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Wall Radical Passivity

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The text discusses concepts of passivity, ethics, time, and the relationship between language and experience in the works of philosophers Emmanuel Lévinas, Maurice Blanchot, and Giorgio Agamben.

The text discusses concepts of passivity, ethics, time, and the relationship between language and experience in the works of philosophers Emmanuel Lévinas, Maurice Blanchot, and Giorgio Agamben.

The text discusses the philosophical works of Emmanuel Lévinas, Maurice Blanchot, and Giorgio Agamben.

RADICAL

PASSIVITY
Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben

Thomas Carl Wall


with a Foreword by William Flesch

STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W Y O R K PRESS


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© 1 9 9 9 State University of N e w York
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Wall, Thomas Carl, 1 9 5 4 -


Radical passivity : Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben / Thomas Carl
Wall : with a foreword by William Flesch.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 4 0 4 7 - 8 (hardcover), — ISBN 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 4 0 4 8 - 6 (pbk.)
1. Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2. Blanchot, Maurice. 3. Agamben, Giorgio.
1942- . I. Title.
B2430.L484W35 1999 98-27843
111—DC21 CIP

Al 8 <b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

TALLINNA ÜLIKOOLI \
AKADEEMILINE }
K RAAMATUKOGU/
X
Contents

Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xv

Introduction
Passivity 1
The Language of Poetry 10

ONE
T h e A l l e g o r y o f Being
Image 13
Duality 17
The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork 22
The Space of Art 25
The Profane 29

TWO
Levinas's Ethics
An Ambiguous Rapport 31
No One Other 34
viii CONTENTS

The Self 40
Impasse 46
Éthique 50
Death 57
Levinas and Heidegger 62 FOREWORD

Love's Characters
THREE
B l a n c h o t , L'arrêt de mort, a n d t h e I m a g e of L i t e r a t u r e 65
Writing 65
Proximity 77
En d e ç à du t e m p s 93
Image, Ipseity, and Art 106

FOUR Wallace Stevens, w h o loved M a u r i c e Blanchot, in


A g a m b e n a n d t h e Political N e u t e r 115 a b o u t 1 9 5 5 : " F r e n c h a n d English c o n s t i t u t e a single l a n g u a g e . "
Anonymity and Belonging 115 B l a n c h o t himself ( o u r o w n " e x t r e m e c o n t e m p o r a r y " a s Leslie
Whatever! 121 Hill calls h i m ) , a few y e a r s earlier: " A t r o p b o n c o m p t e , u n
Community 129 t e x t e t r a d u i t m i m e l'effort d e c r é a t i o n q u i , à p a r t i r d e l a l a n g u e
Object = x 138 c o u r a n t e , celle d a n s l a q u e l l e n o u s v i v o n s e t n o u s s o m m e s i m -
Politics 155 m e r g é s , c h e r c h e à faire n a î t r e u n e a u t r e l a n g u e , e n a p p a r e n c e
la m ê m e et p o u r t a n t , par r a p p o r t à cette langue, c o m m e son
Notes 163 a b s e n c e , s a différence p e r p é t u e l l e m e n t a c q u i s e e t c o n s t a m m e n t
Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y 183 c a c h é e . " S u c h relatively facile t r a n s l a t i o n i s t o o e a s y a p a t h t o
Index 189 s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s n o t easy, t h e w a y t h a t i n t h e
literary w o r k t h e w r i t e r will m a k e l a n g u a g e u n d e r g o " l a t r a n s -
m u t a t i o n q u i d ' u n e seule l a n g u e d o i t e n tirer d e u x , l ' u n e q u i
est lue e t c o m p r i s e s a n s d é t o u r , l ' a u t r e q u i reste i g n o r é e , t u e e t
i n a c c e s s i b l e e t d o n t l ' a b s e n c e ( l ' o m b r e d o n t p a r l e Tolstoï) est
t o u t ce q u e n o u s en s a i s i s s o n s . " It is this w h i c h Stevens is s p e a k -
ing o f a s w e l l — t h e single l a n g u a g e n a m e a b l e o n l y a s t w o ,
French a n d English.
T h e ease w i t h w h i c h t r a n s l a t i o n c a n yield m o c k - p r o f u n d i t y

ix
h a s been .1 hazard Foi English language readers oi Blanchot, T h e ( flannel 1 >l the familial DC! a use you m a y use t h e sec-
Levinas, a n d Agamben (as h a s perhaps the n a t i v e case- with o n d p e r s o n familiar w i t h the o n e you love: tutoiement. But
w h i c h French a n d Italian s p e a k e r s m a y read t h e m ) . The stylis- perhaps one way to characterize Blanchot is to note the ex-
tic infelicity of t h e English l a n g u a g e for t h e i r k i n d of w r i t i n g t r e m e d e m a n d s he p l a c e s on tutoiement. In his fictions his
h a s n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y t e n d e d t o yield i n t h e i r f o l l o w e r s a k i n d n a r r a t o r s c o n s i s t e n t l y insist on its rarity. In his l a t e s t essay,
o f e m p t y s l o g a n e e r i n g , a c l a i m t o s o m e k n o w l e d g e different " P o u r l ' a m i t i é " B l a n c h o t describes the a t m o s p h e r e o f M a y ' 6 8
f r o m t h a t g r e a t eerie c l a r i t y s o e s s e n t i a l t o w h a t t h e y a r e say- as o n e in w h i c h tutoiement w a s d e m a n d e d of e v e r y o n e . It w a s
ing. (That French is n o t Levinas's native language m a y p u t only with his friends, a n d n o t with the c o m r a d e s of t h o s e t i m e s ,
h i m in t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e n a r r a t o r in L'Arrêt de mort, r e s p o n - t h a t B l a n c h o t w o u l d use the formal " v o u s , " sign o f p o l i t e n e s s t o
sive in a l a n g u a g e w h o s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c a n n o t be a given.) his friends, b u t m o r e o f his f r i e n d s h i p , w h i c h c o u l d n e v e r use
F o r y e a r s i t h a s s e e m e d t o m e , e v e r s i n c e r e a d i n g Lydia " t u " o f f h a n d e d l y . A t t h e e n d o f t h e e s s a y B l a n c h o t says t h a t i t
Davis's supple a n d heroic attempts to render Blanchot in En- i s o n l y L e v i n a s w h o m h e will " t u t o y e r , " h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h
glish (in a letter to Steven S h a v i r o B l a n c h o t says of her, " E l l e L e v i n a s , h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h his o t h e r f r i e n d s , a n d his friend-
sait c e q u ' i l e n est d e t r a d u i r e l ' i n t r a d u i s a b l e " ) , t h a t t h e o n l y s h i p w i t h f r i e n d s h i p d e m a n d i n g this d i s t i n c t i v e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
w a y for a n E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e r e a d e r t o r e a d B l a n c h o t h a s b e e n u n f a m i l i a r , a n d u n c a n n y f o r m a l i t y w i t h f a m i l i a r i t y itself.
w i t h i n t h a t single l a n g u a g e S t e v e n s d e s c r i b e s . T h e E n g l i s h w e F r e u d calls t h e u n c a n n y t h e r e t u r n o f t h e f a m i l i a r a n d sees
s p e a k e v e r y d a y h a d s e e m e d t o o q u i r k y for B l a n c h o t . J . L . t h e fact o f r e t u r n itself a s w h a t m a k e s i t u n c a n n y . F o r B l a n c h o t
A u s t i n s u g g e s t s t h a t w e ' l l get s o m e w h e r e i n a e s t h e t i c s w h e n i t w o u l d b e t h e alien f o r m a l i t y a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e familiar, a n d
w e s t o p t r y i n g t o figure o u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d i n d e e d a t t h e h e a r t o f t h a t m o s t f a m i l i a r o f all t h i n g s , l a n -
start looking to describe "the dainty a n d the d u m p y " instead, guage, which is uncanny. Familiar: Blanchot's narrators are
a n d it has been the fundamentally comic genius of English as u n c o m m o n l y e b u l l i e n t , light a t h e a r t , gay. U n c a n n y : t h a t g a i -
a l i t e r a r y l a n g u a g e (even t h e E n g l i s h of S t e v e n s ) , to m a r s h a l ety itself is u n c a n n y in B l a n c h o t , m a r k of t h e p r o x i m i t y of a
such categories of experience. r a d i c a l u n c o n c e r n w i t h any w o r l d , c o n c e r n itself a p r e s e n c e
W e w o u l d b e t e m p t e d t o call this familiar e x p e r i e n c e , H u m e t h a t is p u t by.
at billiards, Austen in Bath, Trollope at a h u n t , experience T h i s u n c a n n y familiarity, this g r a v e g a i e t y i s t h e o p p o s i t e
w h o s e description might be " r e a d a n d u n d e r s t o o d directly." of Freud's n o t i o n of the u n c a n n y as the r e t u r n of the familiar:
B l a n c h o t ' s clarities seem s o m e t h i n g else, r e s t r a i n e d w i t h o u t i t is, t o use Blanchot's i m p o r t a n t o b s e r v a t i o n a b o u t N i e t z s c h e ,
r e t i c e n c e , a u s t e r e w i t h o u t h a u g h t i n e s s , careful w i t h o u t a n x i - t h e e t e r n a l r e t u r n ("Je c h e r c h a i , c e t t e fois, á P a b o r d e r " b e g i n s
ety, f a s c i n a t e d w i t h o u t c a t h e x i s , i m p e r s o n a l w i t h o u t c o l d n e s s . Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas, a story of e n d l e s s reflec-
In B l a n c h o t t h e n a m e of s u c h a s t a t e is l o v e , a w o r d u s e d v e r y tion, of t h o u g h t as re-flecting on t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
r a r e l y i n his w o r k , a n d o n l y w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t diffidence. A n d u n p r e c e d e n t e d experience o f w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h o u g h t ) , b u t n o t
y e t w h a t s t a t e i s m o r e f a m i l i a r t h a n love? F a m i l i a r t o u s a n d t h e eternal r e t u r n of the s a m e , n o r of t h e a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d ,
t h e c h a n n e l o f t h e familiar? n o r of a w o r l d t h a t has been lost b u t is n o w resuscitated, simply
A I I rwn B w wnw

the p u r e "appearance *»f Again, the diva dame" ( S t e v e n s ) . T h e i r love i8 an affair <>l p l a c e . , but (he m a r r i a g e p l a c e , t h e
F r e u d s a w every e r o t u relation as Caking place b e t w e e n at place they love, or the p l a c e they live a n d t h a t S t e v e n s loves is
least f o u r p e o p l e : the lovers a n d t h e i r p a r e n t s . But in B l a n c h o t literary s p a c e : " F r o m this the poem s p r i n g s , t h a t we live in a
true erotic relation is u n c o u n t a b l e a n d takes place w i t h o u t place / That is not o u r o w n , a n d m u c h m o r e , n o t o u r s e l v e s , /
t h o s e p a r e n t s w h o a r e for F r e u d t h e o n l y o n e s w h o c o u n t . A n d h a r d it is in s p i t e of b l a z o n e d d a y s . " In t h e p r e f a t o r y
T h e r e i s t h e lover, o r n a r r a t o r , o r ( u s u a l l y a n d b y a n e x t r e m e verse t o " N o t e s " S t e v e n s a s k s ,
c o n v e n t i o n t h a t signifies t h e i n t e n s e refusal o f t h e d e p t h o f
d e p t h p s y c h o l o g y ) m a l e figure, a n d a n u t t e r l y u n p r e c e d e n t e d A n d for w h a t , e x c e p t for y o u , do I feel love?
other: unprecedented and so beyond the universal precedent Do I press the extremest book of the wisest m a n
o f t h e dialectic o f p r e s e n c e a n d a b s e n c e . Close to m e , hidden in me day a n d night?
F o r L e v i n a s s u c h a r e l a t i o n to t h e o t h e r , to autrui, is t h e In t h e u n c e r t a i n light of single, c e r t a i n t r u t h ,
h y p e r c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e t o e t h i c s ; for A g a m b e n i t i s t h e E q u a l i n living c h a n g i n g n e s s t o t h e l i g h t
future of t h e c o m i n g c o m m u n i t y , free to be u n p r e c e d e n t e d , qual- In w h i c h I m e e t y o u , in w h i c h we sit at r e s t
unque, u n c h a r a c t e r i z e d a n d i n B l a n c h o t ' s t e r m s i m p e r s o n a l . For a m o m e n t , in the central of o u r being,
F o r B l a n c h o t , a s for S t e v e n s , i t i s t h e r e g i o n h a u n t e d b y l o v e . T h e vivid t r a n s p a r e n c e t h a t y o u b r i n g i s p e a c e .
I cite Stevens b e c a u s e I myself w i s h to reflect on t h e p o s s i -
bility o f a n A m e r i c a n c o n t e x t for B l a n c h o t i a n t h o u g h t , t h e W h o m is this addressed to? W h a t is the light in w h i c h they
c o n t e x t for w h i c h (in t h e first i n s t a n c e ) Wall offers t h i s e x - m e e t — t h e light n o t of t r u t h , b u t a n o t h e r light w i t h a n o t h e r
t r a o r d i n a r y b o o k . Love is a v e r y r a r e w o r d in S t e v e n s as w e l l , c l a r i t y ? ( " R o b i n s a n d d o v e s a r e b o t h e a r l y risers a n d a r e c o n -
b u t it is, as I say, a w o r d t h a t he a p p l i e s to B l a n c h o t , in a letter noisseurs of d a y l i g h t before t h e a c t u a l p r e s e n c e of t h e s u n c o a r s -
j u s t f o u r m o n t h s b e f o r e his d e a t h . In g e n e r a l it is a w o r d t h a t e n s i t " says S t e v e n s in a letter.) T h e s e lines a r e a tutoiement,
h e a p p l i e s n o t t o p e o p l e b u t t o p l a c e s ("Life i s a n affair o f a n d it's n o t t h a t w e c a n n o t k n o w w h o m t h e y ' r e a d d r e s s e d t o ,
p e o p l e , n o t o f p l a c e s . B u t for m e life h a s b e e n a n affair o f it's t h a t t h e r e i s n o k n o w i n g , t h e a d d r e s s e e d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o
p l a c e s , a n d t h a t h a s m a d e all t h e d i f f e r e n c e " ) , a s i n " N o t e s the w o r l d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e scholar writes the b o o k , Stevens
Towards a Supreme Fiction," where will say, h o t for a n accessible bliss, b u t t h e bliss t h e w o r k of-
fers c a n n e v e r b e a c c e s s i b l e , c a n n e v e r b e p r e s e n t .
T h e C a p t a i n l o v e d t h e ever-hill C a t a w b a , I t i s t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k t h a t gives u s t h e m o s t i n e l u c t a b l e
A n d therefore married B a w d a w h o m he found there, model of w h a t it is t h a t there is no k n o w i n g . You c a n love a
A n d B a w d a l o v e d t h e c a p t a i n a s she l o v e d t h e s u n . w o r k , b u t y o u c a n n e v e r k n o w it, e v e n i f y o u l o v e it, e s p e -
cially if y o u love it, a n d t h i s is a l e s s o n n o t a b o u t t h e w o r k
T h e y m a r r i e d well because the marriage-place (about w h i c h there is no learning) b u t a b o u t love.
W a s w h a t t h e y l o v e d . I t w a s n e i t h e r h e a v e n n o r hell. F o r F r e u d t o love t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k (since i t i s t h e w o r k
T h e y w e r e love's c h a r a c t e r s c o m e face t o face. t h a t S t e v e n s a d d r e s s e s his d e d i c a t i o n to) i s t o b e e n g a g e d i n
transferential fantasy, i<> love what nil', sut h fantasy. But for
L e v i n a s , Blanchot, a n d Agamben, as loi Prousl a n d Stevens b e -
fore t h e m , love o f a n o t h e r can o n l y b e i n t i m a t e d t h r o u g h t h e
s t r a n g e a n d elusive a n d a l w a y s lost love o f l i t e r a t u r e . S t e v e n s :
" I n p o e t r y y o u m u s t love t h e w o r d s , t h e i d e a s a n d i m a g e s a n d Acknowledgments
r h y t h m s w i t h all y o u r c a p a c i t y t o love a n y t h i n g a t a l l . " T h e
r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r t h a t love n a m e s , a n d t h a t B l a n c h o t e x -
p l o r e s in all his fiction, c u l m i n a t i n g in L'attente l'oubli, is o n e
o f r a d i c a l passivity, i n t e r m i n a b l e a t t e n t i o n , t h e m o s t f o r m a l
a n d d e m a n d i n g m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s e v e r e s t familiarity. L o v e ' s
characters are, m a k e u p , literature. It is only in this strange
language, the other language, the language of literature, that
l o v e c a n b e u t t e r e d (as t h e p a r a b l e a b o u t t h e n a r r a t o r ' s a d -
d r e s s i n g C l a u d i a in h e r n a t i v e l a n g u a g e in L'Arrêt de mort
also m a k e s clear).
T h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o e x p r e s s his g r a t i t u d e t o a
This love is w h a t Wall utters in this r e m a r k a b l e b o o k . He
n u m b e r o f friends w h o m h e e n l i s t e d for m u c h - n e e d e d h e l p .
too k n o w s w h a t it is to translate the untranslatable and he has
The f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e h a v e left t h e i r m a r k s o n t h i s b o o k : Susie
f o u n d a g r a v i t y o f style a n s w e r i n g t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e o t h e r n e s s
Brubaker, Stephen D u c a , Stephen Wall, M a g e n t a Widner, Kate
of the language he attends to. He will, I imagine, defamiliar-
G a r d n e r , K a r l D u d i c k , a n d t h e staff of t h e l e g e n d a r y Left Bank
ize—or ( w h a t is the s a m e thing) render uncannily familiar—
Books in S e a t t l e , W a s h i n g t o n .
t h e s e w o r k s for F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n s p e a k e r s w h o will find t h e
T h e a u t h o r w o u l d also like t o t h a n k D o u g l a s Brick,
t r a n s m u t a t i o n B l a n c h o t s p e a k s of: h e will r e n d e r t h e i r l a n -
Camillo Penna, Robert Thomas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio
guage plural as he renders English plural, able at last to trans-
A g a m b e n , w h o r e a d t h e m a n u s c r i p t a n d offered critical a n d
l a t e t h e s e figures in a n s w e r a b l e style, p r e s e r v i n g all t h e i r alterity
encouraging comments.
a n d giving b a c k to English, as Stevens also h a d d o n e , a sense
o f its o w n alterity, a p l a c e f r o m w h i c h t h e p o e m m a y c o n t i n u e W i t h affection a n d r e s p e c t , t h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o a c k n o w l -

to spring. edge his teachers. A m o n g them are M i k e Wing, Jane Green,


R a n d y Fezel, C h a r l i e A l t i e r i , C a r l D e n n i s , a n d E v a n W a t k i n s .

WILLIAM FLESCH
BRANDÉIS UNIVERSITY

XV
Introduction

Passivity
T h e w r i t e r s w e will e x a m i n e h e r e s h a r e a c e r t a i n
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h a p o i n t o f r a d i c a l p a s s i v i t y t h a t affects
s u b j e c t i v i t y p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
image (Maurice Blanchot), the O t h e r (Emmanuel Lévinas), a n d
being-in-language (Giorgio A g a m b e n ) , each writer c a n n o t re-
sist t u r n i n g r o u n d a n d r o u n d t h e p a r a d o x — o r t h e i n v e r t e d
e s s e n c e — o f t h i s passivity. N a m e l y : p a s s i v i t y i n t h e r a d i c a l
s e n s e , b e f o r e it is s i m p l y o p p o s e d to activity, is p a s s i v e w i t h
r e g a r d t o itself, a n d t h u s i t s u b m i t s t o itself a s t h o u g h i t w e r e
an exterior power. H e n c e , radical passivity conceals, or har-
b o r s in itself, or c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h , a potentia; it is a l w a y s
o u t s i d e itself a n d i s its o w n o t h e r . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o itself,
t h e e s s e n t i a l p a s s i v i t y of t h e s u b j e c t m u s t u n d e r g o itself, suf-
fer itself, feel itself as other. In t h i s s e n s e , p a s s i v i t y is p u r e l y
passionate.
O l d e r t h a n a n y ( a c t u a l ) p o s s i b i l i t y is this potentia-in-gen-
eral t h a t " g i v e s " n o t h i n g ( e x c e p t itself) a n d t h a t " i s g i v e n "

1
2 INTRODUCTION IN I R.ODUCTION 3

p r i o r to a n y real state of affairs. A l w a y s older t h a n a n y activity, i n e x h a u s t i b l e , u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , a n d u n c a n n y passion I must be.


t h i s r a d i c a l passivity " g i v e s " its o w n w i t h d r a w a l , t h e r e f o r e . I t W h e n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g , w e a r e t r y i n g t o say, t h e r e i s a l r e a d y
is and is not t h e subject. M o r e i n t i m a t e t h a n a n y p e r c e p t i o n , n o l o n g e r n o t h i n g . N i h i l i s m i s n o t t h e f i n a l r e s t i n g p l a c e for
e x p e r i e n c e , o r feeling, r a d i c a l passivity " g i v e s " n o n p r e s e n c e , h u m a n being. With nihilism's global completion in t h e form
inequality-in-itselfness: i.e., the incalculable specificity of de- of t h e spectacle, A g a m b e n a r g u e s specifically, t h e r e is still s o m e -
struction. T h i s p a r a d o x w o u l d r e m a i n a m e r e l y f r u s t r a t i n g thing to be destroyed with a nonconservative destruction that
f o r m a l i t y w e r e it n o t for t h e fact t h a t existence is t h e n a m e for will a l t e r e v e r y t h i n g w h i l e c h a n g i n g n o t a t h i n g . If y o u like,
this p a s s i v i t y t h a t suffers itself o u t s i d e itself. P r i o r t o a n y given we (but this " w e " does n o t n a m e us—it is the not-yet w h o we
b e i n g , in s h o r t , is t h e e x i s t e n c e t h a t d e s t r o y s itself as a p r e s - still m u s t be) m u s t d e s t r o y i n a r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t t h a t leaves
e n c e w i t h a d e s t r u c t i o n t h a t leaves e v e r y t h i n g i n t a c t . It is a n o t h i n g t o b e r e s t o r e d , n o t h i n g t o b e r e d e e m e d . W e m u s t seize
v e r y d e s t r u c t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n — o n e t h a t c a n n o t c o n s e r v e itself d e s t r u c t i o n a s obsessively a s p a s s i v i t y d e s t r o y s , b y failing t o
in order to destroy; one that c a n n o t but incessantly destroy complete the w o r k of destruction.
itself. I f y o u like, this p a r a d o x d e s c r i b e s t h e " p r o d u c t i o n " o f E a c h o f t h e w r i t e r s w e shall d i s c u s s i n w h a t f o l l o w s r e -
nothing, or the " p r o d u c t i o n " of an absolute past or an ex- t u r n s obsessively to the p a r a d o x we have described (some-
t r e m e y o u t h t h a t t h e s u b j e c t never has been. T h a t is to say, w h a t t o o r a p i d l y , n o d o u b t ) a s r a d i c a l passivity. T h e y h a v e
r a d i c a l passivity p r o d u c e s t h e i m a g i n a r y , p r o d u c e s s o m e t h i n g radicalized their particular disciplines to the p o i n t w h e r e we
like fiction, s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e m a i n s o n l y possibly intelligible. c a n n o l o n g e r a s s o c i a t e w h a t t h e y say w i t h a n y t h i n g like w h a t
W e h a v e l e a r n e d f r o m H e i d e g g e r t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s possi- w o u l d c o m m o n l y fall u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s " e t h i c s , " " a e s t h e t -
bility in general a n d t h e r e f o r e it is u n r e a l i z a b l e in p a r t i c u l a r , i c s , " o r " p o l i t i c s . " F o r e a c h , t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s a r e a l w a y s al-
or it is i m p o s s i b l e in p a r t i c u l a r . E x i s t e n c e as t h e g e n e r a l i t y of r e a d y t h e t r a c e of a general or a potential r e l a t i o n t h a t a n y
t h e p o s s i b l e i s precisely t h e i m p o s s i b l e : t h e u n c a n n y i m p o s s i - p a r t i c u l a r discipline o n l y r e s t r i c t s . T h u s e a c h s p e a k s a l a n -
bility of Da-sein—the b e i n g I myself am at my o w n m o s t . T h a t g u a g e at o n c e f a m i l i a r a n d a l i e n a t i n g . Each says very little, if
is to say, b e f o r e I t a k e on t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of a p e r s o n , I a m — w e m e a n b y t h i s t h a t e a c h fails t o p r o d u c e a c o r p u s o f t h o u g h t
a n d a m n o t — a n e x t r e m e possibility. T o say i t e v e n better, I a m we m a y debate a m o n g s t ourselves. There are no pros a n d cons
a potential p o s s i b i l i t y : t h e null e v e n t of an i n a c t u a l i t y . B u t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e w o r k s w e shall d i s c u s s . T h e r e w i l l h a v e
w h a t exposes t h i s potentia I a m a t m y o w n m o s t ? W h a t e x - been, however, the repeated exposure to impossibility t h a t we
poses Da-sein} may take to be an irreducible experience of an intimacy empty
Blanchot, Levinas, and A g a m b e n provide answers, each of itself, a n d as fragile as it is r e p e t i t i v e .
of which says the same thing: W h e n there is n o t h i n g (when I n o u r f i r s t c h a p t e r w e will f o l l o w L e v i n a s ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e
there is fascination with the image, w h e n the other is rendered a r t w o r k a s t h a t w h o s e ( e n i g m a t i c ) b e i n g i s precisely its iner-
a n o n y m o u s a n d b e c o m e s O t h e r , w h e n l a n g u a g e itself s p e a k s ) , tia, o r its inability t o e n t e r t h e r o b u s t p r e s e n t . W e will t h e n
t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f this n o t h i n g d e s t r o y s itself a s a n e x p e r i e n c e a r g u e that t h e w e a k n e s s o r i m p o t e n c e " e x h i b i t e d " i n t h e a r t -
a n d e x p o s e s a passivity t h a t in fact c o m m a n d s a r e t u r n to t h e w o r k opens, not a w o r l d , b u t a general e t h i c s a n d p o l i t i c s .
I he a r t w o r k "lets g o " of the object a n d t h u s interrupts the is i ommunii a t e d . W h e n someone gestures to me, for e x a m p l e ,

w o r k of subjectivity. T h e w o r k ol art is purely and s i m p l y an h o w do 1 k n o w thai t h e r e is an a t t e m p t to c o m m u n i c a t e e v e n

i m a g e , a n d a n i m a g e e l u d e s all a t t e m p t s t o g r a s p it. il the p e r s o n s p e a k s a foreign t o n g u e ? A m u t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n

I n o u r s e c o n d c h a p t e r , w e will a r g u e t h a t Levinas's e t h i c s p r e c e d e s a n y dit (said). This c o m m u n i c a t i o n is u n s p o k e n b u t

is i m a g i n a r y . T h a t is, like an i m a g e , Autrui will a l w a y s h a v e i r r e d u c i b l e . It is an i m a g e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s a n y

r e m a i n e d u n a v a i l a b l e t o a n y p r e s e n t a n d , like a fissure i n b e - m e s s a g e . L a n g u a g e t h a t precedes.itself, o r t h a t " b e g i n s " i n

i n g , will p r o v o k e a n infinite r a p p o r t t h a t will o v e r w h e l m t h e repetition, is poetry, a n d this preemptive " s p e a k i n g " belongs

s u b j e c t in a flood of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ( T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , h o w - t o n o s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t i o n t o say a n y t h i n g . O l d e r t h a n t h e s u b -

ever, like j e a l o u s y i n P r o u s t , will n o l o n g e r r e s e m b l e w h a t i s ject, i t i s a l a n g u a g e s p o k e n b y n o o n e , o r b y a n a n o n y m o u s

c o m m o n l y m e a n t by the term.) Levinas w o u l d p r o b a b l y dis- " s o m e o n e " ( B l a n c h o t ' s il, " h e , " t h e N e u t e r ) , w h o c a n n o t s p e a k

a g r e e w i t h o u r r e a d i n g since w e will c l a i m t h a t t h a t w h i c h i n t h e first p e r s o n . U n a b l e n o t t o c o m m u n i c a t e , t h i s a n o n y m -

i n c e s s a n t l y e s c a p e s — A u t r u i — i s an a l t e r i t y t h a t t h e moi itself ity c a n n o t c e a s e " h i s " s a y i n g just a s i t i s u n a b l e t o m a n i f e s t

is. We will a r g u e t h a t t h e g e r m of L e v i n a s ' s Autrement qu'être " h i m s e l f " i n a n y s t a t e m e n t , for " h e " i s o n l y i n s o f a r a s , a n d

ou au-delà de l'essence—substitution—is a radical identifica- for a s l o n g a s , " h e " s p e a k s . C o i n c i d i n g s o perfectly w i t h " h i m -

t i o n o f t h e self w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t e v a c u a t e s t h e self o f self," " h e " j u s t a s perfectly e s c a p e s " h i m s e l f " o r i s o u t s i d e

s a m e n e s s , stability, a n d self-certainty. I n b e c o m i n g r e s p o n s i b l e " h i m s e l f . " " H e " (or " S o m e o n e , " for i t i s a l w a y s a n o t h e r ) i s

f o r - t h e - O t h e r , t h e self e n c o u n t e r s a n i n c e s s a n c e t h a t r e s e m b l e s perfectly i n l a n g u a g e . U n a b l e t o t u r n a r o u n d a n d g r a s p h i m -

Blanchotian dying and Agamben's capacity to " n o t not-be." self in a reflection w i t h o u t l o s i n g himself a g a i n , t h i s " S o m e -

It becomes an image, in s h o r t , b u t no l o n g e r an i m a g e of itself. o n e ' s " o n l y b e i n g is t h a t r e p e t i t i v e L e v i n a s i a n dire (saying)

It becomes an image of nothing, of no one. It becomes the t h a t u n s a y s itself. I t i s o u r t h e s i s i n this c h a p t e r t h a t t h e B l a n -

a n o n y m i t y t h a t , i n fact, Autrui a l r e a d y is. H e n c e t h e p a r a d o x c h o t i a n w r i t e r i s t h e o n e w h o i s " c a p a b l e " o f this i n a b i l i t y t o

of an identification with no o n e t h a t is the thesis of o u r second c e a s e t o s p e a k . R e f u s i n g all self-presence, t h i s a n o n y m i t y n e v -

chapter. e r t h e l e s s i s a h o l l o w i n g o u t t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e all p r e s e n c e ,
all w o r k , a n d all t h i n k i n g . " S o m e o n e , " i n s h o r t , i s l a n g u a g e
In our third chapter, we examine Blanchot's notion of an
itself. " S o m e o n e ' s " b e i n g i s s o u t t e r l y a b s o r b e d i n l a n g u a g e
imaginary that precedes the real, precedes the object. In par-
w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e t h a t t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y o n e left t o s a v e
t i c u l a r , w e will b e a t t e n t i v e t o a n i m a g i n a r y l a n g u a g e o r a n
or manifest.
i n c e s s a n t m u r m u r t h a t m u s t b e silenced i n o r d e r for t h e w o r d
to " w o r k . " This m u r m u r is poetic language: language that In this way, t h r o u g h Blanchot, we come to Agamben's

has become an image of language, an image of negation. n o t i o n of a c o m m u n i t y - t o - c o m e t h a t is already " i n " language

" O l d e r " t h a n the Hegelian negative is a simulated language a n d t h a t i s n o l o n g e r g r a s p a b l e a s sacrificed, r e c o g n i z e d , a n d

that poetry cannot but speak. T h a t which poetry each time identified. C e n t r a l t o A g a m b e n ' s r e c e n t w o r k i s t h e n o t i o n o f

s a y s will b e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e e m p t y t o t a l i t y o f l a n g u a g e c o m p l e t e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e . W e believe

itself. Before a n y t h i n g is c o m m u n i c a t e d , c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself t h e r e f o r e t h a t his w o r k unfolds f r o m B l a n c h o t ' s la communauté


inavouable, although Agamben seems to wani i<> deny t i n s , in themselves.) Foi each oi them, Striving to say the u n s a y a b l e ,
Agamben's terms, the Bianchotian writer would be s o m e o n e w r i t i n g is a c o m m u n i c a t i o n thai interrupts itself a n d c o m e s
w h o c a n n o t n o t s p e a k a n d w h o has b e c o m e c a p a b l e o f this back to itself in a s u s p e n s i o n that will p r e c e d e n o t h i n g a n d
i m p o t e n c e (like a literary G l e n n G o u l d , t o use A g a m b e n ' s o w n t h u s refuse the p r e s e n t . The n o t i o n of r a d i c a l s u s p e n s i o n is
e x a m p l e ) . B l a n c h o t (or " B l a n c h o t " ) i s c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d i n n o t m e r e l y a t h e o r e t i c a l nicety. It is t h e very w n p o w e r of t h e
l a n g u a g e , is an i m a g e of himself, b u t as he is c o m p l e t e l y a b - l a n g u a g e of p o e t r y . R a d i c a l s u s p e n s i o n o p e n s us to a h o l l o w
sorbed in language, he is outside himself a n d is thus an image interval of nonsalvageable time t h a t is b o t h w i t h o u t continu-
o f n o o n e . " B l a n c h o t " i s t h e n a m e o f a n infinite d i s p e r s i o n : a t i o n a n d a l s o w i t h o u t c e s s a t i o n . I t will h a v e b e e n a t i m e t h a t
l a n g u a g e itself as a p u r e potentia, or as t h e e m p t i n e s s or p u r e departs from the robust time of geometric chronology.
exteriority t h a t is not a " b e y o n d " but instead an eternal re- We bring together and overlap three thinkers here to the
t u r n to a never-having-been or an extreme youth. A g a m b e n e x t e n t t h a t e a c h a r t i c u l a t e s a n e x t r e m e passivity, e x p r o p r i a -
suggests t h a t o u r e r a — t h e era of the image, of the spectacle, t i o n , d e - n u c l e a t i o n , or n e u t r a l i t y t h a t is p a r a d o x i c a l l y consti-
of t h e e v a c u a t i o n of all beliefs a n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , i n d e e d , of tutive of t h e self, t h e i m a g e , or t h e c o m m u n i t y . To be s u r e ,
t h e R e a l itself—offers us this r e t u r n to a n e v e r - h a v i n g - b e e n as other thinkers have devoted themselves to various versions of
a n e t e r n a l last h o p e . T h e e s s e n c e o f t h e S p e c t a c l e (like t h e r a d i c a l passivity. G e o r g e s Bataille, Gilles D e l e u z e , Luce Irigaray,
l o g i c o f t h e i m a g e w e e x a m i n e i n o u r first c h a p t e r ) i s t o s u b - Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-Luc N a n c y are a m o n g
t r a c t o r e v e n insist o n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e o b j e c t , a n d t h u s i m - those w h o have fashioned their o w n versions of the enigma.
mediately to depart from simple representation. To be sure, Beyond these m o r e recent thinkers there are, of course, Heideg-
w e c a n still seek i n t h e i m a g e for t h a t o f w h i c h w e a r e c h e a t e d ger's t h i n k i n g o f f i n i t u d e , N i e t z s c h e ' s t h o u g h t o f t h e E t e r n a l
(as m a n y o f m y s t u d e n t s often t r y t o find i n p r o f e s s i o n a l w r e s - R e t u r n , a n d even, in a certain sense, Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of the
tling s o m e of the reality of G r e c o - R o m a n wrestling so t h a t T r a n s c e n d e n t a l I m a g i n a t i o n (as w e shall e x a m i n e i n o u r c h a p t e r
they can m a k e of Hulk H o g a n the degraded image of an Olym- o n A g a m b e n ) . N o d o u b t w e a r e f o r g e t t i n g still o t h e r s , b u t this
p i c c h a m p i o n ) , b u t w e c a n a l s o cease t o d o t h i s . W e c a n let t h e o n l y a t t e s t s t o t h e fact t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o h i s t o r i c i z i n g o f
p r e s t i g e of t h a t w h i c h is r e p r e s e n t e d (the m o d e l ) d i s s o l v e in w h a t is precisely a p o i n t of d i s p e r s i o n : t h e s i n g u l a r i t y of an
the image. e n i g m a t h a t " s a v e s " multiplicity s u c h t h a t even t h e t e r m " e n i g -

Any c o m m e n t a r y on the writings of Levinas, Blanchot, m a " (which w e b o r r o w from Levinas) m u s t b e s u b m i t t e d t o

a n d A g a m b e n will b e difficult, b e c a u s e e a c h w r i t e s i n s u c h a its d i s p l a c e m e n t in a series of o t h e r t e r m s s u c h as dissemina-

w a y that our p o w e r to read is neutralized and dispersed. Each tion, desistance, differance, point d'autrui, a n d still o t h e r s t h a t

of these thinkers writes in such a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is are as well k n o w n . H e n c e the restlessness, imposition, super-

interrupted, a n d any formal presentation of their t h o u g h t , such i m p o s i t i o n , d i s p a r i t y , c o n t e s t a t i o n , conflict, a n d o b l i q u e n e s s

a s o u r s h e r e , i s ceaselessly p o s t p o n e d . T o p u t i t m o s t b l u n t l y , t h a t ( d e ) c o n s t i t u t e s this p o p u l a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s . " P h i l o s o p h y

t h e y r e p e a t t h e m s e l v e s endlessly. ( T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f is philosophers in an intersubjective 'intrigue' t h a t n o b o d y

L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t , w h o r e p e a t each other a s w e l l a s e c h o r e s o l v e s , w h i l e n o b o d y is a l l o w e d a l a p s e of a t t e n t i o n or a
lack <>l rigor,"' Levinas tells us. In this s e n s e , each <>| these the expei ien< e ol finitude, ol pHtnordictl t e m p o r a l i t y , is, as we
t h i n k e r ' s d i s c o u r s e s is an " e a c h time" ol the e n i g m a itself since k n o w from Heidegger, rigorously u n r e a c h a b l e . We are pre-
t h e e n i g m a of d e - n u c l e a t i o n is t h e very t a k i n g - p l a c e of c o m - < isely not equal t o i t . It is the passion of the O u t s i d e , as B l a n c h o t
m u n i c a t i v i t y itself, a s w e w a n t t o s h o w . A l w a y s t h e " s a m e " might say. But the O u t s i d e is n o t t h e B e y o n d a n d s o , simplify-
enigma, communicativity is only as trace or iteration w i t h o u t ing t h i n g s , w e will say t h a t w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n L e v i n a s t o t h e
identity. T h i s p o p u l a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s t h e n , f r o m w h i c h w e h a v e e x t e n t t h a t h e fails t o r e v e a l o r i n s t i t u t e a n e t h i c a l B e y o n d ; w e
plucked three, is a c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t commonality, w i t h o u t are interested in Blanchot to the extent that he involves us in
substance or essence. this i n c e s s a n t l i m i t i n g t h a t is t h e v e r y p a s s i o n of t h e ( n o t ) Be-
I f w e focus o n t h e s e t h r e e t h i n k e r s i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s n o t t o y o n d (le pas au-delà); a n d we a r e i n t e r e s t e d in A g a m b e n i n s o -
f o c u s o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c s , l i t e r a t u r e , o r p o l i t i c s , b u t in- far a s h e m a k e s o f this a m b i g u o u s limit a n i n e s c a p a b l e a n d
stead to approach that which in each text touches on any eth- unexcludable "belonging." M o r e narrowly, we are interested
ics, l i t e r a t u r e , o r politics w h a t e v e r , a n d w h i c h e a c h w r i t e r e x - i n a B l a n c h o t i a n " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h " t h a t p r e c e d e s access t o
poses in diverse w a y s . We could, p e r h a p s , have written exclu- a n y a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h a t i s t o say, w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n a n
sively on Heidegger, or H e i d e g g e r w i t h K a n t (of t h e Kantbuch), a n t e r i o r i t y t h a t i n f o r m s t h e Levinasian éthique, t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
o r N i e t z s c h e ( w i t h a n d a g a i n s t H e i d e g g e r ) , since t h i s p o p u l a - littéraire, and the Agambenian Quodlibet ens.
t i o n ( m o r e o r less) s c h e m a t i z e s t h e a b y s s w e t o d a y i n h e r i t a n d Beginning with Levinas's 1 9 4 8 essay "Réalité et son
experience constantly in o u r thinking. Instead, we confine o m b r e , " w e p r o c e e d t o s h o w h o w a s p e c t s o f t h a t a n a l y s i s in-
o u r s e l v e s t o t h i n k e r s w h o confine t h e m s e l v e s t o p r o b l e m s t r a - f o r m b o t h his o w n n o t i o n o f a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t
d i t i o n a l l y " s e c o n d a r y " t o f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y (even if, i n precedes egology, a n d also informs Blanchot's n o t i o n s of writ-
fact, L e v i n a s w i s h e s t o i n s t i t u t e e t h i c s a s "first p h i l o s o p h y " ) . i n g a n d t h e i m a g i n a r y . We t h e n will r e a d B l a n c h o t ' s L'arrêt de
I n e a c h c a s e , t h e s e " s e c o n d a r y " c o n c e r n s b e c o m e very s t r a n g e , mort a s a w o r k "structured" by n o n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d
u n f a m i l i a r , n o t t o say imaginary (i.e., p r o p e r l y b e l o n g i n g t o s t r u g g l e (or, i f y o u w i l l , " s t r u c t u r e d " b y finitude). F r o m t h e r e
n o c a t e g o r y a t all). E a c h t h i n k e r w e e x a m i n e h e r e i s a s t r a n g e we a n a l y z e A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene in l i g h t of H e i -
specialist w h o s e a t t e n t i o n t o ethical, literary, a n d political p r o b - degger's reading of Kantian schematism in order to s h o w an
l e m s h a s led h i m i n t o a n o b s c u r e r e l a t i o n w i t h l a n g u a g e itself affinity b e t w e e n i t a n d t h e B l a n c h o t i a n i m a g i n a r y t h a t , i n t h e
a n d m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s w i t h t i m e . E a c h o p e n s his discipline o n t o e n d , w e c l a i m i s t h e v e r y " p l a c e " o f c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a n d its
a dimension in which language becomes imaginary (anony- r a d i c a l passivity.
m o u s , spoken by no one), a n d in w h i c h time diverges from the We are arguing that the point to which each thinker we
State-time of chronological progress, increase, and improve- e x a m i n e l e a d s us is t h e p o i n t of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y as such, in-
m e n t t o w h i c h c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i t y c o m p u l s i v e l y sacrifices it- s o f a r as this p o i n t is in itself an i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a -
self. T o p u t i t s u c c i n c t l y : W e a r e m o d e r n t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e t i o n . T h a t is to say, c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y pulverizes d i s c o u r s e . It
a r e sick w i t h c o n t i n u o u s , fleeting, a n d g e o m e t r i c t i m e , a n d w e gives n o t h i n g t o b e t h o u g h t ; i t gives n o m e s s a g e t o w h i c h w e
are O t h e r to the extent that we are—in a nutshell—finite. But m i g h t listen b u t , in effect, says: t h e r e is (il y a). C o m m u n i c a t i v i t y
as such—when- ii'h,it is c o m m u n i c a t e d is noi o u t s i d e ii but ol thought, is thingish, like anothei body, or like the words
i n s t e a d b u r i e s l a n g u a g e in itsell is poetry, the o r i g i n a l and we speak at a Mineral. Those dying, w o r d s weigh like t h i n g s in

a b s o l u t e singularity of w h a t d o e s n o t cease to t a k e place. Com- o u r mouths b e c a u s e ihey are n o l o n g e r a b l e t o refer t o a n y -

munication, t h e n , is the pure form of t h e separation of t h i n g real. The l a n g u a g e of p o e t r y is t h e very w e a k n e s s of

c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y from itself, or, in a w o r d , (chronological) t i m e . m e a n i n g t h a t r e m a i n s w h e n t h e real i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m o u r

P o e t r y , h o w e v e r , is an e x p e r i e n c e of t i m e t h a t is r a d i c a l l y d i s - p o w e r s . T h i s funereal l a n g u a g e w e i g h s i n m y m o u t h a s a t h i n g

c o n t i n u o u s . It is t h e t i m e of f u t u r i t y t h a t d o e s n o t lie in a a n d is offered to o t h e r s as a useless gift b e c a u s e it c a n no l o n g e r

future either remote or just a r o u n d the corner, but rather in disappear into the labor of referring. In the lugubrious a t m o -

t h e infinitive " t o " o f t h e " t o c o m e " (or à venir) t o w h i c h w e sphere of the funeral, w o r d s are that w h i c h maintain contact

shall refer n u m e r o u s t i m e s t h r o u g h o u t t h i s b o o k . I n p o e t r y , w i t h a p r o f o u n d l y p a r a l y z e d t i m e . N o l o n g e r a b l e t o refer,

t h a t w h i c h s p e a k s i s t h e very " t o " o f " t o s p e a k . " P o e t r y says language is imperceptibly transformed because it begins to

t h e p u r e there, o r t h e p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n y r e l a t i o n w h a t - r e s e m b l e itself. U n a b l e t o r e v e a l o r aver, w o r d s a r e l o s t b e -

ever, a n d it is o n l y to t h e p u r e there t h a t we ( " p r o p e r l y , " finitely) t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d s h o w i n g , between saying a n d seeing, a n d

belong; but we belong such that no residue remains u p o n which they depart from the straightforwardness of intentionality as

w e m a y reflect, n o r e s i d u e o r p l e a t t h a t w o u l d a l l o w u s t h e if l u r e d by a n o t h e r destiny. I n s o f a r as I c a n n o t s e p a r a t e myself

a b i l i t y t o g r a s p a n d a u t o - o r i g i n a t e o u r s e l v e s . E m p t y o f itself, f r o m t h e s e w o r d s t h a t linger o n m y t o n g u e — w o r d s t h a t a r e

o r different i n itself, w e " o r i g i n a t e , " t h u s , i n t h e i n c e s s a n t r e p - n o l o n g e r m y o w n since t h e y h a v e defected f r o m m y m e a n i n g -

e t i t i o n of t h e there. T h i s will be t h e " o r i g i n a l e x p e r i e n c e " of to-say—they involve me in t h a t other destiny of w h i c h they

which B l a n c h o t s p e a k s in L'espace littéraire. are already a part.


Recently, in a television newscast, we s a w the story of an
e l d e r l y w o m a n w h o s e h u s b a n d h a d p a s s e d a w a y o n t h e floor
o f t h e i r h o m e . She p l a c e d a b l a n k e t o v e r t h e b o d y a n d h e r e -
The Language of Poetry
m a i n e d t h e r e , as if u n d e r t h e b l a n k e t , for a n u m b e r of y e a r s

Merveilleuse hypocrite! Car elle aime la folie qu'elle u n t i l a social w o r k e r d i s c o v e r e d t h e " b i z a r r e " s i t u a t i o n . T h e
surveille. w o m a n h a d c o n t i n u e d t o live, i n t h e m e a n t i m e , m o r e o r less
—Levinas a s she h a d b e f o r e , a s b e s t she c o u l d , given t h e s o l i t u d e a n d
failing s t r e n g t h o f a d v a n c e d a g e . A p p a r e n t l y , s h e n e v e r d e n i e d

P o e t r y i s l a n g u a g e t h a t m a k e s itself felt like t h e t o herself t h a t h e r h u s b a n d w a s d e a d (as d i d t h e d u c h e s s o f

b o d i e s o f liars a n d i m p o s t o r s t h a t b r u s h u p a g a i n s t u s d a i l y o n M a r l b o r o , w h o h a d a statue m a d e of her late h u s b a n d Will-

the street. According to Levinas, the language of p o e t r y does i a m Congreve, a n d seated it at the dinner table, w h e r e she

n o t " n a m e a species w h o s e g e n u s i s r e f e r r e d t o b y t h e w o r d w o u l d converse with it as if the great dramatist had s o m e h o w


2
a r t . " I f P a u l C e l a n " s e e s n o difference b e t w e e n a p o e m a n d a s u r v i v e d his o w n d e a t h ) . T h e social w o r k e r w h o c o m m e n t e d
3
h a n d s h a k e , " it is because poetry, refractory to the categories o n t h e s i t u a t i o n h e h a d d i s c o v e r e d said, p o i g n a n t l y , t h a t t h e r e
w a s o b v i o u s l y great affection here. 01 the most demanding () N E
k i n d , we m u s t a d d . For hers is not a disturbing love. It is n o t
I s o l d e ' s or S a l o m e ' s love. H e r s , we m u s t i m a g i n e , is a m o s t
i r r e p a r a b l e , profane, a n d absolutely impoverished love (to
b o r r o w s o m e t e r m s f r o m A g a m b e n t h a t seem t o b e l o n g i n t h i s The Allegory of Being
c o n t e x t ) : l o v e for h e r h u s b a n d , for t h e u n r e d e e m e d , u n b u r i e d ,
o v e r l y p r e s e n t b o d y h e r h u s b a n d w a s , a n d w a s n o t . She d i d
n o t , i t s e e m s , l o n g for t h e w i t h d r a w n b e i n g h e r h u s b a n d h a d
b e e n , b u t i n s t e a d r e m a i n e d faithful t o t h e d e a t h h e r h u s b a n d
c o u l d n o t a c c o m p l i s h . T h i s c o u l d o n l y h a v e led h e r a s t r a y i n
h e r m a d n e s s (if w e m u s t call i t t h a t ) , s c a t t e r i n g h e r affection
everywhere in the house because her h u s b a n d could no longer
o c c u p y his p r o p e r place. W e i m a g i n e t h a t she m u s t h a v e e n j o y e d
an elemental intimacy, p r o f o u n d and w i t h o u t qualifications.
T h e peculiar intimacy a n d intensity that traditionally be-
l o n g t o l i t e r a t u r e a r e a f i d e l i t y t o a m b i g u i t y t h a t s c a t t e r s inti- Image
m a c y e v e r y w h e r e , m u l t i p l y i n g i t t o infinity, like t h e s n o w f l a k e s L e v i n a s b e g i n s his 1 9 4 8 e s s a y o n a r t , " L a r é a l i t é e t
t h a t fell d o w n u p o n B r e k h o u n o v a s h e lay d o w n u p o n N i k i t a , son o m b r e , " simply enough. As everyone k n o w s , the artist
in the tale from Tolstoy of which Blanchot is so fond. In this 4 s u b s t i t u t e s a n i m a g e for a c o n c e p t . U n i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e intelli-
s t u d y w e w o u l d like t o say very little. W e w o u l d p r e f e r t o b e gibility of t h e object, t h e a r t i s t d o e s n o t m a i n t a i n a real r e l a t i o n -
like t h e e l d e r l y w o m a n w h o d i d v e r y little for h e r h u s b a n d s h i p w i t h t h e o b j e c t b y k n o w i n g it, g r a s p i n g it, a n d p u t t i n g i t
u p o n h i s d e m i s e . She m e r e l y p l a c e d a b l a n k e t o v e r h i m . W e t o w o r k . B y s u b s t i t u t i n g a n i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t , all r e a l
w o u l d merely w a n t to note that in the image, in the narrative, relations w i t h the object are neutralized. Artistic "disinterest"
in t h e o t h e r p e r s o n — a s it w e r e , "in p a r e n t h e s i s " (or in q u o t a - is just this blindness to concepts, Levinas says. T h e artistic
t i o n m a r k s ) or, if y o u prefer, under erasure ( b e c a u s e t h e p a r e n - g a z e n e u t r a l i z e s v i s i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n . It is n o t an a c t . It is a
t h e s e s a r e invisible a n d c a n n o t b e a d m i t t e d i n t o t h e n a r r a t i v e nonconcerning, n o n k n o w i n g gaze. It does not cross a distance
p r o p e r , y e t i n t r o d u c e i n t o t h e s t o r y a n e l e m e n t t h a t i s felt w i t h - in order to grasp an object as does the h a n d t h a t labors or the
o u t b e i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d , like a n a p h o n i c voice t h a t says " k e e p c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t seizes t h e t h i n g i n a n a c t o f r e c o g n i t i o n .
me in mind but do not think a b o u t m e " ) — o n e enters a maze T h e simple, e l e m e n t a r y s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t
o f r u m o r a n d i n n u e n d o a s i f o n e ' s p o w e r t o r e a d , t o see, a n d i n v e r t s all directionality, all c o n s c i o u s " a i m i n g - a t . " T h e i m a g e
t o tell h a d b e c o m e defective, a o r i s t , m e t a m o r p h o s e d , a n d su- t h a t t h e a r t i s t s u b s t i t u t e s for t h e c o n c e p t i s n o t a n o t h e r o b j e c t
pererogatory. a n d d o e s n o t b e h a v e like a n o b j e c t . I n e v e r y d a y life, i n e v e r y -
d a y c o m m e r c e w i t h t h i n g s , t h e seized object t e n d s t o d i s a p p e a r

33
a oneseli I >m a son ol passage from oneseli to anonymity [dans
into its usefulness, its fun< tion, its familiarity. A11 arrests ilii.s
le rythme il n'y a plus de SOI, mais c o n i m c un p a s s a g e de soi a
movement ol recognition and industry. In art, that w h i c h v a n -
M
I'anonymat |.'
ishes into utility a n d k n o w l e d g e r e a p p e a r s o u t s i d e its useful-
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n itself is an u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o v e m e n t .
n e s s , o u t s i d e all real r e l a t i o n s , in a s p a c e strictly u n c r o s s a b l e ,
In a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e t h e r e is an i n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h o is
infinitely fragile, o n l y p r o x i m a l l y there at all, as if its e x i s t -
p o s s e s s e d o r affected a n d t h a t w h i c h p o s s e s s e s o r affects.
e n c e h a d b e e n p a r a l y z e d , o r a s i f t h e o b j e c t led a p h a n t o m
L e v i n a s n o t e s i n p a s s i n g t h a t this s i m u l t a n e i t y o f p o s s e s s i o n
e x i s t e n c e p a r a l l e l t o its t r u t h .
a n d d i s p o s s e s s i o n h a s a r o l e in ecstatic r i t e s . A e s t h e t i c exist-
T h e i m a g e i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y o r essentially p a s s i v e . I t e l u d e s
ence involves us in an indistinction of " s a m e " a n d "other." It
all a t t e m p t s t o seize i t b e c a u s e i t o c c u p i e s e m p t y s p a c e . A n
is t h u s a t r u l y u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o m e n t ( b u t n o t a " b e y o n d " )
i m a g e , q u i t e simply, i s n o t h i n g . O u r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e i m a g e
w h e r e i n t h e d e n s i t y of b e i n g in its " h e r e " is i n v a d e d by a " n o -
" m a r k s a h o l d o v e r u s r a t h e r t h a n o u r initiative [ m a r q u e u n e
1 w h e r e , " a " n o t h i n g . " R h y t h m c a n n o t b e objectified; i t c a n
emprise sur n o u s , plutôt que n o t r e initiative]," Levinas says.
o n l y b e d r a m a t i z e d , e n a c t e d , suffered. I t i s e x p e r i e n c e d a s
T h e i m a g e c o n t r a s t s w i t h c o n c e p t s or, m o r e precisely, i t i s t h e
i n d i s t i n c t i o n , a s myself-as-other. U n a b l e t o h a n g o n t o its free-
v e r y e v e n t o f c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h c o n c e p t s . Precisely t o t h e e x -
d o m , the subject experiences an exteriority in which it c a n n o t
t e n t t h a t I d o n o t a c t o n , k n o w , o r t h i n k t h e t h i n g i n its c o n -
b u t m i s t a k e itself for a n o t h e r . T h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t c e a s e s t o
cept, there is an inversion of my everyday relationship with
e x p e r i e n c e itself as itself. T o t a l l y a b s o r b e d in t h e s c e n e , c o n -
the object, a n d subjectivity is p u s h e d to an e x t r e m e pole of
s c i o u s n e s s , h a v i n g n o t h i n g t o a i m at, b e c o m e s s u p e r e r o g a t o r y ,
passivity. U n a b l e to seize an i m a g e , I p a r t i c i p a t e in its i m a g i -
a s d o e s t h e b o d y , for, a t o n c e a c t o r a n d s p e c t a t o r , t h e b o d y i s
n a r y d i m e n s i o n . T h i s passivity c a n b e o b s e r v e d , L e v i n a s p o i n t s
2 transformed into sensations belonging to no one, or belong-
o u t , i n m u s i c , d a n c e , a n d m a g i c . T o this list w e m a y a d d t r a n c e ,
ing to an a n o n y m o u s Someone w h o s e organs of perception
hysterical possession, a n d hypnotic suggestion. In short, the
h a v e d e f e c t e d . H e n c e t h e fear o f t h e a r t i s t i c m i l i e u t h a t i s a t -
i m a g e i n s p i r e s a n d i t i s just t h e i m a g e t h a t i n s p i r e s , n o t t h e
t e s t e d t o i n t h e n e r v o u s a n x i e t y s o m a n y p e o p l e feel i n t h e
o b j e c t it r e p r e s e n t s . Precisely when there is nothing and just
c r o w d e d concert hall or the august m u s e u m .
insofar as there is nothing, the image exercises its impotent
power. R h y t h m a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e t h e " e x c e p t i o n a l s t r u c - A n i m a g e , L e v i n a s s a y s , i s essentially m u s i c a l i n s o f a r a s i t

t u r e of a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e [la s t r u c t u r e e x c e p t i o n e l l e de l'exis- d e t a c h e s itself f r o m t h e o b j e c t a s d o e s s o u n d f r o m t h a t w h i c h


5

t e n c e e s t h é t i q u e ] " a n d a r e a l s o t h e w a y " t h e p o e t i c o r d e r af- m a k e s the s o u n d . In the aesthetic experience, this d e t a c h m e n t


3
fects u s [ l ' o r d r e p o é t i q u e n o u s a f f e c t e ] . " T h i s i n v o l v e m e n t , i s a n e s s e n t i a l a t m o s p h e r e . I n fact, h o w e v e r , this a t m o s p h e r e

i m p o r t a n t l y , i s n o t " b e y o n d " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t is, t o t h e c o n - is everywhere because images are everywhere. Indeed, the

t r a r y , t h e p r o f o u n d i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e s u b j e c t i n its o w n r e p - w h o l e w o r l d w e a r s o n its face its o w n i m a g e a n d w e a r e t h u s

resentations. P r o f o u n d because their " e n t r y into us is o n e w i t h permitted to think a dimension of aesthetic participation t h a t

o u r entry into them [entrent en nous ou nous entrons en eux, is general a n d n o t restricted to the movie theater or concert

p e u i m p o r t e ] , " a n d t h e r e f o r e " i n this r h y t h m t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r hall. This general dimension of p r o f o u n d participation w o u l d ,


then, subtend consciousness and industry at every moment, i m a g e , a nonobje< t, • t h i n g , triggers the i m m e d i a c y oi p a s -
Industrial language necessarily fails to tell of this i n v o l v e m e n t , s i o n a t e i n v o l v e m e n t . W h i l e r e t a i n i n g the f o r m , c o l o r s , s o u n d ,
for this p r o f o u n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n defects from "every m o m e n t " a n d o t h e r q u a l i t i e s ol the o b j e c t , the i m a g e , in effect, " d r i v e s
of subjectivity (i.e., of initiative a n d p o w e r ) . T h e d e c o n c e p t u a l - t h e object out o f t h e w o r l d [chasser les o b j e t s d u m o n d e ] " a n d
7
i z a t i o n of r e a l i t y t h a t a r t realizes r e s t r i c t e d l y is, in fact, a g e n - t h u s " b r e a k s u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [briser l a r e p r é s e n t a t i o n ] "
e r a l i z e d i m p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t lies " b e l o w " all k n o w i n g . I f y o u because the image subtracts the object to be represented from
like, a n e c s t a t i c rite s h a d o w s all c o g n i t i o n . W h e r e b e i n g - i n - the representation. T h e image disincarnates the real, b u t this
t h e - w o r l d involves existence in concepts a n d t r u t h , ecstatic is so o n l y b e c a u s e t h e real is a l w a y s a l r e a d y a p p r o a c h e d by its
sensations depart from each m o m e n t of being-in-the-world i m a g e : " T h e w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d , w i t h its e l e m e n t a r y a n d in-
a n d i n v o l v e us in a d i s i n c a r n a t i o n of t h e r e a l s i m p l y b e c a u s e tellectually e l a b o r a t e d g i v e n s , c a n t o u c h u s musically, c a n b e -
o f t h e i m a g e (the n o n o b j e c t , o r t h e m u s i c ) t h a t i s o n t h e face c o m e a n i m a g e [ L ' e n s e m b l e d e n o t r e m o n d e , a v e c ses d o n n é e s
o f all t h a t i s i n t h e w o r l d . B e n e a t h o r b e s i d e o n e ' s c o n c e p t u a l et élémentaires et intellectuellement élaborées, peut nous
8
commerce with the world there remains a rhythmic participa- toucher musicalement, devenir i m a g e ] . " Art in general real-
t i o n w h o s e i m m e d i a c y drives o u t all t h o u g h t . A e s t h e t i c e x i s t - izes t h i s l a t e n c y a n d p e r p e t u a l l y effaces t h e difference b e t w e e n
e n c e , in s h o r t , is p e r p e t u a l l y suggestive, affirmative, influential, the real a n d t h e imaginary, n a t u r e a n d mimesis. " L a réalité et
i m p e r s o n a l , a n d i m m e m o r i a l . It is as if in t h e r e a l itself a b a n d son o m b r e " is thus an introduction to the i m p o r t a n t recent
o f Sirens h a d a l w a y s called t o u s , a s i n B l a n c h o t ' s r e t e l l i n g o f w o r k d o n e by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe on radical, or n o n -
9
the fabulous episode from Homer. 6
P l a t o n i c (i.e., n o n r e s t r i c t e d , t h a t is to say, general) m i m e s i s .
A r t realizes t h e p a r a d o x o f i m m e d i a c y — t h e p a r a d o x o f
a n i m m e d i a c y t h a t d r i v e s o u t all m e d i a t i o n a n d , e s s e n t i a l l y
e m p t y , d r i v e s o u t itself a n d i s t h u s o u t s i d e m e m o r y . D i s i n c a r - Duality
nate a n d impersonal, aesthetic existence c a n n o t enter into any A sign d i r e c t l y refers to its o b j e c t , b u t an i m a g e
10
p r e s e n t (or it " d i e s " w h e n forced t o , as do the Sirens in resembles it. An image resembles an object, b u t resemblance
Blanchot's essay). It is thus intolerable to t h o u g h t . N o t the is n o t the result of a c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t w o realms: the real
m i n u t e s t sliver o f reflection o r t e m p o r a l lag m a k e s r o o m for a n d t h e i m a g i n a r y . T h i s is a key p o i n t for L e v i n a s in t h i s essay.
s u b j e c t i v e initiative o r a c t i o n . T h e m u s i c l o v e r n o d o u b t feels A u d i e n c e s w h o r e s p o n d t o a film b y i m m e d i a t e l y c o m p a r i n g
g r e a t p a s s i o n as s h e listens to a b e l o v e d p i e c e , b u t it is n o t i t t o s o m e r e a l i t y often r e s p o n d e n e r g e t i c a l l y a n d aggressively
c e r t a i n t h a t s h e feels herself in t h e p a s s i o n . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , i m - as if they w e r e being cheated of reality a n d only t h e p r o p e r
m e d i a c y u n h i n g e s m e f r o m myself. T h e p r o x i m i t y o f a r t t o c o m p a r i s o n c o u l d r e s t o r e t h e r e a l t o itself a n d k e e p t h e t w o
magic a n d trance indicates a trajectory wherein the subject r e a l m s s e p a r a t e . I n j e o p a r d y i s t h e p r o p e r difference b e t w e e n
e x p e r i e n c e s a f a i n t i n g a w a y o f self a l t o g e t h e r , a n d a n e x p o - t h e m . But resemblance is n o t the e n d result of a c o m p a r i s o n .
sure to exteriority. T h e body has a m e m b r a n e , a skin, but the I t i s t h a t w h i c h e n g e n d e r s t h e i m a g e i n t h e first p l a c e . R e s e m -
self d o e s n o t . T h e " m a g i c a l " c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i n t o a n b l a n c e b e g i n s in t h e r e a l itself:
I 1ère is a p e r s o n w h o is wli.il lie is; bill he d o e s nol apart from its truth (from its identity), li i s a s ii thai which is
m a k e u s forget, d o e s not a b s o r b , c o v e r over entirely imaginable w e r e a l w a y s already left b e h i n d by the thing. Inso-
t h e objects h e h o l d s a n d t h e w a y h e h o l d s t h e m , his far as a t h i n g r e s e m b l e s itself, it d e p a r t s from itself a n d c a n be
gestures, limbs, gaze, t h o u g h t , skin, which escape from q u o t e d , or p l a c e d in p a r e n t h e s i s , in an i m a g e . An i m a g e c a p -
u n d e r t h e i d e n t i t y of his s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h like a t o r n t u r e s a n d i m m o b i l i z e s this (invisible, u n i m a g i n a b l e ) m o v e m e n t
s a c k is u n a b l e to c o n t a i n t h e m . [ . . . ] T h e r e is t h e n a o f a thing-resembling-itself. A r t c a p t u r e s t h a t w h i c h t r u t h
d u a l i t y in this p e r s o n , t h i s t h i n g , a d u a l i t y in its b e i n g . s h e d s , leaves a b a n d o n e d , l e a k s . Art, Levinas tells us s u m m a r i l y ,
It is w h a t it is a n d it is a s t r a n g e r to itself, a n d t h e r e is " l e t s g o o f t h e p r e y for t h e s h a d o w [ l ' a r t l a c h e d o n e l a p r o i e
1 2
a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n these t w o m o m e n t s . We will say pour Pombre]." We are nonetheless entitled to ask: W h a t
t h e t h i n g is itself a n d is its i m a g e . A n d t h a t this r e l a t i o n - w a s t h e p r e y ? W h a t was lost?
s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t h i n g a n d its i m a g e i s r e s e m b l a n c e . T h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n i s a m b i g u o u s . T h e r e is, L e v i n a s
s a y s , a d u a l i t y in b e i n g , a n o n t r u t h or a d e f e c t i o n f r o m t r u t h
[Voici u n e p e r s o n n e q u i est c e q u ' e l l e est; m a i s elle n e t h a t i s s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h t r u t h . S i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h being it-
fait p a s oublier, n ' a b s o r b e p a s , n e r e c o u v r e p a s e n t i è r e - self, a t h i n g r e s e m b l e s itself, or flees itself. G i o r g i o A g a m b e n
m e n t les o b j e t s q u ' e l l e t i e n t et la m a n i è r e d o n t elle les u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s t o m e a n t h a t a t h i n g i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y itself
13
t i e n t , ses g e s t e s , ses m e m b r e s , s o n r e g a r d , s a p e n s é e , and its q u a l i t i e s w i t h o u t b e i n g t h e s a m e t h i n g a s its q u a l i t i e s .
sa peau, qui s'échappent de sous l'identité de sa sub- A t h i n g , A g a m b e n s a y s , i s n o t its q u a l i t i e s , i s n o t i d e n t i c a l t o
s t a n c e , i n c a p a b l e , c o m m e u n sac t r o u é , d e les c o n t e n i r . its q u a l i t i e s , b u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e i t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its
[ . . . ] Il y a d o n c c e t t e p e r s o n n e , d a n s c e t t e c h o s e u n e q u a l i t i e s . W e shall r e t u r n t o this d e l i c a t e p o i n t i n o u r c h a p t e r
d u a l i t é , u n e d u a l i t é d a n s s o n ê t r e . Elle est c e q u ' e l l e est o n A g a m b e n . (Let u s n o t e for n o w , h o w e v e r , t h a t B l a n c h o t
et elle est é t r a n g è r e à e l l e - m ê m e et il y a un r a p p o r t reads the same ambiguity t h r o u g h the uncanniness of the ca-
14
e n t r e ces d e u x m o m e n t s . N o u s d i r o n s q u e l a c h o s e est daver. He points out that the dear departed is nothing other
elle-même et son image. Et que ce r a p p o r t entre la chose t h a n t h e c a d a v e r t h a t lies i n s t a t e . Yet t h e d e p a r t e d i s c e r t a i n l y
e t s o n i m a g e est l a r e s s e m b l a n c e . ] 11
n o t the same thing as the corpse, is not identical with the cada-
ver. T h e d e a r d e p a r t e d o n e i s g o n e , precisely. Yet, i n t h e c o r p s e ,
A p e r s o n or a t h i n g r e s e m b l e s itself a n d t h e r e s e m b l a n c e is t h e d e p a r t e d c o m e s t o r e s e m b l e herself, o r e v e n , returns t o
a l r e a d y its " o t h e r " d e s t i n y : t o w a r d t h e i m a g e . T h i s m o v e m e n t herself a s h e r r e s e m b l a n c e , w h i l e a t t h e s a m e t i m e a b s e n t i n g
of resemblance is obscure. O n e c a n n o t imagine a thing resem- herself. T h e r e is a s o r t of e r o s i o n at w o r k h e r e t h a t is strictly
b l i n g itself. O n e s i m p l y i m a g i n e s t h e t h i n g , o f c o u r s e . T h i s s p e a k i n g u n t h i n k a b l e . It is n o t a c a s e of q u a l i t i e s c l i n g i n g to
a t t e s t s t o t h e s i m u l t a n e i t y o f its b e i n g a n d its a p p e a r i n g . T h a t s o m e substance, sub-base, or f u n d a m e n t . It is rather t h e case
which appears, however, is detachable from the thing a n d can t h a t resemblance moves to replace the real, t h a t identity seems
e n d o u t s i d e t h e t h i n g on a v i d e o t a p e or in a m u s e u m . T h a t a t o b e " c o n s t i t u t e d " b y r e s e m b l a n c e o r q u a l i t i e s w i t h o u t being
t h i n g is i m a g i n a b l e , t h a t it is sensible, gives it a n o t h e r d e s t i n y those qualities or that resemblance.)
n i i

Levinas finds, therefore, thai that w h i c h is strange, ob nait d a n s son p r o p r e reflet \ . The massive presence ol a corpse-

s c u r e (bul in no w a y ineffable), and lends itsell to art a n d to w r i n g s so m a n y tears from us b e c a u s e it o c c u p i e s fully a n d

m y t h is t h i s : Being-such-as-it-is, the real in its t r u t h , is a l r e a d y w i t h excessive c o m p l e t e n e s s the place o f t h e d e p a r t e d l o v e d

offered t o , or is in, t h e i m a g i n a r y . T h e b e i n g - i n - t h e - i m a g i n a r y o n e . T h e real is itself and it e s c a p e s itself. A r t d o e s n o t m e r e l y

of t h e r e a l is a k i n d of o r i g i n a r y e x o t i c i s m . It is t h e s t r u c t u r e reflect this e v a s i o n ; it b r i n g s it o u t a n d c o m p l e t e s it. It i n t e n s i -

o f t h e sensible a s s u c h . T h e sensible c h a r a c t e r o f t h e t h i n g , its fies it by c o m p l e t i n g it, by q u o t i n g it, by s u b s t i t u t i n g for t h e

q u a l i t i e s (red, h a r d , s o n o r o u s , a r o m a t i c ) , m a k e i t i m a g i n a b l e , t r u t h o f t h e t h i n g its i m a g e — a s i f i t w a s indifferent t o t h e

a n d t h e t r u t h o f t h e t h i n g i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its b e i n g i m a g - r e a l i t y of t h e t h i n g , or as if t h e r e a l i t y of t h e t h i n g c o u n t e d for

inable as such. T h e real, being, truth, is the place w h e r e the n o t h i n g . A r t p l a c e s i n p a r e n t h e s i s t h e fugitivity o f t h e r e a l , its

imaginary takes place. T h a t which is "lost," the " p r e y " t h a t ambiguity, a n d circumscribes a " d i m e n s i o n of evasion [une
1 6

a r t " l e t s g o of" is, q u i t e simply, t h e v e r y e v e n t o f t h e i m a g i - dimension d'évasion]." Insofar as it does this, it introduces

n a r y — a n e v e n t t h a t c a n n o t b e i m a g i n e d , a n e v e n t t h e real i s i n t o t h e w o r l d the a t m o s p h e r e o f t h a t t e m p o r a l interval L e v i n a s

a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d in. (By t h e w a y , this i s t h e t o r m e n t o f t h e calls Ventretemps.

