An Appraisal of The South African Strategy

19
THE NAMIBIAN BORDER WAR:

AN APPRAISAL OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY
Dr Leopold Scholtz1
Extraordinary Professor, Department of History,
Stellenbosch University
Introduction
From the sixties to the late eighties, the border war became a household term
in South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of young white men were called up for
military service, and many served in some or other capacity in Namibia then South
West Africa often in the so-called operational area, often as combat troops. These
young men were told that they were there to fight communism and that Swapo (the
South West African Peoples Organisation), the enemy, had to be bested for peace
and freedom to come to the southern African subcontinent.
Nevertheless, when the UN-supervised elections came after years of
international wrangling, Swapo won handsomely, obtaining 57 per cent of the votes.
The South African Government and South African Defence Force (SADF) was
taken aback, because they really had believed that the anti-Swapo coalition would
get a majority.2 The question therefore is: How was this possible? Did the South
Africans, who developed a sophisticated strategy to counter-revolutionary guerrilla
warfare and really were convinced that they had Swapo on the run, make mistakes
they were not aware of? Did they disobey in practice the rules they supported in
theory? It will be the purpose of this analysis to answer this question.
Principles
In order to do this, we will have to start with a short analysis of the accepted
principles of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, as they developed during the 20th
century.
Dr. Leopold Scholtz is also Deputy Editor of Die Burger in Cape Town and a captain
(infantry) in the Reserve Force of the SA Army.
2
Cf. Hilton Hamann: Days of the Generals. The Untold Story of South Africas Apartheidera Military Generals (Cape Town, Zebra, 2001), pp. 178-179; Brian Pottinger: The
Imperial Presidency. P.W. Botha the First 10 Years (Johannesburg, Southern, 1988), p. 212.
20
It is a political struggle: It is generally true of all wars that they are political
in nature. The famous 19th-century Prussian military philosopher Carl von
Clausewitz postulated the well-known dictum that war is a continuation of politics
by other means. By this he meant that politics (or the political leaders) are the brains
behind warfare, which essentially is the tool of a government in the pursuance of a
political aim. Wars grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic, he says.
As a matter of fact, war without politics is something pointless and devoid of
sense.3
Obviously, the context of revolutionary war is somewhat different in the
sense that it is not a struggle between two sovereign states, but between a
government and a revolutionary movement which tries to overthrow it. However,
this does not alter the basic truth of the Clausewitzian logic. This type of war, even
more so than conventional war, is essentially political in nature.
However, the nature and intensity of the aim has a profound influence on the
character of any specific war. The smaller the penalty you demand from your
opponent, Clausewitz says, the less you can expect him to try to deny it to you.
The opposite is also true, as the more modest your own political aim, the less
importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must.4
These observations are important if we want to understand the revolutionary
wars in Southern Africa. All the revolutionary movements in the region, from the
MPLA in Angola, Frelimo in Mozambique, Zanu/Zapu in Rhodesia to the ANC in
South Africa, wanted to overthrow the white-dominated minority governments in
order to replace them with socialist states, representing the black majorities.
However, although Swapo too wanted a socialist state, it had no interest in
completely destroying apartheid South Africa, and in contrast to the ANC never
presented its aims in that way. Thus, the war in Namibia, objectively speaking, never
became a question of survival for the South Africans, although a Swapo take-over
there, in the minds of some South Africans, would indeed increase the pressure on
their core base. Nevertheless, they could afford to lose the war there without being
destroyed totally, which made it easier for them in the end to hand over power on
favourable terms.
Maos three phases: Another fundamental point to understand about
revolutionary guerrilla warfare is the basic three-phase model originated by Mao
Zedong in the 1930s. Mao distinguished three phases in revolutionary guerrilla war.
The first was when the guerrillas were still weak and the enemy strong; the second
Carl von Clausewitz: On War, VIII/6B, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.
4
Ibid., I/1, p. 81.
21
one of strategic stalemate and mobile warfare; and the third, during which
conventional war takes place.5
This should not be regarded as an iron law, as the third phase may not be
necessary at all. For instance, external and/or internal pressure may cause the antirevolutionary forces to abandon the fight before the onset of the third stage, as
happened with the French in Algeria and Vietnam, the Americans in Vietnam, the
Soviets in Afghanistan, the Portugese in their African colonies, the South Africans
in Namibia, and the Rhodesians in their own country.
Fish in the water: Without the support of the local population, no guerrilla
force can ever hope for success. Mao stated that guerrilla warfare must fail if its
political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their
sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained [b]ecause guerrilla
warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither
exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation.6
Mao also wrote: Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for
long in the enemys rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the
relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. Then came the
famous slogan, illustrating the point beautifully: The former may be likened to
water; the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot
exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies
and who, like the fish out of its native element cannot live.7
In his excellent study of the revolutionary wars against the Portuguese
colonial regimes, Kaas van der Waals points out that revolutionary war differs
from conventional war because its centre of gravity is not to be found in the
destruction of opposing armed forces and the occupation of territory, but rather in
hijacking the socio-political system by obtaining control over the population.8 In
other words, not the armed forces of the enemy are the primary target of the
revolutionaries; rather, the population is seen as the centre of gravity, the
fundamental goal.
Political work: This symbiosis between the revolutionaries and the people
which Mao emphasised, does, of course, not fall from heaven. It entails hard,
slogging propaganda and political work, day by day, week by week, month by
month, to establish the revolutionary movement among the people, to win their trust
Mao: On Protracted War, Selected Military Writings, pp. 210-215; Mao: Problems of
Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War, Selected Military Writings, pp. 113-115.
6
Mao: On Guerrilla Warfare, ch. 1, at eastofhateandfear.com/archives/tse_tung.html.
7
Ibid., ch. 6, at eastofhateandfear.com/archives/tse_tung.html.
8
WS van der Waals: Portugals War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia, Ashanti, 1993), pp. 263264.
22
and support. This applies especially to the first of Maos three phases, when the
revolutionaries are still weak.
For any revolutionary war, the foundations thus laid are of supreme
importance. The legendary Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap later wrote of this
stage that political activities were more important than military activities, and
fighting less important than propaganda.9
Revolutionary bases: One of the most important conditions for a succesful
revolutionary guerrilla war is the establishment of liberated base areas. According to
Mao Zedong, these are necessary for several reasons. Firstly, for rest and
recuperation after arduous guerrilla operations in the enemys rear, but there is also a
political motive: [W]e must form mass organisations, we must organise the
workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people
according to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm
into the various mass organisations10 In other words, Maos base areas became
the places where an alternative state, with an alternative government, administration
and ideology was set up.
Terrorism: This is not to say that the peoples active support may be taken
for granted. If propaganda and political mobilisation is not enough, terrorism has
often been used as a tool to ensure at least the peoples passive acceptance of the
revolutionaries presence and political agenda.
Brian Crozier distinguishes between two types of terrorism, disruptive and
coercive. The first is aimed at the enemy; the second at the local population on
whose aid the revolutionaries are dependent.11 For example, notwithstanding Maos
dictum about the fish and the water, he was not averse to using drastic methods to
get the people in line. As was the case with Lenin, Mao explicitly endorsed the use
of terror as indispensable to the communist cause. At first, it was only to be used
against class enemies, but this rapidly degenerated into a weapon against fellow
Party members in Maos power struggle against his rivals.12
Spread the war as wide as possible: One of the most obvious military
principles is concentration of force. You have to concentrate your forces so that you
have a mailed fist at the point you wish to attack. Or, conversely, you have to
concentrate at the point the enemy is attacking.
Vo Nguyen Giap: Peoples War, Peoples Army. The Viet Cngs Insurrection Manual
for Underdeveloped Countries (New York, Bantam, 1968), p. 68.
10
Mao: Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan, Selected Military Writings,
pp. 167-176.
11
Brian Crozier: A Theory of Conflict (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1974), pp.127-128.
12
Cf. Philip Short: Mao. A Life (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999), pp. 265-271.
23
In guerrilla warfare, the exact opposite applies. You have to disperse your
force as widely as possible, while concentrating only locally when you wish to
attack an isolated enemy position or unit, and dispersing immediately when the fight
is over. By dispersing your own forces, you force the anti-guerrilla powers to do the
same. The government or occupying force must, for political reasons, be seen to
occupy the whole country physically and be able to provide security everywhere.
The problem is that they dont know where your next blow will fall, even if it
amounts to nothing more than a pin-prick. With hundreds of pin-pricks that never
end, chances are that you may force the enemy to over-extend himself.13
Arguably the most profound modern French strategic thinker, General Andr
Beaufre, put the matter very concisely: For guerrilla warfare it is a question of
menacing the adversary over the largest possible area... Doing so, it obliges regular
forces to disperse their means over an area exceeding their capability, while the
guerrillas remain capable of acting wherever they choose.14
Dispersal of effort: The principle of forcing the enemy to disperse his forces
does not only apply to the physical level. It is also true of the political and
psychological terrain. To see revolutionary warfare only or even primarily as a
military process is to miss the point completely. The wise revolutionary will attack
and isolate its enemy on every front possible, be it the economy, labour relations, the
church, international politics, culture, the media, etc. Even negotiations will be
viewed as part of the war. Making use of every possible network is central to the
revolutionary strategy.
To reach these networks, the 4GW [4th Generation Warfare] operational
planner must seek various pathways for various messages, opines Thomas X.
Hammes. Traditional diplomatic channels, both official and unofficial, are still
important but no longer the only pathway for communication and influence. Other
networks rival the prominence of the official ones. The media are rapidly becoming
a primary avenue.15 This means that the government or regime will have to fight on
every front simultaneously, whereby its collective effort is dispersed as much as its
armed forces.
The South African doctrine
Before we come to the war itself, we will have to look briefly at how the
South Africans translated these principles into their own doctrine. To begin with,
13
This factor also applied par excellence to the Anglo-Boer War. Cf. Leopold Scholtz: Why
the Boers Lost the War (London, Macmillan, 2005), ch. 6; Leopold Scholtz: Clausewitz,
Mao Zedong en die Anglo-Boereoorlog, Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis, 25/2, Dec.
2000, pp. 264-265.
14
Andr Beaufre: Strategy for Tomorrow (Menlo Park, California, Stanford Research
Institute, 1974), pp. 39-40. His italics.
15
Thomas X. Hammes: The Sling and the Stone. On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul,
Zenith, 2004), pp. 213-214.
24
they studied the way the Portuguese and Rhodesians fought their wars closely and
learnt many lessons, both about how to do things, but also about the mistakes made
there.16
Especially two writers exercised great influence, the American J.J. McCuen
and Lieutenant-General Alan Pop Fraser, Chief of Joint Operations of the SADF
in the sixties and a veteran of the British COIN campaign in Malaya in the fifties.17
McCuen proposed five strategic and four tactical principles when fighting
revolutionary guerrillas.18 His tactical principles, which need concern us no more
here, were, shortly, keeping the initiative, having good intelligence, maintaining
mobility and achieving surprise. His strategic principles were the following:
Having a clear political aim: In the light of the intense political nature of
revolutionary warfare, McCuen places great emphasis on this aspect.
Without it, neither the civilian administration of the government nor the
military can properly deal with the evolving phases of the rebellion.
Annihilation of the enemy and preservation of own forces: Obviously, the

