XII.

13th week (acceptance and repudiation of the inheritance; executors and administrators)
Study: Civil Code, articles 1041-1069
Read:
1. Ignacio v. Martinez- YAP
Facts: Crispulo Martinez, the deceased husband of Dolores Arce Ignacio and father of the minor Arsenio Martinez, was a brother of Felisa
Martinez and uncle of Juan Martinez, the defendants. The plaintiff's ward and the defendants were the owners in equal parts of the
undivided real estate described in the complaint.
Dolores Arce Ignacio, as the guardian of her minor son, instituted this action for the purpose of having the property divided and the onethird part belonging to the minor turned over to her. The defendant, Felisa Martinez, alleged that she and her deceased husband bought
Crispulo Martinez' interest in the property in question in 1908. Defendants paid for the educational fees of Crispulo and in return the latter
renounce and assigned to the former his undivided interest in the subject property left by their parents.
The contract was signed and notarized when Crispulo was living with his sister, Felisa, separate from his wife and son on account of bad
feeling then existing between them, and that on the very day that that date, he requested his wife, in the presence of Felisa to send for a
person to make his will, as he wished to annul the contract, and that Felisa then stated to him that it was not necessary for him to make his
will for that purpose as she had already destroyed the document. Felisa has administered the property since the execution of the contract.
Issue WON there was a valid repudiation
Ruling: No.
Under the Civil Code, repudiation of the inheritance is an act entirely voluntary and free, made without consideration. An heir cannot
renounce his inheritance in favor of a designated heir or heirs, or any other persons. Neither can an heir renounce or repudiate his
inheritance so as to relieve himself of all liability after he had accepted the inheritance, without the benefit of an inventory, and had received
the products therefrom as such heir. Acts of mere conservation or professional administration do not constitute an acceptance of the
inheritance.
In the instant case, Crispulo Martinez had, by taking possession of the property, exercising act of dominion over it, and receiving products
therefrom for a period of more than eight years, accepted the inheritance without the benefit of an inventory. He "renounced" his interest in
favor of designed persons, one of whom was not an heir of his deceased parents, and for a valuable consideration. The word" renounce,"
used in paragraph 4 of the document does not, under the terms of the document, constitute must be considered together. Words, phrases
or clauses cannot be segregated and given a meaning which is contrary to the terms of the entire document. "The whole contract must be
interpreted or read together in order to arrive at its true meaning.
2. Guy v. CA - AQUINO
Facts:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen
and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by
their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his
father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to
dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.

3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange
for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from
any and all liabilities.

4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted
guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards
RULING: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval.
repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the
court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have
yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which,
according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of
letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of
heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition,
and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)
3. Sison v. Azarraga - BISNAR

Isidro Azarraga executed a will, wherein he instituted his son, Leodegario as his executor.
In his will, he also left some of his properties to Leodegario and instituted his grandchildren, Maria Felisa and Jesus, as universal heirs.
Maria Felis and Jesus were children of his daughter, Filomena.
Tomas Sison, guardian of the minor grandchildren, filed a motion to remove Leodegario as executor for having collected large sums of
money belonging to the estate in his care and in paying them out without authorization of the court.
He further argued that the grandchildren were in danger of losing their interests and claims in the estate.
Leodegario however argued that the amounts he collected belonged to him, as they were proceeds of his machinery that were sold by
Isidro.
Issue: Whether Leodegario, as executor, can make payments of his claims from the estate?
Ruling: No.

It is improper for the executor to make payments to himself and to take possession of the property of the deceased that he might claim
from the estate.
The executor who alleges that he has claims against the estate in his care in under the obligation, to give notice thereof, in writing to the
court, so that a special administrator may be appointed to adjust his claim; this the appellant has not done.

4. Mercado v. Vda. De Jaen- CLETO

Facts:

Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo, retired Bishop of Cebu, died in Cebu on December 20, 1934.
He left a will instituting his sister, Maria Gorordo Viuda de Jaen, as the universal heir to his estate, and in case of her death, his nieces
Telesfora Jaen and Cesarea Gorordo Revilles.
He bequeathed part of his estate to the various persons and entities mentioned in his will, and named Father Emiliano Mercado, parish
priest of San Nicolas, Cebu, as executor, and in the absence of the latter Father Alejandro Espina, parish priest of the Cebu Cathedral.
The will of the deceased bishop was probated without opposition and consequently the Court of First Instance of Cebu confirmed the
appointment of Father Emiliano Mercado as executor after the latter filed a bond of P5,000.
The heirs Maria Gorordo Viuda de Jaen, Telesfora Jaen and Cesarea Gorordo de Revilles instituted in the will, however, excepted to the
order of February 15, 1935, appointing Father Emiliano Mercado as the executor.
The lower court denied their motion, hence the present appeal.
The appellants' opposition to the appointment of Father Mercado was based on his alleged unfitness and incapacity to discharge the duties
of executor for the following reasons:

o (1) That notwithstanding the appellants' opposition, he contracted the services of Attorneys Hipolito Alo and Gabino R.
Veloso to represent him in these proceedings for the sole purpose of repaying the obligations he owed said Attorney Alo;
o (2) that he cannot be impartial as executor because the church of San Nicolas of which he is parish priest is one of the
legatees named in the will. It being natural that as such parish priest he would favor the interests of his parish to those of
the heir and the other legatees, and above all, he is related to some of the legatees;
o (3) that as the estate has no debts and the heirs instituted in the will are all of age and are willing, according to them, to
secure payment of all the legacies, there is no necessity of making the estate incur such unnecessary expenses as the
executor's fees and expenses and his attorneys' fees;
o (4) that the appellants are better able to protect the interests of the estate; and
o (5) that Attorney Margarito E. Revilles, married to the heir Cesarea Gorordo, is willing to render professional services to
the estate free of charge.

