claim
that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her, may have had on the estate of Digna
Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears
repeating:
The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the
decedent's present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives
of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed succession.
...
To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre, with
respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna Maravilla's estate and for damages
against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband, who had then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X404), before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X, presided over by

(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404 declaring that the Testatrix's
collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate to the exclusion of the husband who was designated her
sole and universal heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment and overturns the pronouncements
of both the Appellate Court and this Court on the case.
There being former judgments on the issues which have become final rendered by Courts having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties, the said judgments having been rendered on the merits, and there being
between the prior and subsequent action Identity of parties, subject matter and substantial Identity of cause of
action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by the principle of res adjudicata, and
whatever transpired therein are nun and void ab initio and without any legal effect.
To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicata rests that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when a right or fact has been judicially determined,
the judgment of the Court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those
in privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54
[1961]).

ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Court's judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080
is hereby affirmed.

A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez as
his name still appears on the cover page of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court still
recognizes him as counsel for respondents (at p. 4)

SO ORDERED.
Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Order and denied review in an
extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was "railroaded
with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that
have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded, induced and influenced" by
Solicitor General Ordonez and Justice Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution"
The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven Justices, which initially gave it due
course because the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered
by the then Court of Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study.
Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be considered as the date when this case
was submitted for resolution.
The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the February, 1986 political upheaval The
last incident in the case was a motion for the early release of decision filed by petitioner on November 19,
1985.

The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty. Ordonez as counsel as shown by
his pleadings filed before the Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey
Ordonez." No withdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty. Ordonez in the main petition, his
name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue to furnish him with copies
of Resolutions of this Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986,
were "unjust" and were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division Resolution, explained:
The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The pleadings filed by the parties, as in any other
case, were included in the Agenda of the First Division as soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all
Agenda items, and the minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as possible after Agenda day.
xxx xxx xxx
The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the
interests of a party, does not mean that it is an 'unjust decision;' or that it has been "railroaded."

When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the First Division was reduced to five (5)
Justices. Taking account of the motion of petitioner for early release of decision, the new First Division, then
chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only
as to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene
and participate in the proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 to dismiss the petition through an extended
resolution which at the same time recalled the due course order. The new Division of 5 acted unanimously.

This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor. (at p. 4)

The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the
Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall. They have
lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the I entire history"
of the Supreme Court.

On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the Busran Decision" AC-GR SP No. 13680), aptly held:

As to the participation of Justice Yap in the ease, the "Banc Resolution" stated:
Justice Yap clarified that he was an official mission to Switzerland for the Presidential Conunission on Good
Government after his appointment to the Supreme Court an April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in
the Supreme Court his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986 was issued,
Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez was private respondent's counsel.
On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was taken up by the First Division on
July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former
partner, Atty. Ordonez, had submitted the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo L.
Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in his place. The
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9, 1986.
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986.
On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied on
September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28, 1986.
Justice Yap again took no part in the deliberation of the case.
But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been "unaware" of the
appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez. They reacted by saying "ten it to the marines" (Letters of November 3,
1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact.
With so many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during deliberative sessions very
often escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved.
Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordonez as counsel" for their opponents in the
case. In the same " Banc Resolution," it was clarified:

Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their own words "the ordered probate of
the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as
to the genuineness and due execution of said will but not upon the validity of testamentary provision,
particularly with the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal heir of Digna Maravilla."

The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run counter to the decision of the Hon.
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers to
the extrinsic validity of the will while the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot agree with this
observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision that the will was in effect declared not to
have been freely and voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna Maravilla but was the result of the evil and
fraudulent machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will The declaration that
private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an
indication that the Hon. respondent Court has nullified the will. Private respondents are not compulsory heirs
and, in the absence of their being named legatees or devisees in the will, they could only lay claim to the
estate of Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant to Art. 1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants ascendants, illegitimate children or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.'
However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complain d of by private respondents referred only to the
intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper for them to have instituted a separate action in a court other
than that in which the probate proceeding was pending.
xxx xxx xxx
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First
Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court or in any other court by a
person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the
purpose of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estate determined The very purpose of the trial or hearing
provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they are settled and
determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one can be maintained.
Considering that the "Escolin Decision, " as affirmed by this Court on November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-46155,
had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly observed:

