Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

Upon arrival of the team at the target area, the informer pointed to Alejandro, who was standing near the Anaud Store at Natividad St., as the drug trafficker. Foncardas forthwith told the informer to leave and instructed Morados to pose as buyer, furnishing him for this purpose with a marked P5.00 bill with serial number SN-LL742686. 4 Morados approached Alejandro and asked him in chavacano: "Tiene ba quita alli?" (Do you have anything there?) The latter answered: "Tiene aqui valor de P5.00 lang de marijuana. (I have here worth only P5.00 of marijuana.) Morados then said: "Saca yo se, compra yo conose." (I will take that, I will buy it.) 5 Alejandro thereupon took from the right pocket of his shirt an object wrapped in the piece of newspaper and handed it to Morados. After opening the parcel and finding what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves with three rolling papers, Morados gave the marked money to Alejandro. He then gripped Alejandro's right hand, identified himself as a NARCOM agent, and placed his quarry under arrest. 6 Foncardas and Estillote, who were about ten meters away from the two, rushed to assist Morados. Foncardas retrieved the marked money from Alejandro and received the wrapped parcel from Morados. The team then took the accused to the NARCOM headquarters at Calarian, Zamboanga City. 7 Custody to the accused, together with the seized parcel and the marked money, was turn over to NARCOM Investigator Norberto Francia. Francia prepared an Investigation Report, 8 Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, 9 and a written request addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory for the examination of the contents of the seizal parcel. 10 Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, subjected the contents of the parcel to physical, micro-chemical and confirmatory or duoquinois test and found them positive for marijuana. Her findings were embodied in her Official Dangerous Drugs Report, 11 which was offered as an exhibit along with the marijuana and affirmed by her at the trial. 12 The accused denied the charged against him and gave a different version of the incident. He claimed that in the afternoon of June 4, 1989, he had gone

G.R. No. 94644 August 17, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MICHAEL ALEJANDRO y MARIANO, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Yulo, Aliling & Macanay Law Office for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.: Michael Alejandro was convicted of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act no. 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 plus the costs. 1 In this appeal, he asks for the reversal of his conviction or at least the reduction of his penalty in the interest of the justice and equity." The evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of the NARCOM operatives who conducted the buy-bust operation that led to the appellant's arrest and prosecution. 2 That evidence showed that about half past five in the afternoon of June 4, 1989, a confidential informer reported to Sgt. Amos Foncardas at the NARCOM Headquarters in Calarian, Zamboanga City, that the appellant was selling marijuana on Natividad St., Tetuan, Zamboanga City. Acting on this information, the Commanding Officer, P/Major Claudio Cabayacruz, organized a surveillance and buy-bust team with Sgt. Foncardas as leader and CIC Bonifacio Morados and C2C Vicente Estillote as members. 3

on orders of his father to buy fish at the public market on Falcatan St. On his way home, someone driving a motorcycle blocked his way and immediately handcuffed him. The bicycle he was riding fell to the ground, spilling the fish he had bought. He was then brought to the NARCOM headquarters. at Calarian by several men who said they were NARCOM agents. 13 Abraham Narag and Norberto Feliciano testified that they were at the Anaud Store and witnessed Alejandro's arrest. They also saw his parents standing on the other side of the street across the store, only about two meters away from their son. Alejandro's father later picked up the fish that were scattered on the street. 14 Alejandro swore that at the police headquarters, the NARCOM agent took his wallet from his pocket and laid his money on the table. They then placed a P5.00 bill on top, telling him it was the marked money. The accused denied ownership of the bill but the agents insisted that it was his. The policemen later returned his money but retained the marked bill. 15 Going over the appellant's brief, the Court notes that it does not point to any error committed by the trial court. It simply hints, and rather vaguely at that, that the evidence may have been "planted" on Alejandro and points to newspaper reports of abuses committed by the police who "blackmail and profit from their alleged suspects." No evidence of this charge is offered. The brief is practically an admission of guilt. The appellant is in effect throwing himself at the mercy of this Court and praying that the original sentence "be reduced to make itself more palatable to reason." An appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for review and empowers (indeed obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the appellate court the appealed judgment even if they have not been assigned. 16 However, a careful study of the record yields no compelling reason for a reversal of the respondent court. The prosecution has adequately established that the accused was caught in the act of selling P5.00 worth of marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act.

