Wall Radical Passivity
Wall Radical Passivity
Wall Radical Passivity
PASSIVITY
Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben
L i b r a r y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D a t a
Al 8 <b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
TALLINNA ÜLIKOOLI \
AKADEEMILINE }
K RAAMATUKOGU/
X
Contents
Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction
Passivity 1
The Language of Poetry 10
ONE
T h e A l l e g o r y o f Being
Image 13
Duality 17
The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork 22
The Space of Art 25
The Profane 29
TWO
Levinas's Ethics
An Ambiguous Rapport 31
No One Other 34
viii CONTENTS
The Self 40
Impasse 46
Éthique 50
Death 57
Levinas and Heidegger 62 FOREWORD
Love's Characters
THREE
B l a n c h o t , L'arrêt de mort, a n d t h e I m a g e of L i t e r a t u r e 65
Writing 65
Proximity 77
En d e ç à du t e m p s 93
Image, Ipseity, and Art 106
ix
h a s been .1 hazard Foi English language readers oi Blanchot, T h e ( flannel 1 >l the familial DC! a use you m a y use t h e sec-
Levinas, a n d Agamben (as h a s perhaps the n a t i v e case- with o n d p e r s o n familiar w i t h the o n e you love: tutoiement. But
w h i c h French a n d Italian s p e a k e r s m a y read t h e m ) . The stylis- perhaps one way to characterize Blanchot is to note the ex-
tic infelicity of t h e English l a n g u a g e for t h e i r k i n d of w r i t i n g t r e m e d e m a n d s he p l a c e s on tutoiement. In his fictions his
h a s n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y t e n d e d t o yield i n t h e i r f o l l o w e r s a k i n d n a r r a t o r s c o n s i s t e n t l y insist on its rarity. In his l a t e s t essay,
o f e m p t y s l o g a n e e r i n g , a c l a i m t o s o m e k n o w l e d g e different " P o u r l ' a m i t i é " B l a n c h o t describes the a t m o s p h e r e o f M a y ' 6 8
f r o m t h a t g r e a t eerie c l a r i t y s o e s s e n t i a l t o w h a t t h e y a r e say- as o n e in w h i c h tutoiement w a s d e m a n d e d of e v e r y o n e . It w a s
ing. (That French is n o t Levinas's native language m a y p u t only with his friends, a n d n o t with the c o m r a d e s of t h o s e t i m e s ,
h i m in t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e n a r r a t o r in L'Arrêt de mort, r e s p o n - t h a t B l a n c h o t w o u l d use the formal " v o u s , " sign o f p o l i t e n e s s t o
sive in a l a n g u a g e w h o s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c a n n o t be a given.) his friends, b u t m o r e o f his f r i e n d s h i p , w h i c h c o u l d n e v e r use
F o r y e a r s i t h a s s e e m e d t o m e , e v e r s i n c e r e a d i n g Lydia " t u " o f f h a n d e d l y . A t t h e e n d o f t h e e s s a y B l a n c h o t says t h a t i t
Davis's supple a n d heroic attempts to render Blanchot in En- i s o n l y L e v i n a s w h o m h e will " t u t o y e r , " h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h
glish (in a letter to Steven S h a v i r o B l a n c h o t says of her, " E l l e L e v i n a s , h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h his o t h e r f r i e n d s , a n d his friend-
sait c e q u ' i l e n est d e t r a d u i r e l ' i n t r a d u i s a b l e " ) , t h a t t h e o n l y s h i p w i t h f r i e n d s h i p d e m a n d i n g this d i s t i n c t i v e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
w a y for a n E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e r e a d e r t o r e a d B l a n c h o t h a s b e e n u n f a m i l i a r , a n d u n c a n n y f o r m a l i t y w i t h f a m i l i a r i t y itself.
w i t h i n t h a t single l a n g u a g e S t e v e n s d e s c r i b e s . T h e E n g l i s h w e F r e u d calls t h e u n c a n n y t h e r e t u r n o f t h e f a m i l i a r a n d sees
s p e a k e v e r y d a y h a d s e e m e d t o o q u i r k y for B l a n c h o t . J . L . t h e fact o f r e t u r n itself a s w h a t m a k e s i t u n c a n n y . F o r B l a n c h o t
A u s t i n s u g g e s t s t h a t w e ' l l get s o m e w h e r e i n a e s t h e t i c s w h e n i t w o u l d b e t h e alien f o r m a l i t y a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e familiar, a n d
w e s t o p t r y i n g t o figure o u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d i n d e e d a t t h e h e a r t o f t h a t m o s t f a m i l i a r o f all t h i n g s , l a n -
start looking to describe "the dainty a n d the d u m p y " instead, guage, which is uncanny. Familiar: Blanchot's narrators are
a n d it has been the fundamentally comic genius of English as u n c o m m o n l y e b u l l i e n t , light a t h e a r t , gay. U n c a n n y : t h a t g a i -
a l i t e r a r y l a n g u a g e (even t h e E n g l i s h of S t e v e n s ) , to m a r s h a l ety itself is u n c a n n y in B l a n c h o t , m a r k of t h e p r o x i m i t y of a
such categories of experience. r a d i c a l u n c o n c e r n w i t h any w o r l d , c o n c e r n itself a p r e s e n c e
W e w o u l d b e t e m p t e d t o call this familiar e x p e r i e n c e , H u m e t h a t is p u t by.
at billiards, Austen in Bath, Trollope at a h u n t , experience T h i s u n c a n n y familiarity, this g r a v e g a i e t y i s t h e o p p o s i t e
w h o s e description might be " r e a d a n d u n d e r s t o o d directly." of Freud's n o t i o n of the u n c a n n y as the r e t u r n of the familiar:
B l a n c h o t ' s clarities seem s o m e t h i n g else, r e s t r a i n e d w i t h o u t i t is, t o use Blanchot's i m p o r t a n t o b s e r v a t i o n a b o u t N i e t z s c h e ,
r e t i c e n c e , a u s t e r e w i t h o u t h a u g h t i n e s s , careful w i t h o u t a n x i - t h e e t e r n a l r e t u r n ("Je c h e r c h a i , c e t t e fois, á P a b o r d e r " b e g i n s
ety, f a s c i n a t e d w i t h o u t c a t h e x i s , i m p e r s o n a l w i t h o u t c o l d n e s s . Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas, a story of e n d l e s s reflec-
In B l a n c h o t t h e n a m e of s u c h a s t a t e is l o v e , a w o r d u s e d v e r y tion, of t h o u g h t as re-flecting on t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
r a r e l y i n his w o r k , a n d o n l y w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t diffidence. A n d u n p r e c e d e n t e d experience o f w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h o u g h t ) , b u t n o t
y e t w h a t s t a t e i s m o r e f a m i l i a r t h a n love? F a m i l i a r t o u s a n d t h e eternal r e t u r n of the s a m e , n o r of t h e a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d ,
t h e c h a n n e l o f t h e familiar? n o r of a w o r l d t h a t has been lost b u t is n o w resuscitated, simply
A I I rwn B w wnw
the p u r e "appearance *»f Again, the diva dame" ( S t e v e n s ) . T h e i r love i8 an affair <>l p l a c e . , but (he m a r r i a g e p l a c e , t h e
F r e u d s a w every e r o t u relation as Caking place b e t w e e n at place they love, or the p l a c e they live a n d t h a t S t e v e n s loves is
least f o u r p e o p l e : the lovers a n d t h e i r p a r e n t s . But in B l a n c h o t literary s p a c e : " F r o m this the poem s p r i n g s , t h a t we live in a
true erotic relation is u n c o u n t a b l e a n d takes place w i t h o u t place / That is not o u r o w n , a n d m u c h m o r e , n o t o u r s e l v e s , /
t h o s e p a r e n t s w h o a r e for F r e u d t h e o n l y o n e s w h o c o u n t . A n d h a r d it is in s p i t e of b l a z o n e d d a y s . " In t h e p r e f a t o r y
T h e r e i s t h e lover, o r n a r r a t o r , o r ( u s u a l l y a n d b y a n e x t r e m e verse t o " N o t e s " S t e v e n s a s k s ,
c o n v e n t i o n t h a t signifies t h e i n t e n s e refusal o f t h e d e p t h o f
d e p t h p s y c h o l o g y ) m a l e figure, a n d a n u t t e r l y u n p r e c e d e n t e d A n d for w h a t , e x c e p t for y o u , do I feel love?
other: unprecedented and so beyond the universal precedent Do I press the extremest book of the wisest m a n
o f t h e dialectic o f p r e s e n c e a n d a b s e n c e . Close to m e , hidden in me day a n d night?
F o r L e v i n a s s u c h a r e l a t i o n to t h e o t h e r , to autrui, is t h e In t h e u n c e r t a i n light of single, c e r t a i n t r u t h ,
h y p e r c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e t o e t h i c s ; for A g a m b e n i t i s t h e E q u a l i n living c h a n g i n g n e s s t o t h e l i g h t
future of t h e c o m i n g c o m m u n i t y , free to be u n p r e c e d e n t e d , qual- In w h i c h I m e e t y o u , in w h i c h we sit at r e s t
unque, u n c h a r a c t e r i z e d a n d i n B l a n c h o t ' s t e r m s i m p e r s o n a l . For a m o m e n t , in the central of o u r being,
F o r B l a n c h o t , a s for S t e v e n s , i t i s t h e r e g i o n h a u n t e d b y l o v e . T h e vivid t r a n s p a r e n c e t h a t y o u b r i n g i s p e a c e .
I cite Stevens b e c a u s e I myself w i s h to reflect on t h e p o s s i -
bility o f a n A m e r i c a n c o n t e x t for B l a n c h o t i a n t h o u g h t , t h e W h o m is this addressed to? W h a t is the light in w h i c h they
c o n t e x t for w h i c h (in t h e first i n s t a n c e ) Wall offers t h i s e x - m e e t — t h e light n o t of t r u t h , b u t a n o t h e r light w i t h a n o t h e r
t r a o r d i n a r y b o o k . Love is a v e r y r a r e w o r d in S t e v e n s as w e l l , c l a r i t y ? ( " R o b i n s a n d d o v e s a r e b o t h e a r l y risers a n d a r e c o n -
b u t it is, as I say, a w o r d t h a t he a p p l i e s to B l a n c h o t , in a letter noisseurs of d a y l i g h t before t h e a c t u a l p r e s e n c e of t h e s u n c o a r s -
j u s t f o u r m o n t h s b e f o r e his d e a t h . In g e n e r a l it is a w o r d t h a t e n s i t " says S t e v e n s in a letter.) T h e s e lines a r e a tutoiement,
h e a p p l i e s n o t t o p e o p l e b u t t o p l a c e s ("Life i s a n affair o f a n d it's n o t t h a t w e c a n n o t k n o w w h o m t h e y ' r e a d d r e s s e d t o ,
p e o p l e , n o t o f p l a c e s . B u t for m e life h a s b e e n a n affair o f it's t h a t t h e r e i s n o k n o w i n g , t h e a d d r e s s e e d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o
p l a c e s , a n d t h a t h a s m a d e all t h e d i f f e r e n c e " ) , a s i n " N o t e s the w o r l d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e scholar writes the b o o k , Stevens
Towards a Supreme Fiction," where will say, h o t for a n accessible bliss, b u t t h e bliss t h e w o r k of-
fers c a n n e v e r b e a c c e s s i b l e , c a n n e v e r b e p r e s e n t .
T h e C a p t a i n l o v e d t h e ever-hill C a t a w b a , I t i s t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k t h a t gives u s t h e m o s t i n e l u c t a b l e
A n d therefore married B a w d a w h o m he found there, model of w h a t it is t h a t there is no k n o w i n g . You c a n love a
A n d B a w d a l o v e d t h e c a p t a i n a s she l o v e d t h e s u n . w o r k , b u t y o u c a n n e v e r k n o w it, e v e n i f y o u l o v e it, e s p e -
cially if y o u love it, a n d t h i s is a l e s s o n n o t a b o u t t h e w o r k
T h e y m a r r i e d well because the marriage-place (about w h i c h there is no learning) b u t a b o u t love.
W a s w h a t t h e y l o v e d . I t w a s n e i t h e r h e a v e n n o r hell. F o r F r e u d t o love t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k (since i t i s t h e w o r k
T h e y w e r e love's c h a r a c t e r s c o m e face t o face. t h a t S t e v e n s a d d r e s s e s his d e d i c a t i o n to) i s t o b e e n g a g e d i n
transferential fantasy, i<> love what nil', sut h fantasy. But for
L e v i n a s , Blanchot, a n d Agamben, as loi Prousl a n d Stevens b e -
fore t h e m , love o f a n o t h e r can o n l y b e i n t i m a t e d t h r o u g h t h e
s t r a n g e a n d elusive a n d a l w a y s lost love o f l i t e r a t u r e . S t e v e n s :
" I n p o e t r y y o u m u s t love t h e w o r d s , t h e i d e a s a n d i m a g e s a n d Acknowledgments
r h y t h m s w i t h all y o u r c a p a c i t y t o love a n y t h i n g a t a l l . " T h e
r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r t h a t love n a m e s , a n d t h a t B l a n c h o t e x -
p l o r e s in all his fiction, c u l m i n a t i n g in L'attente l'oubli, is o n e
o f r a d i c a l passivity, i n t e r m i n a b l e a t t e n t i o n , t h e m o s t f o r m a l
a n d d e m a n d i n g m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s e v e r e s t familiarity. L o v e ' s
characters are, m a k e u p , literature. It is only in this strange
language, the other language, the language of literature, that
l o v e c a n b e u t t e r e d (as t h e p a r a b l e a b o u t t h e n a r r a t o r ' s a d -
d r e s s i n g C l a u d i a in h e r n a t i v e l a n g u a g e in L'Arrêt de mort
also m a k e s clear).
T h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o e x p r e s s his g r a t i t u d e t o a
This love is w h a t Wall utters in this r e m a r k a b l e b o o k . He
n u m b e r o f friends w h o m h e e n l i s t e d for m u c h - n e e d e d h e l p .
too k n o w s w h a t it is to translate the untranslatable and he has
The f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e h a v e left t h e i r m a r k s o n t h i s b o o k : Susie
f o u n d a g r a v i t y o f style a n s w e r i n g t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e o t h e r n e s s
Brubaker, Stephen D u c a , Stephen Wall, M a g e n t a Widner, Kate
of the language he attends to. He will, I imagine, defamiliar-
G a r d n e r , K a r l D u d i c k , a n d t h e staff of t h e l e g e n d a r y Left Bank
ize—or ( w h a t is the s a m e thing) render uncannily familiar—
Books in S e a t t l e , W a s h i n g t o n .
t h e s e w o r k s for F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n s p e a k e r s w h o will find t h e
T h e a u t h o r w o u l d also like t o t h a n k D o u g l a s Brick,
t r a n s m u t a t i o n B l a n c h o t s p e a k s of: h e will r e n d e r t h e i r l a n -
Camillo Penna, Robert Thomas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio
guage plural as he renders English plural, able at last to trans-
A g a m b e n , w h o r e a d t h e m a n u s c r i p t a n d offered critical a n d
l a t e t h e s e figures in a n s w e r a b l e style, p r e s e r v i n g all t h e i r alterity
encouraging comments.
a n d giving b a c k to English, as Stevens also h a d d o n e , a sense
o f its o w n alterity, a p l a c e f r o m w h i c h t h e p o e m m a y c o n t i n u e W i t h affection a n d r e s p e c t , t h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o a c k n o w l -
WILLIAM FLESCH
BRANDÉIS UNIVERSITY
XV
Introduction
Passivity
T h e w r i t e r s w e will e x a m i n e h e r e s h a r e a c e r t a i n
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h a p o i n t o f r a d i c a l p a s s i v i t y t h a t affects
s u b j e c t i v i t y p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
image (Maurice Blanchot), the O t h e r (Emmanuel Lévinas), a n d
being-in-language (Giorgio A g a m b e n ) , each writer c a n n o t re-
sist t u r n i n g r o u n d a n d r o u n d t h e p a r a d o x — o r t h e i n v e r t e d
e s s e n c e — o f t h i s passivity. N a m e l y : p a s s i v i t y i n t h e r a d i c a l
s e n s e , b e f o r e it is s i m p l y o p p o s e d to activity, is p a s s i v e w i t h
r e g a r d t o itself, a n d t h u s i t s u b m i t s t o itself a s t h o u g h i t w e r e
an exterior power. H e n c e , radical passivity conceals, or har-
b o r s in itself, or c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h , a potentia; it is a l w a y s
o u t s i d e itself a n d i s its o w n o t h e r . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o itself,
t h e e s s e n t i a l p a s s i v i t y of t h e s u b j e c t m u s t u n d e r g o itself, suf-
fer itself, feel itself as other. In t h i s s e n s e , p a s s i v i t y is p u r e l y
passionate.
O l d e r t h a n a n y ( a c t u a l ) p o s s i b i l i t y is this potentia-in-gen-
eral t h a t " g i v e s " n o t h i n g ( e x c e p t itself) a n d t h a t " i s g i v e n "
1
2 INTRODUCTION IN I R.ODUCTION 3
i n g , will p r o v o k e a n infinite r a p p o r t t h a t will o v e r w h e l m t h e repetition, is poetry, a n d this preemptive " s p e a k i n g " belongs
s u b j e c t in a flood of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ( T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , h o w - t o n o s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t i o n t o say a n y t h i n g . O l d e r t h a n t h e s u b -
c o m m o n l y m e a n t by the term.) Levinas w o u l d p r o b a b l y dis- " s o m e o n e " ( B l a n c h o t ' s il, " h e , " t h e N e u t e r ) , w h o c a n n o t s p e a k
is. We will a r g u e t h a t t h e g e r m of L e v i n a s ' s Autrement qu'être " h i m s e l f " i n a n y s t a t e m e n t , for " h e " i s o n l y i n s o f a r a s , a n d
s a m e n e s s , stability, a n d self-certainty. I n b e c o m i n g r e s p o n s i b l e " h i m s e l f . " " H e " (or " S o m e o n e , " for i t i s a l w a y s a n o t h e r ) i s
f o r - t h e - O t h e r , t h e self e n c o u n t e r s a n i n c e s s a n c e t h a t r e s e m b l e s perfectly i n l a n g u a g e . U n a b l e t o t u r n a r o u n d a n d g r a s p h i m -
Blanchotian dying and Agamben's capacity to " n o t not-be." self in a reflection w i t h o u t l o s i n g himself a g a i n , t h i s " S o m e -
chapter. e r t h e l e s s i s a h o l l o w i n g o u t t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e all p r e s e n c e ,
all w o r k , a n d all t h i n k i n g . " S o m e o n e , " i n s h o r t , i s l a n g u a g e
In our third chapter, we examine Blanchot's notion of an
itself. " S o m e o n e ' s " b e i n g i s s o u t t e r l y a b s o r b e d i n l a n g u a g e
imaginary that precedes the real, precedes the object. In par-
w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e t h a t t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y o n e left t o s a v e
t i c u l a r , w e will b e a t t e n t i v e t o a n i m a g i n a r y l a n g u a g e o r a n
or manifest.
i n c e s s a n t m u r m u r t h a t m u s t b e silenced i n o r d e r for t h e w o r d
to " w o r k . " This m u r m u r is poetic language: language that In this way, t h r o u g h Blanchot, we come to Agamben's
has become an image of language, an image of negation. n o t i o n of a c o m m u n i t y - t o - c o m e t h a t is already " i n " language
that poetry cannot but speak. T h a t which poetry each time identified. C e n t r a l t o A g a m b e n ' s r e c e n t w o r k i s t h e n o t i o n o f
s a y s will b e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e e m p t y t o t a l i t y o f l a n g u a g e c o m p l e t e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e . W e believe
w a y that our p o w e r to read is neutralized and dispersed. Each tion, desistance, differance, point d'autrui, a n d still o t h e r s t h a t
of these thinkers writes in such a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is are as well k n o w n . H e n c e the restlessness, imposition, super-
L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t , w h o r e p e a t each other a s w e l l a s e c h o r e s o l v e s , w h i l e n o b o d y is a l l o w e d a l a p s e of a t t e n t i o n or a
lack <>l rigor,"' Levinas tells us. In this s e n s e , each <>| these the expei ien< e ol finitude, ol pHtnordictl t e m p o r a l i t y , is, as we
t h i n k e r ' s d i s c o u r s e s is an " e a c h time" ol the e n i g m a itself since k n o w from Heidegger, rigorously u n r e a c h a b l e . We are pre-
t h e e n i g m a of d e - n u c l e a t i o n is t h e very t a k i n g - p l a c e of c o m - < isely not equal t o i t . It is the passion of the O u t s i d e , as B l a n c h o t
m u n i c a t i v i t y itself, a s w e w a n t t o s h o w . A l w a y s t h e " s a m e " might say. But the O u t s i d e is n o t t h e B e y o n d a n d s o , simplify-
enigma, communicativity is only as trace or iteration w i t h o u t ing t h i n g s , w e will say t h a t w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n L e v i n a s t o t h e
identity. T h i s p o p u l a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s t h e n , f r o m w h i c h w e h a v e e x t e n t t h a t h e fails t o r e v e a l o r i n s t i t u t e a n e t h i c a l B e y o n d ; w e
plucked three, is a c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t commonality, w i t h o u t are interested in Blanchot to the extent that he involves us in
substance or essence. this i n c e s s a n t l i m i t i n g t h a t is t h e v e r y p a s s i o n of t h e ( n o t ) Be-
I f w e focus o n t h e s e t h r e e t h i n k e r s i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s n o t t o y o n d (le pas au-delà); a n d we a r e i n t e r e s t e d in A g a m b e n i n s o -
f o c u s o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c s , l i t e r a t u r e , o r p o l i t i c s , b u t in- far a s h e m a k e s o f this a m b i g u o u s limit a n i n e s c a p a b l e a n d
stead to approach that which in each text touches on any eth- unexcludable "belonging." M o r e narrowly, we are interested
ics, l i t e r a t u r e , o r politics w h a t e v e r , a n d w h i c h e a c h w r i t e r e x - i n a B l a n c h o t i a n " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h " t h a t p r e c e d e s access t o
poses in diverse w a y s . We could, p e r h a p s , have written exclu- a n y a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h a t i s t o say, w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n a n
sively on Heidegger, or H e i d e g g e r w i t h K a n t (of t h e Kantbuch), a n t e r i o r i t y t h a t i n f o r m s t h e Levinasian éthique, t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
o r N i e t z s c h e ( w i t h a n d a g a i n s t H e i d e g g e r ) , since t h i s p o p u l a - littéraire, and the Agambenian Quodlibet ens.