3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August 1981 (referring to the "Macandog
Decision") unsettles and reviews issues which had long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and the
then Court of Appeals.
But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the case to
the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of whether the remedy of petitioners' in that case was
appeal and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not
become final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution," which -reversed the
Busran Decision," held that certiorari was proper when a party has been illegally declared in default. It follows
that the "Macandog Decision" had not attained finality.
Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately evaded divaricated" two important
issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in fact the Court of
Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had long become final," and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband
could not be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on indestructible ground of moral impossibility
and could not inherit wife's vast estate on the ground of utter unworthiness.
The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. It was not in the "Javellana
Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the 'Macandog Decision')
had long become final." That was in the BurRan Decision," which was precisely reversed by the " Javellana
Resolution."
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the "Javellana Resolution" pointedly
observed:
The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her sole
and universal heir, was admitted to probate, pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R.
No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and mental capacity of the
testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of
the instrument by him in the presence of the required member of witnesses who affix their signatures to the
will to attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten years later, the Hon.
respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by declaring that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily
and sanely execute the probated last will and testament, unifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her
sole and universal heir, and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla to the trunk of origin.
The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and "Javellana Resolution"
commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those judgments were
accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it
was that the First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it unnecessary, after further
study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due course Order, which it had previously issued to
give it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986). Contrary to respondents' claim,
the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to the Tanodbayan charging the members
of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an "unjust
extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code 3 and for deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because of the 11
unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 4
Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief
Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the
Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may
pass upon its judgments or declare them "unjust." " It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since
the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public
policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts
determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a
rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered
them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have
fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the
questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering
knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for
decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision
rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals
and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the
members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation
and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a
charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is
"unjust" cannot prosper.
The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's judicial power is by no means a
"display of arrogance" as per respondents' puerile contention, but a restatement of the fundamental principle
of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz.
that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of
the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936
landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), our Constitution "as a definition of the
powers of government"placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope and extent
of such powers" and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.' "
As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal principle he would grossly
impair and violate is that of the independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar are called upon to
defend and preserve. The independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the
supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the
Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial
functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to
the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that
a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would
destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher,
80 U.S. 335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same
principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons 34 Phil 729; Gardiner, et al. vs.
Parades, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the
doctrine that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing
of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by
petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and
reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis (Casco Phil.
Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive,
legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit (Tan vs.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that
neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should
refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch
into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between
the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad
faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon
their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity,

integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of
regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and
undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers mandated by the
Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and
their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to
determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law.

Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their information and guidance, and
spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta.

In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions
thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same
Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions
of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that
she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered
pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not
detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to
privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of
dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse
Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by
challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo
vs. Gica 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not
preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent Ilustre,
notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the
facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and
legal considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of
last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan
are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade
from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and
who would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the
manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert
public confidence in the Courts.
Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that
end, his chent's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970]; Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA
505 [1975[).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are suit generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed in the light of the demonstrated persistence of grave
misconduct and undermining public confidence in the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a
time when the Court is exerting every effort to regain public confidence in our courts after the trauma and
debacle undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose upon him an indefinite suspension,
leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune time, that he shag have once again regained the
fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562)
ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, and is hereby fined in the
amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle of punishment; and

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000]
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated September 9, 1998 rendered by
the former Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The assailed Decision affirmed
the judgment[2] dated October 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, finding petitioner
David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended,
(for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs) as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D,
respectively.
The facts are as follows:
On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de
Venecia, Jr., was arrested by elements of the PNP NARCOM, in connection with the enforcement of a search
warrant[3] in his residence at No. 331 Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. When the police
operatives of the PNP-NARCOM served the search warrant, which was issued by Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, they found the petitioner and his three (3)
companions inside the comfort room of the masters bedroom, at the second floor of the house. [4] During the
search, the following materials were found on top of a glass table inside the masters bedroom:
a. shabu paraphernalias, such as tooters;
b. aluminum foil;
c. two (2) burners (one small, one big);
d. fourteen (14) disposable lighters;
e. three (3) weighing scales;
f. plastic sealant used in repacking shabu;
g. several transparent plastic bags of different sizes;
h. about 1.4 grams of suspected marijuana fruiting tops contained in a small white plastic;
i. about 0.7 gram of suspected dried marijuana contained in a small plastic container.[5]
The PNP-NARCOM team also inspected the cars of accused Regala, Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. which
were parked inside the compound of the residence of petitioner Gutang. They found a Winchester Rayban
case (sunglasses) with an undetermined amount of suspected shabu residues and tooters in a black plastic
container and aluminum foil inside the car of Regala. The cars of Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. yielded
negative results. The items which were confiscated were then brought to the crime laboratory of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City for laboratory tests. The results of the laboratory
examinations showed that the said items found in the masters bedroom of the residence of petitioner Gutang
were positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The items found inside the car of
Regala were also positive for shabu.
The findings are as follows:

PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-168-94

CASE: Alleged Viol. Of RA 6425
SUSPECTS: DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ
NOEL REGALA Y YORRO
ALEX JIMENEZ Y ESPINOSA
CAREY DE VENECIA Y LOCSIN
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 1430H, 05 MARCH 1994
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, 2nd SOG NARCOM
Camp Crame, Q.C.
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. A One (1) white plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. A-1 One (1) white film case with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 1.56 grams.
Exh. A-2 One (1) small black box with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 0.70 gram.
Exh. A-3 Two (2) pieces of improvised tooter with white crystalline residue.
Exh. A-4 Several foil and small plastic bag with white crystalline residue.
Exh. B One (1) white plastic bag marked ROEL REGALA containing the following:
Exh. B-1 One (1) Winchester case with white crystalline substance.

Chemist Julita De Villa, their office received from PNP-NARCOM which is also based in Camp Crame a letterrequest for drug dependency test on the four (4) men.[6] After receiving the said request, Mrs. Esguerra of the
PNP Crime Laboratory asked the four (4) men including the petitioner to give a sample of their urine. The
petitioner and his co-accused complied and submitted their urine samples to determine the presence of
prohibited drugs. After examining the said urine samples, PNP Forensic Chemist De Villa came out with
Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94[7]and Physical Report No. DT-107-94[8] dated March 9, 1994, showing that
the said urine samples all tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Consequently, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D were filed in court against the
petitioner and his companions for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Incidentally, the charge against accused
Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was dismissed by the trial court in an Order [9] dated August 3, 1994 on the ground that
he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement at the New Beginnings
Foundation, Inc., a private rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty. His co-accused, Regala and Jimenez,
likewise pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases proceeded. However, petitioner Gutang did not
present any evidence.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds 1) accused DAVID GUTANG and ALEXANDER
JIMENEZ in Criminal Case No. 2696-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 8 of R.A.
6425 as amended (Possession and use of prohibited drug); and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the
costs; 2) In Criminal Case No. 2697-D (Possession) accused DAVID GUTANG, NOEL REGALA and
ALEXANDER JIMENEZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16 (ibid) and are hereby
sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs; 3) accused NOEL REGALA, in Criminal Case No. 2698-D (Possession of
regulated drugs) is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years,
four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs.

Exh. B-2 One (1) black case containing several tooters with white crystalline residue.

The items confiscated are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance
with law.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

SO ORDERED.[10]

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.

The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

FINDINGS:

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner raises the following assignments of error:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave the following results:

1. Exhs. A-1 and A-2 POSITIVE to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
2. Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 POSITIVE to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY SEIZED;
EXHIBIT I AND EXHIBIT R; THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-168-94. EXHIBIT D; THE
CHEMISTRY REPORT NO. DT-107-94, EXHIBIT L; AND THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. DT-10794, EXHIBIT M ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

CONCLUSION

II

Exhs. A-1 and A-2 contain marijuana, a prohibited drug.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a regulated drug. xxx
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1630H, Or
March 1994
(Annex A, pp. 6-8)
On the same day, March 5, 1994, immediately after Gutang, Regala, Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. were placed
under arrest, they were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. According to PNP Forensic

We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.

Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibits I and R, which are the Receipts
of Property Seized, considering that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The said Receipts
for Property Seized, which described the properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant,
contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the said evidence were obtained without the
assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount to having been derived from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of the poisonous tree.