him or to just strengthen an otherwise weak case. 17 This defense, like alibi, is inherently weak, as easy to fabricate as it difficult to prove. Alejandro's denial cannot prevail against his positive identification as the marijuana peddler. As a mere negative self-serving averment, his defense cannot have heavier evidentiary weight than the sworn declarations of the police officers who testified affirmatively on his sale of the prohibited drugs. The trial court considered it significant that when the appellant was blocked and handcuffed, he did not even make any protest or outcry. We have noted this too. No less strangely, his parents who, according to the appellant and his witnesses, were only two meters away from him, did not even bother to ask the policemen why their son was being arrested. There was no explanation for this odd indifference. The parents were not even presented as witnesses to corroborate their son. We come now to the appellant's contention that the penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon him for the sale of five pesos worth of marijuana is excessive and grossly disproportionate to the offense, to the extent of being cruel and unjust. He asks that the penalty be reduced if he cannot be acquitted. The law imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 regardless of the amount involved in the sale of prohibited drugs. 18 This is not cruel punishment. It is settle that "it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution" as it may that it was prescribed to prevent or discourage the proliferation of crimes that are especially hurtful to the public interest. As Justice Tuason said in People v. Estoista: 19 . . . The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying the use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If prisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. xxx xxx xxx

The appellant's claim that he was a victim of the frame-up is not convincing. It has not been shown that the NARCOM agents planted evidence on him in order to extort money from him or to exact personal vengeance or to harass

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for the radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believed that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience. A similar justification was made in People v. De la Cruz, 20 where the penalty of six months imprisonment and a fine P2,000.00 was imposed for profiteering because the offense was specially inimical to the national economy and the consuming public, and in People v. Dionisio, 21 where a "bookie" was sentenced to one month imprisonment and the penalty, although disproportionate to the offense, was sustained by this Court on the ground that "the social scourge of gambling must be stamped out." There is no question that the illicit distribution of drugs is one of the most serious problems of our society and that nothing less than the most determined efforts are needed to combat it. The stern penalties prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act are intended to deter the aggravation of this problem, which has already prejudiced the lives and the future of thousands of our people, especially the youth. The persons who peddle prohibited drugs are, as described in one decision, 22 "evil merchants of misery and death." The penalties imposed on them are neither cruel nor inhuman but totally condign, if not in fact even inadequate. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED and the appeal DISMISSED, with costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

and b) the order dated August 26, 1982, denying the separate motions for reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 1982 filed by petitioner People of the Philippines (People) and petitioner Family Bank and Trust Company (Family), which reads: AFTER a careful and thorough study of the allegations in the Motions for Reconsideration, dated August 3, and 13, 1982, filed by the Prosecution, together with the Opposition dated August 12, 1982 and the Supplemental Opposition dated August 21, l982, filed by the Defense, the Court finds the said motion(s) without merit and, therefore, denies the same. SO ORDERED. (p. 28, Rollo) The facts of these cases are not in dispute. On December 23, 1981, the City Fiscal filed against the accused an information (Criminal Case No. 10323) for six (6) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, with the City Court of Lucena, Branch I. On March 3, 1982, the accused was arraigned by the court and she pleaded not guilty to the charge.

G.R. Nos. 61864-69

May 8, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE FAMILY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (Formerly Family Savings Bank), petitioners, vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO as PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH II, AND HERNANI PALILLO, respondents. Silvestre L. Tagarao for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.: This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside and nullify the orders of respondent Judge Benigno M. Puno in Criminal Cases No. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hernani Palillo" filed before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II with station at the City of Lucena, to wit: a) the order dated July 30, 1982, granting respondent Palillo's Motion to Dismiss dated July 30, 1982 and ordering the dismissal of the aforementioned cases, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finding the Motion to Quash filed by the accused TENABLE, hereby DISMISSES the above-entitled cases. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. (p. 27, Rollo)

In compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice contained in a letter from the Chief State Prosecutor dated March 9, 1982 in connection with the criminal charges against private respondent Palillo, the Office of the City Fiscal filed on March 22, 1982 six separate criminal informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of the Philippines V. Hernani Palillo," to wit: Criminal Case No. 3485: That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54332 dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said

bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00 Philippine Currency. Contrary to law. (pp. 32-33, Rollo) Criminal Case No. 3486: That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check no. AA37-54330 dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to law. (pp. 36-37, Rollo) Criminal Case No. 3487: That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54330 dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover said check,

to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to Law. (pp. 36-37, Rollo) Criminal Case No. 3488: That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54328 dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to Law. (pp. 38-39, Rollo) Criminal Case No. 3489: That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54331 dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, but When said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to law. (pp. 40-41, Rollo)

Criminal Case No. 3490: That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. AA37-54334 dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, but when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored and was refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused, did not have sufficient funds in said bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank, Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed and refused to deposit with said bank the necessary amount to cover the said check, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid complainant in the aforestated sum of P85,000.00, Philippine currency. Contrary to law. (pp. 42-43, Rollo) On April 5, 1982, the City Fiscal filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323, pending before the City Court of Lucena, on the ground that proper informations have been filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The counsel for the accused filed an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw on the ground that the filing of so-called proper informations with the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not a legal ground to withdraw the above-entitled case, considering that the City Court of Lucena had already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the accused had already been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 16, 1982, the City Court issued an order, dismissing Criminal Case No. 10323, for lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, upon motion of private respondent through counsel, Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490 pending in various branches of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, were consolidated for trial before Branch II of the aforesaid CFI, presided by the respondent judge.