B l a n c h o t i a n w r i t e r : h e loses t h e m o s t desired m o m e n t , t h e e v e n t T o s u m u p : I n s o f a r a s a b e i n g r e s e m b l e s itself ( a p a r t f r o m


o f p o e t i c l a n g u a g e itself. H e i s t o r m e n t e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e / a b - being itself, t h a t is, a p a r t f r o m t h e t r u t h p r o p e r t o its b e i n g ,
s e n c e in t h e i m a g e of t h a t w h i c h is u n i m a g i n a b l e . In s h o r t , t h e i.e., its p r e s e n c e ) it is sensible a n d this sensibility is its n o n t r u t h ,
r e a l as-it-is i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y b e c o m i n g a n i m a g e , a n u n t r u t h . ) its s h a d o w . T h e i m a g e d o e s n o t p r e c e d e t h e r e s e m b l i n g . T h e

Being is d u a l . It is s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h itself. I r r e d u c i b l y neutralization of space in the image is the r e s e m b l a n c e t h a t


1 7

a m b i g u o u s , it is w i t h d r a w n f r o m itself in its v e r y sensibility. "engenders the image [engendre l ' i m a g e ] . " A thing can par-

N o n t r u t h is t h e sensible c h a r a c t e r of t h e t h i n g . I n s o f a r as a t i c i p a t e in its t r u t h or in its b e i n g , b u t p a r a l l e l to t h i s a t h i n g

b e i n g r e s e m b l e s itself it is s e n s i b l e , b u t its sensibility is an o b - d e p a r t s f r o m itself i n a n e m i s s i o n t h a t i s p h a n t a s m i c a n d i s

s c u r e e s s e n c e or fugitivity t h a t " d i s i n c a r n a t e s " b e i n g . I see a n o t identical w i t h truth. T h e quasi existence of this p h a n t a s m

t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t through it. ( T h u s , L e v i n a s s a y s t h a t t h e is a " s e m b l a n c e of e x i s t i n g [ s e m b l a n t d ' e x i s t e r ] " or a n o n t r u t h


18

i m a g e i s t h e a l l e g o r y o f b e i n g , a p o i n t t o w h i c h w e shall r e t u r n without being. (In t h e c h a p t e r o n G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , w e shall

shortly.) T h e d i s i n c a r n a t i o n o f b e i n g i s t h e v e r y i n t e n s i t y a n d s h o w t h a t the Italian philosopher m a k e s of this p h a n t a s m a

e s s e n t i a l s t r a n g e n e s s o f a r t . But a r t h a s its o w n a g g r e s s i v i t y a s p u r e r e t u r n t o b e i n g , b u t t o b e i n g p u r e l y p r o f a n e d , t h a t is,

w e l l . I n a r t , t h e sensible d o e s n o t m e r e l y d e p a r t f r o m t h e r e a l . s t r i p p e d of all ineffability a n d identity.)

It " i n s i s t s " on t h e a b s e n c e of t h e o b j e c t . S p l a s h e s of color,


s o u n d , a n d bits o f foreign m a t t e r " o c c u p y [the object's] p l a c e
fully t o m a r k its r e m o v a l , a s t h o u g h t h e r e p r e s e n t e d o b j e c t The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork
d i e d , w e r e d e g r a d e d , w e r e d i s i n c a r n a t e d i n its o w n reflection W e h a v e seen t h a t a n i m a g e i s m u s i c a l , t h a t i t i s
[occupent entièrement sa place p o u r m a r q u e r son éloignement, r h y t h m i c , b u t in t h e last a n a l y s i s , it is p l a s t i c , a s t a t u e , a " s t o p -
c o m m e s i l'objet r e p r é s e n t é m o u r a i t , s e d é g r a d a i t , s e d é s i n c a r - p a g e o f t i m e , o r r a t h e r its d e l a y b e h i n d itself [un a r r ê t d u t e m p s
19
ou plutôi son retard sur lui même]." The u n i e thai seems (<> together bul infinitely fragile, a l w a y s s h a l l o w e d by the possi-
be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the arl ol novels, plays, a n d c i n e m a c a n in bility ol congealing into an image a n d thus ol w i t h d r a w i n g
no w a y " s h a t t e r t h e fixity of t h e i m a g e | n ' é b r a n l e p a s la fixité from o u r p o w e r s . ' '
de l'image]." 2 0
J u s t a s M o n a Lisa's smile will n e v e r b r o a d e n , Being is d u a l . It d o u b l e s up a n d r e s e m b l e s itself, a n d t h e
s o will H a m l e t e t e r n a l l y a g r e e t o m e e t w i t h t h e g h o s t t h a t says t e m p o r a l i t y of a r t is c a r v e d o u t of this r e p e t i t i o n . It is in t h i s
it is h i s f a t h e r ' s , a n d so e t e r n a l l y will K a n e suffer t h e loss of w a y t h a t t h e real itself solicits t h e a r t i s t , since i t i s a l w a y s
his family, his p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s , his e m p i r e , a n d his m a r - a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d i n its o w n s h a d o w a n d t h u s i s a l r e a d y v u l -
r i a g e s . T h e w o r k o f a r t will forever b e a r r e s t e d i n t h e t a s k o f nerable to the temporal modification that is the image, the
a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h e w o r k o f b e i n g . I t will forever defect f r o m narrative, the history. An artist is a p e r s o n w h o is fascinated
t h e t i m e p r o p e r t o b e i n g . C e l l u l o i d a n d p a p e r will o f c o u r s e by the plasticity of the real. He or she is o n e w h o , as Blanchot
d e c a y , b u t as an image t h e a r t w o r k will be forever fixed en s a y s , "lives t h e e v e n t a s a n i m a g e [vivre u n é v é n e m e n t e n i m -
2 4
l'entretemps, a n d this fatality is t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e r n of Levinas's age]," t h a t is, w h o e x p e r i e n c e s t h e e v e n t i n s o f a r a s i t i s al-
essay on art. ready a n i m a g e (or a l r e a d y r e s e m b l e s itself a n d i s d e t a c h e d
Art is an instant t h a t " e n d u r e s w i t h o u t a future [dure sans f r o m t h e r e a l ) . L e v i n a s p u t s i t this w a y : "Life solicits t h e n o v -
avenir]" 2 1
a n d even w i t h o u t a d u r a t i o n . For art is an image elist w h e n i t s e e m s t o h i m a s i f i t w e r e a l r e a d y s o m e t h i n g o u t
a n d a n i m a g e is, i f w e m a y say t h i s , rigorously u n c e r t a i n . I t of a b o o k [La vie sollicite le r o m a n c i e r q u a n d elle lui a p p a r a î t
2 5
does n o t even occupy space. An image is an "impersonal a n d c o m m e s i elle s o r t a i t déjà d ' u n l i v r e ] . " This means that there
a n o n y m o u s instant [instant i m p e r s o n n e l et a n o n y m e ] . " 2 2
There i s a l r e a d y s o m e t h i n g artificial a b o u t t h e r e a l , s o m e t h i n g a e s -
is thus something deadly in the puppetry that is art. Unable to t h e t i c , u n c a n n y , p l a s t i c — i f y o u l i k e , s o m e t h i n g f a k e . Life i s
f o r c e itself i n t o t h e p r e s e n t a n d a s s u m e a f u t u r e , a r t i s t h e a l w a y s very n e a r l y a n o v e l , an i m a g e , a c o r p s e . P u t differently,
intrusion of d e a t h into the familiar w o r l d . T h e t e m p o r a l i t y the real is always vulnerable to the stoppage of time—to the
a r t realizes, Levinas says, is the temporality of n i g h t m a r e . Like i m a g e of finitude—that it w e a r s on its face. I n s o f a r as t h i s
t h e z7 y a, t h e i n s t a n t of fixity t h a t is t h e e v e n t of a r t s t r i p s p e r s o n r e s e m b l e s herself, she is infinitely v u l n e r a b l e , infinitely
f r e e d o m o f its p o w e r t o a s s u m e t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t . A r t i s fragile, as an i m a g e is fragile. A s t r a n g e w e a k n e s s p e r v a d e s
n o t the replica of a time that has been suspended halfway h e r t h a t w e c a n n o t g r a s p , a b l e e d i n g w e c a n n o t s t a n c h . She i s
t h r o u g h its c o n t i n u a t i o n a n d a b a n d o n e d a s h a l f - c o m p l e t e d like n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g a s h e r r e s e m b l a n c e t o herself, b u t s h e i s
a bridge t h a t stops in midspan. As Levinas has been s h o w i n g n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n it. H u m a n r e a l i t y i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
u s , a r t i s t h a t w h i c h , i n t h e g e n e r a l e c o n o m y o f b e i n g , defects t h i s infinite v u l n e r a b i l i t y , inequality-in-itself, o r difference-in-
from the present. It is that part of being that incessantly moves itself. It is as if t h e face of t h i n g s w e r e a n o t h e r b o d y , a b o d y
to its en deçà, its " i n t e r s t i c e , " as if e a c h m o m e n t of ( c h r o n o - " m a d e u p of" fragility a n d t h a t t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f p e r s o n a l
logical) t i m e w e r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a m o m e n t of fate. T h i s s h o u l d p r e s e n c e . W e m a y w i s h t o say t h a t t h i s i s a n infinite v u l n e r -
r e m i n d us of a p o i n t t h a t is i m p o r t a n t to L e v i n a s ' s w o r k as a ability to death. However, the ontological signification is
w h o l e . He c o n c e i v e s of t i m e as a series of i n s t a n t s s u t u r e d d o u b l e d b y t h e fugitivity o f t h e i m a g e : a d e r e l i c t t i m e u n a b l e
to become present and that insists on the absence <>l being, s h o r e . It m a y be s u l i i i e d inlo time's I'i'iilirlfinj/s, outside any
b u t a s it a b s e n c e ilsell h a d been immobilized in its a p p r o a c h continuum, a n d s t o p just short ol the p r e s e n t . It is as if living
a n d c o u l d n o t even a c h i e v e the a b s e n c e the i m a g e s o d r a m a t i - t u n e w e r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s u t u r e d i n t o a plastic series, a c e a s e -
cally insists o n . less interval d e p a r t i n g from a n y c o n t i n u i t y . Or it is as if b e i n g -
L e v i n a s g o e s o n t o say i n t h i s e s s a y t h a t a r t i s " t h e u n c e r - as-it-is, i n its t r u t h , w e r e also i r r e p a r a b l y c o n s i g n e d t o n o n t r u t h ,
t a i n t y o f [time's] c o n t i n u a t i o n [ l ' i n c e r t i t u d e d e s a c o n t i n u a - t o i m m o b i l i z a t i o n i n t h e i m a g e — b u r i e d alive, a s i n P o e . A r t
tion]," 2 6
the possibility t h a t time can stop. This anxiety attests realizes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t living b e i n g c a n a l w a y s b e e x p e r i -
t o a d i m e n s i o n o f t i m e t h a t peels itself a w a y f r o m c h r o n o l o g y enced as an image, as unliving, as always already petrified—
a s t h o u g h " a w h o l e set o f facts w a s a l r e a d y i m m o b i l i z e d a n d a s i f q u a l i t i e s c l u n g t o n o t h i n g a t all.
f o r m e d a series [ c o m m e si t o u t e u n e suite de faits s ' i m m o b i l -
2 7
isaient et formaient s é r i e ] . " T h e r e a l , a t its s u r f a c e s , o n its
face, offers itself t o a r t a s i f i t w a s a l r e a d y p l a s t i c . T h e a r t i s t The Space of Art
p a r t i c i p a t e s solely i n t h e s h a d o w d i m e n s i o n . T h e v e r y inti- Art is then something horrible, "something i n h u m a n
3 0
m a c y a n d i n t e n s i t y o f a r t a r e its a t t e n t i v e n e s s t o w h a t a p p e a r s , a n d m o n s t r o u s [quelque chose d ' i n h u m a i n e t d e m o n s t r u e u x ] "
to w h a t is at the surface, to t h a t w h i c h incessantly comes to because it is powerless, because it c a n n o t go beyond, because
t h e s u r f a c e — r e s e m b l a n c e . It is at h e r s u r f a c e s t h a t a p e r s o n is i t c a n n o t e v e n e n d . A r t i s r a d i c a l passivity. I t " s h o w s " this
n e a r l y petrified, n e a r l y c a p t u r e d ( b u t i t i s h e r e t h a t she i s a l s o p a s s i v i t y in t h e s t o p p a g e of t i m e en deçà du temps. Its v a l u e to
e s s e n t i a l l y fugitive, for t h e i m a g e flees t h e p r e s e n t ) . T h i s i n c e s - c i v i l i z a t i o n is a m b i g u o u s since it is u t t e r l y foreign to t h e w o r l d
sant c o m i n g to the surface is the obscurity of the time of dy- o f i n i t i a t i v e . I t s h o w s t h e w o r l d t h e o b s c u r i t y o f fate n o t a s a n
i n g , a s L e v i n a s p r o c e e d s t o m a k e clear. T h e t i m e o f d y i n g i s elsewhere that comes from beyond to intervene in the present,
n o t the cross section of a c o n t i n u u m . Instead, " T h e time of b u t a s t h e v e r y face t h e w o r l d w e a r s . A r t a c c o m p l i s h e s t h i s
dying itself c a n n o t give itself t h e o t h e r s h o r e . W h a t is u n i q u e feat b y w a y o f i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . O u t s i d e all l a b o r , a r t b e c k o n s
a n d p o i g n a n t i n this i n s t a n t i s d u e t o t h e fact t h a t i t c a n n o t to us as if all life c o u l d e n d up in m y t h , in plasticity, in t h e
p a s s . In dying, t h e h o r i z o n of t h e f u t u r e is g i v e n , b u t t h e fu- " r h y t h m of a reality w h i c h solicits o n l y its a d m i s s i o n i n t o a
t u r e as p r o m i s e of a n e w p r e s e n t is r e f u s e d ; o n e is in t h e inter- b o o k o r a p a i n t i n g [le r h y t h m e d ' u n e r é a l i t é q u i n e sollicite
3 1
v a l , f o r e v e r a n interval [Le t e m p s - m ê m e d u mourir n e p e u t q u e s o n a d m i s s i o n d a n s u n livre o u d a n s u n t a b l e a u ] . " It is
p a s s e d o n n e r l ' a u t r e rive. C e q u e cet i n s t a n t a d ' u n i q u e e t d e as if a r t c o u l d r e p l a c e t h e b u i l d i n g up of a h a b i t a t , a w o r l d ,
p o i g n a n t t i e n t au fait de ne p a s p o u v o i r passer. D a n s le mourir, t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of justice, g o v e r n m e n t s , t h e city itself. Ulti-
l ' h o r i z o n d e l ' a v e n i r est d o n n é e , m a i s , l ' a v e n i r e n t a n t q u e mately "horrible," art nonetheless beckons to us in the same
p r o m e s s e d u p r é s e n t n o u v e a u est r e f u s é — o n est d a n s l'inter- w a y t h a t a r h y t h m i s irresistibly e n g a g i n g .
28
valle, à j a m a i s i n t e r v a l l e . ] . " T h i s dying, L e v i n a s s a y s , " i s t h e Levinas concludes, therefore, t h a t art, aesthetic existence,
g r e a t o b s e s s i o n o f t h e artist's w o r l d [la g r a n d e o b s e s s i o n d u r h y t h m , simultaneous possession a n d dispossession, a n d irre-
2 9
monde artiste]." An instant of time may not have another s p o n s i b i l i t y a r e a p a r t of life a n d h a v e a p l a c e , " b u t o n l y a
p l a c e , in l i m n . m happiness [mais u n e place seulement—dans age]" as Blanchot p u i s u . ' " An remains m c o n t a c t w i t h t h a t
11
le b o n h e u r de l'homme]." ( Iriticism, insofar as it approaches w h i c h is infinitely vulnerable to disincarnation—that w h i c h is
t h e a r t i s t i c event a s s u c h , r e i n t r o d u c e s the i n h u m a n i t y o f a r t n e i t h e r itself in its t r u t h n o r in its i m a g e (its d o u b l e , or its
b a c k i n t o t h e w o r l d . A s w e h a v e seen, this will n o t i n v o l v e a o t h e r fate). T h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f the i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t i s
c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e a r t w o r k t o s o m e reality. I t involves t r e a t i n g o n l y t h e first s t e p , for w h e n t h e i m a g e h a s s u c c e e d e d i n d r i v -
the a r t w o r k as a myth: "[TJhis immobile statue has to be p u t ing t h e o b j e c t o u t o f e x i s t e n c e , w h a t r e m a i n s ? W h a t i s t h e
i n m o v e m e n t a n d m a d e t o s p e a k [cette s t a t u e i m m o b i l e , i l f a u t image w h e n it is no longer an image of . . . ? Neither the thing
l a m e t t r e e n m o u v e m e n t e t l a faire p a r l e r ] . " 3 3
It involves, in n o r its d o u b l e , t h e a r t w o r k i s a t o n c e t h e t r a c e o f n o o r i g i n . I f
short, interrupting myth and integrating that which is exces- a r t " l e t s g o o f t h e p r e y for t h e s h a d o w , " a n d i f t h e " i n s e c u r i t y
sively c l o s e d t o l a n g u a g e b a c k i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e f r o m w h i c h i t of a b e i n g t h a t h a s a p r e s e n t i m e n t of its fate is t h e g r e a t o b s e s -
defected. 34
M y t h is t h e s o u r c e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h , for it is, s i o n o f t h e artist's w o r l d , " t h i s i s b e c a u s e a r t m a i n t a i n s c o n -
as the m o m e n t of resemblance, the distance the real takes from t a c t w i t h t h e i m a g i n a r y s p a c e left e m p t y o f all s u b s t a n c e a n d
itself—its a m b i g u i t y a n d duality. A r t i s a n i n v e r s i o n o f c r e - i n h a b i t e d b y n o o n e — t h e s p a c e t h a t b e i n g spills o u t i n t o , b e -
ation. 3 5
It presents to the world the vulnerability of congeal- side itself. In t h i s s p a c e ( B l a n c h o t ' s l'espace littéraire), t h e r e a l
i n g i n t o a n i m a g e t h a t all c r e a t i o n i s p r e y t o , a n d p h i l o s o p h y i s a l r e a d y i m a g i n a r y a n d d e t a c h e d f r o m its t r u t h , its identity.
a n d c r i t i c i s m c a n ally t h e m s e l v e s w i t h c r e a t i o n o n l y b y " s k i p - I n t h i s s p a c e , t h e plasticity o f m a t t e r n o l o n g e r refers t o t h e
p i n g o v e r t h e i n t e r v a l s o f t h e m e a n w h i l e [en s a u t a n t les s u b s t a n c e t o w h i c h q u a l i t i e s cling b u t t o t h e a r r e s t e d d e a t h
intervalles de l ' e n t r e t e m p s ] . " 3 6
I n effect, this m e a n s t h a t p h i - t h a t is the rigorous immobility of the statue. It is a m b i g u o u s
l o s o p h y a n d criticism c a n o n l y b e g i n b y " f o r g e t t i n g " a r t . s p a c e a n d it is t h e m o s t s u b t l e of b o d i e s , for it is n e i t h e r s u b -

For, like a n i d o l , L e v i n a s s a y s , a n a r t w o r k i s " s t u p i d . " 3 7 stance nor image but rather the liquidation of the elemental

W e m u s t a d d t h a t every artist since P y g m a l i o n h a s k n o w n t h i s . distance that separates the t w o . This space belongs neither to

A r t is a c a r i c a t u r e of life, n o t a n o t h e r , better, life. T h e a r t w o r k art nor to philosophy, neither to the image nor to the concept.

c a n n o t a s s u m e o r t a k e o n life. I t o v e r f l o w s life o n all s i d e s , I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , t h e a r t i s t i s allied w i t h t h e v e r y

like w a t e r w i t h o u t a c o n t a i n e r . U n a b l e t o a t t a i n t h e p r e s e n t w e a k n e s s o f s p a c e itself: c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r s h e e r c o m m u n i c a -

m o m e n t , t h e a r t w o r k spills all t h e a s p i r a t i o n s t h e a r t i s t b u i l t t i v i t y — t h e p u r e " t h e r e i s " (il y a). ( B l a n c h o t , in o u r o p i n i o n ,

i n t o it. A r t c a n o n l y e m p t y itself of all t h e artist's efforts. has gone further t h a n any other writer in our times t o w a r d

The elementary procedure of art is to substitute an image m a k i n g this space "speak.")

for a c o n c e p t . But t h e a r t i s t c a n n o t b e said t o a i m a t t h e i m a g e " I n e r t m a t t e r , " L e v i n a s s a y s , " a l r e a d y refers to a s u b s t a n c e


p e r se as a g o a l . A r t ( e x c e p t in a d v e r t i s i n g ) d o e s n o t w i s h to t o w h i c h its q u a l i t i e s cling. I n a s t a t u e , m a t t e r k n o w s t h e d e a t h
limit itself t o a n i m a g e , h o w e v e r p e r f e c t o r b e a u t i f u l . N e i t h e r of i d o l s [La m a t i è r e inert se réfère déjà u n e s u b s t a n c e à l a q u e l l e
d o e s t h e a r t i s t a i m a t a n elusive essence n o r ineffability, a s d o s ' a c c r o c h e n t ses q u a l i t é s . D a n s l a s t a t u e , l a m a t i è r e c o n n a î t l a
39

p h i l o s o p h y a n d criticism. Art aims to r e m a i n in c o n t a c t w i t h mort de l'idole]." T h i s m e a n s t h a t i n a r t m a t t e r will e n c o u n -


t h a t w h i c h is "unmade in its own image [défait selon son im- ter t h e inversion of creation t h a t is l'entretemps. In t h e i n v e r s i o n ,
apart from the inertia <>i mattet and already withdrawn from
t h e thing-for-us, t h e r e is the for no-one that characterizes t h e The Profane
N e u t e r . N e u t r a l w i t h respect to what is, a r t , w h i c h s u b s t i t u t e s For b o t h Lévinas a n d B l a n c h o t , t h e a r t i s t n e i t h e r
t h e i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t , " p r e s e n t s " t h e sheer that there is, creates nor reveals. That w h i c h t h e p h i l o s o p h e r fixes i n t h e
or anteriority as such. This is the a t m o s p h e r e of art a n d this eternity of the concept, art arrests in the interval of the image.
neutralization is unmediated and immediate, and thus eludes W h e r e a s p h i l o s o p h y offers u s t h e t h i n g t o k n o w a n d u s e , a r t
all c o g n i t i o n a n d all m e m o r y . T h e a r t w o r k is a t h i n g - f o r - n o - realizes a w i t h d r a w a l f r o m p o w e r a n d e v e n , m o r e s t r o n g l y , a
one, and it thus induces from us involvements that do not w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e p r e s e n t . A e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e is a l a p s e in
o r i g i n a t e i n o u r i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s a l l o w s B l a n c h o t t o say t h a t o u r ability t o m o b i l i z e t i m e . T h e i n t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t i m e
"the image is intimate because it m a k e s of our intimacy an c a n s t o p is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of b e i n g delivered to a t i m e w i t h o u t
e x t e r i o r p o w e r t h a t w e s u b m i t t o p a s s i v e l y [ i n t i m e est l ' i m a g e us, w i t h o u t a present—impersonal and neutral. This is simu-
p a r c e qu'elle fait d e n o t r e intimité u n e p u i s s a n c e extérieure q u e l a t e d t i m e , a s i m u l a t i o n of e x i s t i n g or an e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e
nous subissons passivement]." 4 0
T h e s h e e r that there is, or t h e initiative. It is n o t the p r o m i s e of a n e w beginning a n d it does
il y a, is u n g r a s p a b l e . It e l u d e s every p r e s e n t y e t it is t h a t w i t h - n o t c a r r y us to a beyond of b e i n g (ethical or o t h e r w i s e ) . It
o u t w h i c h t h e r e will n e v e r h a v e b e e n a n y p o s s i b i l i t y a s s u c h . only subtracts us from ourselves.
A r t d o e s n o t m e r e l y p r e s e n t , a s L e v i n a s stresses, t h e p o s s i b i l - In La comunità che viene, G i o r g i o A g a m b e n will say t h a t
ity t h a t t i m e c a n s t o p . I t a l s o , m o r e affirmatively, p r e s e n t s the whole of our w o r l d has been transformed into an image, a
possibility itself as t h a t w h i c h e l u d e s e v e r y t h i n g — p o s s i b i l i t y s p e c t a c l e . T h i s i s t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t for his p o l i t i c s . H e will s a y
a s (the) n o t h i n g , a s i m m e d i a t e . W h i c h a m o u n t s t o saying t h a t t h a t t h e w o r l d h a s c o m e t o r e s e m b l e itself c o m p l e t e l y , t o t a l l y ,
n o t h i n g , or the n o t h i n g , is t h e f o r m of a n y p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n . a n d t h u s h a s s e p a r a t e d h u m a n a g e n c y f r o m its t r a d i t i o n a l ini-
Presented as arrested, the atmosphere of art presents the t i a t i v e . T h a t i s t o say, t h e w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d c a n n o w b e
return of t h a t which can never be excluded but which, at the experienced as an image and we are no longer able to experi-
same time, excludes everything. In the space of literature quali- e n c e o u r s e l v e s in t h e w o r l d , for its s p a c e is n o w i m a g i n a r y .
ties cling t o n o t h i n g , t o n o b e i n g . S o m e t h i n g e l u d e s c o g n i t i o n , H e n c e , A g a m b e n ' s interest in the e x p r o p r i a t i o n of experience
b u t m a k e s itself felt (if o b s c u r e l y ) as t h a t w h i c h is n e v e r " i t - a n d his a t t e m p t s to rescue from this malaise a radical possibil-
self," t h a t w h i c h i s o n l y " s u g g e s t e d . " S o m e t h i n g c o m e s b u t ity h e calls p u r e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e . H i s p o l i t i c s i s a n a t t e m p t
r e m a i n s a r r e s t e d i n its " m e a n w h i l e . " F o r B l a n c h o t t h i s w i l l b e t o a p p r o p r i a t e t h i s e x p r o p r i a t i o n (or t h i s i m p o t e n c e o u t s i d e
t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g . I t i s u n c o m m o n , unclassifiable, a n d a n o n y - a n y initiative) n o t a s a n o t h e r p o w e r , b u t a s a n u n p o w e r t h a t i s
4
m o u s , like a n infinite m u r m u r , a s F o u c a u l t p u t s i t . ' I t i s w r i t - a n a m b i g u o u s c a p a c i t y for i r r e p a r a b i l i t y . H e w i l l a s k t h a t w e
i n g t h a t c a n n o t e n d itself a n d i s c o n t i n u a l l y o u t s i d e itself like c e a s e t o seek i n t h e i m a g i n a r y for t h a t w h i c h t h e i m a g i n a r y
a thing a m o n g things. An enormity w i t h o u t p r o p o r t i o n , it is s u s p e n d s — i d e n t i t y — a n d instead t h a t we rejoin o u r " o l d e s t "
t h e v e r y s c r a t c h i n g s o u n d w e hear, f r o m s o m e w h e r e , w h e n w e e x p e r i e n c e : t h e sheer p r o f a n i t y that there is. T h e s h e e r il y a is
write these things. without clamor and without pathos. It would be experienced
w h e n there is nothing i<> expei ience as in aesthetic existent e,
TWO
precisely. In his a n a l y s e s <>l a i l , I i v i n a s b r i n g s oui art's " a b i l -
i t y " t o c o n s e r v e this e x p e r i e n c e , a n d i n B l a n c h o t w e c a t c h a
g l i m p s e i n t o a life o u t s i d e i n i t i a t i v e .
F o r all t h r e e w r i t e r s , t h e s h e e r that there is t h a t every i m - Lcvinas's Ethics
age h a r b o r s is our separation from any particular experience,
today it is art that inherits, before our very eyes, the
b u t it does not p r o m i s e a concrete future to which we m a y
delirious role and character of the religious. Today it is art
relate ourselves. Nevertheless, art remains our manifest orien-
that gnaws at and transforms us.
t a t i o n t o w a r d s it. R e f u s i n g all g r a s p , a r t " s a y s " t h a t t i m e o u t - —Bataille
side t h e s y n c h r o n y o f t h e p r e s e n t c a n n o t but b e l o s t , t h a t i t i s
n o n c o n s e c u t i v e , d i s c o n t i n u o u s , a r r e s t i n g . I f y o u like, a r t — t h e Like a Nessus Tunic my skin would be.
p u r e form of any possible relation, or anteriority as such—is —Levinas
also the p u r e form of separation (from the personal a n d the
s u b j e c t i v e ) . T h a t i s t o say, a r t i s n o t o n l y t h e p r e s e n t i m e n t o f
f a t e , i t i s a l s o another d e a t h f r o m w h i c h w e c a n n o t s e p a r a t e
o u r s e l v e s a n d w h i c h w e c a n n o t finish, n o t e v e n i n d e a t h . I t i s An Ambiguous Rapport

a loss w e c a n n o t let g o of, b u t t h a t d o e s n o t h o l d u s i n it. A s i f i n r e s p o n s e t o G e o r g e s Bataille ( w h o m , t o

F o r t h e L e v i n a s o f " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e , " t h e s i t u a t i o n m y k n o w l e d g e , h e n e v e r cites) E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s h a s a t -

of a r t in the general e c o n o m y of being is limited because it t e m p t e d t o define e t h i c s a s t h e p r i v i l e g e d site o f d e l i r i u m i n

l a c k s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e O t h e r (Autrui) t h a t b r e a k s u p t h e our culture. H i s g r e a t b o o k Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de

spell o f a r t a n d a w a k e n s u s t o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . B u t w e will w a n t l'essence defines t h e r a p p o r t w i t h Autrui as t h e " s e e d of folly


1

t o s h o w , i n o u r n e x t c h a p t e r , t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h Autrui i s [grain d e f o l i e ] " i n t h e s o u l . W i t h i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y a n d

a m b i g u o u s a n d , i f w e m a y say s o , i m a g i n a r y . determination he has attempted to articulate a responsibility


i h a t realizes i n t h e e x t r e m e a n a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e c e r t a i n t i e s
a n d i m p e r i a l i s m s o f t h e self. S t r a n g e r t h a n a r t w o u l d b e t h e
i m m e m o r i a l r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O t h e r . A s i f t o a n s w e r Bataille's
11 e q u e n t c o m p l a i n t t h a t , in spite of K a n t , we still c a n n o t i m a g -
ine a n e t h i c s t h a t i s n o t " c o m m i t t e d , " L e v i n a s h a s d e s c r i b e d
his e t h i c s as " f o r - t h e - o t h e r [pour l'autre]," b u t " f o r n o t h i n g
1
I p o u r rien]-" in s h o r t , a s o v e r e i g n e t h i c s . E t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n
w o u l d b e , for L e v i n a s , u n c o n t a i n a b l e , a n d i n e x o r a b l y betrayed
b y m o r a l s a n d l a w s . I t w o u l d b e , i n fact, i n s t a b i l i t y itself: t h e
instability o f t h e n a k e d r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r . For, w i t h Bataille,

31
I I \ I I I A S S I I M M

Levinas l a k e s as his s t a r t i n g point the impossibility oi indil lo be s u r e , this is no ethics thai w o u l d be recognized as
ference to the O t h e r — t o the mortality <>l the other person— such by K. 1111 or Mill. In a sense, we can say t h a t in fact t h e r e
as t h e p l a c e (or n o n p l a c e [non-lieu]) w h e r e the self is e x p o s e d is no l e v i n a s i a n e t h i c s , as it can be said t h a t t h e r e is no p h i -
a n d lacerated. H i s version of Bataille's f a m o u s l'expérience in- l o s o p h y oi I teidegger, since each is " f o u n d e d " on an a b y s s , a
térieur is mauvaise conscience: " t h e inferiority of n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l "forgetting." Like the r e l a t i o n w i t h Being, t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h
consciousness [l'intériorité de la conscience non-intentio- the O t h e r is w i t h o u t an object, an a i m , or a p u r p o s e . It is a
3
n e l l e ] . " I n s i s t i n g , w i t h Bataille, t h a t t h e d e m a n d for a n e t h i c s r e l a t i o n t h a t d r a i n s c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d it is in
c a n n o t b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o a n y t h i n g else, all o f L e v i n a s ' s w o r k this r e l a t i o n t h a t Levinas w o u l d p l a c e t h e d i s p o s s e s s i o n o f self
a i m s a t a r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r (Autrui) " o l d e r " t h a n t h e " r e - t h a t defines c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a s s u c h a n d t h e o p e n i n g b e y o n d
l a t i o n t o t h e self (egology) a n d t h e r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d (cos- the confines o f a n y k n o w i n g . T h e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e O t h e r ( u n -
4
m o l o g y ) . " T h i s o l a m i c r e l a t i o n , h e insists, i s o n e o f r e s p o n s i - like t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n r e l a t i o n to Being) is n o t a p r e c o m p r e h e n -
bility, a n d it s u b t e n d s a n d i n t e r r u p t s t h e relation so dispiritingly sion, but a b r e a k u p of any c o m p r e h e n s i o n .
d e s c r i b e d by F r e u d a n d o t h e r s as homo lupus homini. W e will n o t b e p i t t i n g L e v i n a s a g a i n s t Bataille o n t h e q u e s -
L e t u s n o t e s t r a i g h t a w a y , for i t will g u i d e o u r e n t i r e r e a d - t i o n of a r t ( w h i c h , as we k n o w , is of limited interest to Levinas)
i n g o f L e v i n a s , t h a t a s this r e l a t i o n i s " o l d e r " t h a n t h e self a n d versus ethics. W h a t matters to each of t h e m , in spite of their
t h e w o r l d , this O t h e r will h a v e a l w a y s a l r e a d y s u n k i n t o i m - q u i t e c o n s i d e r a b l e differences, i s t h e s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e
m e m o r i a l i t y , p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y o r r e p r e s s i o n . T h e "rela- o t h e r p e r s o n a s t h a t w h i c h i s t h e m o s t fragile a n d t h e m o s t
t i o n " t h e n will n o t i n v o l v e t w o t e r m s , t h e self a n d t h e o t h e r . exposed. It is a relation that w i t h d r a w s from our p o w e r s — a
T h e r e l a t i o n will b e " o l d e r " t h a n a n y self. T h i s a n t e r i o r i t y r e l a t i o n t o o fragile e v e n t o qualify a s a p r o p e r e x p e r i e n c e .
will b e , for L e v i n a s , a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d a g o o d n e s s w i t h o u t ( T h i s r e l a t i o n , i n fact, e c h o e s t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e i m a g e w e
m e a s u r e t h a t ( d e ) s t r u c t u r e s t h e self as a r e l a t i o n w i t h a never- h a v e d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e i n this b o o k . ) I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , i n o u r
present Other. We add, therefore, that any relation that the I o p i n i o n , n o t t o b e f a s c i n a t e d b y L e v i n a s ' s w o r k , b y his r e l e n t -
establishes w i t h an o t h e r subject will o n l y b e t r a y the p u r e anter- less f o c u s o n a r e l a t i o n t h a t e x c e e d s p o w e r a n d t h a t i s o n l y
i o r i t y t h a t , i n Levinas's t h o u g h t , i m p e r i o u s l y orders m e t o t h e " p o s s i b l e " a s i m p o s s i b l e , b e t r a y e d , o r fictioned, b e c a u s e w h a t
Other. F u r t h e r m o r e , we m u s t note that, as i m m e m o r i a l , this Levinas runs up against, again and again, with a n d against
a n t e r i o r r e l a t i o n c a n only b e b e t r a y e d , a n d t h e r e f o r e a n y rela- H e i d e g g e r , is this (as flatly s t a t e d by M i k k e l B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ) :
t i o n t o a n o t h e r r e m a i n s p a r a d o x i c a l l y faithful t o t h e L e v i n a s i a n " T h e r e is no e t h i c s , n o r m o r a l s , of finitude [Il n ' y a p a s d'
éthique. H e n c e , L e v i n a s offers n o c r i t i q u e o f a n y e x i s t i n g e t h - 'éthique', pas de 'morale' de la finitude]." W h a t happens in 5

ics o r m o r a l s , n o r d o e s h e p r o p o s e m a x i m s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h L e v i n a s , w h a t p a s s e s u n d e r t h e word e t h i c s , i s n o ethics p e r


w e m u s t a c t . All o f Levinas's t h o u g h t g r a v i t a t e s t o w a r d t h i s se, n o r e l a t i o n a s s u c h . W h a t h a p p e n s i s a r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n o
obsessive r e l a t i o n t h a t refracts all a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s , h o l d i n g e a c h relation, that cannot but be betrayed, and by which I cannot
in relation to t h a t i m m e m o r i a l relation w h i c h each c a n n o t b u t b u t be o b l i g a t e d , b e c a u s e t h e " e s s e n c e " of t h e r e l a t i o n to Autrui
b e t r a y . H i s e t h i c s , in s h o r t , is essentially a m b i g u o u s . is au-delà de l'essence—is b e t r a y a l "itself," or is t h a t w h i c h
I W D
I I \ I I J ;\ s s I I I I I ( S .» .">

undermines and h o l l o w s out all real relations. This is precisely Ii diverges from nothingness as well as from b e i n g . It
h o w the o t h e r p e r s o n obligates me: for this other person is provokes tins responsibility against my will, t h a t is,
without relation, is a l o n e a n d m o r t a l , is a l r e a d y b e y o n d my by substituting me for the o t h e r as a h o s t a g e . All my
powers and, therefore, I, t o o , am without relation. Hence my inwardness is invested in t h e form of a d e s p i t e - m e , for-
a n x i e t y , a n d h e n c e t h e " r e s t l e s s n e s s " i n t h e self o f w h i c h a not her. D e s p i t e me for a n o t h e r is signification p a r
L e v i n a s s o often s p e a k s . W h a t " b i n d s " m e t o t h e o t h e r p e r s o n e x c e l l e n c e . And it is t h e sense of t h e " o n e s e l f , " t h a t
i s t h e nonrelation t o t h e O t h e r , t h e n o t h i n g o r n o - r e l a t i o n t h a t u i usative that d e r i v e s f r o m no n o m i n a t i v e ; it is t h e
I, myself, am. My s k i n , a N e s s u s t u n i c . very l a d of finding myself w h i l e losing myself.
We are describing, then, an ethics of betrayal. But betrayal
of w h a t ? Of nothing. Of no relation. Betrayal of t h a t relation 11 a d i a c h r o n i e , c'est le refus de la c o n j o n c t i o n , le n o n -
t h a t can only be betrayed. Betrayal of that " n o ethics" t h a t t o t a l i s a b l e et, e n c e sens p r é c i s , Infini. M a i s d a n s l a
f i n i t u d e is. F o r I am t h a t finitude t h a t defines a n d t h e r e f o r e responsabilité p o u r Autrui—pour une autre liberté—
escapes m e . T h a t is w h a t m a k e s ethical intentionality an ex- la n é g a t i v i t é de c e t t e a n a r c h i e , de ce refus o p p o s é au
posure. There is no realizable relation to the other that w o u l d present,—à l'apparaître—de l'immémorial, me com-
b e e t h i c a l t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h . T h e r e will o n l y h a v e b e e n a m a n d e et m ' o r d o n n e à Autrui, au premier venu, et
f i c t i o n e d , i m a g i n e d r e l a t i o n — f r a g i l e a s a n i m a g e i s fragile, m ' a p p r o c h e d e lui, m e l e r e n d p r o c h a i n — s ' é c a r t e a i n s i
u n g r a s p a b l e , u n p o s s e s s i b l e — a reality m a d e u p o f n o t h i n g n e s s . du néant c o m m e de l'être, p r o v o q u a n t contre m o n gré
O u t s i d e a n y p a r t i c u l a r , defined r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r , t h e r e i s i et te r e s p o n s a b i l i t é , c ' e s t - à - d i r e me s u b s t i t u a n t c o m m e
this exposure to " n o relation at all" that is an obsession w i t h ( >tage à A u t r u i . T o u t e m o n i n t i m i t é s'investit en c o n t r e -
Autrui a n d t h a t b o t h o r i e n t s a n d e s c a p e s m e . I n t h e e n d t h i s inon-gré—pour-un-autre. Malgré moi, pour-un-autre—
r e l a t i o n is finitude itself; b u t it is r e a d by L e v i n a s as s o m e t h i n g v( >ilà la signification p a r excellence et le sens du s o i - m ê m e ,
like e t h i c s . du se—accusatif ne d é r i v a n t d ' a u c u n n o m i n a t i f — l e fait
6
m ê m e de se retrouver en se p e r d a n t . ]

No One Other R a d i c a l d i a c h r o n y (or d i a c h r o n y w i t h o u t a n y s y n c h r o n y )


i Hi i w s us to a p p r o a c h the a n t e r i o r i t y or refus oppose au present
D i a c h r o n y is the refusal of c o n j u n c t i o n , the n o n - thai defines L e v i n a s ' s e t h i c s . W e m a y c o m p a r e t h i s t o i m p e r i -
t o t a l i z a b l e , a n d , i n this sense, infinite. B u t i n t h e r e - i I U S s u p e r e g o i c guilt, b u t t h e i n v o l v e m e n t d e s c r i b e d a b o v e d o e s
s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e o t h e r , for a n o t h e r f r e e d o m , t h e 11« it derive f r o m my p e r s o n a l a n d r e p r e s s e d h i s t o r y of d e s i r e s .
n e g a t i v i t y of this a n a r c h y , this refusal of t h e p r e s e n t , I >i.u h r o n y t h a t e l u d e s all s y n c h r o n y is i n s t e a d t h e t r a c e of t h e
of appearing, of the immemorial, c o m m a n d s me a n d I >ther in m e , b u t " o l d e r " t h a n t h e moi. T h i s is c l e a r l y no e t h -
o r d a i n s m e t o t h e other, t o t h e f i r s t o n e o n t h e s c e n e , |< | I m i g h t ever u n d e r s t a n d or t h e o r i z e , for it is a b o v e me a n d
a n d m a k e s m e a p p r o a c h h i m , m a k e s m e his n e i g h b o r . Dl ior to m e . I am " i t s " e c h o . It o r d e r s me a n d I do n o t e v e n
I I V I N A S ' S I I I I I I '.

o b e y it. M o r e precisely, I am ordered, I am oriented, I iim not yei present, Il Calls a n d il is //, i.e., no o n e t h a t c a n be

s c h e m a t i z e d such that I am obligated to the lirst o t h e r 1 c a n I- m iu 11 an ( )| her b e y o n d my p o w e r s ol iileiil ilical ion. T h e r e -

f i n d . O n e m a y say, b e y o n d F r e u d a n d n e a r t o I leidegger, t h a t in! e h (or, //) is thai from which I cannot distinguish myself.

i t t h r o w s m e , -jects m e , o r casts m e before the o t h e r a n d o t h e r s . The very a n o n y m i t y ol Autrui is w h a t is so c o m m a n d i n g , so

T h i s e t h i c s , t h e n , i s " o l d e r " t h a n m y self a n d i t i s d i s p r o - Imperious, so c o n f o u n d i n g . Precisely no one c o m m a n d s m e ,

p o r t i o n a t e to my p o w e r s . It is forever s t r a n g e . I shall n e v e r n o o n e a i all, and t h e r e f o r e n o o n e f r o m w h o m I c a n s e p a r a t e

h a v e t h e m e a s u r e o f i t n o r e q u a l its d e m a n d . N o m o r a l i t y c a n myself. N o t h i n g o b l i g a t e s me a n d t h e r e f o r e I c a n n o t d i s t a n c e

c o n t a i n this " o t h e r w i s e " t h a n m e a n d t h e r e f o r e all m y m o r a l - mysell from o b l i g a t i o n — f o r I am it. I am o r d e r e d , I am o b l i -

ity is in q u e s t i o n . It d e m a n d s a N i e t z s c h e a n a f f i r m a t i o n : a q u e d , m s h o r t : / am Autrui. It is b e y o n d my p o w e r to d i s t i n -

going-under or an Untergeworfenbeit (to c o m b i n e N i e t z s c h e guish myself from this a n o n y m i t y a n d t h u s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n —

w i t h H e i d e g g e r for a m o m e n t ) t h a t will b e m y s u b - j e c t i o n t o the election o r t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n — w i l l a l r e a d y h a v e t a k e n p l a c e .


9

Autrui. T h i s sub-ject, t o b e s u r e , i s n o t t h e m o d e r n C a r t e s i a n Il is / w h o calls, t h a t is to say, no one other.


7
s u b j e c t d e l i n e a t e d by H e i d e g g e r , b u t is i n s t e a d a r a d i c a l n a - You see, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for L e v i n a s is just this u n p o w e r of

scence t h a t w i t h d r a w s from essence a n d i s e x t r a c t e d from b e i n g . Identification p r i o r t o myself, p r i o r t o a n y d e s i r e , t o a n y m o -

T h i s s u b j e c t i o n g o e s "all t h e w a y t o t h e l a u g h t e r t h a t refuses live or i n t e r e s t , to a n y e m p i r i c guilt. F o r L e v i n a s I am o n l y

l a n g u a g e [ j u s q u ' a u r i r e q u i refuse I e l a n g a g e ] . " 8 Insofar as I am other, o n l y i n s o f a r as I am i d e n t i f i e d / s u b s t i -

E t h i c s , for L e v i n a s , i s a c o m m a n d t h a t c a n n o t b e r e c a l l e d , tuted for this o t h e r , this n o o n e , this n o o n e o t h e r t h a n I . H e n c e

t h a t is olamic, forgotten. It is the forgetting that holds me I lie e n i g m a , t h e " k n o t [ n œ u d ] " in ipseity t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is
1 0

hostage to the Other and that constrains me beyond my p o w - forced to t h i n k . T h e O t h e r o b s e s s e s me b e c a u s e I am t h a t

ers a n d m y i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s f o r g e t t i n g i s b e y o n d m e for t h e O t h e r , w h o i s n o o n e , n o other, n o o n e o t h e r t h a n m y self

simple reason that it is n o t in my p o w e r to forget (no o n e is // ell. As L e v i n a s p u t s it: " [ T ] h e p s y c h e in t h e s o u l is t h e o t h e r

" a b l e " t o f o r g e t ; f o r g e t t i n g i s precisely a l a p s e i n o u r a b i l i t y t o m m e , a m a l a d y of identity, b o t h a c c u s e d a n d self, t h e s a m e

r e m e m b e r ) . T h u s , forgetting takes me outside egoity. It lor the other, t h e s a m e b y t h e o t h e r [le p s y c h i s m e d e l ' â m e ,

d e n u c l e a t e s t h e e g o , s t r i p p i n g it n u d e . I am o r i g i n a l l y a t h i r d - « est l ' a u t r e en m o i ; m a l a d i e de l ' i d e n t i t é — a c c u s é e et soi, le


1 1

p e r s o n n e u t e r w h o m / forget (because forgetting, o u t s i d e egoity, même p o u r l ' a u t r e , m ê m e p a r l ' a u t r e ] . "

is a f o r g e t t i n g of t h e one who f o r g e t s ; t h e " s u b j e c t " of t h e F t h i c s , in L e v i n a s ' s s e n s e , is t h e very e v e n t of t h e self. It

forgetting remains always a n o n y m o u s and is thus preeminently (ethics, t h e self) h a p p e n s to m e , as m e . T h e self ( a l w a y s al-

f o r g e t t a b l e ) . M y r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r p r i o r t o m y self is, a s i t icady involved with the Other) comes to me from an outside

w e r e , c o n t r a c t e d b y this o n e w h o i s f o r g o t t e n , a n d w h o for- all I he m o r e e x t e r i o r in t h a t it p r e c e d e s a n y i n t e r i o r i t y . A ver-

g e t s . A n d t h e r e l a t i o n h e (the a n o n y m o u s il, t h e N e u t e r ) c o n - tiginous interpellation forms the enigmatic " k n o t " that is the

tracts is likewise forgotten, along with the Other. .eli or t h e ipse. R a d i c a l l y o u t s i d e , p r i o r to a n y i n s i d e , t h i s

I t calls t h e n f r o m m y p r e h i s t o r y , f r o m b e f o r e m y o r i g i n , Identification, this trauma, is just as r a d i c a l l y " f o r g o t t e n . " Yet,

from an immemorial time w h e n I, in my "extreme y o u t h , " am II is m e : in m e / b e y o n d m e . I incarnate t h a t w h i c h calls me to


.Ì n I I V I IN A S S I' I I I I i . s

myself. That is w h y Lévinas can say thai ethics "is the b r e a k u p .mi " ii is p . H alyzed: always already no l o n g e r a b l e to be t h e r e
of t h e o r i g i n a r y unity of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t is, a n y m o r e . It is, as Levinas tells us (in w o r d s t h a t s h o u l d r e m i n d
it is t h e b e y o n d of e x p e r i e n c e [c'est l ' é c l a t e m e n t de l ' u n i t é US ol his d e s c r i p t i o n oi the w o r k of a r t ) , a " d e a t h - l i k e p a s s i v -
originaire de Paperception transcendentale—c'est-à-dire l'au- iiv [une passivité à m o r t | . " l s
It " i s " n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h i s
1 2
delà de l ' e x p é r i e n c e ] . " 1 a m , as it were, constitutionally un- M I I r e n d e r o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n . T h e O t h e r o c c u p i e s its p l a c e fully,
a b l e n o t t o a n o n y m o u s l y i n c a r n a t e alterity, a n d h e r e , i n a insisting o n t h e subject's r e m o v a l f r o m its o w n m a n i f e s t a t i o n .
s t r a n g e w a y , an ethics is i n s c r i b e d — a n d exscribed. T h e self is For L e v i n a s , t h e self is "a deposing of the ego, less than
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n c a r n a t e . T h e very a n o n y m i t y o f a l t e r i t y — i t s m >il>ing as uniqueness {dé-position du Moi, le moins que rien
nothingness, if y o u w i l l — i s the impossibility of my indiffer- COmtne unicité]." 16
A c c o r d i n g to L e v i n a s , I h a v e a l w a y s al-
ence to it. All t h e ego's p o w e r s of ( o e d i p a l ) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d ready a b a n d o n e d all for-myselfness. I do n o t first e s t a b l i s h for
c o m p r e h e n s i o n a r e s h a d o w e d b y this a n t e r i o r u n p o w e r . myself a p l a c e in t h e s u n a n d t h e n , as a m o n a d i c A r c h i m e d e a n
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas de- p o i n t , fall i n w i t h o t h e r s i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r . Subjectivity
scribes a subjectivity t h a t precisely w i t h d r a w s f r o m a u t o m a n i - here is n o t h i n g but a p r i m o r d i a l delay behind the Other. This
festation, a n d h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s this w i t h d r a w a l — o r , a s h e m i g h t is absolute p a s s i v i t y (i.e., n o t r e l a t i v e to a n y activity, b u t p a s -
say, t h i s h u m i l i t y — a s t h e very autrement qu'être t h a t e t h i c s sivity a b s o l u t i z e d a s o t h e r t h a n , o r o v e r w h e l m i n g , t h e differ-
" i s . " T h e Levinasian subject eludes t h a t w h i c h is essential to e n c e b e t w e e n active a n d p a s s i v e ) .
s u b j e c t i v i t y : self-certain p r e s e n c e to self in e i t h e r its C a r t e s i o - T h e Western metaphysical subject, then, according to
13
Heideggerian confinement to (auto)representation, o r its r e - Levinas, h a d been incorrectly conceptualized. It w a s never
14
t r e n c h m e n t , after M i c h e l H e n r y , a s a u t o a f f e c t i o n . This novel meant to c o m e to presence, a n d therefore it w a s m e a n t en-
subject of Levinas's w i t h d r a w s , then, from the very c o n c e p t of tirely for t h e O t h e r w h o shall e t e r n a l l y p r e c e d e it. T h e s u b j e c t
subjectivity i n t o a n e n i g m a t h a t m a k e s t h e r e t e n t i o n o f t h e w o u l d be forever devoted to an obligation t h a t w o u l d forever
word abusive. That which is, for Levinas, hypokeimenon, e x c e e d it, since this o b l i g a t i o n w o u l d define t h e i n f e r i o r i t y i t
underlying, or sub-jacent is that which enters into no present is. The crisis i n t o w h i c h m o d e r n i t y h a d fallen, t h e crisis of t h e
a t all a n d i s t h u s b e y o n d s p e c u l a t i o n . A s t r a n g e s u b j e c t . A n a b s e n c e o f f o u n d a t i o n s , t h e discovery t h a t t h e r e w a s n o g r o u n d
i m a g e of t h e s u b j e c t , o n e is t e m p t e d to say. A s t r a n g e s u b j e c t b e n e a t h o u r feet, w a s n o crisis a t all. I t w a s t h e b e l a t e d d i s c o v -
s t r a n g e t o itself since i t i s a l w a y s o n t h e " h i t h e r s i d e " o f r e p r e - ery of a beneficence t h a t h a d e n r a p t u r e d us b e y o n d o u r s e l v e s .
s e n t a t i o n , b u t n o t p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y a b s e n t . I t i s its a v e r s i o n ( )ur v e r y i n a b i l i t y t o " u n i t e all t h e f a c u l t i e s " a n d t o p r e s e n t
t o light. I t i s " a n e x t r e m e s h y n e s s , " a s L e v i n a s says s o m e - o u r s e l v e s to o u r s e l v e s in t h e full light of a k n o w i n g w a s , in
w h e r e . O u t s i d e a n y c o n c e p t o f it, i t i s e x p o s e d , v u l n e r a b l e , fact, a " g o l d e n o p p o r t u n i t y " t o o v e r t u r n all t h i n k i n g t h a t origi-
n a k e d . It is who I am a n d it is n o t , or n o t simply, my v u l n e r - n a t e s subjectivity i n a u t o m a n i f e s t a t i o n o r a u t o a f f e c t i o n . 17

ability to d i s a p p e a r a n c e — t o death, to my inability to be there T h e philosophical obsession w i t h the subject b r o u g h t us,


a n y m o r e . T h i s subject, as L e v i n a s n e v e r tires of telling u s , is d e s p i t e ourselves a n d despite o u r a n g u i s h , face-to-face, n o t w i t h
n o t d e s t i n e d t o a p p e a r , a n d i s foreign t o a n y " p l a c e i n t h e o u r s e l v e s , b u t w i t h a n a l t e r i t y t h a t w o u l d infinitely p o s t p o n e
I I V I N A S ' S I I III* S

autonomy. An extreme humility and an unprecedented ethics ol a persecution that paralyses any a s s u m p t i o n that
h a d r u i n e d the g r a n d e p o c h of the Subject a n d its maniacal i mild awaken il so thai il w o u l d posit itself for-itself.
s t r i v i n g after itself. O n l y t h e l a n g u a g e of ethics w o u l d be e q u a l I his passivity is thai ol an a t t a c h m e n t that h a s a l r e a d y
t o t h i s a b y s s i n t o w h i c h t h e h u m a n sciences h a d fallen. Even been m a d e , as something irreversibly p a s t , p r i o r to all
the language of psychoanalysis, which promised a C o p e r n i - memory a n d recall. It w a s m a d e in an i r r é c u p é r a b l e
c a n r e v o l u t i o n t h a t w o u l d u n d e r m i n e all t h i n k i n g f o u n d e d i n n i n e w h i c h the p r e s e n t , r e p r e s e n t e d i n recall, d o e s n o t
a C a r t e s i a n Cogito, h a d s l i p p e d i n t o m y t h a n d h a d r e m a i n e d e q u a l , in a t i m e of b i r t h or c r e a t i o n , of w h i c h n a t u r e
i m p r i s o n e d b y a classical s c h e m a o f t h e subject. A s N a n c y or c r e a t i o n r e t a i n s a t r a c e , u n c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o a
a n d Lacoue-Labarthe (and later Borch-Jacobsen) have m a d e memory.
clear, t h e ego's s h a d o w r e m a i n e d , i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s f r o m F r e u d
to L a c a n , a n o t h e r ego behind the ego, a n d below the subject [Le s o i - m ê m e ne p e u t p a s se faire, il est déjà fait de
t h e r e l u r k e d a n o t h e r s u b j e c t — o f d e s i r e (or even, of a desire to passivité a b s o l u e , et, d a n s ce sens, victime d ' u n e
be a subject). 18
O n l y t h e l a n g u a g e o f ethics w o u l d b e a b l e t o persécution paralysant toute assumption qui p o u r r a i t
say t h a t t h a t w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y w a s u n a b l e t o p r e s e n t t o itself s'éveiller en lui p o u r le p o s e r pour soi, p a s s i v i t é de
w a s n o t m e a n t t o b e p r e s e n t e d a t all. T h e n e w ethical s u b j e c t l ' a t t a c h e m e n t déjà n o u é e c o m m e i r r é v e r s i b l e m e n t
w o u l d r e m a i n offstage, in t h e s h a d o w s , en deqa du temps, a n d passée, en deçà de toute m é m o i r e , de t o u t rappel.
w o u l d suffer affectively all t h a t t h e e g o w o u l d c o n t r a c t i n all Nouée dans un temps irrécupérable que le présent,
its a d v e n t u r e s in t h e w o r l d . E t h i c a l subjectivity is infinite v u l - représenté dans le rappel n'égale pas, dans un temps
n e r a b i l i t y . T h e a b s e n c e of f o u n d a t i o n w a s in fact a l r e a d y a de la naissance ou de la c r é a t i o n d o n t n a t u r e ou c r é a t u r e
19
r a p p o r t . T h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a n e x p o s u r e t o t h e O t h e r inter- garde une trace, inconvertible en souvenir.]
r u p t i n g a n y b e g i n n i n g . A g a i n s t all o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d p r e j u -
d i c e s , t h e s u b j e c t w a s n o t a g r o u n d a t all. I t w a s u n p o w e r a n d The self, e n i g m a t i c a l l y , " s u f f e r s " itself. It is a w o u n d t h a t
w e a k n e s s , a n d this is t h e c a s e for a s i m p l e a n d even b a n a l d o e s not heal. Before myself, p r i o r to a n y desire to b e , a n t e r i o r
r e a s o n : t h e self d o e s n o t f o r m itself. I t h a s n o ability a t all lo any objectivity, to a n y d i s t a n c e or a n y t i m e — l i t e r a l l y ex
until the other a n d others intervene a n d bring it into exist- nihilo—the self h a p p e n s to m e . T h e self, t h e i p s e , t h e who t h a t
e n c e . T h e self i s a n a b s o l u t e d e p e n d e n c y , a n d its d e p e n d e n c y I am (as o p p o s e d to t h e w h a t ) is formed. It is m a d e , f a s h i o n e d ,
is an i n e x h a u s t i b l e potentia. b e g o t t e n , willed, fictioned. U s i n g t h e l a n g u a g e of L e v i n a s , it is
w< i i m d e d a n d p e r s e c u t e d . T h e O t h e r h a s access to me b e f o r e I
d o . In-myself, I am a w e a k n e s s a n d a d e p e n d e n c y . A s u p p l e -
The Self m e n t , in D e r r i d a ' s sense, is r e q u i r e d for me to be a s o m e o n e
a n d t h u s t h e subject c a n n o t b e t h o u g h t o u t s i d e différance. T h e
T h e oneself c a n n o t f o r m itself; i t i s a l r e a d y f o r m e d lupplement is a t r a u m a that precedes the constituted ego a n d
w i t h a n a b s o l u t e passivity. I n t h i s sense i t i s t h e v i c t i m t h e r e f o r e p r e c e d e s all m e m o r y a n d r e p r e s s i o n . A " f o r g e t t i n g "
L E V I N A S s I I I I I 1 S I )

for Ins politics also relies on a p r i m o r d i a l " t h e f t . " ) W h a t " r e -


precedes all remembering and .1 contact with the outside p r e -
m a i n s " o f m e a l t e r this t r a u m a i s a n e x c e p t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n t o
c e d e s all interiority. The ego proper—the formed, h o u n d e d ,
t h e O t h e r w h o m 1, in fact, i n c a r n a t e . O n l y a b r u s q u e r e s e n t -
h e a l t h y , a r t i c u l a t e d i d e n t i t y — i s n o t its o w n . It receives itself
m e n t a g a i n s t t h e very m o t i f o f p r i m o r d i a l passivity c o u l d p o s -
f r o m w i t h o u t itself (in e v e r y s e n s e ) . A n t e r i o r t o b e i n g - f o r m e d ,
it is n o t . It is u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , p u r e e x t e r i o r i t y — n o t even t h e sibly i g n o r e w h a t is in fact a c o m m o n p l a c e of h u m a n e x i s t -

f r a g m e n t a t i o n of an u n k n o w n e m b o d i m e n t . It is It—no o n e , ence. No one is b o r n into the world from o u t of one's o w n

n o t h i n g . Its self is b o r r o w e d , e a t e n , a b s o r b e d f r o m o t h e r s . Its self.