enemy forces will have to be destroyed, but not to the point of seriously
weakening your own forces. The areas which have not yet be subverted,
should be safeguarded and developed in order to prevent such subversion
from happening. At the same time and this proved to be very important
to the South Africans the internal and external political infrastructure of
the rebels should be high on the agenda for destruction.
Mobilisation of the masses: This principle rests directly on what Mao had
said about the matter, that the active participation of the masses should be
secured, especially as far as the so-called silent majority is concerned. In
addition, the government should offer a vision which is more attractive
than the one offered by the rebels. This should accommodate popular
aspirations and eleminate genuine grievances.
Get outside support: To get the political and moral support of neigbouring
states is necessary to counter the external manoeuvres of the
revolutionaries.
Unity of effort: All means and instruments available should be effectively

integrated into one consolidated effort. Government departments should
not make ad hoc decisions which are not properly integrated into the
central war effort, and this applies not only to military steps, but also those
in the political, psychological, economic and organisational realms. This
principle, when read together with the writings of Beaufre, was the
16
John W. Turner: Continent Ablaze. The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present
(Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1998), p. 29; Francis Toase: The South African Army: The
Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia since 1966, in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott
(eds.): Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency (London, Croom Helm, 1985), p. 199.
17
There was actually a third writer too, the French General Andr Beaufre, but his influence
did not so much lay in the realm of COIN strategy.
18
John J. McCuen: The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, Stackpole Books),
pp. 30-44.
25
foundation of the P.W. Botha governments much maligned Total
Strategy.
At the same time, General Fraser, who was, perhaps apart from General
Jannie Geldenhuys, the only senior South African military man who approached the
phenomenon of revolutionary guerrilla warfare with a more or less intellectual frame
of mind, formulated the following points in a paper entitled Lessons learnt from Past
Revolutionary Wars as summarised by Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF in the
eighties (McCuens influence is obvious):19
A revolutionary war is a political war;
The purpose of both sides in a revolutionary war is to win the support,

endorsement, sympathy and active participation from the population;
The government should win the political iniative over the insurgents by
having a cause which is even more attractive that the one inspiring them;
The danger of complacency (refusal to recognise the true situation) must

be avoided before and during a revolution;
There must be a high-quality intelligence organisation; and
Bureaucratic delays in a revolutionary war is as dangerous as subversion