t i o n ( m o r e o r less) s c h e m a t i z e s t h e a b y s s w e t o d a y i n h e r i t a n d Beginning with Levinas's 1 9 4 8 essay "Réalité et son
experience constantly in o u r thinking. Instead, we confine o m b r e , " w e p r o c e e d t o s h o w h o w a s p e c t s o f t h a t a n a l y s i s in-
o u r s e l v e s t o t h i n k e r s w h o confine t h e m s e l v e s t o p r o b l e m s t r a - f o r m b o t h his o w n n o t i o n o f a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t
d i t i o n a l l y " s e c o n d a r y " t o f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y (even if, i n precedes egology, a n d also informs Blanchot's n o t i o n s of writ-
fact, L e v i n a s w i s h e s t o i n s t i t u t e e t h i c s a s "first p h i l o s o p h y " ) . i n g a n d t h e i m a g i n a r y . We t h e n will r e a d B l a n c h o t ' s L'arrêt de
I n e a c h c a s e , t h e s e " s e c o n d a r y " c o n c e r n s b e c o m e very s t r a n g e , mort a s a w o r k "structured" by n o n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d
u n f a m i l i a r , n o t t o say imaginary (i.e., p r o p e r l y b e l o n g i n g t o s t r u g g l e (or, i f y o u w i l l , " s t r u c t u r e d " b y finitude). F r o m t h e r e
n o c a t e g o r y a t all). E a c h t h i n k e r w e e x a m i n e h e r e i s a s t r a n g e we a n a l y z e A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene in l i g h t of H e i -
specialist w h o s e a t t e n t i o n t o ethical, literary, a n d political p r o b - degger's reading of Kantian schematism in order to s h o w an
l e m s h a s led h i m i n t o a n o b s c u r e r e l a t i o n w i t h l a n g u a g e itself affinity b e t w e e n i t a n d t h e B l a n c h o t i a n i m a g i n a r y t h a t , i n t h e
a n d m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s w i t h t i m e . E a c h o p e n s his discipline o n t o e n d , w e c l a i m i s t h e v e r y " p l a c e " o f c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a n d its
a dimension in which language becomes imaginary (anony- r a d i c a l passivity.
m o u s , spoken by no one), a n d in w h i c h time diverges from the We are arguing that the point to which each thinker we
State-time of chronological progress, increase, and improve- e x a m i n e l e a d s us is t h e p o i n t of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y as such, in-
m e n t t o w h i c h c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i t y c o m p u l s i v e l y sacrifices it- s o f a r as this p o i n t is in itself an i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a -
self. T o p u t i t s u c c i n c t l y : W e a r e m o d e r n t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e t i o n . T h a t is to say, c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y pulverizes d i s c o u r s e . It
a r e sick w i t h c o n t i n u o u s , fleeting, a n d g e o m e t r i c t i m e , a n d w e gives n o t h i n g t o b e t h o u g h t ; i t gives n o m e s s a g e t o w h i c h w e
are O t h e r to the extent that we are—in a nutshell—finite. But m i g h t listen b u t , in effect, says: t h e r e is (il y a). C o m m u n i c a t i v i t y
as such—when- ii'h,it is c o m m u n i c a t e d is noi o u t s i d e ii but ol thought, is thingish, like anothei body, or like the words
i n s t e a d b u r i e s l a n g u a g e in itsell is poetry, the o r i g i n a l and we speak at a Mineral. Those dying, w o r d s weigh like t h i n g s in
P o e t r y , h o w e v e r , is an e x p e r i e n c e of t i m e t h a t is r a d i c a l l y d i s - p o w e r s . T h i s funereal l a n g u a g e w e i g h s i n m y m o u t h a s a t h i n g
future either remote or just a r o u n d the corner, but rather in disappear into the labor of referring. In the lugubrious a t m o -
t h e infinitive " t o " o f t h e " t o c o m e " (or à venir) t o w h i c h w e sphere of the funeral, w o r d s are that w h i c h maintain contact
t h a t w h i c h s p e a k s i s t h e very " t o " o f " t o s p e a k . " P o e t r y says language is imperceptibly transformed because it begins to
belong; but we belong such that no residue remains u p o n which they depart from the straightforwardness of intentionality as
a b i l i t y t o g r a s p a n d a u t o - o r i g i n a t e o u r s e l v e s . E m p t y o f itself, f r o m t h e s e w o r d s t h a t linger o n m y t o n g u e — w o r d s t h a t a r e
Merveilleuse hypocrite! Car elle aime la folie qu'elle u n t i l a social w o r k e r d i s c o v e r e d t h e " b i z a r r e " s i t u a t i o n . T h e
surveille. w o m a n h a d c o n t i n u e d t o live, i n t h e m e a n t i m e , m o r e o r less
—Levinas a s she h a d b e f o r e , a s b e s t she c o u l d , given t h e s o l i t u d e a n d
failing s t r e n g t h o f a d v a n c e d a g e . A p p a r e n t l y , s h e n e v e r d e n i e d
the street. According to Levinas, the language of p o e t r y does i a m Congreve, a n d seated it at the dinner table, w h e r e she
33
a oneseli I >m a son ol passage from oneseli to anonymity [dans
into its usefulness, its fun< tion, its familiarity. A11 arrests ilii.s
le rythme il n'y a plus de SOI, mais c o n i m c un p a s s a g e de soi a
movement ol recognition and industry. In art, that w h i c h v a n -
M
I'anonymat |.'
ishes into utility a n d k n o w l e d g e r e a p p e a r s o u t s i d e its useful-
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n itself is an u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o v e m e n t .
n e s s , o u t s i d e all real r e l a t i o n s , in a s p a c e strictly u n c r o s s a b l e ,
In a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e t h e r e is an i n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h o is
infinitely fragile, o n l y p r o x i m a l l y there at all, as if its e x i s t -
p o s s e s s e d o r affected a n d t h a t w h i c h p o s s e s s e s o r affects.
e n c e h a d b e e n p a r a l y z e d , o r a s i f t h e o b j e c t led a p h a n t o m
L e v i n a s n o t e s i n p a s s i n g t h a t this s i m u l t a n e i t y o f p o s s e s s i o n
e x i s t e n c e p a r a l l e l t o its t r u t h .
a n d d i s p o s s e s s i o n h a s a r o l e in ecstatic r i t e s . A e s t h e t i c exist-
T h e i m a g e i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y o r essentially p a s s i v e . I t e l u d e s
ence involves us in an indistinction of " s a m e " a n d "other." It
all a t t e m p t s t o seize i t b e c a u s e i t o c c u p i e s e m p t y s p a c e . A n
is t h u s a t r u l y u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o m e n t ( b u t n o t a " b e y o n d " )
i m a g e , q u i t e simply, i s n o t h i n g . O u r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e i m a g e
w h e r e i n t h e d e n s i t y of b e i n g in its " h e r e " is i n v a d e d by a " n o -
" m a r k s a h o l d o v e r u s r a t h e r t h a n o u r initiative [ m a r q u e u n e
1 w h e r e , " a " n o t h i n g . " R h y t h m c a n n o t b e objectified; i t c a n
emprise sur n o u s , plutôt que n o t r e initiative]," Levinas says.
o n l y b e d r a m a t i z e d , e n a c t e d , suffered. I t i s e x p e r i e n c e d a s
T h e i m a g e c o n t r a s t s w i t h c o n c e p t s or, m o r e precisely, i t i s t h e
i n d i s t i n c t i o n , a s myself-as-other. U n a b l e t o h a n g o n t o its free-
v e r y e v e n t o f c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h c o n c e p t s . Precisely t o t h e e x -
d o m , the subject experiences an exteriority in which it c a n n o t
t e n t t h a t I d o n o t a c t o n , k n o w , o r t h i n k t h e t h i n g i n its c o n -
b u t m i s t a k e itself for a n o t h e r . T h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t c e a s e s t o
cept, there is an inversion of my everyday relationship with
e x p e r i e n c e itself as itself. T o t a l l y a b s o r b e d in t h e s c e n e , c o n -
the object, a n d subjectivity is p u s h e d to an e x t r e m e pole of
s c i o u s n e s s , h a v i n g n o t h i n g t o a i m at, b e c o m e s s u p e r e r o g a t o r y ,
passivity. U n a b l e to seize an i m a g e , I p a r t i c i p a t e in its i m a g i -
a s d o e s t h e b o d y , for, a t o n c e a c t o r a n d s p e c t a t o r , t h e b o d y i s
n a r y d i m e n s i o n . T h i s passivity c a n b e o b s e r v e d , L e v i n a s p o i n t s
2 transformed into sensations belonging to no one, or belong-
o u t , i n m u s i c , d a n c e , a n d m a g i c . T o this list w e m a y a d d t r a n c e ,
ing to an a n o n y m o u s Someone w h o s e organs of perception
hysterical possession, a n d hypnotic suggestion. In short, the
h a v e d e f e c t e d . H e n c e t h e fear o f t h e a r t i s t i c m i l i e u t h a t i s a t -
i m a g e i n s p i r e s a n d i t i s just t h e i m a g e t h a t i n s p i r e s , n o t t h e
t e s t e d t o i n t h e n e r v o u s a n x i e t y s o m a n y p e o p l e feel i n t h e
o b j e c t it r e p r e s e n t s . Precisely when there is nothing and just
c r o w d e d concert hall or the august m u s e u m .
insofar as there is nothing, the image exercises its impotent
power. R h y t h m a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e t h e " e x c e p t i o n a l s t r u c - A n i m a g e , L e v i n a s s a y s , i s essentially m u s i c a l i n s o f a r a s i t
i m p o r t a n t l y , i s n o t " b e y o n d " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t is, t o t h e c o n - is everywhere because images are everywhere. Indeed, the
resentations. P r o f o u n d because their " e n t r y into us is o n e w i t h permitted to think a dimension of aesthetic participation t h a t
o u r entry into them [entrent en nous ou nous entrons en eux, is general a n d n o t restricted to the movie theater or concert
Levinas finds, therefore, thai that w h i c h is strange, ob nait d a n s son p r o p r e reflet \ . The massive presence ol a corpse-
a n d t h e t r u t h o f t h e t h i n g i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its b e i n g i m a g - r e a l i t y of t h e t h i n g , or as if t h e r e a l i t y of t h e t h i n g c o u n t e d for
inable as such. T h e real, being, truth, is the place w h e r e the n o t h i n g . A r t p l a c e s i n p a r e n t h e s i s t h e fugitivity o f t h e r e a l , its
imaginary takes place. T h a t which is "lost," the " p r e y " t h a t ambiguity, a n d circumscribes a " d i m e n s i o n of evasion [une
1 6
a r t " l e t s g o of" is, q u i t e simply, t h e v e r y e v e n t o f t h e i m a g i - dimension d'évasion]." Insofar as it does this, it introduces
a m b i g u o u s , it is w i t h d r a w n f r o m itself in its v e r y sensibility. "engenders the image [engendre l ' i m a g e ] . " A thing can par-
For, like a n i d o l , L e v i n a s s a y s , a n a r t w o r k i s " s t u p i d . " 3 7 stance nor image but rather the liquidation of the elemental
W e m u s t a d d t h a t every artist since P y g m a l i o n h a s k n o w n t h i s . distance that separates the t w o . This space belongs neither to
A r t is a c a r i c a t u r e of life, n o t a n o t h e r , better, life. T h e a r t w o r k art nor to philosophy, neither to the image nor to the concept.
like w a t e r w i t h o u t a c o n t a i n e r . U n a b l e t o a t t a i n t h e p r e s e n t w e a k n e s s o f s p a c e itself: c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r s h e e r c o m m u n i c a -
i n t o it. A r t c a n o n l y e m p t y itself of all t h e artist's efforts. has gone further t h a n any other writer in our times t o w a r d
31
I I \ I I I A S S I I M M
Levinas l a k e s as his s t a r t i n g point the impossibility oi indil lo be s u r e , this is no ethics thai w o u l d be recognized as
ference to the O t h e r — t o the mortality <>l the other person— such by K. 1111 or Mill. In a sense, we can say t h a t in fact t h e r e
as t h e p l a c e (or n o n p l a c e [non-lieu]) w h e r e the self is e x p o s e d is no l e v i n a s i a n e t h i c s , as it can be said t h a t t h e r e is no p h i -
a n d lacerated. H i s version of Bataille's f a m o u s l'expérience in- l o s o p h y oi I teidegger, since each is " f o u n d e d " on an a b y s s , a
térieur is mauvaise conscience: " t h e inferiority of n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l "forgetting." Like the r e l a t i o n w i t h Being, t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h
consciousness [l'intériorité de la conscience non-intentio- the O t h e r is w i t h o u t an object, an a i m , or a p u r p o s e . It is a
3
n e l l e ] . " I n s i s t i n g , w i t h Bataille, t h a t t h e d e m a n d for a n e t h i c s r e l a t i o n t h a t d r a i n s c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d it is in
c a n n o t b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o a n y t h i n g else, all o f L e v i n a s ' s w o r k this r e l a t i o n t h a t Levinas w o u l d p l a c e t h e d i s p o s s e s s i o n o f self
a i m s a t a r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r (Autrui) " o l d e r " t h a n t h e " r e - t h a t defines c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a s s u c h a n d t h e o p e n i n g b e y o n d
l a t i o n t o t h e self (egology) a n d t h e r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d (cos- the confines o f a n y k n o w i n g . T h e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e O t h e r ( u n -
4
m o l o g y ) . " T h i s o l a m i c r e l a t i o n , h e insists, i s o n e o f r e s p o n s i - like t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n r e l a t i o n to Being) is n o t a p r e c o m p r e h e n -
bility, a n d it s u b t e n d s a n d i n t e r r u p t s t h e relation so dispiritingly sion, but a b r e a k u p of any c o m p r e h e n s i o n .
d e s c r i b e d by F r e u d a n d o t h e r s as homo lupus homini. W e will n o t b e p i t t i n g L e v i n a s a g a i n s t Bataille o n t h e q u e s -
L e t u s n o t e s t r a i g h t a w a y , for i t will g u i d e o u r e n t i r e r e a d - t i o n of a r t ( w h i c h , as we k n o w , is of limited interest to Levinas)
i n g o f L e v i n a s , t h a t a s this r e l a t i o n i s " o l d e r " t h a n t h e self a n d versus ethics. W h a t matters to each of t h e m , in spite of their
t h e w o r l d , this O t h e r will h a v e a l w a y s a l r e a d y s u n k i n t o i m - q u i t e c o n s i d e r a b l e differences, i s t h e s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e
m e m o r i a l i t y , p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y o r r e p r e s s i o n . T h e "rela- o t h e r p e r s o n a s t h a t w h i c h i s t h e m o s t fragile a n d t h e m o s t
t i o n " t h e n will n o t i n v o l v e t w o t e r m s , t h e self a n d t h e o t h e r . exposed. It is a relation that w i t h d r a w s from our p o w e r s — a
T h e r e l a t i o n will b e " o l d e r " t h a n a n y self. T h i s a n t e r i o r i t y r e l a t i o n t o o fragile e v e n t o qualify a s a p r o p e r e x p e r i e n c e .
will b e , for L e v i n a s , a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d a g o o d n e s s w i t h o u t ( T h i s r e l a t i o n , i n fact, e c h o e s t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e i m a g e w e
m e a s u r e t h a t ( d e ) s t r u c t u r e s t h e self as a r e l a t i o n w i t h a never- h a v e d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e i n this b o o k . ) I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , i n o u r
present Other. We add, therefore, that any relation that the I o p i n i o n , n o t t o b e f a s c i n a t e d b y L e v i n a s ' s w o r k , b y his r e l e n t -
establishes w i t h an o t h e r subject will o n l y b e t r a y the p u r e anter- less f o c u s o n a r e l a t i o n t h a t e x c e e d s p o w e r a n d t h a t i s o n l y
i o r i t y t h a t , i n Levinas's t h o u g h t , i m p e r i o u s l y orders m e t o t h e " p o s s i b l e " a s i m p o s s i b l e , b e t r a y e d , o r fictioned, b e c a u s e w h a t
Other. F u r t h e r m o r e , we m u s t note that, as i m m e m o r i a l , this Levinas runs up against, again and again, with a n d against
a n t e r i o r r e l a t i o n c a n only b e b e t r a y e d , a n d t h e r e f o r e a n y rela- H e i d e g g e r , is this (as flatly s t a t e d by M i k k e l B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ) :
t i o n t o a n o t h e r r e m a i n s p a r a d o x i c a l l y faithful t o t h e L e v i n a s i a n " T h e r e is no e t h i c s , n o r m o r a l s , of finitude [Il n ' y a p a s d'
éthique. H e n c e , L e v i n a s offers n o c r i t i q u e o f a n y e x i s t i n g e t h - 'éthique', pas de 'morale' de la finitude]." W h a t happens in 5
undermines and h o l l o w s out all real relations. This is precisely Ii diverges from nothingness as well as from b e i n g . It
h o w the o t h e r p e r s o n obligates me: for this other person is provokes tins responsibility against my will, t h a t is,
without relation, is a l o n e a n d m o r t a l , is a l r e a d y b e y o n d my by substituting me for the o t h e r as a h o s t a g e . All my
powers and, therefore, I, t o o , am without relation. Hence my inwardness is invested in t h e form of a d e s p i t e - m e , for-
a n x i e t y , a n d h e n c e t h e " r e s t l e s s n e s s " i n t h e self o f w h i c h a not her. D e s p i t e me for a n o t h e r is signification p a r
L e v i n a s s o often s p e a k s . W h a t " b i n d s " m e t o t h e o t h e r p e r s o n e x c e l l e n c e . And it is t h e sense of t h e " o n e s e l f , " t h a t
i s t h e nonrelation t o t h e O t h e r , t h e n o t h i n g o r n o - r e l a t i o n t h a t u i usative that d e r i v e s f r o m no n o m i n a t i v e ; it is t h e
I, myself, am. My s k i n , a N e s s u s t u n i c . very l a d of finding myself w h i l e losing myself.