self proper is n o t its o w n , for in-itself it is a " n o n - q u i d d i t y , no This enigmatic birth, incarnation, and involvement with

one, clothed in purely b o r r o w e d being, which m a k e s it a n a m e - o t h e r s p r i o r t o myself, this v e r t i g i n o u s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a c c o u n t s

less s i n g u l a r i t y by c o n f e r r i n g on it a r o l e [ n o n - q u i d d i t é — for, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e insistence o f a n a r c h y i n all h u -

p e r s o n n e — r e v ê t u e d ' u n ê t r e d e p u r e m p r u n t , qui m a s q u e s a m a n intersubjectivity a n d also the hyperbologic t h a t governs

s i n g u l a r i t é s a n s n o m e n lui c o n f é r a n t u n r ô l e ] . " 2 0
T h e oneself t h e ego's s u p e r e g o i c guilt. T h a t is, since it is precisely " m y -

itself i s n o o n e ( s i n g u l a r a n d u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ) w h o i s s o m e - self" t h a t I o w e to t h e O t h e r a n d o t h e r s , o n l y complete b e i n g -

o n e ( a self, b u t a b o r r o w e d o r s t o l e n o n e — a s o m e o n e O t h e r f o r - t h e - o t h e r (or, as L e v i n a s s o m e t i m e s calls it, " m a t e r n i t y " )

w h o for t h a t r e a s o n s i n k s i n t o i m m e m o r i a l i t y i n t h e p r e - h i s - c a n a n s w e r t o t h e d e m a n d " i n s i d e " m e . But a s i t will a l w a y s

t o r y of t h e s u b j e c t ) . Autrement qu'être is t h e b e i n g - f o r m e d , or b e / w h o a m f o r - t h e - o t h e r , a r e m a i n d e r o r t r a c e o f for-

t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o t h e O t h e r , " o l d e r " t h a n t h e e g o a n d al- myselfness i s u n e r a d i c a b l e , n o m a t t e r h o w n o b l e o r "selfless"

w a y s j u s t p r i o r t o a n y self-presence. B e i n g - c r e a t e d i s t h e in- I t r y t o b e . H e n c e , " t h e m o r e just I a m , t h e m o r e guilty I a m


2 1

c a r n a t i o n t h a t is t h e self. T h e self d o e s n o t identify, it is i d e n - [plus je suis j u s t e — p l u s je suis c o u p a b l e ] . " In his w a y , L e v i n a s

tified w i t h a n identification t h a t r e m a i n s a l w a y s j u s t a n t e r i o r has deconstructed the mysterious authority of Freudian

t o t h e self. T h e self d o e s n o t c o n s i s t o f t h a t t o w h i c h i t a g r e e s s u p e r e g o i c g u i l t b y p l a c i n g i t o u t s i d e its m y t h i c o e d i p a l t r i a n -

(as C. S. Peirce a r g u e s ) . It c o n s i s t s of its a b s o l u t e l y p a s s i v e g u l a t i o n . I t i s n o t s o m e f i g u r e , s o m e p e r s o n , f r o m t h e subject's

b e i n g - f o r m e d w h i c h m a k e s p o s s i b l e its ( a m b i g u o u s ) a b i l i t y t o past that has internally modeled a n d modified the subject.

identify w i t h o t h e r s a n d a l s o t o i m i t a t e t h e m . L e v i n a s i a n Autrui will n e v e r h a v e b e e n identified yet will never


be w i t h o u t identity, for I am Autrui myself, a n d o u t s i d e t h i s
It is by w a y of this " k n o t " in subjectivity t h a t L e v i n a s is
identification, I am N O T H I N G . N o t even desire. A n d there-
a b l e t o s p e a k t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s a n d say t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i s
f o r e , I a m , in myself, a n x i o u s l y u n f i g u r a b l e a n d a n - a r c h i c .
i n c a r n a t e d as e t h i c a l , w h e t h e r we like it or n o t . Subjectivity is
S t r a n g e l y , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , b u t perfectly r i g o r o u s l y , my v e r y self
responsibility-for-the-other and the Other is involved in sub-
i s b e y o n d m e , i s w i t h o u t e s s e n c e , i s o t h e r w i s e t h a n (my) b e -
jectivity like a p l a y of l i m i t s . T h r o u g h this stricto sensu u n -
i n g . T h e self is faire: b o r n , b e g o t t e n , i n c a r n a t e d - a s - m o d e l e d ,
t h i n k a b l e e n i g m a , h e c a n say t h a t t h e h u m a n i s n o t a t all wolfish
copied, echoed, repeated. An a n o n y m o u s mimesis precedes
b u t is, f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , f o r - t h e - o t h e r b e c a u s e its self c o m e s
a n d p e r m a n e n t l y e r o d e s all identity. M y b e i n g i s n o t m y o w n .
from t h e o t h e r w h o t h u s r o b s t h e subject o f all for-itselfness.
It is b e i n g - p o s s e s s e d , b e i n g - c a s t (in b o t h s e n s e s : like a die is
( K e e p this i n m i n d a s w e c o n c l u d e t h e c h a p t e r o n A g a m b e n ,
I I V I N A S ' S E I 11 I I S

t h r o w n , anil as it cast into s o n i c role in a drama). Usui)', the c o n s c i o u s ) b e g a n to r e s e m b l e n o t h i n g so m u c h as a c r o w d , a


l a n g u a g e of H e i d e g g e r , we w o u l d say that, lor L e v i n a s , Mit- p r i m o r d i a l a n a r c h i c b a n d . T h e id, h a v i n g n o b e i n g o f its o w n ,
sein is rigorously c o r r e l a t i v e w i t h Da-sein a n d Da-sein's a n x i - like the c r o w d o r h o r d e , i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y in-itself o u t s i d e -
ety ( w h i c h s u b t e n d s all its o n t i c affects) is precisely its l o s t n e s s itself. It is f o r m l e s s n e s s "itself" a n d it is a t h r e a t of f o r m l e s s -
in das Man s i n c e , o u t s i d e its l o s t n e s s , it is n o t h i n g . n e s s , a t h r e a t of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e social b o n d .
I a m h a u n t e d , a l t e r e d — b u t b y n o o n e , n o father, n o m o t h e r . W h a t B o r c h - j a c o b s e n c o n c l u d e s , o r forces F r e u d t o c o n -
I a m h a u n t e d b y n o o n e o t h e r t h a n myself. T h i s i s m y u n - c l u d e , is t h a t It (the id, t h e u n c o n s c i o u s ) is n o t a n o t h e r s u b j e c t
g r o u n d e d , a b y s s a l , e n d l e s s passivity. M y self c o m e s t o m e a s (of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) b u r i e d i n r e p r e s s i o n a n d s p e a k i n g i n
t h e very e v e n t o f m y b e i n g a n d t h e r e f o r e , a s c a s t , I a m e x - hieroglyphs, but is instead nothing other than the nascent
p o s e d t o , a n d p e r m e a t e d by, alterity. M i s s i n g f r o m m e , t h e i n c o m p l e t i o n a n d t h e original passivity o f t h e e g o itself. H e n c e -
h o l e i n m y b e i n g t h a t H e g e l o - K o j e v e a n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s after forth, he concludes, there could be no rigorous Freudian dis-
L a c a n insists o n , is n o t , as is said, my self. T h e self is Other, t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l a n d social p s y c h o l o g y , b e t w e e n
n o t l a c k i n g . W h a t i s " l a c k i n g , " i f t h a t i s t h e w o r d for it, i s t h e S a m e a n d O t h e r . T o use t h e l a n g u a g e o f L e v i n a s , t h e n o n p l a c e
for-itselfness p r o p e r to t h e self. T h e self is an o t h e r (je est un (non-lieu) w h e r e I e n c o u n t e r t h e O t h e r (Autrui) in a p a s t i m -
autre) a n d t h e r e f o r e is n e v e r for-itself, b u t is "despite-itself- m e m o r i a l , o u t s i d e c o n c e p t s , is precisely myself itself.
for-another." This does not m e a n that the O t h e r has been reduced to
W e m a y r e c o g n i z e i n this f o r m i d a b l e e n i g m a t h e i n s p i r a - the Same. W h a t Levinas argues, and w h a t Borch-jacobsen
tion for M i k k e l B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ' s i n c e s s a n t c o r r e c t i o n o f b r i l l i a n t l y e x p l o i t s in his r e a d i n g of F r e u d , is t h a t t h e S a m e is
F r e u d ' s n o t i o n of p r i m a r y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . In The Freudian Sub- n o l o n g e r itself. I t i s " i n q u e s t i o n . " L e v i n a s h a s a l l o w e d u s t o
ject, B o r c h - j a c o b s e n is a b l e to p o i n t o u t , by i d e n t i f y i n g i n n u - r e a d t h e S a m e a s p u r e r a d i c a l e x p o s u r e t o alterity, a s infil-
m e r a b l e a p o r i a s i n F r e u d ' s logic a n d a n a l y s e s , t h a t , d e s p i t e t r a t e d b y alterity. I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n t o B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ' s b o o k ,
the s t u b b o r n l y held n o t i o n of an absolute Narcissus, there is F r a n c o i s R o u s t a n g says, concisely, t h a t subjectivity i s r a d i c a l l y
no s u b j e c t prior to " i t s " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . T h e e g o itself t h e n a l t e r e d a n d " i s n e v e r itself e x c e p t b e c a u s e i t i s a l t e r e d , b e -
w o u l d b e b o t h a n d n e i t h e r itself a n d other, or, a s B o r c h - J a c o b - c a u s e it is o t h e r to itself, b e c a u s e it is its o w n o t h e r , a l t h o u g h
sen so nicely p u t s it, w o u l d be a point d'autrui: a h y p n o t i c a n d i t i s n e v e r a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t t h a t o t h e r t o itself." 24
A n d this will
2 2
somnambulistic contraction of otherness into sameness. forever p r e c e d e all its dialectical a d v e n t u r e s . O u t s i d e its b i r t h ,
Hence my undecidability with regard to myself—my debts a n d it is n o t an i m m a n e n c e invisible to itself (as in a H e g e l i a n f o r m u -
m y guilt, m y p a r a n o i a a n d m y e n d l e s s rivalries w i t h o t h e r s . l a t i o n ) . T h e self i s n o o n e , n o t h i n g — a l r e a d y b o t h w i t h a n d w i t h -
Borch-jacobsen is able to s h o w that t h a t at w h i c h p s y c h o - o u t r a p p o r t w i t h the Other. As s u p p l e m e n t e d , t h e self is s c h e m a -
a n a l y s i s a i m e d — t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h e e g o — w a s w i t h o u t a self t i z e d , o r d e r e d , c a t e g o r i z e d as f o r - t h e - o t h e r or as (the) rapport
23
o f its o w n , w a s " w i t h o u t q u a l i t i e s . " The ego had no being of itself. B u t , this r a p p o r t is a c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h no o n e since
its o w n a n d this led B o r c h - j a c o b s e n t o l e a d F r e u d i n e l u c t a b l y t h e O t h e r is i n c a r n a t e d in t h e self, as t h e self. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e
f r o m i n d i v i d u a l to social p s y c h o l o g y . F o r It (the id, t h e u n - r a p p o r t r e m a i n s . It is n e v e r r e p r e s s e d . It is i m a g i n a r y .
l i v l N A s ' s ETHICS

So, il Levinas has given us a n y t h i n g to think u is this: there Subjected to the Other) is a d i v i d i n g ol t h e past from the f u t u r e
i s n o sociality, n o c o m m u n i t y , n o c o m m u n i c a t i o n , n o d i a l o g u e bin w i t h o u t p a s s i n g i n t o a p r e s e n t . Subjectivity, in L e v i n a s ' s
n o r dialectic t h a t is unaffected by a n o t h i n g n e s s , an a n o n y m - s e n s e , i s t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f r o m " b e t w e e n " p a s t a n d fu-
ity, a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d h e n c e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n , a p a n i c , a rest- t u r e . It is t i m e w i t h o u t a n y " n o w " p o i n t , if t h a t is i m a g i n a b l e .
lessness or a d e l i r i u m at t h e h e a r t of w h i c h t h e r e is a s u b j e c t in I n s t e a d of a " n o w " p o i n t t h e r e is a point d'autrui—a p o i n t of
une passivité à mort. i n s t a b i l i t y a n d d i s s o l u t i o n . Subjectivity, i n t h i s s e n s e , i s t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f t h e difference b e t w e e n S a m e a n d O t h e r , t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f intersubjectivity, a n d a p r o x i m i t y t o t h e O t h e r
Impasse o u t s i d e of, or e v a c u a t e d of, a n y p r e s e n c e . T h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of
As a r e s u l t of its o r i g i n a r y passivity, of its b e i n g indifference we s p o k e of earlier is t h e fact t h a t , in a r e a l c a s e ,
f o r m e d , t h e self is d e l a y e d " b e h i n d " itself. B u t , as it is n o t h i n g w e c a n n o t d o u b t t h a t a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s i n p a i n (to b o r r o w
o t h e r t h a n its passivity, we m u s t c o n c e i v e of t h e self as d e l a y f r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s w o r k for a m o m e n t ) . It is a fact t h a t gives
itself, o r — t i m e . L i k e t h e w o r k o f a r t , t h e t e m p o r a l i t y o f t h e n o i n f o r m a t i o n , n o c o n t e n t , n o ethical f o r m u l a . I t i s a n affect,
self is w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t . As m o d e l e d or d o u b l e d or e c h o e d b u t an affect w i t h o u t a self, for I am t h e o t h e r f r o m w h o s e
f r o m t h e O t h e r , t h e self is " o r i g i n a l l y " a r e c u r r e n c e to self. suffering I c a n n o t d i s t a n c e myself by d o u b t i n g . B u t I do n o t
T h e d e l a y is, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s , a n o r i g i n a r y politesse, identify w i t h t h a t sufferer as s o m e o n e in p a r t i c u l a r . I identify,
o r a n " a f t e r y o u , sir." T h e self i s b e l a t e d , b e h i n d t h e O t h e r v e r y m u c h to t h e c o n t r a r y , i n s o f a r as t h e sufferer is not o t h e r -
a n d a n s w e r i n g t o t h e O t h e r w h o p r e c e d e s it. E x n i h i l o I r e - t h a n - I , is not a l t e r e g o . T h a t is, I identify i n s o f a r as t h e o t h e r
s p o n d t o t h e O t h e r b e f o r e even h e a r i n g t h e O t h e r , b e f o r e r e c - i s precisely n o o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s b e y o n d himself a n d i s n o t
ognizing the O t h e r as other. I am thus indistinguishable from e q u a l to his suffering. / identify with the other precisely to the
that Other. extent that the other is anonymous, and thus I identify with

In spite of w h a t Levinas says here a n d there, there c a n be no one. It is o n l y w i t h g r e a t difficulty t h a t we c a n say, w i t h

n o r e v e l a t i o n o f this " h i t h e r s i d e " o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e p a s - Levinas, t h a t an "ethics" or a "hither side" is revealed here,

sivity a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t y L e v i n a s insists o n a r e o t h e r t h a n I , t h a t a responsibility or an obligation is born here. We can just

other t h a n something that is in my power to accomplish. I can a s easily say t h a t n o t h i n g i s r e v e a l e d h e r e . T h a t w h i c h t h e

n o m o r e f o r m m y self t h a n I c a n f o r g e t m y self. L i k e forget- sufferer a n d I s h a r e or h a v e in c o m m o n — o u r " c o m m o n s u b -

t i n g , b e i n g - f o r m e d is a l a p s e in p o w e r . T h i s l a p s i n g is t h e radi- jectivity" as Bataille p u t s it (or o u r b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n , as N a n c y

cal d i a c h r o n y o f w h i c h w e h a v e a l r e a d y s p o k e n : d i a c h r o n y says)—is precisely N O T H I N G . N o b o n d . N o ethics. N o m o r a l s .

w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n y or, t o say t h e s a m e t h i n g , d i a c h r o n y a s A n d it is precisely to N O T H I N G t h a t I c a n n o t r e m a i n indif-

p e r p e t u a l d e f e c t i o n f r o m t h e p r e s e n t . T h e self a s t h i s d e l a y i s ferent. T h e other, the sufferer, c a n d r a g m e , despite myself, i n t o

s u b j e c t e d t o t h e O t h e r a n d t h u s c a n n o t resist b e i n g - a l t e r e d t h a t N O T H I N G t h a t w e " s h a r e . " T h e affect t h e n , w o u l d b e ,

s i n c e i t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n b e i n g - a l t e r e d . Subjectivity ( b e i n g a s B l a n c h o t p u t s it, a n " e x p e r i e n c e o f n o n e x p e r i e n c e , " o r a n


I 11 1 \\ T '
I. !•• v i IN A s•s I I III s I

itself. The subjecl is radically no o n e , is i m a g i n a r y , is " c l o t h e d


i n c o m p l e t e e x p e r i e n c e , or an e x p e r i e n c e <>l the n o n c o m p l e t i o n
in purely borrowed b e i n g , " or is g i v e n , as L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e
t h a t I myself a m , t h a t t h e self is.
2 6
says of Da-sein, " t h e gift of n o t h i n g . " T h e s u b j e c t is w i t h o u t
F o r L e v i n a s , this i n c o m p l e t e n e s s is m y s e l f — o r is given to
q u a l i t i e s , b l a n k , a n d t h u s infinitely u n s t a b l e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e ,
m e a s t h a t w h i c h s i n g u l a r i z e s m e a n d calls m e t o myself a n d
as no o n e , the subject is deeply panicked, p a r a n o i d , a m a n of
t o m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t calls m e , i n t h e e n d , t o " t h e m a t i z a t i o n ,
c r o w d s , a t h o m e n o w h e r e — f o r t h e O t h e r h a s stolen h i m f r o m
t h o u g h t , history, a n d inscription [thématisation, pensée,
2 5 himself a t b i r t h . I a m a n d I a m n o t w h o I a m . I n s h o r t , w e
histoire et é c r i t u r e ] . " I n o t h e r w o r d s , like t h e self, w i t h t h e
c o m e very c l o s e h e r e t o m a d n e s s , o r s o m e t h i n g like m a d n e s s .
self, as t h e self, ethics is b o r n ex n i h i l o — f r o m its o w n a b s e n c e .
Ethics is b o r n from the absence of a n y p r o p e r subjective r e l a - E t h i c s will h a v e b e e n b o r n w h e r e i t w a s d i s s o l v e d : i n p r i -

t i o n . I t i s b o r n from anxiety. F r o m finitude. T h e r e i s N O T H I N G m a l (a)sociality w h e r e " e a c h o n e i s t h e o t h e r a n d n o o n e i s

t h a t f o u n d s t h e social o r d e r a n d t h a t i s t h e i n c e s s a n t m u r m u r - himself," as H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s das Man. In a s e n s e , L e v i n a s

ing I " h e a r " calling me o u t of n o t h i n g to be s o m e o n e . Ethics is w i s h e s t o say t h a t this i s o u r " p r o p e r " s t a t e : " P a r a d o x i c a l l y i t

nothing and hence it is disproportionate, vertiginous, a n d anx- i s q u a alienus—foreigner a n d o t h e r — t h a t m a n i s n o t alien-

ious. This nothing m u r m u r s to me through the Other from a t e d [ P a r a d o x a l e m e n t , c'est e n t a n t q u ' a l i e n u s — é t r a n g e r e t


2 7

w h o m I a m u n a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h myself a n d t h i s b l i n d r a p - a u t r e — q u e l'homme n'est pas aliéné]." For Levinas, being is

p o r t reveals (without revealing) a for-the-other-for-nothing, b e i n g - c a s t , b e i n g - e n r o l l e d , b e i n g - d r a m a t i z e d . Being is (simul-

o r a g r a t u i t y , a n a b s u r d i t y , o r a n i n s a n e l a u g h t e r , t h a t lacer- t a n e o u s l y ) " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g . " Being-cast i s i n s p i r a t i o n

a t e s t h e for-itself a n d e x p o s e s i t t o n o t h i n g , t o d e a t h — t o t h a t b y t h e o t h e r a n d d e l a y b e h i n d t h e p r e s e n t : a d i a c h r o n y . Be-

a b s o l u t e p a s s i v i t y I s h a r e w i t h t h e o t h e r . For, I am t h a t O t h e r tween Geworfenheit and Verfallenheit is being-cast, being-

w h o i s t h e n n o o n e o t h e r o r n o o t h e r t h a n myself. I n s o f a r a s I formed, being-ficted—the (imaginary) space of literature, in

am identifying with no one, I t o o am no one. T h u s , / am n o t other words. Geworfenheit and Verfallenheit are, therefore,

e t h i c a l , J d o n o t s u b s t i t u t e . T h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f indifference strictly c o r r e l a t i v e . T h e r e i s n o c h r o n o l o g y , n o fall f r o m g r a c e

in t h e scene of suffering is a l s o an i n a b i l i t y to say I. i n t o t h r o w n n e s s (or, i n t o a r t i c u l a t i o n ) . M y " f a l l e n n e s s " i n t o


t h e " t h e y " is t h e r e v e l a t i o n of t h e nullity I a m . T h u s , b e i n g -
T h e e v e n t o f ethics t h a t h a p p e n s t o m e i s a l s o t h e inter-
c a s t , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , p r e c e d e s b o t h fallenness a n d t h r o w n -
r u p t i o n of ethics. I can no m o r e reveal or represent this ethics
n e s s . I t " t h r o w s " m e i n t o t h r o w n n e s s , o r a r t i c u l a t e s it.
t h a n I c a n i m a g i n e myself d e a d o r a b s e n t f r o m myself. E t h i c s ,
Fallenness is always already articulated as t h r o w n n e s s .
the response to a n o t h e r in pain, is a repetition of my b i r t h — a
B u t " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g " i s n o t , o r n o t strictly, e t h i c a l .
r e p e t i t i o n of t h a t r e p e t i t i o n t h a t I am, of t h e e c h o t h e self is.
It is a l s o t h e s u s p e n s i o n of e t h i c s . T h e r e is no " s c e n e " of e n i g -
L e v i n a s i a n e t h i c s i s t h e " p r e s e n t a t i o n " o f myself t o myself a s
m a t i c r a p p o r t t h a t c a n b e d i s p l a y e d b e f o r e us. Da-sein a n d
r e p e t i t i o n (i.e., a s u n p r e s e n t a b l e ) . T h e i m p a s s e w e w i s h t o d e -
t h e L e v i n a s i a n s u b j e c t d o n o t s i m p l y " f a l l , " t h e y a r e vertigi-
scribe, t h e n , is my b e c o m i n g self or my c o m i n g to myself as repeti-
n o u s l y a r t i c u l a t e d , singled o u t , a n d elected.
t i o n or r e c u r r e n c e . T h e subject is n o t h i n g o u t s i d e of its r e t u r n to
LÉVINAS'S ETHICS 51

given US K» think, tli.it w h i c h a n y e t h i c s o u t s i d e e s s e n c e d e -


Ethique
mands.
T h e reality of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , of Autrui, is, as G i o r g i o A g a m b e n p u t s i t this w a y :
L e v i n a s says o f P r o u s t ' s A l b e r t i n e , m a d e u p o f t i m e , o f e v a -
nescence, if you like—of nothingness. T h a t w h i c h is other in T h e fact t h a t m u s t c o n s t i t u t e t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e
t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s o t h e r n e s s "itself": t h e r a d i c a l t e m p o r a l i t y for a n y d i s c o u r s e o n e t h i c s i s t h a t t h e r e i s n o e s s e n c e ,
of a d i a c h r o n y w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n i c h o r i z o n , or, in a w o r d , no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological des-
dying. Autrui is c o n s t i t u t e d as a n d by t h a t w h i c h o n l y e s c a p e s . t i n y t h a t h u m a n s m u s t e n a c t o r realize. T h a t i s t h e
B e c a u s e o f t h i s , n o t i n s p i t e o f it, w e c o m e t o b e i n v o l v e d w i t h
o n l y r e a s o n w h y s o m e t h i n g like e t h i c s c a n e x i s t , b e -
t h e o t h e r i n t i m a t e l y a s other, o u t s i d e o f a n y c o n c e p t o r t h o u g h t
c a u s e i t i s clear t h a t i f h u m a n s w e r e t o b e this o r t h a t
of t h e o t h e r .
s u b s t a n c e , t h i s o r t h a t destiny, n o e t h i c a l e x p e r i e n c e
In the writings of E m m a n u e l Levinas the language of eth- w o u l d be possible—there w o u l d only be tasks to be
ics h a s c o m e t o d e s i g n a t e ( o n e i s t e m p t e d t o say, h a s c o m e t o done.
t h e r e s c u e of) a singular, c o u n t e r u n i v e r s a l , n o n i n t e n t i o n a l ( t h a t
i s t o say, a i m l e s s , p u r p o s e l e s s , n o n c o n s c i o u s ) r e l a t i o n w i t h a n d [Il f a t t o da cui d e v e p a r t i r e o g n i d i s c o r s o s u l l ' e t i c a è
response to the other person as other (and n o t as alter ego, c h e l ' u o m o n o n è n e h a d a essere o d a r e a l i z z a r e a l c u n a
a n o t h e r v e r s i o n of t h e s a m e , n o r , for t h a t m a t t e r , as a self at essenza, alcuna vocazione storica o spirituale, alcun
all). T h i s s t r a n g e ethics ( a n d it is q u i t e precisely s t r a n g e — i t is destino biologico. Solo per questo qualcosa c o m e
a s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n , u n i q u e , u n r e c o g n i z a b l e , a n d , like t h e r e - u n ' e t i c a p u ò esistere: p o i c h é è c h i a r o c h e s e l ' u o m o
sult of a dice t h r o w , d o e s n o t r e l a t e to o t h e r r e l a t i o n s ) is r e a l - fosse o avesse da essere q u e s t a o quella s o s t a n z a , q u e s t o
ized as a " s u b s t i t u t i o n of me for t h e o t h e r s [ s u b s t i t u t i o n de o q u e l d e s t i n o , n o n vi s a r e b b e a l c u n a e s p e r i e n z a etica
2 8
moi aux autres]," and it can only be included in any moral- possible—vi sarebbero solo compiti da realizzare.] 29

ity, politics, or c o m m u n i t y w h a t e v e r as excluded (or, as L e v i n a s


p u t s it, a s " b e t r a y e d " ) . T h i s m e a n s t h a t a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i o n - T h e " p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e " h e r e i s i n fact t h e a b s e n c e o f
ship with a n o t h e r already betrays w h a t is "essentially" a r a p - anything t h a t w o u l d constitute a point of d e p a r t u r e , w h i c h is
p o r t w i t h o u t essence o r a n i m p r o p r i e t y t h a t precedes a n d m a k e s w h y e t h i c s will a l w a y s h a v e b e e n , a s A g a m b e n p u t s it, " s o m e -
possible (while at the same time m a k i n g questionable) any t h i n g like e t h i c s . " T h e r e will be s o m e t h i n g like e t h i c s b e c a u s e
r e l a t i o n s h i p w h a t e v e r . T h a t w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s ethics, for t h e r e will b e n o e t h i c s proper. T h e " e t h i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , " t o b e
L e v i n a s , i s t h e " l o s s " o f p r o p r i e t y — o r its a b s e n c e , o r its p r e s - p o s s i b l e a t all, p r e s u p p o s e s n o e s s e n c e n o r a n y d e s t i n y t h a t
e n c e - a s - b e t r a y e d . It is a loss t h a t p r e c e d e s t h e r e b e i n g a n y - w o u l d h a v e this o r t h a t d e s i g n a t i o n . T h a t i s t o say, t h e " e t h i -
t h i n g to lose, or it is a r e l a t i o n " w i t h " loss t h a t s u g g e s t s t h e cal e x p e r i e n c e , " o u t s i d e e s s e n c e , will b e a n e x p e r i e n c e o f a n
very possibility any relation whatever. In any case, it is i m p o s - improper, incoherent, indeterminate obligation. Outside any
sible t o say s i m p l y a n d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t w h i c h L e v i n a s h a s p r o p e r o r a u t h e n t i c r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r , t h e very p r e s e n c e o f
i i vi N A s•s I i M 11 s

the o t h e r p e r s o n will he d r a i n e d oi s u b s t a n c e , and the subject gular relation ( r e s e m b l i n g ethics and r e n d e r i n g e t h i c s a r e s e m -


will find itself in a s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n to t h e O t h e r w i t h o u t m e a - b l a n c e to itself, that is, d e n u c l e a t i n g it of essence) is a n a r c h y —
sure or c o m p a r i s o n . At the limit of any c o m m u n i t y or any the coming (apart) of any c o m m u n i t y whatever. It h a p p e n s to
relation whatever, Levinas wishes to reveal a p r o x i m i t y t h a t u s w h e n , for e x a m p l e , a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s i n p a i n , o r for t h a t
c a n n o t b e m a d e p r e s e n t , b u t t h a t I c a n n o t d i v o r c e myself f r o m . m a t t e r , i n ecstasy. I t h a p p e n s w h e n a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s d e p r i v e d
T h e ethics Levinas has in m i n d is o n e t h a t " h a p p e n s " to me o f t h e d i g n i t y o f t h e self, a s w h e n d e a t h a p p r o a c h e s , o r a s
w h e n a n o t h e r p e r s o n loses his o r h e r p r o p e r r e l a t i o n t o h i m - w h e n s o m e o n e forgets himself in p a s s i o n . D i s p o s s e s s e d of self,
o r herself. T h i s e r o s i o n o f p r e s e n c e c o n s t i t u t e s a n e v e n t (or, o u t s i d e oneself, t h e o t h e r p e r s o n is, i f w e m a y say t h i s , p o s -
better, is t h e e v e n t of t h e e m p t y i n g o u t of all p r e s e n c e ) t h a t sessed by d i s p o s s e s s i o n , or by a n o n y m i t y . In t h e g r i p s of p a i n
" d e n u c l e a t e s " t h e self (moi), a n d t h u s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p p r o p e r o r p a s s i o n t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , n o l o n g e r h i m - o r herself, i s n o
w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n slips i n t o a v e r t i g o , an i n d u c e m e n t , a l o n g e r self-possessed a n d s o m e t h i n g i r r e p a r a b l e h a p p e n s . T h i s
p r o v o c a t i o n , or a s u g g e s t i o n — s o m e t h i n g like an e t h i c a l o b l i - o c c u r r e d , a s w e k n o w , t o Bataille, w h o b e c a m e s o o b s e s s e d
g a t i o n , b u t o n l y imprecisely, loosely. In fact it is i m p o s s i b l e to w i t h t h e f a m o u s p h o t o g r a p h o f a m a n w h o w a s b e i n g flayed
characterize w h a t " h a p p e n s " here and it is only ambiguously a n d dismembered while being kept conscious with o p i u m . T h e
t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e o f ethics i s " e q u a l t o , " o r i s t h e m e a n i n g of, e x p r e s s i o n o n t h e sufferer's face, Bataille s a y s , w a s " a t o n c e
3 1
this e r o s i o n . 3 0
I t i s L e v i n a s ' s p r o j e c t t o s h o w t h a t all h u m a n ecstatic(?) a n d i n t o l e r a b l e . " The other person became
relations are always threatened by an evacuation of presence, u n s i m p l e : n e i t h e r s i m p l y living n o r d e a d , n e i t h e r i n p a i n n o r
a n d h e insists o n o u r e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t o " t h e n e x t o n e I i n e c s t a s y — b e c a m e , w e m a y say, c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e
m e e t , " the next one on the street I h a p p e n to run into. W h a t p o l e s — n o l o n g e r a self b u t c o m m u n i c a t i o n "itself." T h i s e v e n t
L e v i n a s w a n t s to say is t h a t h u m a n life is in r a p p o r t w i t h a o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n m a y h a p p e n t o u s w h e n s o m e o n e (like o n e
general i m p r o p r i e t y t h a t s u g g e s t s b o t h a n a r c h y and c o m m u - of t h e g l a m o r o u s p e o p l e f r o m t h e film Paris Is Burning) is
nity, b o t h s t a b i l i t y and instability. T h a t i s t o say, a c c o r d i n g t o engaged in the project of passing from male to female, or the
L e v i n a s , t h e r e is a r e l a t i o n in r e l a t i o n to w h i c h I am a l w a y s reverse. There the other person passes beyond mere imitation
already in relation, or in relation to which I am absolutely o f f e m a l e (or m a l e ) a n d a p p r o a c h e s , n o t a t h i r d s e x , b u t t h e
p a s s i v e . T h i s passivity is a r e s p o n s e to t h e O t h e r — b e y o n d h i m - c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e sexes t h a t m a k e s t h a t w h i c h i s
or h e r s e l f — t h a t I c o m e to be r e s p o n s i b l e for. But, a n d t h i s is called g e n d e r possible, w h i l e calling it i n t o q u e s t i o n . In these
s t r a n g e , r e s p o n s i b l e for nothing ( t h a t is to say, not n e c e s s a r i l y e x t r a v a g a n t cases, the o t h e r p e r s o n b e c o m e s radically dis-placed,
r e s p o n s i b l e t o r e s t o r e t h e o t h e r t o p r o p r i e t y , for t h a t w o u l d s e e m s t o b e l o n g n o w h e r e , s e e m s t o h a v e lost a w o r l d , a n d
p r e s u p p o s e s o m e c o m m o n essence or destiny). It is a responsi- b e c o m e s , a s Levinas p u t s it, " n a k e d b e y o n d n u d i t y " because this
bility p r o p r i e t y c a n n o t satisfy. " s o m e o n e " will h a v e e x c e e d e d a n y localizable c o n t e x t s . W h e n

W e r e t u r n a g a i n a n d a g a i n t o this fragile a n d i n d e f i n a b l e t h i s h a p p e n s , all p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s t o t h e o t h e r a r e s u s p e n d e d

relation with Autrui as that from which I cannot distinguish a n d t h e r e is, b e f o r e a n y t h i n g else, a f a s c i n a t i o n . T h i s f a s c i n a -
32

myself. B e y o n d o r o t h e r w i s e t h a n d o u b t o r c e r t a i n t y , t h i s sin- tion or obsession is the " s u b s t a n c e " of Levinas's e t h i c s .


) 'I I W ( > i, r. V i IN /\ 3 a i ' i i l i * i

W i t h a B l a n c h o t i a n accent, I.evinas h a d given us to u n d e r - (like a s t r a n g e r , in o t h e r w o r d s ) , (hen the b o r d e r s b e t w e e n

s t a n d t h a t , b e f o r e i t i s a n y t h i n g else, o u r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e stage and audience are suspended and we are "involved,"

o t h e r p e r s o n is an i n v o l u n t a r y f a s c i n a t i o n . Autrui is a r r e s t i n g " e l e c t e d , " " s i n g u l a r i z e d . " T h e p a r a l y s i s o f t h e subject i s a n

a n d p a r a l y z i n g . W e c a n b e o v e r c o m e by, o r e x p e r i e n c e , a n u n c o n t r o l l a b l e r a p p o r t w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n . W i t h this i s car-

arresting fascination with a n o t h e r person w h o has "passed ried a w a y all p r o p e r difference b e t w e e n S a m e a n d O t h e r . T h e r e

b e y o n d " while remaining here. It is a fascination w i t h t h a t i s a n identification o f t h e S a m e w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t d e n u c l e a t e s

w h i c h p r e s e n t s itself as o u t s i d e itself—as d r a i n e d of all reality, t h e S a m e o f s a m e n e s s a n d r e n d e r s t h e o t h e r p e r s o n all t h e

as threatened or already contaminated by absence, but in such m o r e Other in that I am the same as he (who, nonetheless,

a w a y t h a t p r e s e n c e a n d a b s e n c e cease t o b e t h e p r o p e r t e r m s remains other than I, other than anyone). This is an intimacy

for t h e O t h e r . T h e o t h e r p e r s o n , o u t s i d e a n y s i m p l e p r e s e n t a - more profound than sympathy or empathy, which presuppose

tion, is " b e y o n d " while remaining here, before m e ; b u t this a s t a b i l i t y i n t h e S a m e w h o can identify w i t h t h e o t h e r . W h a t

" h e r e " is no l o n g e r a p r e s e n c e , it is, as it w e r e , d e l a y e d b e h i n d h a p p e n s in L e v i n a s i a n p r o x i m i t y is an i n a b i l i t y or a n o n i n t e n -

itself, or is yet to c o m e . It is t h e wrcpresence of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y . t i o n a l i t y t h a t seizes u s f r o m t h e inside. T h i s loss o f p r o p r i e t y

T h e other person is threatened with becoming a spectacle—a is c o n t a g i o u s . It is s h a r e d like a c o m m u n a l ecstasy.

r e a l i t y m a d e u p o f n o t h i n g n e s s (as, for e x a m p l e , i n p r o f e s - A n o n y m o u s identification is n o t a k n o w l e d g e t h a t I t o o


sional wrestling, where the spectacle comes from the draining c a n die, or that I too can have my gender transformed. It is an
a w a y o f all " r e a l " w r e s t l i n g a n d c o m p e t i t i o n ) . T h e f a c e - t o - e x p e r i e n c e o f a n o n y m i t y (an e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e r e
face r a p p o r t f r o m Totality and Infinity is s u c h a s p e c t a c u l a r being a n y o n e there to have the experience). It is the experi-
r e l a t i o n . T h e r e , t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , a s visage, i s p r e s e n t e d a s e n c e of b e i n g already d e a d . A n o n y m o u s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is a
m a d e u p o f t h a t p a s s i n g a w a y t h a t d o e s n o t p a s s : t i m e . (In p a r a l y s i s t h a t subjects m e t o alterity " d e s p i t e myself," a n d
p r o f e s s i o n a l w r e s t l i n g , all r e a l i t y h a v i n g b e e n d r a i n e d a w a y , t h i s is t h e very s t r u c t u r e of subjectivity for L e v i n a s : d e s p i t e -
s o m e t h i n g yet r e m a i n s t o b e seen. T h a t w h i c h i s a r r e s t i n g i s oneself-for-an other.
a l w a y s t h a t w h i c h r e m a i n s t o b e seen w h i l e all i s a l r e a d y i n It is precisely t h i s s i n g u l a r r e s p o n s e or " r e l a t i o n " — p a r a -
f r o n t o f m e , b u t a s i f yet t o c o m e . ) B e y o n d a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i o n lyzing a n d a n o n y m o u s , " d e s p i t e - m e " — t h a t L e v i n a s s e e k s t o
t o self, a s p e c t a c l e c o m e s t o a r r e s t a n d p a r a l y z e u s : t h a t t o a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s . H e w i s h e s t o define e t h -
w h i c h t h e r e i s n o p r o p e r r e s p o n s e . A n d t h e p a r a l y s i s w e feel i s ics a s a n a n o n y m o u s i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h alterity t h a t calls for
a p a r a l y s i s of the subject. Bataille p r o b a b l y k n e w t h i s b e t t e r a n d dissolves all p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , a n d i t
t h a n a n y o n e : " A m a n alive, w h o sees a f e l l o w - m a n d i e , c a n " p o s e s p r o b l e m s i f o n e i s n o t t o a b a n d o n oneself t o v i o l e n c e .
s u r v i v e o n l y beside himself'[s'il v o i t s o n s e m b l a b l e m o u r i r , un I t calls for c o m p a r i s o n , m e a s u r e , k n o w i n g , l a w s , i n s t i t u t i o n s —
v i v a n t ne petit p l u s s u b s i s t e r q u e hors de soi]." 33
justice | a m o i n s d e s ' a b a n d o n n e r a l a v i o l e n c e , p o s e des p r o b -

O n e d o e s n o t m e r e l y o b s e r v e a scene h e r e . For, w h e n t h e l e m s . Elle en a p p e l l e a l o r s a la c o m p a r a i s o n , a la m e s u r e , au


3 4

o t h e r p e r s o n is d r a i n e d of all s u b s t a n c e , w h e n his r e a l i t y is savoir, a u x lois, a u x i n s t i t u t i o n s — a l a j u s t i c e ] . " T h a t is to

t h i s e r o s i o n , w h e n Autrui faces us like " t h e n e x t o n e I m e e t " say, o u t s i d e p u r e a n d s i m p l e a b a n d o n m e n t t o v i o l e n c e , t o a


I [ o b b e s i a n w a r ol .ill againsl all, there must be s o m e t h i n g like m a y h e d o n e t o him) like the m a n t o r t u r e d t o d e a t h i n C h i n a
k n o w i n g , l a w s , justice, a n d s o f o r t h — a l l o f w h i c h m u s t re- w h o s o o b s e s s e d Bataille. I n t h e face o f t h e o t h e r , i n t h e s p e c -
m a i n q u e s t i o n a b l e a n d r e t a i n w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s a call for t h e i r tacle t h a t is an i m a g e l o s i n g its r e f e r e n c e , is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n
r e v a l u a t i o n . T h e r e i s n o e t h i c s p r o p e r , p e r se, o r a s s u c h a n y - o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f f i n i t u d e : t h e O t h e r , precisely, c a n n o t b e
w h e r e in Levinas's w o r k s . But n e i t h e r is t h e r e a p u r e a n d s i m p l e himself. Autrui c a n n o t be himself a n d t h e r e f o r e I am c a l l e d to
a b s e n c e o f e t h i c s . T h e call o f t h e O t h e r will n e v e r c e a s e t o b e f o r - h i m . H e i s n o t e q u a l t o himself, b y definition, a s
place an incoherent d e m a n d in the soul of the subject to w h i c h Heidegger has so implacably shown. T h a t is h o w it is with the
n o r e s p o n s e i s a d e q u a t e (by d e f i n i t i o n , for n o t h i n g c a n b e a d - other person, a n d t h a t is w h y he obsesses me. He is w e a k ,
e q u a t e t o t h e i n c o h e r e n t ) . H i s e t h i c s , t h e r e f o r e , is, a s h e s a y s , i m p o v e r i s h e d , h o m e l e s s , g l o r i o u s . . . T h a t is w h a t affects me
a n " o b s e s s i o n . " Every r e s p o n s e t o t h e o t h e r , every r e s t o r a t i o n beyond characterization and beyond description. Even the
t o t h e g e n e r a l , will b e t r a y t h e d e m a n d . B u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e , h o m e l e s s a r e n o t e q u a l t o their h o m e l e s s n e s s — t h e y a r e a l w a y s
e a c h b e t r a y a l will b e a n e w r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r a n d t h u s w o r s e off o r o t h e r w i s e affected t h a n o t h e r s (or t h e y t h e m -
e t h i c s will m i m e o r " c o n f o r m " t o m i m e s i s , t o t h e i m p r o p e r selves) c a n s a y t h e y a r e . T h o s e w h o suffer c a n n o t g r a s p t h e i r
"itself." T h e r e will b e n o r e a c h i n g e t h i c s , n o t e a c h i n g it, n o suffering, e v e n if t h e y tell us of it. On t h e " h i t h e r s i d e " of all
i n s t i t u t i n g it. T h e r e will b e i n s t e a d t h e s l o w e m p t y i n g o u t o f t h a t is said, an infinite vulnerability obsesses us b e y o n d m e a s u r e .
a n y d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n w h a t s o e v e r , a n d this e m p t y i n g o u t E t h i c s , a s L e v i n a s defines it, i s r i g o r o u s l y c o r r e l a t i v e w i t h
will a r t i c u l a t e b y e x h a u s t i o n a n d e x c l u s i o n t h e s i n g u l a r "it- f i n i t u d e . T h e p a r a l y s i s o f t h e s u b j e c t i s t h e infinite v u l n e r a b i l -
self." T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t ethics i s a n y r e l a t i o n a t all. A n y ity t h a t i s f i n i t u d e — i t s o p e n n e s s t o a n y r e l a t i o n w h a t e v e r (just
r e l a t i o n a t all w o u l d r e m a i n j u s t t h a t — i n d i f f e r e n t — w e r e i t o r u n j u s t , r e s p o n s i b l e o r n o t ) . A n d , t h e r e i s n o ethics o f f i n i t u d e .
n o t for t h e p e c u l i a r g r a v i t y o f m i m e s i s : t h a t t o w h i c h n o r e l a - T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g like a s u g g e s t i o n , a m u r m u r t h a t o b l i g e s
tion (and no language) is adequate. u s a n d c o n s t r a i n s u s t o s o m e t h i n g like e t h i c s . S o m e t h i n g , h o w -

L e v i n a s ' s e t h i c s , if it is e t h i c s , will be an e x p e r i e n c e of t h i s ever, t h a t will a l w a y s h a v e " d u p e d " u s i n t h e s e n s e o f o u r

i m p o s s i b i l i t y : t h e r e i s n o r e l a t i o n t h a t i s e i t h e r inside o r o u t - h a v i n g b e e n t a k e n in by a d u b i o u s s c h e m e in s p i t e of o u r b e s t

side t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p o n d t o t h e O t h e r t h a t i s n o t a l s o a (or w o r s t ) i n t e n t i o n s . S o m e t h i n g will a l w a y s h a v e d r a g g e d u s

s u b s t i t u t i o n of me for t h e other. S u b s t i t u t i o n , in L e v i n a s , is a g a i n s t o u r will i n t o a v e r t i g o f r o m w h i c h o n l y a n a m e l e s s

the very m e a s u r e of a measureless w e a k n e s s : finitude. T h a t is a n d affectless voice will s p e a k , like t h e n a r r a t i v e v o i c e f r o m


35

t o say, t h e r e i s n o h u m a n r e l a t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t c i r c u m s c r i b e a Blanchot.

loss t h a t p a s s e s w i t h o u t p a s s i n g a w a y . T h a t loss i s i n s c r i b e d
in, o r a s , t h e face o f t h e o t h e r p e r s o n w h o faces m e f r o m b e -
y o n d himself a n d thereby obligates t h a t I am called on to be Death
substituted for him who cannot substitute for himself, and T h e space of radical ethics—a relation with others
w h o i s a b a n d o n e d t o a n infinite v u l n e r a b i l i t y t h a t i t i s b e y o n d t h a t precedes egology—is deeply, even definitively, a m b i g u o u s .
his p o w e r t o e q u a l ( a b a n d o n e d b e y o n d e v e n a n y v i o l e n c e t h a t As a m b i g u o u s , it is n e u t r a l a n d n e u t r a l i z i n g . It is as m u c h a
i i: v i N A s • s i i 111 > 5

s p a c e of d e a t h a n d dying, oi l i n i t u d c , literature, a n d m a d n e s s , v o l o n t é p a r t a g é e d ' ê t r e a p l u s i e u r s , fût-ce p o u r ne rien


as it is of e t h i c s . F i n i t u d e is given at b i r t h by t h e O t h e r w h o m faire, c ' e s t - à - d i r e ne rien faire d ' a u t r e q u e de m a i n t e n i r
I f o r g e t b u t to w h o m I o w e t h e finitude I a m . I am i g n o r a n t of le partage de 'quelque chose' qui précisément semble
m y b i r t h a s I a m o f m y d e a t h , since t h e s e define a n d t h e r e f o r e s ' ê t r e t o u j o u r s d é j à s o u s t r a i t à la p o s s i b i l i t é d ' ê t r e
e s c a p e m e , o r i n v o l v e m e i n a limit o v e r w h i c h I e x e r c i s e n o considéré c o m m e part à un partage: parole, silence.] 38

36
c o n t r o l . I t i s (the) O t h e r ( s ) w h o i n v o l v e ( s ) m e i n t h e s e l i m i t s
t h a t define m e . O n l y b y a n a b u s e o f l a n g u a g e , h o w e v e r , c a n This space, without or beyond essence (au-delà de
t h i s s p a c e b e a p p r o p r i a t e d t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s ; for t h e l'essence), t h i s b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n t h a t ¿5 o n l y as " o t h e r w i s e
space of incarnation a n d death is singular a n d incomparable. t h a n b e i n g , " is, for L e v i n a s , t h e p l a c e of a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t
It belongs to no one. It is properly neither ethical n o r aes- p l a c e s me in q u e s t i o n , for o n l y t h e r e , o u t s i d e e s s e n c e , can I
t h e t i c . I t i s n o m o r e t h e f i r s t sign o f e t h i c s ( a n e x t r e m e h u m i l - meet the other as other t h a n other-I. T h e ambiguity of this
ity b e f o r e t h e o t h e r ) t h a n o f h i s t r i o n i c s (the ability t o p l a y all s p a c e is s h a r e a b l e o n l y as c o n t e s t e d , as i n - q u e s t i o n ( h e n c e , it
t h e r o l e s w i t h a n icy d e t a c h m e n t ) , o r o f m a d n e s s ( a d i s p o s s e s - is the space n o t only of responsibility, b u t also of rivalry a n d
s i o n o f self a n d a r e p o s s e s s i o n b y w h o k n o w s w h a t forces o r jealousy). D e a t h is inscribed here as well. It is the space of t h e
demons). Incarnation is irreducibly undecidable, unoccupiable, f i n i t u d e , w e m u s t say, i n spite o f L e v i n a s ' s p r o f o u n d a v e r s i o n
a n d u n p r e s e n t a b l e . B u t this i s a l s o t h e s p a c e o f e x i s t e n c e w h i c h t o f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y a n d Bataille's i m p a t i e n c e w i t h H e i -
is, a s N a n c y s a y s , " o f f e r e d b y n o o n e t o n o o n e . " I t i s offered, degger's "slavish" devotion to philosophy. It is finitude as t h a t
b u t i t i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y lost o r s u r r e n d e r e d b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s o b l i g a t i o n - t o - b e t h a t I c a n n o t ever m e e t , for i t defines m e a n d
t o n o o n e . I t is, N a n c y s a y s , " s h a r e d , " b u t o n l y a s t h a t w h i c h is t h u s b e y o n d me as the inescapable voice of conscience t h a t
3 7
e l u d e s all s h a r i n g . There can be no transcending this space, calls Da-sein to itself by p u t t i n g it in q u e s t i o n . It is an i m -
since it is u n e q u a l or insufficient to itself. T h e r e f o r e , as B l a n c h o t
p r o p e r s p a c e , b e l o n g i n g t o n o o n e , a n d i s given t o Da-sein,
reminds us:
b u t o n l y o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t Da-sein i s r a d i c a l l y n o o n e .
U n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p a c e is a s p a c e of u n p o w e r , of a n a r c h y .
I t d o e s n o t follow, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y i s t h e It is w h e r e there is exposure to e x p o s u r e . In this space, the
s i m p l e p u t t i n g i n c o m m o n , i n s i d e t h e limits i t w o u l d o t h e r p e r s o n , e n r o l l e d a s this o r t h a t m e m b e r o f s o c i e t y (or
p r o p o s e for itself, of a s h a r e d will to be s e v e r a l , a l b e i t part of some whole), is depropriated and communicates with
t o d o n o t h i n g , t h a t i s t o say, t o d o n o t h i n g else t h a n t h i s s p a c e i t s e l f — b e y o n d a n y self. H e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s
m a i n t a i n t h e s h a r i n g o f ' s o m e t h i n g ' w h i c h , precisely, a p p r o a c h e d by an u n p o w e r over w h i c h he can exercise no
seems always already to have eluded the possibility of m a s t e r y a n d for w h i c h his r o l e d o e s n o t p r e p a r e h i m . L e v i n a s
b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t of a s h a r i n g : s p e e c h , silence. s a y s , " t h e face is e x p o s e d , m e n a c e d , as if i n v i t i n g us to an a c t
o f v i o l e n c e fie visage est e x p o s é , m e n a c é c o m m e n o u s i n v i t a n t
3 9
[La c o m m u n a u t é n ' e s t p a s p o u r a u t a n t l a s i m p l e m i s e à un acte de v i o l e n c e ] . " T h e entire lacerated b o d y of the
e n c o m m u n , d a n s les limites q u ' e l l e s e t r a c e r a i t , d ' u n e m a n t o r t u r e d i n C h i n a , w h o s e p h o t o g r a p h s Bataille h a d s e e n ,
I I v I N A '. '. I I I I I I a (> i

w a s a visage in the Lcvinasian sense. I lis m u t i l a t i o n e x c i t e s a ( )ther w h o presents (my) death i<> me by r e v e a l i n g it n o t to be
p a s s i o n for further mutilation, even as it excites a p a s s i o n a t e m y d e a t h , n o r his, n o r a n y o n e ' s . I a m o b l i g a t e d t o b e f o r - t h e -
r e v u l s i o n . In this s p a c e of c o n t e s t a t i o n — o f rivalry, of jealousy, o t h e r , t o die i n his p l a c e , i n t h a t s p a c e w h e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n
o f t o r t u r e , o f d e a t h — t h e o t h e r p e r s o n loses himself a n d "of- is approached by an unpower that approaches me and from
f e r s " t o m e a n o p e n i n g i n t o this s p a c e . T h e O t h e r i s s u b j e c t t o w h i c h I h a v e n o p o w e r t o s e p a r a t e myself. T h i s i s n o t a c o m -
a w i t h d r a w a l over which there is no control and of w h i c h m u n i o n , nor an exchange of places. It is the corrosive a n d
t h e r e i s n o k n o w l e d g e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , h e b e g i n s t o lose his s o b e r i n g r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o t a b l e t o die
a b i l i t y - t o - d i e , his definitive m o r t a l potentia, his " o w n m o s t " his own d e a t h . T h a t is w h a t is so t e r r i b l e a b o u t t h e final h o u r .
4 0
possibility. H e b e g i n s t o lose t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t defines h i m a s T h e s o l i t u d e o f d y i n g m u s t b e s h a r e d . 1 die f o r - t h e - o t h e r a n d
Da-sein. T h i s possibility, H e i d e g g e r tells u s , o n c e r e a l i z e d is, in his place because the other c a n n o t . He r e m a i n s , to the end,
h e n c e , n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e a n d Da-sein, o n c e r e a l i z e d i n its b e - u n c a n n i l y alive, r e m a i n s u n a b l e t o cease t o d i e , a n d s u r r e n -
i n g , loses itself a b s o l u t e l y b e c a u s e it is no l o n g e r able to d i e . It d e r s t h e o w n - m o s t n e s s (the p o s s i b i l i t y t o die) t h a t defines h i m .
i s t o t h a t definitive p o w e r l e s s n e s s t h a t I r e s p o n d . T h i s m a y b e D e a t h i s i m p e r s o n a l . T h a t i s w h y I m u s t b e t h e r e for h i m , w i t h
t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a n e t h i c s , b u t i t w o u l d b e a fatal o n e b e c a u s e h i m . I a m called t o a c c o m p l i s h w h a t h e c a n n o t a c c o m p l i s h
I a m n o t a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h myself f r o m t h a t p o w e r l e s s n e s s . himself. I m u s t s u b s t i t u t e for h i m this ability to die t h a t / a m .
T h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o l o n g e r a b l e t o forestall t h e a p p r o a c h o f I a m t h a t s u p p l e m e n t h e d e m a n d s , o b l i g e s , i n o r d e r t o be, i n
d e a t h — a p a r a l y s i s t h a t , i n spite o f his l a n g u a g e , defines H e i - o r d e r t o r e m a i n p o s s i b l e . H o w e v e r , I offer h i m w h a t i s n o t m y
d e g g e r ' s Entschlossenheit as a r a d i c a l passivity. It is to t h i s o w n , w h a t I c a n n o t offer, w h a t I a m u n a b l e t o g i v e . H e n c e w e
p a s s i v i t y t h a t e x p o s e s b e y o n d n u d i t y t h a t I r e s p o n d , a n d for e n t e r a d e a t h l i k e p a s s i v i t y (une passivité à mort) t o g e t h e r . T h i s
w h i c h I a m r e s p o n s i b l e . I n its a p p r o a c h (as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y - t o - i m p o s s i b l e o b l i g a t i o n a n d i m p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n d o e s n o t define
die t h a t i s a l r e a d y a n i n a b i l i t y - t o - c e a s e - d y i n g ) , finitude e s c a p e s me as t r a g i c . It e x p o s e s me to t h e r a d i c a l inability t h a t I must
f r o m " b e t w e e n " us, a n d h e n c e , t h e r e is a v e r t i g i n o u s (or a n o n y - t, —that t h a t t o w h i c h I a m ethically o b l i g a t e d i s b e y o n d m e ,
e

m o u s ) c o n t a c t . I identify w i t h this O t h e r n o n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , p r i o r b e y o n d m y p o w e r . I identify w i t h t h e o t h e r i n s o f a r a s h e i s n o


t o a n y d e c i s i o n , for t h e r e i s n o o n e t o identify w i t h a n d n o t h - o n e , i s b e y o n d himself, a n d t h e r e f o r e I t o o a m b e y o n d , a m n o
ing to intend. T h e r e is an e m p t y identification "despite m y - o n e , n o ipse—am myself a l r e a d y u n a b l e t o die. T o s u b s t i t u t e ,
self" t h a t i n t e r r u p t s m y " a s for m e . " to s u p p l e m e n t for t h e o t h e r , is to d i e , like t h e o t h e r , as O t h e r .
T h e response is prior to consciousness a n d it dissolves the J u s t a s t h e o t h e r m u s t die a d e a t h n o t his o w n , s o t o o I m u s t
s o c i a l b o n d , since I identify w i t h t h e O t h e r w h o i s n o o n e a t die a n o t h e r ' s d e a t h . S u b s t i t u t i o n , t h e " g e r m " o f L e v i n a s ' s
a l l , is a l r e a d y b e y o n d t h e s o c i a l . O u t s i d e my self, I am t h a t Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,^ is n o t a c c o m p l i s h e d
O t h e r w h o , p a r a l y z e d a n d d y i n g , i s already n o l o n g e r a b l e t o except beyond me, outside me, despite-me-for-another. Sub-
be there a n y m o r e . T h e O t h e r a n d I share this dying outside s t i t u t i n g for t h e o t h e r , I d i e , t h u s a c c o m p l i s h i n g w h a t t h e o t h e r
ourselves that both touches and separates us. Resoluteness c a n n o t . B u t d y i n g f o r - t h e - o t h e r , I r e m a i n u n a b l e t o die m y
(Entschlossenheit) e s c a p e s me a n d is a l r e a d y a r e s p o n s e to t h e o w n d e a t h . I die a w a y f r o m myself. D e a t h i s i m p e r s o n a l ; i t
b e l o n g s lo no o n e . I l e n e e , e v e r y o n e dies an ( )thcr's d e a t h , no b e i n g - c a s t , a n d il I hi sein is Mit-einandersein, t h e n , letting go
o n e his o w n . ol a n x i e t y a b o u t lostness (as b a t a i l l e r e c o m m e n d e d ) , it w e l -
T h e e t h i c s o f s u b s t i t u t i o n i s b e t r a y e d b y a n i n t e r n a l limit. c o m e s t h e O t h e r . Ethics w o u l d b e s u g g e s t e d , a s i f h y p n o t i -
It is an i m p a s s e . I leave t h e s c e n e . I a b a n d o n a n d b e t r a y t h e cally, by t h e call of finitude, if finitude is u n d e r s t o o d to be
O t h e r w h o calls t o m e . W h a t r e m a i n s i s t h e call f r o m n o o n e rigorously articulated as Mit-einandersein.
t o n o o n e . A call t o w h i c h n o e t h i c s , n o o b l i g a t i o n , i s a d - T h e space we share/expose is the space of an instability
e q u a t e . T h e r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r , like f i n i t u d e itself, i s b e y o n d t h a t c a n n o t be c o m m a n d e d . It is t h e s p a c e of a r a d i c a l c o n t e s -
my g r a s p . Levinas's ethics is h a u n t e d by finitude, t h e very tation of discourses that cannot be rigorously distinguished
finitude t h a t suggests an e t h i c s . T h e call of finitude—lacerat- f r o m e a c h o t h e r . It is, if y o u like, t h e s p a c e of l a n g u a g e itself,
ing m e , e x p o s i n g m e , e n r o l l i n g m e , o b s e s s i n g m e — s a y s n o t h - of w r i t i n g b e f o r e t h e letter, as D e r r i d a s a y s , or of le dire, as
i n g . It is t h a t other d e a t h t h a t d i s p o s s e s s e s me of myself. L e v i n a s p r e f e r s . I n s o f a r a s Levinas's t e x t c o m e s t o d o u b l e H e i -

