Continued Eminent Domain

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2089 October 31, 1949
JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner,
vs.
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO AGUILAR, Manager, Rural Progress Administration,
respondent.
Guillermo B. Guevara for petitioner.
Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G.
Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters,
situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running
from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit:
(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate
power in filling the expropriation complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of
P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land.
(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of
the provisions of Act 539.
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to
buy at an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in
ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA.
We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case will make superfluous a
decision on the other questions raised.
Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows:
SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein,
through purchaser or farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to
their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and
who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.
SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National
Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of this Act. For this purpose,
the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation.
The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which, copied verbatim, is as follows:
The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location,
nature and area? The answer is to be found in the explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel Cuaderno,
member of the Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the above-quoted
provision. In this speech, which was entitled "Large Estates and Trust in Perpetuity" and is transcribed in
full in Aruego's "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution," Mr. Cuaderno said:
There has been an impairment of public tranquility, and to be sure a continuous of it, because of the
existence of these conflicts. In our folklore the oppression and exploitation of the tenants are vividly
referred to; their sufferings at the hand of the landlords are emotionally pictured in our drama; and
even in the native movies and talkies of today, this theme of economic slavery has been touched upon.
In official documents these same conflicts are narrated and exhaustively explained as a threat to social
order and stability.
But we should go to Rizal inspiration and illumination in this problem of this conflicts between landlords
and tenants. The national hero and his family were persecuted because of these same conflicts in
Calamba, and Rizal himself met a martyr's death because of his exposal of the cause of the tenant class,
because he would not close his eyes to oppression and persecution with his own people as
victims.lawphi1.nêt
I ask you, gentlemen of the Convention, knowing this as you do and feeling deeply as you must feel a
regret over the immolation of the hero's life, would you not write in the Constitution the provision on
large estates and trust in perpetuity, so that you would be the very instrument of Providence to
complete the labors of Rizal to insure domestic tranquility for the masses of our people?
If we are to be true to our trust, if it is our purpose in drafting our constitution to insure domestic
tranquility and to provide for the well-being of our people, we cannot, we must fail to prohibit the
ownership of large estates, to make it the duty of the government to break up existing large estates, and
to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has
been provided in the Constitutions of Mexico and Jugoslavia.
No amendment was offered and there was no debate. According to Dean Aruego, Mr. Cuaderno's
resolution was readily and totally approved by the Convention. Mr. Cuaderno's speech therefore may be
taken as embodying the intention of the framers of the organic law, and Act No. 539 should be
construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the National Assembly
did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its powers.
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of
the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would
be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual
rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property of law. The protection
against deprivation of property without due process for public use without just compensation occupies
the forefront positions (paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for private use relieves the owner of his property
without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be taken for public
use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the Constitution) forbids necessary
implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said
that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of and citizen and
transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is
claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a
free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.)
Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a
declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state"
created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary
components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness.
Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within
reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large
estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to
destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of
what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the
protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate has
occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in a democracy as
democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used
legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a social middle
class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy
country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other
government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of
efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to
housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the
elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without
ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for
the poor and the destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears
direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.
In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without that
provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire large
tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As Mr.
Aruego says "the primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts as to
the power of the government to expropriation the then existing landed estates to be distributed at costs
to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it would seem such expropriation
necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein."
In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole
town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform
secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The
expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils
inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts are not
in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go far in
the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of
the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interest
involved are considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S., 823, 824. See also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern
Sugar Associates, 156 Fed. [2nd], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by
condemnation. The highest court of New York States has ruled that slum clearance and reaction of
houses for low-income families were public purposes for which New York City Housing authorities could
exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The
underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and insanitary
dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemic, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and
diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities,
and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray vs. La Guardia, 52 N.E. [2nd], 884;
General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N.W. [2ND], 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N.Y.S.
[2nd], 50.) But it will be noted that in all these case and others of similar nature extensive areas were
involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the action taken.
The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure
to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation
proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any
consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to
be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her
and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or
leave the premises.
No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each
case has to be judge according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this
decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public
convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our
system of government and embraced by the majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case
would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see
no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to
those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural
Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or
2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build
thereon.