On July 28, 1982, private respondent was again arraigned, now before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and she entered a plea of "Not Guilty" in all aforesaid six (6) criminal cases. After entering her plea of "Not Guilty," private respondent filed on the same day a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned six (6) criminal cases on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming that the City Court of Lucena City had already acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323 and that, therefore, the dismissal of the last mentioned case, the very case bearing the same causes of action as the six (6) criminal cases, constituted a dismissal on the merits. On July 29, 1982, the City Fiscal filed an Opposition to the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss, citing as grounds therefore that the private respondent had not been placed in jeopardy before the City Court since she was arraigned under a defective information before the latter Court and such court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 10323. On July 30, 1982 the respondent CFI judge issued the first questioned order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss all the six (6) criminal informations filed against her. On August 5, l982, the complainant through Assistant City Fiscal Elviro Q. Quitain of Lucena City filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. On August 12,1982, private respondent filed an Opposition to the City Fiscal's motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the A.M. Perez and Associates Law Office, through Atty. Dante T. Ramos, filed its formal appearance on August 12, 1982 as private prosecutor in behalf of the Family Bank and Trust Company (herein private petitioner) under the direct control and supervision of the City Fiscal in the six (6) criminal cases before the CFI of Quezon. On August 16, 1982, with the conformity of the City Fiscal, the private prosecutor through the above-named counsel filed its own Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent judge's order of dismissal. On August 23, 1982, private respondent Palillo through counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the prosecution s motions for reconsideration.

On August 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued the second questioned order, denying both the City Fiscal and the private prosecutor's motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which the City Fiscal and the private prosecutor jointly filed directly with this Court. In his comment, the Solicitor General recommended that the questioned orders of the respondent judge be reversed and set aside and that the case be remanded to the court a quo for trial. On the other hand, the counsel for the herein private respondent, after four (4) motions for extension of time, failed to file his own comment. Accordingly, an March 2, 1983, this Court issued a resolution dispensing with the private respondent's comment, giving due course to the petition and declaring the case submitted for decision. In support of their petition, petitioners contend that, in issuing the orders complained of, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess or lack of jurisdiction because: a) The respondent judge was without jurisdiction to inquire into, much less reverse the City Court's finding contained in its order dated April 16, 1982 that the City Court had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323, the latter order having long become final and constituted res judicata between the parties thereto. b) The respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction of the City Court over Criminal Case No. 10323, such competence being in law reserved only to the Supreme Court. c) The respondent judge's holding that the City Court had concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance of Lucena over the offense charged under Criminal Case No. 10323 and that the dismissal of said case thereby precludes further prosecution of the accused under the six (6) cases before the Court of First Instance of Quezon finds no valid support in law and jurisprudence.

d) The orders complained of effectively denies the prosecution of its day in Court and of its right to due process. e) The respondent judge gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the accused, herein, respondent PALILLO, has waived the defense of double jeopardy and is thus estopped from setting up said defense (p. 78, Rollo). The main issue in this petition is whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10323 pending before the City Court of Lucena, Branch I, for lack of jurisdiction and the subsequent filing of other informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490) with the respondent Court against the same private respondent for the same offenses had placed her in double jeopardy. A careful scrutiny of the circumstances of these cases would clearly show that no double jeopardy exists. It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense include or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (People v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 175; Ada v. Virola, G.R. Nos. 82346-47, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 336). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (Tangan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 73963, Nov. 5, l987, 155 SCRA 435). As correctly found by the City Court of Lucena, jurisdiction over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 10323 exclusively pertains to the Court of First Instance of Quezon. Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides for a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine or imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 provides that the municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both . . . (Section 87). In determining whether a criminal case is within the jurisdiction of a Municipal or City Court, the maximum punishment that might be imposed is controlling, and the fact that the minimum punishment is within its jurisdiction is immaterial. Taking into account the amount of each check which is P85,000.00 upon which the court may base the alternative imposable penalty of fine pursuant to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in the information filed in the City Court, it is clear that the latter has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that the imposable fine will be P85,000.00 at the very least up to the amount of P170,000.00 which is way beyond the maximum amount of P6,000.00 from which the City Court may validly draw concurrent jurisdiction over the case. It is this alternative penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which divests the City Court of its jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 10323. Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed said case and since the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the same offense in the proper court. (U.S. v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 6027, 19 Phil. 265; Cristobal v. People, G.R. No. L-1542, 84 Phil. 473) It is noteworthy that the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323 and the subsequent filing of the six (6) criminal informations with the Court of First Instance were made in compliance with the directive of the Ministry of Justice. Clearly, these were designed to correct the error committed with respect to the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 10323. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the error does not constitute substantial prejudice to private respondent considering that no evidence yet has ever been presented and the private respondent was never exposed to trial. Thus, the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 were as though the accused was being tried and prosecuted under an original information. The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present its own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the information, there is no second jeopardy to speak of. Contrary to the stand of the private respondent in its motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490, the City Court's order of dismissal cannot be considered as a judgment of acquittal since, as already pointed out, the said court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Moreover, the assailed order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 unjustly deprives the State of its right to due process. This Court had occasion to rule in People v. Pablo, G.R. No. L-37271, June 25, 1980 (98 SCRA 289) that the court should bear in mind that it is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as of the people at large, and that it should not unduly force the accused to go to trial, or for light cause, jeopardize the rights or interest of the public. The rights of the offended parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally entitled to the protection offered by the courts to the public at large in the trial of a criminal case. (People v. Declare, G.R. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142) In the earlier case of Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, G.R. No. L46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 19, We ruled that: The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution and, where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict, it denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and, therefore null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental pre-requisite, that is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby. (People v. Navarro, etc., 63 SCRA 264).