itself.
The following words of Stephen Ellis is a very good summary of the South
African general security strategy as it developed during the seventies and eighties
(the quotation is, of course, about South Africa itself, but is perfectly applicable to
the South African strategy in Namibia as well):
In the view of the securocrats, then, the aim of violence was less to destroy
the enemys armed forces than to win the support of the population by a
mixture of political action, intimidation, propaganda and the symbolic
manifestation of those socio-economic grievances which made South Africa
fertile ground for revolutionaries. For the securocrats, most of whom were
professional soldiers and policemen rather than politicians, the war was
essentially a management in which the security and welfare functions of
government had to be integrated for the overall purpose of preserving the life
of the state. This is the ideology of sophisticated military rulers. They
believed that it was above all the use of revolutionary violence and
propaganda by the ANC and its allies which accounted for the ANCs
success in winning support from what they saw as an essentially manipulable
black population, as part of what became, after the late 1970s, a classical
revolutionary strategy.20
19
Jannie Geldenhuys: Di wat wen. n Generaal se storie uit n era van oorlog en vrede
(Kaapstad, Van Schaik, 1993), p. 64. In 1986 Frasers study was translated into Afrikaans and
circulated to senior officials in South Africa. Cf. Stephen Ellis: The Historical Significance of
South Africas Third Force, Journal of Southern African Studies, 24/2, June 1998, p. 275.
20
Ellis: The Historical Significance of South Africas Third Force, Journal of Southern
African Studies, 24/2, June 1998, p. 265.
26
It is clear that the South Africans, in theory, had developed a very
sophisticated approach to Swapos onslaught which embodied a good understanding
of revolutionary guerrilla warfare principles. The question is to what extent they
practised what they preached.
The beginnings
The war is generally thought to have started on 28 August, 1966 when a
force of 130 men mostly policemen under the command of Commandant
(Lieutenant-Colonel) Jan Breytenbach and 9 of his paratroopers from 1 Para Bn
swooped down on the secret Swapo base of Ongulumbashe in Ovambo with 35
Alouette III helicopters. This was early days, and the tactical inexperience of the
South Africans showed in the fact that only two guerrillas were killed and nine taken
prisoner.21 Of the rest, according to Willem Steenkamp, 45 were eventually caught.22
The start of Swapos armed struggle to drive out the as they saw it South
African colonialists, was a direct result of decades humiliation at the hands of
whites, just as their equivalents struggle in South Africa flowed from the white
governments discrimination and violence towards blacks. As Pastor Siegfried
Groth, who in later years became one of Swapos greatest critics, wrote of the
sixties:
Namibian men and women were no longer prepared to accept oppression and
humiliation. The prisons in Ovamboland were full to overflowing. Hundreds
of people, including women, were whipped in public. The victims had to
undress and were then brutally beaten on their buttocks with a six-foot long
palm-tree cane. Anyone who tried to resist the South African dictatorship
received electric shock treatment and was imprisoned without trial for
months or even years.23
In 1959, a public protest in Windhoeks Old Location against a forced
population removal to Katutura led to a police shooting and the death of 11 people,
while 54 were wounded. The South African authorities also practised the apartheid
policy in the territory through social segregation at grassroots leven and the
duplication of its homelands policy.24 All of this is important in the present context,
as it partly explains why Swapo, even though it proved to be a very imperfect
21
Peter Stiff: The Silent War. South African Recce Operations 1969-1994 (Alberton,
Galago, 1999), pp. 36-37.
Willem Steenkamp: South Africas Border War 1966-1989 (Gibraltar, Ashanti, 1989), p.
22.
23
Siegfried Groth: Namibia the Wall of Silence. The Dark Days of the Liberation
Struggle (Wuppertal, Hammer, 1995), p. 33.
24
Peter H. Katjavivi: A History of Resistance in Namibia (London, James Curry, 1988), pp.
47-49 and 72-73.
22
27
liberation movement, succeeded in retaining such loyalty from so many black
Namibians for so long.
The first years of the war were very low-key. After having been decimated at
Ongulumbashe, Swapo did not enter Ovamboland again for some years. Instead, the
Caprivi strip, being relatively accessible from Zambia, for the time being became the
main battleground. Swapo had moved its headquarters to Lusaka in 1962, and
Zambia became the main staging ground for the insurgency.25 This was favourable
to South Africa, as the wars centre of gravity proved not to be in Caprivi, but
Ovamboland further west, where 46 per cent of the Namibian population lived.
Ovamboland was also the area where Swapo, most of their leaders being Ovambos,
would have the best chance of gaining the support and trust of the locals. The
Caprivians were loyal to Canu (Caprivi African National Union), and their support
hinged on the precarious alliance between Swapo and Canu holding up.
In the meantime, the SADF looked on in growing frustration how their role
in the fight at Ongulumbashe were not only being denied in public, but how the SA
Police was given the task of nipping the uprising by these few uppity blacks as it
was seen in the bud. The SADF was also denied the chance of getting muchneeded combat experience in Rhodesia, where the Police took the honours of
helping the Rhodesians fight their war.26 Moreover, most of the policemen employed
in patrolling the operational area were riot policemen whose effectivity was at best
dubious. According to Annette Seegers, their approach seems to have been searchand-capture, consistent with policing that aims at a criminal trial. Patrols and
hearts-and-mind activities played a secondary role. The riot policemen were pulled
out in 1968, after which the SAP started a COIN training course in Pretoria. Until
1972 only whites were employed, after which the experience of the Rhodesians
convinced the SAP to bring in black policemen as well.27
But even good policemen arent necessarily trained to be good soldiers. And
so, when several countrywide strikes broke out in Namibia in 1972 and the police
found it impossible to cope with internal security as well as the insurgency, the
government at last decided to turn the war over to the military. In spite of its lack of
combat experience, the SADF was better placed to do the job. It had more man- and
firepower, and had already started training some of its soldiers in COIN operations
in 1960.28 Some of their senior ranks, like General Fraser, had also given
considerable theoretical thought to how to fight a counter-insurgency war.
25
Susan Brown: Diplomacy by Other Means. Swapos Liberation War, in Colin Leys and
John S. Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword (London, James
Currey, 1995), p. 21.
26
Cf. Hamann: Days of the Generals, p. 9.
27
Annette Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London, Tauris,
1996), pp. 137-138; Toase: The South African Army: The Campaign in South West
Africa/Namibia since 1966, in Beckett and Pimlott (eds.): Armed Forces & Modern
Counter-Insurgency, pp. 202-203.
28
Cf. Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, p. 64.
28
The military finally took over responsibility for the war on 1 April 1974. Just
in time, because just more than three weeks later, on 24 April, a coup detat toppled
the Portuguese fascist dictatorship, and soon afterwards the new government
announced that it would pull out of its African empire in Mozambique, Angola and
Guinea-Bissau.
South Africa loses the war
The strategic consequences of the Portuguese military forces leaving Angola
were tremendous. No longer could the South Africans count on them to prevent
Swapo from infiltrating Namibia through Angola. In his memoirs, Swapo leader and
later Namibian president Sam Nujoma wrote perceptively: Our geographical
isolation was over. It was as if a locked door had suddenly swung open. I realized
instantly that the struggle was in a new phase... For us [it] meant that... we could at
last make direct attacks across our northern frontier and send in our forces and
weapons on a large scale. To reflect the new reality, Swapos headquarters was
presently moved again from Lusaka to Luanda.29
This is not the place for an analysis of Operation Savannah, the South
African invasion of Angola in support of the pro-Western FNLA and Unita
movements against the Marxist MPLA.30 Suffice it to say that South Africa
intervened after having been requested to do so by the governments of the United
States, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and by Unita. Four South African combat groups
marched rapidly hundreds of kilometres northwards in a remarkable lightning
campaign, before international politics scuttled it. Firstly, Cuba sent several
thousands soldiers and heavy weapons to Angola in order to bolster the MPLA,
which took control of the capital, Luanda, and esconced itself as government of the
newly independent Angola. Then the US withdrew its support, while the
Organisation of African Unity decided to back the MPLA as well. With this, the
international backing of the South African intervention collapsed and the
government in Pretoria felt that it had no option but to withdraw, a process that was
completed early in 1976.31
29
Sam Nujoma: Where Others Wavered. The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma (London,
Panaf, 2001), pp. 228-229, 234.
The fullest description is given by F.J. du Toit Spies: Angola. Operasie Savannah (Pretoria,
SA Weermag Direktoraat Openbare Betrekkinge, 1989), while Sophia du Preez: Avontuur in
Angola. Die Verhaal van Suid-Afrika se Soldate in Angola 1975-1976 (Pretoria, Van
Schaik, 1989), presents a more popular and readable account (in Afrikaans). The Cuban
sources have recently been unlocked by Piero Gleijeses: Conflicting Missions. Havana,
Washington, Pretoria (Alberton, Galago, 2003).
31
This has never been the subject of a military historical debate. Cf. Colonel Jan Breytenbach:
The Buffalo Soldiers. The Story of South Africas 32-Battalion 1975-1993 (Alberton,
Galago, 2002), pp. 123-127 for a very thought-provoking analysis of the operation.
30
29
Operation Savannah did have one lasting advantage for South Africa. The
SADF gained a new ally, namely Jonas Savimbis Unita, which was previously
friendly to Swapo.32 But the advantages would not make themselves felt for several
years. In the meantime, Swapo moved swiftly to exploit the new possibilities.
Within a few months of Portuguese control in southern Angola collapsing, the area
was swarming with Swapo bands, and from October 1975, for the first time since
1966, Swapo made its presence felt in Ovamboland with an invasion of over 500
trained guerrillas.33 Within a reasonably short time, the South African security forces
were in really big trouble.
The consequences of the Angolan debacle was very negative for South
Africa. Firstly, the combination of the harsh treatment of blacks under the apartheid
system and the hope for liberation furnished by what was perceived to be a South
African beating at the hands of the Cubans and the MPLA, brought about a veritable
exodus of young Namibians across the border to Swapo.34 According to SADF
intelligence, Swapos military strength increased from about 400 trained guerrillas in
1974 to approximately 2 000 in 1976.35
Swapo thus succeeded in breaking out of the relatively strategically
unimportant territory of Caprivi. By being able to utilise southern Angola, they were
in a position to infiltrate large bands of guerrillas into Kavango as well as the
geographical centre of gravity, Ovamboland thereby stretching the operational area
to a great extent and threatening to overstretch the security forces. But Swapo was
even more ambitious than this: As the chief of staff of Plan (The Peoples Liberation
Army of Namibia, Swapos army), David Namholo, related to Susan Brown, their
strategy was changed to cross into farming areas, going to urban areas rather than
just being in the north or in Caprivi...36 And indeed, for a time sabotage and bomb
explosions were reported in Windhoek, Gobabis, Swakopmund, etc.37
In order to combat Swapo, the SADF relied mainly on white conscripts and
reservists, often from the cities, who proved to be unsuitable. Being a fair sample of
the white community with their paternalistic and even racist attitudes at the time,
they were at a disadvantage when dealing with tribal blacks of whom they knew
nothing and understood even less. This certainly did not help in getting the loyalty
32
Hammann: Days of the Generals, p. 69.

Brown: Diplomacy by Other Means, in Leys and Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle, p.
21; Helmoed-Rmer Heitman: South African Armed Forces (Cape Town, Buffalo, 1990), p.
146.
34
23; Nujoma: Where Others Wavered, p. 229; Groth: Namibia the Wall of Silence, p. 33.
35
Heitman: South African Armed Forces, p. 146.
36
24.
37
Cf. Peter Stiff: The Covert War. Koevoet Operations Namibia 1979-1989 (Alberton,
Galago, 2004), pp. 21-22; Eugne de Kock: A Long Nights Damage. Working for the
Apartheid State (Saxonwold, Contra, 1998), p. 66.
33
30
and support of the locals, which meant that the security forces got little or no
intelligence, and when they got it, it was mostly too old to be useful.38 Eugne de
Kock, who later became notorious as a police assassin in service of the apartheid
government, was at this stage a police station commander in Ruacana. His
observation was that Swapo seemed to be doing what it liked. In his memoirs, he
writes that Swapo was ahead of us in most respects. The main reason was that
our troops were not bush-savvy. We took a boy who had just matriculated, gave
him a gun, two to three months of basic training and then threw him in the middle
of a country that he did not know, people he did not understand and an enemy that
he had never seen. No wonder he did not do very well.39 Indeed, how could you
expect city boys to track and find guerrillas who grew up in the area and knew every
bush-craft trick in the book when they did not want to be found?
Not only that, South African tactics also were clumsy and unwieldy. Colonel
Jan Breytenbach relates with more than just a touch of sarcasm how the then
Major-General Constand Viljoen, General Officer Commanding (GOC)
South West Africa Command, launched a big sweeping operation to clear out
Swapo elements that had infiltrated into northern Ovamboland in the wake of
South Africas retreat from Angola. They caught exactly nothing in their
nets. Masses of infantry were called up from South Africa. Huge convoys
headed north. Supply bases, bursting at the seams, were set up in the
operational area to provide everything from hot showers to ample issues of
daily ration packs. Battalions of infantry were moved backwards and
forwards through the bush in long sweep lines south of the cutline [border],
like General Kitcheners troops during the Anglo-Boer War. It was the
biggest deployment of South African troops since World War II. But this
huge force did not get a single kill.40
Eugne de Kock also observed that the security forces had a disdain for
Swapo at the time because the guerrillas never stood and fought:
The fact that Swapo soldiers were seldom seen, and resisted getting into setpiece engagements, reinforced the view that they were ineffectual and merely
a nuisance. This was not so. Swapo groups large ones at that moved
freely around Ovamboland. But, because they could not be found, they did
not exist for the security forces.41
38
Cf. Breytenbach: The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 200.