In support of these allegations, the appellants pointed out that the named executor hired Attorney Alo, to whom he is under obligation, in
order to be able to repay him in some way not with his own money but with the money of the estate, thereby insinuating that he lacks the
interest which a good executor must have for the protection of the rights and interest of the estate entrusted to him.

Issue:
W/N Fr. Espina is unfit or unworthy of the trust of being named executor of the estate. NO.

Held:

When the retired bishop Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo chose Father Emiliano Mercado as executor and administrator of his
estate after his death, he must have had good and sufficient reasons therefore, and his will must be respected.
The evidence shows that when the deceased bishop made his will naming said priest in preference to anybody else, he was in the full
enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under the circumstances, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with his last will
In order for the court to exercise its power to not appoint the named executor, the unworthiness, incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of
such person must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary.
The evidence shows that Attorneys Alo and Veloso were engaged by Father Emiliano Mercado not as attorneys for the estate but as his
own, in his capacity as petitioner for the probate of the will of Bishop Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo. It shows further that the
special agreement he had with said attorneys was to the effect that their fees would only be that determined and fixed by the court.
The appellants' allegation that Father Mercado cannot be impartial as executor because the church of which he is the parish priest is to
receive a legacy of P10,000 under the will, is untenable. His parish is not a legatee as all that the will provides with respect to said sum of
P10,000 is as follows:
To the poor of Cebu, Opon, and San Nicolas, I bequeath ten thousand pesos (P10,000) under the administration and at the
discretion of whomsoever may be the Most Reverend Bishop of the Diocese.

The foregoing provision does not give Father Mercado as executor, even the right to intervene in the distribution and disposition of the
funds in question.
The appellants' proposition not to name any executor to save the estate unnecessary expenses, as the testator left no debts and the heirs
on the other hand, are willing to secure payment of the legacies, is untenable. The will contains so many provisions, there are so many
legacies to deliver and pay, and it is premature to assert that the estate has no obligation or debt to pay. Thus, it is necessary to have an
executor to take charge of the estate so as to protect the interests thereof and later enforce compliance with the will of the testator.
The appellants' last proposition that they and Attorney Margarito E. Revilles could look after the interests of the estate better than Father
Mercado and attorneys Alo and Veloso, is likewise untenable. The estate in their hands would be no more immune from irregularities, and
the interests of the legatees amounting to more than those of the heirs would not be better taken care of because of what may be inferred

from the incident which took place during the preparation of the inventory of the estate left by the testator.

5. Liwanag v. CA - FERNANDEZ
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag

Respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime

petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the
deceased.

WON petitioner, as special administrator, can be sued? Yes

Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or
other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general
distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the
executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove
the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the
ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets.
Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the
property.
The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors
would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator
is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator
will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.

6. Pacific Commercial Co. v. Sotto - FORTES

Pacific Commercial v. Mauricia Sotto (1916)
By Roselle Fortes-Leung
Doctrine: if a final judgment is obtained by a creditor against the estate of a deceased person represented by a special administrator,
such judgment must be satisfied by the regular administrator or executor out of the funds of the estate.

Facts:
Mauricia Sotto is the administratrix of the estate of Claro Ong
Pacific Commercial was a supplier of La Fortuna Bakery
It delivered merchandise amounting to P3,303.75
P1,200 was paid
Balance was P2,103.75
Claro Ong was the owner of La Fortuna Bakery

Ong sold the bakery to Mamerto Laudico who later on sold it to Matias Ubaldo. Both Laudico and Ubaldo assumed all liabilities
Pacific knew about the sale to Laudico but not of the sale to Ubaldo
The 3rd owner, Ubaldo made several payments to Pacific but P399 remains unpaid
When the original owner died, Pacific Commercial presented its claim to commissioners of Ongs estate
Commissioners denied claim of Pacific
But trial court allowed the claim and found Ongs estate liable
Defense of the estate of Claro Ong: Mauricia Sotto is merely a special administratrix
Hence not liable to an action by creditor to pay any debts of the deceased
WON:

1. The estate of Ong is liable? YES

2. A special administratrix is allowed to pay the estates debt? - No

HELD:
Record fails to disclose any attempt whatever on the part of Claro Ong to be released from his obligation to pay the plaintiff the amount in
question.
There was no novation as Pacific did not consent to the substitution of Ubaldo as new debtor
The fact that Mauricia Sotto is only the special administratrix cannot prejudice in any way the interests of the estate which she represents.
The correctness of the plaintiffs claim has been fully considered by the court below after hearing and the presentation of all the testimony
by both parties.
The claim of debtor, Pacific Commercial shall be paid by the regular administrator of the estate of Claro Ong.
7. Anderson v. Perkins - ITARALDE
DOCTRINES: 1) special administrators function is to preserve not only the property of the decedents estate but also its value. 2) The sale
of alleged personal estate of the deceased husband cannot be authorized where his widow claims some items as conjugal or are her own
property - the conjugal partnership must first be liquidated and the issue of ownership adjudicated.
FACTS : Dora Perkins Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins
and the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate. Court approved appointment of special administrator
upon his posting of a bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will
presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson.
The special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased
Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death. 2 years later, he submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to
some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets,
electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to
save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition
Idonah Slade opposition Perkins filed an to the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal
properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had
been made.
Lower court approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider
this order on the grounds, among others, that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were
perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; and that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and
collections of oppositor;
ISSUES: 1) WON the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell
them? 2.) WON the opposition of the surviving spouse of the deceased that she is entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in
question should be entertained ?
HELD: 1. Section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only. It is
true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is
appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal

provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to
preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other
property as the court ordered sold" .
2.Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been
taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left
by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of
the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement
be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the
proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical
appliances, various gadget and books can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of
two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale
at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the
personal estate in question.3.It does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory
she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same
were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do
not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.
8. Torres v. Javier - KUNG
It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman
named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on
behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who, if
either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator.
ISSUES/RULINGS
1.