We disagree, however, with the petitioner's contention that respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction of the City Court over Criminal Case No. 10323. Respondent Court obviously has the competence to pass upon the issue of the city court's jurisdiction over the first information. It should be pointed out that in order to resolve whether or not an accused has been placed twice in jeopardy, the court should first determine whether or not a first jeopardy had legally attached. As already discussed before, a legal jeopardy attaches only if the court which first tried the offense is a court of competent jurisdiction. And since the herein private respondent interposed the defense of double jeopardy on the basis that the city court had validly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323, it is necessary for the respondent court to pass upon the said issue. Anent the contention of petitioner that private respondent had waived the defense of double jeopardy when she failed to plead the said defense at the time of arraignment, suffice it to say that the promulgation of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure had effectively granted to an accused the right to invoke the defense of double jeopardy even after arraignment. Thus, Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the New Rules provides: Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash, or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be deemed a waiver with the grounds of a motion to quash except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction, of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied). Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisitions with respect to the procedural issues raised, this petition warrants the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for, there being no double jeopardy in this case. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. These cases are hereby REMANDED to the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Quezon to which Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490 are assigned to proceed with the trial on the merits against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City FIRST DIVISION

for the duration stated in the decision of the said respondent Court dated February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of the civil liabilities has been promulgated earlier. SO ORDERED. 5 The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:

G.R. No. 128540

April 15, 1998

EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Promulgation" filed by the accused thru counsel, is meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby granted. The Facts The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are reproduced below:

PANGANIBAN, J.: The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability. The Case This is the gist of this Court's resolution of the petition for review on certiorari, assailing the November 5, 1996 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CAGR SP No. 41096. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, which set aside the April 12, 1996 Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, 4 reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 of the respondent Judge is hereby SET ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused to serve imprisonment

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of [p]rision [m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993. The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions thereof: In the dispositive portion of this Court's decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of the court a quo in one respect only the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646. In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched on at all by this Court especially in the light of [o]ur [o]bservation in the said decision, as follows: After a careful review of the evidence on records, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The court a quo has expressed the following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to: Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances: xxx xxx xxx

same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 127-129) Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby declares that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial court's decision. Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation on the following grounds: 1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4 April 1995 and therefore there is nothing to promulgate anymore. 2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the accused's constitutional right against jeopardy. In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion holding: Now, the question is: May the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals promulgated on 17 August 1995 which "clarified" the dispositive portion of its original decision, be considered as an amendment, alteration or modification of the decision? Here, we must not forget the basic rule that in the execution of the judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the decision which controls. We cannot also forget that, as already mentioned above, we have already promulgated the said decision by reading to the accused the dispositive portion, and that to the best of our knowledge, he had already complied therewith by paying the damages which were awarded. It may be relevant at this point in time, to cite the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 393 that Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and precise in quoting data from the records, it would have arrived at the right conclusion. The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692, that:

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode or manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the

Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Supreme Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final. (emphasis supplied) The above decision is in consonance with the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Buan vs. Court of Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein the Supreme Court said: ". . . Thus the respondent Court stated, "it is undisputed that the Decision of the Court of Appeals . . . had become final and executory." Taken in this light the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable and conclusive. But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation. (emphasis supplied) It would seem from the above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme Court therefore, that it may suspend the operation of the rules of procedure by virtue of its rule-making power. Certainly if the Honorable Supreme Court has the power to promulgate the Rules of Court, then it has the power to suspend its operation in order to promote substantial justice. Unquestionably, however, the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that rule[-] making authority. Therefore it may not suspend the operation of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil cases. Will the same doctrines apply to criminal cases as in the cases before us? The accused thru his counsels raised the issues of the effect of a promulgation already once made arguing in the process that another promulgation can no longer be legally feasible if the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will not be violated. We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower courts, which the Honorable Supreme Court has imposed, i.e., to accept with modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate courts. However, we feel that we must

equate this with another injunction, that trial judges must keep abreast with the jurisprudence or run the risk of being found to be grossly ignorant of the law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a dilemma. Since the very jurisprudential authority relied upon by the Honorable [Court] of Appeals refers to the power of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may not this Court therefore conclude that the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have the power to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision which has not only become final, but has already been previously promulgated? Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to the observation made by counsel for the accused in paragraph 4 of their motion which we quote: 4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to promulgate as the same had already been promulgated on April 4, 1995. Besides, there is, likewise, nothing to promulgate in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February 2, 1996 and much less in the alluded August 17, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it direct this Court to repromulgate the Decision. On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, filed [before the Court of Appeals a] petition for certiorari and mandamus contending that the respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals'] Decision of July 30, 1991 and Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996 of respondent Judge be nullified and the penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced. 6 Ruling of the Appellate Court In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way: Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of imprisonment was not affirmed by [the Court of Appeals] although it increased the civil liability from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. He failed to recognize the fact that the only modification made by [the Court of Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil liability, which would not have been imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he looked

carefully into the text of the decision he would have found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the decision of conviction, as borne out by the following portions of said decision: After a careful review of the evidence on record, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The Court a quo has expressed the following findings in its decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to: Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances: 1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the same table with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro drinking beer at the terrace upon the arrival of Leo Petete and his companions; 2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes after the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo Petete and Agardo Reyes and boarded the same yellow car owned and driven by accused Eduardo Cuison. 3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a resident of Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a disinterested witness in the evening of May 27, 1986 infront (sic) of the house of said accused Eduardo Cuison in Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo Cuison alighted from his car, proceeded to his house and after coming out of his house was seen holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol. Eduardo Cuison called for his brother Warling to whom he handed the carbine pistol and received by the latter. Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When Bot Cuison arrived, he, Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison and two others inside the car proceeded towards the north. Obviously, these two were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde. 4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at the driveway of the Tropical Hut on board the car of accused Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the use of their respective firearms simultaneously fired several shots in the air;

5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to [sic] Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the fatal shot to [sic] Sapigao; 6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao obviously to see to it and make sure Sapigao was already dead; 7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused Eduardo Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come outside the restaurant and when Rulo Castro emerged at the door, accused Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot Cuison, Domy Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at Rulo Castro hitting the latter; 8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and uncles of Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo Cuison being a kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon his brother Warling and his two nephews Bot and Domy; 9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each other before the incident; 10. After shooting the victims to death, the accused Cuisons went away from the scene of the crime on board the same car. The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode o[r] manner in which the offenses were perpetrated taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the same aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, '88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560). Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and

cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them for concerted means is proved (People vs. Colman, et. al., 55 O.G. 2393). In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered the accused-appellant "to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao [in] the amount of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00" (Decision, p. 24). In accordance with the new policy of the Supreme Court on this matter, the above-specified amount of P30,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646). It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil liability in accordance with new rulings of the Supreme Court without finding that the accused [was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus, the promulgation of the civil liability only and omission of the criminal liability is an error. Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused. This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an already final decision. It is conceded that such cannot be done anymore. The Court of Appeals simply stated in categorical terms what it obviously meant in its decision that the conviction of the accused is affirmed with the modification that the civil liability is increased. The dispositive portion of the decision may not have used the exact words but a reading of the decision can lead to no other conclusion. It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after paying the heirs the civil indemnity imposed by the Court for his participation in the act of killing the two (2) victims in these cases, because of a wrong interpretation of a decision. 7 Hence, this appeal. 8 The Issues

In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following "assignment of errors": I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to show the existence of the elements for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus. III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be modified, over objection of the accused. IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the filing of the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28, 1995 by the Solicitor General violates the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in deciding as it did and in denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 9 Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether petitioner's right against double jeopardy was violated. The Court's Ruling The petition is utterly unmeritorious. First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified

A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law. 10 Grave abuse of discretion " . . . implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 11 Petitioner points out that the solicitor general's petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals failed to show grave abuse of discretion in the assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In the said Resolution, the trial court declined to order the incarceration of petitioner and, thus, effectively refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA Decision which, in turn, clarified that the CA's earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991 merely increased the amount of indemnity but did not delete the penalty of imprisonment. In justifying its said Order, the trial court insisted that it had already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased amount of indemnity. Petitioner argues that the trial court's Order, "far from being whimsical, capricious or malevolent, [was] valid and substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution was issued after a careful deliberation and weighing of the facts, issues and points of applicable law." 12

We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the Court of Appeal's July 30, 1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction of petitioner. The trial court's assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution was therefore "tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of the land affirming the judgment of conviction of respondent Court" and "unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion." 14 Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judge's justification that he has previously promulgated the Court of Appeals' Decision on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was imprisonment plus a higher amount of civil indemnity. In ordering only the payment of the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute the CA Decision in its entirety. Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying and this Court's dismissal of the petition questioning the said earlier CA Decision, the trial court still adamantly refused to do so. The persistent refusal of the trial court is a clear display of grave abuse of discretion. We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the latter's July 30, 1991 Decision was "ambiguous and obscure." 15 Such claim is bereft of factual basis. Nowhere in its Resolution 16 did the CA so describe its previous Decision. It merely restated the import of its July 30, 1991 Decision. Evidently, this was either misunderstood or distorted by the trial court, which stated that "it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched on at all by [the Court of Appeals] . . . ." 17 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of mandamus, in view of the trial court's refusal to perform its ministerial duty of promulgating the appellate court's Decision in its entirety. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted "[w]hen any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . ." 18 Obedience to a superior court's order is a ministerial duty of lower courts. Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was improper, because the People had not filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order. 19 This contention is bereft of merit. A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for

We disagree. While its language may have been a little faulty, it is still quite obvious that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision convicting Petitioner Eduardo Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision, therefore, cannot be construed to mean that the appellate court merely imposed an indemnity and deleted the penalty of imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision in no way communicated that the appealed Decision of the trial court was modified only in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it be gleaned that the penalty of imprisonment was deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and the entire records of this case contain no legal or factual basis for acquitting petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases against him. In granting petitioner's motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily decided not to promulgate the Court of Appeals' July 30, 1991 Decision. 13 He had no discretion to refuse; his refusal was thus a glaring transgression of his jurisdiction.

certiorari where the questioned resolution was a patent nullity, as in this case. 20 Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction Not Barred by Double Jeopardy Petitioner submits that the trial court's promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 "cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered" 21 because to do so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy. 22 He contends that the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final 23 and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case. 24 To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: . . . (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted). 25 Petitioner contends that "the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court's decision of June 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner . . . ." 26 In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point. The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. 27 Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially

incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. 28 Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. 29 We must stress that Respondent Court's questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. Cases Cited Not Applicable People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioner, are not applicable because they refer either to the lower court's proceeding that is not void or to errors of judgment, not to lack or excess or abuse of jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Hernando, 30 the Court ruled that the questioned proceedings of the court a quo "were not an absolute nullity as to render the judgment of acquittal null and void," considering that the prosecution was not denied due process. In Ramos vs. Hodges 31 the Court found that the trial judge's erroneous conclusion merely constituted "errors of fact or of law," and not of jurisdiction. Lastly, in Republic vs. Court of Appeals 32 the Court held that the lower court committed merely "an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as there was no clear showing [that it] exercised its power in [an] arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that its act was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law." Epilogue This Court takes this occasion to remind members of the bench to be precise in their ponencias, most especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and clarity in substance and in language are revered objectives in decisionmaking. Having said that, we also lament the trial court's convoluted attempt at sophistry, which obviously enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his imprisonment and to unnecessarily clog the dockets of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honor's expressed desire "to accept with modesty the

orders and decisions of the appellate court" was, in truth and in fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to his veiled rejection of the superior court's order modifying his earlier decision. His sophomoric justification of his refusal to obey for fear of "being found to be grossly ignorant of the law" does not deserve one whit of sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be blindfolded but she is neither blind nor naive. She can distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious argument from common sense. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED

People Vs Alejandro FACTS : Michael Alejandro was convicted of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act no. 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 plus the costs. The evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of the NARCOM operatives who conducted the buy-bust operation that led to the appellant's arrest and prosecution. ISSUE : WON the sentence was cruel or inhumane HELD : The law imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 regardless of the amount involved in the sale of prohibited drugs. 18 This is not cruel punishment. It is settle that "it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution" as it may that it was prescribed to prevent or discourage the proliferation of crimes that are especially hurtful to the public interest. There is no question that the illicit distribution of drugs is one of the most serious problems of our society and that nothing less than the most determined efforts are needed to combat it. The stern penalties prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act are intended to deter the aggravation of this problem, which has already prejudiced the lives and the future of thousands of our people, especially the youth. The persons who peddle prohibited drugs are, as described in one decision, "evil merchants of misery and death." The penalties imposed on them are neither cruel nor inhuman but totally condign, if not in fact even inadequate.