De Kock: A Long Nights Damage, p. 65. Cf also Brigadier-General McGill Alexanders
opinion in his MA thesis, The Cassinga Raid (Unpublished MA thesis, Unisa, July 2003), p.
40.
40
Breytenbach: The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 149.
41
De Kock: A Long Nights Damage, p. 66. This was Operation Cobra, launched in May
1976. Cf. Toase: The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia
since 1966, in Beckett and Pimlott (eds.): Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency, p.
210.
39
31
Recalling that era, a senior Swapo commander told Susan Brown years later
that the enemy had no influence among the masses... During that time, even the
SADF were under-trained. They were not specialised in guerrilla tactics. That is why
they found it difficult to track down guerrillas during that time; they were not in a
position to move in the areas where we used to operate and they got demoralised. At
that time we had the upper hand.42 Indeed, reviewing the situation at the end of
1977, SADF intelligence concluded that Swapos standard of training had improved
significantly because of the training they had received from Cuban instructors.43
Moreover, Swapos freedom of movement meant that they could assassinate
local pro-South African headmen and officials almost at will pour encourager les
autres. One of the first was the chief minister of Ovamboland, Filemon Elifas.44
As we have seen in the theoretical introduction, selective terrorism can be a strong
incentive for the locals to support the insurgents.
Truth is, by the end of 1977 the SADF was losing the war in Nambia. In the
period 1966-77, 363 Swapo guerrillas were killed in action compared with 88
security force members45 a kill ratio of only 4,1 to 1, hopelessly inadequate in a
guerrilla conflict. All of this was, however, about to change. In January 1976
Major-General Jannie Geldenhuys was appointed GOC South West Africa
Command. During his command period of five years, a series of measures were took
which completely turned the war around.
The turn-around: security strategy
On the security strategic level South Africa in the early seventies was really
in an unwinnable situation. Internally as well as internationally it was regarded as an
illegal colonial occupier of the territory. Officially, Namibia was administrated in
the spirit of the old League of Nations mandate of 1919 (which was revoked by the
International Court of Justice in 1971), but in practice it was simply run as a fifth
province of the Republic. In fact, Pretoria was intent on applying the policy of grand
apartheid, with self-governing and eventually independent homelands for the
different black ethnic groups. Petty apartheid segregation on grassroots level was
applied assiduously by an army of officials and policemen. This, as we have seen,
provided the main cause of dissent, giving rise to Swapos insurgency.
However, Pretoria responded with a pragmatism that was, at the time, quite
surprising. Instead of the usual semi-theological arguments of apartheid being a
naturally-ordained way of ordering human relations, instead of a blanket refusal to
42
27.
43
Steenkamp: SAs Border War, p. 71.
44
25.
45
32
give up the territory, the government reacted flexibly, albeit slowly. In 1973 Prime
Minister John Vorster declared that the Namibian population would have to decide
their own future, thereby implicitly accepting that the territory could become
independent. Four years later, a conference was convened at the Windhoek
Turnhalle to enable the Namibians to decide on the political structures to govern
them, but Swapo viewed this as a sham and boycotted the process. Progressively, all
apartheid laws were repealed a rather adventurous process, seeing that it was still
unthinkable back in the Republic to bring about more than just cosmetic changes to
apartheid.46
It is also important to note that, in contrast to South Africa itself (where the
ANC and other liberation movements remained proscribed), in Namibia Swapo was
permitted to act as a legitimate political party. An anonymous South African official
explained to an American military visitor that this was to keep it out in the open,
and keep the faint-hearted from going to Angola.47
In the military field, the changes were reflected in an ever increasing number
of blacks fighting for the South African administration, 32 Bn (consisting of exFNLA fighters) being the first unit allowing blacks to join the previously lily-white
SADF. This was followed by 31 Bn (Bushmen), 101 Bn (Ovambos), 201 Bn (East
Caprivi), 202 Bn (Okavango), 203 Bn (West Caprivi), and 911 Bn (ethnically
mixed). Especially 32 and 101 Bn were much more than ordinary infantry battalions,
growing into what really amounted to motorised infantry brigades. Many blacks also
joined the Police COIN unit Koevoet. With the exception of 32 Bn (SADF) and
Koevoet (SAP), these all became part of the South West Africa Territorial Force
(SWATF), an indigenous Namibian force under South African command which,
during the eighties, supplied about 70 per cent of the military manpower in the
territory, about 30 000 men. More than 90 per cent of these had black, yellow or
brown skins.48
This did not mean that the South African government was content on
handing Namibia over to Swapo. The South Africans viewed the war against Swapo
as being a struggle against communism, and this explained their whole posture. As
Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha explained to dr. Chester Crocker, US
Assistant State Secretary for Africa, in a face-to-face meeting in 1981, the South
African government thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet gains...
Swapos people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day... SAGs [South African
Government] bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek.49 His colleague for
Defence, General Magnus Malan, was even more forthright. According to the US
46
For a negative Swapo view of these developments, see Katjavivi: A History of Resistance
in Namibia, pp. 84-103.
47
Major Robert C. Owen: Counterrevolution in Namibia, Aerospace Power Journal,
Winter 1987-88, at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicled/apj87/owen.html.
48
Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, p. 77.
49
Richard Leonard: South Africa at War. White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa
(Craighall, AD Donker, 1983), p. 251. My italics.
33
minutes, Malan flatly declared that the SAG cant accept prospects of a Swapo
victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from any
election which left Swapo in a dominant position. Therefore a Swapo victory would
be unacceptable in the context of a Westminister-type political system. Namibia
needs a federal system. SAG does not rule out an internationally acceptable
settlement, but could not live with a Swapo victory that left Swapo unchecked
power.50 In other words, the abolition of apartheid yes; an international
settlement yes; elections with universal suffrage yes; but a Swapo victory no!
And so, on a security strategic level, the war became an attempt to win enough time
to create the conditions in which Swapo would lose an election.51
Indeed, Pretoria did not have to look far for indications of Swapos Marxist
and dictatorial inclinations. In the aftermath of thousands of young, mostly idealistic
Namibians flocking to Swapos banners in Zambia and Angola, grassroots pressure
built up to make the leadership accountable to the rank and file. This was not
appreciated by either Sam Nujoma or his top lieutenants. Njoma convinced
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to order the Zambian Army to arrest the
dissident leadership and keep them incommunicado in a prison in Lusaka. When the
news leaked out and a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the court to produce the
arrested, they were simply flown out to Dar es Salaam where several remained
incarcerated for several years. Dissident thinking within Swapo was brutally
suppressed. Inside Namibia, Swapo also took steps to ensure the neutralisation of
possible dissidents. Many others were detained and cruelly tortured.52
Under heavy pressure Swapo held a congress in July and August, 1976 in
Nampundwe, Zambia, where it adopted a new party constitution. But instead of
making the party more open, democratic and accountable as the dissidents had
demanded, it transformed Swapo into an orthodox Marxist-Leninist vanguard party.
In the constitution, Swapo pledged to combat all forms of ethnic orientation and
racism and to unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the
peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society
based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism.53
50
Ibid., p. 250.
In 1978, part of P.W. Bothas reasoning for unleashing Operation Reindeer on Swapo, was:
Die Swapo-mag moes gebreek word voordat verkiesing gehou word. Cf. Dirk and Johanna
de Villiers: PW (Kaapstad, Tafelberg, 1984), p. 341. Cf. also Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, p. 49.
52
Cf. Shipanga: In Search of Freedom, ch. 23-31; Lauren Dobell: Swapos Struggle for
Nambia, 1960-1991: War by Other Means (Basel, Schlettwein, 1998), pp. 47-51; Groth:
Namibia the Wall of Silence, pp. 55-66; John S. Saul and Colin Leys: SWAPO. The
Politics of Exile, in Leys and Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle, pp. 48-53; Colin Leys
and John S. Saul: Liberation without Democracy? The Swapo Crisis of 1976, Journal of
Southern African Studies, 20/1, March 1994, pp. 123-147. For a Swapo view of the crisis, see
Katjavivi: A History of Resistance in Namibia, pp. 105-108.
53
Swapo: Political Programme of the South West Africa Peoples Organization, adopted by
the meeting of the Central Committee, Lusaka, July 28 1 August 1976, p. 6.
51
34
Some observers, while conceding the Stalinist register or the textbook
example of Soviet-style phraseology, seek to portray it as merely opportunistic to
gain the support of young Namibians and of the Soviet-bloc weapons suppliers.54
But why Swapo cannot simply be taken at its word, is not clear. After all, most
African liberation movements, including the MPLA, PAIGC, Frelimo and the ANC,
were at this stage either avowed Marxist-Leninist organisations or dominated by
communists.55 There seems to be no reason to assume that the Swapo leadership did
not mean what they said. After all, only a few months later, Sam Nujoma let the cat
out of the bag when he said quite openly in an interview with SABC-TV in answer
to a question whether Swapo would not be left out in the cold if a non-Swapo
government took power on independence: The question of black majority rule is
out. We are not fighting even for majority rule. We are fighting to seize power in
Namibia, for the benefit of the Namibian people. We are revolutionaries. We are not
counter-revolutionaries.56
Swapos own political propaganda from the time reinforces the point.
Comrade Lumumba, reportedly the nom de guerre of Plans chief political
commissar, wrote in 1986 in Swapos propaganda publication The Combatant that
political education among the masses should be of class character, be based on the
irreconcilable hatred against class enemies, capitalist and imperialist... It should
strengthen the class position of our combatants in the interests of the toiling and
exploited, but fighting people of Namibia.57 This is nothing if not orthodox
Marxism-Leninism.
All of this meant that apartheid, race discrimination and colonial domination
diminished as casus belli. What remained, was Swapos avowed aspiration to
convert Namibia into a Marxist one-party state, thereby enabling Pretoria, ironically
enough, to present the conflict in the rather more respectable cloak of communist
dictatorship versus liberal multiparty democracy. And that, we may surmise,
weakened Swapo and strengthened Pretoria to some extent.
The turn-around: military strategy
Like the British army, the SADF traditionally looked down on an intellectual
approach to war. This is illustrated by the fact that the Military Academy in
54
Cf. Dobell: Swapos Struggle for Nambia, p. 58; Saul and Leys: SWAPO. The Politics of
Exile, in Leys and Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle, p. 52; Denis Herbstein and John
Evenson: The Devils are among us. The War for Namibia (London, Zed Books, 1989), pp.
47-49; Groth: Namibia: The Wall of Silence, pp. 131, 135 and 152. Cf. also Katjavivi: A
History of Resistance in Namibia, p. 109.
55
Cf. Leopold and Ingrid Scholtz: Die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van die SAKP se tweefaserevolusiemodel (two parts, as yet unpublished but accepted by the Tydskrif vir
Geesteswetenskappe).
56
Steenkamp: SA Border War, p. 74.
57
Herbstein and Evenson: The Devils are among us, p. 41.
35
Saldanha only instituted a course in military strategy in 1991, while military history
has never really taken the necessary central position in providing officers with an
intellectual understanding of what their profession entailed. It seems that the SADF
preferred action above thinking as if there was no need to understand what you
were doing, and in doing so also understand how to do whatever you were doing.
Quite a lot of the mistakes made during the course of the war was directly
attributable to this unfortunate lacune.58
One general officer who, at least in hindsight, seems to have overcome this
wide-spread disdain for knowledge and understanding, was General Jannie
Geldenhuys. If one can accept his memoirs as an accurate mirror of what happened,
he and his staff during the late seventies apparently really set their minds to how to
root out the Swapo insurgency, keeping close to the dictums of McCuen and
Fraser.59 Interpreting what he wrote there and going beyond, let us look at how the
South Africans tackled the problem.
The basic strategic task was to prevent the conflict from developing beyond
Maos first phase to open mobile warfare, or even the final conventional phase. But
how? The operative word here seems initiative.60
Internally, the security forces needed to wrest the initiative from the
insurgents by forcing them into fights on the formers terms. As the security forces
were much better equipped and, as the eighties approached, also better trained
than the Swapo guerrillas,61 such firefights would mostly end in the defeat of the
insurgents. The SADF relied more and more on black and white professionals and
less and less on the white conscripts and reservists who were clearly not up to the
job.
By the end of the seventies, the Rhodesian fire-force system was taken
over, adapted and perfected. Troops being utilised for defensive tasks, such as
escorting vehicle convoys, guard duties, etc., were minimised to free up men for
offensive tasks.62 Typically, the operational area would be patrolled aggressively
and continuously, on foot, on horse, on motor cycles with muffled engines and on
mine-resistant infantry vehicles such as Buffels, Casspirs (Koevoet and 101 Bn) and,
at times, even Ratel IFVs or Panhard 90 armoured cars. They would invariably have
expert trackers with them, often from 102 Bn (Bushmen), although Koevoet
preferred native Ovambos. When chancing on an enemy bands tracks, or when
58
Cf. Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p. 191; G.E. Visser:
Militre professionalisme en die onderrig van Krygsgeskiedenis in die Suid-Afrikaanse
Nasionale Weermag: n historiese perspektief, Scientia Militaria, 27/2, 1997, pp. 15-36;
Leopold Scholtz: Cuito Cuanavale: Wie het regtig gewen?, Scientia Militaria, 28/1, 1998,
pp. 16-61.
59
Cf. Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, pp. 62-79.
60
Ibid., pp. 67-73.
61
62
36
receiving information from the locals about a Swapo unit in the vicinity, the news
would be radioed to the nearest HQ. There a Romeo Mike (the Afrikaans term was
reaksiemag or reaction force) team would be on alert. Often the RM would be
paratroopers, flown in on Puma helicopters, with air support from specially
converted Alouette III helicopters equipped with 20 mm cannon. These mostly
proved devastating in firefights. Sometimes, a C-47 Dakota with parachute-equipped
troops or a Dakota gunship, similar to the American Puff the Magic Dragon used
in Vietnam, would also be used. In the case of Koevoet and 101 Bn, the RM would
more often than not consist of ground troops, rushing to the battle zone in their
Casspir vehicles. Although the insurgents would sometimes really astound the
pursuing troops with phenomenal feats of physical endurance and excellent
bushcraft techniques like anti-tracking or hiding themselves, often the contact would
result in some or most of the insurgents being killed or wounded. Especially
Koevoet, and to a somewhat lesser extent 101 Bn, became highly feared killing
machines, achieving the highest kill ratio of all units in the war.63
With these methods, according to General Geldenhuys, the number of
combat contacts with insurgents doubled in 1979 compared to the previous year. Of
those contacts 85 per cent were initiated by the security forces, illustrating their
ability to dominate the operational area militarily.64
Externally, the SADF decided not to wait for the insurgents to come to
Namibia, do their mischief there and then try to kill or capture them, but to take the
war to their bases in Angola and prevent them from coming to Namibia in the first
place. In a military appreciation of the situation in Namibia, dated 1 April 1978, the
SADF Chief of Staff Operations pointed out that Swapos actions had notably
improved the previous year, mainly because of the movement having many bases
just across the border in Angola. In contrast, because the SADF was not allowed to
cross the border in a big way, it was forced to react to Swapo, while Swapo retained
the initiative.65
Actually, cross-border operations against Swapo had already started
clandestinely soon after the SADF pulled out of Angola in the wake of Operation
Savannah. Under the inspired but unorthodox leadership of Colonel Jan Breytenbach
32 Bn, consisting largely of black Angolans, struck repeatedly over the border and
harassed Swapo in places where it deemed itself safe. It was his intention,
Breytenbach wrote, to turn the southern Angolan bush into a menacing, hostile
environment for Swapo. In short, he wanted to out-guerrilla the guerrillas.66
63
Cf. Al J. Venter (ed.): The Chopper Boys. Helicopter Warfare in Africa (Gibraltar,
Ashanti, 1994), pp. 127-168; John W. Turner: Continent Ablaze. The Insurgency Wars in
Africa 1960 to the Present (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1998), pp. 34-55.
64
65
Alexander: The Cassinga Raid, p. 38.
66
Breytenbach: The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 179.
37
However, the first sizable external operation, Operation Reindeer, took place
in April 1978, when a understrength composite parachute battalion was dropped
over Cassinga, a large Swapo administrative, supply and training base about 300 km
inside Angola, which was completely destroyed. This gave rise to a hysteric furore,
with Swapo alleging that the approximately 700-1000 killed were all innocent and
defenceless women and children refugees on the run from the South African racists.
However, the newest research by a professional SANDF paratrooper General has
shown that, although there were indeed some women and children refugees at the
base, by far the majority were Swapo cadres.67 At the same time, another Swapo
base at Chetequera, much nearer to the Namibian border, was also attacked and
wiped out.68
But this was not the turning point. In spite of Swapo losing up to a third of its
military strength at Cassinga and its war effort being hugely disrupted, this success
in contradiction to all military principles was not followed up, and within six
months everything was back to where they were before Reindeer.69 Sam Nujoma
writes that Swapos strategy at this time was to carry out military offensives on all
these fronts [eastern Caprivi, Kavango, eastern and western Ovamboland and the
Kaokoveld] at the same time, to confuse and overstretch the enemys military
power...70
It was not to be. In the years to come, until 1984, Swapo was kept on the
ropes with several successive operations, mostly with great success, at times less so.
Operations Sceptic and Klipkop (1980), Protea and Daisy (1981), Super and Meebos
(1982) and Askari (1983-84) were, perhaps, the most well known, but there were
also several smaller ones.
There can be no doubt that, taken as a whole, these cross-border operations,
the regular ritual international condemnations notwithstanding, were hugely
successful in breaking the back of the Swapo insurgency. As Susan Brown not
particularly friendly towards the apartheid government put it perceptively:
Swapos ability to strike at will into the Ovambo area of Namibia now began
to diminish rapidly. Plan combatants, previously based within a few
kilometres of the Namibian border, were forced hundreds of kilometres back
into the Angolan hinterland. The Plan headquarters and regional command
points came under constant air and ground attack. Forward command posts
from which guerrillas operated into Namibia became increasingly insecure if
close to the border, with their lines of supply disrupted. When Swapo could
no longer establish bases close to the border, this imposed on combatants the
67
Alexander: The Cassinga Raid, p. 170.

