XVI.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Policy Statement. The Congress shall give highest priority to

the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this
end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and
disposition of property and its increments [Sec. 1, Art. XIII]. The
promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and selfreliance [Sec 2, Art. XIII].
1. While the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect,
it cannot justify breaking the law. While the State is mandated to
promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in
the field of housing, this cannot be interpreted to mean that
squatting has been legalized. The States solicitude for the
destitute and the have-nots does not mean it should tolerate
usurpation of property, public or private [Astudillo v. Board of
Directors PHHC 73 SCRA 15],
B. Labor. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It
shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of
shared responsibility between the workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith
to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations
between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises
to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and
growth [Sec. 3, Art. XIII], 1
1. In SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, it
was held that employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages to pressure
the Government to accede to their demands. In Bangalisan v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 23, 1997, it was held
that the ability to strike is not essential to the right to association!
and that the right of the sovereign to prohibit strikers or work
stoppages was clearly recognized at common law. In JMM
Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA
319, the Supreme Court said that obviously, protection to labor
does not mean promotion of employment alone.
C. Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform. Read Secs. 4-8,
Art. XIII.
1. In Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, supra., the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was upheld. In Maddumba
v. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281, it was held that the GSIS may be
compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value in
payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the
bondholder from the GSIS; the value of these bonds cannot be
diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly since these
bonds are fully guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines.
D. Urban Land and Housing Reform. The State shall, by law,
and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the
private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also
promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In
the implementation of such programs the State shall respect the
rights of small property owners [Sec. 9, Art. XU], Urban or
rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall
be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the

communities where they are to be located [Sec. 10, Art. XIII].

Read also R.A. 7279 [Urban Development and Housing Act],
1. The constitutional requirement that the eviction of squatters
and the demolition of their shanties shall be done in accordance
with law does not mean that the validity or legality of the
demolition or eviction hinges on the existence of a resettlement
area designated or earmarked by the Government [People v.
Leachon, G.R. No. 108725, September 25, 1998]. 2
2. In Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284
SCRA 716, where the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the
fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task of
Government in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in
urban areas, particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, local
government units are not given an unbridled authority when
exercising this power in pursuit of solutions to these problems.
The basic rules still have to be followed, i.e., Sec. 1 and Sec. 9,
Art. Ill of the Constitution. Thus, even Sec. 19 of the Local
Government Code imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. R.A. 7279 provides the order in
which lands may be acquired for socialized housing, and very
explicit in Secs. 9 and 10 thereof is the fact that privately owned
lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing.
3. In City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152,
January 29, 2001, the Supreme Court reiterated that under RA
7279, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the
following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the
public domain; (3) unregistered, abandoned or idle lands; (4)
lands within the declare Areas for Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement
sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired, and (6) privately-owned lands. The mode
of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be
resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted; and (b) parcels owned by small property owners are
exempt from such acquisition. a) Small property owners are [1]
owners of residential lands with an area not more than 300 square
meters in urbanized cities and not more than 800 square meters
in other urban areas; and [2] they do not own residential property
other than the same. In this case, the respondents fall within the
classification of small property owners. 4
4. In Solanda Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
123479, April 14, 1999, it was held that the urban tenants
right of first refusal (pre-emptive right) under P.D. 1517, can be
exercised only where the disputed land is situated in an area
declared to be an area for priority development (APD) and an
urban land reform zone (ULRZ).
E. Health. Read Secs. 11-13, Art, XIII.
F. Women. Read Sec. 14, Art. XIII. See Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Co. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
(discussed in Sec. 14, Art. II).
G. Peoples Organizations. Read Secs. 15-16, Art. XIII.
H. Human Rights.
1. The Commission on Human Rights. Composed of a
Chairman and four members who must be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the
Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
a) The power to appoint the Chairman and members of
the Commission is vested in the President of the
Philippines, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments /Mary Concepcion
Bautista v. Salonga, supra.].
b) The Commission on Human Rights does not enjoy
fiscal autonomy. It does not belong to the species of
constitutional commissions under Art. IX of the
Constitution
[Commission
on
Human
Rights
Employees Association v. Commission on Human
Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004],

SOCIAL JUSTICE EDUCATION Page 1 of 4

2. Powers and Functions of the Commission. Read Sec. 18,

Art. XIII.
a) In Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.
96681, December 2, 1991, on the question of whether or not
the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction or adjudicatory
powers over certain specific types of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights, the Supreme
Court said that it does not; that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter. It is conceded, however, that the Commission may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official; the function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. Having merely the power to
investigate, the Commission cannot and should not try and
resolve on the merits the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case 90775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed.
b) The Commission on Human Rights, not being a court of justice,
cannot issue writs of injunction or a restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights [EPZA v. Commission on
Human Rights, 208 SCRA 125].
c) In Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117,
the Supreme Court ruled that evicting squatters is not a violation
of human rights. Also reiterated was the rule that the.CHR has no
jurisdiction to issue the order to desist (a semantic interplay of a
restraining order) inasmuch as such order is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicatory power it does not
possess.