We are describing, then, an ethics of betrayal. But betrayal
of w h a t ? Of nothing. Of no relation. Betrayal of t h a t relation 11 a d i a c h r o n i e , c'est le refus de la c o n j o n c t i o n , le n o n -
t h a t can only be betrayed. Betrayal of that " n o ethics" t h a t t o t a l i s a b l e et, e n c e sens p r é c i s , Infini. M a i s d a n s l a
f i n i t u d e is. F o r I am t h a t finitude t h a t defines a n d t h e r e f o r e responsabilité p o u r Autrui—pour une autre liberté—
escapes m e . T h a t is w h a t m a k e s ethical intentionality an ex- la n é g a t i v i t é de c e t t e a n a r c h i e , de ce refus o p p o s é au
posure. There is no realizable relation to the other that w o u l d present,—à l'apparaître—de l'immémorial, me com-
b e e t h i c a l t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h . T h e r e will o n l y h a v e b e e n a m a n d e et m ' o r d o n n e à Autrui, au premier venu, et
f i c t i o n e d , i m a g i n e d r e l a t i o n — f r a g i l e a s a n i m a g e i s fragile, m ' a p p r o c h e d e lui, m e l e r e n d p r o c h a i n — s ' é c a r t e a i n s i
u n g r a s p a b l e , u n p o s s e s s i b l e — a reality m a d e u p o f n o t h i n g n e s s . du néant c o m m e de l'être, p r o v o q u a n t contre m o n gré
O u t s i d e a n y p a r t i c u l a r , defined r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r , t h e r e i s i et te r e s p o n s a b i l i t é , c ' e s t - à - d i r e me s u b s t i t u a n t c o m m e
this exposure to " n o relation at all" that is an obsession w i t h ( >tage à A u t r u i . T o u t e m o n i n t i m i t é s'investit en c o n t r e -
Autrui a n d t h a t b o t h o r i e n t s a n d e s c a p e s m e . I n t h e e n d t h i s inon-gré—pour-un-autre. Malgré moi, pour-un-autre—
r e l a t i o n is finitude itself; b u t it is r e a d by L e v i n a s as s o m e t h i n g v( >ilà la signification p a r excellence et le sens du s o i - m ê m e ,
like e t h i c s . du se—accusatif ne d é r i v a n t d ' a u c u n n o m i n a t i f — l e fait
6
m ê m e de se retrouver en se p e r d a n t . ]
o b e y it. M o r e precisely, I am ordered, I am oriented, I iim not yei present, Il Calls a n d il is //, i.e., no o n e t h a t c a n be
f i n d . O n e m a y say, b e y o n d F r e u d a n d n e a r t o I leidegger, t h a t in! e h (or, //) is thai from which I cannot distinguish myself.
h a v e t h e m e a s u r e o f i t n o r e q u a l its d e m a n d . N o m o r a l i t y c a n myself. N o t h i n g o b l i g a t e s me a n d t h e r e f o r e I c a n n o t d i s t a n c e
ity is in q u e s t i o n . It d e m a n d s a N i e t z s c h e a n a f f i r m a t i o n : a q u e d , m s h o r t : / am Autrui. It is b e y o n d my p o w e r to d i s t i n -
t h a t is olamic, forgotten. It is the forgetting that holds me I lie e n i g m a , t h e " k n o t [ n œ u d ] " in ipseity t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is
1 0
forgetting remains always a n o n y m o u s and is thus preeminently (ethics, t h e self) h a p p e n s to m e , as m e . T h e self ( a l w a y s al-
f o r g e t t a b l e ) . M y r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r p r i o r t o m y self is, a s i t icady involved with the Other) comes to me from an outside
g e t s . A n d t h e r e l a t i o n h e (the a n o n y m o u s il, t h e N e u t e r ) c o n - tiginous interpellation forms the enigmatic " k n o t " that is the
myself. That is w h y Lévinas can say thai ethics "is the b r e a k u p .mi " ii is p . H alyzed: always already no l o n g e r a b l e to be t h e r e
of t h e o r i g i n a r y unity of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t is, a n y m o r e . It is, as Levinas tells us (in w o r d s t h a t s h o u l d r e m i n d
it is t h e b e y o n d of e x p e r i e n c e [c'est l ' é c l a t e m e n t de l ' u n i t é US ol his d e s c r i p t i o n oi the w o r k of a r t ) , a " d e a t h - l i k e p a s s i v -
originaire de Paperception transcendentale—c'est-à-dire l'au- iiv [une passivité à m o r t | . " l s
It " i s " n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h i s
1 2
delà de l ' e x p é r i e n c e ] . " 1 a m , as it were, constitutionally un- M I I r e n d e r o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n . T h e O t h e r o c c u p i e s its p l a c e fully,
a b l e n o t t o a n o n y m o u s l y i n c a r n a t e alterity, a n d h e r e , i n a insisting o n t h e subject's r e m o v a l f r o m its o w n m a n i f e s t a t i o n .
s t r a n g e w a y , an ethics is i n s c r i b e d — a n d exscribed. T h e self is For L e v i n a s , t h e self is "a deposing of the ego, less than
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n c a r n a t e . T h e very a n o n y m i t y o f a l t e r i t y — i t s m >il>ing as uniqueness {dé-position du Moi, le moins que rien
nothingness, if y o u w i l l — i s the impossibility of my indiffer- COmtne unicité]." 16
A c c o r d i n g to L e v i n a s , I h a v e a l w a y s al-
ence to it. All t h e ego's p o w e r s of ( o e d i p a l ) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d ready a b a n d o n e d all for-myselfness. I do n o t first e s t a b l i s h for
c o m p r e h e n s i o n a r e s h a d o w e d b y this a n t e r i o r u n p o w e r . myself a p l a c e in t h e s u n a n d t h e n , as a m o n a d i c A r c h i m e d e a n
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas de- p o i n t , fall i n w i t h o t h e r s i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r . Subjectivity
scribes a subjectivity t h a t precisely w i t h d r a w s f r o m a u t o m a n i - here is n o t h i n g but a p r i m o r d i a l delay behind the Other. This
festation, a n d h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s this w i t h d r a w a l — o r , a s h e m i g h t is absolute p a s s i v i t y (i.e., n o t r e l a t i v e to a n y activity, b u t p a s -
say, t h i s h u m i l i t y — a s t h e very autrement qu'être t h a t e t h i c s sivity a b s o l u t i z e d a s o t h e r t h a n , o r o v e r w h e l m i n g , t h e differ-
" i s . " T h e Levinasian subject eludes t h a t w h i c h is essential to e n c e b e t w e e n active a n d p a s s i v e ) .
s u b j e c t i v i t y : self-certain p r e s e n c e to self in e i t h e r its C a r t e s i o - T h e Western metaphysical subject, then, according to
13
Heideggerian confinement to (auto)representation, o r its r e - Levinas, h a d been incorrectly conceptualized. It w a s never
14
t r e n c h m e n t , after M i c h e l H e n r y , a s a u t o a f f e c t i o n . This novel meant to c o m e to presence, a n d therefore it w a s m e a n t en-
subject of Levinas's w i t h d r a w s , then, from the very c o n c e p t of tirely for t h e O t h e r w h o shall e t e r n a l l y p r e c e d e it. T h e s u b j e c t
subjectivity i n t o a n e n i g m a t h a t m a k e s t h e r e t e n t i o n o f t h e w o u l d be forever devoted to an obligation t h a t w o u l d forever
word abusive. That which is, for Levinas, hypokeimenon, e x c e e d it, since this o b l i g a t i o n w o u l d define t h e i n f e r i o r i t y i t
underlying, or sub-jacent is that which enters into no present is. The crisis i n t o w h i c h m o d e r n i t y h a d fallen, t h e crisis of t h e
a t all a n d i s t h u s b e y o n d s p e c u l a t i o n . A s t r a n g e s u b j e c t . A n a b s e n c e o f f o u n d a t i o n s , t h e discovery t h a t t h e r e w a s n o g r o u n d
i m a g e of t h e s u b j e c t , o n e is t e m p t e d to say. A s t r a n g e s u b j e c t b e n e a t h o u r feet, w a s n o crisis a t all. I t w a s t h e b e l a t e d d i s c o v -
s t r a n g e t o itself since i t i s a l w a y s o n t h e " h i t h e r s i d e " o f r e p r e - ery of a beneficence t h a t h a d e n r a p t u r e d us b e y o n d o u r s e l v e s .
s e n t a t i o n , b u t n o t p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y a b s e n t . I t i s its a v e r s i o n ( )ur v e r y i n a b i l i t y t o " u n i t e all t h e f a c u l t i e s " a n d t o p r e s e n t
t o light. I t i s " a n e x t r e m e s h y n e s s , " a s L e v i n a s says s o m e - o u r s e l v e s to o u r s e l v e s in t h e full light of a k n o w i n g w a s , in
w h e r e . O u t s i d e a n y c o n c e p t o f it, i t i s e x p o s e d , v u l n e r a b l e , fact, a " g o l d e n o p p o r t u n i t y " t o o v e r t u r n all t h i n k i n g t h a t origi-
n a k e d . It is who I am a n d it is n o t , or n o t simply, my v u l n e r - n a t e s subjectivity i n a u t o m a n i f e s t a t i o n o r a u t o a f f e c t i o n . 17
autonomy. An extreme humility and an unprecedented ethics ol a persecution that paralyses any a s s u m p t i o n that
h a d r u i n e d the g r a n d e p o c h of the Subject a n d its maniacal i mild awaken il so thai il w o u l d posit itself for-itself.
s t r i v i n g after itself. O n l y t h e l a n g u a g e of ethics w o u l d be e q u a l I his passivity is thai ol an a t t a c h m e n t that h a s a l r e a d y
t o t h i s a b y s s i n t o w h i c h t h e h u m a n sciences h a d fallen. Even been m a d e , as something irreversibly p a s t , p r i o r to all
the language of psychoanalysis, which promised a C o p e r n i - memory a n d recall. It w a s m a d e in an i r r é c u p é r a b l e
c a n r e v o l u t i o n t h a t w o u l d u n d e r m i n e all t h i n k i n g f o u n d e d i n n i n e w h i c h the p r e s e n t , r e p r e s e n t e d i n recall, d o e s n o t
a C a r t e s i a n Cogito, h a d s l i p p e d i n t o m y t h a n d h a d r e m a i n e d e q u a l , in a t i m e of b i r t h or c r e a t i o n , of w h i c h n a t u r e
i m p r i s o n e d b y a classical s c h e m a o f t h e subject. A s N a n c y or c r e a t i o n r e t a i n s a t r a c e , u n c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o a
a n d Lacoue-Labarthe (and later Borch-Jacobsen) have m a d e memory.
clear, t h e ego's s h a d o w r e m a i n e d , i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s f r o m F r e u d
to L a c a n , a n o t h e r ego behind the ego, a n d below the subject [Le s o i - m ê m e ne p e u t p a s se faire, il est déjà fait de
t h e r e l u r k e d a n o t h e r s u b j e c t — o f d e s i r e (or even, of a desire to passivité a b s o l u e , et, d a n s ce sens, victime d ' u n e
be a subject). 18
O n l y t h e l a n g u a g e o f ethics w o u l d b e a b l e t o persécution paralysant toute assumption qui p o u r r a i t
say t h a t t h a t w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y w a s u n a b l e t o p r e s e n t t o itself s'éveiller en lui p o u r le p o s e r pour soi, p a s s i v i t é de
w a s n o t m e a n t t o b e p r e s e n t e d a t all. T h e n e w ethical s u b j e c t l ' a t t a c h e m e n t déjà n o u é e c o m m e i r r é v e r s i b l e m e n t
w o u l d r e m a i n offstage, in t h e s h a d o w s , en deqa du temps, a n d passée, en deçà de toute m é m o i r e , de t o u t rappel.
w o u l d suffer affectively all t h a t t h e e g o w o u l d c o n t r a c t i n all Nouée dans un temps irrécupérable que le présent,
its a d v e n t u r e s in t h e w o r l d . E t h i c a l subjectivity is infinite v u l - représenté dans le rappel n'égale pas, dans un temps
n e r a b i l i t y . T h e a b s e n c e of f o u n d a t i o n w a s in fact a l r e a d y a de la naissance ou de la c r é a t i o n d o n t n a t u r e ou c r é a t u r e
19
r a p p o r t . T h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a n e x p o s u r e t o t h e O t h e r inter- garde une trace, inconvertible en souvenir.]
r u p t i n g a n y b e g i n n i n g . A g a i n s t all o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d p r e j u -
d i c e s , t h e s u b j e c t w a s n o t a g r o u n d a t all. I t w a s u n p o w e r a n d The self, e n i g m a t i c a l l y , " s u f f e r s " itself. It is a w o u n d t h a t
w e a k n e s s , a n d this is t h e c a s e for a s i m p l e a n d even b a n a l d o e s not heal. Before myself, p r i o r to a n y desire to b e , a n t e r i o r
r e a s o n : t h e self d o e s n o t f o r m itself. I t h a s n o ability a t all lo any objectivity, to a n y d i s t a n c e or a n y t i m e — l i t e r a l l y ex
until the other a n d others intervene a n d bring it into exist- nihilo—the self h a p p e n s to m e . T h e self, t h e i p s e , t h e who t h a t
e n c e . T h e self i s a n a b s o l u t e d e p e n d e n c y , a n d its d e p e n d e n c y I am (as o p p o s e d to t h e w h a t ) is formed. It is m a d e , f a s h i o n e d ,
is an i n e x h a u s t i b l e potentia. b e g o t t e n , willed, fictioned. U s i n g t h e l a n g u a g e of L e v i n a s , it is
w< i i m d e d a n d p e r s e c u t e d . T h e O t h e r h a s access to me b e f o r e I
d o . In-myself, I am a w e a k n e s s a n d a d e p e n d e n c y . A s u p p l e -
The Self m e n t , in D e r r i d a ' s sense, is r e q u i r e d for me to be a s o m e o n e
a n d t h u s t h e subject c a n n o t b e t h o u g h t o u t s i d e différance. T h e
T h e oneself c a n n o t f o r m itself; i t i s a l r e a d y f o r m e d lupplement is a t r a u m a that precedes the constituted ego a n d
w i t h a n a b s o l u t e passivity. I n t h i s sense i t i s t h e v i c t i m t h e r e f o r e p r e c e d e s all m e m o r y a n d r e p r e s s i o n . A " f o r g e t t i n g "
L E V I N A S s I I I I I 1 S I )
self proper is n o t its o w n , for in-itself it is a " n o n - q u i d d i t y , no This enigmatic birth, incarnation, and involvement with
s i n g u l a r i t é s a n s n o m e n lui c o n f é r a n t u n r ô l e ] . " 2 0
T h e oneself t h e ego's s u p e r e g o i c guilt. T h a t is, since it is precisely " m y -
So, il Levinas has given us a n y t h i n g to think u is this: there Subjected to the Other) is a d i v i d i n g ol t h e past from the f u t u r e
i s n o sociality, n o c o m m u n i t y , n o c o m m u n i c a t i o n , n o d i a l o g u e bin w i t h o u t p a s s i n g i n t o a p r e s e n t . Subjectivity, in L e v i n a s ' s
n o r dialectic t h a t is unaffected by a n o t h i n g n e s s , an a n o n y m - s e n s e , i s t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f r o m " b e t w e e n " p a s t a n d fu-
ity, a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d h e n c e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n , a p a n i c , a rest- t u r e . It is t i m e w i t h o u t a n y " n o w " p o i n t , if t h a t is i m a g i n a b l e .
lessness or a d e l i r i u m at t h e h e a r t of w h i c h t h e r e is a s u b j e c t in I n s t e a d of a " n o w " p o i n t t h e r e is a point d'autrui—a p o i n t of
une passivité à mort. i n s t a b i l i t y a n d d i s s o l u t i o n . Subjectivity, i n t h i s s e n s e , i s t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f t h e difference b e t w e e n S a m e a n d O t h e r , t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f intersubjectivity, a n d a p r o x i m i t y t o t h e O t h e r
Impasse o u t s i d e of, or e v a c u a t e d of, a n y p r e s e n c e . T h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of
As a r e s u l t of its o r i g i n a r y passivity, of its b e i n g indifference we s p o k e of earlier is t h e fact t h a t , in a r e a l c a s e ,
f o r m e d , t h e self is d e l a y e d " b e h i n d " itself. B u t , as it is n o t h i n g w e c a n n o t d o u b t t h a t a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s i n p a i n (to b o r r o w
o t h e r t h a n its passivity, we m u s t c o n c e i v e of t h e self as d e l a y f r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s w o r k for a m o m e n t ) . It is a fact t h a t gives
itself, o r — t i m e . L i k e t h e w o r k o f a r t , t h e t e m p o r a l i t y o f t h e n o i n f o r m a t i o n , n o c o n t e n t , n o ethical f o r m u l a . I t i s a n affect,
self is w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t . As m o d e l e d or d o u b l e d or e c h o e d b u t an affect w i t h o u t a self, for I am t h e o t h e r f r o m w h o s e
f r o m t h e O t h e r , t h e self is " o r i g i n a l l y " a r e c u r r e n c e to self. suffering I c a n n o t d i s t a n c e myself by d o u b t i n g . B u t I do n o t
T h e d e l a y is, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s , a n o r i g i n a r y politesse, identify w i t h t h a t sufferer as s o m e o n e in p a r t i c u l a r . I identify,
o r a n " a f t e r y o u , sir." T h e self i s b e l a t e d , b e h i n d t h e O t h e r v e r y m u c h to t h e c o n t r a r y , i n s o f a r as t h e sufferer is not o t h e r -
a n d a n s w e r i n g t o t h e O t h e r w h o p r e c e d e s it. E x n i h i l o I r e - t h a n - I , is not a l t e r e g o . T h a t is, I identify i n s o f a r as t h e o t h e r
s p o n d t o t h e O t h e r b e f o r e even h e a r i n g t h e O t h e r , b e f o r e r e c - i s precisely n o o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s b e y o n d himself a n d i s n o t
ognizing the O t h e r as other. I am thus indistinguishable from e q u a l to his suffering. / identify with the other precisely to the
that Other. extent that the other is anonymous, and thus I identify with
ing I " h e a r " calling me o u t of n o t h i n g to be s o m e o n e . Ethics is w i s h e s t o say t h a t this i s o u r " p r o p e r " s t a t e : " P a r a d o x i c a l l y i t
a t e s t h e for-itself a n d e x p o s e s i t t o n o t h i n g , t o d e a t h — t o t h a t b y t h e o t h e r a n d d e l a y b e h i n d t h e p r e s e n t : a d i a c h r o n y . Be-
am identifying with no one, I t o o am no one. T h u s , / am n o t other words. Geworfenheit and Verfallenheit are, therefore,
relation with Autrui as that from which I cannot distinguish a n d t h e r e is, b e f o r e a n y t h i n g else, a f a s c i n a t i o n . T h i s f a s c i n a -
32
as threatened or already contaminated by absence, but in such m o r e Other in that I am the same as he (who, nonetheless,
tion, is " b e y o n d " while remaining here, before m e ; b u t this a s t a b i l i t y i n t h e S a m e w h o can identify w i t h t h e o t h e r . W h a t
i m p o s s i b i l i t y : t h e r e i s n o r e l a t i o n t h a t i s e i t h e r inside o r o u t - h a v i n g b e e n t a k e n in by a d u b i o u s s c h e m e in s p i t e of o u r b e s t
t o say, t h e r e i s n o h u m a n r e l a t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t c i r c u m s c r i b e a Blanchot.
loss t h a t p a s s e s w i t h o u t p a s s i n g a w a y . T h a t loss i s i n s c r i b e d
in, o r a s , t h e face o f t h e o t h e r p e r s o n w h o faces m e f r o m b e -
y o n d himself a n d thereby obligates t h a t I am called on to be Death
substituted for him who cannot substitute for himself, and T h e space of radical ethics—a relation with others
w h o i s a b a n d o n e d t o a n infinite v u l n e r a b i l i t y t h a t i t i s b e y o n d t h a t precedes egology—is deeply, even definitively, a m b i g u o u s .
his p o w e r t o e q u a l ( a b a n d o n e d b e y o n d e v e n a n y v i o l e n c e t h a t As a m b i g u o u s , it is n e u t r a l a n d n e u t r a l i z i n g . It is as m u c h a
i i: v i N A s • s i i 111 > 5
36
c o n t r o l . I t i s (the) O t h e r ( s ) w h o i n v o l v e ( s ) m e i n t h e s e l i m i t s
t h a t define m e . O n l y b y a n a b u s e o f l a n g u a g e , h o w e v e r , c a n This space, without or beyond essence (au-delà de
t h i s s p a c e b e a p p r o p r i a t e d t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s ; for t h e l'essence), t h i s b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n t h a t ¿5 o n l y as " o t h e r w i s e
space of incarnation a n d death is singular a n d incomparable. t h a n b e i n g , " is, for L e v i n a s , t h e p l a c e of a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t
It belongs to no one. It is properly neither ethical n o r aes- p l a c e s me in q u e s t i o n , for o n l y t h e r e , o u t s i d e e s s e n c e , can I
t h e t i c . I t i s n o m o r e t h e f i r s t sign o f e t h i c s ( a n e x t r e m e h u m i l - meet the other as other t h a n other-I. T h e ambiguity of this
ity b e f o r e t h e o t h e r ) t h a n o f h i s t r i o n i c s (the ability t o p l a y all s p a c e is s h a r e a b l e o n l y as c o n t e s t e d , as i n - q u e s t i o n ( h e n c e , it
t h e r o l e s w i t h a n icy d e t a c h m e n t ) , o r o f m a d n e s s ( a d i s p o s s e s - is the space n o t only of responsibility, b u t also of rivalry a n d
s i o n o f self a n d a r e p o s s e s s i o n b y w h o k n o w s w h a t forces o r jealousy). D e a t h is inscribed here as well. It is the space of t h e
demons). Incarnation is irreducibly undecidable, unoccupiable, f i n i t u d e , w e m u s t say, i n spite o f L e v i n a s ' s p r o f o u n d a v e r s i o n
a n d u n p r e s e n t a b l e . B u t this i s a l s o t h e s p a c e o f e x i s t e n c e w h i c h t o f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y a n d Bataille's i m p a t i e n c e w i t h H e i -
is, a s N a n c y s a y s , " o f f e r e d b y n o o n e t o n o o n e . " I t i s offered, degger's "slavish" devotion to philosophy. It is finitude as t h a t
b u t i t i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y lost o r s u r r e n d e r e d b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s o b l i g a t i o n - t o - b e t h a t I c a n n o t ever m e e t , for i t defines m e a n d
t o n o o n e . I t is, N a n c y s a y s , " s h a r e d , " b u t o n l y a s t h a t w h i c h is t h u s b e y o n d me as the inescapable voice of conscience t h a t
3 7
e l u d e s all s h a r i n g . There can be no transcending this space, calls Da-sein to itself by p u t t i n g it in q u e s t i o n . It is an i m -
since it is u n e q u a l or insufficient to itself. T h e r e f o r e , as B l a n c h o t
p r o p e r s p a c e , b e l o n g i n g t o n o o n e , a n d i s given t o Da-sein,
reminds us:
b u t o n l y o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t Da-sein i s r a d i c a l l y n o o n e .
U n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p a c e is a s p a c e of u n p o w e r , of a n a r c h y .