Yet I must be this e x i s t e n c e , this finitude, w h i c h is offered degger's (diachronie a n d Zeit, anarchie a n d das Man, le sujet
by no one to no one. I am nothing—nothing other than that and Da-sein, responsabilité and Gewissenheit, and so forth)
being-offered, t h a t supplement, or t h a t substitution t h a t I can- his w o r k a m o u n t s t o a v a s t p r o t e s t a g a i n s t w h a t H e i d e g g e r
n o t a c c o m p l i s h . I am O t h e r — t h a t is, no o n e , no ipse. I am could m e a n , a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of finitude to
only as substituted. T h a t is w h y I am always the first person " f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . " In an essay on Lyotard, L a c o u e -
accused, the first person responsible. My fascinated attentive- L a b a r t h e says, "I h a v e a lot of t r o u b l e n o t seeing in H e i d e g g e r ' s
n e s s t o t h e O t h e r i s t h e b r e a k u p o f m y unity. T h e r e l a t i o n t o ' b e i n g ' , if it is still b e i n g , a n d if it is H e i d e g g e r ' s b e i n g , t h e
t h e O t h e r i s singular, u n i q u e , n o n g e n e r a l i z a b l e . T h e r e i s n o s a m e t h i n g a s (if n o t its very possibility) L e v i n a s ' s ' t h e o t h e r -
4 3
e t h i c s a s s u c h , n o e t h i c s itself. O r , this e t h i c s i s s t r u c t u r e d like wise than being'. Or as an empty t r a n s c e n d e n c e . "
i m p r o p r i e t y , a n d t h e L e v i n a s i a n s u b j e c t i s n o t h i n g b u t its infi- T h a t is, b y a c t i n g a s a c o m p e t i t o r t o H e i d e g g e r a n d t o
nite unfinished vulnerability. fundamental ontology, Levinas has exposed a n d exploited an
an-archic r a p p o r t and has attempted to undermine Heidegger,
w h o w r o t e n o e t h i c s . W h o w r o t e n o e t h i c s for t h e v e r y g o o d
Levinas and Heidegger reason that there is nothing adequate or equal to finitude,

If L e v i n a s ' s e t h i c s is an e l a b o r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n of n o t h i n g " o t h e r w i s e " t h a n finitude. Levinas is Heidegger in

finitude, then something about finitude—its primordial tem- F r e n c h , b u t this c a n u n d e r m i n e H e i d e g g e r i n G e r m a n . I n very


p o r a l i t y , its d i a c h r o n y , its a l w a y s - o u t s i d e - i t s e l f n e s s — s u g g e s t s different w a y s , Bataille a n d L e v i n a s e a c h e c h o H e i d e g g e r . E a c h
to L e v i n a s an e t h i c s . T i m e itself means ethics to L e v i n a s . Da- says w h a t H e i d e g g e r will n o t say b e c a u s e i t i s u n s a y a b l e . F o r
sein—that b e i n g t h a t d o e s n o t h a v e its b e i n g , t h a t i s a l w a y s i n L e v i n a s , t h e r e i s n o m e a n i n g i n t h e fact t h a t t h e r e i s n o e t h i c s
question, t h a t is the " p u r e abyss of presence in the p r e s e n t " — 4 2
of finitude. By r e p e a t i n g H e i d e g g e r in t e r m s of e t h i c s , L e v i n a s
suggests to Levinas, possibly to us as well, s o m e kind of eth- gives u s n o t h i n g t o t h i n k , n o t h i n g t o k n o w b e y o n d t h i s s u g -
ics. If b e i n g o n l y " i s " in its p a s s i n g , or in its b e i n g - a l t e r e d , or gestion: w h y did finitude n o t suggest an ethics to Heidegger?
We do not suggest that Levinas p u i s his own text in q u e s -
T II R E E
t i o n in o r d e r to p u t H e i d e g g e r ' s t e x t in question. We s u g g e s t
t h a t the ethics t h a t g n a w s at and transfigures Levinas is an
involuntary dramatization of being-in-question. We are sug-
g e s t i n g t h a t finitude itself is infinitely s u g g e s t i b l e . It c a n n o t
b u t suggest a " b e y o n d " o r a n " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g . " Levinas's
Blanchot, L'arrêt de mort,
e t h i c s , in its w a y , u n l e a s h e s this s u g g e s t i o n . and the Image of Literature
Artists are replicants who have found the secret of their
obsolescence.
—Massumi

Writing
W r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t o f w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Yet w r i t -
i n g s a y s , e a c h t i m e , c l e a r l y a n d u n o b t r u s i v e l y , there is. It s a y s
t h i s if o n l y to d e n y it: there is n o t . . . W r i t i n g affirms e x i s t -
e n c e — t h e t h i n g itself, t h e r e a l — b u t o n l y b y t a k i n g its p l a c e .
W r i t i n g t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f t h e r e a l i n o r d e r t o say it. I t i n t r u d e s
itself b e t w e e n u s a n d t h e reality o f w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Still, o u t -
side o f w r i t i n g (before it, p r i o r t o it) w h a t h a s r e a l l y t a k e n
p l a c e ? W h a t h a p p e n e d ? W r i t i n g w o u l d like t o say t h i s t h i n g ,
b u t as it sets o u t to do this it is i m m e d i a t e l y infected by a f o r e i g n -
ness t h a t w e a k e n s i t i m m e a s u r a b l y . I n s t e a d o f s a y i n g t h e t h i n g ,
it says (or e v e n , like t h e w o r k of a r t in L e v i n a s , it insists on) its
absence by p r e s e n t i n g itself in t h e p l a c e of t h a t to w h i c h it
w o u l d like to refer. B u t , w h a t is w r i t i n g itself ( o u t s i d e of, or
j u s t s h o r t of, its r e f e r r i n g t o t h e t h i n g ) ? A n d d i d w e n o t b e g i n
this p a r a g r a p h by saying t h a t writing says, not absence, but
existence, there is? We s h o u l d h a v e said: Writing tears itself apart
from the moment it begins to speak. But w h o c a n say this?
L e t u s g o further.
W h a t i f e x i s t e n c e ¿ 5 o n l y a s a b s e n c e , a n d m o r e precisely,

65
a s t h a t a b s e n c e that w r i t i n g s a y s , affirms, a n d " p r e s e n t s " ? O r , a r e "cast towards us like c h u n k s that h a v e w e i g h t in t h e m -
t o say t h e s a m e t h i n g a g a i n , w h a t i f e x i s t e n c e (the r e a l , t h e selves [se jettent sur n o u s d e s c h o s e s c o m m e d e s m o r c e a u x q u i
4
t h i n g itself) is a l r e a d y t h e saying of absence, in s h o r t , w r i t - s ' i m p o s e n t p a r e u x - m ê m e s ] . " I m p o r t a n t l y , this c h a o t i c m a t -
i n g — t h e v e r y w r i t i n g w h o s e p r e s e n c e insists u p o n t h e a b s e n c e ter i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n t h a t m a t t e r w h i c h i s " d e f i n e d b y m e c h a -
o f t h e real? I n t h a t c a s e w r i t i n g w o u l d b e t h e v e r y t a k i n g - nistic l a w s w h i c h w r i n g o u t its w h o l e e s s e n c e a n d r e n d e r i t
p l a c e o f ( d o u b l e genitive) e x i s t e n c e : w r i t i n g t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f intelligible [définie p a r les lois m é c a n i s t e s q u i e n é p u i s a i e n t e t
5
existence a n d existence takes place as writing (but n o t — a n d la r e n d a i e n t i n t e l l i g i b l e ] . " It is n o t , h o w e v e r , t h e s a m e thing
let us be clear a b o u t t h i s , for it is a t e m p t a t i o n to w h i c h L e v i n a s a s t h i s inter-essed m a t t e r . I t i s n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g a s m a t t e r
says a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e i s p r o n e — a s p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y f o r m e d t h a t is f o r m e d , t h a t is s o m e item t h a t rests in a s e t t i n g , a w o r l d ,
or narrated). T h a t which happens outside the text takes place a n d t h a t is, as H e i d e g g e r p u t s it, zuhandensein. Aesthetic m a t t e r
as writing b u t is n o t re-presented in the text. We could say i s n o t d e s t i n e d t o t h e h a n d , t o t h e subject, o r t o a n y u s e r c o m -
t h a t w r i t i n g is the very h a p p e n i n g of an outside t h a t r e m a i n s m u n i t y . It is i n s t e a d m a t t e r d e s t i n e d o n l y to appear, a n d o n l y
in t h e t e x t , b u t o n l y as a silence, like t h e voix narrative of in poetry, but w i t h o u t being named.
1
w h i c h B l a n c h o t s p e a k s . W e c o u l d a l s o say t h a t w r i t i n g " f o r - But this other destiny or other aspect to matter is n o t a
g e t s " itself a n d t h a t t h i s h a s u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s ; silence af- n e w quality that art discovers (and w o u l d , thereby, contribute
firms itself i n w r i t i n g w i t h o u t h a v i n g t h e s t r e n g t h t o say itself. t o t h e intelligibility o f t h e w o r l d ) . I t i s n o t a q u a l i t y t h a t w o u l d
I n o u r first c h a p t e r w e s a w h o w i n a r t t h e c r e p u s c u l a r b e p o e t r y ' s offering t o science a n d p h i l o s o p h y , c u l t u r e a n d
paroxysmality of naked matter suddenly makes an obscure p s y c h o l o g y . T h a t w h i c h a r t d i s c o v e r s , o r u n c o v e r s , o r lays b a r e
" a p p e a r a n c e . " L e v i n a s s h o w s this t o u s i n his e v a l u a t i o n o f will n o t b e f o u n d u n d e r a n y e n c y c l o p e d i c s u b j e c t h e a d i n g . T o
a r t f r o m b o t h " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e " a n d t h e s e c t i o n f r o m p u t i t v e r y s i m p l y : a r t i s useless m a t t e r . I t i s m a d e u p o f useless
Existence and Existents w h o s e title q u i e t l y s u m s up t h e u n i q u e m a t t e r a n d uselessness i s n o t o n e o f m a t t e r ' s q u a l i t i e s . (It is,
6
a t m o s p h e r e he finds in art: "Existence w i t h o u t a W o r l d [Ex- A g a m b e n w o u l d say, s o m e t h i n g like a " h a l o [ a u r e o l a ] . " ) W e
istence sans M o n d e ] . " 2
He m a k e s it clear in the later w o r k m a y say, h o w e v e r , t h a t uselessness i s o n e o f m a t t e r ' s " p o s s i -
t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f m a t t e r t h a t i n t e r e s t s h i m i s n o t s o m e stuff bilities." But w h a t does this m e a n , a n d w h a t does it m e a n t h a t
that is utterly refractory to mind, b u t is instead t h a t m a t t e r o n l y i n a r t d o e s this " p o s s i b i l i t y " a p p e a r a s s u c h ? D o e s i t m e a n
which c a n only appear in poetry (but namelessly a n d w i t h o u t t h a t a r t realizes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f uselessness a n d p u t s i t t o
3
a n y o b j e c t i v i t y ) . H e refers t o t h a t a s p e c t o f m a t t e r w h i c h i s w o r k ( a n d t h e r e b y b e t r a y s it)?
l i b e r a t e d w h e n , via a r t , o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e w o r l d ( w i t h I n his e s s a y " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " B l a n c h o t
usefulness a n d w o r k ) a r e n e u t r a l i z e d . A s w e h a v e seen i n o u r says (in t e r m s t h a t a r e close t o b o t h L e v i n a s a n d H e i d e g g e r )
first chapter, this neutralization is the very event of art a n d it t h a t "if t h e s c u l p t o r uses s t o n e a n d i f t h e r o a d b u i l d e r a l s o
immerses us in an a t m o s p h e r e w h e r e space is w i t h o u t a hori- uses s t o n e , the first uses it in a w a y t h a t it is n o t used, c o n s u m e d ,
zon, w h e r e "[n]aked elements, simple a n d absolute [Éléments n e g a t e d b y u s a g e , b u t affirmed, r e v e a l e d i n its o b s c u r i t y , a s a
n u s , simples et a b s o l u s ] " detach themselves from things a n d r o a d t h a t l e a d s o n l y t o itself [si l e s c u l p t e u r s e sert d e l a p i e r r e
I II I \ I I

et si le c a n t o n n i e r aussi se sert de la p i e r r e , le p r e m i e r l'utilise ier can be used in such .1 w a y that it v a n i s h e s i n t o its uses. But
d e telle s o r t e q u ' e l l e n ' e s t p a s utilisée, c o n s o m m é e , niée p a r art uses m a i l e r such t h a t it is wwused, w o r k l e s s , idle, useless.
l ' u s a g e , m a i s affirmée, révélée d a n s s o n o b s c u r i t é , c h e m i n q u i Art s i m p l y c a u s e s t h e m a r b l e t o " a p p e a r , " n o t t o d i s a p p e a r
7
n e c o n d u i t q u ' à elle m ê m e ] . " T h e a r t w o r k , l e a d i n g t h e s t o n e , into use. In p o e t r y likewise, w o r d s , d e t a c h e d from referentiality,
a s i t w e r e , b a c k t o itself ( b u t d i d i t e v e r leave itself?) " m a k e s s u d d e n l y m a k e a m a t e r i a l a p p e a r a n c e . It is t h e a p p e a r a n c e of
w h a t d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e o b j e c t a p p e a r [fait a p p a r a î t r e c e q u i m a t t e r t h a t is, e m i n e n t l y , w h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t i s m a d e of. N o t
8
disparaît dans l'objet]." It is material that disappears into the m a t t e r in its t h i n g l y reality, b u t in its a p p e a r i n g as such. N o t
object, a n d " t h e m o r e the material is appropriate—the m o r e it thingliness, b u t the image of matter. Imaginary matter, if you
n e a r s n o t h i n g n e s s [plus la m a t i è r e { . . . } est a p p r o p r i é e , p l u s prefer. I t i s u n e m p l o y e d m a t t e r , o r t h a t a s p e c t o f m a t t e r t h a t
9
elle s e fait p r o c h e d e r i e n ] . " But i n t h e a r t w o r k t h i s m a t t e r i s r e m a i n s a l w a y s p r i o r t o its b e i n g m a t e r i a l for t h i s o r t h a t . A r t
p r e s e r v e d . " T h e s t a t u e glorifies t h e m a r b l e , " B l a n c h o t s a y s , ¿5 u n u s e d , u n e m p l o y e d , a n d idle m a t t e r . A r t , in s h o r t , is t h e
e c h o i n g b o t h L e v i n a s a n d H e i d e g g e r , a n d t h e a r t w o r k "is i m a g e of m a t t e r . I c a n d i s m a n t l e t h e t e m p l e a n d b u i l d a r o a d
e m i n e n t l y that of w h i c h it is made [est é m i n e m m e n t ce dont w i t h t h e m a r b l e , b u t I c a n n o t d i s m a n t l e t h e image t h e t e m p l e
]0
elle est faite]." However, e m i n e n t l y is. I c a n c a s t c e l l u l o i d i n t o t h e fire b u t I c a n n o t m a -
n i p u l a t e t h e m o t i o n p i c t u r e itself. I c a n n o t e v e n t o u c h it.

T h e painting is not m a d e from material ingredients I t a p p e a r s . I t d i s a p p e a r s . A t t h e s a m e t i m e . For, t h i s i m a g e


a d d e d to a c a n v a s ; it is t h e p r e s e n c e of this m a t t e r , o f m a t t e r t h a t p r e c e d e s its d i s a p p e a r a n c e i n t o t h e o b j e c t (the
which without it w o u l d remain hidden to us. A n d the t h i n g t h a t settles i n t o t h e f a m i l i a r h o r i z o n s o f t h e w o r l d ) i s
p o e m likewise is n o t m a d e with ideas, or with w o r d s , n o t i n t u r n t h e m a t e r i a l for a p e r c e p t i o n . T h a t i s w h y B l a n c h o t
it is the point from which w o r d s begin to become their says t h a t t h e so-called elemental d e p t h i s " o p e n e d " b u t " a t t h e
a p p e a r a n c e , a n d t h e elemental depth u p o n w h i c h t h i s s a m e t i m e it closes." Levinas says t h a t " p a r a d o x i c a l as it m a y
a p p e a r a n c e i s o p e n e d w h i l e a t t h e s a m e t i m e i t closes. s e e m , p a i n t i n g is a struggle w i t h sight [si p a r a d o x a l q u e cela
puisse p a r a î t r e , la p e i n t u r e est u n e lutte avec la v i s i o n ] " for " s i g h t
[Le t a b l e a u n ' e s t p a s fait à p a r t i r de la toile et a v e c d e s s e e k s t o d r a w o u t o f t h e light b e i n g s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a w h o l e
i n g r é d i e n t s m a t é r i e l s , il est la p r é s e n c e de c e t t e m a t i è r e [elle c h e r c h e à a r r a c h e r à la l u m i è r e les ê t r e s i n t é g r é s d a n s un
1 2

q u i s a n s lui n o u s r e s t e r a i t c a c h é e . E t l e p o è m e e n c o r e ensemble]." I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r — m a t t e r t h a t i s its o w n i m a g e


n ' e s t p a s fait a v e c d e s idées, n i a v e c des m o t s , m a i s i l a n d t h a t only appears in poetry (but remains unseen, u n o b -
e s t c e à p a r t i r d e q u o i les m o t s d e v i e n n e n t l e u r served, unperceived, silent)—is m a t t e r as such, in its ipseity or
apparence et la profondeur élémentaire sur laquelle origin. ( W h a t is ipseity if n o t origin, anteriority, s o m e t h i n g as
c e t t e a p p a r e n c e est o u v e r t e e t c e p e n d a n t s e r e f e r m e . ] 11 itself, as such, p r i o r to its predicative i n v o l v e m e n t s in t h e w o r l d ? )
U s e l e s s n e s s , w e h a v e s a i d , i s n o t a q u a l i t y . I t will n o t b e
T h e w o r k o f a r t r e q u i r e s m a t e r i a l s j u s t like o b j e c t s d o . f o u n d i n a n y list o f q u a l i t i e s t h a t w o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h m a t t e r .
Plastic, ink, canvas, a n d m a r b l e are necessary to art, a n d mar- Yet, it is o n l y as useless t h a t m a t t e r is m a d e to a p p e a r as s u c h ,
BI A N ( I I 0 I

a s i t s e l f — u n f o r m e d , u n t h i n g l y , a n d u n i l l u m i n a t e d . Useless, ingness o u t s i d e ol all e v e n t s . But w h a t ol this n o t h i n g -


aesthetic matter is neither graphic nor acoustic. To be sure, in ness itsell? S o m e t h i n g w o u l d h a p p e n , if o n l y t h e n i g h t
the temple marble is revealed as unemployed matter a n d it a n d silence o f n o t h i n g n e s s . T h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f t h i s
c a n a p p e a r , t o t h e i n d u s t r i o u s engineer, a s m a t e r i a l for a r o a d ' s o m e t h i n g is h a p p e n i n g ' is n o t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y of a
(especially since t h e g o d s h a v e l o n g since fled t h e t e m p l e a n d s u b j e c t a n d d o e s n o t refer t o a s u b s t a n t i v e . L i k e t h e
r e p l i c a n t t e m p l e s m a d e o f o t h e r m a t e r i a l s exist e l s e w h e r e a s t h i r d p e r s o n p r o n o u n in the i m p e r s o n a l form of t h e v e r b ,
m u s e u m pieces, t h u s r e n d e r i n g t h e b a r e existence o f this t e m p l e i t designates n o t t h e uncertainly k n o w n a u t h o r o f t h e
s u p e r f l u o u s ) . T h i s i s j u s t t h e p o i n t . N o o n e sees t h e useless- a c t i o n , b u t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f this a c t i o n itself w h i c h
ness o f m a t t e r . O n e sees m a t e r i a l for this o r t h a t . M a t e r i a l i t y s o m e h o w has no author. This impersonal, a n o n y m o u s ,
itself h a r b o r s itself in its o w n visibility. T h a t is its o b s c u r i t y . In yet inextinguishable " c o n s u m m a t i o n " of being, w h i c h
its u s e l e s s n e s s , u n c l o t h e d b y f o r m s , i t w i t h d r a w s f r o m p e r c e p - m u r m u r s i n t h e d e p t h s o f n o t h i n g n e s s itself w e shall
t i o n . W h e n t h e g o d s h a v e fled the t e m p l e a n d w h e n e v e n t h e i r d e s i g n a t e by t h e t e r m there is. T h e there is, i n a s m u c h
flight h a s b e e n f o r g o t t e n , B l a n c h o t s a y s i n this essay, t h e n t h e as it resists p e r s o n a l f o r m , is ' b e i n g in g e n e r a l . '
t e m p l e i s n o l o n g e r a t e m p l e a n d i t r e t u r n s t o itself, w i t h o u t
e v e r h a v i n g d e p a r t e d f r o m itself, i n its sheer, o b s c u r e , a n d [ I m a g i n o n s l e r e t o u r a u n é a n t d e t o u s les ê t r e s : c h o s e s
u n p e r c e i v e d p r e s e n c e . I t r e t u r n s t o m a t e r i a l i t y itself, its o r i - e t p e r s o n n e s . I l est i m p o s s i b l e d e p l a c e r c e r e t o u r a u
gin, w i t h o u t any proper n a m e or place in the world. Material- n é a n t e n d e h o r s d e t o u t é v é n e m e n t . M a i s c e n é a n t lui-
ity (or a e s t h e t i c , o r i m a g i n a r y m a t t e r ) i s t h e n a m e g i v e n t o m ê m e ? Q u e l q u e c h o s e s e p a s s e , fût-ce l a n u i t e t l a si-
m a t t e r itself—that s t r a n g e b o d y w h i c h h a s n o p r o p e r n a m e lence du néant. L'indétermination de ce ' q u e l q u e c h o s e
s i n c e its p r e s e n c e r e m a i n s u n p e r c e i v e d . I n s o f a r a s i t h a s n o s e p a s s e , ' n ' e s t p a s l ' i n d é t e r m i n a t i o n d u sujet, n e s e
p u r p o s e a n d serves n o p u r p o s e , a r t affirms t h i s n a m e l e s s n e s s : r é f è r e p a s à u n s u b s t a n t i f . Elle d é s i g n e c o m m e l e
13
t h e v e r y fact of t h e il y a, as L e v i n a s s a y s . It is an a f f i r m a t i o n p r o n o m de la troisième personne dans la forme
t h a t d e f o r m s all w r i t i n g a n d t h a t m a k e s o f all w r i t i n g a n e r o - impersonnelle du verbe, n o n point un auteur mal c o n n u
sion of t h a t propriety w h i c h places the things of the w o r l d de l'action, mais le caractère de cette action elle-même
w i t h i n o u r grasp. Such deformed writing w o u l d be poetry: the q u i , e n q u e l q u e m a t i è r e , n ' a p a s d ' a u t e u r , q u i est
v e r y difference o r d i v e r g e n c e o f t h e visible f r o m t h e invisible. anonyme. Cette 'consommation' impersonnelle,
In the r e n o w n e d passage that immediately follows "Exist- a n o n y m e , m a i s i n e x t i n g u i b l e de l'être, celle qui
ence w i t h o u t a W o r l d , " Levinas describes "existence w i t h o u t m u r m u r e au fond du néant lui-même, n o u s la fixons
e x i s t e n t s " ( w h i c h a m o u n t s t o t h e s a m e t h i n g , since e x i s t e n t s , p a r le t e r m e d ' i l y a. Mil y a, d a n s s o n refus de p r e n d r e
1 4
or beings, belong to a world). He says: u n e f o r m e p e r s o n n e l l e , est 1 ' ' ê t r e e n g é n é r a l ' . ]

L e t u s i m a g i n e all b e i n g s , t h i n g s , a n d p e r s o n s , r e v e r t - This crepuscular event is the writer's most quotidian mi-


i n g t o n o t h i n g n e s s . O n e c a n n o t p u t this r e t u r n t o n o t h - i . A s w e s a w i n o u r first c h a p t e r , a r t i s t s w o r k w i t h i m a g e s .
r. i A IN i ii i i i / .1

T h e y w o r k w i t h that w h i c h resists w o r k a n d w h i c h b a l k s a t at the s a m e t u n e , there is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e w o r l d , n o t h -


p e r s o n a l f o r m . T h e y w o r k w i t h i n t h e i m a g i n a r y milieu t h a t ing b e y o n d it, or o n l y the n o t h i n g . W r i t i n g s a y s , e a c h t i m e ,
p r e c e d e s t h e w o r l d a n d its i n t e r e s t s , a milieu w h e r e n o o n e there is (nothing else, more, or beyond). An Orphic glance
p r o p e r l y b e l o n g s . I n his f a m o u s e s s a y " T w o V e r s i o n s o f t h e c a n d e t a c h from t h e t h i n g o f t h e w o r l d its p r e d i c a t e s , its k n o w -
Imaginary," Blanchot asks: ability, its f e a t u r e s a n d d i s t i n g u i s h i n g m a r k s , its h i s t o r y a n d
its f o r m — n o n e o f w h i c h a r e o t h e r t h a n i t a n d all o f w h i c h
But w h a t is the image? W h e n there is nothing, the t o u c h u p o n its ipseity. A n d it is t h e r e , in this d e t a c h m e n t , " b e -
i m a g e f i n d s i n t h i s n o t h i n g its n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n , b u t side itself," a s a n o r i g i n a r y i m a g e , t h a t t h e t h i n g t a k e s p l a c e .
there it disappears. The image needs the neutrality a n d A r t " s h o w s " t h i s . T h e d e t a c h m e n t i s its " e a c h t i m e " — a sin-
the fading of the world; it w a n t s everything to return gular, a r t i c u l a t e d i n s t a n t , a fatal a n d d y i n g i n s t a n t u n a b l e t o
t o t h e i n d i f f e r e n t d e e p w h e r e n o t h i n g i s affirmed; i t give itself its e n d . W r i t i n g gives t h i s to us as such; b u t we c a n -
t e n d s t o w a r d t h e i n t i m a c y o f w h a t still s u b s i s t s i n t h e n o t g r a s p t h i s " g i f t , " for it is n o - t h i n g - l i k e . It is h o w it is. By
void. t h e s a m e t o k e n , t h e b e i n g o f w r i t i n g itself i s " b e s i d e itself" i n
poetry.
[ M a i s q u ' e s t - c e q u e l'image? Q u a n d il n ' y a rien, l ' i m a g e E x i s t e n c e (or Being) t a k e s p l a c e i n p o e t r y , n o t i n t h e w o r l d
t r o u v e là sa c o n d i t i o n , m a i s y disparaît. L'image ( w h e r e it is d i s s e m i n a t e d in t h i n g s ) , b e c a u s e p o e t r y is w i t h o u t
d e m a n d e l a n e u t r a l i t é e t l ' e f f a c e m e n t d u m o n d e , elle a w o r l d a n d w i t h o u t e x i s t e n t s (or b e i n g s ) . B u t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g
v e u t q u e t o u t r e n t r e d a n s l e f o n d indifférent o ù r i e n n e o t h e r t h a n t h e w o r l d . L a n g u a g e i s t h e s a y i n g o f t h i s fatality. I t
s'affirme, elle t e n d à l ' i n t i m i t é de ce q u i s u b s i s t e e n - r e t u r n s e x i s t e n c e t o "itself" (never h a v i n g left itself) j u s t a s , a t
core dans le vide.] 1 5
t h e e n d o f its i t i n e r a r y , t h e t e m p l e (the W o r k ) r e t u r n s t o it-
self—to t h a t w h i c h i t a l r e a d y n o l o n g e r w a s . T h i s i s its p u r e
In formulations t h a t have b e c o m e so familiar to us, we e x p o s u r e t o i r r e p a r a b i l i t y , a s G i o r g i o A g a m b e n w o u l d say a n d
m a y say t h a t t h e i m a g e , a r t , o r p o e t r y (insofar a s p o e t r y b e - a s w e shall d i s c u s s i n o u r n e x t c h a p t e r . T h e secret o f its o b s o -
gins o n l y w h e n w o r d s b e c o m e t h e i r o w n i m a g e ) i s t h e p r e s - lescence i s t h i s " a l r e a d y n o l o n g e r " t h a t d e s c r i b e s its o r i g i n .
e n c e o f a b s e n c e , t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t n o t h i n g n e s s (or d e a t h ) A l r e a d y n o l o n g e r a t h i n g , n e i t h e r m e a n t n o r s h o w n , its b e i n g
b e p r e s e n t i n p e r s o n . O r , w e m a y say t h a t w h e n e v e r y t h i n g i s its b e i n g - t o w a r d - i t s e l f , t o w a r d its d e a t h , t h a t a t e a c h in-
d i s a p p e a r s , d i s a p p e a r a n c e itself " a p p e a r s . " T h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s s t a n t a r r e s t s its b e i n g - t o w a r d , like t h e superfluity o f a n in-
r e m a i n helpful o n l y i n s o f a r a s w e r e m a i n a t t e n t i v e t o t h e i r s t a n t t h a t m u s t e n d u r e its n o l o n g e r h a v i n g t i m e . T h i s i s like-
o b s c u r i t y , for t h e y d o n o t clarify t h e n o t i o n o f a n " e l e m e n t a l wise the essence of Heideggerian finitude: at each instant o n e
d e p t h " t h a t B l a n c h o t i n v o l v e s u s in. I t r e m a i n s o u r t a s k t o h a s a l r e a d y r u n o u t of t i m e a n d death is possible ( b u t t h e r e is
t h i n k t h a t it is in l a n g u a g e , in w r i t i n g , t h a t n a k e d e x i s t e n c e is no longer any time during which or in which to die, as Blanchot
t o u c h e d , n o t i n t h e w o r l d (in w h i c h I c o n t i n u a l l y h i d e f r o m inflects it). T h e u n c a n n y p r e s e n c e o r p e r s i s t e n c e o f t h e c o r p s e ,
m y e x p o s u r e a n d c a n flee m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s like J o n a h ) . B u t o r t h e w o r k o f a r t , realizes this e n i g m a .
16
b u t they are h a p p i l y i e l a t e d . The s c h e m a " s h a r e s " w i t h t h e
W r i t i n g , t h e n , e x p o s e s or "exscribes" a certain resistant
image some characteristic, but this shared characteristic h a s
m a t e r i a l i t y o f w h i c h w e c a n o n l y say " t h e r e is." W h e n w e
its own nature. It is n e i t h e r a s i m p l e a s p e c t (a " t h i s h e r e " ) n o r
s p e a k o f ipseity o r o r i g i n , a s w e d o a b o v e , w e a r e i n d i c a t i n g
a r e p r o d u c t i o n (of a n a b s e n t " t h i s h e r e " ) . T h e s h a r e d c h a r a c -
an a b s o l u t e past, i m m e m o r i a l l y p a s t (since it w a s never
teristic is c a l l e d , by H e i d e g g e r , in d e f a u l t of a p r o p e r n a m e of
p r e s e n t ) , a n d its o n l y " l i f e " is in its p e r s i s t e n c e in t h e i m a g e of
its o w n , a schema-image.™ T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is t h e i m a g e of
t h e t h i n g s o f t h e w o r l d , b u t w i t h o u t its p r o p e r l y " b e l o n g i n g "
to the world and the world's personal forms. The temple that a c o n c e p t , an i m a g e of t h o u g h t , a n d it is t h a t by v i r t u e of

r e t u r n s to its o r i g i n , to its m a t e r i a l i t y , to itself, a l s o d i s a p p e a r s w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r c a n n o l o n g e r b e j u s t a n y t h i n g a t all, a n d

i n t o itself a n d b e c o m e s its o w n u n n a m a b l e i m a g e , r e c k l e s s b e c o m e s i n s t e a d o n e a m o n g m a n y like it. T h i s i s t h e e s s e n c e

a n d u n g r a s p a b l e . / cannot touch the earth, for I am it, in an of h u m a n intelligence: t h e s u b s u m p t i o n of particulars u n d e r

uncontrollable identification whose intimacy is its dispersion. universals. By m e a n s of the schema-image, the particular b e c o m e s ,

T h e a r t i s t c a n n o t r e a c h m a t e r i a l i t y , for m a t e r i a l i t y e x c l u d e s in s h o r t , an " e x a m p l e of . . ." I m p o r t a n t l y , in b e c o m i n g an


a u t h o r i t y . T h e very life of m a t e r i a l i t y is its u n c a n n y p e r s i s - e x a m p l e , t h e p a r t i c u l a r relinquishes its prelinguistic i n d é t e r m i n a -
t e n c e i n t h e w o r k o f a r t (or t h e c o r p s e ) a n d its d i s a p p e a r a n c e t i o n a n d a c q u i r e s all i t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s b e c a u s e , a s a n e x a m p l e ,
into things t h a t rest in the horizons of the w o r l d . T h u s we it need not appear as in fact it actually does appear. This lib-
m u s t n o t envision an independent, glorious, and p u r e pre- e r a t i o n f r o m a c t u a l i t y is necessary for it to be s u b s u m e d u n -
p r e d i c a t i v e life. W e m u s t t h i n k s o m e " i t " t h a t r e m a i n s a l w a y s , d e r t h e u n i v e r s a l . As an e x a m p l e , it is necessarily contingent
a s i t w e r e , " b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e s . " U n s a i d e a c h t i m e , its life i s ( t h a t is, i t m u s t b e a b l e t o a p p e a r o t h e r w i s e t h a n i n f a c t i t d o e s
o n l y its t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y , its e x p o s u r e t o b e i n g s a i d . I t i s m a d e a p p e a r o r i t c o u l d n o t b e r e c o g n i z e d a s w h a t i t is). T h e r e is,
up solely of v e r s i o n s . Its life is in t h a t v i b r a t i o n w h i c h m a k e s t h e n , no actual s c h e m a - i m a g e . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a pos-
i t s e n s a t i o n a l a n d leaves i t a l w a y s a t t h e t i p o f m y t o n g u e . sible p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e " r u l e " o f p r e s e n t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d b y
A g a m b e n defines i t a s " p u r e l y linguistic e x i s t e n c e " a n d o n e t h e s c h e m a . I t i s a n a n t e r i o r profile i n t o s u c h a t h i n g ( b u t t h e r e
that, always slipping from my t o n g u e , r e m a i n s strictly is no such thing) as a general form of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e ,
unformulaic, but is eminently reformulaic (and w h o s e only a h o u s e - i n - g e n e r a l . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vor-
life i s its r e f o r m u l a t i o n s , o r its t r a c e s , a s D e r r i d a a n d L e v i n a s stellung) t h a t m u s t p r e c e d e a n y a c t u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s i s
w o u l d say.) the " a r t " hidden deep in our souls. It is the " p r o d u c t i o n " of
t h a t w h i c h is, a s W i l l i a m J . R i c h a r d s o n s a y s , " n o t t h e m a t i z e d
In this w a y we c o m e very close to the old p r o b l e m of 1 9
at a l l , " o r o f t h a t w h i c h is, A g a m b e n will say, n e i t h e r univer-
s c h e m a t i s m f r o m K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason a n d to t h e 20

1 7
sal n o r p a r t i c u l a r . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a potentia, or, as
mysterious "art concealed in the depths of the h u m a n s o u l . " 2 1
A g a m b e n says, a " h a l o . " It is t h e p a r t i c u l a r with all its predi-
R e c a l l t h a t t h e s c h e m a p r o v i d e s a n i m a g e for a c o n c e p t a n d
cates, n o o n e o f w h i c h o r n o c o m b i n a t i o n o f w h i c h , h o w e v e r ,
t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e s c h e m a i s called s c h e m a t i s m . N o w , a
d i s t i n g u i s h e s it as w h a t it is. It is n o t , H e i d e g g e r r e m i n d s u s , a
schema is not an image and schematism is not imagination,
IS I A IN l . I I < > I

d e s c r i p t i o n that enumerates a list <>f characteristics. The mind


d o e s n o t w o r k from a n i m a g i n a r y i n v e n t o r y . N o p a r t i c u l a r Proximity
t h i n g c a n c l a i m t o b e t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e e x a m p l e . W e will r e - The chance of regarding the world, or another
turn to Kantian schematism when, in our next chapter, we p e r s o n , from t h e i m p o s s i b l e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n infinite d i s t a n c e ,
discuss A g a m b e n ' s politics. We bring it up n o w to indicate the or a glacial r e m o t e n e s s , is at t h e h e a r t of B l a n c h o t ' s récits a n d
radical direction and orientation of Blanchotian t h o u g h t to- his w r i t i n g s o n a e s t h e t i c s , a n d i t i s a l s o t h e k e r n e l o f L e v i n a s ' s
w a r d t h e " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h s , " a n d t h e icy i m a g e t h a t p r e c e d e s éthique ( w h i c h w e m i g h t j u s t a s well g r o w a c c u s t o m e d t o c a l l -
the real a n d t h a t the real sinks b a c k into in the a r t w o r k , the i n g " i m a g i n a r y " in B l a n c h o t ' s sense, b e c a u s e it is an e t h i c s
p o e m , t h e récit. t h a t resists p e r s o n a l a n d f a m i l i a r f o r m ) . I n fact, t o f o l l o w u p
W e c a n see h e r e t h a t t h e s o u r c e o f a n y d e t e r m i n a t e i m a g e , on the remarks we m a d e on Levinas in our second chapter, we
o b j e c t , o r for t h a t m a t t e r , a n y h i s t o r y o r n a r r a t i v e ( a n y " t h i s m a y keep in m i n d as we read Blanchot t h a t the aesthetic dis-
h e r e " or any absent "this here"), is a "rule-image" t h a t is n o t tance or O r p h i c glance t h a t so obsesses Blanchot's n a r r a t o r s
b o u n d t o a n y definitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e r u l e - i m a g e i s i m - is, i n L e v i n a s ' s t e x t , identified a s a n infinite r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , o r
p e r c e p t i b l e a n d i t v a n i s h e s i n t o its " w o r k " o f free c o n s t r u c - even an uncontrollable c o m p u l s i o n to be for-the-other, w h i c h
t i o n (Freibilden). It is a b s e n t / p r e s e n t in a n y definitive a c t u a l - c a n n e v e r b e satisfied o r u s e d u p . T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o p e n s
ity or i m a g e e x p o s i n g t h a t i t e m to all its p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a n d it is o n t o a t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h " t h a t t h e O t h e r (Autrui) " p r e -
n o t h i n g other t h a n this e m p t y totality that remains e m p t y be- s e n t s " in a visage (or an a s p e c t , or i m a g e , in t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
c a u s e it is n e v e r a c t u a l i z e d or e n v i s i o n e d . It is, in t h e w o r d s of sense) t h a t e s c a p e s c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n just a s d o e s
Agamben once more, the pure heing-in-language of the non- the " m a t e r i a l i t y " of w h i c h we speak in the first section of this
linguistic (l'essere-nel-linguaggio del nonlinguistico) , 2 2
Neither chapter. F u r t h e r m o r e , this time b e y o n d " m y d e a t h , " or this
an aspect n o r a r e p r o d u c t i o n , this endlessly proliferating t i m e t h a t is en deçà du temps (the t i m e of t h e " a l r e a d y no
" d e p t h ' s " o n l y e s s e n c e i s its e x i s t e n c e i n r e f o r m u l a t i o n s — b e - l o n g e r " ) , f r o m w h i c h Autrui i n c e s s a n t l y e m e r g e s as visage, is
i n g n a m e d b u t r e m a i n i n g silent, o u t s i d e t h e t e x t " i n " t h e t e x t . a l s o t h e t i m e of " s u b s t i t u t i o n " or complete b e i n g - f o r - t h e - o t h e r
T h i s m e a n s t h a t its life is only e x t e n d e d a n d its e n d is only t h a t f i g u r e s a s Levinas's m o s t striking a n d m o s t difficult n o t i o n .
p o s t p o n e d o r r e p r i e v e d a s i t i s e a c h t i m e (re)said. T h i s i s w h y T h i s infinite d i s t a n c e o r g l a c i a l r e m o t e n e s s i s a l s o a n e x -
t h e a n o n y m o u s n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort insists t h a t " t h e t r e m e c l o s e n e s s , c o n t a c t , o r proximity i n t h e sense d e v e l o p e d
t r u t h will b e t o l d , e v e r y t h i n g o f i m p o r t a n c e will b e t o l d . B u t at l e n g t h by L e v i n a s in his Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
n o t e v e r y t h i n g h a s h a p p e n e d yet [la vérité sera d i t e , t o u t c e l'essence. It " l i v e s " in c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a trace or a p e r s i s t e n t
q u i s'est p a s s é d ' i m p o r t a n t s e r a dit. M a i s t o u t n e s'est p a s thought t h a t c a n n o t b e t h e m a t i z e d a n d t h a t h a u n t s t h e n a r r a -
e n c o r e p a s s é ] , " b e c a u s e "[i]t m a y b e t h a t all t h e s e w o r d s a r e a t o r in t h e s e c o n d d i v i s i o n of L'arrêt de mort. T h e o x y m o r o n i c
c u r t a i n b e h i n d w h i c h w h a t h a p p e n e d will n e v e r s t o p h a p p e n - conjunction or disjunction of these t w o moments—closeness
i n g [Il s e p e u t q u e t o u s ces m o t s s o i e n t u n r i d e a u d e r r i è r e lequel a n d d i s t a n c e — i s i n t e n d e d t o i n d i c a t e a h e t e r o n o m y , or, i f y o u
2 3
c e q u i s'est j o u é n e c e s s e r a p l u s d e s e j o u e r ] . " prefer, a h y p o c r i t i c a l s c h e m a t h a t is, w e m a y say, t o o " w e a k "
to be resolved in s i m p l e i m a g e s or a n n o u n c e d in t h e m e s . Us- n e v e r returns altogether to itself. In a formulation t h a t will
i n g B l a n c h o t i a n l a n g u a g e , w e c a n say t h a t p r o x i m i t y neutral- not s u r p r i s e psychoanalysis, c o n s c i o u s n e s s (the e g o ) is n o t
izes s p a c e by n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e fixity of p r e s e n c e . As it will be entirely f a m i l i a r to itself b e c a u s e it " i n c l u d e s " in it an a l t e r i t y
s p o k e n o f h e r e , p r o x i m i t y i s f o r e i g n t o ( o r i s n o t identifiable it n e v e r i n t e n d e d .
in) i m a g e s o r t h o u g h t . ( T h e s t r a t e g i c f u n c t i o n o f t h e o x y m o - T h e infected c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t t h e / t h a t m a g i s t e r i a l l y
r o n i n all o f B l a n c h o t a n d L e v i n a s — n o t t o m e n t i o n B a t a i l l e , d i s t a n c e s itself f r o m t h e w o r l d o r f r o m a n o t h e r p e r s o n . T h e
Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, and even, sometimes, Heidegger— B l a n c h o t i a n n a r r a t o r is n o t a p l a y e r in a g a m e of r e l a t i o n s . He
is p r e c i s e l y to f a t i g u e a n d freeze t h o u g h t i n t o a s u s p e n s i o n en ( a l w a y s " h e , " il, o r " i t , " a l w a y s , e v e n t o t h e n a r r a t o r , " t h e
deca d i a l e c t i c s . T h e " l o g i c " o f t h e o x y m o r o n i s t h e l o g i c o f n a r r a t o r " ) is instead involved in a separation of time f r o m
the Blanchotian image, which, detaching the things of the w o r l d time a n d space from space that opens o n t o writing because
from their involvement in the w o r l d , exposes t h e m to " t h e m - w r i t i n g is t h e v e r y a p p r o a c h of o b s c u r i t y . As J w r i t e , he (il)
selves" prior to their m u n d a n e investments. T h e o x y m o r o n d i s t a n c e s h i m s e l f w h i l e r e m a i n i n g near, u n a b l e t o a n n e x t h e
i n d i c a t e s a s c h e m a - i m a g e — a t e r m t h a t is, o f c o u r s e , itself s p a c e of a p r e s e n t f r o m w h i c h or in w h i c h to w r i t e . J c a n n o t
o x y m o r o n i c — o r an " i m a g e " of t h o u g h t that neutralizes that write w i t h o u t this affirmation of distancing t h a t does n o t be-
thought's thinkability. T h e o x y m o r o n is an image of w h a t re- l o n g t o t h i s t i m e a n d this p l a c e i n w h i c h I w r i t e . B u t t h i s i s
mains when a thought—or an image—cannot be absorbed into a l s o t h e f o r m u l a for e g o i s t e n j o y m e n t — t h e e n j o y m e n t of a
discourse. T h e o x y m o r o n is a hypocritical schema t h a t de- c e r t a i n h o l i d a y f r o m t h e self.
t a c h e s t h o u g h t f r o m its p o w e r t o c o m p r e h e n d . ) For example, one day I may return h o m e with a strange
N o w , the distance referred to here is n o t the distance c o n - d e s i r e t o m o v e t o a n o t h e r a p a r t m e n t a n d , after a few w e e k s , I
s c i o u s n e s s t a k e s f r o m itself in t h e p o w e r of its for-itselfness by m a y do just that. But then I m a y wish to m o v e to yet another
w h i c h i t m a i n t a i n s itself i n its f r e e d o m a n d a u t o n o m y , a s H e g e l a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h e n yet a n o t h e r , a n d a n o t h e r , a n d s o o n a n d
t e a c h e s . T h e d i s t a n c e referred to h e r e is repulsive: it is t h e so on—until I am no longer able to " r e t u r n " " h o m e . " I m a y
d i s t a n c e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t a k e s f r o m w h a t is never itself, f r o m e v e n , like t h e n a r r a t o r in {'arret de mort, m a i n t a i n t h r e e or
2 5
w h a t can be described as absolute vicariousness a n d from f o u r flats a t t h e s a m e t i m e . W h a t can compel someone to
w h o s e a n - a r c h i c kiss t h e e g o is e x p e l l e d i n t o itself in a p r o x - m a i n t a i n several a p a r t m e n t s at o n c e , since he or she c a n n o t
imity that cannot become transparent to consciousness. Prox- i n h a b i t t h e m all s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ?
i m i t y i s a s u r p l u s b e y o n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' s ability t o t h e m a t i z e ; I m a y give i n t o t h i s m a d i m p u l s e b e c a u s e i n a n y o n e o f
it is a c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t is a l w a y s " l o s t , " forgetful of itself, or my a p a r t m e n t s I could enjoy my absence from it as well, a n d
t r a p p e d in a d e l a y b e h i n d itself, as L e v i n a s s a y s , b e c a u s e it a t t h e s a m e t i m e . T h a t is, I c o u l d e n j o y t h e fact t h a t I n e e d n o t
c a n n o t b r i n g i n t o t h e p r e s e n t in a Vorstellung (a " p l a c i n g b e - sleep h e r e w h e r e I a m i n fact a c t u a l l y lying d o w n for t h e n i g h t .
f o r e " ) t h a t w h i c h affects i t . 24
It "forgets" to bring that which I c o u l d g e t u p , d r e s s , a n d r e m o v e myself t o a n y o n e o f m y
affects it i n t o a p r e s e n t b e c a u s e it h a s no m e m o r y of it. Be- o t h e r flats. E a c h o f t h e s e o t h e r s ( a n d t h e r e n e e d n o t b e a n y -
c a u s e of t h i s r e n d e z v o u s en deca t h e p r e s e n t , c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h i n g special a b o u t t h e m ) s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h o u s e s m y a b s e n c e ,
s h e l t e r i n g , for as l o n g as I ^.m afford t h e m , a n o t h e r , slightly of his othei apartments. Any this a p a n m e n t is, if y o u like, t h e

different, version ol this o n e thai I am in. E a c h o n e of t h e m schema-image ol all the o t h e r s a n d it is e n j o y a b l e o n l y i n s o f a r

says t o m e : C o m e . T h i s w o u l d h e very p l e a s a n t . N o w a n d as it " t o u c h e s " all ol t h e m . S l e e p i n g t o n i g h t so c o n t e n t e d l y in

t h e n , I m a y e v e n i g n o r e all of my flats a n d r e n t o u t a h o t e l this flat, he is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e m b r a c e d by all t h e o t h e r s . S e p a -

r o o m for a n i g h t o r t w o . O r I m a y s p e n d a n e n t i r e n i g h t w a n - r a t e d f r o m its p a r t i c u l a r i t y — f r o m its i n d i v i d u a l , identifiable

d e r i n g t h e streets w i t h o u t s l e e p i n g a n y w h e r e , p a s s i n g , s o m e - existence at this or that address in the city—it does n o t then


t i m e s , i n f r o n t o f o n e o f m y a p a r t m e n t s w h e r e I will h a v e left b e c o m e insipidly ideal o r u n i v e r s a l . I n s t e a d , its " l i f e , " its " m a -
o n t h e l i g h t a n d t h e t e l e v i s i o n set i n o r d e r t o s a v o r all t h e t e r i a l i t y , " i s o n l y i n its p r o x i m i t y . N e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r n o r u n i -
m o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g t h e r e . Y o u see, I w o u l d b e l o n g i n versal, it is already no longer an object of consciousness. This
any o n e a p a r t m e n t only by virtue of belonging in each of the kind of pleasure d e p a r t s from any cognitive relation the nar-
o t h e r s . (Is t h i s n o t t h e p l e a s u r e b i g a m i s t s seek o u t a n d enjoy?) r a t o r m a i n t a i n s w i t h a n y p a r t i c u l a r flat. T h e n a r r a t o r i s i n
E a c h o f t h e s e v a r i o u s flats w o u l d h o u s e a n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f m e a n y o n e r o o m o n l y via a d i s t a n c e f r o m / c o n t a c t w i t h all t h e
a n d w o u l d welcome me inside. No d o u b t , the n a r r a t o r of o t h e r s h e r e n t s o u t . H e i s i n t h i s r o o m t h a t i s this r o o m o n l y
L'arrêt de mort s o u g h t o u t a n d e n j o y e d this p l e a s u r e b o r n of b y v i r t u e o f its similarities to/differences f r o m all t h e o t h e r s .
i n d e c i s i o n , a n d e v e n j e a l o u s l y g u a r d e d it. ( W h e n , i n h i s a b - T h i s r o o m " i n c l u d e s " t h e o t h e r s i n it, a n d i n t h i s r o o m , h e i s
s e n c e , a little girl s t a r e s i n t o a r o o m he r e n t s in a h o u s e w h e r e the echo of himself in a n y of the other r o o m s . In this r o o m , as
o t h e r s a r e a l r e a d y living, t h e n a r r a t o r b e c o m e s f u r i o u s . H e i s Levinas says, the ego is "like the echo of a s o u n d t h a t w o u l d
f u r i o u s b e c a u s e , g a z i n g a t his a b s e n c e , s h e t a k e s his p l a c e a n d precede the resonance of this s o u n d [ c o m m e l'écho d ' u n son,
2 7
h e r g a z e p r e c e d e s a n d i n h a b i t s his r o o m , c o n t a m i n a t i n g h i s qui précéderait la résonnance de ce s o n ] . "
26
own presence/absence.) T h e I w h o signs all t h e r e n t a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d t h e c h e c k s
t o p a y for t h e s e flats e v e r y m o n t h i s e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e p l e a -
By virtue of r e m a i n i n g pleased w i t h t h e possibility of fleeing
sure of egoism. T h e subject c a n savor this i m m e n s e pleasure,
f r o m flat to flat, t h e n a r r a t o r finds himself i m p l i c a t e d in a w o r l d
b u t o n l y f r o m a n i m m e n s e d i s t a n c e , a s if, a s B l a n c h o t s a y s , i t
o f flats a n d i n v a i n w o u l d h e seek o u t t h e p r e c i s e m o m e n t h e
w e r e s e p a r a t e d by a p l a t e of glass f r o m w h a t it n e v e r t h e l e s s
b e c a m e so implicated. By virtue of taking pleasure in the p o s -
e n j o y s , for i t c a n o n l y h a v e a d e g r a d e d i m a g e o r c o n c e p t i o n o f
sibility o f his flight f r o m r o o m t o r o o m , t h e n a r r a t o r e n c l o s e s
t h a t which it enjoys. T h e / is excluded from proximity a n d
h i m s e l f i n h i m s e l f a n d h e e n j o y s t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f subjectivity.
egoist enjoyment in which it is nevertheless implicated, b u t
T h e e n j o y m e n t i s precisely t h a t e a c h " h e r e " i s a l s o a n " e l s e -
o n l y a t a glacial r e m o v e b e c a u s e t h a t w h i c h t h e e g o e n j o y s , i s
w h e r e . " I t i s n o t t h e p r e s e n c e o f this r o o m i n its a c t u a l p a r -
t o u c h e d by, i s in, r e m a i n s i n c o n c e i v a b l e t o i n t e n t i o n a l c o n -
t i c u l a r i t y t h a t c o n t e n t s h i m , b u t his s a v o r i n g o f its p r o x i m i t y
sciousness. T h a t which is desired, sought out, a n d enjoyed
t o e a c h o t h e r r o o m h e r e n t s o u t . T h a t w h i c h h e enjoys i s n o t
p r o x i m a l l y — i n s h o r t t h e p l a c e of jouissance—is precisely the
present, is n o t c o n s u m e d or used up, n o t even partially. This is
divergence of the particular from the universal. Or, the diver-
t h e o n l y w a y t h e flat he is in c a n t r u l y " m a t e r i a l i z e . " This
gence of the image from t h e concept. It is a divergence t h a t
a p a r t m e n t is enjoyable only insofar as it is e x e m p l a r y of any
e a c h t u n c is s i n g u l a r a m i e x c l u s i v e . U n p e r c e i v e d , u n i n t e n d e d , the hours a n d the life w h i c h w e r e then | h i s | a r e d e a d t o o

a c c i d e n t a l , e r r o n e o u s , this d i v e r g e n c e is the very i n c a r n a t i o n [pourissent, leur histoire est m o r t e , et m o r t e s a u s s i ces h e u r s


0

of the materiality of matter. This r o o m that the n a r r a t o r en- et cette vie qui a l o r s o n t été les m i e n n e s ] . " ' He r e c o u n t s in-
j o y s is o n l y i n s o f a r as it is " b e s i d e itself," t o u c h i n g all its p o s - s t e a d e v e n t s t h a t , w e m u s t p r e s u m e , a r e n o t (yet) d e a d a n d
sibilities. t h a t d i d n o t o c c u p y his a t t e n t i o n a t t h e t i m e . T h e t h i n g s h e

S u c h e n j o y m e n t is n o t at all an e l e v a t e d feeling or a s p e - r e c o u n t s d o n o t b e l o n g t o " t h e still p l e a s a n t s h a d o w o f


3 1

cial sensitivity t o s o m e q u a l i t y o r a s p e c t o f t h i s flat i n its p a r - yesterday's world [l'ombre du m o n d d'hier plaît e n c o r e ] , "

ticularity. T h e n a r r a t o r c a n n o t identify o r c o n c e i v e o f w h a t i s but instead are things t h a t are n o t limited to the past a n d t h a t

e n j o y e d . T h e e n j o y m e n t , i n fact, i s perfectly negligible. I t h a s c o n t i n u e to attract h i m even as he a t t e m p t s " t o p u t an end to


1

n o dignity. T h a t i s w h y this e g o i s m i s s u p p o r t e d o r r e c o g n i z e d it all [ m e t t r e fin à t o u t c e l a ] " in w r i t i n g t h e récit?

by the subject only as a s h a d o w , an unfamiliarity " t o o close," W h a t t h e n a r r a t o r r e c o u n t s , a n d w o u l d like t o e n d , a r e

o r a p r o x i m i t y t h a t o v e r w h e l m s self-presence. T h e e g o i s m o f t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t d i s t r a c t e d h i m : his seeing s o m e o n e a g a i n

t h i s p l e a s u r e i s "in-itself," i s s i n g u l a r a n d a n o n y m o u s , a n d i t w h o m h e h a d f o r g o t t e n e v e n e x i s t e d , his m u l t i p l e d w e l l i n g s ,

r e m a i n s " i n itself" i n s o f a r as it is w i t h o u t s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n , t h e s t r a n g e a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n his ( a l w a y s p r e -

w i t h o u t a p l e a t of reflection, a n d is r e p u l s i v e to i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . carious) health a n d m o o d s (neither of w h i c h he takes very

( T h e n a r r a t o r ' s fury a t t h e little girl w h o spies o n h i m i n his seriously), o d d encounters with neighbors, comings a n d go-

a b s e n c e i s d i r e c t e d t o t h e fact t h a t she " s a w " h i m w h e n h e ings i n a n d o u t o f r o o m s h e a n d o t h e r s e n t e r b y m i s t a k e , a n d

w a s " n o t himself," w h e n h e w a s n o t there, j u s t a s i f she h a d his r e l a t i o n s w i t h t w o w o m e n (J. a n d N a t h a l i e ) n e i t h e r o f

s e e n his v e r y e g o i s t p l e a s u r e — w h i c h h e himself i s f o r b i d d e n w h o m h e h a s a n y i n t e n t i o n o f m a r r y i n g (even t h o u g h h e p r o -

t o " s e e . " W h a t t h e little v o y e u r s a w , i n fact, w a s a m o m e n t o f poses to one of them). N o n e of these things h a d a n y t h i n g to

extreme intimacy, which the n a r r a t o r can only convey to the d o w i t h his i m p o r t a n t a n d c o n s e q u e n t i a l w o r k a s a j o u r n a l i s t

girl's m o t h e r i n c o n v e n t i o n a l a n d b a n a l t e r m s : h e said t h a t s h e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e M u n i c h crisis. T h e s e t h i n g s h e r e c o u n t s a r e

h a d s p i e d o n h i m w h e n h e w a s i n his r o o m w i t h a w o m a n . B u t sometimes immensely pleasurable, sometimes annoying, some-

i t w a s i n fact t h e p r e s e n c e o f his a b s e n c e t h a t h e w a s " w i t h " t i m e s g r a v e , a n d i f h e i s n o w (after e i g h t y e a r s a n d n u m e r o u s

a n d t h a t t h e little girl s e e m e d t o b e f a s c i n a t e d by.) a t t e m p t s ) a b l e t o w r i t e o f t h e m , i t i s b e c a u s e h e sees t h a t t h e y


33
c o n c e r n only himself.
T o b e perfectly p e r v e r s e a b o u t it, all o f " t h e s e t h i n g s " t h a t
" h a p p e n e d t o [the n a r r a t o r ] i n 1 9 3 8 [ces é v é n e m e n t s m e s o n t While the events of the w a r years are dead, these inconse-

arrivés en 1 9 3 8 ] " 2 8
a r e perfectly n e g l i g i b l e , u n w o r t h y o f c o m - q u e n t i a l h a p p e n i n g s h a v e m a n a g e d t o live o n a n d r e m a i n

mentary, of narration. The narrator does not c o m m e n t on u n d e a d a n d u n r e c o r d e d b y v i r t u e o f t h e i r insignificance. B y

e v e n t s o f s e r i o u s p u b l i c a n d historic c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t o c c u r r e d v i r t u e o f t h e i r insignificance, t h e y e s c a p e h i s t o r i c a l s c r u t i n y

a t a r o u n d t h i s d a t e a n d t h a t " o c c u p i e d [the n a r r a t o r ' s ] a t t e n - a n d w o r m their w a y lackadaisically into the time of his writ-

t i o n all t h e t i m e [ m ' o n t o c c u p é t o u s les j o u r s ] , " 2 9


because those i n g . B u t t h e y a r e n o t i m p o r t a n t t o w r i t e a b o u t n o w , either.

e v e n t s , h e tells u s , a r e " r o t t i n g a w a y , t h e i r s t o r y i s d e a d , a n d They are w h a t the journalist did not write a b o u t at the time
b e c a u s e they wen- inessential e v e n t s , <>i s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c e , Ins n a r r a t o r s . A m o r e o b s c u r e d e m a n d solicits his a t t e n t i o n .
m e r e e v e r y d a y life. They w e r e a l r e a d y s u p p l e m e n t a r y t o t h e A n a n i o r p h i c , (he f r a g m e n t ' s only life is its s e p a r a t i o n f r o m
t i m e o f t h e c o m i n g war. Unlike t h e M u n i c h crisis, seeing S i m o n e any w h o l e , a n y n a r r a t i v e , a n y history. I t c a n n o t b e p u t i n p l a c e
a g a i n after he h a d f o r g o t t e n she even e x i s t e d is a m e r e trifle— and therefore d e m a n d s from the writer something other t h a n
i t h a p p e n e d w h e n n o t h i n g m u c h else w a s h a p p e n i n g . B u t i n a f o r m . I t d e m a n d s d e s t r u c t i o n . I t d e m a n d s , a s w e say a t t h e
certain sense, these everyday events are purely historic. T h e y o u t s e t of this c h a p t e r , t h a t writing tear itself apart from the
a r e h i s t o r y p u r g e d of h i s t o r i c e v e n t s , or, t h e e v e r y d a y as t h e moment it begins to speak:
p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h i s t o r y . I m p o r t a n t l y , for t h e p u r p o s e o f
a p p r o a c h i n g B l a n c h o t ' s aesthetics, w e m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e s e W r i t i n g i s n o t d e s t i n e d t o leave t r a c e s , b u t t o e r a s e , b y
everyday events already possess the characteristics of writing t r a c e s , all t r a c e s , t o d i s a p p e a r i n t h e f r a g m e n t a r y s p a c e
and of the image. T h e y a r e of s e c o n d a r y , i n e s s e n t i a l , n o n - o f w r i t i n g m o r e definitively t h a n o n e d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e
primary importance, thus they already open the space of writ- t o m b , o r a g a i n , t o d e s t r o y , t o d e s t r o y invisibly, w i t h -
ing. T h e y are w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n n o t h i n g h a p p e n s , just a s out the uproar of destruction.
writing only h a p p e n s w h e n nothing h a p p e n s . T h e events t h a t
he w r i t e s of, a n d w i s h e s to be r i d of, a r e , f r o m t h e first, sec- [Écrire n'est p a s destiné à laisser des t r a c e s , m a i s à effa-
ondary. T h e y r e l a t e to n o t h i n g of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e . If he cer, p a r les traces, toutes traces, à disparaître d a n s l'espace
d i d n o t d a t e t h e récit for u s a n d m e n t i o n t h e M u n i c h crisis, f r a g m e n t a i r e d e l'écriture, p l u s définitivement q u e d a n s
w o u l d w e k n o w t h a t t h e t i m e f r a m e o f t h e n a r r a t i v e i s t h e eve la t o m b e on ne disparaît, ou encore à détruire, détruire
36
of World War Two? The "things" the narrator writes of were, invisiblement, sans le v a c a r m e de la d e s t r u c t i o n . ]
f r o m t h e o u t s e t , " t r a c e s " i n t h e sense m a d e s o w e l l k n o w n b y
Derrida a nd Levinas. All t h e " t h i n g s " t h a t " h a p p e n " in L'arrêt de mort a r e frag-
I n his e s s a y " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e , " L e v i n a s tells u s t h a t m e n t s , pieces o f n o w h o l e s , s e p a r a t i o n s i n defiance o f p r e s -
life solicits t h e n o v e l i s t w h e n i t a p p e a r s t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f a e n c e s . T h a t i s w h a t gives t h i s a n d his o t h e r récits t h e i r p e c u -
novel. 3 4
(We n e e d o n l y recall t h e n a r r a t o r f r o m À la Recher- liar a t m o s p h e r e , their " n e w thrill [frisson n o u v e a u ] , " as Levinas
3 7
che du Temps Perdu, w h o is a s t o n i s h e d to r e a d a n e w s p a p e r says o f t h e m . Someone enters by mistake into another person's
account of a m u r d e r that seems to him to be torn from the r o o m a n d this h a s u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s b e c a u s e n o t h i n g a b o u t
pages of Dostoyevsky. He then comes to the realization that, it, o r t h e t u r m o i l i t c a u s e s , a d d s u p t o a n y t h i n g c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
o f c o u r s e , D o s t o y e v s k y ' s i n s p i r a t i o n w a s precisely t h e s a m e : a N o t h i n g o f w h a t t h e n a r r a t o r d e s p e r a t e l y w a n t s t o say a n d b e
newspaper account of a murder that seemed to be torn from r i d o f will r e s o l v e itself i n t o i m a g e s , t h o u g h t , c o m m e n t a r y ,
t h e p a g e s o f a n o v e l t h a t h e w o u l d t h e n sit d o w n t o w r i t e . ) 3 5
s c e n e s , n a r r a t i v e , or, t o s u m i t u p , text. N o t h i n g o f w h a t h e
B l a n c h o t , h o w e v e r , never, n o t e v e n i n his e s s a y s , w r i t e s a t t h e w a n t s t o say c a n b e p r o p e r l y reflected. I n t h e e n d , t h a t w h i c h
level o f f o r m . H e w r i t e s f r a g m e n t s , a n d h e e v e n w r i t e s frag- h e w a n t s (the t r u t h , o f c o u r s e ) , h e s a y s , "is n o t c o n t a i n e d i n
m e n t a r i l y a b o u t f r a g m e n t a r y w r i t i n g . I t i s n o t f o r m t h a t solicits t h e s e facts. I c a n i m a g i n e s u p p r e s s i n g t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r o n e s .
IV I /\ IN 1 I I l> I