The first error assigned is that the court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to appear in the proceeding.

It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila
under the misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time of his death. After it had been
ascertained that the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal, the Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the appointment by the Court of First Instance of
Manila was disregarded the proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.
2.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in taking into consideration the claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a
Chinese wife in China.
It must be remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a
third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as
they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as
administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Marta
Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po
Pic. We do not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this court.
3.
The third error assigned is to the effect that the trial court erred in not finding that Marta Torres was the lawful wife of the
deceased Tan Po Pic.
We do not believe the court erred in this respect. The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a
disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration
proceedings at the proper time.
We are of the opinion that the decision of the probate court is so far correct that it must be affirmed. Section 642 of the Code of

Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other
relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the
administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such
creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the court may appoint.

9. Esler v. Tad-Y -YAP

Facts:
Vicente Tad-Y died leaving a will survived by his wife and son. The will cannot be admitted to probate because in its execution the
solemnities required by the law were not complied with. Hence, an intestate proceeding was instituted.
The Court appointed Locsin as special administrator, he being one of the persons named by the testator Vicente Tad-y as executors in his
will.
Esler alleged that the trial court erred in appointing Manuel Locsin as administrator in this proceeding without the consent of Rosario Esler
Vda. de Tad-Y and the minor Jose E. Tad-Y.
Issue: WON Court erred in appointing Locsin as administrator
Ruling: No.
After considering the reason given in the briefs of both parties, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the appeal is groundless. If the
administrator Manuel Locsin was appointed by the court as special administrator, section 660 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not
permit any appeal from the appointment of said administrator. If Manuel Locsin was appointed by the trial court as administrator of the
intestate estate in accordance with section 642 of Act No. 190, the trial court had discretion to issue the letters of administrator to any of
the persons mentioned in said section, and unless there has been an abuse of discretion, which does not appear to have been committed
in the present case, the appointment shall not be revoked on appeal.
10. Johannesburg v. Harvey - AQUINO

CARMEN THEODORA JOHANNES died intestate in Singapore. His heirs are: B.E Johannes, husband, Frederick Charles, Alfred,
and Ida DAlmeida, her siblings. All the heirs lives in Singapore except for brother Alfred.

B.E Johannes was appointed as administrator of the properties of the deceased situated in Singapore by the SC Straits
Settlements in Singapore.

Alfred, on the other hand, was appointed administrator of Manila estate deposits in Manila banks previously under guardianship
by Phil. Trust Company amounting to P109,732.55.

The other heirs filed a petition to annul the appointment of Alfred and to issue an order directing Judge George Harvey to give it to
B.E Johannes as lawful administrator. They claim that Judge Harvey gravely abused its discretion.
Issue: Whether the Judge correctly appointed Alfred as administrator of Manila estate of Carmen.
HELD: Yes.

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the
country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration.

The reason for the ancillary adminstration is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts

or to be distributed among his heirs.

The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late Carmen Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits
Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration, conformable
to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay the claims of creditors, if there be any,
settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin.

It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong
reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else.

While naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves this to
the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility. Moreover,
nonresidence is a factor to be considered in determining the propriety of the appointment, and in this connection, it is to be noted that the
husband of the deceased, the administrator of the principal administration, resides in Singapore.

Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary representative, if he applies therefor, or to his nominee, or attorney;
but in the absence of express statutory requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other person.

Pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of
the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of
the statute, and is appealable.

11. Moran Sison v. Teodoro - BISNAR

Facts:

Carlos Moran Sison was appointed judicial administrator, without compensation, of the estate of Margarita David, and was required to file a
bond before assuming his duties.
Sison filed a bond in the amount of P5,000 and assumed his duties.
1955: Sison filed an accounting of his administration, wherein, he included of the expenses of administration the amount he had paid
Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation for the renewal of his bond.
Narcisa F. Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected, claiming that the sums paid for renewal of Sisons bond was not a necessary expenses of
administration and should not be charged to the estate.
Issue: Whether a judicial administrator serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums
paid on his bond?
Ruling: No.

Position of an executor or administrator is one of trust.

It is proper for the law to safeguard the estates of deceased persons by requiring the administrator to give a suitable bond, and that the
ability to give this bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office.
The ability to give this bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office. The execution and approval of the bond constitute a condition
precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust.
If an individual does not desire to assume the position of executor or administrator, he may refuse to do so.
It is far-fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond by an administrator is an necessary expense in the care, management and settlement
of the estate within the meaning of the law, because these expenses are incurred "after the executor or administrator has met the
requirement of the law and has entered upon the performance of his duties.
12. Joson v. Joson - CLETO
Facts:

Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Quezon, Nueva Ecija leaving behind heirs and properties.
He married three times and was survived by nine (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by his first wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2)
daughters by his second wife Pomposa Miguel and his third wife and surviving widow Dominga M. Joson.
Upon his death, his will was presented to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August,
1945, said will having been duly probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed an
inventory of the properties left by the deceased.
The administrator prepared accounts that were never approved by the court.
Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts filed by the administrator where he alleged that the administrator
diminished the shares of the heirs in the yearly produce of the properties and had padded his expenses of administration.
In the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise their differences and entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition of the entire
estate. This settlement was contained in two documents wherein they manifested that they are entering into it because of their desire to put
an end to the judicial proceeding and administration.
But, as the court was never informed of this extrajudicial settlement either by the administrator or by the heirs, it issued an order requiring
the administrator to file an accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954, which accordingly the administrator complied with.
However, on November 25, 1954, without said accounts having been heard or approved, the administrator filed a motion to declare the
proceedings closed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such.
Heir Eduardo Joson filed an opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the court issued an order declaring the proceedings terminated
and relieving the administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said accounts.
According to the trial court, the report of the administrator is a mere incident in the proceeding to wind up the estate of the deceased, and If
the parties concerned have already entered into an extra-judicial settlement of the estate, the same should put an end to this proceeding.
Once this proceeding is terminated, the incidents thereto must yield, since the only purpose of submitting a report of the accounts by the
administrator is to facilitate the liquidation. The trial court also said that the administration of an estate cannot be an end but only a means
of settlement of the estate, and therefore, calling on the administrator to account for his administration becomes unnecessary from the
moment that the heirs have already entered into an extra-judicial settlement.
Issue:

(1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration a mere incident, which can be avoided once the estate has been
settled? No.
(2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without the necessity of having the
accounts of the administrator heard and approved by the court? No.
(3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of proving his account from the moment said partition has been executed? No.

Held:
There is merit in the petition.

Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession at the value of appraisement contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of such an estate; and with the
proceeds of so much of the estate as is hold by him, at the price at which sold."
Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his administration within one year from his appointment,
unless the court otherwise directs, as well as to render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is fully settled.
Section 10 provides that before an account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to all persons interested of the time and
place of examining and allowing the same.
Section 9 expressly directs that the court shall examine the administrator upon oath with respect to every matter relating to his account
except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent testimony.
The duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which ran be waived or
disregarded when the same is terminated; rather, it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the
administration is finally ordered closed and terminated.
When the administrator moved the court to close the proceedings and relieve him of his administration and of his accounts, the heirs who
objected thereto objected likewise to the closing of the proceedings invoking their right to be heard but the court ignored their opposition

and granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefor what we quoted in the early part of this decision.
The fact that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition in order to put an end to their differences
cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the administrator, especially when there is
nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.
This is more so when, according to the oppositors, the administrator has committed in his accounts a shortage in the amount of
P132,600.00 which certainly cannot just be brushed aside by a mere technicality.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

13. Chua v. Absolute Management Corp - FERNANDEZ

Doctrine: In compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the
deceased the administrator should include or exclude in the inventory
Facts: Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Jose L. Chua. Thereafter, she submitted to the
trial court an inventory of all the real and personal properties of the deceased.1awphi1.nt
One of the creditors of the deceased, [herein respondent] Absolute Management Corporation, filed a claim on [sic] the estate
Absolute Management Corporation noticed that the deceaseds shares of stocks with Ayala Sales Corporation and Ayala Construction
Supply, Inc. were not included in the inventory of assets.
Absolute Management Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T. Chuas reply were spurious and simulated, filed a
motion for the examination of the supposed transferees. xxx It premised its motion on Section 6, Rule 87
CA ruling:
the Court of Appeals pointed out that the presentation of the deeds of assignment executed by the decedent in
petitioners favor does not automatically negate the existence of concealment. The appellate court stated that it is
a common occurrence in estate proceedings for heirs to execute simulated deeds of transfer which conceal and
place properties of the decedent beyond the reach of creditors.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated February 7, 2000 of respondent Judge Manuel P.
Dumatol is hereby SET ASIDE. He is hereby ORDERED to give due course to petitioners "Motion for the
Examination of the Administratrix and Others" and thereafter, to dispose of the claim accordingly.
Issue: The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the trial court to give due course to the Motion for
Examination? Yes
Held: Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the properties left by a
deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the properties of the deceased.16
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings has
supervision and control over these properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory of the administrator lists all
the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court
also has the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased the administrator should include or exclude in
the inventory. An heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased may call the courts attention that certain properties, rights or

credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations of such party. The court has the
power to determine if such observations deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to the estate.
However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to
the persons examined. If after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person examined is keeping properties belonging
to the estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain shares of stock by the
administrator in the inventory does not automatically deprive the assignees of their shares. They have a right to be heard on the question
of ownership, when that property is properly presented to the court.
In the present case, some of the transferees of the shares of stock do not appear to be heirs of the decedent. Neither do they appear to be
parties to the intestate proceedings. Third persons to whom the decedents assets had been conveyed may be cited to appear in court and
examined under oath as to how they came into possession of the decedents assets. In case of fraudulent conveyances, a separate action
is necessary to recover these assets.
Taken in this light, there is no reason why the trial court should disallow the examination of the alleged transferees of the shares of stocks.
This is only for purposes of eliciting information or securing evidence from persons suspected of concealing or conveying some of the
decedents properties to the prejudice of creditors. Petitioners admission that these persons are the decedents assignees does not
automatically negate concealment of the decedents assets on their part. The assignment might be simulated so as to place the shares
beyond the reach of creditors. In case the shares are eventually included in the estate, this inventory is merely provisional and is not
determinative of the issue of ownership. A separate action is necessary for determination of ownership and recovery of possession

14. Salonga Hernandez v. Pascual - FORTES

Salonga Hernandez v. Pascual (2006)
by Roselle Fortes-Leung

Doctrine: Administrator or executor primarily liable for attorneys fees subject to reimbursement from the estate. When direct recovery of
the attorneys fees is made on the estate rather than on the administrator or executor, proper notice must be given to all heirs of the
decedent
In short, lack of notice to other heirs is fatal to the claim of the law firm
Facts:
Dona Adela Pascual was married to Don Andres Pascual
They have no children and executrix, Dra. Olivia Pascual is the illegitimate niece of Don Andres Pascual
Don Andres died intestate and predeceased Dona Adela
Dona Adela died testate years later, appointing Dra. Olivia Pascual as executrix of her will
Petitioner Salonga Hernandez is a professional law partnership
Their services were engaged by the Executrix Dra. Olivia Pascual in the settlement of the estate of Dona Adela Pascual
In their 1987 retainer agreement, which Dra. Pascual signed, the final professional fee shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the
fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate
Salonga Hernandez Law Firm obtained a favorable judgment, the will presented by Dra. Pascual was allowed
The firm then filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien on the properties of the Estate of Dona Adela
The firm applied as well for a Notice of Writ of Execution
WON: A lawyer who renders legal services to the executor or administrator of an estate can claim attorneys fees against the estate instead
of the executor or administrator?