I t d o e s n o t follow, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y i s t h e It is w h e r e there is exposure to e x p o s u r e . In this space, the
s i m p l e p u t t i n g i n c o m m o n , i n s i d e t h e limits i t w o u l d o t h e r p e r s o n , e n r o l l e d a s this o r t h a t m e m b e r o f s o c i e t y (or
p r o p o s e for itself, of a s h a r e d will to be s e v e r a l , a l b e i t part of some whole), is depropriated and communicates with
t o d o n o t h i n g , t h a t i s t o say, t o d o n o t h i n g else t h a n t h i s s p a c e i t s e l f — b e y o n d a n y self. H e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s
m a i n t a i n t h e s h a r i n g o f ' s o m e t h i n g ' w h i c h , precisely, a p p r o a c h e d by an u n p o w e r over w h i c h he can exercise no
seems always already to have eluded the possibility of m a s t e r y a n d for w h i c h his r o l e d o e s n o t p r e p a r e h i m . L e v i n a s
b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t of a s h a r i n g : s p e e c h , silence. s a y s , " t h e face is e x p o s e d , m e n a c e d , as if i n v i t i n g us to an a c t
o f v i o l e n c e fie visage est e x p o s é , m e n a c é c o m m e n o u s i n v i t a n t
3 9
[La c o m m u n a u t é n ' e s t p a s p o u r a u t a n t l a s i m p l e m i s e à un acte de v i o l e n c e ] . " T h e entire lacerated b o d y of the
e n c o m m u n , d a n s les limites q u ' e l l e s e t r a c e r a i t , d ' u n e m a n t o r t u r e d i n C h i n a , w h o s e p h o t o g r a p h s Bataille h a d s e e n ,
I I v I N A '. '. I I I I I I a (> i
w a s a visage in the Lcvinasian sense. I lis m u t i l a t i o n e x c i t e s a ( )ther w h o presents (my) death i<> me by r e v e a l i n g it n o t to be
p a s s i o n for further mutilation, even as it excites a p a s s i o n a t e m y d e a t h , n o r his, n o r a n y o n e ' s . I a m o b l i g a t e d t o b e f o r - t h e -
r e v u l s i o n . In this s p a c e of c o n t e s t a t i o n — o f rivalry, of jealousy, o t h e r , t o die i n his p l a c e , i n t h a t s p a c e w h e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n
o f t o r t u r e , o f d e a t h — t h e o t h e r p e r s o n loses himself a n d "of- is approached by an unpower that approaches me and from
f e r s " t o m e a n o p e n i n g i n t o this s p a c e . T h e O t h e r i s s u b j e c t t o w h i c h I h a v e n o p o w e r t o s e p a r a t e myself. T h i s i s n o t a c o m -
a w i t h d r a w a l over which there is no control and of w h i c h m u n i o n , nor an exchange of places. It is the corrosive a n d
t h e r e i s n o k n o w l e d g e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , h e b e g i n s t o lose his s o b e r i n g r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o t a b l e t o die
a b i l i t y - t o - d i e , his definitive m o r t a l potentia, his " o w n m o s t " his own d e a t h . T h a t is w h a t is so t e r r i b l e a b o u t t h e final h o u r .
4 0
possibility. H e b e g i n s t o lose t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t defines h i m a s T h e s o l i t u d e o f d y i n g m u s t b e s h a r e d . 1 die f o r - t h e - o t h e r a n d
Da-sein. T h i s possibility, H e i d e g g e r tells u s , o n c e r e a l i z e d is, in his place because the other c a n n o t . He r e m a i n s , to the end,
h e n c e , n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e a n d Da-sein, o n c e r e a l i z e d i n its b e - u n c a n n i l y alive, r e m a i n s u n a b l e t o cease t o d i e , a n d s u r r e n -
i n g , loses itself a b s o l u t e l y b e c a u s e it is no l o n g e r able to d i e . It d e r s t h e o w n - m o s t n e s s (the p o s s i b i l i t y t o die) t h a t defines h i m .
i s t o t h a t definitive p o w e r l e s s n e s s t h a t I r e s p o n d . T h i s m a y b e D e a t h i s i m p e r s o n a l . T h a t i s w h y I m u s t b e t h e r e for h i m , w i t h
t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a n e t h i c s , b u t i t w o u l d b e a fatal o n e b e c a u s e h i m . I a m called t o a c c o m p l i s h w h a t h e c a n n o t a c c o m p l i s h
I a m n o t a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h myself f r o m t h a t p o w e r l e s s n e s s . himself. I m u s t s u b s t i t u t e for h i m this ability to die t h a t / a m .
T h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o l o n g e r a b l e t o forestall t h e a p p r o a c h o f I a m t h a t s u p p l e m e n t h e d e m a n d s , o b l i g e s , i n o r d e r t o be, i n
d e a t h — a p a r a l y s i s t h a t , i n spite o f his l a n g u a g e , defines H e i - o r d e r t o r e m a i n p o s s i b l e . H o w e v e r , I offer h i m w h a t i s n o t m y
d e g g e r ' s Entschlossenheit as a r a d i c a l passivity. It is to t h i s o w n , w h a t I c a n n o t offer, w h a t I a m u n a b l e t o g i v e . H e n c e w e
p a s s i v i t y t h a t e x p o s e s b e y o n d n u d i t y t h a t I r e s p o n d , a n d for e n t e r a d e a t h l i k e p a s s i v i t y (une passivité à mort) t o g e t h e r . T h i s
w h i c h I a m r e s p o n s i b l e . I n its a p p r o a c h (as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y - t o - i m p o s s i b l e o b l i g a t i o n a n d i m p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n d o e s n o t define
die t h a t i s a l r e a d y a n i n a b i l i t y - t o - c e a s e - d y i n g ) , finitude e s c a p e s me as t r a g i c . It e x p o s e s me to t h e r a d i c a l inability t h a t I must
f r o m " b e t w e e n " us, a n d h e n c e , t h e r e is a v e r t i g i n o u s (or a n o n y - t, —that t h a t t o w h i c h I a m ethically o b l i g a t e d i s b e y o n d m e ,
e
Yet I must be this e x i s t e n c e , this finitude, w h i c h is offered degger's (diachronie a n d Zeit, anarchie a n d das Man, le sujet
by no one to no one. I am nothing—nothing other than that and Da-sein, responsabilité and Gewissenheit, and so forth)
being-offered, t h a t supplement, or t h a t substitution t h a t I can- his w o r k a m o u n t s t o a v a s t p r o t e s t a g a i n s t w h a t H e i d e g g e r
n o t a c c o m p l i s h . I am O t h e r — t h a t is, no o n e , no ipse. I am could m e a n , a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of finitude to
only as substituted. T h a t is w h y I am always the first person " f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . " In an essay on Lyotard, L a c o u e -
accused, the first person responsible. My fascinated attentive- L a b a r t h e says, "I h a v e a lot of t r o u b l e n o t seeing in H e i d e g g e r ' s
n e s s t o t h e O t h e r i s t h e b r e a k u p o f m y unity. T h e r e l a t i o n t o ' b e i n g ' , if it is still b e i n g , a n d if it is H e i d e g g e r ' s b e i n g , t h e
t h e O t h e r i s singular, u n i q u e , n o n g e n e r a l i z a b l e . T h e r e i s n o s a m e t h i n g a s (if n o t its very possibility) L e v i n a s ' s ' t h e o t h e r -
4 3
e t h i c s a s s u c h , n o e t h i c s itself. O r , this e t h i c s i s s t r u c t u r e d like wise than being'. Or as an empty t r a n s c e n d e n c e . "
i m p r o p r i e t y , a n d t h e L e v i n a s i a n s u b j e c t i s n o t h i n g b u t its infi- T h a t is, b y a c t i n g a s a c o m p e t i t o r t o H e i d e g g e r a n d t o
nite unfinished vulnerability. fundamental ontology, Levinas has exposed a n d exploited an
an-archic r a p p o r t and has attempted to undermine Heidegger,
w h o w r o t e n o e t h i c s . W h o w r o t e n o e t h i c s for t h e v e r y g o o d
Levinas and Heidegger reason that there is nothing adequate or equal to finitude,
Writing
W r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t o f w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Yet w r i t -
i n g s a y s , e a c h t i m e , c l e a r l y a n d u n o b t r u s i v e l y , there is. It s a y s
t h i s if o n l y to d e n y it: there is n o t . . . W r i t i n g affirms e x i s t -
e n c e — t h e t h i n g itself, t h e r e a l — b u t o n l y b y t a k i n g its p l a c e .
W r i t i n g t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f t h e r e a l i n o r d e r t o say it. I t i n t r u d e s
itself b e t w e e n u s a n d t h e reality o f w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Still, o u t -
side o f w r i t i n g (before it, p r i o r t o it) w h a t h a s r e a l l y t a k e n
p l a c e ? W h a t h a p p e n e d ? W r i t i n g w o u l d like t o say t h i s t h i n g ,
b u t as it sets o u t to do this it is i m m e d i a t e l y infected by a f o r e i g n -
ness t h a t w e a k e n s i t i m m e a s u r a b l y . I n s t e a d o f s a y i n g t h e t h i n g ,
it says (or e v e n , like t h e w o r k of a r t in L e v i n a s , it insists on) its
absence by p r e s e n t i n g itself in t h e p l a c e of t h a t to w h i c h it
w o u l d like to refer. B u t , w h a t is w r i t i n g itself ( o u t s i d e of, or
j u s t s h o r t of, its r e f e r r i n g t o t h e t h i n g ) ? A n d d i d w e n o t b e g i n
this p a r a g r a p h by saying t h a t writing says, not absence, but
existence, there is? We s h o u l d h a v e said: Writing tears itself apart
from the moment it begins to speak. But w h o c a n say this?
L e t u s g o further.
W h a t i f e x i s t e n c e ¿ 5 o n l y a s a b s e n c e , a n d m o r e precisely,
65
a s t h a t a b s e n c e that w r i t i n g s a y s , affirms, a n d " p r e s e n t s " ? O r , a r e "cast towards us like c h u n k s that h a v e w e i g h t in t h e m -
t o say t h e s a m e t h i n g a g a i n , w h a t i f e x i s t e n c e (the r e a l , t h e selves [se jettent sur n o u s d e s c h o s e s c o m m e d e s m o r c e a u x q u i
4
t h i n g itself) is a l r e a d y t h e saying of absence, in s h o r t , w r i t - s ' i m p o s e n t p a r e u x - m ê m e s ] . " I m p o r t a n t l y , this c h a o t i c m a t -
i n g — t h e v e r y w r i t i n g w h o s e p r e s e n c e insists u p o n t h e a b s e n c e ter i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n t h a t m a t t e r w h i c h i s " d e f i n e d b y m e c h a -
o f t h e real? I n t h a t c a s e w r i t i n g w o u l d b e t h e v e r y t a k i n g - nistic l a w s w h i c h w r i n g o u t its w h o l e e s s e n c e a n d r e n d e r i t
p l a c e o f ( d o u b l e genitive) e x i s t e n c e : w r i t i n g t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f intelligible [définie p a r les lois m é c a n i s t e s q u i e n é p u i s a i e n t e t
5
existence a n d existence takes place as writing (but n o t — a n d la r e n d a i e n t i n t e l l i g i b l e ] . " It is n o t , h o w e v e r , t h e s a m e thing
let us be clear a b o u t t h i s , for it is a t e m p t a t i o n to w h i c h L e v i n a s a s t h i s inter-essed m a t t e r . I t i s n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g a s m a t t e r
says a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e i s p r o n e — a s p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y f o r m e d t h a t is f o r m e d , t h a t is s o m e item t h a t rests in a s e t t i n g , a w o r l d ,
or narrated). T h a t which happens outside the text takes place a n d t h a t is, as H e i d e g g e r p u t s it, zuhandensein. Aesthetic m a t t e r
as writing b u t is n o t re-presented in the text. We could say i s n o t d e s t i n e d t o t h e h a n d , t o t h e subject, o r t o a n y u s e r c o m -
t h a t w r i t i n g is the very h a p p e n i n g of an outside t h a t r e m a i n s m u n i t y . It is i n s t e a d m a t t e r d e s t i n e d o n l y to appear, a n d o n l y
in t h e t e x t , b u t o n l y as a silence, like t h e voix narrative of in poetry, but w i t h o u t being named.
1
w h i c h B l a n c h o t s p e a k s . W e c o u l d a l s o say t h a t w r i t i n g " f o r - But this other destiny or other aspect to matter is n o t a
g e t s " itself a n d t h a t t h i s h a s u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s ; silence af- n e w quality that art discovers (and w o u l d , thereby, contribute
firms itself i n w r i t i n g w i t h o u t h a v i n g t h e s t r e n g t h t o say itself. t o t h e intelligibility o f t h e w o r l d ) . I t i s n o t a q u a l i t y t h a t w o u l d
I n o u r first c h a p t e r w e s a w h o w i n a r t t h e c r e p u s c u l a r b e p o e t r y ' s offering t o science a n d p h i l o s o p h y , c u l t u r e a n d
paroxysmality of naked matter suddenly makes an obscure p s y c h o l o g y . T h a t w h i c h a r t d i s c o v e r s , o r u n c o v e r s , o r lays b a r e
" a p p e a r a n c e . " L e v i n a s s h o w s this t o u s i n his e v a l u a t i o n o f will n o t b e f o u n d u n d e r a n y e n c y c l o p e d i c s u b j e c t h e a d i n g . T o
a r t f r o m b o t h " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e " a n d t h e s e c t i o n f r o m p u t i t v e r y s i m p l y : a r t i s useless m a t t e r . I t i s m a d e u p o f useless
Existence and Existents w h o s e title q u i e t l y s u m s up t h e u n i q u e m a t t e r a n d uselessness i s n o t o n e o f m a t t e r ' s q u a l i t i e s . (It is,
6
a t m o s p h e r e he finds in art: "Existence w i t h o u t a W o r l d [Ex- A g a m b e n w o u l d say, s o m e t h i n g like a " h a l o [ a u r e o l a ] . " ) W e
istence sans M o n d e ] . " 2
He m a k e s it clear in the later w o r k m a y say, h o w e v e r , t h a t uselessness i s o n e o f m a t t e r ' s " p o s s i -
t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f m a t t e r t h a t i n t e r e s t s h i m i s n o t s o m e stuff bilities." But w h a t does this m e a n , a n d w h a t does it m e a n t h a t
that is utterly refractory to mind, b u t is instead t h a t m a t t e r o n l y i n a r t d o e s this " p o s s i b i l i t y " a p p e a r a s s u c h ? D o e s i t m e a n
which c a n only appear in poetry (but namelessly a n d w i t h o u t t h a t a r t realizes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f uselessness a n d p u t s i t t o
3
a n y o b j e c t i v i t y ) . H e refers t o t h a t a s p e c t o f m a t t e r w h i c h i s w o r k ( a n d t h e r e b y b e t r a y s it)?
l i b e r a t e d w h e n , via a r t , o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e w o r l d ( w i t h I n his e s s a y " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " B l a n c h o t
usefulness a n d w o r k ) a r e n e u t r a l i z e d . A s w e h a v e seen i n o u r says (in t e r m s t h a t a r e close t o b o t h L e v i n a s a n d H e i d e g g e r )
first chapter, this neutralization is the very event of art a n d it t h a t "if t h e s c u l p t o r uses s t o n e a n d i f t h e r o a d b u i l d e r a l s o
immerses us in an a t m o s p h e r e w h e r e space is w i t h o u t a hori- uses s t o n e , the first uses it in a w a y t h a t it is n o t used, c o n s u m e d ,
zon, w h e r e "[n]aked elements, simple a n d absolute [Éléments n e g a t e d b y u s a g e , b u t affirmed, r e v e a l e d i n its o b s c u r i t y , a s a
n u s , simples et a b s o l u s ] " detach themselves from things a n d r o a d t h a t l e a d s o n l y t o itself [si l e s c u l p t e u r s e sert d e l a p i e r r e
I II I \ I I
et si le c a n t o n n i e r aussi se sert de la p i e r r e , le p r e m i e r l'utilise ier can be used in such .1 w a y that it v a n i s h e s i n t o its uses. But
d e telle s o r t e q u ' e l l e n ' e s t p a s utilisée, c o n s o m m é e , niée p a r art uses m a i l e r such t h a t it is wwused, w o r k l e s s , idle, useless.
l ' u s a g e , m a i s affirmée, révélée d a n s s o n o b s c u r i t é , c h e m i n q u i Art s i m p l y c a u s e s t h e m a r b l e t o " a p p e a r , " n o t t o d i s a p p e a r
7
n e c o n d u i t q u ' à elle m ê m e ] . " T h e a r t w o r k , l e a d i n g t h e s t o n e , into use. In p o e t r y likewise, w o r d s , d e t a c h e d from referentiality,
a s i t w e r e , b a c k t o itself ( b u t d i d i t e v e r leave itself?) " m a k e s s u d d e n l y m a k e a m a t e r i a l a p p e a r a n c e . It is t h e a p p e a r a n c e of
w h a t d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e o b j e c t a p p e a r [fait a p p a r a î t r e c e q u i m a t t e r t h a t is, e m i n e n t l y , w h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t i s m a d e of. N o t
8
disparaît dans l'objet]." It is material that disappears into the m a t t e r in its t h i n g l y reality, b u t in its a p p e a r i n g as such. N o t
object, a n d " t h e m o r e the material is appropriate—the m o r e it thingliness, b u t the image of matter. Imaginary matter, if you
n e a r s n o t h i n g n e s s [plus la m a t i è r e { . . . } est a p p r o p r i é e , p l u s prefer. I t i s u n e m p l o y e d m a t t e r , o r t h a t a s p e c t o f m a t t e r t h a t
9
elle s e fait p r o c h e d e r i e n ] . " But i n t h e a r t w o r k t h i s m a t t e r i s r e m a i n s a l w a y s p r i o r t o its b e i n g m a t e r i a l for t h i s o r t h a t . A r t
p r e s e r v e d . " T h e s t a t u e glorifies t h e m a r b l e , " B l a n c h o t s a y s , ¿5 u n u s e d , u n e m p l o y e d , a n d idle m a t t e r . A r t , in s h o r t , is t h e
e c h o i n g b o t h L e v i n a s a n d H e i d e g g e r , a n d t h e a r t w o r k "is i m a g e of m a t t e r . I c a n d i s m a n t l e t h e t e m p l e a n d b u i l d a r o a d
e m i n e n t l y that of w h i c h it is made [est é m i n e m m e n t ce dont w i t h t h e m a r b l e , b u t I c a n n o t d i s m a n t l e t h e image t h e t e m p l e
]0
elle est faite]." However, e m i n e n t l y is. I c a n c a s t c e l l u l o i d i n t o t h e fire b u t I c a n n o t m a -
n i p u l a t e t h e m o t i o n p i c t u r e itself. I c a n n o t e v e n t o u c h it.
uncontrollable identification whose intimacy is its dispersion. universals. By m e a n s of the schema-image, the particular b e c o m e s ,
1 7
sal n o r p a r t i c u l a r . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a potentia, or, as
mysterious "art concealed in the depths of the h u m a n s o u l . " 2 1
A g a m b e n says, a " h a l o . " It is t h e p a r t i c u l a r with all its predi-
R e c a l l t h a t t h e s c h e m a p r o v i d e s a n i m a g e for a c o n c e p t a n d
cates, n o o n e o f w h i c h o r n o c o m b i n a t i o n o f w h i c h , h o w e v e r ,
t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e s c h e m a i s called s c h e m a t i s m . N o w , a
d i s t i n g u i s h e s it as w h a t it is. It is n o t , H e i d e g g e r r e m i n d s u s , a
schema is not an image and schematism is not imagination,
IS I A IN l . I I < > I
of the materiality of matter. This r o o m that the n a r r a t o r en- et cette vie qui a l o r s o n t été les m i e n n e s ] . " ' He r e c o u n t s in-
j o y s is o n l y i n s o f a r as it is " b e s i d e itself," t o u c h i n g all its p o s - s t e a d e v e n t s t h a t , w e m u s t p r e s u m e , a r e n o t (yet) d e a d a n d
sibilities. t h a t d i d n o t o c c u p y his a t t e n t i o n a t t h e t i m e . T h e t h i n g s h e
cial sensitivity t o s o m e q u a l i t y o r a s p e c t o f t h i s flat i n its p a r - yesterday's world [l'ombre du m o n d d'hier plaît e n c o r e ] , "
ticularity. T h e n a r r a t o r c a n n o t identify o r c o n c e i v e o f w h a t i s but instead are things t h a t are n o t limited to the past a n d t h a t
t h i s p l e a s u r e i s "in-itself," i s s i n g u l a r a n d a n o n y m o u s , a n d i t w h o m h e h a d f o r g o t t e n e v e n e x i s t e d , his m u l t i p l e d w e l l i n g s ,
( T h e n a r r a t o r ' s fury a t t h e little girl w h o spies o n h i m i n his seriously), o d d encounters with neighbors, comings a n d go-
arrivés en 1 9 3 8 ] " 2 8
a r e perfectly n e g l i g i b l e , u n w o r t h y o f c o m - q u e n t i a l h a p p e n i n g s h a v e m a n a g e d t o live o n a n d r e m a i n
e v e n t s o f s e r i o u s p u b l i c a n d historic c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t o c c u r r e d v i r t u e o f t h e i r insignificance, t h e y e s c a p e h i s t o r i c a l s c r u t i n y
a t a r o u n d t h i s d a t e a n d t h a t " o c c u p i e d [the n a r r a t o r ' s ] a t t e n - a n d w o r m their w a y lackadaisically into the time of his writ-
e v e n t s , h e tells u s , a r e " r o t t i n g a w a y , t h e i r s t o r y i s d e a d , a n d They are w h a t the journalist did not write a b o u t at the time
b e c a u s e they wen- inessential e v e n t s , <>i s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c e , Ins n a r r a t o r s . A m o r e o b s c u r e d e m a n d solicits his a t t e n t i o n .
m e r e e v e r y d a y life. They w e r e a l r e a d y s u p p l e m e n t a r y t o t h e A n a n i o r p h i c , (he f r a g m e n t ' s only life is its s e p a r a t i o n f r o m
t i m e o f t h e c o m i n g war. Unlike t h e M u n i c h crisis, seeing S i m o n e any w h o l e , a n y n a r r a t i v e , a n y history. I t c a n n o t b e p u t i n p l a c e
a g a i n after he h a d f o r g o t t e n she even e x i s t e d is a m e r e trifle— and therefore d e m a n d s from the writer something other t h a n
i t h a p p e n e d w h e n n o t h i n g m u c h else w a s h a p p e n i n g . B u t i n a f o r m . I t d e m a n d s d e s t r u c t i o n . I t d e m a n d s , a s w e say a t t h e
certain sense, these everyday events are purely historic. T h e y o u t s e t of this c h a p t e r , t h a t writing tear itself apart from the
a r e h i s t o r y p u r g e d of h i s t o r i c e v e n t s , or, t h e e v e r y d a y as t h e moment it begins to speak:
p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h i s t o r y . I m p o r t a n t l y , for t h e p u r p o s e o f
a p p r o a c h i n g B l a n c h o t ' s aesthetics, w e m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e s e W r i t i n g i s n o t d e s t i n e d t o leave t r a c e s , b u t t o e r a s e , b y
everyday events already possess the characteristics of writing t r a c e s , all t r a c e s , t o d i s a p p e a r i n t h e f r a g m e n t a r y s p a c e
and of the image. T h e y a r e of s e c o n d a r y , i n e s s e n t i a l , n o n - o f w r i t i n g m o r e definitively t h a n o n e d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e
primary importance, thus they already open the space of writ- t o m b , o r a g a i n , t o d e s t r o y , t o d e s t r o y invisibly, w i t h -
ing. T h e y are w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n n o t h i n g h a p p e n s , just a s out the uproar of destruction.