But il they did not h a p p e n , 01 others h a p p e n e d in their p l a c e , ever, luiili readet a n d w r i t e r are on the s a m e side, w h i l e di-
a n d a n s w e r i n g the s u m m o n s oi the all p o w e r f u l a f f i r m a t i o n verging from both oi t h e m is the w r i t i n g , as S t e v e n S h a v i r o
41
w h i c h is united with m e , they take on the same m e a n i n g a n d h a s noted. Each oi t h e i n c i d e n t s w r i t t e n of in L'arrêt de
t h e s t o r y i s t h e s a m e [ n ' e s t p a s d a n s ces faits. Les faits e u x - mort—J.'s d e a t h , r e t u r n t o life, a n d " s e c o n d " d e a t h ; t h e b o m b -
m ê m e s , j e p u i s rêver d e les s u p p r i m e r . M a i s , s'ils n ' o n t p a s e u ing o f Paris a n d t h e n a r r a t o r ' s t a k i n g shelter w i t h N a t h a l i e
lieu, d ' a u t r e s , à leur p l a c e , a r r i v e n t et, à l ' a p p e l de l'affirmation a n d p r o p o s i n g m a r r i a g e t o h e r i n a frenzied a n d foreign l a n -
t o u t e - p u i s s a n t e q u i est u n i e à m o i , ils p r e n n e n t le m ê m e s e n s guage; the return of S i m o n e — e a c h of these incidents is out-
et l ' h i s t o i r e est la m ê m e ] . " 3 8
T h a t is w h y L'arrêt de mort is n o t side t h e o t h e r s a n d e a c h i s m e m o r a b l e o n l y i n s o f a r a s e a c h
a m a s t e r f u l a t t e m p t t o recollect facts a n d i m a g e s t h a t a t t h e d e t a c h e s itself f r o m a n y t i m e f r a m e . T h e t h i n g s w r i t t e n a b o u t
t i m e seemed negligible b u t t h a t n o w h e l p u s t o e n v i s i o n 1 9 3 8 in t h i s récit will n o t f o r m a n a r r a t i v e . E a c h i n c i d e n t is an inter-
m o r e r i c h l y a n d m o r e a c c u r a t e l y . L'arrêt de mort is n o t a r e - r u p t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g else. I n t h i s sense t h e y d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e
c o u n t i n g at all. T h e récit gives us a un frisson nouveau b e - a u t h o r a n d p u s h h i m t o t h e s a m e side a s t h e r e a d e r w h o s e
c a u s e it is c u r i o u s l y a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l y alive. inability to connect the events told of echo the author's o w n
I f t h e n a r r a t o r i s a b l e t o s u p p r e s s c e r t a i n facts a n d a l l o w i m p o t e n c e . H e n c e , L'arrêt de mort is n o t a W o r k . It is, as
others to replace t h e m it is because he writes w i t h o u t any final B l a n c h o t p u t s it, désœuvrement. It is w n w o r k e d , idle, a n d in
o r a u t h e n t i c j u d g m e n t . E i t h e r this fact o r t h a t o n e c a n " t e l l " this r e g a r d B l a n c h o t ' s aesthetics s q u a r e s perfectly w i t h Levinas's
t h e s t o r y a n d t h e s t o r y will r e m a i n " t h e s a m e " b e c a u s e " w h a t a n a l y s i s of a r t . L'arrêt de mort is w o r k - l e s s . It is an i m i t a t i o n
h a p p e n e d " i s a u t o n y m i c . I t i s precisely t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o d e t e r - of t h o u g h t , a s e m b l a n c e of b e i n g , a n d it is w r i t t e n in a s i m u -
m i n a t e form. T h e n a r r a t o r struggles against, a n d also unites l a t e d l a n g u a g e (i.e., a l a n g u a g e t h a t d o e s n o t c o m m u n i c a t e
with, this a n a m o r p h i a as if s u m m o n e d . We are told, in a post- but that simultaneously shows and conceals; w o r d s appear on
s c r i p t (or a s u r p l u s t h a t w a s p r e s e n t a t t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 4 8 t h e p a g e only to sink back into their o w n image, so t h a t the
version of the text, deleted in the second edition in 1 9 7 1 , a n d difference b e t w e e n b e i n g a n d a p p e a r i n g i s e r a s e d ) .
t h e n r e a t t a c h e d for Lydia D a v i s ' s beautiful E n g l i s h t r a n s l a - T h e text we study here does not preserve anything. It is
tion in 1978) that if we can " i m a g i n e " the h a n d that writes i n t e n d e d t o b e d e s t r u c t i v e : " t o e r a s e , b y t r a c e s , all t r a c e s . " 4 2

3 9
t h e s t o r y t h e n r e a d i n g will b e c o m e for u s " a s e r i o u s t a s k . " W e will n o t b e a b l e t o c o n c e i v e o f w h a t " t h r i l l s " u s a s w e r e a d
Serious because the h a n d that writes the sentences is dead, B l a n c h o t . H i s récit i s n o t w h a t u s e d t o b e c a l l e d a " p l u r a l "
a b s e n t . M o r e a b s e n t even t h a n t h e e n t o m b e d L a z a r u s (as Blan- t e x t . It d o e s n o t offer itself to a v a r i e t y of r e a d i n g s , no o n e of
40
chot writes elsewhere) w h o m w e c a n o n l y i m a g i n e a s living w h i c h w o u l d be authentic a n d decidable, leaving the reader
a n d n o t a s h e really is. adrift in playfulness. 43
I n s t e a d , t h e t e x t " p e r f o r m s " its o w n
L'arrêt de mort d o e s n o t a w a i t r e a d e r l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . It disappearance. It "puts an end to it all" in writing, but by
does not preserve or e n t o m b a discourse the reader is obliged putting the end in writing it remains w i t h o u t an end the nar-
to l i b e r a t e . It is itself t h e very s p a c e of d i v e r g e n c e . M o s t b a - r a t o r c o u l d p u t b e h i n d h i m a n d limit t o t h e p a s t . T h e récit
nally, it is t h e d i v e r g e n c e of r e a d e r a n d writer. In a s e n s e , h o w - t h u s d i s a p p e a r s b y s e e k i n g another e n d — a n e n d y e t t o c o m e
l i m e il a wail s is ihe lime oi I he forgetting oi l i m e , of indiffer-
in a t i m e not yet. L'arrêt de mort is the "place" oi t h e absence
e n c e lo l u n e . Il is m this sense that the B l a n c h o t i a n t e x t is so
of a p r o p e r e n d , a n d it h o l d s this p l a c e like an e c h o t h a t p r e -
extraordinarily radical. His writing addresses a time outside
c e d e s t h e s o u n d it r e s o u n d s . T h a t is to say, in r e a d i n g t h e
initiative. But this t i m e t o c o m e — a t i m e w h e n t i m e i s f o r g o t -
B l a n c h o t i a n récit, we h e a r t h e r e v e r b e r a t i o n of a s o u n d n o t
t e n — i s n o t a c h r o n o l o g i c a l e p o c h after m y d e a t h . T h e t i m e
y e t h e a r d , f r o m a t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e t e x t i s al-
awaited is always h a p p e n i n g in everyday events t h a t fragment
ready an echo of a s o u n d (a speaking, a writing) to c o m e , b u t
a n d s e p a r a t e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m a W h o l e , like the events of L'arrêt
t h a t will n e v e r b e p r e s e n t b e c a u s e i t will itself e c h o t h e e c h o
de mort t h a t " c o u l d h a v e h a p p e n e d at a m u c h e a r l i e r t i m e
t h e t e x t a l r e a d y is. N o t a p l u r a l t e x t , L'arrêt de mort is a t e x t
4 4
[car t o u t a p u r e m o n t e r à u n m o m e n t b i e n p l u s a n c i e n ] . " To
e m p t i e d o f all p r e s e n c e a n d , w h a t i s m o r e , i t v i o l e n t l y e m p t i e s
await this time is to await forgetting (l'attente l'oubli) as
t i m e of all p r e s e n c e . P u t m o r e s i m p l y a n d m o r e a b r u p t l y , L'arrêt
B l a n c h o t s o s u c c i n c t l y p u t i t i n o n e o f his m a n y r e m a r k a b l e
d e mort d e s t r o y s t i m e . T h e p a s t — t h e t h i n g s t h a t h a p p e n e d t o
titles. B u t f o r g e t t i n g i s n o t a p u n c t u a l e v e n t . I t d o e s n o t p r o p -
t h e n a r r a t o r i n 1 9 3 8 — a r e n o t offered t o t h e r e a d e r , t o t h e
erly a r r i v e a t all. H a v i n g n o d u r a t i o n , i t i s o v e r b e f o r e i t b e -
p r e s e n t , b u t i n s t e a d offered t o a f u t u r i t y w h o s e c o m i n g o u r
g i n s , a n d i t closes i n o n itself a n d s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m t i m e a s
r e a d i n g a l r e a d y e c h o e s . T h e récit i s a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o
a c h r o n o l o g i c a l flow. F o r g e t t i n g defects f r o m t i m e a n d f r o m
" m y t i m e , " " m y d e a t h . " It skips over the present m o m e n t .
i n i t i a t i v e . W h e n t h e t i m e o f f o r g e t t i n g c o m e s i t will s i m u l t a -
T h a t which "thrills" us then, when we read Blanchot, is
n e o u s l y h a v e b e e n f o r g o t t e n a n d s o t o o will h a v e b e e n f o r g o t -
the divergence a n d disjunction of past a n d future. Past a n d
t e n its a n t i c i p a t i o n .
future are unhinged because there is no present to insure con-
t i n u i t y . (It is, i n its w a y , p r o f o u n d l y p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . T h e L e t us n o t e t h a t in a d d i t i o n to a t h r i l l , L'arrêt de mort is

evacuation of the present renders the future truly f u t u r a l — a l s o t h e site o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y s t r u g g l e s : J.'s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t

i.e., a r a d i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n , b u t a l r e a d y t o o near, futurity.) T h e d e a t h , t h e n a r r a t o r ' s s t r u g g l e t o w r i t e t h e t e x t after s e v e r a l

t h r i l l is t h e thrill of p r o x i m i t y . T h e t e x t I r e a d is w i t h d r a w n a t t e m p t s , his struggle w i t h a n d a g a i n s t t h e " t h o u g h t " t o w h i c h


4 5

f r o m m y p r e s e n c e . I t is, a s i t w e r e , b e h i n d g l a s s : t o o c l o s e a n d h e gives " a l l [his] s t r e n g t h [ t o u t e m a f o r c e ] , " a n d his s t r u g g l e

a l s o glacially indifferent t o m e , t o m y t i m e . A s I r e a d , I e x p e - to m a i n t a i n a relationship with a w o m a n of w h o m , he says,

rience the time of the absence of time, time w i t h o u t a present. very seriously, " I c a n say t h a t b y g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h N a t h a l i e

Eternally caressed by futurity, this time will never (have) I w a s h a r d l y g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h a n y o n e [je n e m e liais
4 6

e n t e r ( e d ) t h e p r e s e n t b e c a u s e i t will a l w a y s h a v e r e m a i n e d e n p r e s q u e avec p e r s o n n e ] . " B u t let u s a l s o n o t e t h e n a r r a t o r ' s

deçà du temps. c u r i o u s i n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e facts t h a t w o u l d p r o p e r l y


represent these struggles. We have already discussed the ana-
T h e f r a g m e n t s t h e t e x t r e c o r d s d o n o t — l e t u s b e clear a b o u t
m o r p h i a o f t h e " s t o r y . " Let u s n o w c o n s i d e r this i n light o f
t h i s — a w a i t a t i m e t o c o m e i n w h i c h t h e y will b e s e w n i n t o a
the narrator's worldly involvements.
W h o l e , a W o r k . L'arrêt de mort d o e s n o t a w a i t its w e l c o m e
i n t o a c o m m u n i t y , c u l t u r e , c i v i l i z a t i o n , or e v e n a l i t e r a t u r e . In a certain sense, the n a r r a t o r seems cold a n d indifferent

T h e indifference t h e t e x t s h o w s t o t h e p r e s e n t tells u s t h a t t h e t o his r o l e a s t h e n a r r a t o r w h o w o u l d j u d i c i o u s l y select t h o s e


d e t a i l s a n d that l a n g u a g e w i n c h can fully a p p r e c i a t e t h e val- sary lor linn to w i n e and to remain face-to-face w i t h his re-
i a n c e of J.'s fight to live, as well as the relation b e t w e e n t h e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , w h i c h he s a w clearly. To w r i t e w a s to live w i t h
e v e n t s h e recites a n d t h e t i m e s i n w h i c h they o c c u r (i.e., t h e his t o r m e n t a m i to affirm it to the p o i n t of l a u g h t e r , j u s t as t h e
eve o f t h e w a r t h a t n o d o u b t affected t h e m all, n o t t o m e n t i o n n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort lives w i t h a n d loves t h e " t h o u g h t "
all t h e w o r l d o u t s i d e t h e s m a l l circle o f c h a r a c t e r s w e r e a d o f t h a t "lives a n d acts like a p e r s o n even if it isn't e x a c t l y like
i n this récit). N o r d o e s t h e n a r r a t o r t a k e t h e t i m e t o e x p l a i n o n e [ n ' e s t p a s t o u t à fait u n e p e r s o n n e , m ê m e si elle agit et vit
4 8
w h a t t h e first s e c t i o n o f t h e récit h a s t o d o w i t h t h e s e c o n d . comme elle]."
F u r t h e r , t h e n a r r a t o r s e e m s i n d i f f e r e n t t o his o w n h e a l t h a n d , A t t h e e n d o f t h e récit, N a t h a l i e t e a r s a p a r t t h e p r e t e n s e s
w h e n h e w r i t e s o f J.'s final h o u r s a n d h e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o u r - s h e a n d t h e n a r r a t o r lived u n d e r i n t h e d e l i r i o u s d a y s t h a t
a g e , h e r e t a i n s a c e r t a i n j o u r n a l i s t i c a l o o f n e s s t h a t is, a t t h e followed the insincere promise of marriage he m a d e to her in
v e r y least, d i s a r m i n g . the M e t r o as Paris w a s b o m b e d . D u r i n g t h a t time, the n a r r a -
All t h i s , i n fact, i s a n effect o f a n a m o r p h i a . W h a t w e r e a d t o r w a s s t r o n g l y m o v e d b y g r e a t e m o t i o n a n d affection for
h e r e is n o t a w h o l e . It is n o t a s t o r y o/"J's c o u r a g e , t h e w a r , h i s N a t h a l i e . H e felt a " l i m i t l e s s i m p a t i e n c e t o s p e n d t i m e [ i m p a -
life, o r a n y t h i n g else. T h e e n t i r e récit r e m a i n s a t t h e t h r e s h o l d t i e n c e s a n s limite d ' u n t e m p s c o m m u n ] " w i t h h e r a n d h e i s
49

of a story. T h e n a r r a t o r s t o p s s h o r t of p r e s e n t i n g s o m e It t h a t c e r t a i n she felt a n e x t r e m e a t t r a c t i o n t o h i m a s w e l l . But of


t h e s t o r y w o u l d b e a b o u t . All t h a t h e w r i t e s i s j u s t a n t e r i o r t o that passion he asks:
t h e s t o r y , j u s t en deçà t h e story. A n d y e t he tells us e v e r y t h i n g ,
a s h e p r o m i s e s t o d o o n t h e o p e n i n g p a g e . H e tells u s e v e r y - — w h a t d o e s i t m e a n ? A n d t h e w o r d ecstasy? W h o h a s
t h i n g b e c a u s e e v e r y t h i n g i s o u t s i d e t h e story. N o t h i n g o f w h a t e x p e r i e n c e d t h e m o s t i n t e n s e feeling? O n l y I h a v e , a n d
h e w a n t e d t o say w a s ever p r o p e r l y f o r m e d . I t w a s s u d d e n , I k n o w t h a t it is t h e m o s t glacial of all, b e c a u s e it h a s
accidental a n d m o v i n g because it w a s unprepared-for, unful- t r i u m p h e d o v e r a n i m m e n s e defeat, a n d i s e v e n n o w
filled, a n d failed. A n d i t i s precisely t h e failure o f t h e s t o r y a n d t r i u m p h i n g o v e r it, a n d a t e a c h i n s t a n t , a n d a l w a y s , s o
t h e w e a k n e s s o f l a n g u a g e t o say i t t h a t c o n t i n u a l l y e x p o s e s t h a t t i m e n o l o n g e r exists for it.
h i m t o it, t o t h e s e u n p r e p a r e d - f o r e v e n t s t h a t a l t e r e d h i m b e -
yond comprehension. W h e n Blanchot writes on Kafka, he [quel est s o n sens? Et le m o t délire? Q u i c o n n a î t le
m e n t i o n s K a f k a ' s lifelong s e l f - r e c r i m i n a t i o n s , h i s e t h i c a l c r i - s e n t i m e n t le p l u s g r a n d ? M o i seul, et je sais q u ' i l est le
ses, his c o n f e s s i o n s o f failure, a n d his c h r o n i c i n d e c i s i v e n e s s . 47
p l u s g l a c é , c a r il a t r i o m p h é d ' u n e i m m e n s e d é f a i t e , et
B l a n c h o t p o i n t s o u t , h o w e v e r , t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o flee o n e ' s m a i n t e n a n t encore il en t r i o m p h e et à c h a q u e instant
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by fleeing into t h e w o r l d , i n t o o n e ' s r o l e as a e t t o u j o u r s , d e s o r t e q u e p o u r lui i l n ' y a p l u s d e
5 0
m a n of the world: diplomat, bureaucrat, journalist, university temps.]
professor, or h u s b a n d . Even those w h o m o s t zealously a n d
e n e r g e t i c a l l y p u r s u e n o b l e political a n d ethical e n d s c a n " h i d e " T h e n a r r a t o r felt m o v e d t o live w i t h N a t h a l i e , b u t she d e -
like J o n a h . B u t K a f k a ' s i n d e c i s i v e n e s s a n d failure w e r e n e c e s - finitively d i s r u p t e d his e n t h u s i a s m a n d " w a n t e d t o t e a r a p a r t
H I , /\ IN » . I I l ) I ' 1

w i t h a / c a l o n s hand the pretenses [they] were living under Venir), w h e n I une is no l o n g e r anchored in the p r e s e n t , in c o n -
[ n ' a i t rien v o u l u de p l u s q u e déchirer, d ' u n e m a i n j a l o u s e , les tinuity. This l u n e will h a v e been a t o p i c . W h e n w i t h d r a w a l
a p p a r e n c e s d a n s lesquelles n o u s v i v o n s ] , " a n d recall h i m t o i n t o t h e w o r l d will have been f o r g o t t e n , o n e ' s r e l a t i o n t o p l a c e ,
5
his " p l a c e [ l i e u ] . " ' She t h e n h a s a p l a s t e r c a s t o f her h e a d a n d t o r o o t e d n e s s , o r t o h o m e will h a v e b e e n r u p t u r e d b y t h e h y p o -
h a n d s m a d e for h i m . T h a t i s t o say, s h e offers h i m h e r e t e r n a l critical c o n t i n u i t y of p r o x i m i t y t h a t n e i t h e r u n i t e s i n t o a w h o l e
d e a t h , a gift (as Levinas's a n a l y s i s of d e a t h s h o w s ) t h a t she n o r s c a t t e r s i n t o d i s t i n c t p a r t s , b u t i n s t e a d e x p o s e s o n e t o all
herself will n e v e r e x p e r i e n c e , will n e v e r c r o s s o v e r i n t o . S h e the others such that any one is an echo of each, a n d n o n e is
offers h i m a s his " p l a c e " t h e t i m e o f h e r d y i n g a n d its glaciality, original.
w h i c h i s a l w a y s t h e m o s t p a s s i o n a t e feeling o f all since i t e x - B u t i s t h i s n o t j u s t a n o t h e r role i n t h e w o r l d ? H o w i s i t n o t
c l u d e s t h e o n e - w h o - d i e s f r o m it. She offers h i m a t i m e in w h i c h j u s t a n o t h e r v e r s i o n of t h e p o e t as c o n s c i e n c e of his t i m e s ? A
she i s a l r e a d y r e m o v e d f r o m t h e w o r l d . I f t h e B l a n c h o t i a n c o n s c i e n c e w i t h o u t c o n t e n t s , if y o u like, or c o n t e n t l e s s n e s s as
n a r r a t o r comes across to us as aloof a n d detached it is be- c o n s c i e n c e , o r a s t h e p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n s c i e n c e (or e v e n —
c a u s e h e i s n o l o n g e r himself. T h e n a r r a t o r i s affected b y a n - w h y not?—Gewissen-haben-wollen), but a conscience none-
o t h e r t i m e i n w h i c h h e i s a b s e n t , a s w e shall see m o r e defini- theless, a n d thus assigning the p o e t a role in given society
tively i n o u r n e x t s e c t i o n . w h e t h e r o r n o t h e o r she likes it. P e r h a p s this i s t h e c a s e , b u t
T o w r i t e o f these t h i n g s i s t o r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f t h e t h e r e i s n o r o o m i n t h e w o r l d for h i m o r h e r w h o , w r i t i n g ,
w o r l d a n d t o live w i t h o u t f o r m — i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e B o o k , refuses t h e w o r l d . N o r i s t h e r e a n y r o o m o u t s i d e t h e w o r l d .
a s B l a n c h o t p u t s it. I t i s t o r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f l a n - H e n c e , t h e r e is w r i t i n g , w h i c h is neither/nor. N e i t h e r c o n s c i e n c e
g u a g e , of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . N o t at all a refusal of r e s p o n s i b i l - n o r its l a c k .
ity, w r i t i n g u n i t e s w i t h it, refusing t o f l e e its e x o r b i t a n c e . W r i t -
ing is the imitation of thought, the simulation of action, a n d
t h e c o n t i n u a l e x p o s u r e t o responsibility, t h a t i s t o say, t o t h e En deca du temps
O t h e r . W r i t i n g is B l a n c h o t ' s ethics a n d his p o l i t i c s . It is f o r m - T h e t i m e o f t h e " m e a n w h i l e " (I'entretemps), w h i c h
less w r i t i n g , h o w e v e r . I t i s r a d i c a l l y a m b i g u o u s a n d i t u n i t e s we b r o u g h t o u t in our discussion of Levinas's aesthetics a n d
w i t h this a m b i g u i t y . T r y t o s u m m a r i z e B l a n c h o t ' s e s s a y s . T a k e e t h i c s , i s o f obsessive i m p o r t a n c e t o B l a n c h o t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s
L'espace littéraire for e x a m p l e . T h e title of t h e b o o k a n d t h e on art and community. T h e time of the " m e a n w h i l e " is the
essays i n i t c o u l d h a r d l y b e b r o a d e r i n s c o p e a n d m o r e i n c o n - time " p r e s e r v e d " in the w o r k of art (Lévinas), the time of
clusive, verging on interpretation b u t w i t h o u t " p r o d u c i n g " a writing and the time of dying (Blanchot), and also, we think,
" r e a d i n g . " B u t this i s precisely t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e B o o k , t h e t i m e of la comunità che viene ( A g a m b e n ) . In h i s d i s c u s -
t h e refusal of t h e p r e s e n t . It is a s t r u g g l e t h a t t a k e s p l a c e as a sion of T i a n a n m e n , A g a m b e n observes t h a t the d e m o n s t r a -
m e t i c u l o u s indifference to a given c o m m u n i t y . E m p t i e d of all t o r s m a d e few c o n c r e t e d e m a n d s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e s e
determinate contents, Blanchot's workless w o r k s are already were readily g r a n t e d . 5 2
He points o u t that the students did n o t
t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t i m e to c o m e , a b o o k to c o m e (le livre à act in o p e n confrontation to, or competition with, the state
o v e r recognizable issues. Instead, Agamben says: "The nov- l.i mort, arrache celle-ci a I'fitat de chose ou elle voudrait se
54

elty of the coining politics is that it will no longer he ¡1 struggle pacifier]." Even death does not b r i n g an e n d to d y i n g ( w h i c h

for the conquest and control of the State, hut a struggle be- is w h y all suicides, h o w e v e r beautiful, fail to a t t a i n their s o u g h t -

tween the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmount- after finale). That d e a t h does n o t c o m p l e t e t h e m o v e m e n t o f

able disjunction between whatever singularity and the State d y i n g d i s t u r b s t h e often t o o facilely u n d e r s t o o d n o t i o n o f h u -

organization [Poiché il fatto nuovo della politica che viene è m a n finitude: t h e e q u a t i o n o f d e a t h w i t h r e s t a n d p e a c e . F a r

che essa non sarà più lotta per la conquista o il controllo dello f r o m s e t t i n g a l i m i t t o d y i n g , d e a t h magnifies its i n c o m p l e t i o n ,

stato, ma lotta fra lo stato e il non-stato (l'umanità), disgiun- p l a c i n g it, a s i t w e r e , u n d e r g l a s s . Like t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g a n d

zione incolmabile delle singolarità qualunque e dell'organiz- of the image, it never achieves the present m o m e n t . "It c a n n o t
5 5

zazione statale]."" (We will t a k e up A g a m b e n ' s politics at m o r e give itself t h e o t h e r s h o r e [ne p e u t p a s s e d o n n e r l ' a u t r e r i v e ] , "

l e n g t h i n o u r n e x t c h a p t e r , b u t w e w a n t t o say i n a d v a n c e t h a t Levinas says. T h e time of writing a n d the time of dying dis-

he seems to be describing a politics w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n a t e con- r u p t the continuity of time by disjoining past a n d future. R a d i -

t e n t s , a n d a s u s p e n s i o n of p o l i t i c a l t i m e as it is o r g a n i z e d by cally p o i g n a n t , I'entretemps is r a d i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n , r a d i c a l l y

t h e S t a t e . In this i n t e r r u p t i o n , we g l i m p s e a t i m e à venir, b e - unforeseeable time.

y o n d , or, en degà S t a t e - t i m e . In T i a n a n m e n S q u a r e A g a m b e n T h e time of writing a n d the time of dying are the time of

g l i m p s e d a n i m a g e , i n B l a n c h o t ' s sense; a n i m a g e t h a t , i n ef- radical divergence of past from future. They are discontinu-

fect, d e s t r o y e d S t a t e - t i m e , a n d this i s w h y t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o u s t i m e . T h e t i m e o f d y i n g i s o p e n t o a t i m e t h a t will n e v e r

w a s s o m a s s i v e l y c r u s h e d a n d yet h a s c o n t i n u e d t o h a u n t t h e h a v e b e e n , since i t will n o t h a v e p a s s e d t h r o u g h a p r e s e n t .

S t a t e ever since.) This time, w h i c h is an openness o n t o a time w i t h o u t a present,


i s b o t h t o o r e m o t e a n d t o o near. Void o f d u r a t i o n , t h i s d i s c o n -
T h e r e is a notion we w a n t to bring o u t in this section of
t i n u o u s t i m e h o l l o w s itself o u t , e r a s e s , o r e x s c r i b e s itself. I a m
o u r s t u d y t h a t i s essential t o A g a m b e n ' s t h o u g h t b u t i s a n t i c i -
n o t c o m p l e t e l y sensible o r c o n s c i o u s o f it. R a t h e r , t h i s d i s c o n -
p a t e d in m a n y pages of writing by Blanchot. It is the n o t i o n of
t i n u i t y o r r a d i c a l u n c e r t a i n t y i n s i n u a t e s itself i n t o c o n t i n u o u s
a n a b s o l u t e d i s j u n c t i o n . " P r e s e r v e d " i n t h e w o r k o f a r t (or
t i m e a n d i s s m u g g l e d i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s u n a w a r e s , just a s a
t h e i c o n , a s L é v i n a s p r e f e r s t o call t h e a r t w o r k ) , t h e r e i s t h e
skilled s e d u c e r c a n i n a u g u r a t e a s e d u c t i o n i n e v e n t h e m o s t
t i m e o f w r i t i n g o r t h e t i m e o f d y i n g t h a t " d o e s n o t let itself b e
b a n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h o u t o n c e b e t r a y i n g his o r h e r i n t e n -
s i t u a t e d or affirmed in r e l a t i o n to life [ne se laisse s i t u e r ou
t i o n s . A s s h o u l d b e all t o o o b v i o u s , w e s p e a k h e r e o f s o m e -
affirmer d a n s u n r a p p o r t d e v i e ] , " a n d t h a t " d o e s n o t localize
t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y s u b t l e . I n fact, this v o i d - t i m e i s t h e v e r y
itself as an e v e n t , n o r d o e s it last in t h e w a y of a t e m p o r a l
hollowing out of time that makes continuity possible in the
b e c o m i n g ; d y i n g d o e s n o t last, d o e s n o t e n d , a n d , p r o l o n g i n g
f i r s t p l a c e . I t i s like a n e m p t y s p e e c h o r a n i m a g i n a r y c o n v e r -
itself in d e a t h , t e a r s this a w a y f r o m t h e s t a t e of a t h i n g in
s a t i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s all i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s . U n a b l e a s w e
w h i c h i t w o u l d like t o r e s t peacefully [ne s e localise p a s d a n s
a r e to s p e a k of it, it is n e v e r t h e l e s s affirmed in all s p e a k i n g .
un é v é n e m e n t , ni ne d u r e à la faeton d ' u n d e v e n i r t e m p o r e l :
V o i d - t i m e is i m a g i n a r y t i m e . In L e v i n a s it is t h e t i m e of t h e
m o u r i r n e d u r e p a s , n e s e t e r m i n e p a s et, s e p r o l o n g e a n t d a n s
dire t h a t precedes (.'very dit a n d t h a t is not entirely absorbed and Blanchot h a v e uncovered a n e w mode ol t h o u g h t , or a
i n t o a n y dit. In t h e w o r k of a r t , the t i m e of w r i t i n g r e s o n a t e s , n e w category, or an intuition hitherto unattested to in p h i l o s -
j u s t a s t h e s t a t u e s q u e c o r p s e magnifies t h e t i m e o f d y i n g . ophy. To be sure, all of Levinas's c o n c e r n w i t h an autrement
If d e a t h is, or if t h e d e a d a r e , a b s o l u t e l y m a s t e r f u l , it is qu'être refers ( o b l i q u e l y ) to this en deçà, a n d we m u s t t h i n k
b e c a u s e o n e sees i n i t t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y p l a c e i n t h e w o r l d . a b o u t his éthique in light of t h i s . L i k e w i s e , all of B l a n c h o t ' s
T h e d e a d r e m a i n there, r e m a i n p e r c e p t i b l e , y e s , b u t o n l y i n s o - e n i g m a s c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h this " h i t h e r s i d e " a s w e l l . B u t n e i -
far a s t h e y r i g o r o u s l y resist a n y r e l a t i o n t o life, t o c o n t i n u i t y . t h e r Levinas (in spite of a p p e a r a n c e s ) n o r B l a n c h o t h a s c o n -
T h e y refuse t o " d e p a r t , " a s life s p e a k s o f t h e m , a n d t h e eld- structed a n y t h i n g like a corpus of t h o u g h t o u t of a " d i s c o v e r y . "
erly w o m a n w e s p o k e o f i n o u r i n t r o d u c t i o n m u s t h a v e h a d N e i t h e r of t h e m m a k e a c o n t r i b u t i o n to arts a n d letters in a n y
a n infinite r e s p e c t for t h i s r e s i s t a n c e h e r h u s b a n d m a n i f e s t e d . c o n v e n t i o n a l s e n s e , a n d this m a k e s a n y r e a d i n g o f t h e m u n -
O n e sees i n t h e d e a d , a s i n t h e w o r k o f a r t , a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y difficult a s w e l l . I n o u r o w n w r i t i n g t o this
d i s j u n c t i o n . O n e c o m e s face-to-face w i t h Ventretemps: a t i m e p o i n t w e h a v e b e e n d r a w n i n t o t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f a n y ex-
" w i t h o u t m e " a n d b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e rites t h a t sur- plication du texte. We o u r s e l v e s sometimes write obliquely
r o u n d t h e d e a d a r e i n t e n d e d , like p h i l o s o p h y a n d c r i t i c i s m , t o a n d o x y m o r o n i c a l l y , a s d o L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t . T h e expli-
" s k i p o v e r " this e m p t y i n t e r v a l a n d m a k e o f d e a t h a n e v e n t i n cation w e i n t e n d e d r e m a i n s s t a l l e d , a n d i s still n o t p a r t o f a n y
life a n d w i t h i n t h e c o n t i n u i t y life r e g a r d s itself a s . B u t n o t h i n g p r o p e r l y critical c o n t e x t . I n fact, w e h a v e b e e n r e p e a t e d l y re-
c o u l d b e m o r e fragile t h a n t h i s c o n t i n u i t y . F o r p r e c e d i n g i t pulsed b y B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k , u n a b l e t o b r i n g t o light t h e " s p a c e
(and preserved and exhibited in the cadaver) is the p a r o d y of of literature" he describes so well. For no matter where one
c o n t i n u i t y t h a t is t h e t i m e of d y i n g . It is a p a r o d y of e t e r n a l tries t o p l a c e B l a n c h o t — w i t h H e g e l , w i t h N i e t z s c h e , w i t h H e i -
57
life. In this s e n s e , o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e c a d a v e r is a p a r o d y degger, F r e u d , K a f k a , o r e v e n L e v i n a s — h e v a n i s h e s . This
o f i n t e r subjectivity. W h a t i s a l w a y s d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t o u r rela- r e a d e r t h u s i s exiled: n o l o n g e r a n d n o t yet e x p l i c a t i n g , n o
t i o n w i t h t h e d e a d i s t h a t this r e l a t i o n e x p o s e s a n a l w a y s p r i o r l o n g e r a n d n o t y e t r e a d i n g . W e e x p e r i e n c e , i n spite o f m u l t i p l e
r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n e v e r c o n s c i o u s l y i n c l u d e d i n o u r living rela- p r e c a u t i o n s , a r e m a r k a b l e failure at t h e h e a r t of a n y a p p r o a c h
tions with the other person. Exposed in the corpse is the time t o t h e B l a n c h o t i a n œuvre. Yet i t i s i n o u r failure t h a t w e " e n -
o f d y i n g t h a t silently i n v e r t s o u r c o n s c i o u s r e l a t i o n s . T h e d e a d c o u n t e r " t h e w o r k ( a n d t h i s i s w h a t w i l l e t e r n a l l y justify
expose a scandalous discontinuity that precedes continuous S h a v i r o ' s r e a d i n g o f B l a n c h o t i n t e r m s o f affect a n d m e t a m o r -
58
time. O u r relation w i t h the dead necessarily confronts us w i t h phosis). Failure is a n a m o r p h i c a n d everyone w h o fails—at
d i s c o n t i n u i t y p a r e x c e l l e n c e : a t i m e w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t , en deca anything—struggles against the myriad of chance, uniting with
du temps, r e m a i n i n g a l w a y s at t h e t h r e s h o l d of living, d u r a - i t like a n a c c o m p l i c e o n e s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y lives w i t h . F a i l u r e
tional time. o p e n s t h e s p a c e o f l i t e r a t u r e b e c a u s e failure h a s m a n y r e a s o n s

T h e w o r k of art, likewise, exhibits this "hither side" of w h e n o n l y o n e w o u l d suffice.

t i m e t h a t L é v i n a s says i s " i n t o l e r a b l e t o t h o u g h t [ i n t o l e r a b l e à Still, this is o n l y a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n . To r e a d B l a n c h o t ' s


la pensée]." 5 6
We must not be tempted to think that Lévinas récits o r his essays i s t o h a v e t o c o m e r e p e a t e d l y t o e x t r e m e
Il I A N < . 1 I O I

p o i n t s o f u n c e r t a i n t y , p o i n t s w h e r e o n e really d o c s n o t k n o w yet w i t h o u t the attempt o n e will never c o m e to t h e m o m e n t of


w h a t to say a n d w h e r e o n e is a priori d e p r i v e d of a n y m e a n s u n c e r t a i n t y that i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , a n d n o t b y a n a l o g y , t h e
t o say a n y t h i n g . T h e s e m o m e n t s o f e n i g m a a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n t i m e o f d y i n g a n d its e x t r a o r d i n a r y a n d s t u p e f y i n g a t t r a c t i v e -
a r e s o n u m e r o u s i n B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k t h a t w e m u s t say t h e y a r e n e s s . F o r t h e c o r p s e , m a k e no m i s t a k e , is attractive par excel-
t h e very " s u b s t a n c e " o f it. U n c e r t a i n t y o r a m b i g u i t y a r e p o i n t s lence, e v e n as it r e p u l s e s .
at w h i c h an encounter, a reading, a discourse, can begin to W h e n t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort, t h r o u g h t h e force
t a k e p l a c e a n d w h e r e t h e w o r d s t h a t will s p e a k i t c a n t r u l y o f his love a n d d e s i r e , b r i n g s J . b a c k f r o m t h e d e a d , w e r e a d
begin t o b e f o u n d b e c a u s e t h e y c o m e f r o m n o w h e r e . T h e y t h a t h e r eyes " o p e n e d a b r u p t l y a n d t h e y o p e n e d t o reveal s o m e -
c o m e from the ambiguity of an imperceptible m e t a m o r p h o s i s t h i n g t e r r i b l e w h i c h I will n o t t a l k a b o u t , t h e m o s t t e r r i b l e
s u c h t h a t h a v i n g n o t h i n g t o say a n d n o m e a n s t o s a y i t itself l o o k a living b e i n g c a n receive [ b r u s q u e m e n t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t ,
begins a discourse. This is w h a t " h a p p e n s " in Blanchot be- e t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t s u r q u e l q u e c h o s e d e t e r r i b l e d o n t j e n e
c a u s e all his t e x t s a r e Sirenic, i n t h e sense h e h i m s e l f d e s c r i b e s parlerai pas, sur le regard le plus terrible q u ' u n être vivant
i n his e s s a y o n the f a m o u s e p i s o d e f r o m H o m e r . S o a l l u r i n g , puisse r e c e v o i r ] . " 5 9
Like O r p h e u s , the n a r r a t o r has g o n e into
Blanchot's texts remain a m b i g u o u s , void of content, hesitant, H e l l t o f i n d his b e l o v e d a n d h e h a s l o o k e d a t h e r face-to-face.
a n d o f a n u n c e r t a i n s t a t u s (are t h e y p o e t i c ? p h i l o s o p h i c ? criti- J.'s eyes l o o k a t t h e n a r r a t o r f r o m d e a t h . Eyes t h a t w o u l d l o o k
cal?). O n e can a p p r o a c h t h e m , to be sure, in the m a n n e r of a t u s f r o m d e a t h a l l o w u s t o c o m e face-to-face w i t h d e a t h i n
U l y s s e s , b y s t r a p p i n g oneself t o t h e s t u r d y m a s t o f H e g e l , p e r s o n . It is of c o u r s e a c o m m o n p l a c e t h a t o n e c l o s e t h e eyes
Heidegger, Kojéve, or whomever. O n e can also spare others o f t h e d e c e a s e d s o t h a t t h e y d o n o t cruelly c o n t i n u e t o g a z e , t o
a n y p e r c e p t i o n o f h i m a t all b y n o t t e a c h i n g h i m ( b e c a u s e h e i s s e a r c h o u t for s o m e t h i n g t o see; for this d e a d g a z e — p u r e l y
" u n t e a c h a b l e " ) . He is a "difficult" writer. Q u i t e . For, w h a t i n d i f f e r e n t , b l a n k , a n d s u p e r f l u o u s — i s a gaze nevertheless. In
B l a n c h o t reveals in his t e x t s is t h e very a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of litera- t h e face o f t h e d e a d a n d i n t h e w o r k o f a r t ( w h i c h h a s its o w n
t u r e as such, a r t a n d w r i t i n g as such, t h o u g h t as such. W h o b l a n k n e s s ) o n e i s faced w i t h t h e e t e r n a l , t h e e n d l e s s — n o t d e a t h
c a n resist this allure? W h o w o u l d n o t , like O r p h e u s i n H e l l , as absent, but death as the absence of another shore a n d with-
w a n t to enter the space of literature and wrest from it the o u t a n y p l a c e i n life. T o c l o s e t h e eyelids o f t h e d e a d i s t o
f o r m a n d f i g u r e o f t h a t w h i c h h a s s o affected o n e ? I t i s n o t p r e t e n d t h a t t h e d e a d sleep i n p e a c e . B u t h u m a n eyes d o n o t
l i t e r a t u r e , p h i l o s o p h y , o r literary criticism t h a t B l a n c h o t w r i t e s , sleep. E v e n i n sleep t h e y p a t h e t i c a l l y s e a r c h b e h i n d c l o s e d e y e -
b u t their infinite attractiveness. Not literature, b u t its image; lids for s o m e t h i n g t o see. H u m a n eyes a n d t h e i r g a z e d o n o t
n o t a t e x t , b u t a récit; n o t t h o u g h t , b u t its s i m u l a c r u m . The m e r e l y , a s S a r t r e t e a c h e s , resist m y a p p r o p r i a t i o n . T h e y resist
Blanchotian text is the shimmering and pure appearance of a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i o n t o life a t all. T h e y a r e a l r e a d y little c o r p s e s .
literature. It is p o e t r y as p u r e a p p e a r a n c e , p u r e s e e m i n g , p u r e T h e n a r r a t o r c o u l d revive J., b u t h e i s p o w e r l e s s t o r e s u s c i t a t e
ambiguity. Neither literature nor t h o u g h t as it is n o w t h o u g h t her eyes, w h i c h are always already " b e y o n d " — f r o m b e y o n d
of, b u t as it is to c o m e , v o i d of p r e s e n c e in a t i m e a venir. A n d a n d v a i n l y s e a r c h i n g for a b e y o n d .
s o i t i s futile a n d fatal t o a t t e m p t a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f B l a n c h o t — I n t h e a r r e s t e d , stupefied g a z e o f t h e d e a d o n e sees t h e
image of a g a z e . O n e secs an i m a g i n a r y seeing. O n e secs a thai m o m e n t ol absolute uncertainty, the Outside w a s there,

g a z e t h a t is t h e g a z e of no o n e . ( A n d t h a t is w h y , in t h e m y t h , death w a s there open, impotent, and w i t h o u t intimacy. T h e

E u r i d i c e v a n i s h e s w h e n O r p h e u s l o o k s a t her, o r a t h e r g a z e — n a r r a t o r w a s greeted by the gaze he w a s d r a w n to a n d s o u g h t

for h e r s is t h e g a z e of no o n e , t h e g a z e of t h e d e a d . ) T h e r e is a for. I t w a s indifferent t o h i m , t o his p r e s e n c e , a n d i t c o n d e m n e d

d o u b l e o p e n i n g o f J.'s eyes (they " o p e n e d a b r u p t l y a n d t h e y h i m to d e a t h b e c a u s e it l o o k e d at h i m as if he was already no

o p e n e d t o r e v e a l [ b r u s q u e m e n t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t , e t elles longer there. Yes, t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort d o e s find J.,

s'ouvrirent sur]"), because there must be a dead, blank, anony- the J. he sought, in Hell. But he only meets her w h o disregards

m o u s g a z e t h a t h o l l o w s itself o u t a n d c r e a t e s a s p a c e for see- h i m . H e m e e t s h e r a s she is: d e a d a n d w i t h o u t h i m , o u t s i d e

i n g . I t w a s t h a t b l a n k g a z e t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r c o n f r o n t e d i n J.'s h i m utterly.

e y e s . It w a s a g a z e t h a t r e s e m b l e d J.'s b u t t h a t was not hers, T h e n a r r a t o r is n o t a w a r e of this strangeness at the time,

was not anyone's. T h e eyes t h a t l o o k e d like J.'s, for a m o - for t h e e v e n t i s t o o p r e c i s e a n d t o o i m p e r s o n a l e v e n t o b e

ment, belonged to no one. At that m o m e n t , J. became her a c k n o w l e d g e d . H e s a y s , "[I]f I h a d s h u d d e r e d a t t h a t i n s t a n t ,

o w n double, her o w n image, and it w a s the image of J. that a n d i f I h a d b e e n a f r a i d , e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d h a v e b e e n lost, b u t

stared at the n a r r a t o r with an imaginary stare. It w a s the im- my tenderness w a s so great t h a t I didn't even think a b o u t the

a g e o f J., y e s , b u t J . herself w a s a b r u p t l y eyeless. T h e eyes t h a t strangeness of w h a t w a s happening, which certainly seemed

s t a r e d w e r e n o t h e r s a n d i t w a s t h o s e a n o n y m o u s eyes t h a t t o m e a l t o g e t h e r n a t u r a l b e c a u s e o f t h a t infinite m o v e m e n t

s t a r e d a t t h e n a r r a t o r a s h e l o o k e d i n t o a face w i t h n o eyes: a w h i c h d r e w me t o w a r d h e r [si à cet i n s t a n t j ' a v a i s frémi, et si

face h e l o v e d a n d h a d b r o u g h t b a c k f r o m H e l l . j ' a v a i s é p r o u v é d e l a peur, t o u t e û t été p e r d u , m a i s m a t e n d r e s s e


était si g r a n d e que je n'eus m ê m e pas une pensée p o u r le carac-
T h e i m a g e o f a g a z e p r e c e d e d J.'s g l a n c e a t t h e n a r r a t o r
tère singulier de ce qui se passait, qui me p a r u t c e r t a i n e m e n t
a n d J.'s i m a g e p r e c e d e d h e r r e t u r n t o life. I t w a s a n i m a g e
t o u t à fait n a t u r e l , à c a u s e de ce m o u v e m e n t infini q u i me
terrible a n d u n n a m a b l e , or an "absent absence," as Foucault
6 3
60 portait à sa r e n c o n t r e ] . " T h e "infinite m o v e m e n t " h e s p e a k s
puts it. In other w o r d s , a resemblance preceded the actual
of, t h e H e l l i n t o w h i c h J. h a d s l i p p e d , is Ventretemps: a c r o s s -
a n d t h e n d i s a p p e a r e d i n t o H e l l a s J . r e t u r n e d t o life. B u t t h e
i n g t h a t is infinite, a r r e s t e d , like a (step n o t ) b e y o n d or le pas
living J . (the o t h e r s u b j e c t , t o use t h e c r u d e l a n g u a g e o f t h e
au-delà (as B l a n c h o t so n e a t l y says in t h e title of a n o t h e r of
p h i l o s o p h e r s ) i s n o t t h e w o m a n t h e n a r r a t o r s o u g h t , for J . ,
his w o r k s t h a t should p e r h a p s be r e a d as a clandestine c o m -
r e t u r n e d t o life, r e t u r n e d a t t h e s a m e t i m e t o m o r t a l i t y a n d , i n
61 p a n i o n to L'arrêt de mort).
fact, a few d a y s later, t h e n a r r a t o r h e l p s h e r t o d i e . That
w h i c h p r e c e d e d J . — h e r i m a g e a n d its i m a g i n a r y g a z e — w a s I t i s i m p o r t a n t for u s t o c o n s i d e r t h e p r e c i s i o n o f t h e e v e n t

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h e r p a s t (herself d e a d , o r " a l r e a d y n o m o r e for these precise m o m e n t s m a k e u p t h e " s u b s t a n c e " o f

t h a n a s t a t u e [déjà p l u s q u ' u n e s t a t u e ] , " t h e n a r r a t o r s a y s ) 62 Blanchot's writings. These m o m e n t s , or m o v e m e n t s , or spaces

a n d h e r f u t u r e ( a g a i n , herself d e a d a few d a y s l a t e r ) . T h a t are precise a n d a n a m o r p h i c insofar as they c a n n o t be interro-

which preceded J.—the terrible resemblance—was w i t h o u t a gated, or even properly experienced or n a r r a t e d . T h e O u t s i d e

present, w i t h o u t being, a n d bore no relation to the present. In o f w h i c h w e s p e a k i n t h e scene(s) o f J.'s d e a t h ( s ) i s n o t o u t s i d e


of an i n t e r i o r i t y (the narrator's or the reader's). II we a n d nu Cannol relaie tO them. And if I can " i m a g i n e (he h a n d t h a t
6 1
m e r o u s o t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s s o frequently i n v o k e t o p o g r a p h y , w r i t e s them," ' I will o n l y find myself face-to-face w i t h a g a z e
it is o n l y i m m e d i a t e l y to c o n t e s t it. L'entretemps m u s t be that does not regard me, that dispenses with me. For t h a t is
t h o u g h t o f p r o x i m a l l y , i n t h e sense w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d . the " p r i c e " of transgression: / am neglected. Reading then
T h a t w h i c h h a p p e n s t o t h e n a r r a t o r d o e s n o t , a s w e see, in- becomes une tâche sérieuse because l'entretemps substitutes
s p i r e m e m o r a b l e i m a g e s o r d a z z l i n g p r o s e . T h e t o n e o f L'arrêt itself for a n d s i m u l a t e s — i n s i s t s o n t h e a b s e n c e o f — t h e p r e s e n t .
de mort is, if a n y t h i n g , d i s t a n t , b u t w i t h t h a t d i s t a n c e t h a t T o b e sure, i n all a r t a s w e h a v e seen, t h e " m e a n w h i l e " r e p l a c e s
Blanchot has found at the heart of intimacy and passion. W h a t t h e p r e s e n t , t h e i m a g e s u b s t i t u t e s itself for t h e c o n c e p t . I n
r e m a i n s a t t r a c t i v e t o t h e n a r r a t o r i s r e n d e r e d i n o u t l i n e only, Blanchot, this e n i g m a is foregrounded. By " t h i n n i n g o u t " im-
in profile o n l y (as is le visage in L e v i n a s ) . Barely p e r c e p t i b l e ages, scenes, characters, actions, a n d language the Bianchotian
s c e n e s a n d f i g u r e s a p p e a r (or a p p e a r o n l y o b l i q u e l y , o r appear t e x t a p p r o a c h e s t h e i m a g i n a r y a s such—where t h e r e a r e n o
to a p p e a r ) t h r o u g h o u t all of B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k s . (Le pas au- i m a g e s , w h e r e n o t h i n g crystallizes i n t o definite f o r m s o r f i g u r e s ,
delà a l s o c o n t a i n s scenes o f d e a t h , c o n v e r s a t i o n s , a n d " c h a r - a n d w h e r e the time of reading is also the time of writing a n d
a c t e r s " e v e n m o r e s p a r s e l y d r a w n t h a n t h o s e i n L'arrêt d e the time of dying. We reach the s h a d o w of the world w h e r e
mort.) W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s a l w a y s " b e t w e e n " (or i n p a r e n t h e - initiative a n d action are already no longer possible. T h a t is to
ses) w h a t m i g h t b e c a l l e d a c t i o n s o r e v e n t s . W h a t m a t t e r s a n d say, r e a d i n g c o m e s t o d o u b l e t h e p a t h o s o f d y i n g . I t d o u b l e s
w h a t affects u s a s r e a d e r s , a n d w h a t affects B l a n c h o t ' s n a r r a - the inability to enter into the present and the impossibility of
t o r s i n all his récits, a r e e v e n t s t h a t t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e a n y finding any p r o p e r place in the w o r l d . It is the time of radical
c h a r a c t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e or i n t e n t i o n . T h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de incompletion and of worklessness.
mort i s a b l e t o w r i t e a n d t o t r y t o p u t a n e n d t o t h e s e e v e n t s If, as we say, o u r relation w i t h t h e d e a d is a p a r o d y of inter-
b e c a u s e , h e s a y s , t h e y c o n c e r n o n l y h i m . Yet t h a t w h i c h i s subjectivity, it is b e c a u s e it is an i m a g i n a r y r e l a t i o n : a r e l a t i o n
o n l y h i s , t h a t w h i c h b e l o n g s w i t h i n his o w n i n t i m a c y , i s o p e n w i t h n o o n e . But i t i s a r e l a t i o n n o n e t h e l e s s , a n d o n e t h a t d o e s
t o s t r a n g e r s , t o r e a d e r s . Few, i f any, w o r k s i n t h i s c e n t u r y (or not terminate our relations with the one w h o the dead person
e v e r p e r h a p s ) c a u s e t h e r e a d e r t o feel m o r e a c u t e l y t h a t h e o r w a s . It is a relation w i t h o u t relation, b u t it " p r e s e r v e s " a n d
s h e i s intruding o n s o m e o n e else's p r i v a c y t h a n d o t h e w o r k s e x h i b i t s t h a t v a c a n t t i m e en deçà du temps t h a t a l w a y s p r e -
of B l a n c h o t . T h i s is i n d e e d p a r t of t h e i r " t h r i l l . " It is as if o n e c e d e s t h e living t i m e o f h u m a n i n t e r subjectivity. I t i s p a r o d i e
h a d entered a prohibited space or had stepped uninvited into in the sense t h a t it is a relation with the other t h a t t o u c h e s h i m
s o m e o n e else's a p a r t m e n t . o u t s i d e his subjectivity i n t h e t i m e o f d y i n g t h a t t h e o t h e r will
T h e c u r i o u s effect h e r e is o n e of a t r a n s g r e s s i o n of i n t i - never c o m e to t h e e n d of. It is n o t a t i m e or a r e l a t i o n t h a t I am
macy: witnessing that which doesn't concern one. These ever c o n s c i o u s of in my dealings w i t h o t h e r s . It is t h u s a relation
"things" that happened to someone in 1938 are attractive pre- o v e r w h i c h I can exercise no m a s t e r y w h a t s o e v e r .
cisely i n s o f a r a s t h e y c o n c e r n o n l y t h a t s o m e o n e . I t i s like t h e T h e infinite m o v e m e n t t o w a r d , o r r e n d e z v o u s w i t h , Levi-
thrill o f g o s s i p . T h e s e t h i n g s a t t r a c t m e p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r a s I n a s ' s Autrui i s l i k e w i s e e t e r n a l l y p a r a l y z e d a n d w i t h o u t a n
o u t c o m e , as is o u r r e l a t i o n with t h e artwork. It is, if y o u like sell, b e c o m e engulfed in o r d e r a n d t a k e on the a p p e a r a n c e of
( a n d a s L é v i n a s w o u l d prefer), a m o v e m e n t t o w a r d a n O u t - a c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t |se t r a h i r et s ' e n g l o u t i r d a n s l ' o r d r e p o u r se
side t h a t is only ever rebegun in any conscious u n d e r t a k i n g m o n t r e r produit culturel |" a n d poetry, of course, c a n be " a p -
w i t h others in t h e w o r l d . It is a time or a m o v e m e n t " w i t h o u t plauded a n d rewarded, sold, bought [applaudi et primé, vendu,
6 9
m e , " a n d its i n t i m a c y i s precisely its d i s r e g a r d o f m e . T h e e n - acheté]," and so o n . This is because, Levinas says, poetry
c o u n t e r w i t h Autrui i s e m p t i e d b o t h o f myself a n d t h e o t h e r , surfaces at a precise instant b e t w e e n k n o w l e d g e a n d culture,
70
as if I w e r e o b l i g e d , as t h e " p r i c e " of this i n t i m a c y , to f o r g e t b e t w e e n seeing a n d s a y i n g . For t h a t very reason, he argues,
b o t h myself a n d t h e o t h e r . W e h a v e a l r e a d y t a k e n u p t h i s issue the t w o "pincers" are never quite closed—"le m o m e n t entre
7 1
i n o u r c h a p t e r o n L é v i n a s . I n its i n t i m a c y a n d a n o n y m i t y , a s l e v o i r e t l e d i r e o ù les m â c h o i r e s r e s t e n t , e n t r ' o u v e r t e s . "
B l a n c h o t so m a t c h l e s s l y e x p r e s s e s it t h r o u g h o u t L'arrêt de T h e a r t w o r k i s t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e i r ever c o m p l e t e l y c l o s i n g .
mort, w e m u s t b e a t t e n t i v e t o t h a t w h i c h p r e c e d e s all living L i k e w i s e , w e t h i n k , t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h Autrui t h a t L e v i n a s calls
relations a n d to that which, as it is a n o n y m o u s , is imaginary. ethics is an o b s c u r e resistance to the closing of ontic categories.
T h i s justifies, w e t h i n k , o u r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e L e v i n a s i a n T h e p o i n t w e a r e g e t t i n g t o i n this c h a p t e r i s this p o i n t o f
éthique as imaginary. r e s i s t a n c e , this i n t e r m i n a b l e p a r a l y s i s t h a t m a k e s u p t h e " s u b -
I m m e m o r i a l l y p a r a l y z e d , i n t e r r u p t e d , h e s i t a n t , c o y (all s t a n c e " o f B l a n c h o t ' s œuvre a n d is, w e m a y say, t h e I m a g e o f
t h e s e t e r m s will h a v e to do for n o w ) this en deçà, or le dire, or an Outside, and an O t h e r to the categories of t h o u g h t or of
I m a g e , o r I m a g i n a r y i s just a s i m m e m o r i a l l y f o r g o t t e n , i g n o r e d , t h e S t a t e . T h e a r t w o r k , t h e B l a n c h o t i a n récit, T i a n a n m e n , a n d
overlooked, and dispensed with as inconsequential. In one of L e v i n a s i a n responsabilité a r e d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s a n d d i s j u n c t i o n s .
his essays o n B l a n c h o t , " T h e S e r v a n t a n d H e r M a s t e r , " L é v i n a s A g a m b e n , a s w e shall see, t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o i t s t h i s i n t e r m i -
s p e a k s o f this " f o r g e t t i n g " a s t h a t w h i c h r e s t o r e s d i a c h r o n y n a b l e failure (or, a s h e will p u t it, t h i s " p o w e r t o n o t n o t - b e
72
to time by turning " a w a y from the past instant [détourne de [poter n o n non-essere]") i n his w r i t i n g s o n t h e " c o m i n g c o m -
l'instant p a s s é ] . " 6 5
But, importantly, d i a c h r o n y is n o t a d u r a - munity." W h a t we have tried to bring o u t of the s h a d o w s in
t i o n . I t h a s n e i t h e r " p r e t e n t i o n n o r r e t e n t i o n , " a s L é v i n a s says, o u r c h a p t e r o n B l a n c h o t i s t h e sense t h a t t h e t i m e o f c o n t i n u -
good student that he is of Husserl. 66
(When, here and t h e r e — ity a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y (as we p e r s i s t in c a l l i n g it) is r a d i c a l l y
in Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence for instance— u n d e r m i n e d a n d hollowed o u t by a "forgetting," or a p r o -
L é v i n a s s p e a k s o f diachronie, h e m e a n s t h e " m e a n w h i l e " t h a t found "past" intolérable à la pensée.
w e h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s i n g i n this c h a p t e r . ) H o w e v e r , t h a t w h i c h
turns a w a y from the past also "abides in w o r d s [demeure en
6 7
une p a r o l e ] " a n d w h e n they become "attentive to their con- The Image and Ipseity of Art
dition, w o r d s c o m e to a stop a n d t u r n into pillars of salt W e h a v e seen t h a t t h e t r a j e c t o r y o f B l a n c h o t i a n
[ p e n c h é s s u r l e u r c o n d i t i o n , les m o t s s ' a r r ê t e n t e n s t a t u e s d e a n d L e v i n a s i a n a e s t h e t i c s is t o w a r d a n t e r i o r i t y as such. N o t a
6 8
sel]." p r i m o r d i a l s t a t e - o f - t h i n g s , n o r a fluid a n d i n c o h e r e n t m a s s o f
P o e t r y , i n c l u d i n g t h e p o e t r y o f B l a n c h o t , c a n " b e t r a y it- data awaiting organized impression, but instead the subtlety
of i m a g i n a r y m a t t e r (like le dire that overflows every le dit) N o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its mimetic r a p p o r t w i t h w h a t i t i s n o t —

w h o s e d e s t i n y is n e i t h e r subjective n o r o b j e c t i v e . In t h e d i s e n - the real. Art i s reality's s h a d o w — t h a t w h i c h v a n i s h e s w h e n

gaged, more-than-passive and otherwise-than-worldly w o r k a n y light is s h e d on it.

o f a r t (as i n t h e c a d a v e r ) , this a n t e r i o r i t y i s " f r o z e n " a n d " p r e - T h e a r t w o r k is not an object. It is p u r e r a p p o r t , p u r e c o m -

s e r v e d " a s a n i c o n . Yet i t r e m a i n s u n p e r c e i v e d a n d silent, like m u n i c a t i o n , p u r e p a s s i o n . A s B l a n c h o t s o o b l i g i n g l y p u t s it:

t h e voix narrative, b e c a u s e it is n o t t h e m a t e r i a l for a p e r c e p - " I t is as if a secret l a w r e q u i r e d of t h e w o r k t h a t it a l w a y s be

t i o n . T h i s a n t e r i o r i t y en deçà du temps is n o t d e s t i n e d for t h e concealed in w h a t it shows a n d that it only s h o w w h a t m u s t

light of day, b u t neither is it the day's simple obverse. In r e m a i n c o n c e a l e d a n d t h a t finally i t o n l y s h o w s w h a t m u s t