We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property
Seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. [11] The signature of the
accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged for
the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by
law. Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R)
are not admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which
is prohibited by the Constitution.
Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in
evidence, it follows that the Physical Science Reports Nos. D-168-94 and DT-107-94 (Exhibit D and M) and
Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94 (Exhibit L) finding the said items seized to be positive for marijuana and
shabu, are also inadmissible inasmuch as they are mere conclusions drawn from the said Receipts and hence
a part thereof.
We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence
does not render inadmissable the Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report
(Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on
the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or taken from the bedroom of the petitioner in his
presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally and validly done. Hence, the said Reports
containing the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of the
prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said
prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession. In other words, even without the Receipts of Property
Seized (Exhibits I and R) the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial investigation when his urine
sample was taken and chemically examined, Exhibits L and M, which are the respective Chemistry and
Physical Reports, both dated March 9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was
derived in effect from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. Petitioner claims that the taking of his urine
sample allegedly violates Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed
under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what the
Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused,
but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. [12] In fact, an accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his
body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.[13] The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a
mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and
his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same
when they were requested to undergo a drug test. [14]
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree
with the trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
First of all, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the presence in his bedroom of the assorted drug
paraphernalia[15] and prohibited drugs found atop a round table therein at the time of the raid. [16] Petitioners
feeble excuse that he and his co-accused were not in the masters bedroom but inside the comfort room
deserves scant consideration since the comfort room is part of the masters bedroom. [17] Prosecution witness
Capt. Franklin Moises Mabanag, head of the said PNP-NARCOM raiding team, testified that when petitioner
was arrested, the latter showed manifestations and signs that he was under the influence of drugs, to wit:

By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)

Q: Mr. Witness, why was a drug defendant (sic) test requested on the persons of David Gutang, Noel Regala,
Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia?
A: A drug test was made on them because when we held these persons David Gutang, Noel Regala,
Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, they showed manifestations and signs that they are under the
influence of drugs.
Atty. Arias:
That is a conjectural answer. The witness is not authorized to testify on that.
Fiscal Villanueva:
We agreed as to the expertise of this witness at the time when I was qualifying him (interrupted)
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Court:
At any rate, that was only his observation it is not necessarily binding to the court, that is his testimony, let
it remain.
Atty. Arias:
But the rule is clear.
Court:
That is what he observed.
Fiscal Villanueva:
And what is this manifestation that you observed?
Atty. Arias:
Precisely, that is already proving something beyond what his eyes can see.
Fiscal Villanueva:
That is part of his testimony.
Court:
Let the witness answer.
Witness:
I observed they are profusely sweating and their lips are dry, I let them show their tongue and it was
whitish and their faces are pale, reason why we made the necessary request for drug test. [18]
It is worth noting that the search warrant was served only after months of surveillance work by the PNPNARCOM operatives led by Chief Inspector Franklin Mabanag in the residence of petitioner. Earlier, a
confidential informant had even bought a gram of shabu from petitioner Gutang. Prosecution witness
Mabanag also found, during the surveillance, persons who frequented the house of petitioner, and that the
confidential informant of the PNP-NARCOM had in fact gained entry into the house. The police officers are
presumed to have performed the search in the regular performance of their work. Allegedly improper motive
on the part of the PNP-NARCOM team must be shown by the defense, otherwise, they are presumed to be in
the regular performance of their official duties. [19] But the defense failed to do so.
All told, in the face of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear that petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN,

Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

SO ORDERED.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO,

Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA,

CARPIO,

Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO

CORONA,

G.R. No. 167798

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG
and RENATO M. REYES, JR.

CARPIO-MORALES,

of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ

CALLEJO, SR.,

MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),

JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
EMILIA P. DAPULANG,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA,
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and
of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO

AZCUNA,

ROQUE M. TAN,
of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE

TINGA,

of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG

CHICO-NAZARIO,

of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA

GARCIA, and

of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA,

VELASCO, Jr., JJ.

Petitioners,

- versus AMADO GAT INCIONG,

RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC
SHARON R. DUREMDES of the
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
and THE SECRETARY,
IN THE PHILIPPINES, and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC)
MANAGEMENT,
of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR
Respondents.
RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

PHILIPPINES (AMRSP),
BAYAN MUNA Representatives

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 167930

SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO

A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR,

Present:

- versus -

GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY

Representative LIZA L. MAZA,
ANAKPAWIS Representatives
RAFAEL V. MARIANO

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI,
in his capacity as Director-General

of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and

b.
To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing
of government services;

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)

and the Administrator of the

Promulgated:

NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO),

Respondents.

c.
To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided
under this executive order;
d.

April 19, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------x

e.

To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing
ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by thisexecutive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the
participating agencies shall be limited to the following:

DECISION

Name
Home Address

CARPIO, J.:

Sex
Picture

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.

Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

Marital Status
Names of Parents

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks

WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;

Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary and costly
redundancies and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be holding
several identification cards;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification
cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business with
government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability
of government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false
names and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. All
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt
a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:
a.
To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public
brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;

Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference number
shall form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above, including the
print of the right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear on the face or
back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to
Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic
Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority. In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
a.
Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID system
containing only such data and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of the
card holder:

b.
Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of governors or
mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities of the
government, for the purpose of ensuring government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to streamline
the ID systems in government;
b.
Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical
working groups, to provide such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of
its functions; and

1.
EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court
in Ople v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the
Social Security Act of 1997.