Held:
Attorneys fees chargeable to the estate, not only to the share of Dra. Pascual.
However, the court remanded the case to RTC Malabon to hear the Petition for Payment of Professional Fees
General Rule: it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for attorneys fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for
the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate.

The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in attorneys fees
if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate
2 Recourses of Lawyers should executors refuse to pay professional fees:
1.
file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and not as administrator or executor
2.
file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorneys fees as an
expense of administration
Resort to option 2 means all the heir must be notified of the claim
The court held that the firm incompletely resorted to the second option
BUT it did not serve notice to all the heirs of Dona Adela Pascual
Requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law
Payment of such attorneys fees necessarily diminishes the estate of the decedent, and may effectively diminish the value of the
testamentary dispositions made by the decedent

XIV. 14th week (collation)

Study: Civil Code, articles 1061-1077
Read:
1. Guingguing v. Abuton - ITARALDE
DOCTRINE: Disputes between heirs with reference to the obligation to collate may be determined in the administration proceedings over
the estate of the ancestor without the necessity of the institution of a separate action.
FACTS: Estates in question is that of Ignacio Abuton. He died leaving 2 sets of children by 2 differenct wives. With first, Dionisia Olarte,
who predeceased Ignacio,he got 12 children. With second, Teodora Guinguing, he got 4 children.
Gabriel Binaoro was appointed administrator. In due course of proceeding Binaoro submitted to the court an inventory of the properties
belonging to the deceased at the time of his death. In this inventory he included only the lands which the testator had devised to the
children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children of

the first marriage as having been derived from their mother.

Teodoro Guinguing, in representation of herself and her four minor children, protested asking that the administrator be required to amend
his inventory and to include therein all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including
property actually in the hands of his children by her which had been delivered to said children as an advancement. The purpose of the
motion was to force the first set of children to bring into collation the properties that had been received by them, in conformity with article
1035 of the Civil Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition that Ignacio Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation of
the conjugal property pertaining to himself and Dionisia Olarte. This motion was formally opposed by two of the children of the first
marriage, namely, Agapito and Calixto Abuton y Olarte.
Lower court ordered that the administrator should include in the inventory of the estate all of the property of which the testator was
possessed at the time of his death, considering that no property was acquired by the testator during his second marriage, thus the
administration was concerned only with the property that had been acquired before the death of first wife. Since testator already divided
the properties with the first wife to the children of first marriage, the only property subject matter of the present administration proceedings
are the property retained by the testator in his own hands. Both parties appealed this order. This order was appealed with the contention,
among others, that the for it to be valid, a formal notice must be given to all persons in interests in the same manner as if a new action had
begun.
ISSUE: WON formal notice must be given to all persons in interest for the order of the Lower court regarding the inclusions or changes in
the inventory of the estate of the deceased be valid?
HELD: NO. The making of the inventory is necessarily of a preliminary and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion of property
therein or the improper omission of property therefrom is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons in interest.

Since all the heirs are already virtually represented in the administration and are bound by all proper orders made therein, the order has
legal effect. This is not inconsistent with the proposition that contested claims of ownership between the administrator and third persons
should be tried in separate proceedings, which is entirely true. The question here is merely between some of the heirs and the
administrator, as representative of all persons in interest. Besides, it should be pointed out, the inclusion of a property in the inventory does
not deprive the occupant of possession; and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly included in the estate, the
occupant heir is liable for the fruits and interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, Civ. Code). The provisions
of the Civil Code with reference to collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to the obligation to collate may be
determined in the course of the administration proceedings.

2. Tordilla v. Tordilla - KUNG

Francisco Tordilla, who died intestate in Naga, Camarines Sur, on December 18, 1925, leaving as his only heirs his widow, a legitimate
son, the defendant and appellant, and a recognized natural daughter, petitioner and appellee.
ISSUE / RULING
1.
One of the issues, The contention of appellant is that, where a certain value is stated in a deed of donation, that value cannot be
questioned when the properties are brought into collation.
This is incorrect, as article 1045 of the Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property at its actual valuation at the time of donation.
The recital in the deed cannot therefore be controlling. The actual value at the time of the donation is a question of fact which must be
established by proof the same as any other fact.
The trial court, with much experience, and after study of the evidence produced, held that the actual value of one of the properties was
greater than that recited in the deed of donation, and also fixed the fruits and income from the donated properties at a higher figure than
appellant thought just. The fruits and interest produced by property subject to collation must be ascertained under article 1049 of the Civil

Code. There is some doubt in our mind as to the real value of the parcel in question and the amount of the income from the donated
properties.
2.
The seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error refer to the validity of Exhibit H, a contract entered into between the appellee
and the appellant in another case and signed shortly before the death of their father. The contract is in the nature of a compromise and
covered two items, namely, first, the support of the natural daughter which the brother agreed to assume for one year and, second, a
proposed division of their future inheritance upon the death of their father. It is assumed that appellant has complied with his terms of the
contract, and the father died before the obligation of the brother terminated. The second portion of the contract Exhibit H clearly relates to
the anticipated future inheritance and, therefore, is null and void under the provisions of article 1271 of the Civil Code which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not out of the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.

"Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division
intervivos of the estate, in accordance with article 1056.