B l a n c h o t ' s t e r m s , it is t h e autre nuit. 73 s t a y h i d d e n b y c o n c e a l i n g i t [ C o m m e s i u n e loi secrète e x i g e a i t


d'elle q u ' e l l e soit t o u j o u r s c a c h é e en ce qu'elle m o n t r e , et q u ' e l l e
W h e n Blanchot asks of the w o r k of art, " W h a t has always
n e m o n t r e aussi q u e c e qui d o i t r e s t e r c a c h é e t n e l e m o n t r e ,
e l u d e d its l a n g u a g e [ q u ' e s t - c e q u i s'est t o u j o u r s d é r o b é à s o n
7 6
enfin, q u ' e n l e d i s s i m u l a n t ] . " T h e w o r k o f a r t " r e v e a l s " its
l a n g a g e ] ? " a n d a n s w e r s , "Itself"; w h e n h e says t h a t a r t "is
o w n h i d d e n n e s s , i t " s h o w s " its o w n a b s e n c e f r o m all s h o w -
a l w a y s a n t e r i o r t o w h a t i t s p e a k s o f a n d t o itself [est t o u j o u r s
i n g , i t " s a y s " its o w n silence, a n d s o f o r t h . Before t h e w o r k o f
p l u s a n t é r i e u r q u e c e d o n t i l p a r l e e t p l u s a n t é r i e u r q u e lui-
7 4 a r t c o m m u n i c a t e s a n y t h i n g (the g o d s , e.g.) i t c o m m u n i c a t e s
même]," he is referring to anteriority insofar as art is t h a t
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t i s o n l y after t h a t t o w h i c h t h e w o r k o f a r t
w h i c h resists its o w n u n v e i l i n g a n d t h u s e l u d e s t h e v i c e - g r i p
refers i s f o r g o t t e n (i.e., t h e g o d s w h o h a v e fled a n d w h o s e
of s e e i n g a n d s a y i n g . For, t h e voix narrative is t h e t a l e itself,
flight t o o h a s b e e n f o r g o t t e n ) t h a t t h i s e n i g m a b e g i n s t o m a k e
t h e w o r k o f a r t itself, p r i o r t o its n a r r a t i v e " c o n t e n t s . " T h i s i s
itself felt, b e g i n s t o d r a w n e a r t o its " o r i g i n a l e x p e r i e n c e . "
n o t so v e r y s t r a n g e . All of t h e r e a l i t y of a r t (like all of t h e
75 This vanishing point is w h a t Blanchot is getting at w h e n he
r e a l i t y o f t h e self, a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d ) is b o r r o w e d
a s k s : " W h a t will b e c o m e n o w o f a r t , n o w t h a t t h e G o d s a n d
f r o m o u t s i d e it: f r o m m a t e r i a l s , clay, m a r b l e , p i g m e n t , a n d
even their a b s e n c e are g o n e , a n d n o w t h a t m e n ' s presence offers
life itself, w h i c h s o m e t i m e s a p p e a r s t o t h e a r t i s t t o b e a l r e a d y
n o s u p p o r t [ N e p o u v a n t plus p r e n d r e a p p u i sur les d i e u x , n i
aesthetically attractive. Art is mimesis, according to one of
m ê m e sur l'absence des d i e u x ; n e p o u v a n t s ' a p p u y e r sur l ' h o m m e
t h e W e s t ' s o l d e s t d e f i n i t i o n s . A r t , q u i t e simply, h a s n o self, n o
7 7
présent qui ne lui a p p a r t i e n t plus {...} q u e va devenir l ' œ u v r e ?] "
ipse, to be r e v e a l e d . T h a t is t h e secret of its a n t e r i o r i t y , its
A fascinating question. It is at this p o i n t t h a t the w o r k of art
" o t h e r n i g h t . " Its itselfness is always to come. T h i s is t h e se-
t r u l y finds its c o n d i t i o n , its " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h s . " It b e c o m e s a
c r e t o f its i n e x h a u s t i b l e r e s o u r c e s . M i m e s i s c a n n o t b e r e v e a l e d .
p u r e i m a g e o f itself, a n d i t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o itself, i n t o its t i m e .
If t h e w o r k of a r t e l u d e s itself, a n d n e v e r s p e a k s itself in its
own l a n g u a g e , it is b e c a u s e a r t is precisely selfless. It is w i t h - Inexhaustibly communicating with w h a t it is not, the w o r k

o u t a n y t h i n g t h a t w o u l d b e p r o p e r t o it. P r i o r t o its " c o n - of art resembles, again, nothing so m u c h as a cadaver w h o s e


t e n t s , " t h e w o r k of a r t is a p u r e i m a g e of itself, an i m a g e of very materiality is the erasure of the b o r d e r b e t w e e n presence

n o t h i n g . B y t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a r y logic w e m u s t c o n c l u d e w i t h a n d a b s e n c e , life a n d d e a t h , d i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e t u r n , i m a g e

B l a n c h o t a n d L e v i n a s t h a t a r t itself— m i m e s i s — i s n o t h i n g . a n d reality (for t h e c a d a v e r ' s e n t i r e reality i s t h a t i t i s a n i m a g e


of itself). Like the c o r p s e , the w o r k ol art is i n c a p a b l e of its in s o m e sense the sovereign a n d last p o w e r of t h i n g s .
" n o w , " i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g itself, i n c a p a b l e o f r e a c h i n g o r a t - This m o v e m e n t implies infinite d e g r e e s . T h u s p s y c h o -
t a i n i n g its b e i n g , w h i c h a l w a y s slips b e y o n d i t w h e r e i t c a n n o t a n a l y s i s says t h a t t h e i m a g e , far f r o m l e a d i n g u s o u t -
s t e p . L i k e t h e c o r p s e , t h e w o r k o f a r t i s t h e very i m a g e o f a side o f t h i n g s a n d m a k i n g u s live i n t h e m o d e o f g r a t u -
s t r a n g e i n c a p a c i t y s i m p l y t o be. Like t h e d e a r d e p a r t e d , t h e i t o u s fantasy, s e e m s t o s u r r e n d e r u s p r o f o u n d l y t o o u r -
w o r k o f a r t c a n n o t d i s a p p e a r i n t o its own d i s a p p e a r a n c e , its selves. T h e i m a g e i s i n t i m a t e b e c a u s e i t m a k e s o u r in-
own e n d . T h i s i m p o t e n c e , h o w e v e r , i s its " o w n m o s t " e x p e r i - t i m a c y a n e x t e r i o r p o w e r t h a t w e passively s u b m i t t o :
e n c e of "itself." T h a t is, it c a n o n l y e x p e r i e n c e "itself" in its outside of us, in the b a c k w a r d m o t i o n of the w o r l d
o t h e r , as o t h e r . It c a n o n l y e x p e r i e n c e itself as o t h e r t h a n itself; t h a t t h e i m a g e p r o v o k e s , t h e d e p t h o f o u r p a s s i o n trails
it is o n l y itself as o t h e r t h a n itself. It c a n o n l y c o m m u n i c a t e , in along, astray a n d brilliant.
s h o r t . A r t is no s o o n e r itself t h a n it is a l r e a d y petrified i n t o a
s t a t u e , a n i c o n , a p u p p e t , a toy. " S h e w h o w a s o n c e a b s o l u t e l y [Vivre u n é v é n e m e n t e n i m a g e , c e n ' e s t p a s s e d é g a g e r
alive w a s n o w n o m o r e t h a n a s t a t u e [Elle n ' é t a i t déjà p l u s d e cet é v é n e m e n t , s'en désintéresser, c o m m e l e v o u -
q u ' u n e s t a t u e , elle a b s o l u m e n t v i v a n t e ] , " B l a n c h o t ' s n a r r a t o r d r a i e n t l e v e r s i o n e s t h é t i q u e d e l ' i m a g e e t l'idéal serein
7 8
says o f J . a t h e r d e a t h . N o s o o n e r d o e s she die t h a n s h e b e - d e l ' a r t c l a s s i q u e , m a i s c e n ' e s t n o n p l u s s'y e n g a g e r
comes other than herself, other than anyone—totally a n o n y - p a r u n e d é c i s i o n l i b r e : c'est s'y laisser p r e n d r e , p a s s e r
m o u s . L i k e t h e c a d a v e r , t h e w o r k of a r t itself Is t h e i m a g e of d e l a r é g i o n d u réel, o ù n o u s n o u s t e n o n s à d i s t a n c e
a n image. I t i s a n i m a g i n a r y i m a g e , t o b e s u r e , a n d o n e t h a t des choses p o u r m i e u x en disposer, à cette autre région
n o b o d y recognizes, but it is an image nonetheless a n d one o ù l a d i s t a n c e n o u s t i e n t , c e t t e d i s t a n c e q u i est a l o r s
t h a t is t h a t is always " o l d e r " t h a n that of which it is the im- profondeur non vivante, indisponible, lointain
age. In this w a y we can u n d e r s t a n d p e r h a p s m o r e clearly inappréciable devenue c o m m e la puissance souveraine
Blanchot's "other version" of the imaginary: e t d e r n i è r e des c h o s e s . C e m o u v e m e n t i m p l i q u e d e s
d e g r é s infinis. L a p s y c h a n a l y s e dit ainsi q u e l ' i m a g e ,
T o e x p e r i e n c e a n e v e n t a s a n i m a g e i s n o t t o free o n e - loin d e n o u s laisser h o r s d e c a u s e e t d e n o u s faire v i v r e
self o f t h a t e v e n t , t o d i s s o c i a t e oneself f r o m it, a s a s - s u r l e m o d e d e l a fantaisie g r a t u i t e , s e m b l e n o u s livrer
s e r t e d b y t h e e s t h e t i c v e r s i o n o f t h e i m a g e a n d t h e se- p r o f o n d é m e n t à n o u s - m ê m e s , i n t i m e est l ' i m a g e , p a r c e
r e n e ideal o f classical a r t , b u t n e i t h e r i s i t t o e n g a g e q u ' e l l e fait d e n o t r e i n t i m i t é u n e p u i s s a n c e e x t é r i e u r e
oneself w i t h it t h r o u g h a free d i m e n s i o n : it is to let que nous subissons passivement: en dehors de nous,
oneself b e t a k e n b y it, t o g o f r o m t h e r e g i o n o f t h e d a n s l e recul d u m o n d e q u ' e l l e p r o v o q u e , t r a î n e , é g a r é e
7 9
real, w h e r e we hold ourselves at a distance from things et brillante, la profondeur de nos passions.]
t h e b e t t e r t o use t h e m , t o t h a t o t h e r r e g i o n w h e r e d i s -
tance holds us, this distance which is n o w unliving, " O l d e r " t h a n t h e s e r e n e classical v e r s i o n o f t h e i m a g e t h a t
unavailable depth, an inappreciable remoteness become guarantees distance, is that which is not to be and that which
is n o t to b e c o m e either. T h e w o r k ol an is the i m a g e of that In this way, the "experience" Blanchot refers to m u s t be p r i o r

w h i c h is never to be, never to b e c o m e — t h a t w h i c h is ever on to Kantian experience a n d w o u l d refer to t h e pure position of

t h e h i t h e r side of t i m e (en deca du temps). Eternally Mona the subject. To e x p e r i e n c e t h e e v e n t as an i m a g e , t h e n , is n o t

Lisa will be about to smile. E t e r n a l l y d e l a y e d p r i o r to b e i n g / to e x p e r i e n c e an o b j e c t (since t h e o b j e c t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o it-


b e c o m i n g , she i s t h e d e g r a d e d i m a g e o f t h e e t e r n a l . N o t a t i m e - self), b u t to e x p e r i e n c e t h e self as t h e p u r e p a s s i v i t y of p o s i -
less s t a t i c f o r m , b u t a fragment of a never to be continued and t i o n , or, " t h e r e n e s s . " I t i s t h u s p r i o r t o a n y e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e
completed whole. In t h e c o r p s e , in t h e w o r k of a r t , we see w o r l d , a n d it i m m e d i a t e l y closes in on itself w i t h o u t a t r a c e . It
( w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g ) t h a t w h i c h i m a g e s itself. I t i s n o t a n o t h e r closes b e c a u s e t h e s u b j e c t c a n " f e e l " o n l y its o w n i n t r i n s i c a l l y
image, as we learn from Blanchot, b u t a n o t h e r version of the e m p t y receptivity. I t is, a s i t w e r e , t h e s h a d o w o f t h e r e c e p t i v -
s a m e i m a g e . It is a r e t u r n of t h e i m a g e to itself, p r i o r to its ity t h a t , u n i t i n g w i t h s p o n t a n e i t y , f o r g e s t h e p r o p e r l y K a n t i a n
b e i n g an i m a g e of . . . T h e " o t h e r " v e r s i o n of t h e i m a g i n a r y is experience. In the language of Levinas, it is an e x t r e m e passiv-
its e t e r n a l r e t u r n t o itself, t o t h e s a m e i m a g e . N o s o o n e r i s t h e ity t h a t c a n n o t s i m p l y b e o p p o s e d t o activity, b e c a u s e i t i s t h e
a r t w o r k finished t h a n i t i s a r r e s t e d , o t h e r t h a n itself, or, t o say p a s s i v i t y w h o s e o n l y " q u a l i t y " i s infinite r e c e p t i v i t y o r m a l -
t h e s a m e t h i n g , t h e " s a m e " a s itself i n its very alterity. I n t h i s leability. It is t h e p a s s i v i t y of absolute instability. T h a t is to
arrested time there is no " n o w " in which the a r t w o r k can say, t h i s e x p e r i e n c e closes i n o n itself a n d leaves n o t r a c e b e -
b e c o m e . It is the repetition of the real, a n d repetition is with- c a u s e i t i s n e v e r e v e n o p e n e d . I n a b s o l u t e passivity, i n its p u r e
out a present. p o s i t i o n p r i o r t o a n y o b - o r s u b - j e c t i o n , t h e " s u b j e c t " (or shall
w e say, t h e " c o m m u n i c a t a n t " ? ) i s w h a t i t i s n o t , a n d i s n o t
E v e r y s t a t u e , every c a d a v e r , every p u p p e t , toy, o r a r t i f a c t —
w h a t i t is. T h e r e is, q u i t e simply, n o c o n t a i n i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l
i n d e e d , e v e r y t h i n g a n d every p e r s o n w h o falls, i f o n l y for a
8 0
ambiguity, or the "essential s o l i t u d e " of communicativity.
m o m e n t , outside utility—returns to an inconceivable image
void of either subject or object. This is the "last p o w e r of T h e s p a c e o f l i t e r a t u r e — o r , a s w e c a n n o w say, t h e s p a c e

things." They invert the " m o t i o n of the w o r l d " a n d " r e t u r n of absolute passivity or communicativity—is the thick, crepus-

us to ourselves," but to ourselves insofar as there is no one to cular, a n d p a r o x y s m a t i c materiality o f t h o u g h t t h a t t h i c k e n s i n t o

r e t u r n t o , n o society o f i d e n t i t i e s i n w h i c h w e c a n r e c o g n i z e a " t h i n g " (the " t h i n g " w e c a n say, t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r o f L'arrêt


8 1

ourselves. In this " o t h e r " imaginary, subject a n d object disap- de mort "lives w i t h " ) . It is t h e e r a s u r e of t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t

pear as such, as ob-posed and distanced. W h a t remains is pure hyphen, the erosion of mastery, the erosion of that distance

-jection (or t h r o w n n e s s ) , like N i e t z s c h e ' s (or H e i d e g g e r ' s ) d i c e . w h i c h a l l o w s u s t o h o l d t h e w o r l d a t a distance. F o r B l a n c h o t ,

A r t (the t a l e , t h e voix narrative) is t h e " f o r g e t t i n g " of s u b - as for D e r r i d a of " b e f o r e the letter," t h e n a m e of this m o v e m e n t

ject a n d o b j e c t a n d i s i n fact t h e i r r a d i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , fu- is writing: the paradoxical "strength" of an inexhaustible im-

sion, or desegregation. Experiencing the event as an image is p o t e n c e . O f t h i s s p a c e w e c a n o n l y say t h a t i t i s . . . , t h e r e i s .

an experience in which the object is disavowed as such, as . . , il y a. If w r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t of w h i c h it s p e a k s it is

object o p p o s e d to us in a Vorstellung ( a " p l a c i n g b e f o r e " ) , a n d b e c a u s e w r i t i n g — w h o s e "original e x p e r i e n c e " a r t a p p r o a c h e s —

t h u s it " r e t u r n s " t h e subject to itself p r i o r to its o p - p o s i t i o n i n g . is the obscurity, or the forgetting, anterior to any memory.
T o u s , art r e m a i n s " c o n s t a n t l y invisible [ c o n s t a m m e n t in- e r a s e s "itself," fOl il is w i t h o u t a n y self. N o t s i m p l y w i t h -

visible]," S2
h i d d e n , en deck, a n d an autre unit. But we a r e d r a w n d r a w n from all p r e s e n c e , this t i m e of w r i t i n g is, in t h e l a n -

to it nonetheless. W h e n the object is doubled and neutralized guage of Agamben, an imaginary youth that never-has-been

in the image, w h e n the image w i t h d r a w s the object from the a n d t h a t r e - m o v e s itself e a c h t i m e . I t i s t h a t w h o s e "self" i s its

w o r l d , a n d w h e n t h e o b j e c t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o its o w n i m a g e — re-moval. To sum it up, then, writing—or art, which can double
t h e n i t e x e r c i s e s its f a s c i n a t i o n , its " p o w e r l e s s p o w e r . " W r i t - u p a n d p r e s e r v e e v e r y t h i n g t h a t p r e s e n t s itself t o u s — i s for-
ing is the c o m i n g of an i m p o t e n c e t h a t neutralizes subjectivity g e t t i n g . B u t it is n o t a f o r g e t t i n g of a n y thing. It is a f o r g e t t i n g
b y n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e o b j e c t . " I , " a s B l a n c h o t says, b e c o m e " h e " t h a t p r e c e d e s eidetic e v i d e n c e / a f o r g e t t i n g i m m e m o r i a l l y for-
[il, t h e N e u t e r ] . I n this d o u b l e d s p a c e , t h i s s h a d o w o f t h e r e a l , gotten/not even absent/always already forgotten/a perpetual
I c e a s e t o b e sub-ject a n d b e c o m e " h e " w h o i s " h i s " r a p p o r t l a c k of v i s i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s all seeing a n d s a y i n g / . . .
w i t h t h a t w h i c h h o l d s " h i m " i n its spell. For, i n t h e s p a c e o f
literature, I am t h a t " h e " to w h o m I eternally r e t u r n in this B l a n c h o t i a n a e s t h e t i c s l e a d s u s t o , a n d i s c o n s t a n t l y in-
timeless time of repetition a n d incompletion. I am " h e " in v a d e d by, a n a n t e r i o r i t y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p r e s e n c e , a " h i t h e r
w h o m I d o n o t r e c o g n i z e myself. Yet, I a m n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n s i d e " t h a t i s a n t e r i o r t o objectivity. I t i s t h e " l a s t p o w e r o f
" h i s " return, " h i s " immemorial and eternal return. A n d " h e " t h i n g s " t o exercise a silent a n d f o r g o t t e n f a s c i n a t i o n t h a t o p e n s
is imaginary—pure passion, pure rapport, pure communica- the space of literature, a space evacuated of subject a n d o b -
t i o n . I a m " h e " w h o I a m n o t , for " h e " i s n o t ( a n d n e v e r w i l l ject, a n d t h u s a s p a c e of r a d i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d affectivity.
be) w h o " h e " is. T h e w o r k o f a r t , like t h e c a d a v e r , before i t r e p r e s e n t s a n y t h i n g

This does not mean that the artwork harbingers my death. ( o r s c e n e , o r d r a m a , o r p e r s o n ) , f i r s t o f all c o m m u n i c a t e s c o m -

It m e a n s t h a t an Httlife, an arrested d e a t h , a p a r a l y z e d f o r c e , m u n i c a t i o n itself, o r b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n . I n s o f a r a s I a m e v a c u -

h o l l o w s o u t the time of d u r a t i o n a n d r e m a i n s my invisible, a t e d of subjectivity, I am this b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n itself, myself.

hidden involvement with a time of radical incompletion. T h e O l d e r t h a n a n y s p e c u l a t i o n is this obsession. If B l a n c h o t d e -

a r t w o r k does not harbinger death, it is my involvement with scribes this as an " o t h e r version" of the imaginary, it is only
d e a t h a l r e a d y . All o f B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k b o r d e r s o n t h i s " o t h e r b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o w o r d for it. I t i s n o t d e s i r e , b u t o b s e s -
n i g h t " a n d i s c a r r i e d a l o n g i n its infinite m o v e m e n t . N o t a t s i o n — a n in-forming t h a t precedes any object or information.
t h e e n d of a w o r l d l y itinerary, b u t at every i n s t a n t , t h e t i m e en It is a dependency that precedes any psyche that w o u l d be
dega du temps d i s a p p e a r s i n t o itself, e r a s e s itself, exscribes d e p e n d e n t . T h e r e is no subject in this " s p a c e " but instead an
itself. T h i s m o v e m e n t c a n n o t b e u n v e i l e d , n o t b e c a u s e i t i s infinite d e p e n d e n c y , m a l l e a b i l i t y , suggestibility, o r p u r e p a s -
basically w i t h d r a w n and absent, but because it does n o t be- sivity o f p o s i t i o n t h a t will b e e v e r a n t e r i o r t o a n y p r e s e n t .
l o n g to t h e light at all. It is t h e t i m e of il—always a l r e a d y P r i o r to subject a n d o b j e c t — a n d this is crucial to L e v i n a s i a n
f a b r i c a t e d , fictioned, w o r k e d over, a n d , as s u c h , it is irrecuper- e t h i c s — t h e r e is a v i o l e n t affect, i n t r u s i o n , or m o r e - t h a n - i n t i -
able t i m e . m a c y t h a t i s invisible, u n d e t e c t a b l e , i n e r a d i c a b l e , a n d i r r e d u c -

W r i t i n g , t h e n , i s t h e very m o v e m e n t t h a t f o r g e t s "itself," ible. It is an " o t h e r " b e g i n n i n g o u t s i d e a n y origin. It is n e u t e r —


" t h e r e i s . " It is a region in w h i c h the O t h e r is not only o t h e r
t h a n I but also other than he or she. Profoundly unpresentable, FOUR
this region in-forms me prior to any actual c o m m u n i c a t i o n or
d i s t a n c e . In every i m a g e t h e r e is a l r e a d y t h a t w h i c h I ( " I " ) am,
myself. T h e w r i t e r i s h e w h o s p e a k s w h i l e entirely t r a v e r s e d
a n d t r a n s f i x e d b y t h e other t h a t h e ¿5, t h e " h e " w h o i s n e v e r
Agamben and the Political Neuter
a n y o n e — n e v e r a n y o n e o t h e r t h a n I , myself, b u t w i t h o u t m e .

Anonymity and Belonging


We learn from Blanchot that to write is to pass
f r o m " I " t o " H e , " /'/, t h e N e u t e r . T h e N e u t e r i s t h e s p a c e o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( a n i m a g i n a r y s p a c e en deçà du temps), w h i c h is
i n t e r m i n a b l e , incessant, a n d p e r p e t u a l l y n o n c o n t e m p o r a r y . T h e
neuter is the time of inaction a n d no initiative. It is the s h a d o w
of time, of the real, of my h a n d , Blanchot says, as it grips the
p e n a n d w r i t e s t h e s e w o r d s . T h e w r i t e r w o u l d like t o e x p r e s s
himself w i t h w o r d s , b u t h e f i n d s o n l y t h e i r s h a d o w , t h e i r sheer
a p p e a r a n c e , a n d n o t h i n g b e y o n d . T h e writer, l i k i n g i t o r n o t ,
writes an imaginary language that he cannot put to w o r k and
t o w h i c h h e c a n n o t give life. T h e w r i t e r c a n " b e l i e v e h e i s
a s s e r t i n g himself i n l a n g u a g e , b u t w h a t h e i s a s s e r t i n g i s c o m -
p l e t e l y w i t h o u t a self [ p e u t c r o i r e q u ' i l s'affirme en ce l a n g a g e ,
m a i s c e q u ' i l affirme est t o u t à fait p r i v é d e s o i ] " a n d " h e c a n
n e v e r a g a i n e x p r e s s himself a n d h e c a n n o t a p p e a l t o y o u ei-
ther, n o r let a n y o n e else s p e a k [il ne p e u t p l u s j a m a i s s ' e x p r i m e r
et il ne p e u t pas d a v a n t a g e en appeler à toi, ni encore d o n n e r

115
1
la p a r o l e à a u t r u i ] . " In the n e u t r a l i z i n g s p a c e <>l l i t e r a t u r e , he abandoned by referent es, emptied of subject a n d o b j e c t — w h e r e

loses t h e p o w e r t o say " I , " a n d lie finds h e c a n n o t " g i v e life t o all is s u c h as u is. Irreparably so.
c h a r a c t e r s w h o s e f r e e d o m w o u l d b e g u a r a n t e e d b y his c r e - T h e writer, then, is " p o s s e s s e d " by no o n e , by the a n o n y -
ative force [ d o n n e r vie à des p e r s o n n a g e s d o n t sa force c r é a t r i c e m o u s . H e c a n n o t n a r r a t e himself, b e c a u s e h e i s n o o n e ; h e i s
2
g a r a n t i r a i t l a l i b e r t é ] . " T o w r i t e , t o e n t e r t h e N e u t e r , "is t o Quelqu'un, S o m e o n e b u t no o n e in p a r t i c u l a r — d a s Man. T h e
arrange language under fascination, and, through language, Blanchotian writer is not Anna O. w h o was "possessed" by
in language, to r e m a i n in contact w i t h the absolute milieu, " a n o t h e r m e " s u c h t h a t n o e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f this o t h e r w a s
where the thing becomes an image again, where the image, ever p o s s i b l e for h e r i n t h e m o d e o f n a r r a t i v e , a s F r e u d ( a n d
w h i c h h a d b e e n a l l u s i o n t o a figure, b e c o m e s a n a l l u s i o n t o L a c a n ) w i s h e d , b e c a u s e s h e w a s herself t h e d e m o n w h o p o s -
5
w h a t is w i t h o u t figure [ . . . ] w h e n t h e r e is no w o r l d yet [c'est sessed h e r . W r i t i n g is n o t a c a s e of h y s t e r i a . T h e h y s t e r i c is
d i s p o s e r le l a n g a g e s o u s f a s c i n a t i o n et, p a r lui, en lui, d e m e u r e r n o t H o m e r , w h o c o u l d p a s s f r o m first t o t h i r d p e r s o n , f r o m
en c o n t a c t avec le milieu absolu, là où la chose redevient im- p u r e t o d r a m a t i c diegesis. T h e d i s c o u r s e o f t h e h y s t e r i c , a s o f
6
a g e , où l ' i m a g e , d ' a l l u s i o n à u n e figure, d e v i e n t a l l u s i o n à ce a n y m u l t i p l e - p e r s o n a l i t y p a t i e n t , is n o t a mixed mode. To
q u i est s a n s figure et { . . . ) q u a n d il n ' y a p a s e n c o r e de w r i t e i s n o t t o p a s s f r o m " I " t o another " I . " I t i s t o p a s s f r o m
3
monde]." " I " to t o t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f all i d e n t i t i e s , o f all " P s . "

T h i s o b s c u r e r e g i o n , s k e t c h e d o u t i n " T h e E s s e n t i a l Soli- Writing is n o t hypnotic or ventriloquized speech. It is n o t the


7

t u d e " ( a n d i n m a n y , i f n o t all, o f B l a n c h o t ' s o t h e r essays) i s somnambulistic discourse of someone ravished by a n o t h e r ego.

t h e r e g i o n of t h e il y a: "[AJlien to r e v e l a t i o n , n o t e v e n b e - Plato's Ion w a s not demonically possessed. But Plato saw in

cause it is radically d a r k , but because it transforms everything Ion the image of madness, an image of radical depropriation.
8

t h a t h a s access t o it, e v e n light, i n t o a n o n y m o u s a n d i m p e r - F u r t h e r m o r e , we learn from Philippe L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e that

s o n a l b e i n g , t h e N o t - t r u e , t h e N o t - r e a l a n d yet a l w a y s t h e r e P l a t o " c a u g h t a g l i m p s e of" a n d " r e d u c e d t o a l i t e r a r y p r o b -

[étranger à t o u t e révélation, ni m ê m e parce qu'elle serait radi- l e m " t h e v e r y " t e r r o r i z i n g " p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t d i s c o u r s e itself

calement obscure, mais parce qu'elle transforme t o u t ce qui a c o n t a i n s , or ¿5, t h e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y of a general m i m e s i s , a

access à elle m ê m e la l u m i è r e , en l'être a n o n y m e i m p e r s o n n e l , general i n s t a b i l i t y t h a t is in fact p o s i t i v e a n d p o w e r f u l e s p e -


4
l e N o n - v r a i , l e N o n - r é e l e t c e p e n d a n t t o u j o u r s l à ] . " (We s h o u l d cially i n t h o s e f a b l e s , o r " o l d w i v e s ' t a l e s , " t h a t h a v e n o a u -

n o t e t h a t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f B l a n c h o t ' s c o u l d easily h a v e b e e n t h o r , n o g u a r a n t o r s o m e w h e r e i n t h e w o r l d t o a n s w e r for t h e i r

written by Levinas.) To write is to be " p o s s e s s e d " by a n o n y m - veracity. T h e s e " p a r a d o x i c a l l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e " fables, a s L a c o u e -

ity, t o b e seized b y i t a n d infinitesimally r e t a r d e d . T h i s " m i - L a b a r t h e describes t h e m , are begun in the m o d e "it is said"

l i e u " i s a b s o l u t e b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t refer t o a n y p l a c e i n t h e a n d exist, t h e r e f o r e , e n t i r e l y w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e itself. T h e y a r e ,

w o r l d . I t a b - s o l v e s itself f r o m t h e r e a l , a n d i s a n a b s e n c e o f i n fact, e x e m p l a r y o f all a u t h o r i t y . T h u s P l a t o s o u g h t t o r i d

inside o r o u t s i d e . T o w r i t e i s t o lose oneself i n this r e g i o n w h e r e d i s c o u r s e o f this i n s t a b i l i t y a n d t e n d e n c y t o w a r d s H o m e r i c i s m

there is n o t h i n g to be revealed, expressed, m e a n t , or s h o w n , b y t a r g e t i n g p o e t s a n d m a k i n g t h e m r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e v e r a c -

b e c a u s e n o t h i n g is e v e n h i d d e n . It is t h e r e g i o n of a m b i g u i t y , ity o f d i s c o u r s e s t h e y o n l y re-cite. I n fact, h o w e v e r , d i s c o u r s e


is t h i s i m p u r i t y , this h e s i t a t i o n between "Ps." 1 )iscourse is neu- w i t h o u t evei attaining it. At t h e i n s t a n t of her d e a t h , J. no
tral w i t h r e g a r d to its p r o p r i e t y . T h e r e is a n a t u r a l a m b i g u i t y longer depends on all thai she w a s , yet she is n o n e - o t h e r t h a n
in discourse with regard to authority, and to speak, or to write, "all t h a i she w a s . " She b e c o m e s , i n t h a t s e n s e , all t h a t i s s u b -
i s first t o p a s s t o this equivocality. T h e r e i s n o f i n a l w a y , m e t h o d , t r a c t e d f r o m her.
o r t e c h n i q u e t h a t c a n r i d d i s c o u r s e o f its essential a m b i g u i t y . Likewise, the w o r k of art attains a strange independence
T o w r i t e i s t o p a s s t o this p u r e l y linguistic s p a c e w h e r e I a m f r o m all t h a t w e n t i n t o it. I t n o l o n g e r b e a r s a n y d e p e n d e n c e
p r i o r t o myself, w h e r e s p e a k i n g i s t h e p u r e p a s s i o n o f s p e a k - o n a n y r e a l c o n d i t i o n s a n d , f r o m t h e " s t a r t " o f its " l i f e " (as
i n g - b e i n g itself, d e p r o p r i a t e d o f ail i d e n t i t y a n d n e a r t o m a d - a n a r t w o r k ) , i t s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m t h e w o r l d s o t h a t i t b e -
n e s s , if n o t a l r e a d y its i m a g e . c o m e s a p u r e resemblance resembling nothing. It becomes in-
T o w r i t e , o r t o s p e a k , i s t o e n t e r i n t o t h a t w h i c h , i n itself, itselfness. W h e n I l o o k at a p a i n t i n g or w h e n I r e a d a n o v e l , I
p r e c e d e s itself. It is to be s t r i p p e d of all i d e n t i t y a n d to b e - p e r c e i v e w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g a n y t h i n g . I a m affected w i t h o u t
c o m e a p u r e i m a g e (of n o o n e ) — u n a b l e a n y m o r e t o b e , o r n o t f i n d i n g myself i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f m i n d . T h e w o r k o f
to be. It is to become, not another persona, but instead the art, as we have said, is m a d e up of imaginary, fabulous matter
p u r e passion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , where passion is c o m m u n i - t h a t is indistinguishable from the sensations it evokes. Imagi-
cation a n d w h e r e my identity is this passionate, vertiginous nary matter is sensational because it c a n n o t be dissociated from
" n o o n e " w h o c a n n o t a n s w e r for w h a t i s w r i t t e n . T h i s s p a c e s e n s a t i o n itself (i.e., s e n s a t i o n b e f o r e it is a s e n s a t i o n o / s o m e -
i s t h e p u r e a n t e r i o r i t y o r p u r e reserve f r o m w h i c h all a r t c o m e s . thing). The w o r k of art is nothing but fabulous, imaginary,
It is u n l i v a b l e , u n e n d u r a b l e (i.e., it h a s no d u r a t i o n ) a n d it is sensational matter—matter emptied of the space it w o u l d oc-
1 0
t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f r o m a n y a c t u a l s t a t e o f affairs. W r i t - c u p y a n d t h a t , " s i m p l e a n d a b s o l u t e , " h u r l s itself t o w a r d s u s .
ing is a petrified t r a n s c e n d e n c e , an e v e n t t h a t is n o t e v e n p o t e n - I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r c o n f u s e s m a t t e r a n d s e n s a t i o n s u c h t h a t sen-
tially a c c o m p l i s h a b l e . I t i s a l w a y s " b e t w e e n , " o r " m e a n w h i l e . " s a t i o n b e c o m e s e x t e r i o r i t y a n d t a k e s o n its o w n life i n d e p e n -
T o p a s s t o i l i s t o p a s s t o " h e " w h o c a r r i e s o u t a n infinite d e n t o f a n y sensum. I n t h e w o r k o f a r t t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y
9
m o v e m e n t ("infinite d e g r e e s , " B l a n c h o t s a y s ) . W r i t i n g m o v e s r e f e r e n c e t o s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , a n d s e n s a t i o n itself i s b o r n i n
u s t o w a r d t h a t w h i c h i s a l w a y s in-itself, t h a t w h i c h d e p e n d s t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f m a t t e r f r o m objectality. I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r i s
o n n o c o n d i t i o n since i t i s alien t o all a c t u a l i t y , i n i t i a t i v e , a n d i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h objectality a n d is the very thickening
accomplishment. of the h y p h e n that separates/links subject-object. W h e n mat-

W e h a v e seen i n p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s t h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t ter n o l o n g e r a d h e r e s t o a n o b j e c t , i t s u d d e n l y " a p p e a r s . " B u t

i m m e d i a t e l y d e t a c h e s itself f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s (the m a t e r i a l s as it " a p p e a r s " as no object or no form, it immediately disap-

a n d t h e a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l states-of-affairs) t h a t i t s p r a n g f r o m . p e a r s . T h a t is, i t d o e s n o t e n t e r i n t o a n y p e r c e p t i o n , b u t r a t h e r

We s a w as w e l l in L'arrêt de mort t h a t , at t h e i n s t a n t of h e r i t b e g i n s (or r e b e g i n s ) a n infinite c o n t e s t a t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n .


11

d e a t h , J . b e c a m e n o l o n g e r herself, n o l o n g e r a n y o n e . A t t h e L e v i n a s h a s s h o w n us t h a t " p a i n t i n g is a struggle w i t h s i g h t . "

i n s t a n t o f h e r d e a t h she e x h i b i t e d t h a t " s h e " w h o i s q u a s i - T h i s s t r u g g l e is t h e r e t u r n of t h e dynamis of s e n s a t i o n itself,

e t e r n a l l y p r e s e r v e d in-herself, a l w a y s a t t h e lips o f t h e a c t u a l b e f o r e s e n s a t i o n e n t e r s i n t o a n y e x p e r i e n c e (in t h e K a n t i a n


s e n s e ) . The s t r u g g l e Levinas refers to is .1 pure affection—as community, 1 >ui a t ommunity nevertheless. What il that w h i c h
p a s s i v e as it is d y n a m i c , as d y n a m i c as it is p a s s i o n a t e . A r t r e m a i n s invisible a m i u n p e r c e i v e d w a s in fact t h a t w h i c h in
t e n d s t o w a r d this infinite, p e r s i s t e n t m o v e m e n t t h a t i s t h e af- any c o m m u n i t y escapes it such that o n e always already " b e -
fection of s e n s a t i o n by t h e i m a g i n a r y m a t e r i a l i t y it itself is. longs" to any c o m m u n i t y whatever without, however, belong-
S e n s a t i o n itself, or p u r e p a s s i o n , is n e u t r a l . It is t h e e x t e r i o r i t y ing b a s e d o n a n y r e p r e s e n t a b l e c o n d i t i o n ? W h a t w o u l d i t m e a n
o f o u r m o s t p a s s i o n a t e inferiority, a s w e shall d i s c u s s m o r e to belong to a community purely anonymously? To belong to
t h o r o u g h l y later in this c h a p t e r . a c o m m u n i t y b e f o r e it is a c o m m u n i t y of. . . (this or t h a t ,
O u r r a p p o r t with the a r t w o r k , as with the cadaver, is n o t m e n , G o d ' s c r e a t u r e s , etc.)? A c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t a n y essence
m a d e up of memories but of the sudden eruption of the imme- o r a n y p r e c o n d i t i o n s o f b e l o n g i n g ? G i o r g i o A g a m b e n profiles
m o r i a l — a r a p p o r t t h a t i s c o n t i n u a l l y s u b t r a c t e d f r o m all a c - for us s u c h a c o m m u n i t y in his r e m a r k a b l e b o o k La comunità
tual, representational states one m a y have enjoyed w i t h the che viene. He d e s c r i b e s a c o m m u n i t y to w h i c h o n e is c a l l e d by
d e p a r t e d o r w i t h t h a t w h i c h t h e a r t w o r k p r i m a facie r e p r e s e n t s . virtue of p u r e " b e i n g called [l'esser-detto]": the " p r o p e r t y
T h a t is to say, we e n t e r i n t o a r a p p o r t t h a t is autonomous a n d [ p r o p r i e t à ] , " h e says " t h a t e s t a b l i s h e s all p o s s i b l e b e l o n g i n g
w h o s e r e l a t i o n t o all lived a n d m e m o r i a l e x p e r i e n c e s o r s t a t e s [che f o n d a t u t t e l e possibili a p p a r t e n e n z e ] . " T h i s " p r o p e r t y "
of mind is always equivocal. This rapport, which the artwork h e tells u s , i s " p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c b e i n g [ l ' e s s e r e p u r a m e n t e
provokes, is the becoming-equivocal of m e m o r y and percep- linguistico]."
t i o n . It is t h e b e c o m i n g - e q u i v o c a l or b e c o m i n g - f a b u l o u s of
the real. T h e r a p p o r t is a u t o n o m o u s because it has no subject
or o b j e c t . It is a b s o l u t e . It is n o t a r a p p o r t with a n y thing Whatever!
( o t h e r t h a n its o w n o b s e s s i v e " s e l f " ) . H e n c e i t i s t h e m o s t u n - T h e " s p a c e " or structure of Agamben's b o o k is
c e r t a i n o f r a p p o r t s a n d t h e m o s t p e r s i s t e n t , since i t c a n n o t b e crazy, slightly d r u n k (even a s t h e t h i n k i n g i n i t i s p r e c i s e a n d
absorbed into anything determinate or accomplished. It can- d e l i c a t e ) . E a c h o f its brief t h r e e o r four p a g e s e c t i o n s , frag-
n o t be p u t behind us because it is a r a p p o r t with the n o n t h i n g m e n t s , o r p a n e l s (like i n c o m i c b o o k s ) a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k t h e
t h a t s h i m m e r s " b e s i d e " the thing in a space e m p t y of space. It same thought under various names: "Quodlibet ens," "Ex-
c a n n o t b e p o s s e s s e d a n d p u t t o w o r k i n t h e service o f a n y ample," "Ease," "Manner," "Halo," "Shekinah," " B a r t l e b y , "
t a s k , b u t i t c a n b e a f f i r m e d — m u s t b e a f f i r m e d — o b l i q u e l y , for "Principium Individuations, " "Image," Heidegger's as, the thus,
i t i s w i t h o u t a n y self o r identity. Every a r t w o r k i s a n o b l i q u e a n d t h e rather, a m o n g still o t h e r s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e a d e a c h
a f f i r m a t i o n o f this r a p p o r t t h a t resists definition. section or panel as superimposed on the others or as if each
W h a t if this neutralizing space, as close as possible to s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o c c u p i e d t h e s a m e s p a c e (or p e r p e t u a l l y e m p t y
m a d n e s s (if n o t its v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y a n d b e g i n n i n g ) — t h i s s p a c e thought) s u c h t h a t e a c h is a n e w , d i s p a r a t e p e r s p e c t i v e b u t of
t h a t d i s c o u r s e itself o p e n s u p a n d m a i n t a i n s a n d t h a t litera- no landscape or argument. We m a y describe the b o o k as eru-
ture purely a n d simply affirms—what if this space emptied of dite, or as a philosophical serendipity, b u t t h a t seems beside
all i d e n t i t i e s w e r e a l r e a d y a c o m m u n i t y ? It w o u l d be a s t r a n g e t h e p o i n t , for it is as if t h e s e p a n e l s c a m e from e l s e w h e r e t h a n
o n e m i n d or o n e t h i n k e r . T h e work, i! a n y t h i n g , is variously each i n he. 0 1 I H I o w n c o m p l e t e l y s i n g u l a r w a y . T o t h e a d u l t

e r u d i t e , a s i f A g a m b e n himself ( a n d w e k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t w h o w a t t lies, i Ins t e n d s to petrify t h e o b j e c t a n d m a k e of it an

h i m p e r s o n a l l y ) w e r e a c r a z y a u t o - d i c t a t w h o s e poly vocal e r u - i m a g e o f itself. A n y o n e w h o h a s h a d t o t e n d m o r e t h a n t w o

diti o n a l w a y s t h r e a t e n e d t o t r a n s f o r m h i m i n t o a m u l t i p l e - children at once is a w a r e of the b r e a k u p of perception into

p e r s o n a l i t y c a s e . B u t w e insist t h a t t h e sense o f a l m o s t c o m i - r a d i c a l p e r s p e c t i v i s m a n d r a d i c a l l y p l u r a l i z e d significations.

cal e r u d i t i o n i s q u i t e t o t h e p o i n t . H e i s n o t o b s e s s e d s o m u c h O u r perspective is a perspective on that which has returned to

w i t h a n ideé fixe b u t w i t h a n I d e a t h a t p e r p e t u a l l y i n f i x e s its o r i g i n a r y i m a g e a n d i s w i t h o u t f i g u r e , a s i f o u r p e r c e p t i o n

thought, so that thoughts themselves become pure perspec- w e r e t e m p o r a r i l y b l i n d e d . W e are n o l o n g e r a b l e t o see a n

tives, or images of t h o u g h t , w i t h o u t forming any one figure. image of this or that, a n d o u r perception is o v e r w h e l m e d a n d
pulverized by pure perspectivism.
We m a y w i s h to c o m p a r e La comunità che viene to a
B a l t h u s s t r e e t scene w h e r e e a c h o f t h e c h a r a c t e r s i n t h e s t r e e t A g a m b e n ' s f r a g m e n t s , o r p a n e l s , a r e all c o m m e n t a r i e s , h e

q u i e t l y o c c u p i e s its o w n s p a c e a n d g o e s a b o u t its b u s i n e s s b u t tells u s , o n a n old m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m : t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n


n

w h e r e e a c h s e e m s t o b e l o o k i n g i n t o o r m o v i n g i n t o different e s s e n c e a n d e x i s t e n c e , quid est a n d quod est. E a c h f r a g m e n t

s p a c e s s o t h a t , a s w e l o o k a t t h e c a n v a s , o u r g a z e i s petrified. r e t h i n k s this p r o b l e m ( w h i c h i s t h e p r o b l e m o f intelligibility

O u r gaze looks into no one space, b u t rather is transferred itself) a n e w , offers a n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e p r o b l e m , a n d i n

from various space to various space, each tangential to the e a c h c a s e s e e k s t o liquefy t h e n o t i o n o f e s s e n c e a s s t a b l e a n d

o t h e r , b u t n o t o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d . I n this w a y , e a c h c h a r a c t e r s t a b i l i z i n g , p r o p e r , erect, a n d unifying. I n s t e a d of an esse, he

b e c o m e s s i m p l e , s e r e n e , a b s o l u t e , a n d is p o s s e s s e d by a s t r a n g e a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k a " m o s t c o m m o n " o r the m o s t c o m m o n . H e

d e t a c h m e n t . O u r gaze is n o t merely passive a n d c o n t e m p l a - a t t e m p t s to t h i n k t h e W h a t e v e r or Quodlibet (qualunque or

t i v e . I t c a n n o t b u t get i n v o l v e d since i t c a n n o t e v e n f i n d w h a t quelconque), w h i c h , his t r a n s l a t o r c a u t i o n s u s , refers n o t t o

w o u l d b e called t h e s p a c e o f t h e c a n v a s . O u r eye i s d r a w n into the general or the particular, the generic or the individual, b u t

t h e c a n v a s , w h o s e " s p a c e " i s m i s s i n g , a n d w h i c h itself, t h e n , t o t h e " s i n g u l a r " i n t h e sense i n w h i c h D e l e u z e a n d B a d i o u


1 4

b e c o m e s a n e n o r m o u s eye s t a r i n g a t u s w i t h a g a z e e m p t i e d o f use the t e r m . The commonality Agamben repeatedly ap-

sight. This is Balthus's technique a n d it w a s first noticed, as p r o a c h e s in his f r a g m e n t s b o t h i n v o l v e s us in a " b e l o n g i n g "

far a s w e c a n tell, b y A n t o n i n A r t a u d , w h o c o n t r a s t s i t t o a n d also deprives us of any representable condition of belong-

t r o m p e l'oeil. 12
Instead of d u p i n g us into believing t h a t s o m e - ing. For the W h a t e v e r is just t h a t — w h a t e v e r !

thing real is there t h a t is n o t there, Balthus overcomes or over- T h e r e i s n o t h i n g m y s t e r i o u s , m a g i c a l , o r ineffable a b o u t

w h e l m s t h e d i s t a n c e d p a s s i v i t y o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n b y petrifying the Whatever. It is as c o m m o n as can be. It is the m o s t c o m -

t h e r e a l . H e a c c o m p l i s h e s this b y b r e a k i n g u p p e r s p e c t i v e i n t o m o n . It is not representable or themetizable, not because it is

f r a g m e n t s (of n o w h o l e s ) t h u s giving his c h a r a c t e r s t h e s p h i n x - w i t h d r a w n , silent, n e g a t i v e , or r e m o v e d , b u t because it is too

like q u a l i t y t h a t A r t a u d n o t i c e d i n his review. O n e c a n o b - common. It is n o t e v e n h i d d e n , a n d it offers n o t h i n g to be

serve the s a m e thing a m o n g children w h o are each fascinated thought, contemplated, or worried about. T h o u g h t need not

by, a n d t o t a l l y i n v o l v e d i n p l a y i n g w i t h , t h e s a m e o b j e c t s b u t seek after it, for it is a l r e a d y in every t h o u g h t a n d in e v e r y


r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Ii is not .1 g e n e r i c " g i v e n " thai we c a n a l w a y s particulai o u r 0! those predicates ( b e i n g - m a s c u l i n e , b e i n g -
f a l l b a c k o n , n o r a b a n a l b a c k g r o u n d for any p o s s i b l e c o m - A m e r i c a n , e.g.) e x p o s e s a relation b e t w e e n a real b e i n g a n d
m u n i t y s u c h a s " W e ' r e all h u m a n , " o r "It's a small w o r l d , " o r an empty t o t a l i t y , a n o n t h i n g , or n o t h i n g t h a t r e n d e r s t h i s r e a l
" T o e a c h his o w n a s l o n g a s i t d o e s n ' t h u r t a n y o n e e l s e . " T h e being a whateverness. This does not drain whatever being
m o s t c o m m o n , like t h e il y a in L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t , is w h a t b l o o d l e s s a n d m a k e it, like S a r t r e ' s ego, p u r e a n d s i m p l e t r a n -
15
n e e d s t o b e r e p e a t e d l y a p p r o a c h e d a n d e x p o s e d , for t h e m o s t scendence. It means that whatever being is a pure a n d empty
c o m m o n i s o n l y i n its a p p r o a c h , its e x p o s u r e , its " c o m i n g . " relation to language, to p r e d i c a t i o n , s u c h t h a t o n l y in l a n -
To a p p r o a c h the W h a t e v e r is to a p p r o a c h an ever-elsewhere g u a g e is w h a t e v e r b e i n g as it is, yet w i t h o u t b e i n g defined o n c e
t h a t i s n o t a b s e n t , a n e v e r - h e r e t h a t i s n o t p r e s e n t . Qualunque a n d for all: n o t being its p r e d i c a t e s b u t being-called (this or
is the neutralization of identity t h a t is in every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t , " A m e r i c a n , " " m a s c u l i n e , " e.g.). W h a t e v e r b e i n g i s n o t
while remaining noncontemporary with that representation. its q u a l i t i e s . It is its e x p o s u r e to all its q u a l i t i e s t h a t e a c h p a r -
It is o n l y g l i m p s e d in profile, or in t h e s h a d o w s of a p e r c e p - t i c u l a r q u a l i t y r e s a y s o r re-calls. T h e e x i s t e n c e o f w h a t e v e r
t i o n or a feeling. b e i n g is p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c , p u r e l y b e i n g - c a l l e d . T h u s it is in l a n -

W h a t e v e r b e i n g is n o t a s u b j e c t , bypokeimenon, or s u b - g u a g e t h a t w h a t e v e r b e i n g f i n d s itself, suffers itself, t o u c h e s

s t a n c e t h a t u n d e r l i e s all its p r e d i c a t e s a n d i s w h a t e v e r r e m a i n s itself in t h e p u r e p a s s i o n of b e i n g - c a l l e d . It is itself as an e m p t y

w h e n all its q u a l i t i e s a r e r e m o v e d . It is n o t a limit t h a t g r o u n d s t o t a l i t y t h a t e n v e l o p s its r e a l e x i s t e n c e a s t h i s o r t h a t .

intelligibility. W h a t e v e r b e i n g i s b e i n g s u c h t h a t all its p r e d i - T h i s e m p t y t o t a l i t y is n o t a p u r e a n d s i m p l e v o i d . It is a

c a t e s u n l i m i t it infinitely, u n g r o u n d or l i b e r a t e it infinitely. n o t h i n g or an empty space that is a d d e d to, or supplements,

W h a t e v e r b e i n g i s b e i n g t h a t f i n d s itself i n its u n l i m i t i n g . " A l l a n y being whatsoever. It is a never present s u p p l e m e n t w i t h -

its p r e d i c a t e s " w n d e t e r m i n e w h a t e v e r b e i n g , u n r a v e l it, a n d o u t w h i c h n o b e i n g c o u l d b e w h a t i t is. A n y p a r t i c u l a r b e i n g i s

expose it such that whatever being can only transcend t o w a r d also " w h a t e v e r is called . . . " Any particular being of course

itself infinitely, t o w a r d itself s u c h a s i t i s — a n e m p t y t o t a l i t y belongs to s o m e genus of s o m e species such t h a t it c a n be

t h a t "all its p r e d i c a t e s " (de)constitute a n d (de)limit. W h a t e v e r identified a s w h a t i t i n fact i s a n d c a n b e e x p e r i e n c e d a s s u c h .

b e i n g i s b e i n g w h o s e Being i s p e r p e t u a l l y d e l a y e d , r e t a r d e d , B u t — a n d this is A g a m b e n ' s insight—it " b e l o n g s " to the ge-

or a p p r o a c h e d , for " a l l its p r e d i c a t e s " is n o t a p o s s i b i l i t y for n u s a s a n example o f it, a s a n i m a g e o r s c h e m a - i m a g e o f a n y

whatever being. Rather, it is an impossibility that continually s u c h m e m b e r of t h a t g e n u s . It is this p a r t i c u l a r and it is an

s h i m m e r s b e s i d e it, i n a n e m p t y i m a g i n a r y s p a c e " r e s e r v e d " example of w h a t e v e r is c a l l e d t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r . It is t h i s

for i t b u t n e v e r o c c u p i e d . p a r t i c u l a r ( h o u s e , e.g.) and it s e r v e s for, or s t a n d s in t h e p l a c e

T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t w h a t e v e r b e i n g strives m a j e s t i - of, whatever is-called ( " h o u s e , " e.g.). As s u c h it e x p o s e s its

cally t o w a r d all t h a t i t c a n b e , t o w a r d a U t o p i a n self t h a t s h i m - s i n g u l a r i t y , its w h a t e v e r n e s s . I t o c c u p i e s its o w n , a n d s i m u l t a -

m e r s in an inaccessible horizon lighting up a p a t h t o w a r d s an n e o u s l y t h e e m p t y , p l a c e of t h e e x a m p l e . It is a p a r t i c u l a r a n d

ideal i d e n t i t y . I n s t e a d , s o m e t h i n g q u i t e different h a p p e n s . Since it is so-called. It is itself (idem) a n d it is w h a t e v e r b e i n g . T h i s

" a l l its p r e d i c a t e s " is not a p r e d i c a t e of w h a t e v e r b e i n g , a n y i s its s e c o n d life, its s e c o n d n a t u r e , A g a m b e n s a y s . I n s o f a r a s


it is-called, it is n e i t h e r shown n o r m e a n t , is n e i t h e r this p a r e m p t y spa< 6 ol the e x a m p l e . T h i s e m p t y totality u n r a v e l s it of
t i c u l a r n o r an insipid generality. Il only fills the e m p t y s p a c e i d e n t i t y a n d singulai r/.es it or " u n m a k e s it a c c o r d i n g to its
of t h e " w h a t e v e r is called . . ." As c a l l e d , as n a m e d , as an i m a g e , " as Blanchot w o u l d s a y . 17
It is t h e t h i n g w i t h all its
e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t t h e m a t i z e d a t all. N e c e s s a r i l y , t h e e x a m p l e r e l a t i o n s , all its q u a l i t i e s . In t h e s p a c e of t h e e x a m p l e , t h e t h i n g
(or t h e s c h e m a - i m a g e ) is t h a t in l a n g u a g e for w h i c h t h e r e is no i s "all its r e l a t i o n s " a n d " a l l its q u a l i t i e s . " T o b o r r o w f r o m
n a m e . It is t h e pure b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e of t h e n o n l i n g u i s t i c , t h e one of A g a m b e n ' s o w n e x a m p l e s , 1 8
this letter p t h a t I m a k e
u n n a m a b l e ( t h a t is, t h e n o n u n i v e r s a l t h a t i s n o t a p a r t i c u l a r , h e r e i s itself n o t b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s t o a n ideal p - f o r m b u t
either). T h e schema-image is the image of no (representable) b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s a m o n g , o r b o r d e r s o n , all t h e v a r i o u s dif-
figure. W e will l e a r n from o u r a n a l y s i s o f K a n t l a t e r i n t h i s ferences a n d i d i o s y n c r a s i e s in i n n u m e r a b l e v e r s i o n s of p. T h e
c h a p t e r t h a t an o b j e c t is itself only insofar as it need not ap- p h a s i d e n t i t y i n s o f a r as it b e l o n g s to an a l p h a b e t i c g e n u s , of
pear as in fact it actually does appear. As s u c h , as an e x a m p l e , c o u r s e , b u t it is r e c o g n i z a b l e as w h a t it is o n l y as e n g e n d e r e d
it is " g i v e n " all its possibilities as an e m p t y totality (a nonfigure) b y a t h o u s a n d i d i o s y n c r a s i e s t h a t h a b i t u a l l y r e n d e r i t legible.
t h a t c h a n g e s n o t h i n g b u t t h e sense o f t h e a c t u a l . A s a n e x - I n this w a y c o m m o n a n d p r o p e r b e c o m e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m
a m p l e , a t h i n g is " t h e event of an o u t s i d e [I'evento di un fuori]," each other. T h e t h o u s a n d idiosyncrasies describe an e m p t y
A g a m b e n s a y s , b y w h i c h i t h a s access t o itself (ipse), t o " i t s i n t e r w o r l d w i t h i n w h i c h w h a t i s called p m o v e s freely a n d
16
face, its eidos [il s u o v o l t o , il s u o eidos]" (italics in o r i g i n a l ) . a c c o r d i n g t o its o w n m a n n e r . T h e e m p t y t o t a l i t y o f " i t s " i d i o -
As e x e m p l a r y , a b e i n g is n o t defined by q u a l i t i e s e x c e p t s y n c r a s i e s a r e n o t its p r o p e r t i e s b u t its i m p r o p r i e t i e s — i t s h a -
first b y p a s s i n g t h r o u g h b e i n g - c a l l e d , b y p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e b i t u a l resistance to p r o p r i e t y , w h i c h in fact constitutes its r e c -
space of neither the particular nor the universal. A l t h o u g h a o g n i z a b l e a p p e a r a n c e o n t h e p a g e . T h i s i s its s e c o n d n a t u r e ,
s u c h - a n d - s u c h will be a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , it is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t it its s i n g u l a r i t y . T h u s A g a m b e n s h o w s u s s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s n o t
m u s t s e r v e for all o t h e r s o f t h e s a m e t y p e , a n d t h u s i t o c c u p i e s e s t a b l i s h e d o n c e a n d for all, eternally, b u t t h a t w h i c h i s al-
t h e e m p t y p l a c e o f w h a t e v e r b e i n g — a s p a c e t h a t i s p u r e l y lin- w a y s I'entretemps, d e l a y e d o r c o m i n g a m o n g s t "an infinite
guistic a n d i n w h i c h i t c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h o t h e r s i n g u l a r i t i e s series o f m o d a l v a r i a t i o n s [ u n a serie infinita d i o s c i l l a z i o n i
1 9
u n b o u n d by any identity. It is strictly being-called, an modali]." Each individual p opens o n t o an exemplarity, a
u n n a m a b l e w i t h i n a n y d e n o m i n a t i o n t h a t i t m a y b e given. T h a t s i n g u l a r i t y , t h a t i s its o s c i l l a t i o n s — a v i c a r i o u s s p a c e w h e r e
is: it is a pure anteriority or infinite shortage of presence that e a c h i n d i v i d u a l p s u b s t i t u t e s itself for e a c h o t h e r p o s s i b l e p
radically calls its identity into question. It is h e n c e c u t off f r o m s u c h t h a t this p a r t i c u l a r p is i n c a r n a t e d as s u b s t i t u t e d .
a n y real c o m m u n i t y a n d yet it is t h e m o s t - c o m m o n . It is "what- In this a n d in m a n y other w a y s , A g a m b e n describes c o m -
ever is-called ..." m u n i t y such t h a t each being occupies a particular place t h a t is
W h a t e v e r b e i n g is n o t a je ne sais quoi, an o b s c u r e q u a l i t y radically in question as it opens o n t o another space where
n o o n e c a n p u t t h e i r f i n g e r o n . I t i s t h e t h i n g with all its p r e d i - e a c h b e i n g i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y s u b s t i t u t e d for a n o t h e r b e i n g w h o
c a t e s t h a t undefine or d e l i m i t it. Quodlibet ens is t h e t h i n g is in an always other place. In that " o t h e r " space, "beside
ipse, b u t o n l y i n s o f a r as it " t r a n s c e n d s t o w a r d itself" in t h e itself," as exemplary, it c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h all o t h e r singularities.
a k, n IM w i u /\ i l l ' i ii i l'ii i I I I C A I NEUTER

T h i s is not an actualized c o m m u n i t y . No i n f o r m a t i o n is p a s s e d identity. W h e n I '.peak, no identity w o u l d s p e a k a n d I w o u l d


a l o n g i n a n y real c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e c o m m u n i t y c o m m u n i - s p e a k an imaginary, a b s o l u t e l a n g u a g e . I w o u l d be s p e a k i n g
c a t e s o n l y its b e l o n g i n g t o t h e m o s t - c o m m o n . I n t h e e x a m p l e , from t h e p l a c e o l the O t h e r w h o w o u l d r e m a i n a l w a y s else-
s i n g u l a r b e i n g is " e x p r o p r i a t e d of all i d e n t i t y ( e s p r o p r i a t e di w h e r e . As s u c h , I w o u l d a p p r o a c h t h e o t h e r as other, o u t s i d e
tutte le identità]" 2 0
a n d a b a n d o n e d to pure a n d simple be- a n y identity, for I w o u l d n o t be t h e s u b j e c t of a n y d i s c o u r s e .
l o n g i n g . (It is n o t as myself, b u t as s i n g u l a r , as other, t h a t I am "Older" t h a n a n y communique w o u l d b e t h i s r a p p o r t w i t h
exposed to the other. " I , " in short, to return to the language the O t h e r outside intersubjectivity, a n d completely linguistic
o f B l a n c h o t , b e c o m e s H e , il, N e u t e r . T h e m u l t i p l e c o m m o n b e i n g w o u l d " c o m e " t o u s like a l o n g s u p p r e s s e d r e m i n i s c e n c e
space described by A g a m b e n r e m a i n s , in my o p i n i o n , close to o r like a l o n g - s u p p r e s s e d p a s s i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d t h e n
B l a n c h o t i a n a e s t h e t i c s , i n spite o f A g a m b e n ' s r e s e r v a t i o n s . ) 21
be united w i t h this passionate r a p p o r t , or for-the-other-ness,
In Agamben's politics, the expropriation of identity a n d in a s p e e c h t h a t says n o t h i n g , r e v e a l s n o t h i n g , a n d t h a t is as a
t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n — t o d a y s o i n e s c a p a b l e — o f t h e real i n t o its foreign l a n g u a g e w i t h i n o n e ' s n a t i v e t o n g u e (as t h e n a r r a t o r
23
image provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to ap- of L'arrèt de mort e x p e r i e n c e s ) . This radical communicativity
p r o p r i a t e t h e m o s t - c o m m o n a n d t o e x p e r i e n c e t h e fact t h a t w o u l d "possess" us a n d open a space that is not-yet colonized
12
one speaks. T h i s w o u l d a l s o be t h e v e r y a p p r o p r i a t i o n of ( o r by the State.
by) a n o n y m i t y t h a t a n i m a t e s all o f B l a n c h o t ' s n a r r a t o r s a n d i t
perfectly d e s c r i b e s B l a n c h o t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s o n w r i t i n g a n d t h e
s p a c e o f l i t e r a t u r e . For, w h e n one s p e a k s , n o o n e ( n o t h e n o r Community
she, n o t this o n e n o r t h a t one) speaks. O n e becomes w h a t e v e r T h e fate a n d d e s t i n y o f a c o m m u n i t y ( h u m a n b e -
or w h o m e v e r speaker, one becomes speaking-being as such, ing) t h a t d o e s n o t h a v e its origin i n itself a n d c a n n o t f i n d its
a n d n o t a m o r e - o r less-qualified s p e a k e r . I n d e e d , o n e i s d e - o r i g i n o u t s i d e itself e x c e p t i n silence, t r a g e d y , o r a l i e n a t i o n —
p r o p r i a t e d o f all d e t e r m i n a t e q u a l i t i e s a n d o n e e n t e r s t h e e n - in s h o r t , a negative g r o u n d — i s t h e subject of A g a m b e n ' s m e d i -
tire space of discourse, such that the one w h o speaks c a n n o t t a t i o n in his e a r l i e r b o o k Language and Death: The Place of
b e a s c e r t a i n e d o r identified, b u t c i r c u l a t e s w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e Negativity {Il linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
14
itself. A s p u r e s p e a k i n g - b e i n g , I s p e a k w i t h o u t a n y o n e ' s b e i n g della negatività]. In t h a t b o o k , he a t t e m p t s to a p p r o a c h an
able to trace my w o r d s back to me and hold me accountable experience of language t h a t does n o t rest on a negative foun-
for t h e m , even if I s t a n d s m a c k in f r o n t of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , dation and he does not find that experience in either philoso-
b e c a u s e t h e experience of s p e a k i n g - b e i n g d o e s n o t refer to a p h y or poetry. Each of those traditions also traces the h u m a n
self t h a t I w o u l d b e . A s s p e a k i n g - b e i n g , u n a b l e t o refer t o a n y voice t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e , b u t e a c h finds o n l y ineffability, silence,
reality, I w o u l d s p e a k w i t h o u t h a v i n g a n y b a s i s for s p e a k i n g , mystery, sacred action, or the tragic division of existence a n d
any reason to open my mouth. Moreover, I would speak with- e s s e n c e , a n d t h e a b s o l u t e fear o f t h e H e g e l i a n t h r e a t o f t h e
o u t having anything to communicate. My speech w o u l d carry N e g a t i v e t h a t m a g i c a l l y t r a n s f o r m s N o t h i n g n e s s i n t o Being.
no information intended to inform a n o t h e r speaker, a n o t h e r T h a t i s t o say, n e i t h e r p h i l o s o p h y n o r p o e t r y i s a b l e t o g r a s p
t h e t a k i n g - p l a c e <>l l a n g u a g e w i n c h w o u l d he the t a k i n g - p l a c e s u c h thai the Von e the division ol n a t u r e a n d c u l t u r e , d e n o -

of t h e h u m a n (insofar as h u m a n b e i n g is s p e a k i n g - b e i n g ) s u c h t a t i o n a n d signification, s h o w i n g a n d telling, e.g.—is a b o l i s h e d

t h a t h u m a n b e i n g w o u l d t h e n be capable of l a n g u a g e , seize w i t h o u t a t r a c e . La comunità che viene is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k

t h e f a c u l t y for l a n g u a g e , a n d u n i t e it w i t h his finitude as a habit, o u r " s e c o n d n a t u r e , " in s u c h a w a y t h a t it is n o t seized,

c o m p l e t e d f o u n d a t i o n . But, A g a m b e n says, h u m a n being, in b u t t e n d s t o w a r d itself, t o w a r d t r a n s p a r e n c y . A g a m b e n ' s b o o k

fact, does not have a voice—a n a t u r e , an e s s e n c e — n o t e v e n a i s a n a t t e m p t t o t h i n k l a n g u a g e a s ipse a n d n o t idem: l a n g u a g e

b a s i c a l l y r e m o v e d , s i l e n t , o r n e g a t i v e v o i c e (or V o i c e , a s o u t s i d e identity, o r l a n g u a g e a s t h a t w h i c h h a s n o i d e n t i t y , n o