The petition is granted without special findings as to costs.
---------

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-
appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor
a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as
mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair
permit issued.
SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation
liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor
more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public
Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or
house.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name,
located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January
16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and
hitherto they had been living on leased property.
On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of
Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of
First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the
costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of
Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From
this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us
because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.
A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute
discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no
conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards;
standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined
and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392)
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the respondents.
It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city
is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it others; to
refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material
purposes, the two applying for precisely the same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger
of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of
the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under our
government do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances
which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in
the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this
conclusion.
As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep.
180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities to be well established that municipal ordinances placing
restrictions upon lawful conduct or the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid, specify the
rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and must admit of the exercise of the
privilege of all citizens alike who will comply with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of the
exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal
authorities between citizens who will so comply. (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al.,
2 SE (2d), pp. 394-395).
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed
building "destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section
3); and in fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was
predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by
preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the
beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while
property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may
prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As
the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own
beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of
the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land
remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To
legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the
restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation
would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscation
and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451;
also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be said
to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots
that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds
no support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a
doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused,
then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable
compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property
for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)
The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have
authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed
or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall
be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building
permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this
subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to
require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of
the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As
there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits
within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired
within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived
and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality
of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and
void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs
de oficio. So ordered.
-------

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
C.A. Mendoza & A. V. Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for defendant-appellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an
expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June
26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi,
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi),
over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded on the NE by Maria Nieves
Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP
reservation. Containing an area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of
Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...;
and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-Gozun
over two parcels of land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot 3, on the
SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-B, Blk. 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW by AFP military
reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less and registered in the name of
Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. ..., and
A parcel of land (Portion of lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot No.
3, on the SE by school lot and national road, on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo
23666), on the NW by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or less, and
registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, ....
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-
mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more
than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value
of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of
the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court
appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.
On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.
In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land
under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter,
so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally
occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus
causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of
P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered
to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.
By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G. viuda de Gil, Paloma Castellvi,
Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and
Consuelo Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently, Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr.,
husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also allowed by the court to intervene as a party
defendant.
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10,
the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually
placed in possession of the lands on August 10,
1959.1
In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged, among other things, that her
two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had
already been subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had
already been set aside for expansion sites of the already completed subdivisions; that the fair market
value of said lands was P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and
she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount
of P50,000.00.
Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on February 11, 1960, and also
intervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, in his motion to
dismiss, dated May 27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the lands sought to be expropriated was at the
rate of P15.00 per square meter.
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant
Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands.2 On May 16, 1960 the trial
Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of
P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to
deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of
Court. In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.3
The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for
the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch at
Floridablanca, for the plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base,
for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified themselves, proceeded to the
performance of their duties.
On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after
having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended
unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands
of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements
found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid
after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be
awarded.4 The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case — by defendants
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at
P15.00 per square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands
should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.5
After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective memoranda, and the Republic,
after several extensions of time, had adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of the
Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision6 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances, and that the lands are titled, ... the
rising trend of land values ..., and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court finds
that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for
the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just.
xxx xxx xxx
The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozun
since (sic) the amount deposited as provisional value from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made to
said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court.
In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to
defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi
land when the instant action had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value
thereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said (Castellvi) land as herein adjudged.
The same rate of interest shall be paid from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudged
minus the amount deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run until full payment
is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in court. All the intervenors having failed to
produce evidence in support of their respective interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed.
The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff.
On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds of
newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision
was against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective
oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was
called for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional
newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was denied by the court on
July 12, 1961.
On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the decision of May 26, 1961
and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from
the decision of the trial court.
The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on
appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on December 6, 1961.
Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to the approval of the Republic's
record on appeal, but also a joint memorandum in support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a
memorandum in support of its prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December 27, 1961
the trial court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal filed by the Republic, and the record
on appeal filed by defendant Castellvi as having been filed out of time, thereby dismissing both appeals.
On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for
reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion the defendants
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating
that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the
Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal
containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the
trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended.
Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.
The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun
before this Court, but this Court denied the motion.
In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the provisional value of her land.
The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's
motion in a resolution dated October 2,1964.
The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969, praying that they be
authorized to mortgage the lands subject of expropriation, was denied by this Court or October 14,
1969.
On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the estate of the late Don
Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings, filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per
agreement with the administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall receive by way of
attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the court may finally decide as the
expropriated price of the property subject matter of the case."
---------
Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:
1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings as just
compensation;
2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this
action;
3. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged value of the Castellvi property to
start from July of 1956;
4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first issue to be considered. We shall
follow the sequence of the Republic's discussion.
1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the
properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic
argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease
agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and
privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of
such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that
the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period
of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of
permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security.7
Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or
upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public
use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This
appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon
provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic
was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant
the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."8
Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in support of the second error
assigned, because as far as she was concerned the Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior
to August 10, 1959.9
In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the Castellvi property is
concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force
since 1947 under a contract of lease, typified by the contract marked Exh. 4-Castellvi, the pertinent
portions of which read:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into by and between INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALFONSO
DE CASTELLVI, represented by CARMEN M. DE CASTELLVI, Judicial Administratrix ... hereinafter called
the LESSOR and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by MAJ. GEN. CALIXTO DUQUE, Chief of
Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, hereinafter called the LESSEE,
WITNESSETH:
1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter reserved and the mutual terms, covenants and
conditions of the parties, the LESSOR has, and by these presents does, lease and let unto the LESSEE the
following described land together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances thereof, viz:
Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752, parte de la hacienda de Campauit, situado
en el Barrio de San Jose, Municipio de Floridablanca Pampanga. ... midiendo una extension superficial de
cuatro milliones once mil cuatro cientos trienta y cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros cuadrados, mas o
menos.
Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof are actually occupied and covered by this
contract. .
Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province of
Pampanga ...
of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the registered owner(s) and with full
authority to execute a contract of this nature.
2. The term of this lease shall be for the period beginning July 1, 1952 the date the premises were
occupied by the PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, AFP until June 30, 1953, subject to renewal for another year at
the option of the LESSEE or unless sooner terminated by the LESSEE as hereinafter provided.
3. The LESSOR hereby warrants that the LESSEE shall have quiet, peaceful and undisturbed possession of
the demised premises throughout the full term or period of this lease and the LESSOR undertakes
without cost to the LESSEE to eject all trespassers, but should the LESSOR fail to do so, the LESSEE at its
option may proceed to do so at the expense of the LESSOR. The LESSOR further agrees that should
he/she/they sell or encumber all or any part of the herein described premises during the period of this
lease, any conveyance will be conditioned on the right of the LESSEE hereunder.
4. The LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR as monthly rentals under this lease the sum of FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY-FIVE PESOS & 58/100 (P455.58) ...
5. The LESSEE may, at any time prior to the termination of this lease, use the property for any purpose
or purposes and, at its own costs and expense make alteration, install facilities and fixtures and errect
additions ... which facilities or fixtures ... so placed in, upon or attached to the said premises shall be and
remain property of the LESSEE and may be removed therefrom by the LESSEE prior to the termination of
this lease. The LESSEE shall surrender possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of
this lease and if so required by the LESSOR, shall return the premises in substantially the same condition
as that existing at the time same were first occupied by the AFP, reasonable and ordinary wear and tear
and damages by the elements or by circumstances over which the LESSEE has no control excepted:
PROVIDED, that if the LESSOR so requires the return of the premises in such condition, the LESSOR shall
give written notice thereof to the LESSEE at least twenty (20) days before the termination of the lease
and provided, further, that should the LESSOR give notice within the time specified above, the LESSEE
shall have the right and privilege to compensate the LESSOR at the fair value or the equivalent, in lieu of
performance of its obligation, if any, to restore the premises. Fair value is to be determined as the value
at the time of occupancy less fair wear and tear and depreciation during the period of this lease.
6. The LESSEE may terminate this lease at any time during the term hereof by giving written notice to
the LESSOR at least thirty (30) days in advance ...