Willem Steenkamp: Borderstrike! (Durban, Butterworths, 1983), pp. 104-134.
69
Cf. Breytenbach: The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 210; Alexander: The Cassinga Raid, pp. 176178.
70
Nujoma: Where Others Wavered, p. 316.
68
38
need to carry land-mines, mortars, automatic rifles, medical equipment and
so on hundreds of kilometres on their backs before they even entered
Namibia, let alone crossed into white farming areas. This long trek south was
impossible without water, so Plan operations became restricted to the rainy
season between November and March... This cut into the time combatants
were able to stay in Namibia. This crucially affected their ability to conduct
political work among the local population. After 1982, the politicising role of
guerrillas who move continually and easily among the people of
Ovamboland, often in civilian clothes, able to communicate and convince,
began to wane. The role of combatants was increasingly forced into an
exclusively military mould.71
The culmination of this series of cross-border operations was Operation
Askari, which started in December 1983 and lasted into 1984. The concomitant
clashes with Fapla, under whose wings Plan had seeked protection against the SADF
invaders, moved the MPLA government to seek accommodation with the South
Africans, and a half-hearted joint effort was started in terms of the Lusaka Accord to
stop the fighting and keep Swapo out of the border area. The conclusion of the SA
Air Force commander during the operation, Brigadier Dick Lord, was: Plan never
succeeded in regaining the offensive capability it had prior to Askari, he says.
Askari became the watershed in the course of the Angola/SWA war. Swapo Plan
was reduced in military strength and from then onwards no longer posed a major
threat.72 And an independent observer like Francis Toase wrote in remarks
published in 1985 that the South Africans have successfully blunted Swapos
military edge. Indeed, the SADF has established a growing mastery over Swapo in
the military sphere...73 No wonder then, that Chester Crocker called Angola the
centrepiece of the SADFs anti-Swapo strategy.74
This fact was facilitated by the fact that the SADF successfully prevented
Swapo from spreading the war so wide that the security forces could not adequately
cover the entire operational area in Namibia intensively. According to Geldenhuys,
the main purpose of the SADFs strategy was to clean Kaokoland, Kavango and the
Caprivi... If we could attain this goal, we could reduce the wide-spread insurgentinfested territory until only Ovambo remained. We could then concentrate our
efforts there...75
71
32.
72
Brigadier R.S. Lord: Operation Askari (a Sub-commanders Retrospective View of the
Operation), Militaria, 22/4, 1992, p. 9.
73
Toase: The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia since
1966, in Beckett and Pimlott (eds.): Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency, p. 216.
74
Chester A. Crocker: High Noon in Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough
Neighborhood (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1992), p. 57. His view on the Lusaka Accord
appears on pp. 183-196.
75
39
Swapos first geopolitical set-back was when President Kenneth Kaunda
decided to kick the organisation out of his country in 1978. This was a breakthrough
in that it made the insurgency in the eastern Caprivi impossible. This was the
beginning of the fulfillment of our plan, Geldenhuys commented.76 Infiltration into
the eastern Caprivi became impossible.
Adding to Swapos woes, Canu broke with its erstwhile ally in 1981, thereby
dealing a death blow to the insurgency there. The fact that Swapo allowed Savimbis
Unita to become an ally of South Africa, now also came into play. As Unita
dominated the whole southeast corner of Angola, this meant that any attempt to
infiltrate into western Caprivi and Okavango became so fraught with danger as to be
next to impossible. To the west, the Kaokoveld remained implacable to the Ovambodominated Swapo.
That left Ovamboland, admittedly Swapos heartland and therefore a tough
nut to crack. Nevertheless, the fact that this territory was only 56 000 hectares big
made it much easier for the security forces to keep it in an iron grip. Swapo also
made sporadical attempts to infiltrate into the white farmlands south of Ovambo, but
the bands were invariably hunted down and wiped out. And so we reached our goal
to limit the insurgency to Ovamboland in a relative short time, according to
Geldenhuys.77
That the war went rather well for the security forces is borne out by the
South African statistics. If they are accepted as accurate, the casualty rate looked
like this:78
Table 1:
Year
1966-74
1978
1997
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Swapo losses
363
971
915
1447
1494
1280
913
916
Sec. Forces losses