2.
The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO
420. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.

d.
Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of
this executive order.
Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the
pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the right to
privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a
minimum, include the following:
a.
The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity
of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

3.

EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

(i)

It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent.

(ii)
provisions.

EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its

b.
In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy
shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;
c.

Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d.
Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a
personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
e.
The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic
technology; and
f.
A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision
of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall
prescribe.
Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and Management
shall be provided to carry out the objectives of this executive order.

(iii)

There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

4.
Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued
without public hearing.

5.
EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the
discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those without ID. [2]

Issues

Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent
with this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative
power by the President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.

Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.

Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming that
petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of
paramount public concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The petitions also present a
justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all government entities currently issuing
identification cards are mandated to implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional.
Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation
of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizens right to privacy.[1]
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:
The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for identification
purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the
government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes, other
than the 14 specific data.

Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive
order. EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under
existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO
420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, [3] SSS,[4] Philhealth,[5] Mayors Office,[6] LTO,
[7]
PRC,[8] and similar government entities.

Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either expressly
or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some
government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the data collected
and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs they issue are dissimilar.

Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt
a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the
uniform data collection and format, namely:

In the case of the Supreme Court,[9] the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the Justices,
contain 15 specific data, namely:
(1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID
Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair;
(10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of Person to
be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally
also show the sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.

a.
To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public
brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;

b.
To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those
availing of government services;

c.
To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided
under this executive order;
d.

To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e.

To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency
and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only
14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of
Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax
Identification Number.

These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government
entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the
LTO all these 14 specific data.

In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only the first five items listed in Section
3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus,
at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for government
entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially
sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform,
will admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment
and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus increased
reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data to
the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can
individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the
authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are already authorized under
existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of
these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems
uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the
uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an
administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to

achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not
extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the
Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. [10] This
only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a
single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services.[11] The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not
usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of
the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President
did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces
costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of
current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance
and not an act of legislation.

The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not
require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools
also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their
members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an
employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a
privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club.

What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the
implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing
appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens
whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and
recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the
citizens right to privacy is infringed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems
of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not
compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very
narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such
data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded
under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID
card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and
issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an
ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will
contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the
common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and reliability of
identification.

This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should
undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and
provide user-friendly service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day
functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its own ID system
for employees of the Court and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system
with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is
true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive
department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings,
efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative
power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID
cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that
the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of
abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to
EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to
complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system
under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific
data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected,
stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data
to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record
only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their
ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards
on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now,
under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:

a.
The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the
identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b.
In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to
privacy be allowed or tolerated under this order;

c.

Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d.
Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a
personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e.
The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and
cryptographic technology;

f.
A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or
revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card
shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further
provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems
which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one
hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France,
Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID
systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden,
have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. [12] Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall
under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social
security, health services, and other specific purposes.

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform
effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names
and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.

In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on
individuals from public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from the
press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a
central database information on citizens gathered from public records across the country. In fact, the
law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification
records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such information with
officials of States, cities and other institutions. The Department of Justice treated such information as
confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of
four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, and the information demanded falls under that category of exempt information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded
under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only
strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the
coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly
confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be
released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420
but actually supports the validity EO
420.
Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over
information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors
to furnish the government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for
abuse. The government maintained acentral computerized database containing the names and addresses
of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the database
allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal matters confidential. The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:
Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies,
and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)
Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State inWhalen, the 14
specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far
less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike the
sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen,
therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to
privacy.

The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely,Griswold v. Connecticut,
[13]
U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,[14] and Whalen v. Roe.[15] The
last two decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to the present case.

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth,[16] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing
abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such records by public
health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are
reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patients confidentiality
and privacy are permissible.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and
distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms
of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. Because the facts and the issue involved
in Griswoldare materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present
case.

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,[17] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
law that required doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctors
name, the womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman had, the medical
complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the marital status of the woman. In case of statefunded institutions, the law made such information publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated: The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and
so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion more difficult.

Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld
in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under EO
420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure
of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate
anyone.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such
violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection,
recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly
drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required
legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring
opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on
this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that
they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v.
Torres sought to establish a NationalComputerized Identification Reference System,[19] a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none
existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declaredVALID.

SO ORDERED.