People Vs Martinez FATCS : These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. ISSUE : WON BP 22 violates the Constitutional rights against imprisonment due to debt HELD : The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the

statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 minion to 80 million pesos a day The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

People Vs Cudia FACTS : On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat Pampanga, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitution HELD : In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.[5] In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following: (a) Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) Valid complaint or information (c) Arraignment (c) Valid plea (e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983 Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court. With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall: xxx xxx xxx b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction

People Vs Puno FACTS : On December 23, 1981, the City Fiscal filed against the accused an information (Criminal Case No. 10323) for six (6) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, with the City Court of Lucena, Branch I. On March 3, 1982, the accused was arraigned by the court and she pleaded not guilty to the charge. In compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice contained in a letter from the Chief State Prosecutor dated March 9, 1982 in connection with the criminal charges against private respondent Palillo, the Office of the City Fiscal filed on March 22, 1982 six separate criminal informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, On April 5, 1982, the City Fiscal filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323, pending before the City Court of Lucena, on the ground that proper informations have been filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The counsel for the accused filed an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw On July 28, 1982, private respondent was again arraigned, now before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and she entered a plea of "Not Guilty" in all aforesaid six (6) criminal cases. After entering her plea of "Not Guilty," private respondent filed on the same day a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned six (6) criminal cases on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming that the City Court of Lucena City had already acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323 and that, therefore, the dismissal of the last mentioned case, the very case bearing the same causes of action as the six (6) criminal cases, constituted a dismissal on the merits. On July 30, 1982 the respondent CFI judge issued the first questioned order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss all the six (6) criminal informations filed against her. ISSUE : WON there is double jeopardy HELD : A careful scrutiny of the circumstances of these cases would clearly show that no double jeopardy exists. It is a settled rule that to raise the

defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense include or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides for a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine or imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 provides that the municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both Taking into account the amount of each check which is P85,000.00 upon which the court may base the alternative imposable penalty of fine pursuant to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in the information filed in the City Court, it is clear that the latter has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that the imposable fine will be P85,000.00 at the very least up to the amount of P170,000.00 which is way beyond the maximum amount of P6,000.00 from which the City Court may validly draw concurrent jurisdiction over the case. It is this alternative penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which divests the City Court of its jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 10323. Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed said case and since the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the same offense in the proper court.

It is noteworthy that the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 10323 and the subsequent filing of the six (6) criminal informations with the Court of First Instance were made in compliance with the directive of the Ministry of Justice. Clearly, these were designed to correct the error committed with respect to the filing of the information in Criminal Case No. 10323. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the error does not constitute substantial prejudice to private respondent considering that no evidence yet has ever been presented and the private respondent was never exposed to trial. Thus, the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 were as though the accused was being tried and prosecuted under an original information. The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present its own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the information, there is no second jeopardy to speak of. Contrary to the stand of the private respondent in its motion to quash Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490, the City Court's order of dismissal cannot be considered as a judgment of acquittal since, as already pointed out, the said court has no jurisdiction to try the case.

People Vs obsania FACTS : On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quogranted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal. ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitution HELD : In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the accused. The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy states that when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not

be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. The doctrine of estoppel says that an accused cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the trial court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words, appellee can not adopt a posture of double dealing without running afoul with the doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled that the parties to a justiciable proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower. Consequently, appellee is now estopped from invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that she would still be convicted under an information which she branded to be insufficient in the lower court. The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence.

People Vs pilpa FACTS : On April 19, 1967 the city fiscal of Tacloban City filed in the lower court against Pilpa the following information for frustrated murder. About two months later, or on June 15, Pilpa was arraigned. With the assistance of counsel, he plead not guilty. At the hearing in the morning of November 20, 1967 the prosecution moved in open court for the dismissal of the case on the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction because intent to kill was not specify alleged in the information. The counsel tor the manifested that he had no objection to the dismissal as may on that occasion in the afternoon of the same day, November 20, the a accused filed a manifestation signed by him and his two lawyers, making of record his opposition to the dismissal of the case. In the meantime, or on November 22 (two days after the issuance of the oder of dismissal), the city fiscal filed a new information for frustrated murder against Pilpa (Criminal Case No. 12183). In that second information the fiscal reproduced the wording of the first information and added the words "intent to kill" and "vital portion. On February 15, 1968 the accused filed a motion to quash the second information on the ground of double jeopardy. The fiscal opposed the motion. Judge Lope C. Quimbo in his order of April 5, 1968 (mentioned at the begininng of this ) granted the motion. ISSUE : WON there is violation of the constitution HELD : Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked in cases of (a) previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction (autrefois convict) of the same offense, or (c) when the case against the accused has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In any of these three cases, in order that there be former kill jeopardy, it is in the first case that (a) there was a valid competent or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (c) and that the had been and had entered his

plea. When these conditions or requotes are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,or for carry offense which necessarily includes or is included therein We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel's assent to the dismissal

People Vs Silay FACTS : Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. ISSUE : WON there is double jeopardy HELD : It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.