"Any services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject-matter of a contract."cralaw virtua1aw library

The action of the trial court in holding Exhibit H to be uncontroverted and predicating its final action on the terms of that document was
erroneous and contrary to law.

3.
The tenth assignment of error reads: "In adjudicating to the natural daughter the same share or amount of properties as that
adjudicated to the legitimate son." This assignment of error is based on article 840 of the Civil Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, and also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to each of the legitimate children who have not received any betterment, provided that
a sufficient amount remains of the disposable portion, from which it must be taken, after the burial and funeral expenses have been paid.

"The legitimate children may pay the portion pertaining to the natural ones in cash, or in other property of the estate, at a fair
valuation."cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellee contends that article 840 of the Civil Code has been repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the statement of this
court in Concepcion v. Jose (46 Phil., 809). It is true that in the majority decision in that case it speaks of article 840 being repealed. While,
with the question there considered, namely, from where the funeral expenses should be taken, the Code of Civil Procedure changed the
rule as to those items from what had formerly been in the Civil Code, by reading the whole decision we have no hesitancy in saying that
what the court then had in mind was not a repeal of the article but in fact merely a modification thereof. In the case of In re Intestate Estate
of Tad-Y, found in the same volume (46 Phil., 557), this court, speaking through the Chief Justice, applied article 840 of the Civil Code in
the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To determine the share that pertains to the natural child which is but one-half of the portion that in quality and quantity belongs to the
legitimate child not bettered, the latters portion must first be ascertained. If a widow shares in the inheritance, together with only one
legitimate child, as in the instant case, the child gets, according to the law, the third constituting the legitimate in full ownership, and the
third available for betterment in naked ownership, the usufruct of which goes to the widow. Then the natural child must get one-half of the
free third in full ownership and the other half of this third in naked ownership, from which third his portion must be taken, so far as possible,
after deducting the funeral and burial expenses. . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Our attention has not been called to any case in which this court has treated article 840 as entirely and completely repealed.
We are therefore of the opinion that this case must be disposed of according to the above quotation from the case of Tad-Y.
The decision and orders of the trial court must therefore be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consonant with this
opinion. Costs against appellee. So ordered.

3. Adan v. Casili - YAP

Facts: Felix Adan commenced an action against his sister and the latter's husband Casili, to secure the judicial partition of the estate left by
their deceased mother Simplicia, which consist of six parcels of land. Parcels 1 and 3, however, were subsequently discarded, the first
having been sold by the, and the second being admittedly the property of their half sister. The remaining four parcels, are valued at
P2,783.55.
The defendants interposed the following defense: That the four lots in question were ceded by the deceased to her daughter as her share
of the inheritance; and that the plaintiff has received more than his share consisting of money, livestock, palay, and real property which
amounted to P3600, namely:
It found, that the plaintiff received from his mother during her lifetime various sums aggregating P3,000 for his expenses while studying
surveying in Manila, one-half of which, or P1,500, should be brought into collation; that he also received or took from his mother twelve
carabaos worth P360, and 300 cavans of palay worth P1,260, all of which amounted to P3,120 more than the value of the four parcels
of land now in the possession of the defendants. Hence it absolved the defendants from the complaint without any finding as to costs.
Issue: WON Felix Adan received more than his share.
Ruling: Yes.
We find the record that the plaintiff and appellant did not prove his contentions. On the other hand, the defendant spouses both testified in
their own behalf, and in addition to their testimony they called the caretaker to corroborate their declaration regarding the appropriation by
the plaintiff of twelve carabaos.
It was also established during the trial that the plaintiff studied surveying in Manila and that during his studies his mother and sister sent
him money for his support and expenses.
Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education, attendance in illnesses, even though unusually expensive,
apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation. But article 1042 of the same Code provides that
expenses which may have been incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional or artistic career shall not be brought to
collation unless the parent so orders or they encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases in which it is proper to collate
them, the money which the child would have spent if it had lived in the house and company of its parents shall be deducted therefrom.
Since the career of surveyor is a professional one, and since the expenses incurred by plaintiff's mother in giving him that career
encroached upon the legitimate, it is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him during the two years he studied
surveying, the other half being considered as the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of
his mother.
Summarizing the evidence, we find that the plaintiff has received from the estate of his mother a total of P2,630.00. The defendant Victoria

Adan, on the other hand, received from her deceased mother the four parcels of land in question, the agreed value of which is P2,783.55
less P300 (funeral expenses), P2,483.55 as her net share, which is less than that received by the plaintiff.
4. Lesaca v. Lesaca - AQUINO
FACTS: Baldomero Lesaca died and survived by the following heirs: second wife, 2 minor children by the latter, 3 children by his first
marriage, and three acknowledged natural children. Petition for the probate of the will and for the administration of the estate was instituted
in the CFI of Manila. CFI, at the instance of the widow granted each of the two minor children a monthly allowance of P100 for living
expense plus an extra P300 for matriculation and uniforms. The other children opposed and the CFI issued an order, holding the amounts
to be considered allowances for support, to be deducted from their hereditary protion onlu is so far as they exceed what they are entitled to
as fruits or income.
Minor children contends that these allowances are not subject to collation by virtue of Article 1430 (1067) which provides that, allowances
for support xxx are not subject to collation.
ISSUE: WON the allowances for support granted by the court to the minor children pending liquidation of the estate are subject to collation
and deductible from their share of the inheritance.
HELD: Yes. The answer should be the affirmative in view of Article 1430 of the CC The surviving spouse and his/her children shall be
given an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share has
been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or
income.
The contention of the minor children is without merit. Article 1041 us found under the section Collation, which refers only to property or
rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.
5. Vda. De Rodriguez v. CA (read separate opinion) - BISNAR
Facts:

The Spouses Jose Valero and Beatriz Bautista did not beget a child during their marriage.
Beatriz adopted Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista and although, Jose also wanted to adopt her, he was unable to do so having been
disqualified for having 2 children from his 1st marriage.
Jose had 2 daughters from his 1st marriage: 1) Flora Valero Vda. De Rodriguez; and 2) Rosie Valero Gutierrez.
Jose donated his pro indiviso share in 2 conjugal lots with improvements to Carmen.
Jose executed his last will and testament, wherein he devised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute her legitime and left the
remainder to his Flora and Rosie.
He failed to mention the donation to Carmen.
The spouses then sold to Carmen the 2 properties that were earlier donated to her.
It was sold for P120,000.
When the spouses Jose and Beatriz died, proceedings for the settlement of their estate began.
In the proceedings for Joses estate, his share in the 2 properties were included.
Carmen, claiming ownership, moved that the 2 properties be excluded from Joses estate.
The executor opposed on the ground that the lots were donated to Carmen and the donation would allegedly involve collation.
The properties were excluded from the inventory of Joses estate. Hence the appeal.
Flora argues that although the properties were sold to Carmen, the consideration was too low, only of the true value, that it was really a
donation.
Issue: Whether the 2 properties are subject to collation?
Ruling: The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the proceedings. It was not necessary to mention in the order of
exclusion the controversial matter of collation.

Proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The
numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been
determined.
In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Carmens titles to the disputed lots are
questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
have to be determined.
Separate Opinion: Teehankee

2 properties are not subject to collation.

The question of collation of said lots is immaterial insofar as respondent and the deceased Jose M. Valeros estate since Carmen is not
even an heir of his estate (which he had willed to his two legitimate children, herein petitioners, his second wife Beatriz Bautista having
predeceased him in September, 1972).
Under Article 1061 of the Civil Code, only a compulsory heir succeeding with other compulsory heirs is required to collate whatever
property he/she may have received from the decedent during the decedent's lifetime by way of donation or any other gratuitous title in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition." There can therefore be
no collation here because from the documents of record, respondent Carmen is not a compulsory heir who received property by donation
or gratuitous title from the deceased that would be subject to collation.
It also has to be mentioned that the properties were sold to Carmen, not donated.

6. Lucerne vda de Tupas v. RTC - CLETO

Facts:

Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving
compulsory heir.
He also left a will dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital.
However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before to the Tupas
Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to
have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime.
The Trial Court did not see things her way, holding that the properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the
death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978, that the donation
properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate, and that Tupas Foundation, Inc., being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the
donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation.
Issue:

W/N a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased may be declared inofficious and be reduced at the instance of the donor's widow?
Yes.

W/N the donation was subject to collation? Yes.

Held:

The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.

A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can
give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code).

If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the
extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing
donated (Art. 771, Civil Code).
Such a donation is, moreover, collationable - that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death for
the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate.
This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would
seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations.
The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to
prevent its being brought to collation. It is obvious that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.
The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give.
In order to find out whether it is inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the determination of
the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of
which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined:
1.

Determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death

2.

Determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the value of the
property thus left;

3.

Determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;

4.

Addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to collation; and

5.

Determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as
the legitime of each respective compulsory heir.

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question
here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to
stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess.
In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased
Epifanio R. Tupas.
Case remanded.

7. De Roma v. CA - FERNANDEZ
Doctrine: Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.
Facts: Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30,
1971
Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that
certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation;
what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the
decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious
Issue: WON there was express stipulation to collate in the deed of sale? no
Law: Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor
should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

Held: We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the deed of donation expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described
the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is
irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we
may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise
language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil T
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in
Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
8. Pagkatipunan v. IAC - FORTES
Canuta Pagkatipunan v. IAC (1991)
by Roselle Fortes-Leung
Doctrine: The avowed specific provisions of the Civil Code respecting collation, which are controlling even in intestate succession, must
be followed in adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate. Adjudication must not be purely speculative and conjectural.
Facts:

Jose Velasquez, Sr. was married to Victorina Real, they had 5 children
When Victorina died, Jose contracted marriage with Canuta Pagkatipunan
Canuta bore him 13 children
The conjugal partnership with Victorina was not liquidated and Jose enjoyed full possession of the conjugal properties
When Jose Velasquez died, the 2nd conjugal partnership with Canuta was also not liquidated and Canuta possessed the properties
This situation gave rise to the controversies in the instant case spawned by the parties' conflicting claims from both sides of the two
marriages.
Commissioners determined 27 lots belonged to conjugal partnership of first marriage
Trial Court held that West Ave house should be divided into 2, one half to 2 nd wife and her children, the other half to the husband and his
heirs
TC also cancelled all donations inter vivos executed by Jose Velasquez to his children with Canuta
Decreed as simulated sale and resale of Canuta to siblings of the property in the name of Sps. Jose and Victorina Velasquez
WON: The trial and appellate courts properly adjudicated the shares of Jose Velasquezs heirs?
HELD: Case was remanded to RTC Laguna and directed it to follow procedure prescribed in the SC ruling and outlined in the NCC

Lower court's ruling adjudicating the remaining portion of the conjugal estate to the private respondents is purely speculative and
conjectural.
Failed to consider among others, the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 908 determining legitime, value of property left by testator, deduction of debts and charges
Add value of donations subject to collation in the net value of the estate
Art. 1061 compulsory heirs to include donations received from decedent for the computation of legitime
Trial court must determine gross value of the conjugal properties of the 1st marriage
Art. 909. Charge donations received by compulsory heirs to their legitimes, those received by strangers to the free portion
Court however affirmed findings that Canuta Pagkatipunan employed fraudulent acts to acquire title over some properties
Sale then resale back to her by her siblings
Deeds of assignments in favor of her children
Affirmed that properties listed in the inventory belong to 1st marriage