A g a m b e n c h r i s t e n s it). In s h o r t , t h e r e is no o r i g i n a l vouloir essence. In d o i n g this, A g a m b e n is attempting to think that, if

dire, a n d t h i s , a l a s , h a s d e s t i n e d h u m a n b e i n g t o a h i s t o r y a n d it is the essence of h u m a n being to exist—Heidegger's m o s t

a State (which we n o w inherit in the form of Capital). T h u s , difficult t h o u g h t — t h e n it is in l a n g u a g e , w h i c h h a s no e s s e n c e ,

w i t h N i e t z s c h e , A g a m b e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e Voice m u s t d i e . 2 5 t h a t h u m a n being b e c o m e s capable of this. Such a l a n g u a g e is


16 m e r e l y t h e " trite w o r d s t h a t we have [le trite p a r o l e c h e abbia-
B u t w h a t is l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t a Voice, w i t h o u t a Sigetics?
29
mo}." All of his b o o k is an a t t e m p t to get " b e t w e e n " existence
W h a t i s a l a n g u a g e t h a t d o e s n o t say perfectly a n d p r e s e r v e i n
a n d essence into a p a r a o n o m a s t i c interworld t h a t t r a n s c e n d s
itself a n U n s a y a b l e , a n Ineffable, a M y s t e r y ? W h a t , i n s h o r t ,
o n l y t o w a r d itself a n d d o e s n o t refer b a c k t o a n a n t e r i o r r e a l -
is a language that does not c o n d e m n h u m a n being to a State,
ity t h a t w o u l d r e m a i n ineffable a n d u n s a y a b l e , n o r t o w a r d a
a Sacer, a d e s t i n y ? W h a t is a l a n g u a g e t h a t so i m p o v e r i s h e s
fictitious signification t h a t w o u l d a n n i h i l a t e t h e r e a l a n d u n -
h u m a n b e i n g t h a t t h e " e x t r e m e l y nullifying u n v e i l i n g [ e s t r e m o
27 veil i t a s essentially N o t h i n g . T h i s i n t e r w o r l d i s p o p u l a t e d w i t h
svelamento nullificante]" that we today experience w o u l d
b e i n g s w h o s e b e i n g is o n l y in-language.
a c t u a l l y offer us a h o p e ? A h o p e n o t for an e x t r e m e H a v i n g -
been that, in the Hegelian Absolute or the Heideggerian T h o u g h t , h e tells u s , t r a d i t i o n a l l y w a n t s t o t h i n k e i t h e r

Ereignis, c o u l d be seized a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d , b u t a h o p e for a t h e e x i s t e n c e o r t h e essence. A g a m b e n w a n t s t o t h i n k t h e i r

Never-having-been, an extreme youth or an absolute infancy m u t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n , t h e e r o s i o n o f t h e i r difference, i n t h e a n -

s u c h t h a t h u m a n b e i n g w o u l d n o t yet h a v e b e e n b o r n ! 2 8
Such a m o r p h i c " s p a c e " b e t w e e n " t h e n a m e d t h i n g a n d its b e i n g -

a b e i n g — w h o never has b e e n — w o u l d speak a language t h a t n a m e d , b e t w e e n t h e n a m e a n d its r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t h i n g : b e -

does n o t presuppose w o r k , meaning, or articulation. Such a t w e e n , t h a t is, t h e n a m e ' r o s e ' i n s o f a r a s i t signifies t h e r o s e


3 0

b e i n g , n e v e r h a v i n g b e e n , w o u l d b e imaginary, i n t h a t " o t h e r " a n d t h e r o s e i n s o f a r a s i t i s signified b y t h e n a m e ' r o s e ' . "

v e r s i o n B l a n c h o t defines for u s , a n d s u c h a l a n g u a g e w o u l d b e T h i s d e l i c a t e i n t e r v a l is t h e p u r e e x p o s u r e of this to that (quod

a m b i g u o u s , since i t w o u l d a n d w o u l d n o t b e t h e voice o f h u - t o quid), e x i s t e n c e t o e s s e n c e , s u c h t h a t t h e i r m u t u a l i m p l i c a -

m a n b e i n g . I t w o u l d n o l o n g e r refer b a c k t o a self h u m a n t i o n is t h e p u r e thusness of t h e b e i n g , t h e ipseity of t h e ens. He

being w o u l d be. f i n d s i n o u r e r a a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d o p p o r t u n i t y t o seize t h e


thus: t h e p u r e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e o f t h e n o n l i n g u i s t i c . N o t p u r e
A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k
being (ousias tes ousias, substantia sine qualitate) but pure
beyond the "magical" power of the negative. It attempts to
being-in-language. T h e p u r e r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n e i t h e r d e n o t e d
t h i n k a n e x p e r i e n c e o f l a n g u a g e itself, t r a n s p a r e n t t o itself,
I
ii M N IVI i n N l\ IN I i l I I I r v i I I I I I A I IN I I I I r I
I )

n o r m e a n t , n e i t h e r s h o w n n o r said. N e i t h e r the s u b j e c t — t h e so I.mull II because theit reality is entirely m a d e up of t h e i r


p u r e r e l a t i o n l e s s b e i n g t h a t c a n o n l y b e s h o w n a n d not s a i d — v a r i o u s roles such that their m a n n e r i s m s , h a b i t s , l o o k s , v o c a l
n o r t h a t w h i c h is said of the thing in the proposition, but the t o n a l i t i e s , a n d g e s t u r e s all b e c o m e characteristic a n d as f a m i l -
p e r f e c t l y exposed b e i n g t h a t is a l w a y s a l r e a d y in l a n g u a g e , iar a s t h e a c t o r s t h e m s e l v e s r e m a i n u n f a m i l i a r t o u s . T h e s e a r e
always already hollowed out by representation. This "be- a c t o r s , i n s h o r t , w h o show u s t h e i r a n o n y m i t y a n d w e , i n t u r n ,
t w e e n " i s n o t t h e t h i n g i n its n o n r e l a t i o n a l d e n o t a t e d n e s s , n o r quite a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e c o m e absolutely indifferent to t h e m .
t h e t h i n g in its i d e n t i t y (its m e a n i n g ) . It is t h e t h i n g itself (ipse). They always play " t y p e s " a n d they are n o t h i n g a p a r t from
N o t pure being, but being-such: the being-such, A g a m b e n says, t h e t y p e s t h e y play. T h e y r e m a i n s o u n k n o w n t o u s n o t b e -
of the " a s " in the question, " w h a t is being as being?" N o t , cause they hide an essence, but because they are completely
t h e r e f o r e , p r e l i n g u i s t i c s u b s t a n c e , n o r a n y said, b u t t h a t w h i c h e x p o s e d . (If y o u ever t r o u b l e yourself t o s e a r c h t h r o u g h t h e
"exists" only as always already hollowed out by representa- c r e d i t s for s u c h a n a c t o r ' s n a m e i t i s p r o b a b l y o n l y b e c a u s e
tion. Such beings p o p u l a t e Agamben's " c o m i n g c o m m u n i t y . " y o u s u d d e n l y realize y o u ' v e b e e n seeing h i m o r h e r for y e a r s
I t m a y b e helpful h e r e t o t h i n k o f t h a t w o n d e r f u l p o p u l a - without realizing it, a n d this h a s n o t h i n g to do w i t h t h e i r h a v -
tion w h o s e existence is purely plastic: the H o l l y w o o d c h a r a c - i n g g i v e n a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t u n n i n g p e r f o r m a n c e . ) T h e r e is n o t h -
ter actor. These are actors w h o s e n a m e s m a y be k n o w n to us i n g ineffable a b o u t t h e s e a c t o r s . T h e r e i s n o r e s i d u e o f g r e a t -
( T h e l m a Ritter, Elisha C o o k Jr., W a l t e r B r e n n a n ) b u t m u c h n e s s , g e n i u s , o r e v e n t a l e n t t h a t clings t o t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e o n
m o r e often t h a n n o t t h e y r e m a i n u n k n o w n a n d f o r g o t t e n , the screen. T h e y are a void in the midst of the w h o l e ensemble
b u r i e d i n t h e c r e d i t s a t t h e e n d o f t h e film a s w e w a l k o u t o f o f a c t o r s b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r for t h e p i c t u r e . W e b e c o m e a c c u s -
t h e t h e a t e r o r p u s h t h e r e w i n d b u t t o n . Yet t h e y a r e e v e r s o t o m e d t o seeing t h e m , yet w e k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e m via
familiar a n d ever s o versatile, a p p e a r i n g y e a r after y e a r i n m o v - biographies, cults, tabloids, talk s h o w s , or a w a r d s ceremo-
ies a n d o n T V s h o w s , i n W e s t e r n s , N o i r s , h i s t o r i c a l d r a m a s , nies. W e k n o w t h e m o n l y a s i m a g e s a n d w e see t h e m o n l y a s
b i o - p i c s , w a r p i c t u r e s , b e d r o o m farces a n d a c t i o n p o t b o i l e r s . i m a g e s , t h a t is, as allegories of t h e m s e l v e s . E a c h r o l e is a n -
C h a r a c t e r actors are absolutely familiar to us b u t they never o t h e r allegory.
p o s s e s s " s t a r q u a l i t y . " T h e y n e v e r get billing a b o v e t h e title o r These marvelous actors are therefore singularities. T h e y
e v e n o n t h e m a r q u e e a t all, a n d t h e y n e v e r s t a r i n t h e i r o w n c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a s s t a r s n o r identified w i t h a p a r t i c u -
t e l e v i s i o n series o r e v e n costar. T h e y a r e n o t L o n C h a n e y , w h o lar r o l e (for e a c h role t h e y play is an e c h o of all t h e o t h e r s — a l l
w o r k e d s o tirelessly a t t h e a r t o f self-disguise t h a t h e b e c a m e a m o r e o r less t h e s a m e ) a n d t h e y s e e m perfectly a t e a s e w i t h
H o l l y w o o d l e g e n d a n d even h a d a film m a d e a b o u t h i m star- "themselves." We can appreciate the star or g l a m o u r quality
ring J a m e s Cagney. Instead, these character actors we have in o f G r a c e Kelly's p r e s e n c e o n t h e screen a n d t h e g r e a t n e s s (if
m i n d n e v e r w o r k h a r d t o disguise t h e m s e l v e s o r t o d i s s o l v e n o t t h e genius) o f L a u r e n c e Olivier's t a l e n t — s o m e e x t r a o r d i -
into a role as in " m e t h o d " acting. To the contrary, they play nary or extracinematic "essence"—but character actors are
t h e i r v a r i o u s r o l e s i n m u c h t h e s a m e w a y , film after f i l m , y e a r c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e c e l l u l o i d , t h e stock, t h e s t e r e o -
after year, d e c a d e after d e c a d e . T h e y a r e a c t o r s w h o b e c o m e t y p e s t h e y p l a y s o perfectly. T h e y a r e " t y p e s " a n d t h e y h a v e
a * i a ivi is r in a in p i 11 i r i ) i i t t i Al NEUTER I 3 5

a s s u m e d t h e m s e l v e s as s u c h . The character a c t o r c a n n o t In- confondersi quasi i o n essa, d a nimbarla. Essa non e


identified w i t h a n y p a r t i c u l a r role hut n e i t h e r d o they e v o k e I'identita d e l la cosa e, tuttavia, n o n e a l t r o (e non altro)
n o r e x p r e s s a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the r o l e . T h e y h a v e a p u r e che questa.] 12

relation to cinema.
T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e c h a r a c t e r actor, t h e n , i s t h e e x p e r i - T h i s i m a g e , e v e n t , singularity, a l l e g o r y of itself, or I d e a
3 3
ence of p u r e being-in-language—an experience, Blanchot could (as A g a m b e n u n d e r s t a n d s i t ) i s b e i n g s u c h - a s - i t - i s , its n o n e -
say, o f t h e e v e n t a s a n i m a g e , t h a t i s t o say, a s n o t h i n g o t h e r o t h e r n e s s , or its n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s . As a c h a r a c t e r - a c t o r , t h e
t h a n its q u a l i t i e s b u t s u c h t h a t t h e s e q u a l i t i e s cling t o n o r e a l - a c t o r b e c o m e s his o r her o w n i m a g e . C h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a r e c a p a -
ity, n o identity, a n d refer o n l y t o t h e m s e l v e s . L e v i n a s r e m i n d s ble o f t h e i r n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s such t h a t , w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e ,
u s t h a t reality i s a l r e a d y its o w n such e v e n t . W e h a b i t u a l l y see t h e y n e i t h e r b e t r a y a n essence n o r a s u b s t a n c e t h e y " r e a l l y "
a t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t t h r o u g h it. Reality, he h a s t o l d u s , is a r e , n o r d o t h e y identify t h e m s e l v e s w i t h a n y o n e r o l e , b u t
d u a l — i t is itself in its t r u t h (idem) a n d in its i m a g e , " l i k e a r a t h e r m o v e freely, h a p p i l y , i m p e r c e p t i b l y a n d i r r e p a r a b l y
3 1
t o r n s a c k t h a t spills its c o n t e n t s . " Very similarly, A g a m b e n within the paraonomastic interzone of thusness. They are noth-
writes: i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e i r t y p e s , m a n n e r i s m s , a n d g e s t u r e s , a n d yet
t h e y are not t h e s e q u a l i t i e s . T h e y h a v e a s s u m e d t h e i r m a n n e r
It is as if t h e f o r m , t h e k n o w a b i l i t y , t h e f e a t u r e s of of being improperly, habitually, w i t h o u t assuming this or t h a t
every entity w e r e d e t a c h e d f r o m it, n o t a s a n o t h e r t h i n g , q u a l i t y a s definitive o f t h e i r identity. T h e y a r e nicely i n s o u c i -
b u t a s a n intentio, a n a n g e l , a n i m a g e . T h e m o d e o f ant, or cynical, or hypocritical with regard to image a n d real-
b e i n g of this intentio is n e i t h e r s i m p l e e x i s t e n c e n o r ity. T h e y d o n o t s t r u g g l e t o h o l d t h e t w o r e a l m s a p a r t , b u t
t r a n s c e n d e n c e ; it is a p a r a e x i s t e n c e or a p a r a t r a n s c e n - r a t h e r a l l o w the t w o r e a l m s t o i m p l i c a t e e a c h o t h e r . T h e y a r e
d e n c e t h a t d w e l l s beside t h e t h i n g (in all t h e senses o f themselves the erosion of the distance that w o u l d properly
t h e prefix ' p a r a - ' ) , so close t h a t it almost m e r g e s w i t h d i s t i n g u i s h t h e real f r o m t h e i m a g e . T h e y a r e n o t p o s s e s s e d b y
it, g i v i n g it a h a l o . It is n o t t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e t h i n g " a n o t h e r m e " but instead are neutral with regard to identity
a n d y e t it is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e t h i n g (it is none- b e c a u s e a s s u m i n g one's n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s m e a n s a s s u m i n g t h a t
other). w h i c h d o e s n o t refer b a c k t o a self, a n " I , " t h a t o n e w o u l d
truly be. C h a r a c t e r actors are at ease w i t h their m a n n e r of
[È c o m e se la f o r m a , la c o n o s c i b i l i t à , la fattezza di b e i n g . I n this w a y , t h e c h a r a c t e r a c t o r r e m a i n s r i g o r o u s l y u n i -
ogni ente si staccasse da esso, n o n c o m e un'altra cosa, dentifiable (and n o t simply buried in the credits at the e n d of
m a c o m e uWintentio, u n a n g e l o , u n ' i m m a g i n e . I l m o d o t h e f i l m , since t o w h o m w o u l d t h i s o r t h a t p r o p e r n a m e refer,
di essere di q u e s t a intentio n o n è u n a s e m p l i c e esistenza anyway)? Unlike star presence, character acting " s h o w s " a
né u n a t r a s c e n d e n z a : è u n a p a r a e s i s t e n z a o u n a nonparticular presence: a dead presence that seems to belong
p a r a t r a s c e n d e n z a , c h e d i m o r a a fianco alla c o s a (in t o n o p a r t i c u l a r film i t h a p p e n s t o t u r n u p in.
t u t t i i sensi della p r e p o s i z i o n e para), c o s i a fianco da I n t h e s p a c e o f t h e " t y p e , " t h e h a b i t u a l , or, a s B l a n c h o t
could say, the- "everyday," the definitive is engulfed and lost either gravitate toward the h e r o , or w h o , a c t i n g as o n e , t h e m -

a n d , even m o r e d i s a s t r o u s , the unity of space is s h a t t e r e d , since selves constitute a p o w e r ) . C h a r a c t e r a c t i n g is t h e p o w e r l e s s

these " t y p e s " c o m m u n i c a t e with each other w i t h o u t forming possibility ol d i s s o l u t i o n , of n e i t h e r / n o r , of a n o n y m i t y , t h a t

an o r g a n i c c o m m u n i t y or a unicity. T h e y " f o r m " a m o t l e y . t h r e a t e n s all m e m b e r s of all classes. ( O n The Tonight Show

T h a t is, t h e s e c h a r a c t e r s d o n o t c o m e t o g e t h e r w i t h i n a unicity, with Johnny Carson, Gene Hackman once anxiously com-

b u t r a t h e r e x i s t side b y side a s f r a g m e n t s . T h e s p a c e o f c h a r - p l a i n e d t h a t h e w a s b e c o m i n g a c h a r a c t e r actor. J o h n n y q u i c k l y

a c t e r a c t o r s dissolves t h e u n i t y o f s p a c e , a n d t h e g l a m o r o u s reassured him that that couldn't be true, because he h a d re-

p r e s e n c e of t h e G r e a t S t a r ( H u m p h r e y B o g a r t in Casablanca, c e n t l y w o n a n A c a d e m y A w a r d for Best Actor.)

J o s e p h C o t t o n in The Third Man) is a l w a y s in d a n g e r of b e i n g I n m i n o r r o l e s a n d a s bit p l a y e r s , c h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a l w a y s

d r o w n e d b y t h e s e m u l t i p l e a n d s i n g u l a r indifferences t o star- a p p e a r as r e p r o d u c e d . W h e n they t u r n up on the screen o u r

d o m a n d even to " a c t i n g . " As in a Balthus street scene, each g a z e a t t h e m i s p u r e l y superficial, u n b u r d e n e d o f t h e d r a m a o f

c h a r a c t e r a c t o r o c c u p i e s his o r h e r o w n scintillating a n d u n i q u e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e g l a m o u r o f t h e s t a r e v o k e s . Character

s p a c e t h a t t h r e a t e n s t o dissolve t h e n a r r a t i v e i n t o a n infinite actors do not challenge us to see. T h e y offer o u r g a z e t h a t

series o f i n d e t e r m i n a t e a n d c h a o t i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n t h e i r w a y s , w h i c h r e m a i n s t o b e seen w h e n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o see a n d o u r

character actors c o m m u n i c a t e destruction: the radical destruc- g a z e i s a l w a y s satisfied b y t h e m , b y t h e i r i n d e f i n i t e n e s s , b y

t i v e n e s s of a n o n c o l l e c t i v e , n o n i d e n t i f i a b l e c o m m u n i t y . T h e y t h e i r soft u n c e r t a i n p r e s e n c e . T h e s e a c t o r s m a n a g e t o b e i d e n -

a r e e a c h t h e possibility of still appearing w h e n t h e r e is no l o n g e r tified n e i t h e r w i t h t h e i r r e a l n a m e s n o r w i t h a n y n a m e t h e y

a n y o n e to be, no immanence a n d no identity to belong to. m a y be g i v e n in a film. T h e y a r e t h e u n s t a b l e shifters in c i n -


ematic grammar. Always " h e " or "she," always "the one w h o
Character-actors are employed by H o l l y w o o d to repre-
w e j u s t s a w i n . . . , " a l w a y s t h e i r n e x t and p r e v i o u s r o l e s , t h e y
s e n t t h e b u s i n e s s a n d h u m o f e v e r y d a y life. T h e y a r e p a i d t o
a r e p u r e e c h o e s o f identity, m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f insignificance.
represent w h a t happens when nothing happens: everydayness.
W h e n w e see t h e m a g a i n o n t h e s c r e e n , i n yet a n o t h e r f i l m o r
Waiters and waitresses, cabdrivers, cooks, petty crooks, ordi-
T V s h o w (for t h e y a r e a l w a y s a n d o n l y seen repeatedly, n e v e r
nary GIs, musicians, servants, shopkeepers, secretaries, bu-
for a first t i m e ) t h e y a r e seen precisely as s o m e o n e I r e c o g n i z e
r e a u c r a t s , a n d stool pigeons: these roles c o m p r i s e a "petty
b u t h a d f o r g o t t e n e v e n e x i s t e d . But f r o m w h e r e d o I r e c o g n i z e
b o u r g e o i s i e " i n t h e H o l l y w o o d social e c o n o m y . N e i t h e r e x -
t h e m ? I t i s difficult t o say b e c a u s e t h e y a r e n o t identified w i t h
t r a s n o r c o s t a r s , t h e c h a r a c t e r a c t o r i s forever " b e t w e e n " t h e s e
a n y o n e picture o r T V show. ( N o o n e goes t o the c i n e m a t o see
t w o poles. T h e y are n o t p a r t of a m o b , a theater a u d i e n c e , a
a n A k i m Tamiroff o r a Q u e e n i e Smith f i l m . ) T h u s t h e y h a p p e n
street c r o w d ; nor are they strewn, bloody a n d motionless, on
t o a p p e a r , here a n d t h e r e , n o w a n d t h e n , a s events o f r e - c o g n i -
a n y o f c o u n t l e s s m a k e - b e l i e v e battlefields. N e i t h e r a r e t h e y
t i o n , r e p e t i t i o n , a n d difference. Radically d e p r o p r i a t e d of iden-
e v e r l e a d s , n o r h e r o e s . B e l o n g i n g t o n e i t h e r class t h e y a r e , i n
tity (right in front of o u r eyes!), radically " i m a g e d , " radically
effect, w i t h d r a w n f r o m all classes a n d t h e y a r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
s t e r e o t y p e d , they are just as radically " c a p a b l e " of their d e p r o -
of dissolution that threatens both the individual p o w e r of the
p r i a t i o n . T h e y a r e " c a p a b l e " o f i m p r o p r i e t y , insignificance,
h e r o or t h e l e a d e r and also t h e p o w e r of t h e collective ( w h o
i n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . They do not appropriate their q u a l i t i e s as s t a l e d , the i ( v C M luston from the p e r s o n a l . I n the w o r k o f a r t ,
r a d i c a l l y idcntificatory of themselves. I n s t e a d , they a r c , in- as in t h e c o r p s e ( w h e r e w h a t a p p e a r s insists u p o n t h e a b s e n c e
t h e m s e l v e s , t h e p u r e " t a k i n g - p l a c e " of t h o s e q u a l i t i e s : an a c - a n d inaccessibility o f t h a t w h i c h i s r e p r e s e n t e d ) , this " o t h e r "
t o r = x, s o r t of. T h a t is t h e secret of t h e i r lightness a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n m a k e s itself o b s c u r e l y felt. I m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s " o t h e r "
a l w a y s familiar b u t i n s u b s t a n t i a l " l i f e . " W h i l e J a c k i e G l e a s o n ' s r e l a t i o n is a r e l a t i o n to t h e same t h i n g , a r e l a t i o n w i t h t h a t
o b e s i t y identified h i m a n d m a r k e d b o t h his c o m i c a n d d r a - shadow "behind" appearances that is nothing other than the
matic roles with an uncomfortable p a t h o s , in Sydney Green- t h i n g itself. I n s h o r t , w e shall s h o w t h a t o n e a l w a y s h a s a
s t r e e t o b e s i t y is b o r n e superficially a n d s t e r e o t y p i c a l l y , like a relation with a not-otherwiseness, or irreparability, anteced-
s i m p l e p l a y o f light a n d s h a d o w . e n t t o all d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n s . B u t t h a t " o t h e r " r a p p o r t i s a
r a p p o r t with no object. It is a r a p p o r t with nothing other t h a n
t h e self i t s e l f — b u t o u t s i d e of, a n d e x t e r i o r t o , itself.
Object = x A c c o r d i n g t o W i l l i a m R i c h a r d s o n (from w h o s e a d m i r a b l y
If The Coming Community is, as A g a m b e n s a y s , a c l e a r s u m m a r y of t h e Kantbuch we will b o r r o w h e a v i l y in
c o m m e n t a r y on s e c t i o n 9 of Being and Time a n d on p r o p o s i - w h a t follows) the key to Heidegger's study of the First Critique
3 8
tion 6.44 of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 34
i s his r e p e a t e d i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e f i n i t u d e o f h u m a n k n o w i n g .
it is a l s o , in o u r o p i n i o n , t h o r o u g h l y p r e c e d e n t e d by H e i d e g g e r ' s T h e h u m a n knower does not create the being-to-be-known.
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and in particular the T h a t w h i c h is k n o w n is always objective in character, is out-
a n a l y s i s o f w h a t h e c o n s i d e r s t o b e t h e " k e r n e l " o f t h e Cri- side t h e k n o w e r , a n d i s n o t t h e k n o w e r . A s f i n i t e , h u m a n k n o w -
tique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Schema. 3 5
In t h i s i n g m u s t b e g i n i n i n t u i t i o n , s e n s a t i o n , r e c e p t i o n , affect, p a s -
analysis, Heidegger shows t h a t at the heart of objectivity there sivity. T h e " p a s s i v e " side o f k n o w i n g i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y a n t e r i o r
is a n o n t h i n g , a n o n b e i n g , a n o n e m p i r i c a l a n d u n i n t e n d e d " m e - a n d p r i m a r y . B u t for K a n t , a s i s well k n o w n , r e c e p t i v i t y i s n o t
d i u m , " or, as K a n t calls it, an O b j e c t = x w h e r e t h e " p o w e r " sufficient for k n o w l e d g e . T h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a sin-
of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l imagination (Einbildungskraft) becomes g u l a r m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d t o b e such o r s u c h . A s d e t e r m i n e d ,
e q u i v o c a l : e q u a l l y active a n d p a s s i v e , o r p e r h a p s p u r e l y p a s - t h e i m m e d i a t e l y i n t u i t e d is t h e n r e - p r e s e n t e d as w h a t it is in
sionate. 3 6
T h e O b j e c t = x, we shall see, is t h e essentially o b j e c - g e n e r a l , in light of universality. T h i s side of k n o w i n g is t h o u g h t .
tive o r e x t e r i o r c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t i s m o s t i n t i m a t e o r interior. It is active a n d " s p o n t a n e o u s . " F r o m the r a w data of intuition
It is an always anterior presentation t h a t transforms interior- the contents of universality are constructed a n d re-presented.
ity i n t o , a s B l a n c h o t w o u l d say, " a n e x t e r i o r f o r c e t h a t w e T h o u g h t , in g e n e r a l , as R i c h a r d s o n p u t s it, is a p r e s e n t a t i o n
submit to passively." 37
W e shall see t h a t every e m p i r i c a l i n t u - (in c o n c e p t s ) of a p r e s e n t a t i o n (an i n t u i t i o n ) , a n d it is e v e n
i t i o n (every " a p p e a r a n c e " ) i s h a u n t e d b y a n a s p e c t r a l p r e s e n - m o r e f i n i t e t h a n i n t u i t i o n , since i t i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t
t a t i o n , or pure i m a g e , t h a t realizes the possibility of the a b s e n c e o n " r a w d a t a . " O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h o u g h t i s " m o r e " p r e s e n -
of t h e object, b u t t h a t r e m a i n s nevertheless a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e t a t i v e t h a n i n t u i t i o n since i t p r o v i d e s a u n i t y t h a t h o l d s g o o d
same object. This other relation is n o n p e r s o n a l or even, better for m o r e t h a n o n e p a r t i c u l a r . H u m a n k n o w i n g i s t h e i n t i m a c y
A < i A M ii i ii \ M 11 i 11 I i' 11 i i I I ( A I N E U T E R

of t h e s e p r o f o u n d l y diverse s l o p e s : passive and m u l t i p l e intu- i'.ni stand is I he same t h i n g as the t h i n g t h a t a p p e a r s . It is t h e


i t i o n , a n d active a n d unifying t h o u g h t . K a n t ' s task i s t o m a k e s a m e t h i n g a s ihe object: " [ T ] h e thing-in-itself i s n o t a n o t h e r
clear h o w t h e y c a n p o s s i b l y b e s y n t h e s i z e d . W e notice s t r a i g h t - object but a n o t h e r a s p e c t (rcspectus) of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h
a w a y t h a t , a l t h o u g h d i v e r s e , t h e t w o sides h a v e s o m e t h i n g i n r e g a r d to the same object." 41
T h e Ent-stand is t h e s a m e essent
c o m m o n : each presents, and we k n o w that in Kant the p o w e r a s t h e o b j e c t . I n s o f a r a s t h e Ent-stand s t a n d s o u t f r o m G o d , i t
of presentation in general belongs to the transcendental imagi- appears as o b - p o s e d to t h e finite k n o w e r . I n d e e d , i n s o f a r as
nation as it functions in the mystery of schematizing. t h e t h i n g a p p e a r s a t all, i t insists u p o n a n essential n o n k n o w l -
But w h a t c a n b e k n o w n ? K a n t ' s a n s w e r i s f a m o u s . W e e d g e (or " h i d d e n n e s s " a s H e i d e g g e r prefers t o t h i n k o f it). F o r
k n o w o n l y the b e i n g - t h a t - a p p e a r s , a n ob-ject o b - p o s e d (Gegen- t h e Ent-stand is a l t o g e t h e r ( a n d n o t j u s t p a r t i a l l y ) i n a c c e s s i b l e
stand) t o a k n o w e r . W e k n o w a p p e a r a n c e s a n d , crucially, a n t o h u m a n k n o w i n g . O u r r e l a t i o n t o t h e Ent-stand i s n o t a
a p p e a r a n c e " c a n b e n o t h i n g b y itself, o u t s i d e o u r m o d e o f r e l a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e a t all. Finite k n o w i n g — b e g i n n i n g f r o m
3 9
representation." However, k n o w i n g is not ontically creative. f i n i t u d e , i n t u i t i o n , receptivity, p a s s i v i t y — d o e s n o t give u s a c -
We do n o t create t h a t which we know. There is an essential cess t o t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t w h i c h i s k n o w n
d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e k n o w e r a n d t h e k n o w n b e c a u s e t h e finite (the o b j e c t , t h e t h i n g t h a t a p p e a r s ) i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e
k n o w e r does not create the being-to-be-known. A h u m a n Ent-stand. K a n t , of c o u r s e , in t h e First Critique, is c o n c e r n e d
k n o w e r i s n o t G o d . D i s t i n c t f r o m finite k n o w i n g , a n infinite less w i t h b e i n g s p e r s e t h a n w i t h o u r w a y o f k n o w i n g t h e m a s
k n o w e r d o e s n o t k n o w o b j e c t s a t all. G o d k n o w s t h e Ent- o b j e c t s . H e c o n c e r n s himself w i t h i n v e s t i g a t i n g a n d defining
stand, t h e e-ject (i.e., t h e t h i n g i n s o f a r as it t a k e s its o r i g i n in the a priori structures by which and t h r o u g h which that which
4 0
God). G o d d o e s n o t k n o w t h i n g s - t h a t - a p p e a r (i.e., objects) s t a n d s o u t from G o d a p p e a r s a n d i s accessible t o h u m a n k n o w -
b u t t h i n g s as t h e y a r e , as s u c h , i n - t h e m s e l v e s (an sich). Infinite i n g a s o b j e c t i v e a n d o b - p o s e d . S u c h k n o w i n g w o u l d t h e n si-
k n o w i n g is therefore not so much better than h u m a n k n o w - m u l t a n e o u s l y be a b a r r i n g of access to t h e Ent-stand. He is
i n g ( t h a n p e r s p e c t i v i s m ) as it is p r o f o u n d l y different, b e c a u s e n o t s o m u c h c o n c e r n e d w i t h m u t u a l p r e s e n c e a n d self-pres-
n o o b j e c t s a r e e v e n given t o G o d t o b e k n o w n . T o p u t i t differ- e n c e , o r " o n t i c c o m p o r t m e n t " (the p r e s e n c e o f o b j e c t s t o s u b -
ently, u n l i k e t h e finite k n o w e r , G o d d o e s n o t h a v e t o a n t i c i - jects), a s h e i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h a t a n t e r i o r s t r u c t u r e t h a t m a k e s
p a t e a b e i n g - t o - b e - k n o w n , since G o d is its o r i g i n . Finite k n o w - t h e c o m p o r t m e n t p o s s i b l e , b e c a u s e , a s h e s a y s , "[i]n t h e w o r l d
i n g , i n c o n t r a s t , i s essentially t e m p o r a l , a n t i c i p a t o r y , a h e a d - o f s e n s e , h o w e v e r d e e p l y w e e n q u i r e i n t o its o b j e c t s , w e h a v e
of-itself. The Ent-stand is p r o f o u n d l y i n a c c e s s i b l e to finite to do with nothing but appearances." 4 2

k n o w i n g . If t h e Ent-stand is " b e h i n d " a p p e a r a n c e s t h i s d o e s B y K a n t ' s a c c o u n t , t h e n , h u m a n k n o w i n g will c o n s t i t u t e


n o t m e a n t h a t i t dimly, c o n t i n u a l l y , o b l i q u e l y , a n d d i s t o r t e d l y only t h a t w h i c h m a k e s b e i n g s i n t o o b j e c t s a n d a l l o w s u s e x p e -
faces t h e i n f e r i o r h u m a n k n o w e r . It is not knowable at all. r i e n c e t h e m s u c h t h a t t h a t w h i c h s o c o n s t i t u t e s o b j e c t s will
( F o r t h e o n t o l o g y of Sein und Zeit, H e i d e g g e r says it is c o n - a l s o c o n s t i t u t e e x p e r i e n c e . O u r e n c o u n t e r w i t h b e i n g s will n o t
c e a l e d [verdeckt].) T h e Ent-stand is s i m p l y n o t an o b j e c t a n d c r e a t e b e i n g s n o r seize t h e m a s G o d d o e s a n d k n o w t h e m a s
hence is not available to be k n o w n . Importantly, however, the t h e y a r e i n - t h e m s e l v e s . A n t e r i o r (a p r i o r i ) access is a " f a s h -
ioning," a "making," an "instituting" oi things-as-objects. ol unity thai g u i d e s the c o n c e p t . As p u r e , t h e r u l e s c o n s t i t u t e

Anterior contact will c o m b i n e the I w o s i d e s of k n o w i n g , intu- thai w h i c h they rule. They " d i s a p p e a r " i n t o t h a t w h i c h t h e y

i t i o n a n d t h o u g h t , i n t o a unity. A n d since, for K a n t , this is a rule a n d a r e n o t h i n g o u t s i d e their w o r k . T h e y i n s c r i b e t h e m -

" p o w e r " o f t h e k n o w e r , i t will c o m e from t h e k n o w e r a n d selves in a s o m c t h i n g - t o - b e - r u l e d (i.e., a s o m e t h i n g - t o - b e - u n i -

thus must simultaneously fashion, m a k e , institute, and expe- fied). T h e t o t a l i t y of t h e s e r u l e s is t h e c a t e g o r i e s . A c a t e g o r y is

r i e n c e itself. In s h o r t , t h a t w h i c h 06-jectifies a l s o swb-jectifies. a w a y a r u l e r u l e s , a n d t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g is s i m p l y t h e c l o s e d

N e i t h e r i n t u i t i o n a l o n e n o r t h o u g h t a l o n e c a n d o this a n d c l a i m t o t a l i t y o f t h e w a y s b y w h i c h intuitive d a t a c a n b e unified,

to be the "foundation." Each, taken independently, is always i n s c r i b e d , r u l e d . T h e Vet-stand is a " p o w e r of r u l e s " or a p o w e r

p r i o r to a n y e x p e r i e n c e (i.e., is pure). o f w a y s o r m a n n e r s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , since e v e r y

P r i o r t o all e x p e r i e n c e , t h e i m m e d i a t e , r e c e p t i v e e n c o u n - a c t of k n o w i n g i m p l i e s a c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e pure c o n c e p t is

t e r w i t h a s i n g u l a r r e s u l t s in t w o t y p e s of p r e s e n t a t i o n s : s p a c e t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a u n i t y a n d i m p l i e s a pure s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -

and time. Space and time are intuited but are n o t objects. They n e s s . T h u s , for K a n t , all c o n c e p t u a l unities h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r

a r e n o t explicitly a p p r e h e n d e d . Clearly, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t w h i c h of an "I think." This "I t h i n k " is a thinking a n d n o t simply an

p u r e i n t u i t i o n i n t u i t s m u s t c o m e f r o m i n t u i t i o n itself. N o n - a c t ; it is a " p o w e r " (a potentia) he calls transcendental apper-

objects, space a n d time (outer and inner) are not k n o w a b l e . ception. T h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t a n a c t t h a t

I n t u i t i n g t h e m , i n t u i t i o n i s h e n c e n o t affected b y a n y o b j e c t . I t c o m e s a n d g o e s b u t a potentia t h a t r e m a i n s in r e s e r v e e v e n as

is affected by t h a t w h i c h it gives to itself. S o m e t h i n g is i n t u - it w o r k s . It is a stable unity w i t h o u t which there w o u l d be no

i t e d , b u t n o t a n o b j e c t . I t i s n o t n o t h i n g a t all, b u t n e i t h e r i s i t k n o w l e d g e , for t h e r e w o u l d b e n o c o m m o n p o i n t t o serve for

a n y t h i n g t h e m a t i c . H e i d e g g e r s a y s s i m p l y t h a t i n its p u r e p a s - multiple data. T h u s the transcendental apperception is the

sivity, i n t u i t i o n i n t u i t s itself. T h a t i s , i n t u i t i o n is t h a t w h i c h it g r o u n d of the possibility of the categories.

i n t u i t s . It gives itself t h a t w h i c h it is a b l e to i n t u i t . S p a c e a n d N o w , since t h e p r o p e r l y K a n t i a n e x p e r i e n c e m u s t b e made,


time are n o t " o u t s i d e " intuition. Intuition is always already there m u s t be a p o w e r that unites pure intuition a n d p u r e
i n t h a t w h i c h i t receives. S p a c e a n d t i m e , i n s h o r t , a r e p u r e t h o u g h t s u c h t h a t a k n o w e r can e x p e r i e n c e an o b j e c t . Since
images. b o t h i n t u i t i o n a n d t h o u g h t present, H e i d e g g e r will l o o k for

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p u r e t h o u g h t , p r i o r t o all e x p e r i e n c e , t h e i r r o o t i n w h a t t h e y s h a r e a n d , a s w a s s a i d earlier, t h e fac-

is the discerning of a unity t h a t m o r e t h a n one individual pos- ulty of p r e s e n t a t i o n in g e n e r a l is t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . Einbildungs-

sesses in c o m m o n : a c o n c e p t . But p u r e c o n c e p t s (causality, kraft is precisely and only t h e a b i l i t y to " f a s h i o n , " " i m a g e , "

e.g.) h a v e n o e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t ( w h i c h led H u m e , o f c o u r s e , " i n s t i t u t e , " " e s t a b l i s h , " " s e t u p , " e t c . T h i s Kraft i s n o t a n

t o d e n y t h e i r r e a l i t y ) . F o r K a n t , t h e p u r e c o n c e p t (or " n o - established fact b u t a c o n t i n u a l p r o c e s s — t h e process of sharing

t i o n " ) is s i m p l y a f u n c t i o n of unification itself. T h e " c o n t e n t s " that which pure intuition and pure thought have in common.

o f p u r e c o n c e p t s a r e " r u l e s " (i.e., n o t e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n s ) . T h e imagination integrates the r a w data of pure intuition w i t h

T h e s e r u l e s a r e n o t a p r o d u c t o f reflection b u t a r e t h e v e r y t h e s y n t h e s e s o f c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . T h i s p r o c e s s i s a n activity

w o r k i n g o f reflection. T h e r u l e i s a n a n t e c e d e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n called schematizing, a n d it is an activity t h a t is at o n c e sensible


a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l ; n is a fusing nl s e n s a t i o n with i n t e l l e c t i o n . By- be Slire, One Ol these possibilities has been a c t u a l i z e d
4 6
m e a n s o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l (or i m a g i n a r y ) s c h e m a , the t h i n g by the h o u s e dial I see, b u t it need n o t h a v e been s o .
i s a b l e t o a p p e a r a s a n o b j e c t a n d b e e x p e r i e n c e d a s w h a t i t is.
It is K a n t ' s f a m o u s W i t h R i c h a r d s o n , w e m u s t e m p h a s i z e t h e " c a n " h e r e , for
it i n d i c a t e s a potentia a n d an activity by w h i c h a t h i n g is able
third thing which is h o m o g e n o u s on the one h a n d with t o a p p e a r a s w h a t i t i s (i.e., t o " r e v e a l itself," i n H e i d e g g e r i a n
the category, and on the other h a n d with appearance, l a n g u a g e ) . I m p o r t a n t l y for R i c h a r d s o n , K a n t , H e i d e g g e r , a n d
and which makes the application of the former to the A g a m b e n , t h i s p r e - s c r i p t i o n or " r u l e - f o r - a - h o u s e " is n o t a d e -
latter possible. This mediating representation m u s t be t e r m i n a t e c a t a l o g of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s p r o p e r to a h o u s e . It is, in
p u r e , t h a t is, v o i d o f all e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t , a n d y e t a t Richardson's words, a "full s k e t c h [Auszeichen] of the total-
t h e s a m e t i m e w h i l e it m u s t in o n e r e s p e c t be intellec- ity of w h a t is m e a n t by s u c h a t h i n g as ' h o u s e ' " ( e m p h a s i s
4 7
tual, it m u s t in a n o t h e r be sensible. S u c h a r e p r e s e n t a - mine). T h i s " v i e w " b y w h i c h a t h i n g can a p p e a r a s w h a t i t i s
tion is the transcendental schema. 43
c a l l e d is, in A g a m b e n ' s a n a l y s i s , " p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c " : "[T]he
name, insofar as it names a thing, is nothing but the thing,
With regard to empirical concepts, the schema " p r o d u c e s " insofar as it is named by the name [il nome, in quanto nomina
or " p r e s c r i b e s " a n o n t h e m a t i c view, or, as H e i d e g g e r calls it, a una cosa, e non altro che la cosa in quanto e nominata dal
4i
schema-image, 44
such that any particular can appear as w h a t nome]." F u r t h e r m o r e , R i c h a r d s o n a d d s , " t h e view o f w h i c h
it is w i t h o u t being confined to any of the actual particularities we are speaking here is as such neither the immediate (empiri-
o f its a p p e a r a n c e . A g a m b e n , q u i t e a p p r o p r i a t e l y , calls t h i s a n cal) i n t u i t i o n of an a c t u a l s i n g u l a r o b j e c t (for it c o n n o t e s a
"example." 4 5
We can hardly do better than William Richard- g e n u i n e p l u r a l i t y ) , n o r a v i e w of t h e c o n c e p t itself in its unity.
4 9
son's explanation of h o w the schema-image works: T h e view we are speaking of is not thematized at a l l . "
T h a t i s t o say, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f A g a m b e n :
A c r o s s t h e street is a h o u s e . I k n o w it to be a h o u s e ,
for i t i s p r e s e n t e d t o m e b y a n a c t o f k n o w l e d g e . B y N e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r n o r u n i v e r s a l , t h e e x a m p l e i s a sin-
r e a s o n o f this p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e h o u s e offers m e a v i e w g u l a r o b j e c t t h a t p r e s e n t s itself as s u c h , t h a t shows its
o f itself a s a n i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t i n g o b j e c t e n c o u n t e r e d s i n g u l a r i t y . . . . E x e m p l a r y is w h a t is n o t defined by
i n m y e x p e r i e n c e , b u t m o r e t h a n t h a t , i t offers a v i e w a n y property, except by being called. N o t being red,
o f w h a t a h o u s e ( a n y h o u s e ) l o o k s like. T h i s d o e s n o t b u t being-called-red; n o t b e i n g J a c o b but being-called-
m e a n , of course, that the house has no individuality, J a c o b defines t h e e x a m p l e . H e n c e its a m b i g u i t y , j u s t
b u t o n l y t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o its o w n i n d i v i d u a l i t y t h e w h e n o n e h a s d e c i d e d t o t a k e i t really seriously.
h o u s e as p r e s e n t e d offers a v i e w of w h a t a h o u s e can
l o o k like, sc. t h e " h o w " o f a n y h o u s e a t all. I t o p e n s [Né particolare né universale, l'esempio é un oggetto
up for me a s p h e r e [Umkreis] of p o s s i b l e h o u s e s . To s i n g o l a r e c h e , per cosi d i r e , si dà a v e d e r e c o m e t a l e ,
1
Ad A M H I N AND I 11 I I' i i I I l l ( At NEUTER

monstra la sua sua singolarità.... Esemplare è ciò che very scheme < >l the S( hema i m a g e a n d as t h e s c h e m a t a a r e sev-
n o n è definito da a l c u n a p r o p r i e t à , t r a n n e l'esser-detto. e r a l , each is already temporalized. T h u s t h e s c h e m a t a " d e t e r -
N o n l'esser-rosso, m a l ' e s s e r - d e t t o - r o s s o ; n o n l'esser- m i n e time" (or, a r t i c u l a t e it) and t i m e in-forms t h a t w h i c h it is
J a k o b , m a P e s s e r - t i e t t o - J a k o b definisce l ' e s e m p i o . D i a r t i c u l a t e d by. T i m e , a s unified, " m a k e s p o s s i b l e " t h a t w h i c h
q u i la s u a a m b i g u i t à , n o n a p p e n a si decida di p r e n d e r l o a r t i c u l a t e s it a n d t i m e is o n l y as a r t i c u l a t e d (i.e., fused w i t h
50
v e r a m e n t e sul s e r i o . ] categories such that ontological predicates can be applied to
a n y object w h a t e v e r ) . T h a t i s t o say, q u i t e obviously, t h a t t h i n k -
I n s h o r t , t h e K a n t i a n s c h e m a - i m a g e defines t h e " w h a t e v e r - ing in t e r m s of form a n d content is i n a d e q u a t e to c a p t u r e this
i s - c a l l e d n e s s " t h a t A g a m b e n e x p l o i t s so i n g e n i o u s l y in his La c o n u n d r u m o f activity a n d passivity. (But i n t h i s w a y w e r e a c h
comunità che viene. B u t we m u s t go f u r t h e r still a n d r e t u r n to a n o t h e r a s p e c t o f A g a m b e n ' s a n a l y s i s t h a t , i n t h e e n d , will
Heidegger's Kantbuch. b r i n g h i m close t o B l a n c h o t ' s n o t i o n o f t h e i m a g e , a n d o f l a
By w a y of the schema, the unity of the empirical concept communauté inavouable insofar as e a c h p r e d i c a t e s his a n a l y -
(the w o r d ) is referred to t h e i n t u i t e d p l u r a l i t y of possibilities it sis on a general w e a k e n i n g of m u t u a l p r e s e n c e s . )
unifies w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , b e i n g r e s t r i c t e d t o a n y o n e o r a n y N o w , if the transcendental schemata m a k e possible the
set of t h e m . In c o n t r a s t to t h i s , pure i n t u i t i o n — t i m e — i s al- application of ontological categories to "any being whatever,"
ready unified. It is i n s t e a d t h e p u r e c o n c e p t s (the c a t e g o r i e s ) then we m u s t look into the ontological status of this " w h a t -
that are many. T h e schematism of the categories must, there- ever," for it is precisely t h e o n t o l o g i c a l l y known. In s h o r t , what
fore, r e q u i r e special k i n d s of s c h e m a t a or s c h e m a t a of a c h a r - is an o b j e c t in general}
a c t e r different f r o m t h o s e o f e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n . A s t h e p u r e K a n t ' s a n s w e r i s s i m p l e a n d d i s a r m i n g . I t isn't a n y t h i n g :
i n t u i t i o n of t i m e is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of any o b j e c t , t h e s c h e -
m a t a m u s t unite the categories t o time s o t h a t o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i - N o w we are in a position to determine m o r e ad-
c a t e s m a y be a p p l i c a b l e to o b j e c t s in general. T h a t is, t h e p r o - e q u a t e l y o u r c o n c e p t of an object in g e n e r a l . All o u r
f o u n d u n i t y o f t i m e m u s t b e v u l n e r a b l e t o v a r i o u s modes representations have, as representations, their object,
( " w a y s " ) of p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i l e r e m a i n i n g one t i m e (for, " a l l a n d can in turn b e c o m e objects of o t h e r representa-
times are one time"). Richardson reminds us t h a t this is the t i o n s . A p p e a r a n c e s a r e t h e sole o b j e c t s w h i c h c a n b e
m o s t difficult a n d a m b i g u o u s a s p e c t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e n t i r e given to us immediately, a n d t h a t in t h e m which re-
a n a l y s i s of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. D o e s he w a n t to say lates i m m e d i a t e l y t o t h e o b j e c t i s c a l l e d i n t u i t i o n . B u t
both t h a t t i m e i s t h e r o o t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n these appearances are not things-in-themselves; they
a n d that the transcendental imagination is the r o o t of time? are only representations, which in turn have their o b -
R i c h a r d s o n e x p l a i n s it as f o l l o w s : since t i m e is a l r e a d y u n i - j e c t — a n o b j e c t w h i c h c a n n o t itself b e i n t u i t e d b y u s ,
f i e d , t h e s c h e m a t a (the " p o w e r " t o unify) h a v e n o t h i n g t o unify. a n d w h i c h may, therefore, be n a m e d the non-empiri-
B u t as t i m e is already unified, it is a l w a y s a l r e a d y s c h e m a t i z e d , c a l , t h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t = x.
or is t h e (pure) i m a g e of a n y s c h e m a w h a t s o e v e r . T i m e is t h e T h e p u r e c o n c e p t o f this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t ,
I 'I '
t\ I i i\ IVI I \ I IN l\ IN I ' I I I I |- 1 I I I I I I ;\ I IN I I I I I K

which in reality throughout till our knowledge is al tion to the k n o w n will not be cognitive. It is not p r e s e n t . It is
ways one and the same, is w h a t a l o n e can confer u p o n more t h a n present; m o r e p r e s e n t t h a n a n y p r e s e n t a t i o n . It is
all o u r e m p i r i c a l c o n c e p t s in g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s to an t h e sheer ' V a n a p p e a r " o f a n y a p p e a r a n c e w h a t e v e r . N o t a b -
o b j e c t , t h a t is, a n objective reality." ( L a t t e r e m p h a s i s s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g at all, n o r j u s t a n y t h i n g at all, it is the dis-
mine) 5 1
junction of something and nothing. "This = x," K a n t says, "is
o n l y t h e c o n c e p t of a b s o l u t e p o s i t i o n , n o t itself a self-subsist-

H e i d e g g e r will say t h a t t h e m y s t e r i o u s object = x is a " s o m e - ing object b u t only an idea of relation, to posit an object cor-
5 5

thing of which we k n o w n o t h i n g . " 5 2


As an object in general, responding to the form of intuition." Alien t o all s u b s t a n c e

t h e x is n o t a n y p a r t i c u l a r object a n d , like t h e Umkreis " h o u s e , " (i.e., n o t " s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g " ) , t h e o b j e c t = x is fragility itself.

it is n o t d e t e r m i n a b l e . It is t h e Umkreis of a n y p o s s i b l e o b j e c t . E m p t y of all c o n t e n t , t h e x is t h e sheer " t h a t t h e r e i s " (il y a, es

It is t h e s o - c a l l e d o b j e c t , or a n y o b j e c t p u r e l y i n s o f a r as it is gibt) s o m e t h i n g r a t h e r t h a n n o t h i n g , just as Da-sein, or t h e

called an o b j e c t . It is w h a t all o b j e c t s s h a r e , b u t it is in-itself a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n (or, unified a p p e r c e p t i o n ) , is t h e

n o - t h i n g , n o n b e i n g , n o n o b j e c t . I t is, i n A g a m b e n ' s l a n g u a g e s h e e r " t h a t t h e r e i s " s o m e o n e r a t h e r t h a n n o o n e . Infinitely

again, "the pure being-in-language of the non-linguistic." It is fragile, t h e x is a r c h e - r e l a t i o n , a r c h e - o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e r e be

t h a t w h i c h , i n a n y o b j e c t , objectifies it, e n v i s i o n s i t a s s u c h , a s s u c h a t h i n g as i m a g i n a t i o n ( f o r m i n g , p r e s e n t a t i o n ) itself, or

an object. T h e object-in-general is purely imaginary, because a n y syn- itself. Similarly, Da-sein is t h e being of t h e " t h e r e , "

it is s c h e m a t i z e d p a r e x c e l l e n c e , yet it is t h a t w h i c h is n o t p r e - or, t h e p u r e p o s i t i o n of t h e self. Da-sein is t h e being of t h e

s e n t e d i n a n y p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n effect, t o b o r r o w f r o m L y o t a r d : arche-presentation "= x."

it is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e u n p r e s e n t a b l e . H e i d e g g e r will call T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n , n e e d l e s s t o say, i s a m b i g u o u s . N o t h i n g ,


it a " p u r e h o r i z o n " within which any object can be rendered or the N o t h i n g , is p r e s e n t e d . N o t h i n g is " b e y o n d " it, no t h i n g -
p r e s e n t - t o - u s . K a n t will say it is a " p u r e c o r r e l a t e " to t r a n - in-itself arises g h o s t l i k e b e y o n d t h e objectively k n o w n . T h e x ,
s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i n s o f a r as it is a u n i t y w a i t i n g for t h e s h e e r p r e s e n t a t i o n , i s s u s p e n d e d , d e l a y e d , r e t a r d e d , inter-
s o m e t h i n g t o unify, a like t h a t p r e c e d e s a n y t h i n g t o l i k e n . I n rupted—coming but never arriving. T h e essential distance
t h a t sense it is more o b j e c t i v e t h a n a n y o b j e c t , m o r e b e i n g between the knower and that which is the preeminently o n t o -
t h a n a n y b e i n g , s o t h a t H e i d e g g e r will b e a b l e t o r e c h r i s t e n i t logically k n o w n e r o d e s i n such a w a y t h a t t h e t w o sides c a n n o t
56

as Being. In "Brief iiber d e n H u m a n i s m u s " he says (in my b u t fuse t o g e t h e r . " P r e s e n t e d " i s t h e r e t u r n , w e c a n say, w i t h
o w n t r a n s l a t i o n , w h i c h I leave c r u d e l y literal i n o r d e r t o e m - Blanchot and Nietzsche, of w h a t does not come back (into
p h a s i z e t h e p o i n t ) : " T h u s Being i s b e i n g - e r t h a n a n y b e i n g a n y p r e s e n t ) . N o t h i n g definitive i s p r e s e n t e d . N o f i g u r e , n o
[ G l e i c h w o h l ist d a s Sein s e i e n d e r als jegliches s e i e n d e ] . " 5 3
Fur- o u t l i n e , n o b o r d e r , n o t h i n g f r a m e d . W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s (only)
ther, a c c o r d i n g t o R i c h a r d s o n , H e i d e g g e r will identify t h e t r a n - t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n feels itself o b l i g e d t o (or
s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as his Da-sein. 54 c o n s t r a i n e d t o ) present. T h a t is to say, it feels itself, a n d t h u s

T h e o b j e c t = x is n o t a b e i n g , n o t an o b j e c t , h e n c e its r e l a - s u b m i t s to itself, as if it c a m e f r o m o u t s i d e itself—as if it was


itself an exterior force. T h i s a u t o / h e t e r o a f f e c t i o n is p r o f o u n d l y Whatevsi does noi therefore m e a n only (in t h e w o r d s
t e m p o r a l , m o r e o v e r , i n t h e sense o f a n e x t r e m e t e n s ( e ) - i o n , o r ol Alain Badiou) ' s u b t r a c t e d from t h e a u t h o r i t y of l a n -
a n t i c i p a t i o n . (We m u s t recall f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s i s t h a t , g u a g e w i t h o u t a n y possible d e n o m i n a t i o n , i n d i s c e r n -
unlike God's knowing, h u m a n knowing is temporal.) The i b l e ' ; i t m e a n s m o r e e x a c t l y t h a t w h i c h , h o l d i n g itself
"power" of Einbildungskraft is h e r e fused w i t h an essential in s i m p l e h o m o n y m y , in p u r e b e i n g - c a l l e d , is precisely
i m p o t e n c e . T h e o b j e c t = x s h a r e s w i t h t h e Entstand t h e c h a r - a n d o n l y for t h i s r e a s o n u n n a m a b l e : t h e b e i n g - i n - l a n -
a c t e r i s t i c of u n k n o w a b i l i t y , b u t , as a p r e s e n t a t i o n in extremis, guage of the non-linguistic.
i t t u r n s a w a y f r o m G o d b a c k t o w a r d o b j e c t s , b a c k t o w a r d its
c u s t o m a r y p o v e r t y . T h e o b j e c t = x is t h e i r r e p a r a b l e c o n s i g n - [Qualunque n o n significa q u i n d i s o l t a n t o (nelle p a r o l e
m e n t t o t h i n g s , t o o b j e c t s , t o p r o f a n i t y , b u t o n l y via a d e t o u r d i B a d i o u ) : ' s o t t r a t t o a l l ' a u t o r i t à della l i n g u a , senza
t h r o u g h t h e N o t h i n g , t h r o u g h n o n b e i n g . A g a m b e n says, " [ T j h e n o m i n a z i o n e p o s s i b l e , i n d i s c e r n i b l e ' ; esso significa, p i ù
h u m a n i s t h e o n e t h a t , b e i n g o p e n t o t h e n o n - t h i n g - l i k e , is, for precisamente: ciò che, tenendosi in una semplice
this very reason, irreparably consigned to things [{Puomo}, o m o n i m i a , nel p u r o e s s e r - d e t t o , a p p u n t o e s o l t a n t o p e r
essendo aperto al non-cosale, e, unicamente per questo, q u e s t o è i n n o m i n a b i l e : l ' e s s e r - n e l - l i n g u a g g i o del n o n -
58
c o n s e g n a t o i r r e p a r a b i l m e n t e alle c o s e ] . " 5 7
linguistico.]
We do not then, suddenly and unexpectedly, confront the
thing-in-itself, t h e sacred t h i n g , t h e Entstand as it is d i r e c t l y He m a k e s the immediate a d d e n d u m to Badiou in order to
offered f r o m o u t o f t h e M o s t Ineffable. T o t h e c o n t r a r y , w e i n s u r e t h a t w e d o n o t t r y t o see i n this prestntation-in-extremis
suddenly and unexpectedly confront nothing, nonbeing, that a n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n , N e g a t i v e Being, or n e g a t i v e t h e o l o g y .
is to say, ourselves: ourselves as the no-thing "itself." That T h e o b j e c t = x is t h e very t u r n i n g a w a y f r o m t h e s a c r e d for it
w h i c h all t h a t is h a s in c o m m o n is n o - t h i n g . We c o n f r o n t a is t h e p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i n g s , of o b j e c t s (i.e., of t h a t w h i c h
l i m i t w i t h o u t ever c o n f r o n t i n g it, for t h e limit w a s n o t h i n g , is never p r e s e n t e d to G o d ) . If y o u like, t h e x " s h o w s " t h e
w a s a l w a y s a l r e a d y " i n " t h i n g s , e r a s e d i n its a p p r o a c h a n d ungodliness of the world. It shows the irreparable profanity
s u s p e n d e d en deca du temps like a p a r a l y z e d a n d p a r a l y z i n g o f t h e w o r l d . Via this p a r a l y z e d p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e w o r l d i s p r e -
force. For t h a t w h i c h is presented is the sheer " t h e r e , " a n d s e n t e d precisely such as it is. A p p e a r a n c e s c o n c e a l (only t h e )
this p u r e " t h e r e " is the pure position of the K a n t i a n "subject" nothing. No p r o p e r nature is revealed to us, no coming-from-
( w h i c h w e shall i n t e r r o g a t e i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r ) out-of-Ineffability is u n v e i l e d . In A g a r n b e n ' s l a n g u a g e a g a i n ,
o r t h e k n o w e r , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e Da-sein. only the irreducible " t h u s n e s s " of things is revealed. T h o u g h t ,
I m p o r t a n t l y , for A g a r n b e n ' s e n t i r e e n t e r p r i s e since Lan- t h e n , b e f o r e i t t h i n k s a n y t h i n g , i s a b l e t o t h i n k (or i s n o t a b l e
guage and Death, t h e ( w h a t e v e r ) o b j e c t = x is b o t h t h e p o i n t n o t t o t h i n k ) p u r e p r o f a n i t y , o r p u r e o r d i n a r i n e s s , a s its only
o f s u b t r a c t i o n f r o m all l a n g u a g e , all identity, all p r o p r i e t y , a n d extraontic thought.
a l s o t h e p o i n t o f i m m e r s i o n i n l a n g u a g e - i n - g e n e r a l or, s i m p l y , T h i s m e a n s t h e n t h a t (pure) t h o u g h t i s naïveté p a r excel-
t h e s h e e r fact t h a t one speaks: lence. T u r n i n g at o n c e to objects, it has always already forgotten
, 1 v , M 1)1 I . I M \ I I I 1
I I I I I l M I I I » A I IN fi H 1 fi H I 33