Esmena Vs Pogoy FACTS : Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their coaccused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. The case was calendared on October 4, 1978 presumably for arraignment and trial. Upon the telegraphic request of Father Tibudan the case was reset on December 13, 1978. Because Esmea and Alba were not duly notified of that hearing, they were not able to appear. In the meantime, the fiscal lost his record of the case. So, the hearing scheduled on June 18, 1979 was cancelled at his instance. On that date, respondent judge issued an order setting the trial "for the last time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning" When the case was called on that date, the fiscal informed the court that the private prosecutor received from complainant Father Tibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. The counsel for petitioners Esmea and Alba opposed the cancellation of the hearing. They invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. The case was continued as to the fifth accused who did not appear at the hearing. His arrest was ordered Twenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979. On October 24, 1979, Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy

ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitution

HELD : The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense

ISSUE : WON the Promulgation of Conviction not Barred by Double Jeopardy Cuizon Vs CA FACTS : On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993 The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby declares that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts decision. Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion HELD : To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).[25] As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity.[27] Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void.[28] Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.[29] We must stress that Respondent Courts questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.

Tupaz Vs Ulep

abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.

FACT : On June 8, 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against accused Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband Jose J. Tupaz, On January 10, 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, two (2) informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-17321[2] and Q-91-17322,[3] against accused and her late husband, for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979 On November 6, 1991, accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash[6] information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the accused pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 On May 28, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321,[14] stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 was identical to Criminal Case No Q-90-12896, wherein accused was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractors tax, amounting to P346,879.29. ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitutution We sustain petitioners contention. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioners consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed.[24] Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accuseds conformity.[25] As petitioners consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.[26] Consequently, the trial court committed grave

Salcedo Vs Mendoza FACTS : The record shows that on November 11, 1977, Provincial Fiscal Nestor M. Andrada of Oriental Mindoro filed a criminal information of homicide through reckless imprudence against the herein petitioner Leopoldo Salcedo Upon arraignment on December 19, 1977, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and the case was then set for trial on the merits on January 25, 1978. When the case was called for trial on that date, Provincial Fiscal Nestor M. Andrada asked for postponement to February 22, 1978, which was granted, for trial on February 22, 1978, which was granted, because the accused failed to appear. When the case was called for trial on February 22, 1978, the prosecution, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Emmanuel S. Panaligan, once more moved for its postponement and the case was reset for trial on March 28, 1987 Atty. Edgardo Aceron moved that considering the fact that this is the third time that this case was postponed always at the instance of the fiscal although the first postponement was made by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the accused who failed to appear, the Court orders the dismissal of this case with costs de officio. , hence the dismissal of the case. IT IS SO ORDERED On the same day, the prosecution, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arthur B. Panganiban, filed a motion to reconsider the above order. His first motion for reconsideration having been denied, Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a filed a second motion for reconsideration which the court set for hearing to April 20, 1978 It appears that on April 20, 1978, the trial court issued an order requiring both parties to submit within five (5) days from that date their respective pleadings (Annex E, Petition, p. 19, rec.). However, the parties failed to comply with the said order. On May 8, 1978, respondent Judge entered the order here asked to be reviewed, setting aside the order of dismissal dated March 28, 1978 and ordering that the case be set for trial on June 5, 1978 Petitioner learned for the first time about the existence of the above order an June 5, 1978, thus he filed on June 16, 1978 a motion for reconsideration of the said order alleging that the dismissal of the criminal case against him was

equivalent to an acquittal and reinstatement of the same would place him twice in joepardy for the same offense (Annex F, Petition, p. 20, rec.). On June 20, 1978, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and setting the case for trial ISSUE : WON there is a violation of the constitution HELD : The effect of such dismissal is at once clear Following the established jurisprudence, a dismiss predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused for the same offense This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal upon the motion or with the express consent of the accused win not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense as provided for in Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The moment the dismissal of a criminal case is predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial even if it is upon his own motion or express consent, such dismissal is equivalent to acquittal And any attempt to prosecute the accused for the same offense will violate the constitutional prohibition that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offens