Deepwater Horizon Project Details

Submitted by
Purushottam lal suman (10003034)

Kehbruce singh (10003035)
Navneet Meena (10003040)
INTRODUCTION The Deepwater Horizon was a floating semi-submersible drilling unit a fifthgeneration, ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, column-stabilized drilling rig
owned by Transocean and built in Korea. The platform was 396 feet long and 256
feet wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet deep, to a maximum drill
depth of 30,000 feet.
About accident On April 20, 2010 at 9:56PM CDT explosion and subsequent fire on the Deepwater
Horizon semi-submersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) occurred which
was owned and operated by Transocean and drilling for BP in the Macondo
Prospect oil field about 40 miles southeast of the Louisiana coast.
Cause of Explosion
The problem occurred due to blowout, which subsequently caught fire
due to hydrocarbon intake in engine rooms HVAC fans
Blowout
It is uncontrolled release of crude oil and/or natural gas from an oil well or gas
well after pressure control systems have failed. This incident was a type of Subsea
blowout
After the incident,

On April 21, 2011, BP filed $40 billion worth of lawsuits against rig owner
Transocean, cementer Halliburton and blowout-preventer
manufacturer Cameron.
Significance
According to officials there were 126 individuals were on board of 11 were killed
and 17 were severely injured. The ship sank after 36 hours of tough fight but the
hydrocarbons continued to flow for 87 days causing a spill of national significance
Overview of DEEPWATER HORIZON
Investigation Report
The BP report identifies many key elements in the Deepwater Horizon drilling
operation1. Inadequate cementing :
Cement is pushed between the well casings and the sediment layers that
have been drilled through. It protects the metal wall from gas pressure and
from gas leaking up the outside of the well pipe also in case of emergency it
seals the well
Fault
Cement was supposed to prevent oil and gas bursting into the well pipe but
it failed due to bad quality of cement used
2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons:

Barriers in the shoe track had failed to prevent hydrocarbon entry into the
production casing. The barriers had two components:
a) Cement in the shoe track
b) Float collar, a device at the top of the shoe track designed to prevent fluid
ingress into the casing.
Fault
The investigation team has identified potential failure modes that could explain
how the shoe track cement and the float collar allowed hydrocarbon ingress into
the production casing.
3. Pressure reading was misinterpreted:

The pressure reading was misinterpreted by the crew member as the thought of it
as an error.
Fault
Its a human error as well as negligence.
4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser:

The rig crew and mud loggers either did not observe or did not recognize
indications of flow until after hydrocarbons entered the riser at approximately
21:38 hrs where it could be seen in the real-time 20:58 hours. The first well
control response likely occurred at 21:41 hours that is around 40 minutes after
the incident.
5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well:

No apparent well controls were taken until hydrocarbons were in the risers and
actions that were taken afterwards didnt control the well. And once oil and gas
started flooding to the surface, they were not diverted overboard but swept on to
the rig.
Fault
In this case of emergency, the fluid should be directed overboard apart from
directing it towards Mud Gas Separator as this would give rig crew more time to
respond and lessen the consequences of accident
6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig:
MGS known as mud gas separator is a device
that captures and separates free gas within
drilling fluid
But MGS has certain range until which it

separates limited amount of gas entrained in
mud and after separation they are vented into
atmosphere at safe location
Fault
According to the investigation when high flow was directed towards the MGS it
failed and directed gas back to the rig that formed a cloud of gas around the rig
7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition:
According to the investigation, fire and gas systems did not prevent released
hydrocarbons from reaching the engine room HVAC fans that act as potential
ignition source for the cloud of gas around the rig
Fault
The HVAC fans were not designed to trip automatically under gas detection but it
requires manual activation that was a major factor to catch fire
8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well:

BOP Blow Out Preventer
It is a device installed at the wellhead to
prevent fluids from unintentional escape. The
BOP has Automatic Mode Function (AMF),
which activates the Blind Shear Ramp to shear
the drill pipe and seal the wellbore in the event
of catastrophic failure.
But AMF initiation requires at least one

operational control pod of the two.
It happened that both of them failed to respond,
due to
Failure of solenoid valve in the yellow pod
Solenoid valve is a electromechanically operated
valve, where valve is controlled by electric current
through a solenoid. These valves are most
frequently used control element in fluidics and
are mostly used to shut off, release and distribute
fluids.
Insufficient charge in blue pod battery
.
Discussion and Learning Outcomes

Due to misinterpretation of reading of pressure test and lack of observation
of riser by the crew, it initiated the cause of accident due to human error
and negligence therefore human factor plays an important role in every
aspect.
Due to lack of technical skills and experience, crew didnt overboard the
fluid but they directed it to MGS
Due to low maintenance of BOP, AMF was not activated
Due to lack of automation, engine room HVAC fans didnt trip automatically
that cause fire
Latest technology
Technicians plan to place a small containment device called top hat over
the leaking oil pipe that will reduce the formation of hydrates that is due to
gas combining with cold water
Laser drilling is now made to use in which laser is used to make holes
instead of conventional drilling
References
www.deepdesign.com
www.youtube.com
www.wikipedia.com
www.offshoreenergytoday.com
www.nytimes.com
www.guardian.co.uk
www.bp.com
Work Distribution
Purushottam lal suman Powerpoint presentation
Navneet meena and Tongbram Kehbruce Singh Report of the Case Study

Deepwater Horizon Project Details

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Purushottam lal suman (10003034)

After the incident,

Overview of DEEPWATER HORIZON

2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons:

3. Pressure reading was misinterpreted:

4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser:

5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well:

But MGS has certain range until which it

8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well:

But AMF initiation requires at least one

Discussion and Learning Outcomes

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