writing only h a p p e n s w h e n nothing h a p p e n s . T h e events t h a t
he w r i t e s of, a n d w i s h e s to be r i d of, a r e , f r o m t h e first, sec- [Écrire n'est p a s destiné à laisser des t r a c e s , m a i s à effa-
ondary. T h e y r e l a t e to n o t h i n g of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e . If he cer, p a r les traces, toutes traces, à disparaître d a n s l'espace
d i d n o t d a t e t h e récit for u s a n d m e n t i o n t h e M u n i c h crisis, f r a g m e n t a i r e d e l'écriture, p l u s définitivement q u e d a n s
w o u l d w e k n o w t h a t t h e t i m e f r a m e o f t h e n a r r a t i v e i s t h e eve la t o m b e on ne disparaît, ou encore à détruire, détruire
36
of World War Two? The "things" the narrator writes of were, invisiblement, sans le v a c a r m e de la d e s t r u c t i o n . ]
f r o m t h e o u t s e t , " t r a c e s " i n t h e sense m a d e s o w e l l k n o w n b y
Derrida a nd Levinas. All t h e " t h i n g s " t h a t " h a p p e n " in L'arrêt de mort a r e frag-
I n his e s s a y " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e , " L e v i n a s tells u s t h a t m e n t s , pieces o f n o w h o l e s , s e p a r a t i o n s i n defiance o f p r e s -
life solicits t h e n o v e l i s t w h e n i t a p p e a r s t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f a e n c e s . T h a t i s w h a t gives t h i s a n d his o t h e r récits t h e i r p e c u -
novel. 3 4
(We n e e d o n l y recall t h e n a r r a t o r f r o m À la Recher- liar a t m o s p h e r e , their " n e w thrill [frisson n o u v e a u ] , " as Levinas
3 7
che du Temps Perdu, w h o is a s t o n i s h e d to r e a d a n e w s p a p e r says o f t h e m . Someone enters by mistake into another person's
account of a m u r d e r that seems to him to be torn from the r o o m a n d this h a s u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s b e c a u s e n o t h i n g a b o u t
pages of Dostoyevsky. He then comes to the realization that, it, o r t h e t u r m o i l i t c a u s e s , a d d s u p t o a n y t h i n g c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
o f c o u r s e , D o s t o y e v s k y ' s i n s p i r a t i o n w a s precisely t h e s a m e : a N o t h i n g o f w h a t t h e n a r r a t o r d e s p e r a t e l y w a n t s t o say a n d b e
newspaper account of a murder that seemed to be torn from r i d o f will r e s o l v e itself i n t o i m a g e s , t h o u g h t , c o m m e n t a r y ,
t h e p a g e s o f a n o v e l t h a t h e w o u l d t h e n sit d o w n t o w r i t e . ) 3 5
s c e n e s , n a r r a t i v e , or, t o s u m i t u p , text. N o t h i n g o f w h a t h e
B l a n c h o t , h o w e v e r , never, n o t e v e n i n his e s s a y s , w r i t e s a t t h e w a n t s t o say c a n b e p r o p e r l y reflected. I n t h e e n d , t h a t w h i c h
level o f f o r m . H e w r i t e s f r a g m e n t s , a n d h e e v e n w r i t e s frag- h e w a n t s (the t r u t h , o f c o u r s e ) , h e s a y s , "is n o t c o n t a i n e d i n
m e n t a r i l y a b o u t f r a g m e n t a r y w r i t i n g . I t i s n o t f o r m t h a t solicits t h e s e facts. I c a n i m a g i n e s u p p r e s s i n g t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r o n e s .
IV I /\ IN 1 I I l> I
But il they did not h a p p e n , 01 others h a p p e n e d in their p l a c e , ever, luiili readet a n d w r i t e r are on the s a m e side, w h i l e di-
a n d a n s w e r i n g the s u m m o n s oi the all p o w e r f u l a f f i r m a t i o n verging from both oi t h e m is the w r i t i n g , as S t e v e n S h a v i r o
41
w h i c h is united with m e , they take on the same m e a n i n g a n d h a s noted. Each oi t h e i n c i d e n t s w r i t t e n of in L'arrêt de
t h e s t o r y i s t h e s a m e [ n ' e s t p a s d a n s ces faits. Les faits e u x - mort—J.'s d e a t h , r e t u r n t o life, a n d " s e c o n d " d e a t h ; t h e b o m b -
m ê m e s , j e p u i s rêver d e les s u p p r i m e r . M a i s , s'ils n ' o n t p a s e u ing o f Paris a n d t h e n a r r a t o r ' s t a k i n g shelter w i t h N a t h a l i e
lieu, d ' a u t r e s , à leur p l a c e , a r r i v e n t et, à l ' a p p e l de l'affirmation a n d p r o p o s i n g m a r r i a g e t o h e r i n a frenzied a n d foreign l a n -
t o u t e - p u i s s a n t e q u i est u n i e à m o i , ils p r e n n e n t le m ê m e s e n s guage; the return of S i m o n e — e a c h of these incidents is out-
et l ' h i s t o i r e est la m ê m e ] . " 3 8
T h a t is w h y L'arrêt de mort is n o t side t h e o t h e r s a n d e a c h i s m e m o r a b l e o n l y i n s o f a r a s e a c h
a m a s t e r f u l a t t e m p t t o recollect facts a n d i m a g e s t h a t a t t h e d e t a c h e s itself f r o m a n y t i m e f r a m e . T h e t h i n g s w r i t t e n a b o u t
t i m e seemed negligible b u t t h a t n o w h e l p u s t o e n v i s i o n 1 9 3 8 in t h i s récit will n o t f o r m a n a r r a t i v e . E a c h i n c i d e n t is an inter-
m o r e r i c h l y a n d m o r e a c c u r a t e l y . L'arrêt de mort is n o t a r e - r u p t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g else. I n t h i s sense t h e y d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e
c o u n t i n g at all. T h e récit gives us a un frisson nouveau b e - a u t h o r a n d p u s h h i m t o t h e s a m e side a s t h e r e a d e r w h o s e
c a u s e it is c u r i o u s l y a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l y alive. inability to connect the events told of echo the author's o w n
I f t h e n a r r a t o r i s a b l e t o s u p p r e s s c e r t a i n facts a n d a l l o w i m p o t e n c e . H e n c e , L'arrêt de mort is n o t a W o r k . It is, as
others to replace t h e m it is because he writes w i t h o u t any final B l a n c h o t p u t s it, désœuvrement. It is w n w o r k e d , idle, a n d in
o r a u t h e n t i c j u d g m e n t . E i t h e r this fact o r t h a t o n e c a n " t e l l " this r e g a r d B l a n c h o t ' s aesthetics s q u a r e s perfectly w i t h Levinas's
t h e s t o r y a n d t h e s t o r y will r e m a i n " t h e s a m e " b e c a u s e " w h a t a n a l y s i s of a r t . L'arrêt de mort is w o r k - l e s s . It is an i m i t a t i o n
h a p p e n e d " i s a u t o n y m i c . I t i s precisely t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o d e t e r - of t h o u g h t , a s e m b l a n c e of b e i n g , a n d it is w r i t t e n in a s i m u -
m i n a t e form. T h e n a r r a t o r struggles against, a n d also unites l a t e d l a n g u a g e (i.e., a l a n g u a g e t h a t d o e s n o t c o m m u n i c a t e
with, this a n a m o r p h i a as if s u m m o n e d . We are told, in a post- but that simultaneously shows and conceals; w o r d s appear on
s c r i p t (or a s u r p l u s t h a t w a s p r e s e n t a t t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 4 8 t h e p a g e only to sink back into their o w n image, so t h a t the
version of the text, deleted in the second edition in 1 9 7 1 , a n d difference b e t w e e n b e i n g a n d a p p e a r i n g i s e r a s e d ) .
t h e n r e a t t a c h e d for Lydia D a v i s ' s beautiful E n g l i s h t r a n s l a - T h e text we study here does not preserve anything. It is
tion in 1978) that if we can " i m a g i n e " the h a n d that writes i n t e n d e d t o b e d e s t r u c t i v e : " t o e r a s e , b y t r a c e s , all t r a c e s . " 4 2
3 9
t h e s t o r y t h e n r e a d i n g will b e c o m e for u s " a s e r i o u s t a s k . " W e will n o t b e a b l e t o c o n c e i v e o f w h a t " t h r i l l s " u s a s w e r e a d
Serious because the h a n d that writes the sentences is dead, B l a n c h o t . H i s récit i s n o t w h a t u s e d t o b e c a l l e d a " p l u r a l "
a b s e n t . M o r e a b s e n t even t h a n t h e e n t o m b e d L a z a r u s (as Blan- t e x t . It d o e s n o t offer itself to a v a r i e t y of r e a d i n g s , no o n e of
40
chot writes elsewhere) w h o m w e c a n o n l y i m a g i n e a s living w h i c h w o u l d be authentic a n d decidable, leaving the reader
a n d n o t a s h e really is. adrift in playfulness. 43
I n s t e a d , t h e t e x t " p e r f o r m s " its o w n
L'arrêt de mort d o e s n o t a w a i t r e a d e r l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . It disappearance. It "puts an end to it all" in writing, but by
does not preserve or e n t o m b a discourse the reader is obliged putting the end in writing it remains w i t h o u t an end the nar-
to l i b e r a t e . It is itself t h e very s p a c e of d i v e r g e n c e . M o s t b a - r a t o r c o u l d p u t b e h i n d h i m a n d limit t o t h e p a s t . T h e récit
nally, it is t h e d i v e r g e n c e of r e a d e r a n d writer. In a s e n s e , h o w - t h u s d i s a p p e a r s b y s e e k i n g another e n d — a n e n d y e t t o c o m e
l i m e il a wail s is ihe lime oi I he forgetting oi l i m e , of indiffer-
in a t i m e not yet. L'arrêt de mort is the "place" oi t h e absence
e n c e lo l u n e . Il is m this sense that the B l a n c h o t i a n t e x t is so
of a p r o p e r e n d , a n d it h o l d s this p l a c e like an e c h o t h a t p r e -
extraordinarily radical. His writing addresses a time outside
c e d e s t h e s o u n d it r e s o u n d s . T h a t is to say, in r e a d i n g t h e
initiative. But this t i m e t o c o m e — a t i m e w h e n t i m e i s f o r g o t -
B l a n c h o t i a n récit, we h e a r t h e r e v e r b e r a t i o n of a s o u n d n o t
t e n — i s n o t a c h r o n o l o g i c a l e p o c h after m y d e a t h . T h e t i m e
y e t h e a r d , f r o m a t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e t e x t i s al-
awaited is always h a p p e n i n g in everyday events t h a t fragment
ready an echo of a s o u n d (a speaking, a writing) to c o m e , b u t
a n d s e p a r a t e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m a W h o l e , like the events of L'arrêt
t h a t will n e v e r b e p r e s e n t b e c a u s e i t will itself e c h o t h e e c h o
de mort t h a t " c o u l d h a v e h a p p e n e d at a m u c h e a r l i e r t i m e
t h e t e x t a l r e a d y is. N o t a p l u r a l t e x t , L'arrêt de mort is a t e x t
4 4
[car t o u t a p u r e m o n t e r à u n m o m e n t b i e n p l u s a n c i e n ] . " To
e m p t i e d o f all p r e s e n c e a n d , w h a t i s m o r e , i t v i o l e n t l y e m p t i e s
await this time is to await forgetting (l'attente l'oubli) as
t i m e of all p r e s e n c e . P u t m o r e s i m p l y a n d m o r e a b r u p t l y , L'arrêt
B l a n c h o t s o s u c c i n c t l y p u t i t i n o n e o f his m a n y r e m a r k a b l e
d e mort d e s t r o y s t i m e . T h e p a s t — t h e t h i n g s t h a t h a p p e n e d t o
titles. B u t f o r g e t t i n g i s n o t a p u n c t u a l e v e n t . I t d o e s n o t p r o p -
t h e n a r r a t o r i n 1 9 3 8 — a r e n o t offered t o t h e r e a d e r , t o t h e
erly a r r i v e a t all. H a v i n g n o d u r a t i o n , i t i s o v e r b e f o r e i t b e -
p r e s e n t , b u t i n s t e a d offered t o a f u t u r i t y w h o s e c o m i n g o u r
g i n s , a n d i t closes i n o n itself a n d s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m t i m e a s
r e a d i n g a l r e a d y e c h o e s . T h e récit i s a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o
a c h r o n o l o g i c a l flow. F o r g e t t i n g defects f r o m t i m e a n d f r o m
" m y t i m e , " " m y d e a t h . " It skips over the present m o m e n t .
i n i t i a t i v e . W h e n t h e t i m e o f f o r g e t t i n g c o m e s i t will s i m u l t a -
T h a t which "thrills" us then, when we read Blanchot, is
n e o u s l y h a v e b e e n f o r g o t t e n a n d s o t o o will h a v e b e e n f o r g o t -
the divergence a n d disjunction of past a n d future. Past a n d
t e n its a n t i c i p a t i o n .
future are unhinged because there is no present to insure con-
t i n u i t y . (It is, i n its w a y , p r o f o u n d l y p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . T h e L e t us n o t e t h a t in a d d i t i o n to a t h r i l l , L'arrêt de mort is
rience the time of the absence of time, time w i t h o u t a present. very seriously, " I c a n say t h a t b y g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h N a t h a l i e
Eternally caressed by futurity, this time will never (have) I w a s h a r d l y g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h a n y o n e [je n e m e liais
4 6
w i t h a / c a l o n s hand the pretenses [they] were living under Venir), w h e n I une is no l o n g e r anchored in the p r e s e n t , in c o n -
[ n ' a i t rien v o u l u de p l u s q u e déchirer, d ' u n e m a i n j a l o u s e , les tinuity. This l u n e will h a v e been a t o p i c . W h e n w i t h d r a w a l
a p p a r e n c e s d a n s lesquelles n o u s v i v o n s ] , " a n d recall h i m t o i n t o t h e w o r l d will have been f o r g o t t e n , o n e ' s r e l a t i o n t o p l a c e ,
5
his " p l a c e [ l i e u ] . " ' She t h e n h a s a p l a s t e r c a s t o f her h e a d a n d t o r o o t e d n e s s , o r t o h o m e will h a v e b e e n r u p t u r e d b y t h e h y p o -
h a n d s m a d e for h i m . T h a t i s t o say, s h e offers h i m h e r e t e r n a l critical c o n t i n u i t y of p r o x i m i t y t h a t n e i t h e r u n i t e s i n t o a w h o l e
d e a t h , a gift (as Levinas's a n a l y s i s of d e a t h s h o w s ) t h a t she n o r s c a t t e r s i n t o d i s t i n c t p a r t s , b u t i n s t e a d e x p o s e s o n e t o all
herself will n e v e r e x p e r i e n c e , will n e v e r c r o s s o v e r i n t o . S h e the others such that any one is an echo of each, a n d n o n e is
offers h i m a s his " p l a c e " t h e t i m e o f h e r d y i n g a n d its glaciality, original.
w h i c h i s a l w a y s t h e m o s t p a s s i o n a t e feeling o f all since i t e x - B u t i s t h i s n o t j u s t a n o t h e r role i n t h e w o r l d ? H o w i s i t n o t
c l u d e s t h e o n e - w h o - d i e s f r o m it. She offers h i m a t i m e in w h i c h j u s t a n o t h e r v e r s i o n of t h e p o e t as c o n s c i e n c e of his t i m e s ? A
she i s a l r e a d y r e m o v e d f r o m t h e w o r l d . I f t h e B l a n c h o t i a n c o n s c i e n c e w i t h o u t c o n t e n t s , if y o u like, or c o n t e n t l e s s n e s s as
n a r r a t o r comes across to us as aloof a n d detached it is be- c o n s c i e n c e , o r a s t h e p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n s c i e n c e (or e v e n —
c a u s e h e i s n o l o n g e r himself. T h e n a r r a t o r i s affected b y a n - w h y not?—Gewissen-haben-wollen), but a conscience none-
o t h e r t i m e i n w h i c h h e i s a b s e n t , a s w e shall see m o r e defini- theless, a n d thus assigning the p o e t a role in given society
tively i n o u r n e x t s e c t i o n . w h e t h e r o r n o t h e o r she likes it. P e r h a p s this i s t h e c a s e , b u t
T o w r i t e o f these t h i n g s i s t o r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f t h e t h e r e i s n o r o o m i n t h e w o r l d for h i m o r h e r w h o , w r i t i n g ,
w o r l d a n d t o live w i t h o u t f o r m — i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e B o o k , refuses t h e w o r l d . N o r i s t h e r e a n y r o o m o u t s i d e t h e w o r l d .
a s B l a n c h o t p u t s it. I t i s t o r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f l a n - H e n c e , t h e r e is w r i t i n g , w h i c h is neither/nor. N e i t h e r c o n s c i e n c e
g u a g e , of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . N o t at all a refusal of r e s p o n s i b i l - n o r its l a c k .
ity, w r i t i n g u n i t e s w i t h it, refusing t o f l e e its e x o r b i t a n c e . W r i t -
ing is the imitation of thought, the simulation of action, a n d
t h e c o n t i n u a l e x p o s u r e t o responsibility, t h a t i s t o say, t o t h e En deca du temps
O t h e r . W r i t i n g is B l a n c h o t ' s ethics a n d his p o l i t i c s . It is f o r m - T h e t i m e o f t h e " m e a n w h i l e " (I'entretemps), w h i c h
less w r i t i n g , h o w e v e r . I t i s r a d i c a l l y a m b i g u o u s a n d i t u n i t e s we b r o u g h t o u t in our discussion of Levinas's aesthetics a n d
w i t h this a m b i g u i t y . T r y t o s u m m a r i z e B l a n c h o t ' s e s s a y s . T a k e e t h i c s , i s o f obsessive i m p o r t a n c e t o B l a n c h o t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s
L'espace littéraire for e x a m p l e . T h e title of t h e b o o k a n d t h e on art and community. T h e time of the " m e a n w h i l e " is the
essays i n i t c o u l d h a r d l y b e b r o a d e r i n s c o p e a n d m o r e i n c o n - time " p r e s e r v e d " in the w o r k of art (Lévinas), the time of
clusive, verging on interpretation b u t w i t h o u t " p r o d u c i n g " a writing and the time of dying (Blanchot), and also, we think,
" r e a d i n g . " B u t this i s precisely t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e B o o k , t h e t i m e of la comunità che viene ( A g a m b e n ) . In h i s d i s c u s -
t h e refusal of t h e p r e s e n t . It is a s t r u g g l e t h a t t a k e s p l a c e as a sion of T i a n a n m e n , A g a m b e n observes t h a t the d e m o n s t r a -
m e t i c u l o u s indifference to a given c o m m u n i t y . E m p t i e d of all t o r s m a d e few c o n c r e t e d e m a n d s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e s e
determinate contents, Blanchot's workless w o r k s are already were readily g r a n t e d . 5 2
He points o u t that the students did n o t
t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t i m e to c o m e , a b o o k to c o m e (le livre à act in o p e n confrontation to, or competition with, the state
o v e r recognizable issues. Instead, Agamben says: "The nov- l.i mort, arrache celle-ci a I'fitat de chose ou elle voudrait se
54
elty of the coining politics is that it will no longer he ¡1 struggle pacifier]." Even death does not b r i n g an e n d to d y i n g ( w h i c h
for the conquest and control of the State, hut a struggle be- is w h y all suicides, h o w e v e r beautiful, fail to a t t a i n their s o u g h t -
tween the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmount- after finale). That d e a t h does n o t c o m p l e t e t h e m o v e m e n t o f
able disjunction between whatever singularity and the State d y i n g d i s t u r b s t h e often t o o facilely u n d e r s t o o d n o t i o n o f h u -
che essa non sarà più lotta per la conquista o il controllo dello f r o m s e t t i n g a l i m i t t o d y i n g , d e a t h magnifies its i n c o m p l e t i o n ,
zione incolmabile delle singolarità qualunque e dell'organiz- of the image, it never achieves the present m o m e n t . "It c a n n o t
5 5
zazione statale]."" (We will t a k e up A g a m b e n ' s politics at m o r e give itself t h e o t h e r s h o r e [ne p e u t p a s s e d o n n e r l ' a u t r e r i v e ] , "
he seems to be describing a politics w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n a t e con- r u p t the continuity of time by disjoining past a n d future. R a d i -
t e n t s , a n d a s u s p e n s i o n of p o l i t i c a l t i m e as it is o r g a n i z e d by cally p o i g n a n t , I'entretemps is r a d i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n , r a d i c a l l y
y o n d , or, en degà S t a t e - t i m e . In T i a n a n m e n S q u a r e A g a m b e n T h e time of writing a n d the time of dying are the time of
g l i m p s e d a n i m a g e , i n B l a n c h o t ' s sense; a n i m a g e t h a t , i n ef- radical divergence of past from future. They are discontinu-
o p e n e d t o r e v e a l [ b r u s q u e m e n t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t , e t elles longer there. Yes, t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort d o e s find J.,
s'ouvrirent sur]"), because there must be a dead, blank, anony- the J. he sought, in Hell. But he only meets her w h o disregards
i n g . I t w a s t h a t b l a n k g a z e t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r c o n f r o n t e d i n J.'s h i m utterly.
stared at the n a r r a t o r with an imaginary stare. It w a s the im- my tenderness w a s so great t h a t I didn't even think a b o u t the
s t a r e d w e r e n o t h e r s a n d i t w a s t h o s e a n o n y m o u s eyes t h a t t o m e a l t o g e t h e r n a t u r a l b e c a u s e o f t h a t infinite m o v e m e n t
n o t h i n g . B y t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a r y logic w e m u s t c o n c l u d e w i t h a n d a b s e n c e , life a n d d e a t h , d i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e t u r n , i m a g e
things." They invert the " m o t i o n of the w o r l d " a n d " r e t u r n of absolute passivity or communicativity—is the thick, crepus-
ourselves. In this " o t h e r " imaginary, subject a n d object disap- de mort "lives w i t h " ) . It is t h e e r a s u r e of t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t
pear as such, as ob-posed and distanced. W h a t remains is pure hyphen, the erosion of mastery, the erosion of that distance
A r t (the t a l e , t h e voix narrative) is t h e " f o r g e t t i n g " of s u b - as for D e r r i d a of " b e f o r e the letter," t h e n a m e of this m o v e m e n t
t h u s it " r e t u r n s " t h e subject to itself p r i o r to its o p - p o s i t i o n i n g . is the obscurity, or the forgetting, anterior to any memory.
