The Family Code of the Philippines

Marriage
Acebedo vs. Arquero
Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by
rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.
Espinosa and Glindo
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,

Chapter 1. Requisites of Marriage

Republic vs. Albios
Facts: Albios and Fringer were married,after the marriage Albios
filed for the annulment on the ground that they really does not
have intention of entering marriage state that the same was
entered only to acquire an American citizenship.

Issue: Is the marriage void?

Held:

No,marriage is valid

Contrary to the findings of CA there was real consent because it

was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so.

Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in

order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective, considering
that only a valid marriage can properly support an application
for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter
into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.There is no law that declares a marriage void if
it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution
or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Bangayan vs. Bangayan
Facts:
Benjamin were married to Azunena. Later Benjamin entered into
another marriage with Sally but with no valid marriage license.
During their marriage they acquired properties. After sometime
relationship between Benjamin and Sally ended consequently
Benjamin petition to nullify the marriage on the ground that
there is no marriage license. The same was granted.
Issue:
a. Is the court correct?
b. What would be the property relation?

Held:
a. Yes. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License.

b. The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by

Article 148. Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit
of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his
children as advance inheritance.
3.

Republic vs. CA and Castro

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued

by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not
issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties.Hence the marriage is void.
Sevilla vs. Cardenas
The absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as
we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just
cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts
to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Sy vs. CA

Facts:

Filipina and Fernando were married without a valid marriage

license, the
same being issued only after one year from celebration of
marriage.
Issue: Is the marriage valid.

Held: No. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its

absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.

Ninal vs. Bayadog

Pepito and Norma were married only 8 months after the death of
Pepitos former wife. No marriage license was secured in the same
alleging that
they have

been cohabiting as H and W for 5 years.

Issue: Is the marriage valid?

Held: No. Five-year common-law cohabitation period,should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage,
it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months
had elapsed.
Republic vs. Dayot

Facts: Jose and Felisa were married without a marriage license

since they stated in their affidavit that they have lived
together as husband and wife for 5 years, however the same was
not the truth.
Issue: Whether the marriage maybe invalidated on the ground of
falsification.
Held: Yes. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. It
is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Hence the marriage is void ab
initio.
Morigo vs. People
Lucio and Lucia contracted marriage but the same was without a
marriage ceremony.After sometime Lucio entered into another
marriage believing that his marriage with Lucia was already
extinguished since Lucia acquired divorce decree abroad. A
bigamy case was thereafter filed against Lucio.
Issue: Whether the marriage is valid.
Held: No, Since there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The marriage
is void ab initio thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy.
Republic vs. Iyoy
Crasus and Fely were married however marital discord had set in
because of the Fely is said to be hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant. Eventually annulment was filed on the ground That
Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus
and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage
to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family

and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her

alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations
Issue. Is there psychological incapacity.
Held: No. the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void It is worthy to emphasize
that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.[27] It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.[
The root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause
of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect
that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that
it is incurable.
Republic vs. Orbecido
Facts:
Orbecido and Myrus were married however the same ended when
Myrus acquired US citizenship and thereafter acquired divorce
decree and finally married another man. Orbecido now files
before the court for authority to remarry. OSG however assails
the same contending that Art. 26 apply only to mix marriages;
that is marriage celebrated between Filipino citizen and alien.
Issue: Is Art. 26 applicable to the case. the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
Held: Yes. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2.
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
Facts: Corpuz a former Filipino acquired Canadian Citizenship.
Later married Sto. Tomas,however the same ended up after it was
found out by Corpus that Sto. Tomas had another man. Corpuz then
filed for divorce which was granted. Coming back in PH he now
petitioned to the court for judicial recognition of divorce
decree under Art. 26. The same was opposed by SOG on the ground
that he is not the proper party.

Issue: Whether Corpuz may avail of art. 26.

Held: No, only Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code However is not sufficient to
dismiss Girberts petition before the RTC for its unavailability
doesnt necessarily strip Gerberts of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and

conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves asa presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment

is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no
less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in Philippines, provided thedivorce is valid
according to his or her national law.