XVII. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

CULTURE AND SPORTS Constitutional Law

ARTS,

A. State Policy: The State shall give priority to education,

science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development [Sec. 17, Art.
II].
1. Sec. 1, Art. XIV: The State shall protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
a) In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 154 SCRA 730, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a
requirement for admission to medical school. The NMAT
does not violate the right of the citizens to quality
education at all levels; in fact, it ensures quality
education for future doctors, and protects public health
by making sure of the competence of future medical
practitioners. In DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 534,
the regulation that a person who has thrice failed the
NMAT is not entitled to take it again was likewise upheld.
b) It is true that the Court has upheld the constitutional
right of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may
be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions
requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to
engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation
assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to
protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance. In this case, the

Professional Regulation Commission (Board of Medicine)

observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings in
the licensure examination were true only for Fatima
College examinees. Verily, to be granted the privilege to
practice medicine, the applicant must show that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he
has fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as
being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not
issue. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid
requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily
met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to
secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative
will [Professional Regulation Commission v. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004],
c) In Philippine Merchant Marine School v. Court of
Appeals, supra., the Court said that the requirement
that a school must first obtain government authorization
before operating is based on the State policy that
educational programs and/or operations shall be of good
quality and, therefore, shall at least satisfy minimum
standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff,
physical plant and facilities and administrative and
management viability.
2. Constitutional mandate for the State to establish adequate and
relevant education, free public elementary and high school
education, scholarship grants and loan programs, out-of-school
study programs, and adult education. Read Sec. 2, Art. XIV.
3. Constitutional objectives of education: Inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral
character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative
thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and
promote vocational efficiency [Sec. 3 (2), Art. XIV].
4. Optional religious instruction. Option expressed in writing
by parent or guardian; public elementary and high schools; within
regular class hours; by instructors designated or approved by
religious authorities; without additional cost to the Government
[Sec. 3(3), Art. XIV].
5. Educational Institutions.
a) Ownership. Solely by Filipino citizens or corporations
60% Filipinoowned, except those established by religious
groups or mission boards, but Congress may increase
required Filipino equity participation [Sec. 4(2), Art.
XIV],
b) Control and administration. Vested in citizens of the
Philippines
c) Alien schools. No educational institution shall be
established exclusively for aliens, and no group of aliens
shall comprise more than 1/3 of the enrolment in any
school, except schools for foreign diplomatic personnel
and their dependents, and for other foreign temporary
residents [id.].
d) Tax exemptions. All revenue and assets of non-stock,
nonprofit educational institution --- as well as all grants,
endowments, donations and contributions used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes, shall be exempt from taxes and duties [Sec.
4(3), Art. XIV].
6. Highest budgetary priority to education [Sec. 5, Art.
XIV]. This provision has been construed to be merely directory; it
does not follow that the hands of Congress be so hamstrung as to
deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of national
interest and the attainment of other state policies and objectives
[Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221; Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra.].
B. Academic Freedom. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning [Sec. 5(2), Art. XIV]. Colleges,

SOCIAL JUSTICE EDUCATION Page 2 of 4

publicly- or privately-owned, if they offer collegiate courses, enjoy

academic freedom.
1. Two Views:
a) From the standpoint of the educational institution: The freedom
of the university to determine who may teach; what may be
taught, how it shall be taught; and who may be admitted to study
[Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234].
i) Thus, in Miriam College Foundation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, November 15, 2000, it
was held that if the school has the freedom to determine
whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to
determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as to
impose lesser sanctions such as suspension. While under
the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing
curricula, and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.
b) From the standpoint of the members of the academe: The
freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of
learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science
and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in
the instruction of students, without interference from political or
ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the
institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are found
by qualified bodies of his own profession to be completely
incompetent or contrary to professional ethics [Frank Lovejoy,
Encyclopedia of Social Science, p. 384]. , i)
i) In Camacho v. Coresis, G.R. No. 134372, August
22, 2002, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the
Ombudsman
investigator
in
dismissing
the
administrative complaint against the professor on the
ground of academic freedom. Dr. Daleons teaching
style, which was validated by the action of the University
Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional
guarantee on academic freedom. As applied in this case,
academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest
latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of
teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate
students, at that), subject only to the rules and policies
of the University.
2. Limitations: [Kay v. Board of Higher Education of New
York, 173 Miss 943]:
a) The dominant police power of the State; and
b) The social interests of the community.
3. Cases:
a) In Board of Medical Education v. Judge Alfonso, 176
SCRA 304, the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the
Board of Medical Education in closing the Philippine MuslimChristian College of Medicine for being inadequate.
b) In Capitol Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA
493, the closure of the nursing school was upheld, after due
notice to the DECS, when its teachers and students declared a
strike, refusing to hold classes and take examinations. The school
may not be forced to reopen at the instance of the striking
students. In University of the Philippines v. Judge Ayson,
176 SCRA 571, the Court also sustained the closure of the U.P.
Baguio High School, on the ground that U.P. was set up as a
tertiary institution and that the High School was set up only as an
incident to its tertiary functions.
c) In Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, the Supreme Court
reversed its ruling in Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7, declaring
that the termination of contract theory in Alcuaz can no longer
be used as a valid ground to deny readmission or reenrolment to
students who had led or participated in student mass actions
against the school. The Court held that the students do not shed
their constitutionally protected rights of free expression at the
school gates. Cited with approval were the rulings in Malabanan
v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359, along with Villar v. Technological
Institute of the Philippines, 135 SCRA 706; Arreza v.

Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, 137 SCRA 94; and

Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699. Accordingly,
the only valid grounds to deny readmission of students are
academic deficiency and breach of the schools reasonable rules
of conduct. Be that as it may, in imposing disciplinary sanctions on
students, it was held in Guzman (reiterated in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong, supra.) that the following minimum
standards of procedural due process must be satisfied: (i) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them; (ii) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired; (iii) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (iv) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (v) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case. Held inapplicable to this
case are the rulings in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 [where
the issue was whether a female lay student had the right to
compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological
studies leading to a degree], and Tangonan v. Pano, 135 SCRA
245 [where the issue was whether a nursing student, who was
admitted on probation and who failed in her nursing subjects, may
compel her school to readmit her for enrolment],
d) In Tan v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212, which involved a
bitter conflict between the administrators of Grace Christian High
School and the parents of some students on matters of school
policy, the Supreme Court said that the maintenance of a morally
conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously
imperilled if, under the circumstances of the case, Grace Christian
High School is forced to admit petitioners children and to
reintegrate them into the student body.
e) In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA
570, the Court held that it is within the sound discretion of the
university to determine whether a student may be conferred
graduation honors, considering that the student had incurred a
failing grade in an earlier course she took in school.
f) In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848, Resolution
No. 105 of the Professional Regulation Commission prohibiting
examinees for the accountancy licensure examinations from
attending any review class, briefing, conference or the like or to
receive any hand-out, review material or any tip from any
school, etc., was held to have violated the academic freedom of
the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of
review that review schools and centers believe would best enable
their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming
full-fledged public accountants.
g) In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 402, the Supreme
Court ruled that under the U.P. Charter, the power to fix admission
requirements is vested in the University Council of the
autonomous campus, which is composed of the President of the
University'of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank
of professor, associate professor or assistant professor.
Consequently, the University Council alone has the right to protest
against any unauthorized exercise of its power. Petitioners cannot
impugn the directives of the Board of Regents on the ground of
academic freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers
remain unaffected.
h) In Cagayan Capitol College v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 658, it was
held that while DECS regulations prescribe a maximum of three
years probation period for teachers, the termination of the threeyear period does not result in the automatic permanent status for
the teacher. It must be conditioned on a showing that the
teachers services during the probationary period was satisfactory
in accordance with the employer's standards. The prerogative of
the school to provide standards for its teachers and to determine
whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance
with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give
educational institutions the right to choose who should teach.
i) In Isabelo v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 591, it was held
that academic freedom was never meant to be unbridled license;
it is a privilege which assumes the correlative duty to exercise it
responsibly. Thus, where the students expulsion was
disproportionate to his having unit deficiencies in his CMT course,
there is reason to believe the petitioners claim that the schools

SOCIAL JUSTICE EDUCATION Page 3 of 4

action was strongly influenced by the students participation in

questioning PHCRs application for tuition fee increase.
j) In U.P. Board of Regents v. William, G.R. No. 134625,
August 31, 1999, it was held that where it is shown that the
conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud,
the university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or
distinction conferred. This right of the university does not
terminate upon the graduation of the student, because it is
precisely the graduation of such student which is in question.
Wide, indeed, is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of
higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom
is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.
k) In University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001,
the Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom
over Civil Service rules on AWOL, stressing that when the UP
opted to retain private petitioner and even promoted him despite
his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to choose
who may teach or who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even
in light of provisions of the Civil Service Law, the respondent
Commission had no authority to dictate to UP or any institution of
higher learning the outright dismissal of its personnel.

C. Language.
1. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino.
2. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official
languages are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law,
English.
3. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in
the regions and shall serve as ancillary media of instruction
therein.
4. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and
optional basis.
5. The Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English
and shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic and
Spanish.
D. Science and Technology. Read Secs. 10-13, Art. XIV.
E. Arts and Culture. Read Secs. 14-18, Art. XIV.
F. Sports. Read Sec. 19, Art. XIV.

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