T o u s , art r e m a i n s " c o n s t a n t l y invisible [ c o n s t a m m e n t in- e r a s e s "itself," fOl il is w i t h o u t a n y self. N o t s i m p l y w i t h -
visible]," S2
h i d d e n , en deck, a n d an autre unit. But we a r e d r a w n d r a w n from all p r e s e n c e , this t i m e of w r i t i n g is, in t h e l a n -
to it nonetheless. W h e n the object is doubled and neutralized guage of Agamben, an imaginary youth that never-has-been
in the image, w h e n the image w i t h d r a w s the object from the a n d t h a t r e - m o v e s itself e a c h t i m e . I t i s t h a t w h o s e "self" i s its
w o r l d , a n d w h e n t h e o b j e c t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o its o w n i m a g e — re-moval. To sum it up, then, writing—or art, which can double
t h e n i t e x e r c i s e s its f a s c i n a t i o n , its " p o w e r l e s s p o w e r . " W r i t - u p a n d p r e s e r v e e v e r y t h i n g t h a t p r e s e n t s itself t o u s — i s for-
ing is the c o m i n g of an i m p o t e n c e t h a t neutralizes subjectivity g e t t i n g . B u t it is n o t a f o r g e t t i n g of a n y thing. It is a f o r g e t t i n g
b y n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e o b j e c t . " I , " a s B l a n c h o t says, b e c o m e " h e " t h a t p r e c e d e s eidetic e v i d e n c e / a f o r g e t t i n g i m m e m o r i a l l y for-
[il, t h e N e u t e r ] . I n this d o u b l e d s p a c e , t h i s s h a d o w o f t h e r e a l , gotten/not even absent/always already forgotten/a perpetual
I c e a s e t o b e sub-ject a n d b e c o m e " h e " w h o i s " h i s " r a p p o r t l a c k of v i s i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s all seeing a n d s a y i n g / . . .
w i t h t h a t w h i c h h o l d s " h i m " i n its spell. For, i n t h e s p a c e o f
literature, I am t h a t " h e " to w h o m I eternally r e t u r n in this B l a n c h o t i a n a e s t h e t i c s l e a d s u s t o , a n d i s c o n s t a n t l y in-
timeless time of repetition a n d incompletion. I am " h e " in v a d e d by, a n a n t e r i o r i t y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p r e s e n c e , a " h i t h e r
w h o m I d o n o t r e c o g n i z e myself. Yet, I a m n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n s i d e " t h a t i s a n t e r i o r t o objectivity. I t i s t h e " l a s t p o w e r o f
" h i s " return, " h i s " immemorial and eternal return. A n d " h e " t h i n g s " t o exercise a silent a n d f o r g o t t e n f a s c i n a t i o n t h a t o p e n s
is imaginary—pure passion, pure rapport, pure communica- the space of literature, a space evacuated of subject a n d o b -
t i o n . I a m " h e " w h o I a m n o t , for " h e " i s n o t ( a n d n e v e r w i l l ject, a n d t h u s a s p a c e of r a d i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d affectivity.
be) w h o " h e " is. T h e w o r k o f a r t , like t h e c a d a v e r , before i t r e p r e s e n t s a n y t h i n g
This does not mean that the artwork harbingers my death. ( o r s c e n e , o r d r a m a , o r p e r s o n ) , f i r s t o f all c o m m u n i c a t e s c o m -
a r t w o r k does not harbinger death, it is my involvement with scribes this as an " o t h e r version" of the imaginary, it is only
d e a t h a l r e a d y . All o f B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k b o r d e r s o n t h i s " o t h e r b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o w o r d for it. I t i s n o t d e s i r e , b u t o b s e s -
n i g h t " a n d i s c a r r i e d a l o n g i n its infinite m o v e m e n t . N o t a t s i o n — a n in-forming t h a t precedes any object or information.
t h e e n d of a w o r l d l y itinerary, b u t at every i n s t a n t , t h e t i m e en It is a dependency that precedes any psyche that w o u l d be
dega du temps d i s a p p e a r s i n t o itself, e r a s e s itself, exscribes d e p e n d e n t . T h e r e is no subject in this " s p a c e " but instead an
itself. T h i s m o v e m e n t c a n n o t b e u n v e i l e d , n o t b e c a u s e i t i s infinite d e p e n d e n c y , m a l l e a b i l i t y , suggestibility, o r p u r e p a s -
basically w i t h d r a w n and absent, but because it does n o t be- sivity o f p o s i t i o n t h a t will b e e v e r a n t e r i o r t o a n y p r e s e n t .
l o n g to t h e light at all. It is t h e t i m e of il—always a l r e a d y P r i o r to subject a n d o b j e c t — a n d this is crucial to L e v i n a s i a n
f a b r i c a t e d , fictioned, w o r k e d over, a n d , as s u c h , it is irrecuper- e t h i c s — t h e r e is a v i o l e n t affect, i n t r u s i o n , or m o r e - t h a n - i n t i -
able t i m e . m a c y t h a t i s invisible, u n d e t e c t a b l e , i n e r a d i c a b l e , a n d i r r e d u c -
115
1
la p a r o l e à a u t r u i ] . " In the n e u t r a l i z i n g s p a c e <>l l i t e r a t u r e , he abandoned by referent es, emptied of subject a n d o b j e c t — w h e r e
loses t h e p o w e r t o say " I , " a n d lie finds h e c a n n o t " g i v e life t o all is s u c h as u is. Irreparably so.
c h a r a c t e r s w h o s e f r e e d o m w o u l d b e g u a r a n t e e d b y his c r e - T h e writer, then, is " p o s s e s s e d " by no o n e , by the a n o n y -
ative force [ d o n n e r vie à des p e r s o n n a g e s d o n t sa force c r é a t r i c e m o u s . H e c a n n o t n a r r a t e himself, b e c a u s e h e i s n o o n e ; h e i s
2
g a r a n t i r a i t l a l i b e r t é ] . " T o w r i t e , t o e n t e r t h e N e u t e r , "is t o Quelqu'un, S o m e o n e b u t no o n e in p a r t i c u l a r — d a s Man. T h e
arrange language under fascination, and, through language, Blanchotian writer is not Anna O. w h o was "possessed" by
in language, to r e m a i n in contact w i t h the absolute milieu, " a n o t h e r m e " s u c h t h a t n o e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f this o t h e r w a s
where the thing becomes an image again, where the image, ever p o s s i b l e for h e r i n t h e m o d e o f n a r r a t i v e , a s F r e u d ( a n d
w h i c h h a d b e e n a l l u s i o n t o a figure, b e c o m e s a n a l l u s i o n t o L a c a n ) w i s h e d , b e c a u s e s h e w a s herself t h e d e m o n w h o p o s -
5
w h a t is w i t h o u t figure [ . . . ] w h e n t h e r e is no w o r l d yet [c'est sessed h e r . W r i t i n g is n o t a c a s e of h y s t e r i a . T h e h y s t e r i c is
d i s p o s e r le l a n g a g e s o u s f a s c i n a t i o n et, p a r lui, en lui, d e m e u r e r n o t H o m e r , w h o c o u l d p a s s f r o m first t o t h i r d p e r s o n , f r o m
en c o n t a c t avec le milieu absolu, là où la chose redevient im- p u r e t o d r a m a t i c diegesis. T h e d i s c o u r s e o f t h e h y s t e r i c , a s o f
6
a g e , où l ' i m a g e , d ' a l l u s i o n à u n e figure, d e v i e n t a l l u s i o n à ce a n y m u l t i p l e - p e r s o n a l i t y p a t i e n t , is n o t a mixed mode. To
q u i est s a n s figure et { . . . ) q u a n d il n ' y a p a s e n c o r e de w r i t e i s n o t t o p a s s f r o m " I " t o another " I . " I t i s t o p a s s f r o m
3
monde]." " I " to t o t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f all i d e n t i t i e s , o f all " P s . "
cause it is radically d a r k , but because it transforms everything Ion the image of madness, an image of radical depropriation.
8
[étranger à t o u t e révélation, ni m ê m e parce qu'elle serait radi- l e m " t h e v e r y " t e r r o r i z i n g " p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t d i s c o u r s e itself
ity, t o b e seized b y i t a n d infinitesimally r e t a r d e d . T h i s " m i - L a b a r t h e describes t h e m , are begun in the m o d e "it is said"
a n d t h e a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l states-of-affairs) t h a t i t s p r a n g f r o m . p e a r s . T h a t is, i t d o e s n o t e n t e r i n t o a n y p e r c e p t i o n , b u t r a t h e r
tives, or images of t h o u g h t , w i t h o u t forming any one figure. image of this or that, a n d o u r perception is o v e r w h e l m e d a n d
pulverized by pure perspectivism.
We m a y w i s h to c o m p a r e La comunità che viene to a
B a l t h u s s t r e e t scene w h e r e e a c h o f t h e c h a r a c t e r s i n t h e s t r e e t A g a m b e n ' s f r a g m e n t s , o r p a n e l s , a r e all c o m m e n t a r i e s , h e
w o u l d b e called t h e s p a c e o f t h e c a n v a s . O u r eye i s d r a w n into the general or the particular, the generic or the individual, b u t
t r o m p e l'oeil. 12
Instead of d u p i n g us into believing t h a t s o m e - ing. For the W h a t e v e r is just t h a t — w h a t e v e r !
serve the s a m e thing a m o n g children w h o are each fascinated thought, contemplated, or worried about. T h o u g h t need not
expose it such that whatever being can only transcend t o w a r d also " w h a t e v e r is called . . . " Any particular being of course
b a s i c a l l y r e m o v e d , s i l e n t , o r n e g a t i v e v o i c e (or V o i c e , a s o u t s i d e identity, o r l a n g u a g e a s t h a t w h i c h h a s n o i d e n t i t y , n o
s u c h t h a t h u m a n b e i n g w o u l d n o t yet h a v e b e e n b o r n ! 2 8
Such a m o r p h i c " s p a c e " b e t w e e n " t h e n a m e d t h i n g a n d its b e i n g -
relation to cinema.
T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e c h a r a c t e r actor, t h e n , i s t h e e x p e r i - T h i s i m a g e , e v e n t , singularity, a l l e g o r y of itself, or I d e a
3 3
ence of p u r e being-in-language—an experience, Blanchot could (as A g a m b e n u n d e r s t a n d s i t ) i s b e i n g s u c h - a s - i t - i s , its n o n e -
say, o f t h e e v e n t a s a n i m a g e , t h a t i s t o say, a s n o t h i n g o t h e r o t h e r n e s s , or its n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s . As a c h a r a c t e r - a c t o r , t h e
t h a n its q u a l i t i e s b u t s u c h t h a t t h e s e q u a l i t i e s cling t o n o r e a l - a c t o r b e c o m e s his o r her o w n i m a g e . C h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a r e c a p a -
ity, n o identity, a n d refer o n l y t o t h e m s e l v e s . L e v i n a s r e m i n d s ble o f t h e i r n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s such t h a t , w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e ,
u s t h a t reality i s a l r e a d y its o w n such e v e n t . W e h a b i t u a l l y see t h e y n e i t h e r b e t r a y a n essence n o r a s u b s t a n c e t h e y " r e a l l y "
a t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t t h r o u g h it. Reality, he h a s t o l d u s , is a r e , n o r d o t h e y identify t h e m s e l v e s w i t h a n y o n e r o l e , b u t
d u a l — i t is itself in its t r u t h (idem) a n d in its i m a g e , " l i k e a r a t h e r m o v e freely, h a p p i l y , i m p e r c e p t i b l y a n d i r r e p a r a b l y
3 1
t o r n s a c k t h a t spills its c o n t e n t s . " Very similarly, A g a m b e n within the paraonomastic interzone of thusness. They are noth-
writes: i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e i r t y p e s , m a n n e r i s m s , a n d g e s t u r e s , a n d yet
t h e y are not t h e s e q u a l i t i e s . T h e y h a v e a s s u m e d t h e i r m a n n e r
It is as if t h e f o r m , t h e k n o w a b i l i t y , t h e f e a t u r e s of of being improperly, habitually, w i t h o u t assuming this or t h a t
every entity w e r e d e t a c h e d f r o m it, n o t a s a n o t h e r t h i n g , q u a l i t y a s definitive o f t h e i r identity. T h e y a r e nicely i n s o u c i -
b u t a s a n intentio, a n a n g e l , a n i m a g e . T h e m o d e o f ant, or cynical, or hypocritical with regard to image a n d real-
b e i n g of this intentio is n e i t h e r s i m p l e e x i s t e n c e n o r ity. T h e y d o n o t s t r u g g l e t o h o l d t h e t w o r e a l m s a p a r t , b u t
t r a n s c e n d e n c e ; it is a p a r a e x i s t e n c e or a p a r a t r a n s c e n - r a t h e r a l l o w the t w o r e a l m s t o i m p l i c a t e e a c h o t h e r . T h e y a r e
d e n c e t h a t d w e l l s beside t h e t h i n g (in all t h e senses o f themselves the erosion of the distance that w o u l d properly
t h e prefix ' p a r a - ' ) , so close t h a t it almost m e r g e s w i t h d i s t i n g u i s h t h e real f r o m t h e i m a g e . T h e y a r e n o t p o s s e s s e d b y
it, g i v i n g it a h a l o . It is n o t t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e t h i n g " a n o t h e r m e " but instead are neutral with regard to identity
a n d y e t it is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e t h i n g (it is none- b e c a u s e a s s u m i n g one's n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s m e a n s a s s u m i n g t h a t
other). w h i c h d o e s n o t refer b a c k t o a self, a n " I , " t h a t o n e w o u l d
truly be. C h a r a c t e r actors are at ease w i t h their m a n n e r of
[È c o m e se la f o r m a , la c o n o s c i b i l i t à , la fattezza di b e i n g . I n this w a y , t h e c h a r a c t e r a c t o r r e m a i n s r i g o r o u s l y u n i -
ogni ente si staccasse da esso, n o n c o m e un'altra cosa, dentifiable (and n o t simply buried in the credits at the e n d of
m a c o m e uWintentio, u n a n g e l o , u n ' i m m a g i n e . I l m o d o t h e f i l m , since t o w h o m w o u l d t h i s o r t h a t p r o p e r n a m e refer,
di essere di q u e s t a intentio n o n è u n a s e m p l i c e esistenza anyway)? Unlike star presence, character acting " s h o w s " a
né u n a t r a s c e n d e n z a : è u n a p a r a e s i s t e n z a o u n a nonparticular presence: a dead presence that seems to belong
p a r a t r a s c e n d e n z a , c h e d i m o r a a fianco alla c o s a (in t o n o p a r t i c u l a r film i t h a p p e n s t o t u r n u p in.
t u t t i i sensi della p r e p o s i z i o n e para), c o s i a fianco da I n t h e s p a c e o f t h e " t y p e , " t h e h a b i t u a l , or, a s B l a n c h o t
could say, the- "everyday," the definitive is engulfed and lost either gravitate toward the h e r o , or w h o , a c t i n g as o n e , t h e m -
T h a t is, t h e s e c h a r a c t e r s d o n o t c o m e t o g e t h e r w i t h i n a unicity, with Johnny Carson, Gene Hackman once anxiously com-
t i v e n e s s of a n o n c o l l e c t i v e , n o n i d e n t i f i a b l e c o m m u n i t y . T h e y t h e i r soft u n c e r t a i n p r e s e n c e . T h e s e a c t o r s m a n a g e t o b e i d e n -
Anterior contact will c o m b i n e the I w o s i d e s of k n o w i n g , intu- thai w h i c h they rule. They " d i s a p p e a r " i n t o t h a t w h i c h t h e y
P r i o r t o all e x p e r i e n c e , t h e i m m e d i a t e , r e c e p t i v e e n c o u n - a c t of k n o w i n g i m p l i e s a c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e pure c o n c e p t is
t e r w i t h a s i n g u l a r r e s u l t s in t w o t y p e s of p r e s e n t a t i o n s : s p a c e t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a u n i t y a n d i m p l i e s a pure s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -
and time. Space and time are intuited but are n o t objects. They n e s s . T h u s , for K a n t , all c o n c e p t u a l unities h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r
objects, space a n d time (outer and inner) are not k n o w a b l e . ception. T h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t a n a c t t h a t
I n t u i t i n g t h e m , i n t u i t i o n i s h e n c e n o t affected b y a n y o b j e c t . I t c o m e s a n d g o e s b u t a potentia t h a t r e m a i n s in r e s e r v e e v e n as
sesses in c o m m o n : a c o n c e p t . But p u r e c o n c e p t s (causality, kraft is precisely and only t h e a b i l i t y to " f a s h i o n , " " i m a g e , "
t i o n " ) is s i m p l y a f u n c t i o n of unification itself. T h e " c o n t e n t s " that which pure intuition and pure thought have in common.
T h e s e r u l e s a r e n o t a p r o d u c t o f reflection b u t a r e t h e v e r y t h e s y n t h e s e s o f c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . T h i s p r o c e s s i s a n activity
monstra la sua sua singolarità.... Esemplare è ciò che very scheme < >l the S( hema i m a g e a n d as t h e s c h e m a t a a r e sev-
n o n è definito da a l c u n a p r o p r i e t à , t r a n n e l'esser-detto. e r a l , each is already temporalized. T h u s t h e s c h e m a t a " d e t e r -
N o n l'esser-rosso, m a l ' e s s e r - d e t t o - r o s s o ; n o n l'esser- m i n e time" (or, a r t i c u l a t e it) and t i m e in-forms t h a t w h i c h it is
J a k o b , m a P e s s e r - t i e t t o - J a k o b definisce l ' e s e m p i o . D i a r t i c u l a t e d by. T i m e , a s unified, " m a k e s p o s s i b l e " t h a t w h i c h
q u i la s u a a m b i g u i t à , n o n a p p e n a si decida di p r e n d e r l o a r t i c u l a t e s it a n d t i m e is o n l y as a r t i c u l a t e d (i.e., fused w i t h
50
v e r a m e n t e sul s e r i o . ] categories such that ontological predicates can be applied to
a n y object w h a t e v e r ) . T h a t i s t o say, q u i t e obviously, t h a t t h i n k -
I n s h o r t , t h e K a n t i a n s c h e m a - i m a g e defines t h e " w h a t e v e r - ing in t e r m s of form a n d content is i n a d e q u a t e to c a p t u r e this
i s - c a l l e d n e s s " t h a t A g a m b e n e x p l o i t s so i n g e n i o u s l y in his La c o n u n d r u m o f activity a n d passivity. (But i n t h i s w a y w e r e a c h
comunità che viene. B u t we m u s t go f u r t h e r still a n d r e t u r n to a n o t h e r a s p e c t o f A g a m b e n ' s a n a l y s i s t h a t , i n t h e e n d , will
Heidegger's Kantbuch. b r i n g h i m close t o B l a n c h o t ' s n o t i o n o f t h e i m a g e , a n d o f l a
By w a y of the schema, the unity of the empirical concept communauté inavouable insofar as e a c h p r e d i c a t e s his a n a l y -
(the w o r d ) is referred to t h e i n t u i t e d p l u r a l i t y of possibilities it sis on a general w e a k e n i n g of m u t u a l p r e s e n c e s . )
unifies w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , b e i n g r e s t r i c t e d t o a n y o n e o r a n y N o w , if the transcendental schemata m a k e possible the
set of t h e m . In c o n t r a s t to t h i s , pure i n t u i t i o n — t i m e — i s al- application of ontological categories to "any being whatever,"
ready unified. It is i n s t e a d t h e p u r e c o n c e p t s (the c a t e g o r i e s ) then we m u s t look into the ontological status of this " w h a t -
that are many. T h e schematism of the categories must, there- ever," for it is precisely t h e o n t o l o g i c a l l y known. In s h o r t , what
fore, r e q u i r e special k i n d s of s c h e m a t a or s c h e m a t a of a c h a r - is an o b j e c t in general}
a c t e r different f r o m t h o s e o f e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n . A s t h e p u r e K a n t ' s a n s w e r i s s i m p l e a n d d i s a r m i n g . I t isn't a n y t h i n g :
i n t u i t i o n of t i m e is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of any o b j e c t , t h e s c h e -
m a t a m u s t unite the categories t o time s o t h a t o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i - N o w we are in a position to determine m o r e ad-
c a t e s m a y be a p p l i c a b l e to o b j e c t s in general. T h a t is, t h e p r o - e q u a t e l y o u r c o n c e p t of an object in g e n e r a l . All o u r
f o u n d u n i t y o f t i m e m u s t b e v u l n e r a b l e t o v a r i o u s modes representations have, as representations, their object,
( " w a y s " ) of p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i l e r e m a i n i n g one t i m e (for, " a l l a n d can in turn b e c o m e objects of o t h e r representa-
times are one time"). Richardson reminds us t h a t this is the t i o n s . A p p e a r a n c e s a r e t h e sole o b j e c t s w h i c h c a n b e
m o s t difficult a n d a m b i g u o u s a s p e c t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e n t i r e given to us immediately, a n d t h a t in t h e m which re-
a n a l y s i s of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. D o e s he w a n t to say lates i m m e d i a t e l y t o t h e o b j e c t i s c a l l e d i n t u i t i o n . B u t
both t h a t t i m e i s t h e r o o t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n these appearances are not things-in-themselves; they
a n d that the transcendental imagination is the r o o t of time? are only representations, which in turn have their o b -
R i c h a r d s o n e x p l a i n s it as f o l l o w s : since t i m e is a l r e a d y u n i - j e c t — a n o b j e c t w h i c h c a n n o t itself b e i n t u i t e d b y u s ,
f i e d , t h e s c h e m a t a (the " p o w e r " t o unify) h a v e n o t h i n g t o unify. a n d w h i c h may, therefore, be n a m e d the non-empiri-
B u t as t i m e is already unified, it is a l w a y s a l r e a d y s c h e m a t i z e d , c a l , t h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t = x.