7. The LESSEE should not be responsible, except under special legislation for any damages to the
premises by reason of combat operations, acts of GOD, the elements or other acts and deeds not due to
the negligence on the part of the LESSEE.
8. This LEASE AGREEMENT supersedes and voids any and all agreements and undertakings, oral or
written, previously entered into between the parties covering the property herein leased, the same
having been merged herein. This AGREEMENT may not be modified or altered except by instrument in
writing only duly signed by the parties. 10
It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease (Exh. 4, Castellvi) is 'similar in terms
and conditions, including the date', with the annual contracts entered into from year to year between
defendant Castellvi and the Republic of the Philippines (p. 17, t.s.n., Vol. III)". 11 It is undisputed,
therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the above-
mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year)
under the terms and conditions therein stated.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same
but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the
contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of
the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to
subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days
from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as
before occupancy (Exh. 5 — Castellvi). A follow-up letter was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the
delivery and return of the property within one month from said date (Exh. 6 Castellvi). On January 30,
1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it
was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that,
there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings
would be recommended to the President (Exhibit "7" — Castellvi).
Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458,
to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic
instituted these expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic was
placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959, On November 21, 1959, the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case No. 1458, upon petition of the parties, in an order which, in part,
reads as follows:
1. Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an agreement with defendants, whereby
she has agreed to receive the rent of the lands, subject matter of the instant case from June 30, 1966 up
to 1959 when the Philippine Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the Court upon
depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial Appraisal Committee with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga;
2. That because of the above-cited agreement wherein the administratrix decided to get the rent
corresponding to the rent from 1956 up to 1959 and considering that this action is one of illegal detainer
and/or to recover the possession of said land by virtue of non-payment of rents, the instant case now
has become moot and academic and/or by virtue of the agreement signed by plaintiff, she has waived
her cause of action in the above-entitled case. 12
The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year 1947 by
virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on
the subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows:
Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 13
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of
property for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case,
when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property
of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary"
means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI,
page 596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every
moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when applied
to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The
fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not
alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable
from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time
the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy
the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
"intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced
from the language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in
the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud — the
question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila
v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover,
in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947
was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on
year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other
parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting
them into a jet air base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the
lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice — of such
intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind
the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court
(Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance
in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is
present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic
into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized
as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the
provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when
the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until
the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to
public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present
when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between the parties was one of
lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises
under the guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to
terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of the lease
relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not, as of the time of
purchase, but as of the time of occupancy" 15 We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease
on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a
lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case, ceases upon
the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of
eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1,
Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would enter into a contract of lease where its
real intention was to buy, or why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under
the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the Republic had the
right of eminent domain, and could expropriate Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any
guise whatsoever. Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the
absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To sustain the contention of the Republic
is to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends
to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to
lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the lease is about to
terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be
reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the property under the lease, and then
assert that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite
of the fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime increased during
the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would
have the effect of depriving the owner of the property of its true and fair market value at the time when
the expropriation proceedings were actually instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the
"right and privilege" to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first occupied the
property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. What was agreed expressly in paragraph No.
5 of the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the
same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right
and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same
condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the
undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in
the lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to
the cost of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the lessee took possession
of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase was never intended by
the parties to the lease contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that "However general the
terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and
cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code).
We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year
1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of
the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of
the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought
to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158,
April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the
Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be
reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had never
been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority
of the court, on August 10, 1959, The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June
26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
2. Regarding the first assigned error — discussed as the second issue — the Republic maintains that,
even assuming that the value of the expropriated lands is to be determined as of June 26, 1959, the
price of P10.00 per square meter fixed by the lower court "is not only exhorbitant but also
unconscionable, and almost fantastic". On the other hand, both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun maintain
that their lands are residential lands with a fair market value of not less than P15.00 per square meter.
The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are residential lands.
The finding of the lower court is in consonance with the unanimous opinion of the three commissioners
who, in their report to the court, declared that the lands are residential lands.