88
44
50
100
61
77
96
39
'Kill ratio'
4,1:1
22,1:1
18,3:1
14,5:1
24,5:1
16,6:1
9,5:1
23,5:1
According to General Geldenhuys, the kill ratio on previously planned

cross-border operations was 100:1, on general cross-border operations to dominate
southern Angola 30:1 and within Namibia 10:1.79
76
Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid. Cf. also pp. 94-95 and 133; Steenkamp: SAs Border War, pp. 101, 107.
Compiled from different sources.
79
Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, pp. 69-70.
77
78
40
Hearts and minds
But a favourable kill ratio is not by a long chalk enough to win an
insurgency war, as any American with combat experience in Vietnam will be able to
tell you. In the end, destroying the enemy combat forces matters relatively little.
Gaining and keeping the support of the local population is what really matters.
Well, here the South Africans success was a mixed one. In accordance with the
SADFs COIN doctrine, the hearts-and-minds programme was started in 1974,
albeit on a very modest scale. As the years went on, more resources were poured
into a titanic battle for the Nambians loyalty.
When Geldenhuys took over in 1976, Swapo was already spreading
propaganda that the security forces were maltreating the local population in the
operational area. The churches and international human rights organisations soon
took up the matter, and a newspaper like The Namibian regularly published reports
about murders, assaults, rapes and the like.80 It would, of course, be too easy
although not entirely invalid to try and diminish the impact of these allegations by
pointing out that it was in Swapos interest to spread such propaganda stories,
whether they be true or not. This is, after all, the nature of politics. It would be very
surprising indeed if Swapo did not exploit (and exaggerate) these stories for their
propaganda value. But the most credible propaganda is based, even if only partly, on
fact. And many stories about maltreatment, by and large, do have the ring of truth.
Even a veteran South African paratroop officer like Brigadier-General McGill
Alexander accepts, writing about the seventies, that the counter-insurgency
measures adopted by the SADF were, in the eyes of the local inhabitants, as closely
akin to terrorism as anything done by Swapo. His nuanced and apparently carefully
worded view is that [i]ndividuals and groups of soldiers who ignored or
deliberately flaunted instructions to treat people humanely exacerbated the situation,
as in any war.81
This does not mean that the SADF top echelon were not honest in their
hearts-and-minds strategy. After all, they wanted to win the war, and their own
doctrine dictated an approach wherein the locals would be won over. In the official
Army Counterinsurgency Manual which was in force during the war, it was
explicitly stated: Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by
80
Cf. for example Nujoma: Where Others Wavered, p. 321; Leonard: South Africa at War,
pp. 69-72; Herbstein and Evenson: The Devils are among us, p. 105; Groth: Namibia: The
Wall of Silence, pp. 28-31; Barbara Knig: Namibia. The Ravages of War (London,
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1983), pp. 46-47; Katjavivi: A
History of Resistance in Namibia, p. 89. Examples of sworn statements by Namibians
alleging to have been brutalised by the security forces are published in Heike Becker:
Narratives of War and Survival from Northern Namibia: The Liberation War in Postcolonial
Namibian Writing, in Chris van der Merwe and Rolf Wolfswinkel: Telling Wounds.
Narrative, Trauma & Memory Working through the SA Armed Conflicts of the 20th
Century (Stellenbosch, Van Schaik, 2002), pp. 201-208.
81
Alexander: The Raid on Cassinga, p. 34.
41
the government and the military forces, the chance of success is greatly reduced. If
the people support the government and the military forces, the enemy becomes
isolated and cut off from its supplies, shelter and intelligence.82
In fact, a considerable effort was already underway. Apart from troopies
getting lectures about the locals and their ways as well as stern orders on how to
treat the people, hundreds of conscripts were poured into the operational area as
teachers, medics and doctors, builders, etc. Roads were built and tarred, hospitals,
clinics and schools were built, bore-holes sunk, veterinary services provided, and so
forth.83
These efforts met with, at best, mixed results. In 1981 a British
correspondent wrote in The Times that the SADFs civic action programme had
some success in Kavango and the Caprivi, but that it was an almost total failure in
Ovamboland.84 General Geldenhuys also had a fairly nuanced view: The
programmes tended to prevent insurgency from starting in an area but were less
successful in countering it if it had already commenced.85 This is basically
confirmed by Colonel Breytenbach, who points out that most of the Ovambos in
eastern Ovamboland, particularly the [majority clan of the] Kwanyamas, were firmly
on Swapos side. Satisfactory co-operation from the locals was rare and when it
existed it had to be dealt with carefully. This changed to some extent when the
Hearts and Minds campaign began to take effect, but we never fully weaned them
from supporting Swapo.86 The election results of 1990 confirmed this analysis. (Of
course, in the internal election of 1978, an event boycotted by Swapo, a countrywide
voting percentage of 78 per cent was attained,87 but there is some doubt as to how
free especially the Ovambos felt to vote or abstain as they wished.)
The South Africans were, of course, helped by the fact that they wisely never
instituted the type of strategic hamlets or aldeamentos which were enforced at places
in Vietnam, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies.88 No doubt the experience of
concentration camps in the Anglo-Boer War, which were essentially the same thing,
played a powerful role in the South Africans decision.
82
SA Army: Counter Insurgency Manual, ch. 1.

Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, p. 68; Steenkamp: SAs Border War, p. 67.
84
85
Hamann: Days of the Generals, p. 74; Geldenhuys: Di wat wen, p. 68.
86
Breytenbach: The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 196. There is still a controversy about the role of
Koevoet in this context. The SADF generals tended to view Koevoet, one of the tactically most
succesful units in the security forces, as handling the locals very roughly and alienating them
(cf. Hamann: Days of the Generals, pp. 65-66). On the other hand, Breytenbach (The Buffalo
Soldiers, p. 192) and Peter Stiff (The Covert War, passim), are ardent defenders of the unit.
Here too, as with the atrocity allegations, it is difficult to differentiate between propaganda and
fact.
87
88
Heitman: South African Armed Forces, p. 192.
83
42
One last remark about this subject. Following the example of the Chinese
and Vietnamese, Swapo conducted its own campaign of selective terrorism. Local
chiefs and black officials in service of the South African administration were, from
time to time, murdered in order to impress on the people that Swapo would not
tolerate traitors to the cause, and that it would be in their interests to support the
movement. The most well-known cases were the murders of Ovambo chief
minister Filemon Elifas and Herero chief and DTA chairman Clemens Kapuuo, but
there were many others, as most chiefs tended to support South Africa.89 As usual,
the ordinary people were the grass on which the elephants trampled while fighting
each other.
Finally, a point Thomas X. Hammes stresses very much in his insightful
study of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, is the fact that the revolutionaries should
disperse their effort; they should not expend all on the military front, but utilise the
entire spectrum of activities available to them. In their struggle, the South African
ANC understood this very well. After visiting Vietnam in October 1978, they
formulated a four pillar strategy, being the mobilisation of the masses, the
building of underground ANC structures within the country, the international
isolation of the ruling class on all fronts (diplomatic, economic, cultural, sport,
religious, etc.), and the armed struggle. Note that the last one constitutes only one of
the four pillars.90
Swapo dropped the ball on this. Although the movement did succeed in
locking the Namibian Council of Churches into an attitude not to question Swapo
policy,91 Lauren Dobell notes that the Swapo leadership concentrated on the
diplomatic route in its struggle to liberate Namibia, while the organisation and
mobilisation of popular resistance at home was neglected by the leadership in exile,
as it pursued recognition by the international community of Swapos status as the
sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people in that order.92
SWAPO starts losing the war
Swapo was not a party to the 1984 Lusaka Agreement between South Africa
and the MPLA government in Luanda, so it never considered itself bound by it. In
fact, although Fapla, the MPLAs army, was bound by the treaty to cooperate with
the SADF in preventing Swapo from moving south of the agreed line, it did so only
very reluctantly and inefficiently. The result was that Swapo started moving
89
Cf. Leys and Saul: Introduction, in Leys and Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle, p. 15;
Steenkamp: SAs Border War, pp. 74-75.
ANC: Armed Struggle and Umkhonto, Armed Struggle Complements Peoples
Struggle, at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/forward.html.
91
Philip Steenkamp: The Churches, in Leys and Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle, p.
107. To their everlasting shame, the Namibian Council of Churches, according to Steenkamp,
acted as an instrument of domination rather than of liberation. Cf. ibid., p. 111.
92
Dobell: Swapos Struggle for Namibia, p. 20.
90
43
southwards and infiltrating Ovamboland again within a short time, and after six
months or so the insurgency was again in full swing.93
But the military realities did not change. The guerrillas still had to walk
hundreds of kilometres to the border, burdened with all the necessities for guerrilla
warfare. South of the border, Koevoet, 101 Bn and the rest of the SADF and
SWATF units were still waiting for the guerrillas and hunted them down
mercilessly. An attempt or two to activate Kavango and the Kaokoveld failed
miserably; the insurgency remained firmly limited to Ovamboland. And even there,
the locals gave ever more intelligence to the security forces. In a press interview, the
new GOC South West Africa of the SADF and SWATF, Major-General Georg
Meiring, gave telling statistics. In 1983, he said, 64 per cent of the population gave
information about Swapo movements to the security forces. In 1984 this was almost
317 per cent (which, of course, meant that one person gave several pieces of
information) and in 1986 almost 600 per cent. An insurgent was on average only six
days in Ovambo before intelligence about his whereabouts and movements reached
the security forces.94
So the carnage went on, and the number of Swapo guerrillas being able to
survive while moving around and politicising the local population dwindled. That
they kept on coming, it must be said, is a tribute to their courage and steadfastness in
the face of daunting odds. Swapos capabilities were further hamstrung by the fact
that the MPLA exacted a heavy price for its hospitality. Swapo was forced to furnish
two infantry brigades for the war against Unita. According to military intelligence,
in January 1985 Swapo had about 8 500 trained fighters at its disposal. Of these, 3
400 were fighting against Unita, 1 200 were employed in administration and
logistics, 1 200 garrisoned the base camps and headquarters, and 600 were
headquarters staff. This left only 1 500 available for the war in Namibia. Two years
later, the numbers looked even worse: out of a total of 8 350 men, 2 700 were
combating Unita, 2 700 were in base garrisons (remember that the SADF could
attack them at any moment!), 1 050 were headquarters personnel, another 500 were
defending temporary bases in southern Angola, and only 1 000 were available for
infiltration into Namibia.95
Table 2:
Year96
1985
1986
1987
Total97
93
Swapo losses
590
645
747
11 291
Sec. forces losses

?
33
72
715
'Kill ratio
?
19,5:1
10,4:1
15,8:1
Hamann: Days of the Generals, p. 78.

95
Heitman: South African Armed Forces, pp. 174, 176. Cf. also Steenkamp: SAs Border
War, p. 133.
96
Compiled from different sources.
94
44
The absolute figures are down, compared to the years before 1985. But take
into account that the SADFs role in Angola was changing. Increasingly Fapla and
the Cubans became the target instead of Swapo.
These SADF operations in aid of Unita, which culminated in Operations
Modular, Hooper and Packer in 1987-88, cannot, of course, be the subject of this
study. Suffice it to say that South Africa could not afford to lose Unita as a strategic
partner, as the Angolan rebel movement occupied the southeastern part of the
country, thereby in effect denying Swapo access to Okavango and the western
Caprivi. This was an important factor in limiting the insurgency to Ovambo, one of
the SADFs prime strategic goals.98
Apart from the rough handling Swapo insurgents received from the security
forces on the battlefield, the movements internal cohesion also started to sag in the
eighties, partly because of the military difficulties, but also because of the capricious
and dictatorial leadership of Sam Nujoma. The history of Swapo in exile, writes
Pastor Groth, was riddled with internal crises. Throughout the sixties, seventies and
eighties, the liberation movement lurched from one conflict to another, with a
continually escalating trend towards violence among the leadership. He quotes an
anonymous Namibian church leader in early 1979: The same process has started in
Swapo which has also happened in Russia under Stalin... I am extremely concerned
that there will be an era of Stalinism for Swapo in exile.99
This prophecy came to fruition in 1985, when the so-called spy scare broke
out.100 About 2 000 Swapo members were detained, mostly in Angola, but also in
Zambia, under suspicion of being South African spies. Hundreds of Swapo members
were ordered to halls in Lusaka, London, Paris, Bonn and under places, where those
present watched a number of videos they would never forget as long as they lived,
according to Pastor Groth.
This was the first time they saw the faces of the so-called spies the wellknown faces of friends who had fought alongside them for many years,
people who had been loyal, reliable Swapo members both at home and
abroad. They were now confessing their guilt, giving precise details of their
lives in Namibia and in exile, their families and how they supposedly became
enemy agents. The more the audience saw their faces and heard their voices,
the more they were seized by paralysing horror. As part of their confessions,
the spies gave the names of other freedom fighters who were also under
97
On 1.11.1988.
Cf. Scholtz: Cuito Cuanavale: Wie het werklik gewen?, Scientia Militaria, 28/1, 1998, pp.
16-61.
99
Groth: Namibia: The Wall of Silence, pp. 100, 101-102.
100
It is important to note that the ANC at the same time and roughly the same vicinity had a
similar experience. It remains to be investigated whether there was a causal relationship
between the two.
98
45
suspicion of espionage. That evening, the unsuspecting audience suddenly
began to fear for their own lives as they heard their own names being
mentioned and realized that they too, were branded as spies and traitors.
They knew that this would lead to imprisonment and torture.101
And it did. Hundreds were incarcerated, assaulted, maltreated, raped,
tortured; some died. And no-one was given a fair hearing. As Philip Steenkamp
succinctly puts it, subsequent evidence makes in clear that the overwhelming
majority were not spies, but simply critics of the leadership, or just people believed
liable to be such critics.102
However gruesome these events, the question that must interest us here most,
is how this affected Swapos military capabilities. It is true that many Swapo
guerrillas bravely went on fighting, trying to infiltrate Namibia, even though they
must have known that their chances of success could not have been great. But the
brutal suppression of all real or even imagined independent thought surely must
have dampened their enthusiasm, if not for Namibian independence, then for Swapo,
and lowered their morale. The power of the Security Department, like that of the
KGB in the USSR or the Gestapo in Nazi Germany, was all-encompassing. The
Canadian researchers Colin Leys and John S. Saul who are, ironically, sharply
critical of the apartheid government and its war effort in Namibia (they have,
arguably, done the most research into Swapos struggle past) write about the
growing Stalinist influence from 1976 onwards. They come to the conclusion that
after 1976 all questioning of policy decisions was delegitimised, so that not even
leaders as senior as Hage Geingob (later to become Namibias first Prime Minister)
or Lucas Pohamba could get a discussion in the central Committee of what the
security organisation was doing. In the end, they say, one [anonymous] senior
cabinet minister acknowledged to us, there was fear everywhere. The Central
Commitee could not act. We were saved by [the implementation of Security Council
Resolution] 435.103
This last sentence is important, and is further buttressed by Leys and Sauls
assertion that Swapo had all but paralysed itself for despite its many strengths and
its subsequent electoral success, this is hardly too strong a summary of its condition
on the eve of the peace agreement that brought Swapo home and into office after
April 1989.104
It is true that Swapo gave a last military convulsion when it sent 1 600
insurgents across the border on 1 April 1989, the day on which the implementation
101
Groth: Namibia: The Wall of Silence, p. 105.