Fujiki vs. Marinay

Fujiki and Marinay were married but because parents of Fujiki is
not agreeable to the marriage thus could not bring Marinay
abroad. Eventually they lost contact and Marinay married another
Japanese guy without dissolving the first marriage. Marinay was
brought to Japan however the likewise separated because of
physical abuse. She left Maekara and rekindle relationship with
Fujiki. Fujiki and Maekara obtained declaration declaring second
marriage of void on the ground of bigamy. They then returned to
the Philippines and filed petition for Judicial recognition of
foreign judgment the same however denied by the RTC concluding
that only a spouse may petition to declare their void whom in
this case Maekara and Marinay.
Issue:Is the RTC correct?
Held. No The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or

wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage

"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
Chapter 2. Void and Voidable Marriage.
Capili vs. People
Facts. James contracted a second marriage with Shirley while his
first marriage with Karla still subsists. A bigamy case was then
filed,James moved for the dismissal alleging that there is
pending declaration of nullity hence the same is a prejudicial
question.
Issue: Whether there is PQ?
Held: No the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. The
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Carino vs. Carino
Santiago contracted two marriages during his lifetime,the first
was with Susan Nicdao with whom he had two child and the second
was with Susan Yee. After the death of Santiago both wives claim
for the benefits. Susan Yee alleged that the first marriage with
petitioner was without a valid marriage license. Hence void ab
initio. The RTC rendered decision in favour of Respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Susan Nicdao is void.
Held: Yes, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however,
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. under Article 40
of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first
be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous

marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second

marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of
the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan
Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage
was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148.
Quizon vs. Belen
Eliseo were married with Amelia. However Eliseo had a common law
wife Lourdes de Belen with whom he has a child Maria. After the
death of Eliseo,letters of administration was filed by Lourdes
representing Jennifer natural child of Eliseo. Amelia opposed
the same,contending Maria not a proper party. Lourdes in their
answer impugned the marriage between Amelia claiming it was
bigamous for having been entered during the subsistence of
marriage between Amelia and Filipito. The court declared Eliseo
and Amelias marriage void.
Issue: Whether the court is correct.
Held: Yes. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. That is why the action
or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.24
Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who
have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately
from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve
the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Llave vs. Tamano

Psychological Incapacity
Jocelyn Suazo vs. Angelito Suazo
Angelito and Jocelyn were married. After some time Jocelyn asked
for annulment of the ground und art.36
Held:
Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos
psychological incapacity to perform essential marital
obligations. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find
a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the
absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

Halili vs. Halili

Benjamin filed before
Chona void ab intio.

the RTC to declare his marriage with

Held: It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a

psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Tecase, recognized
that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually

have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.

[17] Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental
disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders
affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
others.[18]
Re-Marriage due to absence of Spouse
Manuel vs. People
Manuel was prosecuted for bigamy. He invoke as defence that he
did not know that his marriage is still subsisting. That he has
no intention to commit bigamy. That under the code his marriage
automatically terminated since he has no information about his
spouse for almost 25 years
Issue: Is there a bigamy?
Held: Yes. Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that
for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second
marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided
in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the
missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the
present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already
established.
SSS vs. Bailon
Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz were married. After sometime
Clemente filed before the RTC to declare Alice presumptively
dead. After 13 years Clemente married Teresita Jarque. Later
Clemente died,the latter being a member of SSS was entitled to
benefits which are now claimed by Terista,however Cecilia who
claimed to be daughter of Clemente from Elisa opposed the same.
Claiming that Clemente contracted 3 marriages, the 1st with
ALice, the second with Elisa and the third with Terisita.
Issue: Who is entitled for the benefits.

Held: Teresita, Under the Article 42 Family Code, no judicial

proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. if a
subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse,
the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The
good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage
cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment. It
bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after the death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in
accordance with law, Bailons and respondents marriage prior to
the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the
dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
Annulment of Voidable Marriages
Almelor vs. RTC of Las Pinas
Leonida filed before RTC a petition for annulment of her
marriage with Manuel on the ground that consent was obtained by
fraud; the concealment of Manuel that he is homosexual. The same
was granted by the court.
Issue: Is the court correct in granting the same?
Held: No. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the
onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to
his wife It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not
homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent
party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to
defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. . An
allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance
of evidence.
Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It
is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a
marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket

denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this

fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
Title II. Legal Separation
Bugayong vs. Ginez
Bugayong filed petition for legal separation on the ground of
the alleged adultery of Ginez.
Held: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders,
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiffhusband, especially those portions quoted above, clearly shows
that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the
supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument
that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by
the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the
plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along
with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to
be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and
one night, and the further fact that in the second night they
again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife
all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this
court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and
that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know
of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Ginez
Carmen Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
alleging that during the subsistence of their marriage Eufemio
had an affair with another woman. Carmen sought to deprived
Eufemio of his property rights. Eufemion in his answer
counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage

on the ground of his prior marriage with one Go Hiok. During the
pendency of the action Carmen Sy died.
Issue: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in
an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does,
will abatement also apply if the action involves property
rights?
Held: Yes, An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is
purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by
the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming.
Ong vs. Ong
Lucita filed a petition for legal separation against William of
the of repeated physical violence. Lucita claimed that: soon
after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo",
"gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair,
bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he
could reach with his hand and William hit her on her head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the
stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the
head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house;
Issue: Is the ground for legal separation exist?
Held: Yes. William himself admitted that there was no day that
he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable,
and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and
for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.

TITLE III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Illusorio vs. Illusorio
Erlinda filed before the court a petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of her husband.
Held: The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order" to enforce consortium.21
Title IV. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
Tan vs. Andrade
Rosario entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land with
Bobby. The sale was opposed by Rosarios children claiming that
the property is not exclusively owned by the latter rather it
was co-owned by them, hence they asked for annulment before the
court. In this case, records reveal that the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the
latters death on August 7, 1978.
Issue: Is the property belongs to conjugal property of the
spouses?
Held: No. the said properties were exclusive properties of
Rosario. Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which states that
"[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption
to apply, the party invoking the same must, however,
preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during
the marriage.
In this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the property
was acquired by petitioner Josefina. Thus, we agree with
petitioner Josefinas declaration in the deed of absolute sale
she executed in favor of the respondent that she was the
absolute and sole owner of the property. x x

Dela Pena vs. Avila- same to the preceeding case.

Ching vs. Goyangco
The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to
morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in
favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left
the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from
whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of
the stability of the family, a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from
selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union."
Homeowners Savings and Loan Banks vs. Miguela Dailo
Miguela and Marcelino were married in Aug 1967. After several
years Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner and constituted
REM in favour of the petitioner without the consent of Miguela.
Marcelino failed to pay, consequently the mortgage was
foreclose. After the death of Marcelino it came to the knowledge
of Miguela that the property was now owned by the petitioner.
Miguela now filed an action to annul the sale,therebeing no
consent on his part,the property being a conjugal asset.
Issue: Whether the sale is null and void.
Held: Yes. Under art 124 of the family code. Also the conjugal
partnership shall not be liable for the loan obtained by
Marcelino sinceFor the subject property to be held liable, the
obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Pelayo vs. Perez

Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the

space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her
implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sps. Bautista vs. Silva
Ravina vs. Villa Abrille
An action was filed by Mary to annul the sale that was entered
by her husband involving a house and lot that was acquired
during the marriage through the efforts of both parties in 1982.
Issue: Whether the property belongs to conjugal property.
Held: Yes, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife."
No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro.
CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE.
Agapay vs. Palang
Carlina filed an action to recover a parcel of land and house
and lot against Erlinda the second wife of Miguel. Said parcel
of land was acquired during the cohabitation of Erlina and
Miguel and the house and lot was acquired during their void
marriage since his former marriage stil subsist.
Issue: Who owns the said property.
Held: Carlina, Under Article 148, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision,
in contrast to Article 147. If the actual contribution of the

party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no

presumption of equal shares.
Since Erlinda failed to establish that she actually contributed
to the acquisition of said property he is therefore not the coowner thereof Consequently, the properties should , revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
private respondent Carlina Palang
Salas Jr. Vs. Aguila
Salas and Aguila were married in 1985. Later Salas left the
conjugal dwelling and never communicated with Aguila. In 2003
Aguila filed a petition to nullify her marriage with Salas
petitions state that there are no conjugal properties. The same
was granted in 2007. Shortly thereafter Aguila filed
manifestations that she discovered properties by her husband.
Based on the evidence presented said properties was acquired
during the subsistence of marriage between parties.
Issue: What property regime should govern.
Held: Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
Under this property regime, property acquired during the
marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on coownership.
TITILE V. THE FAMILY
Alvarez vs. Ramirez
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latters direct descendants or ascendants."
April Martinez vs. Rodulfo

Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it

being an exception to the general rule. Hence, a sister-in-law
or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. The
petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her
deceased husband and the respondent:
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. Acuna
Requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable
only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of
the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
TITLE V. THE FAMILY HOME
Patricio vs. Dario III
As a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a
minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the
unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the
spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate
property as family home. After 10 years and a minor
beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be
preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of
majority. , Three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they
live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not
fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. that grandchildren cannot demand
support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the
subject property.
Ariola vs Ariola

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be
sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the
death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
De Mesa vs. SPS Acero
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed
not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of
the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved
to the Sheriff. x x x.28 (emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed
exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the
same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said
exemption.
TITLE VI. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Grande vs. Antonio
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The
use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the
illegitimate children.
Gerardo Concepion vs. CA

In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised
Cabatania vs. CA.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption
that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.11 The presumption of legitimacy
does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on
the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.12
De Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the
late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their
legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because
the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's
heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy
of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of
the husband can be rejected.
Declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in
a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose
Dolina vs. Glenn
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same
is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved

Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an

action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support
Verceles vs. Posadas
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private
handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna
Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In
addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the
dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing,
and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
petitioners illegitimate child.
TITLE VII. ADOPTION
Adoption of LIM
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner,
having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Adoption of Garcia
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to
be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and
Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows
that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to
a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above.
Landingin vs. Republic
Written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right
of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated
and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner

failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the

adoption.

Lihom vs. Sibulo

The new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer
could b
TITLE VII. SUPPORT
Lacson vs. Lacson
.[Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his
wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of
and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in
his own handwriting
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can
rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The
provision reads:

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or

fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any
third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with
right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.

Perla vs. Baring

"An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence."1

in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the

supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate
renders this document incompetent to prove paternity
T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation
of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider
the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity.

Sps Lim vs. Lim

Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting them. This inability of
Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children
shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal[19] lines,
Title IX PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Beckett vs. Judge Sarmiento
The matter of custody is not permanent and
unalterable.1wphi1 If the parent who was given custody suffers
a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of
custody can always be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be
sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good
of the child must be determined as of the time that either
parent is chosen to be the custodian. x x x

Salientes vs. Abanilla

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody
is withheld from a person entitled thereto.[9] Under Article
211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner
Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be

adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of

custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the
custody of their child. In the present case, private
respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
see his child as alleged in his petition.[11] Hence, the remedy
of habeas corpus is available to him.

Gualberto vs. Gualberto

for custodypendente lite of their child who is less than seven
years of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling
reason to separate the minor from his mother, custody should
remain with her.
"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child
of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
compelling reasons for the good of the child: those cases must
indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt.
If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily
be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet
unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 12)
Briones vs. Miguel
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of
the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled
to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her
of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.
CHAPTER 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Bagtas vs. Hon. Ruth and Gallardo
The purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to
the production of the child before the court. The main purpose

of the petition for habeas corpus is to determine who has the

rightful custody over the child.
In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals
with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere
legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her
claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded
on human nature and considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of
the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or
detention, as in the case of adults, but on the courts view of
the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be
in custody of one person or another.
Vancil vs. Belmes
that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the
preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos

for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause
of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.11
St. Josephs College vs. Miranda
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons
injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the
foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to
exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight
incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of

the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the
following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.

TITLE XI. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW

Republic vs. Tango
Republic vs. Granada
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
TITLE XII. USE OF USERNAMES
Wang vs.Cebu Registrar
Silverio vs. Republic
Republic vs. Cagandahan
Hatima Yasin vs. Sharia
Remo vs. Sec. Of Foreign Affairs
De la Cruz vs. Garcia

Submitted to:Sir JOMAR SIRIBAN

Submitted by:ROSTOM P. CASTUERAS

FAMILY CODE OF PHILLIPINE