The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending that the plans of the appellees
to convert the lands into subdivision for residential purposes were only on paper, there being no overt
acts on the part of the appellees which indicated that the subdivision project had been commenced, so
that any compensation to be awarded on the basis of the plans would be speculative. The Republic's
contention is not well taken. We find evidence showing that the lands in question had ceased to be
devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential
purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential
subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain. In the case of City of
Manila vs. Corrales (32 Phil. 82, 98) this Court laid down basic guidelines in determining the value of the
property expropriated for public purposes. This Court said:
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same consideration are to be
regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the
property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time
applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from
its availability for valuable uses?
So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the value of property
condemned for public purposes, that it is practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its
appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as
a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to
the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the
community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River
Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for
which it would bring the most in the market. 17 The owner may thus show every advantage that his
property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market
may be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division
into village or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other circumstances, the proposed subdivision
plans of the lands sought to be expropriated in finding that those lands are residential lots. This finding
of the lower court is supported not only by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as embodied
in their report, but also by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the province of Pampanga composed
of the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor and the District Engineer. In the minutes of the
meeting of the Provincial Appraisal Committee, held on May 14, 1959 (Exh. 13-Castellvi) We read in its
Resolution No. 10 the following:
3. Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of its proximity to the air base and due to
the fact that it was not being devoted to agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it into a
subdivision for residential purposes. The taxes due on the property have been paid based on its
classification as residential land;
The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her land into residential lots as early
as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Exh. 5-Castellvi)
As a matter of fact, the layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively approved by the National Planning
Commission on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8-Castellvi). The land of Castellvi had not been devoted to
agriculture since 1947 when it was leased to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said land was classified as
residential, and taxes based on its classification as residential had been paid since then (Exh. 13-
Castellvi). The location of the Castellvi land justifies its suitability for a residential subdivision. As found
by the trial court, "It is at the left side of the entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by
roads (Exh. 13-Castellvi), paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castellvi), the poblacion, (of Floridablanca) the
municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are closed by. The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are
also near (T.S.N. November 23,1960, p. 68)." 20
The lands of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same condition as the land of
Castellvi. The lands of Toledo-Gozun adjoin the land of Castellvi. They are also contiguous to the Basa Air
Base, and are along the road. These lands are near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel, the
Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1, 3 and 4-Toledo-Gozun). As a matter
of fact, regarding lot 1-B it had already been surveyed and subdivided, and its conversion into a
residential subdivision was tentatively approved by the National Planning Commission on July 8, 1959
(Exhs. 5 and 6 Toledo-Gozun). As early as June, 1958, no less than 32 man connected with the Philippine
Air Force among them commissioned officers, non-commission officers, and enlisted men had requested
Mr. and Mrs. Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their lands in question (Exhs. 8, 8-A to 8-ZZ-
Toledo-Gozun). 21
We agree with the findings, and the conclusions, of the lower court that the lands that are the subject of
expropriation in the present case, as of August 10, 1959 when the same were taken possession of by the
Republic, were residential lands and were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions. Indeed, the
owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use for which they would bring the most in
the market at the time the same were taken from them. The most important issue to be resolved in the
present case relates to the question of what is the just compensation that should be paid to the
appellees.
The Republic asserts that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is P.20 per square meter.
The Republic cites the case of Republic vs. Narciso, et al., L-6594, which this Court decided on May 18,
1956. The Narciso case involved lands that belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, and to one Donata
Montemayor, which were expropriated by the Republic in 1949 and which are now the site of the Basa
Air Base. In the Narciso case this Court fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands
that are sought to be expropriated in the present case being contiguous to the lands involved in the
Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic that the price that should be fixed for the lands now in
question should also be at P.20 per square meter.