God. I r r e d u c i b l y lost among things, though) pure being-in- Willi the expropriation ol .ill " c o n t e n t s , " all " l a t e n c y , " this
l a n g u a g e — i s a b a n d o n e d , u n d e s t i n e d , s c r u p u l o u s l y tbingisli. pure relation is obs( urely felt. The w o r k of a r t , as L é v i n a s h a s
T h o u g h t is constrained to think nothing beyond objects. This s h o w n , realizes such a d e t a c h m e n t f r o m c o n d i t i o n s . It realizes
i s its " e x t r e m e y o u t h " — t o h a v e a l w a y s a l r e a d y e v a c u a t e d it- sheer a p p e a r a n c e . Radically u n s e i z a b l e , a r t realizes t h e e x t r e m e
self of all latency. T h o u g h t is o r i g i n a l l y p u r e l y e x p o s e d , p u r e l y p o s s i b i l i t y of another r e l a t i o n t h a t A g a m b e n h i s t o r i c i z e s in
p r e s e n t e d , p u r e l y there, a n d it is " a b l e " to h o l d itself j u s t en his La comunità che viene. H i s " c o m i n g " c o m m u n i t y is n o t h -
deçà du temps, or I'entretemps, p r i o r to its " w o r k " of figura- i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e sheer, i m m a n e n t p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g - i n - l a n -
tion. T h o u g h t , in short, before it is captured in the w o r l d , g u a g e i n s o f a r as l a n g u a g e offers n e u t r a l i t y , a n o n y m i t y , indif-
" t h i n k s " t h e p l a c e of a r t , l'espace littéraire. It is " a b l e " to ference w i t h r e g a r d t o identity. I t offers t h e s p e a k e r t h e " a b i l -
61
t h i n k , before t h e r e is a n y thing, " r e l a t i o n in g e n e r a l " in t h e i t y " t o n o l o n g e r say " I , " j u s t a s B l a n c h o t h a s w r i t t e n .
p u r e " t h e r e , " or // y a. T h i s " a b i l i t y " is a passivity. It is a p u r e O u r e r a , w r i t e s A g a m b e n , i s o n e i n w h i c h all r e a l i t y h a s
p a s s i o n . A p a s s i o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t is n e v e r p r e s e n t like a s t a t e - been t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o its image. G l a m o r o u s a n d alienating, t h e
o f - m i n d . It is t h e p u r e finding-myself-there, or b e i n g - t h e - t h e r e . spectacle h a s totalized itself a n d forever s e p a r a t e d h u m a n life
It c a n n o t n o t be-the-there (without purely a n d simply ceasing from the possibility of a p r e s u p p o s e d c o m m o n G o o d . O u r
t o b e ) . T h a t i s t o say, for a p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t , p u r e l y e x p o s e d " n a t u r e " — t h e fact t h a t w e s p e a k — h a s b e e n e x p r o p r i a t e d a n d
to all its possibilities (all its p r e d i c a t e s ) it is u n d e s t i n e d to a n y commodified and nothing of God, nothing of the sacred, had
o n e o r a n y set o f t h e m . B u t this p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t d o e s n o t b e e n r e v e a l e d i n t h i s " e x t r e m e l y nullifying u n v e i l i n g [ e s t r e m o
62
b e l o n g to a p a s t , a " w a s . " Da-sein, or t h e K a n t i a n " s u b j e c t , " svelamento nullificante]." In our era, communication occu-
6 3
is its there incessantly, w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , b e i n g a b l e to b r i n g pies its o w n " a u t o n o m o u s s p h e r e [sfera a u t o n o m a ] " (Bau-
itself b e f o r e itself. It is, as H e i d e g g e r s a y s , " a h e a d of itself." drillard's " h y p e r r e a l i t y " ) . T h e " w o r d " — t h e " p o w e r " t o reveal
In a c e r t a i n sense, we c o u l d say t h a t it is t h e very " w o r k " a n y t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r — h a s a c q u i r e d its o w n materiality a n d h a s
o f w h a t e v e r b e i n g precisely t o u n w o r k a n d u n d e t e r m i n e itself b e c o m e a c o m m o d i t y . L a n g u a g e , the M o s t C o m m o n , h a s b e e n
b y h o l d i n g itself i n " p e r f e c t h o m o n y m i t y . " A t least, A g a m b e n t a k e n f r o m u s a n d h a s r e v e a l e d o n l y t h e n o t h i n g n e s s o f all
w o u l d h a v e u s t h i n k s o , a n d i n his o w n w a y h e r e l a t e s w h a t - t h i n g s . Yet a h o p e a n d a n i n t e r v e n t i o n r e m a i n p o s s i b l e for u s .
ever beings, "tricksters or fakes, assistants or ' t o o n s [tricksters o T o b e g i n w i t h , lived e x p e r i e n c e h a s l o n g since b e e n dis-
p e r d i g i o r n o , a i u t a n t i o toons]" 59
(italics a n d English in o r i g i - t a n c e d i n a d v a n c e a n d h o l l o w e d o u t b y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . (It w a s
nal) t o t h e B l a n c h o t i a n writer, a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d i n Walter Benjamin w h o noticed those tourists, standing with
o u r p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . W h e n " e x p r o p r i a t e d o f all identity, s o their c a m e r a s in front of great w o r k s of art, preserving an
a s t o a p p r o p r i a t e b e l o n g i n g itself [ e s p r o p r i a t e d i t u t t e l e i d e n - e x p e r i e n c e t h e y w o u l d n e v e r h a v e . ) T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e Spec-
tità, per appropriarsi dell'appartenenza s t e s s a ] , " 6 0
whatever tacle (representation in general) is the p u r e form of separa-
b e i n g , like t h e writer, is s u b t r a c t e d f r o m all ( r e p r e s e n t a b l e ) t i o n : " [ W ] h e n t h e real w o r l d h a s b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n
c o m m o n a l i t y , all identifiable c o m m u n i t y , a n d b e c o m e s radically image a n d images become real, the practical p o w e r of h u m a n s
" c a p a b l e " of instability, fragility—that is, r e l a t i o n - i n - g e n e r a l . is s e p a r a t e d f r o m itself a n d p r e s e n t e d as a w o r l d u n t o itself
I ( ) I
I J 'I I K

[ d o v e il m o n d o reale si è t r a s f o r m a t o in u n ' i r n m a g i n e e le s o n " loi US Snd hil quasi difference from Blanchot. M o r e " p o s i -

i m m a g i n i d i v e n t a n t o reali, la p o t e n z a pratica dell'uomo si dis- t i v e l y " t h a n Blanchot, hi' says t h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y of t h o s e

t a c c a d a se stessa e si p r é s e n t a c o m e un m o n d o a se]." 6 4
This w h o have no c o m m o n , representable c o m m o n a l i t y is the re-

mondo a sé h a s b e e n c a p t u r e d a n d r e g u l a t e d by a c o m p e t i t i v e t u r n o f n o n e x c l u s i o n . Its e t e r n a l r e t u r n .

mediacracy that n o w manipulates and controls the perception In our era, then, it is no longer the sacred dead w h o reveal

a n d the m e m o r y of the community. H u m a n s , henceforth, are c o m m u n i t y t o u s a s w e g a t h e r t o g e t h e r i n a single ( d e c o m -


6 5

s e p a r a t e d f r o m their M o s t C o m m o n — l a n g u a g e , Logos. F u r - posing throng. I t i s t h e r e a l itself t h a t n o w i n c e s s a n t l y d i e s —

t h e r m o r e , A g a m b e n a r g u e s , this m a m m o t h , m a g n i f i c e n t e x - in its i m a g e , its c o r p s e , in l a n g u a g e itself. E x p e r i e n c e is l o n g

p r o p r i a t i o n h a s e m p t i e d t h e w o r l d o f all beliefs, t r a d i t i o n s , since d e a d . T h e r e i s (only) (the) n o t h i n g left t o e x p e r i e n c e —

c o n t e n t s , latency, a n d s a c r e d n e s s a n d h a s r e p l a c e d t h e m w i t h ourselves, in short. Only those " c a p a b l e " of such an experi-

p r o d u c t s . I t h a s r e v e a l e d t h e n o t h i n g n e s s o f all t h i n g s (i.e., i t e n c e w i l l e n t e r A g a m b e n ' s c o m m u n i t y che viene u n h a r m e d .

h a s r e v e a l e d t h a t w h a t w a s " h i d d e n " i n all t h i n g s — " b e h i n d T h e political task t h a t remains is destruction. T h e a p p e a r a n c e

a p p e a r a n c e s " — w a s o n l y t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y o f all t h i n g s t o be- of t h e autonomy of t h e m e d i a t i z e d spectacle m u s t be d e s t r o y e d .

c o m i n g their o w n image, their o w n a p p e a r a n c e . W h a t w a s L i k e t h e s a c r e d , a n d like t h e Sigetic V o i c e , t h e c o m m o d i t y /

" h i d d e n " w a s n o t s o m e essence, b u t s h e e r spectrality.) spectacle m u s t be ushered to the grave: " [ T ] o link together

T h a t which has been expropriated from h u m a n s n o w image a n d body in a space where they can no longer be sepa-

comes back to them commodified, w o r k e d over a n d revalu- r a t e d , a n d t h u s t o forge t h e w h a t e v e r b o d y , w h o s e physis i s

a t e d by t h e m e d i a because language is dead and has become resemblance—this is the good that humanity must learn to

its own image. O u r linguistic " n a t u r e " c o m e s b a c k to us in- wrest from commodities in their decline [compenetrare

v e r t e d : a s a r t , a s u n n a t u r a l , a s n o t - o u r s . I n its " w o r k " o f e m p - i m m a g i n e e c o r p o i n u n o s p a z i o i n c u i essi n o n p o s s a n o essere

t y i n g o u t beliefs a n d t r a d i t i o n s , l a n g u a g e itself r e m a i n s n e v e r - più separati e ottenere cosi in esso forgiato quel c o r p o

theless hidden a n d separated from us. q u a l u n q u e , la cui physis è la s o m i g l i a n z a , q u e s t o è il b e n e c h e


6 6
l ' u m a n i t à d e v e s a p e r s t r a p p a r e alla m e r c e a l t r a m o n t o ] . "
For this very reason, A g a m b e n argues, it is n o w possible
for u s t o e x p e r i e n c e l a n g u a g e i t s e l f — n o t t h i s o r t h a t c o n t e n t
o f l a n g u a g e , n o t t h i s o r t h a t t r u e o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t t h e
s h e e r fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " L a n g u a g e — t h a t w h i c h u n v e i l s — Politics
r e m a i n s i n o u r e r a , still veiled. W h a t r e m a i n s u n s e e n a n d u n - F a r f r o m l a m e n t i n g t h e loss o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e
e x p e r i e n c e d i s t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n , e m p t i e d o f all c o n t e n t , w e a k e n i n g o f m u t u a l p r e s e n c e a n d self p r e s e n c e , t h e e x p r o -
"is a b l e " t o c o m m u n i c a t e itself. T h e s i n k i n g i n t o n u l l i t y o f t h e p r i a t i o n o f o u r linguistic n a t u r e , a n d o u r c o n s e q u e n t alien-

r e a l c o m m u n i c a t e s n o m e s s a g e , n o destiny, n o t h i n g s a c r e d . I t a t i o n (adrift i n h y p e r s p a c e , B a u d r i l l a r d w o u l d s a y ) , A g a m b e n

c o m m u n i c a t e s o n l y t h e fragility o f b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n . T h i s a s k s u s t o w e l c o m e it. W e m u s t w e l c o m e i t b e c a u s e t h i s a l i e n -

m e a n s t h a t i t c o m m u n i c a t e s obsessively, i n c e s s a n t l y , a n d e x - ation alone can " r e s t o r e " us to ourselves, to ourselves insofar

clusively the impossibility of exclusion. T h i s is A g a m b e n ' s " l e s - a s w e a r e originally e x p r o p r i a t e d o f l a n g u a g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e .


/ M i n M ni IN A IN 11 i 11 r r i M i i i i /\ i IN I I I I E n i -i /

B e i n g - e x p r o p r i a t e d is human being. That is to say, at the e n d predil aii!|, ami ol vvliu h, a p a r t I r o m t h e s e , we c a n n o t


of t h e e r a of C a p i t a l a n d its magnificent c o n c e n t r a t i o n in t h e form the least c o n c e p t i o n . H e n c e we a r e o b l i g e d to go
Spectacle, t h e being t h a t r e t u r n s a n d the c o m m u n i t y t h a t c o m e s r o u n d this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in a p e r p e t u a l circle, i n a s -
is the o n e paradoxically " c o n s t i t u t e d " or "instituted" by ex- m u c h a s w e m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r t o f r a m e
p r o p r i a t i o n . It is t h e b e i n g w h o s e reality is p u r e l y linguistic a n y j u d g m e n t r e s p e c t i n g it. A n d this i n c o n v e n i e n c e w e
a n d ( p a r a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . T h i s b e i n g , this c o m m u n i t y , h a s n o find it i m p o s s i b l e to rid ourselves of, b e c a u s e c o n s c i o u s -
b e i n g p r o p e r t o i t e x c e p t for its ( p a r a ) t r a n s c e n d e n t a l b o r d e r - ness in itself is n o t so m u c h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o v e r n -
i n g on all its p o s s i b i l i t i e s . S u c h a b e i n g is fragile, u n s t a b l e ( a n - i n g a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t as a f o r m of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in
a r c h i c , as L e v i n a s w o u l d s a y ) — t h e pure possibility of any re- general. . . . 6 7

lation whatever. It is a b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d by e x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d
also, simultaneously, by the impossibility of exclusion because L i k e t h e o b j e c t = x, t h e s u b j e c t = x is i n c o n c e i v a b l e o u t -
i t i n c e s s a n t l y b o r d e r s o n all its possibilities. W i t h o u t d e s t i n y side its p r e d i c a t i o n s . I t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its p r e d i c a t i o n s ,
a n d w i t h o u t essence, the c o m m u n i t y t h a t returns is o n e never y e t it is n o t p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y its p r e d i c a t i o n s . T h e s u b j e c t = x
present in the first place. Presubjective in the p r o p e r sense, is " l i k e " t h e o b j e c t = x to t h e e x t e n t of b e i n g l i k e n e s s itself,
this c o m m u n i t y is qualunque! Infinitely v u l n e r a b l e , d e p e n d e n t (i.e., a l w a y s t h e S a m e , likeness or r e s e m b l a n c e is its physis). It
o n t h e s u p p l e m e n t , w e will h a v e b e e n offered, i n t h e e n d , t h e is a pure resemblance resembling nothing, no thing, no object.
p o s s i b i l i t y t o a p p r o p r i a t e o u r e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, b y " h o l d - A m e r e x, this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject is n o t k n o w a b l e or
ing ourselves in simple h o m o n y m i t y . " e x p e r i e n c e a b l e in itself. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n is a
I n o u r a n a l y s i s o f K a n t , w e h a v e seen t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n - nothing that can grasp nothing. It is that which makes pos-
d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t g r a s p a n o b j e c t . T h e sole " c o n - sible e x p e r i e n c e , b u t i t itself i s s u b t r a c t e d f r o m a n y e x p e r i -
t e n t " of its k n o w i n g is a l w a y s t h e " s a m e , " t h e o b j e c t = x: "A e n c e . W e m u s t n o t e K a n t ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o identify i t definitively.
something of which we can k n o w n o t h i n g , " Heidegger says. It is, exactly, a c o n s c i o u s n e s s : I, H e , She, or It. A l w a y s t h e
Deprived of any actual object, transcendental apperception S a m e , it has no identity. It is a l w a y s t h e S a m e x, t h e S a m e
can only " t h i n k " a pure " t h e r e " or a " p u r e position" that, in nothing. T h a t which unites intuition a n d makes experience
fact, it itself is. D e p r i v e d of e v e n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e n t (or i n t e l - " m i n e " i s w i t h o u t a n y identifiable self. A t t h e h e a r t o f K a n t i a n
l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n — s o m e t h i n g K a n t n e v e r a d m i t s i n t o his p h i - jemeinigkeit, t h e n , i s a n i n e l i m i n a t a b l e s t r a n g e n e s s . "Mine-
losophy), this "perfectly contentless representation," he says, n e s s " i s a n i n t i m a c y e x t e r i o r t o myself. T h i s s t r a n g e r c a n n o t
b e e x c l u d e d , for " w e m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r t o f r a m e
C a n n o t even be called a c o n c e p t i o n , b u t m e r e l y a c o n - a n y j u d g m e n t r e s p e c t i n g i t . " T h e p u r e I is x, It: t o o w e a k to
s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s all c o n c e p t i o n s . B y t h i s g r a s p itself or k n o w itself in its own e x p e r i e n c e of itself. Its
I , o r It, w h o o r w h i c h t h i n k s , n o t h i n g m o r e i s r e p r e - u n i t y i s p u r e l y thought, b u t n o t objectified, a n d h e n c e i t r e -
s e n t e d t h a n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject of t h o u g h t = x, m a i n s u n r e c o g n i z e d . I n f r a m i n g itself i t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e l u d e s
which is cognized only by means of t h o u g h t s t h a t are its o w n g r a s p . It is a p a r e n t h e s i s t h a t i n c l u d e s all b u t itself. As
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subjecl is nol a p u n - unity u m l y i n g itself. It is t h e e n u n c i a t o r .
e n f r a m e d , it is e m p t y oí itseli and is t h u s the p m e border or
T h a t w h i c h Kant described as subject = x n e e d e d to be s u p p l e -
l i m i t b e t w e e n b o t h p u r e senselessness and s u p c r s e n s o r i t y , on
m e n t e d a n d r e t h o u g h t a s the o n e w h o says " I . " K a n t ' s s u b j e c t
t h e o n e h a n d , a n d c h a o t i c s e n s a t i o n , o n t h e other. I n this w a y ,
we reencounter the p a r a d o x of time that in-forms that which = x, to be a subject, h a d to s p e a k (itself). B u t t h i s leaves us

a r t i c u l a t e s i t (the c a t e g o r i e s , e.g.) s u c h t h a t t h e r e i s n o t i m e w i t h a q u e s t i o n : if it is n o t (yet) a s u b j e c t (until it e n u n c i a t e s

t h a t is n o t always already articulated a n d also no category itself), w h a t o r w h o m d i d K a n t c a t c h a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g l i m p s e

that is not always already temporalized. of?

For Kant, the pure contentless "representation I," the T h e p u r e " t h e r e " o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n offers

Umkreis o r t h e " I t h i n k " t h a t a c c o m p a n i e s all r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s n o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t w o u l d m a k e i t mine, m y " I . " T h e p u r e

and makes them mine, remains unexaminable and is purely b e i n g - t h e r e i s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a n y subject, b u t t o a m e r e " t h e r e

a n d s i m p l y named a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " s u b j e c t " — t h e p u r e s u b - m u s t be s o m e o n e " (and, moreover, someone ex-scribed, some-

ject of t h e v e r b , in s h o r t , a text. B u t by w h a t m a g i c d o e s K a n t o n e w h o loses t h e power t o say " I " ) . T h i s p u r e p o s i t i o n cer-

identify t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as t h e " I " of language} t a i n l y d o e s n o t realize t h e i m m e d i a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f " m y -

In an earlier book, Infancy and History: Essays on the self," b u t i n fact realizes t h e a b s e n c e o f " m y s e l f , " a s w e h a v e

Destruction of Experience [Infamia e storia: Distruzione dell' a l r e a d y n o t e d . W h a t i s m o r e , t h e sheer p o s s i b i l i t y i n g e n e r a l

esperienza e origine della storia], A g a r a b e n calls o u r a t t e n t i o n o f a n y s p a t i o t e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n i s r a d i c a l l y a n d o r i g i n a r i l y in-

to H a m a n n ' s m e t a c r i t i q u e of K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason. accessible t o a n y subject. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n —

H a m a n n asks: h o w pure is Pure Reason? As we learn from I , H e , S h e , o r I t — i s n o t a s u p r a c o n c e p t t h a t i n c l u d e s all " P s "

A g a m b e n ' s r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f t h e a r g u m e n t , for K a n t t h e p u r e u n d e r its u m b r e l l a . It is n o t a c o n c e p t at all. N o r a s u p r a g e n u s ,

geometric unity of the " t h e r e " seems just naturally to belong n o r a set of all sets. It is precisely t h e r i g o r o u s impossibility of

t o l a n g u a g e , s o t h a t " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n d linguistic s e e m t o a n y such c o n c e p t , of any s u p e r s e n s o r y generality. Totally d e v o i d

merge [trascendentale e lingüístico s e m b r a n o c o n f o n d e r s i ] . " 6 8 o f all c o n t e n t , o f all e x p e r i e n c e , y e t n o t a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g a t

It w a s H a m a n n , according to A g a m b e n , w h o first suggested all, t h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e S a m e a s H e i d e g g e r ' s


72

t h e necessity o f c o n t a m i n a t i n g K a n t i a n p u r i t y b y e x a m i n i n g Da-sein w h o s e " w h o " i s a l w a y s i n q u e s t i o n . It c a n n o t expe-

its h i d d e n (or, L a c a n m i g h t say, its " f o r g o t t e n " ) r e l a t i o n t o r i e n c e itself as itself a n d it is t h e v e r y eclipse of a u t o a f f e c t i o n .

l a n g u a g e . H e says i t s i m p l y a n d d r a m a t i c a l l y : " R e a s o n i s l a n - R a d i c a l l y s u s p e n d e d , t h e Da-sein, b e i n g - t h e - t h e r e , is j u s t as

g u a g e , logos. T h i s i s t h e m a r r o w b o n e a t w h i c h I shall g n a w radically disinherited. Transcendental apperception, the pure

u n t i l I die o f i t . " 6 9
From H a m a n n ' s intuition, Agamben takes " t h e r e , " ( d e ) c o n s t i t u t e s t h e " I " t h a t institutes itself i n l a n g u a g e

us directly to the notion, elaborated by Benveniste, t h a t it is in by interrupting it incessantly—by paralyzing and neutralizing

a n d t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i s insti- it. K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n h a d t o b e s u p p l e m e n t e d

t u t e d . W i t h impressive simplicity, Benveniste d e c l a r e s , " H e w h o b y l a n g u a g e i n o r d e r t o i n s t i t u t e a n " I , " a subject. T h a t w h i c h

says ego is e g o . " 7 0


Prior to any experience, transcending any a c c o m p a n i e s all m y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d m a k e s t h e m m i n e h a s

e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , is t h e saying of " I . " T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t o say " I . " B u t t o w h o m , o r t o w h a t reality, will t h i s " I " refer?
B e n v e n i s t e answers, rigorously, "To something very singular, version ol the iubje< t, n o t a n e w foundation, n o r a p u r e a n d
w h i c h is exclusively linguistic: / refers to the act of individual s i m p l e absence ol foundation. C o m i n g b e i n g is t h e b e i n g t h a t
d i s c o u r s e in w h i c h it is uttered a n d it designates its s p e a k e r e n t e r s l a n g u a g e a n d w h o s e " t r a n s c e n d e n c e " i s its c o m p l e t e
t h e reality it e v o k e s is t h e r e a l i t y of d i s c o u r s e . " 7 1
absorption, w i t h o u t residue, in language. It is the being w h o s e
T h e fleeting a n d p u r e " I " t h a t K a n t a t t e m p t e d t o p o s i t i n Being i s its b o r d e r i n g o n l a n g u a g e , o n " a l l its p r e d i c a t e s . " Y o u
transcendental apperception w a s never a n y w h e r e but in lan- see, t h e r e i s i n fact a n e x p e r i e n c e t h a t " r e m a i n s " w h e n all
g u a g e . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, i n t h e e n d , w a s t o h a v e experience has been expropriated. T h a t experience is the ex-
b e e n m a d e u p o f w o r d s . T h e Umkreis w a s l a n g u a g e . I t w a s p e r i e n c e of e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, or l a n g u a g e , for l a n g u a g e is
t h e r e f o r e l a n g u a g e t h a t s t o l e f r o m m e all m y e x p e r i e n c e s a b t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f all p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i e n c e s a n d i s t h e s h e e r
o v o . / w a s n e v e r a n y w h e r e b u t i n m y saying " I . " T h e s u b j e c t possibility of any particular experience. N o t this or t h a t con-
w a s s p o k e n , u t t e r e d : H e w h o said " I . " All e x p e r i e n c e , i n s h o r t , t e n t o f l a n g u a g e , n o t t h i s o r t h a t t r u e o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t
w a s always already speech. There is no prelinguistic subject, t h e s h e e r a n d fragile fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " T h e c o m i n g b e -
no dumb experience, and no transcendence otherwise than in i n g will b e " c a p a b l e " o f its a b s o r p t i o n , w i t h o u t r e m a i n d e r , i n
language. T h e s u b j e c t is p u r e l y linguistic b e i n g . l a n g u a g e . I t will a t t h e s a m e t i m e " r e t a i n " t h i s " c a p a b i l i t y "

W h a t K a n t c a u g h t a g l i m p s e of, t h e r e f o r e , w a s n o t a t all (or potentia) a n d t h i n k l a n g u a g e a s s u c h . B o t h a c t i v e a n d p a s -

transcendent, but not-yet transcendence, not-yet language. sive will fuse i n t o a single p a s s i o n . S u c h a b e i n g will r e m a i n

W h a t Kant caught a glimpse of was an impotence or an " c a p a b l e " of its passivity. It will a l w a y s t h i n k , n o t itself (in its

o r i g i n a r y dependence o n l a n g u a g e . W h a t K a n t s k e t c h e d o u t i d e n t i t y t h a t l a n g u a g e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y offers a n d w i t h d r a w s )

for us w a s a n o t - y e t s u b j e c t , a H e , S h e , or It t h a t has yet to but the Same—always the Same experience of expropriation

s p e a k a n d i s t h e r e f o r e not p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y e m b e d d e d i n a n d a l i e n a t i o n as o r i g i n a l .

l a n g u a g e . H e c a u g h t a g l i m p s e o f t h a t w h i c h m u s t enter l a n - B e c a u s e I am able to e n t e r l a n g u a g e ( a n d t h e r e is n o t h i n g
g u a g e a n d w h o s e i m p o t e n c e i s its i m p o t e n t " p o w e r " t o think else for h u m a n b e i n g t o e n t e r ) , I a m a l s o a b l e t o t h i n k t h i s
( b u t n o t t o c i r c u m s c r i b e , o r limit) its " m u s t s p e a k . " T h a t i s t o entry. I am able to think the r e t u r n of language to language.
say, K a n t d e s c r i b e s for u s , in light of B e n v e n i s t e , in l i g h t of Such thinking involves, as Blanchot has repeatedly s h o w n , "a
l a n g u a g e , or, m o r e simply, i n light o f L i g h t itself, t h a t w h i c h loss o f t h e p o w e r t o say T , " a n d t h u s a n i m m e r s i o n i n fasci-
h a s n o V o i c e , i s given n o Voice, b u t m u s t a p p r o p r i a t e l a n - nation a n d a contact with an absolute milieu. No longer to be
g u a g e n o n e t h e l e s s in o r d e r to be itself. T h a t is to say, it must a b l e t o say " I " i s t o t h i n k t h e S a m e ( n o o n e , a n y o n e , t h e
appropriate that which will expropriate it of all "mineness." N e u t e r ) . T h e region of A g a m b e n ' s politics is the region of
7 4
" O l d e r " t h a n subjectivity is t h a t w h i c h , in h u m a n being, p r e - Blanchot's "Essential S o l i t u d e " — e m p t i e d of subject a n d o b -
cedes language. N o t a "wordless" experience, sacred and ject a n d r a d i c a l l y i m p e r s o n a l like T h o m a s ' s e n c o u n t e r i n t h e
m y s t e r i o u s , b u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of l a n g u a g e itself. first c h a p t e r of Thomas L'obscur t h a t L e v i n a s c e l e b r a t e d as so
75

I t i s n o t o u t s i d e l a n g u a g e , b u t a t its l i m i t t h a t A g a m b e n fine a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e il y a. F o r if t h e e n t r y i n t o l a n g u a g e

seeks to p r o v o k e a politics. T h e c o m i n g being is n o t a n o t h e r e s t a b l i s h e s all p o s s i b l e b e l o n g i n g o r r e l a t i o n - i n - g e n e r a l ( t h a t


w h i c h , i n s h o r t , h e a r s u p o n a n y politics o r any t l h i e s w h a t
e v e r ) , it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a p p r o p r i a t e s us of a n y p a r t i c u l a r rela-
t i o n , p o l i t i c s , or e t h i c s . A n d t h u s p o l i t i c s is exposed. Any par-
t i c u l a r p o l i t i c s , o r a n y p o l i t i c s a s u s u a l , a s w e cynically say (as
i f i t w e r e a n a u t o n o m o u s s p h e r e c l o s e d t o us), i s o n l y p o l i t i c s Notes
so-called (as w e m u s t l e a r n t o say i f w e a r e t o e n t e r i t a n d
d e s t r o y its p h a n t a s m i c a u t o n o m y ) .
T h a t w h i c h i s offered u s i s a l w a y s t h e S a m e : n o t a n es-
s e n c e , a s h i n i n g p a t h , n o r a destiny, b u t t h e sheer p o s s i b i l i t y
of r e l a t i o n in general—a dice t h r o w . A n y p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c or
e t h i c is a p o i n t of c o n t a c t w i t h an a b s o l u t e m i l i e u e m p t y of all
d e t e r m i n a c y . A n y p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c s is a l s o t h e face, t h e eidos,
of " a n y relation at all." W i t h the notion of radical passivity
w e h a v e a t t e m p t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s b o o k t o d e s c r i b e a general
Introduction
r a p p o r t or an imaginary dimension where we have never been
b u t to w h i c h we are e x p o s e d prior to o u r subjective inten-
1. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy and Awakening," trans.
t i o n s . T h e u n c a n n y " a b i l i t y " t o t h i n k this r a p p o r t i s t h e " a b i l - M a r y Q u a i n t a n c e , in Who Comes After the Subject?, e d . E d u a r d o
ity" to think that which always comes. N o t the masses, nor Cadava, Peter Connor, a n d Jean-Luc N a n c y ( N e w York: Routledge,
the horde, nor the wolves, and not the hero, nor the indi- 1991), p. 215.
v i d u a l , n o r t h e survivor. T h e m o t l e y . 2. E m m a n u e l Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," trans.

M i c h a e l H o l l a n d , in The Lévinas Reader, e d . S e à n H a n d ( C a m b r i d g e :


Basil Blackwell, 1 9 8 9 ) , p. 1 5 9 n. 3.

3. E m m a n u e l Lévinas, "Being and the Other: On Paul Celan,"

trans. Stephen Melville, Chicago Review 2 9 , n o s . 1 6 - 2 1 (winter

1978): 16.
4. Maurice Blanchot, " T h e Outside, the Night," trans. Ann
S m o c k , in The Space of Literature ( L i n c o l n : U n i v e r s i t y o f N e b r a s k a
P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 1 6 4 - 6 7 ; i d e m , " L a d e h o r s , l a n u i t , " i n L'espace
Littéraire, I d é e s s e r . ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 5 5 ) , p p . 2 2 0 - 2 2 .
Chapter One. The Allegory of Being

1. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Reality a n d Its Shadow," trans.

A l p h o n s o Lingis, in H a n d , ed., Lévinas Reader, p . 1 3 3 ; i d e m , " L a


163
rèaIite et son o m b r e , " Les Temps Modernes 4, no, 38 (November I I.udì, I In m y ( lui <>l Bounds s e i . (Minneapolis: University of Min-
1948): 774. nesota Press, I 99 I), pp. 9 7 - 9 8 . La comunità che viene (Torino: Giulio
2. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. I 33; idem, "La réalité Einaudi Editore, 1990), pp. 6 9 - 7 0 .
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 5 . 14. Maurice Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans.
3. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 132; idem, "La réalité Lydia Davis, in Sitney, éd., Gaze of Orpheus, p p . 8 2 - 8 5 ; idem, " T h e
et son o m b r e , " p. 774. Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Lit-
4. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 133; idem, "La réalité erature , p p . 2 5 7 - 6 0 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," in
et son o m b r e , " pp. 7 7 4 - 7 5 . L'espace littéraire , p p . 3 4 6 - 4 9 .
5. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p p . 1 3 3 - 3 4 ; idem, "La 15. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p . 1 3 6 ; idem, "La réalité
réalité et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 5 . et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 9 .
6. Maurice Blanchot, "The Song of the Sirens," trans. Lydia 16. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité
Davis, in The Gaze of Orpheus, ed. P. Adams Sitney (Barrytown, et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 7 .
N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1981), pp. 1 0 5 - 1 3 ; idem, "Le chant des Si- 17. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 3 5 ; idem, "La réalité
rènes," in Le livreà venir, Idées ser. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971),pp. 9 - 1 9 . et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 8 .
7. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 134; idem, "La réalité 18. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 777. et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 1 .
8. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 134; idem, "La réalité 19. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 776. et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 2 .
9. This is hardly the place to summarize Philippe Lacoue- 2 0 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
Labarthe's carefully nuanced w o r k on the question of mimesis. We et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 3 - 8 4 .
only wish to note that he studies various attempts to restrict, reduce, 2 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 138; idem, "La réalité
ignore, or decide on mimesis, and he characterizes each of these et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 2 .
attempts as profoundly political or moral gestures. See especially his 2 2 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 138; idem, "La réalité
" T y p o g r a p h y , " trans. E d u a r d o C a d a v a , "Diderot: P a r a d o x a n d et son o m b r e , " p. 782 (emphasis mine).
Mimesis," trans. Jane P o p p , and "Transcendence Ends in Politics," 2 3 . On this point see Jacques Derrida, "At this very m o m e n t in
trans. Peter Caws, in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. this w o r k here I a m , " t r a n s . R u b e n Berezdivin, in Re-Reading
Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge: H a r v a r d University Press, 1989); Lévinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington:
see as well idem, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Indiana University Press, 1991), p p . 1 1 - 4 8 ; see also J o h n Llewelyn,
Political, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990). "Lévinas, Derrida and Others Vis-à-vis," in The Provocation of
10. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p p . 1 3 4 - 3 5 ; idem, "La Lévinas, ed. R o b e r t Bernasconi a n d D a v i d W o o d ( N e w York:
réalité et son o m b r e , " p. 777. Routledge, 1988), p p . 1 5 3 - 5 4 .
1 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité 2 4 . Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 8 . 87; idem, " T h e Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
12. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité 2 6 1 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
et son o m b r e , " p. 786. 2 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
1 3 . Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael et son o m b r e , " p. 784.
2 6 . Lévinas, "Reality anil lis Shadow," p. 140; idem, " l a réalité 87; idem, " I he [\VO Versions ol d i e Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 . 262; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p . 350 (italics in
2 7 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité original).
et son o m b r e , " p. 784. 39. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité
2 8 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité et son o m b r e , " p. 786.
et son o m b r e , " p. 786. 4 0 . Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
2 9 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité 87; idem, " T h e T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 . 2 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
3 0 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité 4 1 . Michel Foucault, " M a u r i c e Blanchot: The T h o u g h t from
et son o m b r e , " p. 786. Outside," trans. Brian Massumi, in Foucault/Blanchot (New York:
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 - 4 2 ; idem, "La Z o n e Books, 1987), p. 17.
réalité et son o m b r e , " p . 7 8 7 .
32. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité Chapter Two. Levinas's Ethics
et son o m b r e , " p. 788.
3 3 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité 1. Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Es-
et son o m b r e , " p. 788. sence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981),
34. The notion of an "interruption of m y t h " that Lévinas puts p. 191 n. 3; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (The
forward here has recently been developed in an essay by Jean-Luc H a g u e : M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1974), p. 86 n. 3.
N a n c y entitled " M y t h Interrupted," trans. Peter Connor, in The In- 2. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p p . 5 0 ,
operative Community, ed. Peter Connor, Theory and History of Lit- 1 3 6 - 4 0 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 6 4 ,
erature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p p . 1 7 4 - 7 9 (italics in original).
4 3 - 7 0 ; and also in an essay on Paul Celan by Philippe Lacoue- 3. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Bad Conscience and the Inexorable,"
Labarthe entitled " C a t a s t r o p h e , " trans. Andrea Tarnowski, in Word trans. Richard A. Cohen, in Face to Face with Lévinas, ed. Richard
Traces: Readings of Paul Celan, ed. Aris Fioretos (Baltimore: The A. Cohen (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1986), p p .
Johns H o p k i n s University Press, 1994), p p . 1 3 0 - 5 6 . 3 6 - 4 0 ; idem, "La mauvaise conscience et l'inexorable" in De Dieu
3 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 132; idem, "La réalité qui vient à l'idée (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 2 5 8 - 6 5 .
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 3 : "[A]rt does not belong to the order of revela- 4. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas,"
tion. N o r does it belong to that of creation, which moves in just the trans. Richard Kearney, in Face to Face with Lévinas, p. 2 1 .
opposite direction [l'art n'appartient pas à l'ordre de la révélation. 5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, " É c o u t e , " Poésie 35 (1986): 110.
N i , d'ailleurs, à celui de la création dont le mouvement se poursuit 6. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 11;
dans un sens exactement inverse]." idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 14.
3 6 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité 7. M a r t i n Heidegger, Nihilism, vol. 4 of Nietzsche, trans. Frank
et son o m b r e , " p. 788. A Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: H a r p e r and Row,
37. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité 1982), p p . 9 6 - 1 1 8 .
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 1 . 8. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 8; idem,
3 8 . Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p. Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 10.
9. It should be clear even from our analysis so far thai the lan- 2 1 . | evinos, < Hhârwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 112;
guage of Levinas translates nicely into the I Iciclcggerian German of idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 4 3 .
Sein und Lett. This paragraph and the entire discussion of alterity 2 2 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Unconscious Nonetheless," p p . 150,
echoes Heidegger's Ruf (Anruf, Aufruf) and his Schuldigsein. At the 197 n. 4 5 ; see also Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject,
end of this chapter, we will take up the question of Levinas's affinity trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
(and aversion) to Heidegger. 1988), p. 26ff.
10. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 2 5 ; 2 3 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Freudian Subject," p. 2 6 .
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 32. 2 4 . François Roustang, foreword, trans. Catherine Porter, to
1 1 . Levinas, Otherivise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 69; Borch-Jacobsen, Freudian Subject, p. ix.
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 86. 2 5 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 16;
12. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 1 4 8 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 2 0 .
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 189. 2 6 . Lacoue-Labarthe, "Diderot: P a r a d o x and Mimesis," p . 2 5 9 .
1 3 . Heidegger, Nihilism, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 0 . 2 7 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 59;
14. Two impressive books by Michel Henry take up this thesis: idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 76.
The Essence of Manifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The H a g u e : 2 8 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 114;
M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1973) and Généalogie de la psychanalyse (Paris: idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 146.
Presses Universitaires de France, 1985); but see also Mikkel Borch- 2 9 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 4 3 ; idem, La comunità
Jacobsen's insightful summary and critique of the argument, " T h e che viene , p. 30.
Unconscious Nonetheless," trans. Douglas Brick, in The Emotional 30. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
Tie (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p p . 1 2 3 - 5 4 . 3 5 : " N o language other than ethics could be equal to the p a r a d o x
1 5 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 124; which phenomenological description enters when, starting with the
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 159. disclosure, the appearing of a neighbor, it reads it in its trace, which
16. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 5 8 ; orders the face according to a diachrony which cannot be synchro-
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 75 (italics in nized in representation;" idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
original). l'essence, p. 120 n. 35: "Aucun langage autre qu'éthique n'est à même
17. Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," p. 2 8 . d'égaler le p a r a d o x e où entre la description phénoménologique qui,
18. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, " T h e Freudian Subject: From Poli- p a r t a n t du dévoilement du prochain, de son apparaître, le lit dans sa
tics to Ethics," trans. Richard Miller and X. P. Callahan, in Emo- trace qui l'ordonne visage selon une diachronie non-synchronisable
tional Tie, p p . 1 5 - 2 1 ; on this point see also Jean Luc-Nancy and dans le représentation."
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Title of the Letter, trans. François 3 1 . Georges Bataille, The Tears of Eros, trans. Peter C o n n o r (San
Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of N e w York Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989), p. 206ff.
Press, 1992). 32. M u c h of this discussion of Levinas's ethics (and much of my
19. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104; understanding of Blanchot) owes its inspiration to t w o sensitive ar-
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 132-33. ticles by William Flesch: "Proximity and Power: Shakespearean and
2 0 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 106; D r a m a t i c Space," Theater Journal 3 9 , no. 3 (October 1987); idem,
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 3 5 . " P o s t h u m o u s Sadness," unpublished paper.
'It Quoted bj lacques Derrida m "Introduction: Desistance,"
I i. Qu< iicd h y Maurice Blam hoi m The Unallowable < cm ina-
trans. ( Li i s 11 > i ) 11 e i lynsk, in Lacouc-Labarthe, typography, p. 2 3 .
nity, trans. Picric J o n s (BarrytOWfl, N.Y.: Station I [ill Press, I VSS),
p. 9; idem, La communauté inavouable (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit,
1983), p. 21 (italics in original). Chapter Three. Blanchot, L'arrêt de mort, and

34. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n. the Image of Literature
3 3 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 116 n. 3 3 . In
this quiet note Levinas more or less admits that the olamic r a p p o r t 1. Blanchot, " T h e Narrative Voice," trans. Davis, p p . 1 3 3 - 4 4 ;
with the Other is anything but equaled by the language of ethics; the idem, " T h e Narrative Voice," trans. Hanson, p p . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La
rapport, in fact, is a problem for ethics to solve. voix narrative," p p . 4 2 1 - 3 7 .
3 5 . Maurice Blanchot, "The Narrative Voice," trans. Lydia Davis, 2. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso
in Sitney, ed., Gaze of Orpheus, p p . 1 3 3 - 4 4 ; idem, " T h e Narrative Lingis (The Flague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p p . 5 2 - 6 4 ; idem, De
Voice," trans. Susan H a n s o n , in The Infinite Conversation, Theory l'existence à l'existant (Paris: Vrin, 1981), p p . 8 1 - 1 0 5 .
a n d History of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minne- 3. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p p . 5 6 - 5 7 ; idem, De
sota Press, 1 9 9 3 ) , p p . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La v o i x n a r r a t i v e , " i n l'existence à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
L'entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p p . 4 2 1 - 3 7 . 4. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence
36. This Other (Autrui), is, as we have been stressing, neither à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
this one nor that one, neither an individual nor a group or crowd, 5. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
but instead a singularity whose radical indifferentiation is the other à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
of any representable difference. 6. A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp. 53-58; idem, La
37. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Of B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n , " t r a n s . J a m e s comunità che viene, p p . 3 6 - 3 9 .
Creech, in Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective 7. Maurice Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art,"
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p p . 1-12. t r a n s . Ann Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 2 2 4 ; idem, "Les
3 8 . Blanchot, Unavowable Community, p. 8; idem, La commun- caractères de l'œuvre d'art," in L'espace littéraire, p. 2 9 7 .
auté inavouable, p. 19. 8. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
39. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A. "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 7 .
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982), p. 86; idem, 9. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
Éthique et infini (Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard et Radio France, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 6 .
1982), p. 80. 10. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
4 0 . B l a n c h o t , Unavowable Community, p. 11; idem, La "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 6 .
communauté inavouable, p. 2 4 . 1 1 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
4 1 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n. "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 7 .
1; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 125 n. 1. 12. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence
4 2 . Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "History and Mimesis," trans. à l'existant, p. 90.
E d u a r d o C a d a v a , in Looking After Nietzsche, ed. Laurence A. 1 3 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
Ricklels (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1990), p. 2 2 9 .
à l'existant, p. 9 2 .
14. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence (I. Blani hot, D$ath S,•nlrin<\ p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
à l'existant, p p . 9 3 - 9 4 . 76.
15. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p. 32. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7.
79; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p. 3 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 8.
2 5 4 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 4 1 . 34. Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
16. J e a n - L u c Nancy, " O f B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n , " t r a n s . J a m e s et son o m b r e , " p. 784.
Creech, in Miami Theory Collective, ed., Community at Loose Ends, 35. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K.
p. 2. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: R a n d o m H o u s e ,
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N o r m a n 1981), 3:802.
Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 1 8 3 . 36. M a u r i c e Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, t r a n s . Lycette
18. M a r t i n Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Nelson (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1992), p. 5 0 ;
trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, idem, Le pas au-delà (Paris: Gallimard 1973), p. 7 2 .
1962), p p . 1 0 2 - 6 . 37. Levinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 1 5 3 ; idem, "La
19. William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger: Through Phenom- servante et son maître," in Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier: Fata
enology to Thought (The Hague: M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1963), p. 132. M o r g a n a , 1975), p . 34.
2 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p p . 1-2; idem, La comunità 3 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
che viene, p p . 3 - 4 . 126.
2 1 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp. 53-56; idem, La 39. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 8 1 .
comunità che viene, p p . 5 3 - 5 8 . 4 0 . Maurice Blanchot, "Reading," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze
2 2 . A gamben, Coming Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità of Orpheus, p p . 9 4 - 9 6 ; idem, "Reading," trans. Ann Smock, in Space
che viene, p. 52. of Literature, p p . 1 9 4 - 9 6 ; idem, "Lire," in L'espace littéraire, p p .
2 3 . M a u r i c e Blanchot, Death Sentence, t r a n s . Lydia Davis 256-58.
(Barrytown, N Y : Station Hill Press, 1978), p. 3 1 ; idem, L'arrêt de 4 1 . Steven Shaviro, Passion and Excess: Blanchot, Bataille, and
mort (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 54. Literary Theory (Tallahassee: The Florida State University Press,
2 4 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p p . 8 1 - 1990), p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
9; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 3 . 4 2 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 5 0 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p.
2 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 54; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 72.
88. 4 3 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
2 6 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 5 4 - 5 5 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, 4 4 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
p . 89. 126.
2 7 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. Ill; 4 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, 127.
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 4 1 . 4 6 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 80; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
2 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7. 127.
2 9 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 4 6 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 4 7 . Maurice Blanchot, "Kafka and the Work's D e m a n d , " trans.
76. A n n Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 5 7 - 8 3 ; idem, "Kafka et
30. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7 6 . l'exigence de l'œuvre," in L'espace littéraire, p p . 5 9 - 9 8 .
48. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mori, p, 68. I evinflS, "The Sci vani and I 1er Master," p. 155; idem, "La
55. servante el sun maître," p. 37.
4 9 . Blanchot, Deaï/j Sentence, p. 72; idem, //arre/ de mort, p. 69. Lévinas, " T h e Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
115. servante et son maître," p. 40.
50. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 72; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 70. Lévinas, " T h e Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
116. servante et son maitre," p. 40.
5 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7 1 . Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
126. servante et son maître," p. 4 0 .
52. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità 72. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 104; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 8 .
che viene, p. 77.
5 3 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità 7 3 . Blanchot, " T h e Outside, the Night," p. 1 6 3 - 7 0 ; idem, "La
che viene, p. 5 8 .
dehors, la nuit," p p . 2 1 3 - 2 4 .
5 4 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 9 3 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p. 74. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p p . 2 3 2 ;
129.
idem, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p p . 310.
5 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
7 5 . Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 .
and 106; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 1 3 2 -
56. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 199 n.
33 and 135.
2 1 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 191 n. 2 1 .
76. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p p . 2 3 2 - 3 3 ;
57. R Adams Sitney makes this observation in his afterword to
idem, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 310.
Blanchot, Gaze of Orpheus, p. 1 7 1 .
7 7 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 3 3 ; idem,
5 8 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, p p . 1 4 2 - 7 0 .
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 3 1 1 .
59. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
7 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
30.
35.
60. Foucault, "Maurice Blanchot," p. 39. 79. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
6 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 30; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 87; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p p .
52-53. 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
6 2 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 3 5 . 80. " T h e dead present is the impossibility of realizing a pres-
6 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. ence—an impossibility that is present, that is there as that which
36. doubles every present, the s h a d o w of the present, which the present
64. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 8 1 . carries and hides in itself. W h e n I am alone, in this present, I am not
6 5 . Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," p. 1 5 5 ; idem, "La alone, but am already returning to myself in the form of Someone.
servante et son maître," p. 37. Someone is there, when I am alone. [Le présent mort est l'impossibilité
6 6 . Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," p. 155; idem, "La de réaliser une présence, impossibilité qui est présente, qui est là
servante et son maître," p. 37. c o m m e ce qui double tout présent, l'ombre du présent, que celui-ci
67. Lévinas, "The Servant and H e r Master," p. 1 5 5 ; idem, "La p o r t e et dissimule en lui. Q u a n d je suis seul, je ne suis pas seul, mais,
servante et son maître," p. 37. dans ce présent, je reviens déjà à moi sous la forme de Q u e l q u ' u n .
12. Antonin Artaud, "Exposition Balthus à la Gallerie Pierre,"
Quelqu'un est là, où je suis seul.]" Maurice Blanchot, " T h e Essen-
La Nouvelle Revue français 2 2 , no. 248 (May 1934): 8 9 9 - 9 0 .
tial Solitude," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze <>/ Orpheus, p. 74; idem,
1 3 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Literature,
p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude essentielle," in L'espace littéraire, p. 2 7 . che viene, p. 6 2 .
14. Translator's note in Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 0 7 .
8 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p p .
55-56. 1 5 . Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest
Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
82. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 3 2 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 310. 16. Agamben, Corning Community, p p . 6 6 - 6 7 ; idem, La comu-
nità che viene, p p . 4 5 - 4 6 .
Chapter Four. Agamben and the Political Neuter 17. Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," p. 8 5 ; idem,
" T h e Two Versions of the Imaginary," p. 2 6 0 ; idem, "Les deux ver-
1. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 6 9 ; idem, sions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 0 .
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p p . 2 6 - 2 7 ; idem, "La soli-
18. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 19-20; idem, La
tude essentielle," p. 2 1 .
comunità che viene, pp. 15-16.
2. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem, 19. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 19; idem, La comunità
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 27; idem, "La solitude che viene, p. 1 5 .
essentielle," p. 17. 2 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, p p . 8-9.
3. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 77; idem,
2 1 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 85; idem, La comunità
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 3 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p p . 2 7 - 2 8 . che viene, p. 58
22. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 79-83; idem, La
4. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 74; idem,
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude comunità che viene, p p . 5 3 - 5 7 . Let us emphasize yet again the neu-
essentielle," p. 2 4 . trality of this " o n e " w h o speaks. It is not simply the experience that
J speak, but rather that the "I speak" is neutralized such t h a t it is
5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis," trans.
Angela Brewer and X. P. Callahan, in Emotional Tie, p. 50. experienced as an anonymous entry into language. As it enters lan-
guage, the individual identity " I " is overwhelmed and carried away
6. On the relation between analysis, hysteria and narrative
modes see ibid., p. 184 n. 14. by language, or, more simply, by speaking.
7. Ibid., p p . 4 9 - 6 2 . 2 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p p . 6 1 - 6 3 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort,
8. Lacoue-Labarthe, "Typography," p. 1 3 3 . pp.99-103.
9. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p. 2 4 . Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Nega-
8 8 ; idem, " T h e T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p. tivity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt, Theory and History
2 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 . of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991 ),
10. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence p p . 8 4 - 9 8 ; idem, 17 linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
à l'existant, p. 90. della negatività (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1982), p p . 1 0 4 - 2 3 .
1 1 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence 2 5 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 ; i d e m , Il
à l'existant, p. 9 0 .
linguaggio e la morte, p p . 1 1 8 - 2 0 .
26. Agamben, Language and Death, pp, 63 65; idem, // //// )6, Ibid., p. 1 1 3 Lb
guaggio e la morte, pp. 7 9 - 8 I. 37. I'.I.IIK hot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
2 7 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, comunità 87; idem, " H i e Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p p .
che viene, p. 56. 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de 1'imaginaire," 356.
2 8 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, p p . 9 6 - 1 0 6 ; idem, 77 3 8 . Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 107ff., in the pages that follow
linguaggio e la morte, p p . 1 2 1 - 3 3 . Proper attention to this highly we will reproduce the architecture of Richardson's summary of the
important book would require its o w n chapter. We simply wish to Kantbuch, highlighting those aspects that intersect with our interest
retain from this book Agamben's drive to think community (human in Agamben, and departing from Richardson only to quote either
being) outside negativity, negative presentation, or negative theol- Heidegger's or Kant's own words in order to more rigorously specify
ogy. He is critical of Blanchot's La communauté inavouable for re- the notions that interest us.
taining too negative a language. It is a part of our effort here to 39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 2 6 9 .
show that what Blanchot will describe as an "inability to say I," 4 0 . Fleidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 36 n.
Agamben will describe as an "ability to not say I." T h a t is, his La 17.
comunità che viene answers the promise of an "infancy of the hu- 4 1 . Ibid., p. 37 (italics in original).
m a n " that concludes 77 linguaggio e la morte by nuancing Blanchotian 4 2 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 84.
anonymity t o w a r d a latent, ambiguous, and radical potential. 4 3 . Ibid., p . 1 8 1 .
2 9 . Agamben, Language and Death, p. 94; idem, 27 linguaggio e 4 4 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p p . 1 0 2 -
la morte, p. 118 (italics in original). 6 [italics in original].
30. Agamben, Coming Community, p p . 9 6 - 9 7 . (According to a 4 5 . Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 9 - 1 2 ; idem, La comunità
private conversation with Agemben's translator, the parenthetical che viene, p p . 7—9.
passage from which this quotation is taken appears only in the French 4 6 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 1 3 1 .
and English editions of the text.) 4 7 . Ibid., p . 1 3 1 .
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité 4 8 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 77; idem, La comunità
et son o m b r e , " p. 777. che viene, p. 52 (italics in original).
32. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 1 0 1 ; idem, La comunità 4 9 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 132.
che viene, p. 73 (italics in original). 5 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 10; idem, La comunità
33. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 76-77; idem, La che viene, p. 8 (italics in original).
comunità che viene, pp. 5 1 - 5 2 . Agamben understands the Idea as 5 1 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 137.
that " h a l o , " or supplement, or pre-scriptive image, that para-exists 52. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 1 2 7 .
in the empty space of "all its predicates." Like Lévinas and Blanchot, 5 3 . Martin Heidegger, "Brief iiber den H u m a n i s m u s , " in Weg-
he understands the concept to refer to being as it is grasped in its marken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 3 5 9 .
intelligibility within the horizons of a world. 54. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 152.
34. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità 5 5 . Immanuel Kant, Opus postbumum, trans. Eckart Forster and
che viene, p. 62. Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.
3 5 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p p . 1 0 2 - 172.
6. 56. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 154.
57. Agamben, < 'otning < Community, p. 103; idem, La comunità 73, Quoted In Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem,
che viene, p. 7 5 . Infanzia e storia, p. 44.
5 8 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità 74 Blanchot, " T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, pp. 6 3 - / / ;
che viene, p. 52 [italics in originai]. idem, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, pp. 2 1 - 3 4 ; idem, "La
59. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La comunità solitude essentielle," p p . 1 3 - 3 2 .
che viene, p. 9. 75. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 63 n. 7; idem, De
60. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, L<2 comunità l'existence à l'existant, p. 103 n. 1.
che viene, p p . 8-9.
6 1 . Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem,
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 2 6 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p. 17.
6 2 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 3 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 4 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 79; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 3 .
6 5 . Borch-Jacobsen, " T h e Freudian Subject," p. 3 5 .
66. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 50; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 3 5 .
6 7 . Quoted by Giorgio Agamben in Infancy and History: Es-
says on the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz H e r o n (London:
Verso, 1 9 9 3 ) , p p . 3 1 - 3 2 ; idem, Infanzia e storia: Distruzione
dell'esperienza e origine della storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore,
1978), p 2 7 .
6 8 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 44; idem, Infanzia e storia,
pp.41-42.
69. Q u o t e d in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 4 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 1 .
7 0 . Q u o t e d in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 5 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 3 .
7 1 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem, Infanzia e storia,
pp.43-44.
72. M a r t i n Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J o h n Macquarrie
a n d Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p p .
149-219.
Selected Bibliography

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by Karen Pinkus with Michael H a r d t . Theory and History of
Literature ser. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1991.
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negatività. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1982.
Artaud, Antonin. "Exposition Balthus à la Gallerie Pierre." La
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Bataille, Georges. The Tears of Eros. Translated by Peter Connor.
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N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1978. York: Z o n e Books, 1987.
. L'espace littéraire. Idées ser. Paris: Gallimard, 1955. Heidegger, M a r t i n . Being and Time. Translated by J o h n
. The Gaze of Orpheus. Translated by Lydia Davis. M a c q u a r r i e and Edward Robinson. N e w York: H a r p e r and
Barrytown, N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1 9 8 1 . Row, 1962.
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Index

Agamben, Giorgio: La communità Benjamin, Walter, 153-54


che viene (The Corning Benveniste, Emile, 158-60
Community), 9, 29, 93-94, Blanchot, Maurice: L'Arrêt de mort
121-62; // linguaggio e la (Death Sentence), x, xiv, 9,
morte (Language and Death), 76-93, 99-106,111,118-19,
129-31, 178n. 28; Infanzia e 129; L'Attente L'Oubli
storia (Infancy and History), (Awaiting Oblivion), xiv, 89;
158-62 "Les caractères de l'œvre de
an-archic, 43, 63, 78, 156 l'art" ("Characteristics of the
anarchy, 34, 43, 52-53, 59 Work of Art"), 67-70; Celui
Artaud, Antonin, 122-23 qui ne m'accompagnait pas
artwork, 3-4, 65, 93-99, 103-4, (The One Who Was Standing
118-21; as image, 4, 13-30, Apart From Me), xi; La
66-70, 76, 106-14 Communauté inavouble (The
Autrui (Other), xii, 1-2, 4, 8, 3 0 - Unavowable Community), 5-
64, 7 7 , 1 0 4 - 5 , 1 1 4 , 170n. 36 6; "Les Deux Versions de
l'imaginaire" ("Two Versions
Badiou, Alain, 123, 151 of the Imaginary"), 72;
Balthus, 122-23,136 L'Espace littéraire (The Space
Bataille, Georges, 31-33, 47, 5 3 - of Literature), 10, 92; Le Pas
54, 57, 59-60, 63, 78 au-delà (The Step Not
being-in-language, 1, 29, 76, 131— Beyond), 101-2; "Pour
32,134, 148, 153 l'amitié," xi; "La Solitude

189
Blanchot, Maurice (continued)', EXLITENCT, 2, S N , <,S 66, 70-74; Imaginary, 2,4, '>, 17, 20-21, 27, Marlboro, duchesie of, 11-12
essentielle" ("The Essential aetthi in , i'i 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 0 , (><> 77, 10 I 4, 108-10, 130 Massumi, Brian, 65
Solitude"), 115-17, 161; immemorial, I (>, 31-37, 42, 45, Mill, John Stuart, 33
Thomas L'Obscur (Thomas finitude, 8- 9, I! $4, 56-64, 73 74, 104, I 12-13 moi. See self
the Obscure), 161 Flesch, William, I69n. 32 intersubjectivity, 96,103-5, 129. myth, 20, 26, 166n. 34
Bogart, Humphrey, 136 Foucault, Michel, 100 See also subject (and subjectiv-
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel, 33, 40, Freud, Sigmund, xi-xiv, 32, 36, 40, •ty) Nancy, Jean-Luc, 7, 40, 47, 58, 78,
44-45, 168n. 14 43-46, 97, 117 ipseity, 37, 61-62, 69-70, 74, 132 166n. 34
Brennan, Walter, 132 Nessus, 31, 34
Gleason, Jackie, 138 Kafka, Franz, 90-91, 97 Neuter, 28, 36. See also il
Cagney, James, 132 God, 140-42, 150, 151-53 Kant, Immanuel, 8-9, 33, 74-76, Nietzsche, Friedrich, xi, 36, 97,
Casablanca, 136 Greenstreet, Sydney, 138 111, 119-20, 126; Critique of 110, 130, 149
Celan, Paul, 10-11 Pure Reason, 138-52, 156-62 Nihilism, 3
Chaney, Lon, 132 Hackman, Gene, 137 Kelly, Grace, 133
character actors, 132-38 Hamann, Johann Georg, 158 Kojève, Alexandre, 44, 98 Olivier, Laurence, 133
Congreve, William, 11-12 Hegel, G. W. F., 44, 78, 97-98, Other. See Autrui
Cook, Elisha, Jr., 132 129-30 Lacan, Jacques, 40, 44,117, 158 oxymoron, 78
Cotton, Joseph, 136 Heidegger, Martin, 2, 9, 33, 36, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 7, 17,
38, 44, 49, 60, 67-68, 75-76, 4 0 , 4 9 , 6 3 , 7 8 , 1 1 7 - 1 8 , 164 Peirce, C. S., 42
Da-Sein, 2, 44, 49, 59-64, 148-52, 78, 97-98, 111, 130-31, n. 9, 166n. 34 Plato, 117
159 168n. 9; "Brief über den language: of ethics, 39-40, 42, 46, politics, 3, 8, 29, 50, 155-62
Davis, Lydia, x, 86 Humanismus," 148; and 55, 58, 169n. 30; and potentia, 1-2, 40, 60, 7 5 , 1 4 3 ,
death. See dying (and death) ethics, 62-64; Kant and the experience, 154-62; in 145,161
Deleuze, Gilles, 123 Problem of Metaphysics, 138- literature and poetry, 4-5, 7, Proust, Marcel, xiv, 4, 50; A la
Derrida, Jacques, 4 1 , 63, 74, 84, 52, 156-62 10-12. See also being-in- recherche du temps perdu, 84
111 Henry, Michel, 38, 168n. 14 language proximity, 77-93
désœvrement (work-less), 87 Hill, Leslie, ix Levinas, Emmanuel: Autrement
diachronie (diachrony), 34-36, 4 6 - Hulk Hogan, 6 qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence responsibility (responsibilite), x, 4,
47, 49-50, 63,104 Hume, David, x, 142 (Otherwise Than Being or 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 8 , 4 8 , 5 9 - 6 2 , 77, 92,
dying (and death), 4, 24-25, 5 7 - Husserl, Edmund, 104 Beyond Essence), 4, 31-64, 105
64, 92-103 77, 97, 104; De l'existence à rhythm, 14-16, 26
identification, 4, 37-40, 42^18, 55 l'existant (Existence and Richardson, William J., 75-76;
ego. See self il (He, the Neuter), 5, 36, 7 9 , 1 1 2 - Existents), 66-67; "Realité et Heidegger, 139-55, 179n. 38
en deçà du temps (hither side of 14,115-19 son ombre" ("Reality and Its Ritter, Thelma, 132
time), 25, 40, 7 7 , 8 8 , 9 3 - 1 0 6 , il y a (there is), 9, 27-30, 65, 7 0 - Shadow"), 9,13-30, 66-67, Roustang, Francois, 45
110,112, 115,150,152. See 84; "La Servante et son
73, 111, 116-17,124,149,
also I'entretemps maître" ("The Servant and Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99, 125
152, 161
Ventretemps (meanwhile, between- Her Master"), 104-5; Totalité schema-image, 74-76, 138-52
image, 1-2, 4, 13-17, 78, 84, 104-
time), 22-25, 27, 93-106,127, et Infini (Totality and Infinity), self (moi), 4, 34-46, 52, 60, 8 1 -
14,123, 134-35; as resem-
152. See also en deçà du temps 54 82, 106, 111
blance, 17-21; and time, 2 2 -
ethics (éthique), xii, 3, 8, 31-64, 25. See also artwork; schema- love, ix-xiv, 11-12 Shaviro, Steven, x, 87, 97
77, 97, 104-5,113 image Lyotard, Jean-François, 63, 148 Smith, Queenie, 137
y
I)L I N I I I'. . \

spectacle, 6, 29, 54, 57, L53 S6 time. S i r dun In tunc; d y m j ; (and


Stevens, Wallace, ix-xiv death); en deca da temps;
subject (and subjectivity), 1-2, 4 - 5 , Ventretemps; image
1 4 , 1 6 , 3 6 , 3 8 - 4 2 , 44-49,54, Tolstoy, Leo, ix, 12
56, 62,110-14,124, 140-62.
See also intersubjectivity whatever (qualunque), xii, 94,
substitution, 4, 37, 48, 50, 56-57, 121-29, 151, 156
61-62, 77 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 47
work-less. See désozvrement
Tamiroff, Akim, 137 writing, 65-76, 79, 84-85, 92,
Third Man, The, 136 112-13
Tiananmen, 94, 105

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