9. Zaragoza v. CA - ITARALDE

DOCTRINE: Collation cannot be done where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the compulsory
heirs - the petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties
are present.
FACTS: Flavio Zaragosa died intestate survived by 4 children. Alberta Zaragosa- Morgan, one of the children who eventually became an
American citizen filed a complaint in CFI iloilo against spouses Florentino (here brother) and Erlinda Zaragosa for the delivery of her
inheritance shares consisting of the Lots 943 and 871. She claimed that Flavio during his lifetime, by way of donation or any other
gratuitous title, partitioned the his properties among his 4 children. For her 3 brothers and sisters, deeds of sale without valid consideration
were executed to deliver their shares . For her part, since she is no longer Filipino citizen, she was precluded from acquiring properties in
the Philippines, except by hereditary succession. Hence, no deed of conveyance was executed in her favor.
Florentino denied these allegations and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to implead indispensable parties.
But the lower court ruled in favor of Alberta, finding that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his three children by
deeds of sales and he intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent. CA modified the ruling declaring lot 871 and 943 as
inheritance of Alberta as the sale of lot 943 was fictitious and void.
ISSUE: WON the partition intervivos by Flavio of his properties which inlucde Lots 871 and 943 is valid?
HELD: It is the basic rule in the law of succsession that a partition inter vicos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. The
legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061. Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this
case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must
therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the
rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
SC dismissed the case without prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.
10. Valero vda. De Rodriguez - KUNG (SAME WITH THE ABOVE CASE)
Spouses Jose Valero and Beatriz Bautista did not beget a child during their marriage. Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista and although, Jose
also wanted to adopt her, he was unable to do so having been disqualified for having 2 children from his 1st marriage.
Jose had 2 daughters from his 1st marriage, Flora Valero Vda. De Rodriguez; and Rosie Valero Gutierrez.
Jose donated his pro indiviso share in 2 conjugal lots with improvements to Carmen but this was never registered. Later on, Jose
executed his last will and testament, where he devised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute her legitime and left the remainder to
his Flora and Rosie. In the will, Jose never mentioned the donation previously made to Carmen (adopted). The said property was then sold
to Carmen for a consideration of P120,000.00 Upon the death of Jose and Beatriz, the said properties were included in the inventory of the
decedents estate. Carmen filed a petition for exclusion of the said properties contending that she was the owner, and it was sold to
her.The executor opposed on the ground that the lots were donated to Carmen and the donation would allegedly involve collation. Flora
argues that although the properties were sold to Carmen, the consideration was too low, only of the true value, that it was really a
donation.
Issue: Whether the 2 properties are subject to collation?
Ruling: No, According to the SC, the issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the proceedings. It was not necessary to
mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
Proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The
numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been
determined.
In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Carmens titles to the disputed lots are
questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
have to be determined.

11. Lauro Vizconde v. CA - YAP

Facts: Petitioner Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita had two children, Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita, is the daughter of spouses
Rafael and Salud. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio, Ramon, Teresita, and Ricardo, an incompetent. Antonio
predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land in Valenzuela for P135,000. After 11 yrs., Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Lim
and Chiu for P3.4M. Estrellita bought from a parcel of land with at BF Homes, Paraaque using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the
Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". Petitioner
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Rafael and Salud. The properties include
bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral expenses is P3M. The settlement
gave: Rafael and Salud (50% bank deposits), Petitioner (50% bank deposits, car and Paranaque Property)
Rafael died, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding and prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Ramon
filed another opposition alleging, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than P6M.
RTC appointed Teresita, in turn as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Ramon, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property, be collated.
Since there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration, the
trial court ordered the properties to be collated.
Issue: WON the properties should be collated.
Ruling: No.
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation
or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.
The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding.
First: Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who
was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate
estate proceeding.
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included
in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela
property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous.
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate
proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to
warrant collation.
Fourth: What was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita
acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof.
Fifth: Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela
property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael.
12. Eloy Imperial v. CA - AQUINO

FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land. On July 1951 Leoncio allegedly sold the said lot to his
acknowledged natural son (petitioner) who then proceeded to subdivide in into several lots. Parties admit that despite the contracts
designation as one of Absolute Sale the transaction was in fact a donation.
Barely two years after, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he was deceived by
petitioner into signing the document. The parties entered into a compromise agreement under the terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the
legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a part of the land and deposit the
proceeds in a bank for Leoncio.
In 1962 Leocnio died leaving as his heir petitioner and his adopted child, Victor. Victor substituted Leoncio in the above-mentioned case.
Victor died in 1977 and survived his natural father. In 1981 the father died leaving two sons (brothers of Victor). These brothers are the
respondents in this case. Respondents in 1986 filed a complaint for annulment of the donation with the RTC. Petitioner moved to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata, prescription and laches, and that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to cover the legitime of Victor.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impaired the legitime of Victor. On appeal with the CA, the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the lower court, hence, the present appeal.
ISSUE: (1) WON it is proper to reduce the inofficious property donated? (2) And IF YES, is the action not barred by prescription (lower
courts held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years, both courts deemed that the action is a real action over an immovable
property)?
HELD: (1) Yes. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the
donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and
even moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.
Victor did not renounced his legitime merely because he substituted his adopted father in the civil case (regarding the compromise
agreement). Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment.
When Victor substituted Leoncio upon the latters death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered
an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under
Article 772. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article
772, and also in Article 1053: If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to
his heirs.
(2) No. A claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. In Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, the SC declared that what is brought to
collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss
thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious donation? The CC specifies the following instances of
reduction or revocation of donations:
(1) 4 years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child;
(2) 4 years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation;
and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or
their support.
Donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a
particular prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.

Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned?
Mateo vs. Lagua, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, the cause of action to enforce a legitime
accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the
legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.