or is t h e (pure) i m a g e of a n y s c h e m a w h a t s o e v e r . T i m e is t h e T h e p u r e c o n c e p t o f this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t ,
I 'I '
t\ I i i\ IVI I \ I IN l\ IN I ' I I I I |- 1 I I I I I I ;\ I IN I I I I I K
which in reality throughout till our knowledge is al tion to the k n o w n will not be cognitive. It is not p r e s e n t . It is
ways one and the same, is w h a t a l o n e can confer u p o n more t h a n present; m o r e p r e s e n t t h a n a n y p r e s e n t a t i o n . It is
all o u r e m p i r i c a l c o n c e p t s in g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s to an t h e sheer ' V a n a p p e a r " o f a n y a p p e a r a n c e w h a t e v e r . N o t a b -
o b j e c t , t h a t is, a n objective reality." ( L a t t e r e m p h a s i s s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g at all, n o r j u s t a n y t h i n g at all, it is the dis-
mine) 5 1
junction of something and nothing. "This = x," K a n t says, "is
o n l y t h e c o n c e p t of a b s o l u t e p o s i t i o n , n o t itself a self-subsist-
H e i d e g g e r will say t h a t t h e m y s t e r i o u s object = x is a " s o m e - ing object b u t only an idea of relation, to posit an object cor-
5 5
t h e x is n o t a n y p a r t i c u l a r object a n d , like t h e Umkreis " h o u s e , " (i.e., n o t " s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g " ) , t h e o b j e c t = x is fragility itself.
an object. T h e object-in-general is purely imaginary, because a n y syn- itself. Similarly, Da-sein is t h e being of t h e " t h e r e , "
as Being. In "Brief iiber d e n H u m a n i s m u s " he says (in my b u t fuse t o g e t h e r . " P r e s e n t e d " i s t h e r e t u r n , w e c a n say, w i t h
o w n t r a n s l a t i o n , w h i c h I leave c r u d e l y literal i n o r d e r t o e m - Blanchot and Nietzsche, of w h a t does not come back (into
p h a s i z e t h e p o i n t ) : " T h u s Being i s b e i n g - e r t h a n a n y b e i n g a n y p r e s e n t ) . N o t h i n g definitive i s p r e s e n t e d . N o f i g u r e , n o
[ G l e i c h w o h l ist d a s Sein s e i e n d e r als jegliches s e i e n d e ] . " 5 3
Fur- o u t l i n e , n o b o r d e r , n o t h i n g f r a m e d . W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s (only)
ther, a c c o r d i n g t o R i c h a r d s o n , H e i d e g g e r will identify t h e t r a n - t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n feels itself o b l i g e d t o (or
s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as his Da-sein. 54 c o n s t r a i n e d t o ) present. T h a t is to say, it feels itself, a n d t h u s
God. I r r e d u c i b l y lost among things, though) pure being-in- Willi the expropriation ol .ill " c o n t e n t s , " all " l a t e n c y , " this
l a n g u a g e — i s a b a n d o n e d , u n d e s t i n e d , s c r u p u l o u s l y tbingisli. pure relation is obs( urely felt. The w o r k of a r t , as L é v i n a s h a s
T h o u g h t is constrained to think nothing beyond objects. This s h o w n , realizes such a d e t a c h m e n t f r o m c o n d i t i o n s . It realizes
i s its " e x t r e m e y o u t h " — t o h a v e a l w a y s a l r e a d y e v a c u a t e d it- sheer a p p e a r a n c e . Radically u n s e i z a b l e , a r t realizes t h e e x t r e m e
self of all latency. T h o u g h t is o r i g i n a l l y p u r e l y e x p o s e d , p u r e l y p o s s i b i l i t y of another r e l a t i o n t h a t A g a m b e n h i s t o r i c i z e s in
p r e s e n t e d , p u r e l y there, a n d it is " a b l e " to h o l d itself j u s t en his La comunità che viene. H i s " c o m i n g " c o m m u n i t y is n o t h -
deçà du temps, or I'entretemps, p r i o r to its " w o r k " of figura- i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e sheer, i m m a n e n t p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g - i n - l a n -
tion. T h o u g h t , in short, before it is captured in the w o r l d , g u a g e i n s o f a r as l a n g u a g e offers n e u t r a l i t y , a n o n y m i t y , indif-
" t h i n k s " t h e p l a c e of a r t , l'espace littéraire. It is " a b l e " to ference w i t h r e g a r d t o identity. I t offers t h e s p e a k e r t h e " a b i l -
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t h i n k , before t h e r e is a n y thing, " r e l a t i o n in g e n e r a l " in t h e i t y " t o n o l o n g e r say " I , " j u s t a s B l a n c h o t h a s w r i t t e n .
p u r e " t h e r e , " or // y a. T h i s " a b i l i t y " is a passivity. It is a p u r e O u r e r a , w r i t e s A g a m b e n , i s o n e i n w h i c h all r e a l i t y h a s
p a s s i o n . A p a s s i o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t is n e v e r p r e s e n t like a s t a t e - been t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o its image. G l a m o r o u s a n d alienating, t h e
o f - m i n d . It is t h e p u r e finding-myself-there, or b e i n g - t h e - t h e r e . spectacle h a s totalized itself a n d forever s e p a r a t e d h u m a n life
It c a n n o t n o t be-the-there (without purely a n d simply ceasing from the possibility of a p r e s u p p o s e d c o m m o n G o o d . O u r
t o b e ) . T h a t i s t o say, for a p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t , p u r e l y e x p o s e d " n a t u r e " — t h e fact t h a t w e s p e a k — h a s b e e n e x p r o p r i a t e d a n d
to all its possibilities (all its p r e d i c a t e s ) it is u n d e s t i n e d to a n y commodified and nothing of God, nothing of the sacred, had
o n e o r a n y set o f t h e m . B u t this p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t d o e s n o t b e e n r e v e a l e d i n t h i s " e x t r e m e l y nullifying u n v e i l i n g [ e s t r e m o
62
b e l o n g to a p a s t , a " w a s . " Da-sein, or t h e K a n t i a n " s u b j e c t , " svelamento nullificante]." In our era, communication occu-
6 3
is its there incessantly, w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , b e i n g a b l e to b r i n g pies its o w n " a u t o n o m o u s s p h e r e [sfera a u t o n o m a ] " (Bau-
itself b e f o r e itself. It is, as H e i d e g g e r s a y s , " a h e a d of itself." drillard's " h y p e r r e a l i t y " ) . T h e " w o r d " — t h e " p o w e r " t o reveal
In a c e r t a i n sense, we c o u l d say t h a t it is t h e very " w o r k " a n y t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r — h a s a c q u i r e d its o w n materiality a n d h a s
o f w h a t e v e r b e i n g precisely t o u n w o r k a n d u n d e t e r m i n e itself b e c o m e a c o m m o d i t y . L a n g u a g e , the M o s t C o m m o n , h a s b e e n
b y h o l d i n g itself i n " p e r f e c t h o m o n y m i t y . " A t least, A g a m b e n t a k e n f r o m u s a n d h a s r e v e a l e d o n l y t h e n o t h i n g n e s s o f all
w o u l d h a v e u s t h i n k s o , a n d i n his o w n w a y h e r e l a t e s w h a t - t h i n g s . Yet a h o p e a n d a n i n t e r v e n t i o n r e m a i n p o s s i b l e for u s .
ever beings, "tricksters or fakes, assistants or ' t o o n s [tricksters o T o b e g i n w i t h , lived e x p e r i e n c e h a s l o n g since b e e n dis-
p e r d i g i o r n o , a i u t a n t i o toons]" 59
(italics a n d English in o r i g i - t a n c e d i n a d v a n c e a n d h o l l o w e d o u t b y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . (It w a s
nal) t o t h e B l a n c h o t i a n writer, a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d i n Walter Benjamin w h o noticed those tourists, standing with
o u r p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . W h e n " e x p r o p r i a t e d o f all identity, s o their c a m e r a s in front of great w o r k s of art, preserving an
a s t o a p p r o p r i a t e b e l o n g i n g itself [ e s p r o p r i a t e d i t u t t e l e i d e n - e x p e r i e n c e t h e y w o u l d n e v e r h a v e . ) T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e Spec-
tità, per appropriarsi dell'appartenenza s t e s s a ] , " 6 0
whatever tacle (representation in general) is the p u r e form of separa-
b e i n g , like t h e writer, is s u b t r a c t e d f r o m all ( r e p r e s e n t a b l e ) t i o n : " [ W ] h e n t h e real w o r l d h a s b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n
c o m m o n a l i t y , all identifiable c o m m u n i t y , a n d b e c o m e s radically image a n d images become real, the practical p o w e r of h u m a n s
" c a p a b l e " of instability, fragility—that is, r e l a t i o n - i n - g e n e r a l . is s e p a r a t e d f r o m itself a n d p r e s e n t e d as a w o r l d u n t o itself
I ( ) I
I J 'I I K
[ d o v e il m o n d o reale si è t r a s f o r m a t o in u n ' i r n m a g i n e e le s o n " loi US Snd hil quasi difference from Blanchot. M o r e " p o s i -
t a c c a d a se stessa e si p r é s e n t a c o m e un m o n d o a se]." 6 4
This w h o have no c o m m o n , representable c o m m o n a l i t y is the re-
mondo a sé h a s b e e n c a p t u r e d a n d r e g u l a t e d by a c o m p e t i t i v e t u r n o f n o n e x c l u s i o n . Its e t e r n a l r e t u r n .
mediacracy that n o w manipulates and controls the perception In our era, then, it is no longer the sacred dead w h o reveal
" h i d d e n " w a s n o t s o m e essence, b u t s h e e r spectrality.) spectacle m u s t be ushered to the grave: " [ T ] o link together
T h a t which has been expropriated from h u m a n s n o w image a n d body in a space where they can no longer be sepa-
a t e d by t h e m e d i a because language is dead and has become resemblance—this is the good that humanity must learn to
its own image. O u r linguistic " n a t u r e " c o m e s b a c k to us in- wrest from commodities in their decline [compenetrare
r e a l c o m m u n i c a t e s n o m e s s a g e , n o destiny, n o t h i n g s a c r e d . I t a t i o n (adrift i n h y p e r s p a c e , B a u d r i l l a r d w o u l d s a y ) , A g a m b e n
c o m m u n i c a t e s o n l y t h e fragility o f b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n . T h i s a s k s u s t o w e l c o m e it. W e m u s t w e l c o m e i t b e c a u s e t h i s a l i e n -
lation whatever. It is a b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d by e x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d
also, simultaneously, by the impossibility of exclusion because L i k e t h e o b j e c t = x, t h e s u b j e c t = x is i n c o n c e i v a b l e o u t -
i t i n c e s s a n t l y b o r d e r s o n all its possibilities. W i t h o u t d e s t i n y side its p r e d i c a t i o n s . I t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its p r e d i c a t i o n s ,
a n d w i t h o u t essence, the c o m m u n i t y t h a t returns is o n e never y e t it is n o t p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y its p r e d i c a t i o n s . T h e s u b j e c t = x
present in the first place. Presubjective in the p r o p e r sense, is " l i k e " t h e o b j e c t = x to t h e e x t e n t of b e i n g l i k e n e s s itself,
this c o m m u n i t y is qualunque! Infinitely v u l n e r a b l e , d e p e n d e n t (i.e., a l w a y s t h e S a m e , likeness or r e s e m b l a n c e is its physis). It
o n t h e s u p p l e m e n t , w e will h a v e b e e n offered, i n t h e e n d , t h e is a pure resemblance resembling nothing, no thing, no object.
p o s s i b i l i t y t o a p p r o p r i a t e o u r e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, b y " h o l d - A m e r e x, this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject is n o t k n o w a b l e or
ing ourselves in simple h o m o n y m i t y . " e x p e r i e n c e a b l e in itself. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n is a
I n o u r a n a l y s i s o f K a n t , w e h a v e seen t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n - nothing that can grasp nothing. It is that which makes pos-
d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t g r a s p a n o b j e c t . T h e sole " c o n - sible e x p e r i e n c e , b u t i t itself i s s u b t r a c t e d f r o m a n y e x p e r i -
t e n t " of its k n o w i n g is a l w a y s t h e " s a m e , " t h e o b j e c t = x: "A e n c e . W e m u s t n o t e K a n t ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o identify i t definitively.
something of which we can k n o w n o t h i n g , " Heidegger says. It is, exactly, a c o n s c i o u s n e s s : I, H e , She, or It. A l w a y s t h e
Deprived of any actual object, transcendental apperception S a m e , it has no identity. It is a l w a y s t h e S a m e x, t h e S a m e
can only " t h i n k " a pure " t h e r e " or a " p u r e position" that, in nothing. T h a t which unites intuition a n d makes experience
fact, it itself is. D e p r i v e d of e v e n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e n t (or i n t e l - " m i n e " i s w i t h o u t a n y identifiable self. A t t h e h e a r t o f K a n t i a n
l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n — s o m e t h i n g K a n t n e v e r a d m i t s i n t o his p h i - jemeinigkeit, t h e n , i s a n i n e l i m i n a t a b l e s t r a n g e n e s s . "Mine-
losophy), this "perfectly contentless representation," he says, n e s s " i s a n i n t i m a c y e x t e r i o r t o myself. T h i s s t r a n g e r c a n n o t
b e e x c l u d e d , for " w e m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r t o f r a m e
C a n n o t even be called a c o n c e p t i o n , b u t m e r e l y a c o n - a n y j u d g m e n t r e s p e c t i n g i t . " T h e p u r e I is x, It: t o o w e a k to
s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s all c o n c e p t i o n s . B y t h i s g r a s p itself or k n o w itself in its own e x p e r i e n c e of itself. Its
I , o r It, w h o o r w h i c h t h i n k s , n o t h i n g m o r e i s r e p r e - u n i t y i s p u r e l y thought, b u t n o t objectified, a n d h e n c e i t r e -
s e n t e d t h a n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject of t h o u g h t = x, m a i n s u n r e c o g n i z e d . I n f r a m i n g itself i t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e l u d e s
which is cognized only by means of t h o u g h t s t h a t are its o w n g r a s p . It is a p a r e n t h e s i s t h a t i n c l u d e s all b u t itself. As
71
subjecl is nol a p u n - unity u m l y i n g itself. It is t h e e n u n c i a t o r .
e n f r a m e d , it is e m p t y oí itseli and is t h u s the p m e border or
T h a t w h i c h Kant described as subject = x n e e d e d to be s u p p l e -
l i m i t b e t w e e n b o t h p u r e senselessness and s u p c r s e n s o r i t y , on
m e n t e d a n d r e t h o u g h t a s the o n e w h o says " I . " K a n t ' s s u b j e c t
t h e o n e h a n d , a n d c h a o t i c s e n s a t i o n , o n t h e other. I n this w a y ,
we reencounter the p a r a d o x of time that in-forms that which = x, to be a subject, h a d to s p e a k (itself). B u t t h i s leaves us
For Kant, the pure contentless "representation I," the T h e p u r e " t h e r e " o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n offers
and makes them mine, remains unexaminable and is purely b e i n g - t h e r e i s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a n y subject, b u t t o a m e r e " t h e r e
In an earlier book, Infancy and History: Essays on the self," b u t i n fact realizes t h e a b s e n c e o f " m y s e l f , " a s w e h a v e
geometric unity of the " t h e r e " seems just naturally to belong n o r a set of all sets. It is precisely t h e r i g o r o u s impossibility of
u n t i l I die o f i t . " 6 9
From H a m a n n ' s intuition, Agamben takes " t h e r e , " ( d e ) c o n s t i t u t e s t h e " I " t h a t institutes itself i n l a n g u a g e
us directly to the notion, elaborated by Benveniste, t h a t it is in by interrupting it incessantly—by paralyzing and neutralizing
e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , is t h e saying of " I . " T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t o say " I . " B u t t o w h o m , o r t o w h a t reality, will t h i s " I " refer?
B e n v e n i s t e answers, rigorously, "To something very singular, version ol the iubje< t, n o t a n e w foundation, n o r a p u r e a n d
w h i c h is exclusively linguistic: / refers to the act of individual s i m p l e absence ol foundation. C o m i n g b e i n g is t h e b e i n g t h a t
d i s c o u r s e in w h i c h it is uttered a n d it designates its s p e a k e r e n t e r s l a n g u a g e a n d w h o s e " t r a n s c e n d e n c e " i s its c o m p l e t e
t h e reality it e v o k e s is t h e r e a l i t y of d i s c o u r s e . " 7 1
absorption, w i t h o u t residue, in language. It is the being w h o s e
T h e fleeting a n d p u r e " I " t h a t K a n t a t t e m p t e d t o p o s i t i n Being i s its b o r d e r i n g o n l a n g u a g e , o n " a l l its p r e d i c a t e s . " Y o u
transcendental apperception w a s never a n y w h e r e but in lan- see, t h e r e i s i n fact a n e x p e r i e n c e t h a t " r e m a i n s " w h e n all
g u a g e . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, i n t h e e n d , w a s t o h a v e experience has been expropriated. T h a t experience is the ex-
b e e n m a d e u p o f w o r d s . T h e Umkreis w a s l a n g u a g e . I t w a s p e r i e n c e of e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, or l a n g u a g e , for l a n g u a g e is
t h e r e f o r e l a n g u a g e t h a t s t o l e f r o m m e all m y e x p e r i e n c e s a b t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f all p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i e n c e s a n d i s t h e s h e e r
o v o . / w a s n e v e r a n y w h e r e b u t i n m y saying " I . " T h e s u b j e c t possibility of any particular experience. N o t this or t h a t con-
w a s s p o k e n , u t t e r e d : H e w h o said " I . " All e x p e r i e n c e , i n s h o r t , t e n t o f l a n g u a g e , n o t t h i s o r t h a t t r u e o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t
w a s always already speech. There is no prelinguistic subject, t h e s h e e r a n d fragile fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " T h e c o m i n g b e -
no dumb experience, and no transcendence otherwise than in i n g will b e " c a p a b l e " o f its a b s o r p t i o n , w i t h o u t r e m a i n d e r , i n
language. T h e s u b j e c t is p u r e l y linguistic b e i n g . l a n g u a g e . I t will a t t h e s a m e t i m e " r e t a i n " t h i s " c a p a b i l i t y "
transcendent, but not-yet transcendence, not-yet language. sive will fuse i n t o a single p a s s i o n . S u c h a b e i n g will r e m a i n
W h a t Kant caught a glimpse of was an impotence or an " c a p a b l e " of its passivity. It will a l w a y s t h i n k , n o t itself (in its
o r i g i n a r y dependence o n l a n g u a g e . W h a t K a n t s k e t c h e d o u t i d e n t i t y t h a t l a n g u a g e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y offers a n d w i t h d r a w s )
for us w a s a n o t - y e t s u b j e c t , a H e , S h e , or It t h a t has yet to but the Same—always the Same experience of expropriation
s p e a k a n d i s t h e r e f o r e not p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y e m b e d d e d i n a n d a l i e n a t i o n as o r i g i n a l .
l a n g u a g e . H e c a u g h t a g l i m p s e o f t h a t w h i c h m u s t enter l a n - B e c a u s e I am able to e n t e r l a n g u a g e ( a n d t h e r e is n o t h i n g
g u a g e a n d w h o s e i m p o t e n c e i s its i m p o t e n t " p o w e r " t o think else for h u m a n b e i n g t o e n t e r ) , I a m a l s o a b l e t o t h i n k t h i s
( b u t n o t t o c i r c u m s c r i b e , o r limit) its " m u s t s p e a k . " T h a t i s t o entry. I am able to think the r e t u r n of language to language.
say, K a n t d e s c r i b e s for u s , in light of B e n v e n i s t e , in l i g h t of Such thinking involves, as Blanchot has repeatedly s h o w n , "a
l a n g u a g e , or, m o r e simply, i n light o f L i g h t itself, t h a t w h i c h loss o f t h e p o w e r t o say T , " a n d t h u s a n i m m e r s i o n i n fasci-
h a s n o V o i c e , i s given n o Voice, b u t m u s t a p p r o p r i a t e l a n - nation a n d a contact with an absolute milieu. No longer to be
g u a g e n o n e t h e l e s s in o r d e r to be itself. T h a t is to say, it must a b l e t o say " I " i s t o t h i n k t h e S a m e ( n o o n e , a n y o n e , t h e
appropriate that which will expropriate it of all "mineness." N e u t e r ) . T h e region of A g a m b e n ' s politics is the region of
7 4
" O l d e r " t h a n subjectivity is t h a t w h i c h , in h u m a n being, p r e - Blanchot's "Essential S o l i t u d e " — e m p t i e d of subject a n d o b -
cedes language. N o t a "wordless" experience, sacred and ject a n d r a d i c a l l y i m p e r s o n a l like T h o m a s ' s e n c o u n t e r i n t h e
m y s t e r i o u s , b u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of l a n g u a g e itself. first c h a p t e r of Thomas L'obscur t h a t L e v i n a s c e l e b r a t e d as so
75
I t i s n o t o u t s i d e l a n g u a g e , b u t a t its l i m i t t h a t A g a m b e n fine a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e il y a. F o r if t h e e n t r y i n t o l a n g u a g e
1978): 16.