Steenkamp: The Churches, in Leys and Saul: Namibias Liberation Struggle, p. 106.
For testimonies about the maltreatment of prisoners, cf. Groth: Namibia: The Wall of Silence,
pp. 114-129.
103
Leys and Saul: Liberation without Democracy?, Journal of Southern African Studies,
20/1, March 1994, p. 145.
104
Ibid.
102
46
of the peace accords were supposed to have started. But it was a miserable failure.
The breach of the accords was so blatant that South Africa reactivated Koevoet and
101 Bn with the concurrence of the UN and the international community and
wiped the insurgents out. Altogether 312 of them and 25 of the security forces died
unnecessarily in this final death dance, which changed nothing. It was a monumental
miscalculation by the Swapo leadership.105
Conclusion
This is not the place to recount the final peace negotiations which culminated
in the New York accords of 22 December 1988. Suffice it to say that the
international political climate which had made the perpetuation of the war in
Namibia thus far possible, was starting to change. In 1985 President Mikhail
Gorbachev took over power in the Kremlin. He quickly became aware of the fact
that the communist system was hugely inefficient and that the USSR could not
sustain the economic burden of the Cold War much longer. This meant, inter alia,
that the Soviet Union started scaling down its financial and military aid for proxy
wars in the Third World, such as Angola and Namibia. On the one hand, this
reduced the practical and ideological backing available to the MPLA, Swapo and the
ANC, but on the other took away the South African governments only claim to be
fighting a respectable war, namely its opposition to communism. At the same time,
the clashes between Angola, Cuba and South Africa in 1987-88 meant that both
protagonists had a good look down the precipice of total war and didnt like what
they saw.
The New York accords, therefore, were a compromise al three could live
with. It stipulated that South Africa would pull out of Namibia, that UN-supervised
elections would take place, and that the territory would finally become independent.
At the same time, all Cuban troops would leave Angola. Apart from Swapos
blunder of 1 April 1989, all went well. The elections were duly held, and Swapo
received 57 per cent of the votes. Sam Nujoma was inaugurated as first president of
the newly independent Namibia.
So, who won the war? As far as South Africa is concerned, it can rightly be
stated that it did well in terms of its military strategy and tactics. Almost every
firefight between the security forces and Swapo ended in a victory for the former.
After Ongulumbashe, Swapo never succeeded in establishing a single base on
Namibian soil. There were no liberated areas where its forces could recuperate and
set up an alternative government. The bases in neighbouring Angola were pushed
back hundreds of kilometres, and the cadres had to brave a broad strip of land
intensely dominated by the SADF before entering Namibia. And there they were
chased, pursued and hunted down mercilessly by professional experts, often natives
from the north itself. The casualty figures tell a story of Swapo at least after the
105
Stiff: The Covert War, p. 465.
47
South African countermeasures got under way in the late seventies getting beaten
fair and square.
Swapo failed in spreading the war wide. Their attempts to activate Caprivi,
Kavango and the Kaokoveld after the early seventies let alone the rest of the
country bore no fruit. On the contrary, the SADFs avowed goal to limit the
insurgency to Ovamboland was a resounding success.
After having had the initiative until about 1978-79, Swapo progressively
lost it. The South African invasions of Angola were, perhaps, the single most
important factor in causing Swapo to lose the initiative. It is as the legendary
Vietnamese General Vo Nguyan Giap, mastermind of the French and American
defeats in Vietnam, said in an interview in the nineties: We had to force the enemy
to fight the way we wanted them to fight. We had to force the enemy to fight on
unfamiliar territory.106 In Vietnam the guerrillas succeeded. In Namibia the South
African-led COIN forces did. The final debacle of April 1989 merely served to
underline Swapos military defeat. It may safely be said that, had international
developments not intervened, the long awaited coup de grace may not have been far
off.
And yet, there is an interesting story which illustrates the point. When
visiting Hanoi in 1975 just after the Vietnam War, the American strategist Colonel
Harry Summers told his North Vietnamese counterpart: You know you never
defeated us on the battlefield. The other colonel thought for a moment, then
answered: That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.107
The North Vietnamese officer, of course, exaggerated. The military side of
things in a revolutionary guerrilla war is not completely irrelevant. But, as the SADF
doctrine had it, its weight was about 20 per cent compared to the 80 per cent pulled
by politics, socio-economic factors, psychology, etc. Winning every firefight,
succeeding brilliantly in almost all your strategic goals, is simply not enough. In the
end you have to win over the hearts and minds of the people. The South Africans did
rather well here, too, but only in the less important areas of Caprivi, Okavango and
Kaokoveld. Ovamboland, accommodating 46 per cent of the population, proved to
the centre of gravity. And, although the SADFs civic action programmes did have
some effect, in the end the Ovambos still voted for Swapo and helped it to a
convincing majority. The fact that Swapo, at least for the time being, did not get a
two-thirds majority, mattered little. Sam Nujoma occupied the Namibian presidency.
South Africa failed in its bid to prevent Swapo getting into power.
106
Interview
with
Vo
Nguyen
Giap,
Viet
Minh
Commander,
at
www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/guerrillawars/giaptranscript.html.
Harry G. Summers, jr: On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Pennsylvania,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, n.d. [1982]), p. 1.
107
48
This makes it sound as if Swapo actually won. And yet that is not true either.
Swapos strategic goal was not simply to occupy the seats of government. It wanted
unfettered power. It wanted a one-party dictatorship without having to take a pesky
parliamentary opposition into account. It failed in this bid. As John Turner puts it:
Although the political settlement permitted Swapo to win and control the new
government of independent Namibia, it was only after a free and fair election of the
sort it would never have agreed in the heyday of the Cold War. Swapo was
ultimately cornered by its lack of success as an insurgent organisation into accepting
the results of a democratic alection to determine the fate of Namibia.108
So, once again, who won? Truth is, nobody and everybody. Nobody
received a knockout blow. Neither did any of the parties have the privilege of their
arm being held aloft by the referee before an extatic crowd. But the fact that
Namibia has a liberal democratic constitution and that anyone can vote for an
opposition party and criticise the government, is, perhaps, as near to a victory for the
people as can be imagined.
108
Turner: Continent Ablaze, p. 34

An Appraisal of The South African Strategy

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What was the South African strategy in fighting Swapo during the Namibian border war?

What was the South African strategy in fighting Swapo during the Namibian border war?

What were the principles of revolutionary guerrilla warfare according to the text?

What were the principles of revolutionary guerrilla warfare according to the text?

19

THE NAMIBIAN BORDER WAR:

Annihilation of the enemy and preservation of own forces: Obviously, the

Unity of effort: All means and instruments available should be effectively

A revolutionary war is a political war;

The purpose of both sides in a revolutionary war is to win the support,

The danger of complacency (refusal to recognise the true situation) must

There must be a high-quality intelligence organisation; and

Bureaucratic delays in a revolutionary war is as dangerous as subversion

Hammann: Days of the Generals, p. 69.

Cf. Breytenbach: The Buffalo Soldiers, p. 200.

Alexander: The Cassinga Raid, p. 170.

Sec. Forces losses

According to General Geldenhuys, the kill ratio on previously planned

SA Army: Counter Insurgency Manual, ch. 1.

Sec. forces losses

Hamann: Days of the Generals, p. 78.

Groth: Namibia: The Wall of Silence, p. 105.

Stiff: The Covert War, p. 465.

Turner: Continent Ablaze, p. 34

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