4. Maurice Blanchot, " T h e Outside, the Night," trans. Ann
S m o c k , in The Space of Literature ( L i n c o l n : U n i v e r s i t y o f N e b r a s k a
P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 1 6 4 - 6 7 ; i d e m , " L a d e h o r s , l a n u i t , " i n L'espace
Littéraire, I d é e s s e r . ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 5 5 ) , p p . 2 2 0 - 2 2 .
Chapter One. The Allegory of Being
34. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n. the Image of Literature
3 3 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 116 n. 3 3 . In
this quiet note Levinas more or less admits that the olamic r a p p o r t 1. Blanchot, " T h e Narrative Voice," trans. Davis, p p . 1 3 3 - 4 4 ;
with the Other is anything but equaled by the language of ethics; the idem, " T h e Narrative Voice," trans. Hanson, p p . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La
rapport, in fact, is a problem for ethics to solve. voix narrative," p p . 4 2 1 - 3 7 .
3 5 . Maurice Blanchot, "The Narrative Voice," trans. Lydia Davis, 2. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso
in Sitney, ed., Gaze of Orpheus, p p . 1 3 3 - 4 4 ; idem, " T h e Narrative Lingis (The Flague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p p . 5 2 - 6 4 ; idem, De
Voice," trans. Susan H a n s o n , in The Infinite Conversation, Theory l'existence à l'existant (Paris: Vrin, 1981), p p . 8 1 - 1 0 5 .
a n d History of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minne- 3. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p p . 5 6 - 5 7 ; idem, De
sota Press, 1 9 9 3 ) , p p . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La v o i x n a r r a t i v e , " i n l'existence à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
L'entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p p . 4 2 1 - 3 7 . 4. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence
36. This Other (Autrui), is, as we have been stressing, neither à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
this one nor that one, neither an individual nor a group or crowd, 5. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
but instead a singularity whose radical indifferentiation is the other à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
of any representable difference. 6. A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp. 53-58; idem, La
37. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Of B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n , " t r a n s . J a m e s comunità che viene, p p . 3 6 - 3 9 .
Creech, in Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective 7. Maurice Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art,"
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p p . 1-12. t r a n s . Ann Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 2 2 4 ; idem, "Les
3 8 . Blanchot, Unavowable Community, p. 8; idem, La commun- caractères de l'œuvre d'art," in L'espace littéraire, p. 2 9 7 .
auté inavouable, p. 19. 8. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
39. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 7 .
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982), p. 86; idem, 9. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
Éthique et infini (Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard et Radio France, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 6 .
1982), p. 80. 10. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
4 0 . B l a n c h o t , Unavowable Community, p. 11; idem, La "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 6 .
communauté inavouable, p. 2 4 . 1 1 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
4 1 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n. "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 7 .
1; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 125 n. 1. 12. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence
4 2 . Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "History and Mimesis," trans. à l'existant, p. 90.
E d u a r d o C a d a v a , in Looking After Nietzsche, ed. Laurence A. 1 3 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
Ricklels (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1990), p. 2 2 9 .
à l'existant, p. 9 2 .
14. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence (I. Blani hot, D$ath S,•nlrin<\ p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
à l'existant, p p . 9 3 - 9 4 . 76.
15. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p. 32. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7.
79; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p. 3 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 8.
2 5 4 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 4 1 . 34. Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
16. J e a n - L u c Nancy, " O f B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n , " t r a n s . J a m e s et son o m b r e , " p. 784.
Creech, in Miami Theory Collective, ed., Community at Loose Ends, 35. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K.
p. 2. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: R a n d o m H o u s e ,
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N o r m a n 1981), 3:802.
Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 1 8 3 . 36. M a u r i c e Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, t r a n s . Lycette
18. M a r t i n Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Nelson (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1992), p. 5 0 ;
trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, idem, Le pas au-delà (Paris: Gallimard 1973), p. 7 2 .
1962), p p . 1 0 2 - 6 . 37. Levinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 1 5 3 ; idem, "La
19. William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger: Through Phenom- servante et son maître," in Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier: Fata
enology to Thought (The Hague: M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1963), p. 132. M o r g a n a , 1975), p . 34.
2 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p p . 1-2; idem, La comunità 3 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
che viene, p p . 3 - 4 . 126.
2 1 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp. 53-56; idem, La 39. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 8 1 .
comunità che viene, p p . 5 3 - 5 8 . 4 0 . Maurice Blanchot, "Reading," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze
2 2 . A gamben, Coming Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità of Orpheus, p p . 9 4 - 9 6 ; idem, "Reading," trans. Ann Smock, in Space
che viene, p. 52. of Literature, p p . 1 9 4 - 9 6 ; idem, "Lire," in L'espace littéraire, p p .
2 3 . M a u r i c e Blanchot, Death Sentence, t r a n s . Lydia Davis 256-58.
(Barrytown, N Y : Station Hill Press, 1978), p. 3 1 ; idem, L'arrêt de 4 1 . Steven Shaviro, Passion and Excess: Blanchot, Bataille, and
mort (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 54. Literary Theory (Tallahassee: The Florida State University Press,
2 4 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p p . 8 1 - 1990), p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
9; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 3 . 4 2 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 5 0 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p.
2 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 54; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 72.
88. 4 3 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
2 6 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 5 4 - 5 5 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, 4 4 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
p . 89. 126.
2 7 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. Ill; 4 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, 127.
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 4 1 . 4 6 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 80; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
2 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7. 127.
2 9 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 4 6 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 4 7 . Maurice Blanchot, "Kafka and the Work's D e m a n d , " trans.
76. A n n Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 5 7 - 8 3 ; idem, "Kafka et
30. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7 6 . l'exigence de l'œuvre," in L'espace littéraire, p p . 5 9 - 9 8 .
48. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mori, p, 68. I evinflS, "The Sci vani and I 1er Master," p. 155; idem, "La
55. servante el sun maître," p. 37.
4 9 . Blanchot, Deaï/j Sentence, p. 72; idem, //arre/ de mort, p. 69. Lévinas, " T h e Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
115. servante et son maître," p. 40.
50. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 72; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 70. Lévinas, " T h e Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
116. servante et son maitre," p. 40.
5 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7 1 . Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
126. servante et son maître," p. 4 0 .
52. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità 72. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 104; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 8 .
che viene, p. 77.
5 3 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità 7 3 . Blanchot, " T h e Outside, the Night," p. 1 6 3 - 7 0 ; idem, "La
che viene, p. 5 8 .
dehors, la nuit," p p . 2 1 3 - 2 4 .
5 4 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 9 3 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p. 74. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p p . 2 3 2 ;
129.
idem, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p p . 310.
5 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
7 5 . Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 .
and 106; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 1 3 2 -
56. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 199 n.
33 and 135.
2 1 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 191 n. 2 1 .
76. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p p . 2 3 2 - 3 3 ;
57. R Adams Sitney makes this observation in his afterword to
idem, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 310.
Blanchot, Gaze of Orpheus, p. 1 7 1 .
7 7 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 3 3 ; idem,
5 8 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, p p . 1 4 2 - 7 0 .
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 3 1 1 .
59. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
7 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
30.
35.
60. Foucault, "Maurice Blanchot," p. 39. 79. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
6 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 30; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 87; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p p .
52-53. 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
6 2 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 3 5 . 80. " T h e dead present is the impossibility of realizing a pres-
6 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. ence—an impossibility that is present, that is there as that which
36. doubles every present, the s h a d o w of the present, which the present
64. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 8 1 . carries and hides in itself. W h e n I am alone, in this present, I am not
6 5 . Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," p. 1 5 5 ; idem, "La alone, but am already returning to myself in the form of Someone.
servante et son maître," p. 37. Someone is there, when I am alone. [Le présent mort est l'impossibilité
6 6 . Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," p. 155; idem, "La de réaliser une présence, impossibilité qui est présente, qui est là
servante et son maître," p. 37. c o m m e ce qui double tout présent, l'ombre du présent, que celui-ci
67. Lévinas, "The Servant and H e r Master," p. 1 5 5 ; idem, "La p o r t e et dissimule en lui. Q u a n d je suis seul, je ne suis pas seul, mais,
servante et son maître," p. 37. dans ce présent, je reviens déjà à moi sous la forme de Q u e l q u ' u n .
12. Antonin Artaud, "Exposition Balthus à la Gallerie Pierre,"
Quelqu'un est là, où je suis seul.]" Maurice Blanchot, " T h e Essen-
La Nouvelle Revue français 2 2 , no. 248 (May 1934): 8 9 9 - 9 0 .
tial Solitude," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze <>/ Orpheus, p. 74; idem,
1 3 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Literature,
p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude essentielle," in L'espace littéraire, p. 2 7 . che viene, p. 6 2 .
14. Translator's note in Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 0 7 .
8 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p p .
55-56. 1 5 . Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest
Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
82. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 3 2 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 310. 16. Agamben, Corning Community, p p . 6 6 - 6 7 ; idem, La comu-
nità che viene, p p . 4 5 - 4 6 .
Chapter Four. Agamben and the Political Neuter 17. Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," p. 8 5 ; idem,
" T h e Two Versions of the Imaginary," p. 2 6 0 ; idem, "Les deux ver-
1. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 6 9 ; idem, sions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 0 .
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p p . 2 6 - 2 7 ; idem, "La soli-
18. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 19-20; idem, La
tude essentielle," p. 2 1 .
comunità che viene, pp. 15-16.
2. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem, 19. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 19; idem, La comunità
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 27; idem, "La solitude che viene, p. 1 5 .
essentielle," p. 17. 2 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, p p . 8-9.
3. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 77; idem,
2 1 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 85; idem, La comunità
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 3 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p p . 2 7 - 2 8 . che viene, p. 58
22. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 79-83; idem, La
4. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 74; idem,
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude comunità che viene, p p . 5 3 - 5 7 . Let us emphasize yet again the neu-
essentielle," p. 2 4 . trality of this " o n e " w h o speaks. It is not simply the experience that
J speak, but rather that the "I speak" is neutralized such t h a t it is
5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis," trans.
Angela Brewer and X. P. Callahan, in Emotional Tie, p. 50. experienced as an anonymous entry into language. As it enters lan-
guage, the individual identity " I " is overwhelmed and carried away
6. On the relation between analysis, hysteria and narrative
modes see ibid., p. 184 n. 14. by language, or, more simply, by speaking.
7. Ibid., p p . 4 9 - 6 2 . 2 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p p . 6 1 - 6 3 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort,
8. Lacoue-Labarthe, "Typography," p. 1 3 3 . pp.99-103.
9. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p. 2 4 . Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Nega-
8 8 ; idem, " T h e T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p. tivity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt, Theory and History
2 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 . of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991 ),
10. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence p p . 8 4 - 9 8 ; idem, 17 linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
à l'existant, p. 90. della negatività (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1982), p p . 1 0 4 - 2 3 .
1 1 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence 2 5 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 ; i d e m , Il
à l'existant, p. 9 0 .
linguaggio e la morte, p p . 1 1 8 - 2 0 .
26. Agamben, Language and Death, pp, 63 65; idem, // //// )6, Ibid., p. 1 1 3 Lb
guaggio e la morte, pp. 7 9 - 8 I. 37. I'.I.IIK hot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
2 7 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, comunità 87; idem, " H i e Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p p .
che viene, p. 56. 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de 1'imaginaire," 356.
2 8 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, p p . 9 6 - 1 0 6 ; idem, 77 3 8 . Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 107ff., in the pages that follow
linguaggio e la morte, p p . 1 2 1 - 3 3 . Proper attention to this highly we will reproduce the architecture of Richardson's summary of the
important book would require its o w n chapter. We simply wish to Kantbuch, highlighting those aspects that intersect with our interest
retain from this book Agamben's drive to think community (human in Agamben, and departing from Richardson only to quote either
being) outside negativity, negative presentation, or negative theol- Heidegger's or Kant's own words in order to more rigorously specify
ogy. He is critical of Blanchot's La communauté inavouable for re- the notions that interest us.
taining too negative a language. It is a part of our effort here to 39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 2 6 9 .
show that what Blanchot will describe as an "inability to say I," 4 0 . Fleidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 36 n.
Agamben will describe as an "ability to not say I." T h a t is, his La 17.
comunità che viene answers the promise of an "infancy of the hu- 4 1 . Ibid., p. 37 (italics in original).
m a n " that concludes 77 linguaggio e la morte by nuancing Blanchotian 4 2 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 84.
anonymity t o w a r d a latent, ambiguous, and radical potential. 4 3 . Ibid., p . 1 8 1 .
2 9 . Agamben, Language and Death, p. 94; idem, 27 linguaggio e 4 4 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p p . 1 0 2 -
la morte, p. 118 (italics in original). 6 [italics in original].
30. Agamben, Coming Community, p p . 9 6 - 9 7 . (According to a 4 5 . Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 9 - 1 2 ; idem, La comunità
private conversation with Agemben's translator, the parenthetical che viene, p p . 7—9.
passage from which this quotation is taken appears only in the French 4 6 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 1 3 1 .
and English editions of the text.) 4 7 . Ibid., p . 1 3 1 .
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité 4 8 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 77; idem, La comunità
et son o m b r e , " p. 777. che viene, p. 52 (italics in original).
32. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 1 0 1 ; idem, La comunità 4 9 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 132.
che viene, p. 73 (italics in original). 5 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 10; idem, La comunità
33. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 76-77; idem, La che viene, p. 8 (italics in original).
comunità che viene, pp. 5 1 - 5 2 . Agamben understands the Idea as 5 1 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 137.
that " h a l o , " or supplement, or pre-scriptive image, that para-exists 52. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 1 2 7 .
in the empty space of "all its predicates." Like Lévinas and Blanchot, 5 3 . Martin Heidegger, "Brief iiber den H u m a n i s m u s , " in Weg-
he understands the concept to refer to being as it is grasped in its marken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 3 5 9 .
intelligibility within the horizons of a world. 54. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 152.
34. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità 5 5 . Immanuel Kant, Opus postbumum, trans. Eckart Forster and
che viene, p. 62. Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.
3 5 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p p . 1 0 2 - 172.
6. 56. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 154.
57. Agamben, < 'otning < Community, p. 103; idem, La comunità 73, Quoted In Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem,
che viene, p. 7 5 . Infanzia e storia, p. 44.
5 8 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità 74 Blanchot, " T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, pp. 6 3 - / / ;
che viene, p. 52 [italics in originai]. idem, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, pp. 2 1 - 3 4 ; idem, "La
59. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La comunità solitude essentielle," p p . 1 3 - 3 2 .
che viene, p. 9. 75. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 63 n. 7; idem, De
60. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, L<2 comunità l'existence à l'existant, p. 103 n. 1.
che viene, p p . 8-9.
6 1 . Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem,
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 2 6 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p. 17.
6 2 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 3 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 4 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 79; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 3 .
6 5 . Borch-Jacobsen, " T h e Freudian Subject," p. 3 5 .
66. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 50; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 3 5 .
6 7 . Quoted by Giorgio Agamben in Infancy and History: Es-
says on the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz H e r o n (London:
Verso, 1 9 9 3 ) , p p . 3 1 - 3 2 ; idem, Infanzia e storia: Distruzione
dell'esperienza e origine della storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore,
1978), p 2 7 .
6 8 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 44; idem, Infanzia e storia,
pp.41-42.
69. Q u o t e d in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 4 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 1 .
7 0 . Q u o t e d in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 5 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 3 .
7 1 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem, Infanzia e storia,
pp.43-44.
72. M a r t i n Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J o h n Macquarrie
a n d Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p p .
149-219.
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Index
189
Blanchot, Maurice (continued)', EXLITENCT, 2, S N , <,S 66, 70-74; Imaginary, 2,4, '>, 17, 20-21, 27, Marlboro, duchesie of, 11-12
essentielle" ("The Essential aetthi in , i'i 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 0 , (><> 77, 10 I 4, 108-10, 130 Massumi, Brian, 65
Solitude"), 115-17, 161; immemorial, I (>, 31-37, 42, 45, Mill, John Stuart, 33
Thomas L'Obscur (Thomas finitude, 8- 9, I! $4, 56-64, 73 74, 104, I 12-13 moi. See self
the Obscure), 161 Flesch, William, I69n. 32 intersubjectivity, 96,103-5, 129. myth, 20, 26, 166n. 34
Bogart, Humphrey, 136 Foucault, Michel, 100 See also subject (and subjectiv-
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel, 33, 40, Freud, Sigmund, xi-xiv, 32, 36, 40, •ty) Nancy, Jean-Luc, 7, 40, 47, 58, 78,
44-45, 168n. 14 43-46, 97, 117 ipseity, 37, 61-62, 69-70, 74, 132 166n. 34
Brennan, Walter, 132 Nessus, 31, 34
Gleason, Jackie, 138 Kafka, Franz, 90-91, 97 Neuter, 28, 36. See also il
Cagney, James, 132 God, 140-42, 150, 151-53 Kant, Immanuel, 8-9, 33, 74-76, Nietzsche, Friedrich, xi, 36, 97,
Casablanca, 136 Greenstreet, Sydney, 138 111, 119-20, 126; Critique of 110, 130, 149
Celan, Paul, 10-11 Pure Reason, 138-52, 156-62 Nihilism, 3
Chaney, Lon, 132 Hackman, Gene, 137 Kelly, Grace, 133
character actors, 132-38 Hamann, Johann Georg, 158 Kojève, Alexandre, 44, 98 Olivier, Laurence, 133
Congreve, William, 11-12 Hegel, G. W. F., 44, 78, 97-98, Other. See Autrui
Cook, Elisha, Jr., 132 129-30 Lacan, Jacques, 40, 44,117, 158 oxymoron, 78
Cotton, Joseph, 136 Heidegger, Martin, 2, 9, 33, 36, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 7, 17,
38, 44, 49, 60, 67-68, 75-76, 4 0 , 4 9 , 6 3 , 7 8 , 1 1 7 - 1 8 , 164 Peirce, C. S., 42
Da-Sein, 2, 44, 49, 59-64, 148-52, 78, 97-98, 111, 130-31, n. 9, 166n. 34 Plato, 117
159 168n. 9; "Brief über den language: of ethics, 39-40, 42, 46, politics, 3, 8, 29, 50, 155-62
Davis, Lydia, x, 86 Humanismus," 148; and 55, 58, 169n. 30; and potentia, 1-2, 40, 60, 7 5 , 1 4 3 ,
death. See dying (and death) ethics, 62-64; Kant and the experience, 154-62; in 145,161
Deleuze, Gilles, 123 Problem of Metaphysics, 138- literature and poetry, 4-5, 7, Proust, Marcel, xiv, 4, 50; A la
Derrida, Jacques, 4 1 , 63, 74, 84, 52, 156-62 10-12. See also being-in- recherche du temps perdu, 84
111 Henry, Michel, 38, 168n. 14 language proximity, 77-93
désœvrement (work-less), 87 Hill, Leslie, ix Levinas, Emmanuel: Autrement
diachronie (diachrony), 34-36, 4 6 - Hulk Hogan, 6 qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence responsibility (responsibilite), x, 4,
47, 49-50, 63,104 Hume, David, x, 142 (Otherwise Than Being or 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 8 , 4 8 , 5 9 - 6 2 , 77, 92,
dying (and death), 4, 24-25, 5 7 - Husserl, Edmund, 104 Beyond Essence), 4, 31-64, 105
64, 92-103 77, 97, 104; De l'existence à rhythm, 14-16, 26
identification, 4, 37-40, 42^18, 55 l'existant (Existence and Richardson, William J., 75-76;
ego. See self il (He, the Neuter), 5, 36, 7 9 , 1 1 2 - Existents), 66-67; "Realité et Heidegger, 139-55, 179n. 38
en deçà du temps (hither side of 14,115-19 son ombre" ("Reality and Its Ritter, Thelma, 132
time), 25, 40, 7 7 , 8 8 , 9 3 - 1 0 6 , il y a (there is), 9, 27-30, 65, 7 0 - Shadow"), 9,13-30, 66-67, Roustang, Francois, 45
110,112, 115,150,152. See 84; "La Servante et son
73, 111, 116-17,124,149,
also I'entretemps maître" ("The Servant and Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99, 125
152, 161
Ventretemps (meanwhile, between- Her Master"), 104-5; Totalité schema-image, 74-76, 138-52
image, 1-2, 4, 13-17, 78, 84, 104-
time), 22-25, 27, 93-106,127, et Infini (Totality and Infinity), self (moi), 4, 34-46, 52, 60, 8 1 -
14,123, 134-35; as resem-
152. See also en deçà du temps 54 82, 106, 111
blance, 17-21; and time, 2 2 -
ethics (éthique), xii, 3, 8, 31-64, 25. See also artwork; schema- love, ix-xiv, 11-12 Shaviro, Steven, x, 87, 97
77, 97, 104-5,113 image Lyotard, Jean-François, 63, 148 Smith, Queenie, 137
y
I)L I N I I I'. . \