We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find that the price of P.20 per square meter, as fixed
by this Court in the Narciso case, was based on the allegation of the defendants (owners) in their answer
to the complaint for eminent domain in that case that the price of their lands was P2,000.00 per hectare
and that was the price that they asked the court to pay them. This Court said, then, that the owners of
the land could not be given more than what they had asked, notwithstanding the recommendation of
the majority of the Commission on Appraisal — which was adopted by the trial court — that the fair
market value of the lands was P3,000.00 per hectare. We also find that the price of P.20 per square
meter in the Narciso case was considered the fair market value of the lands as of the year 1949 when
the expropriation proceedings were instituted, and at that time the lands were classified as sugar lands,
and assessed for taxation purposes at around P400.00 per hectare, or P.04 per square meter. 22 While
the lands involved in the present case, like the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have a fair
market value of P.20 per square meter in 1949, it can not be denied that ten years later, in 1959, when
the present proceedings were instituted, the value of those lands had increased considerably. The
evidence shows that since 1949 those lands were no longer cultivated as sugar lands, and in 1959 those
lands were already classified, and assessed for taxation purposes, as residential lands. In 1959 the land
of Castellvi was assessed at P1.00 per square meter. 23
The Republic also points out that the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Pampanga, in its resolution No.
5 of February 15, 1957 (Exhibit D), recommended the sum of P.20 per square meter as the fair valuation
of the Castellvi property. We find that this resolution was made by the Republic the basis in asking the
court to fix the provisional value of the lands sought to be expropriated at P259,669.10, which was
approved by the court. 24 It must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional
value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the true and correct value
of the land. The value is only "provisional" or "tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate
occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor. The records show that this resolution
No. 5 was repealed by the same Provincial Committee on Appraisal in its resolution No. 10 of May 14,
1959 (Exhibit 13-Castellvi). In that resolution No. 10, the appraisal committee stated that "The
Committee has observed that the value of the land in this locality has increased since 1957 ...", and
recommended the price of P1.50 per square meter. It follows, therefore, that, contrary to the stand of
the Republic, that resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee can not be made the basis for
fixing the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun.
The Republic further relied on the certification of the Acting Assistant Provincial Assessor of Pampanga,
dated February 8, 1961 (Exhibit K), to the effect that in 1950 the lands of Toledo-Gozun were classified
partly as sugar land and partly as urban land, and that the sugar land was assessed at P.40 per square
meter, while part of the urban land was assessed at P.40 per square meter and part at P.20 per square
meter; and that in 1956 the Castellvi land was classified as sugar land and was assessed at P450.00 per
hectare, or P.045 per square meter. We can not also consider this certification of the Acting Assistant
Provincial Assessor as a basis for fixing the fair market value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun
because, as the evidence shows, the lands in question, in 1957, were already classified and assessed for
taxation purposes as residential lands. The certification of the assessor refers to the year 1950 as far as
the lands of Toledo-Gozun are concerned, and to the year 1956 as far as the land of Castellvi is
concerned. Moreover, this Court has held that the valuation fixed for the purposes of the assessment of
the land for taxation purposes can not bind the landowner where the latter did not intervene in fixing it.
25
On the other hand, the Commissioners, appointed by the court to appraise the lands that were being
expropriated, recommended to the court that the price of P10.00 per square meter would be the fair
market value of the lands. The commissioners made their recommendation on the basis of their
observation after several ocular inspections of the lands, of their own personal knowledge of land values
in the province of Pampanga, of the testimonies of the owners of the land, and other witnesses, and of
documentary evidence presented by the appellees. Both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun testified that the
fair market value of their respective land was at P15.00 per square meter. The documentary evidence
considered by the commissioners consisted of deeds of sale of residential lands in the town of San
Fernando and in Angeles City, in the province of Pampanga, which were sold at prices ranging from
P8.00 to P20.00 per square meter (Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23-Castellvi). The
commissioners also considered the decision in Civil Case No. 1531 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, entitled Republic vs. Sabina Tablante, which was expropriation case filed on January 13,
1959, involving a parcel of land adjacent to the Clark Air Base in Angeles City, where the court fixed the
price at P18.00 per square meter (Exhibit 14-Castellvi). In their report, the commissioners, among other
things, said:
... This expropriation case is specially pointed out, because the circumstances and factors involved
therein are similar in many respects to the defendants' lands in this case. The land in Civil Case No. 1531
of this Court and the lands in the present case (Civil Case No. 1623) are both near the air bases, the Clark
Air Base and the Basa Air Base respectively. There is a national road fronting them and are situated in a
first-class municipality. As added advantage it may be said that the Basa Air Base land is very near the
sugar mill at Del Carmen, Floridablanca, Pampanga, owned by the Pampanga Sugar Mills. Also just
stone's throw away from the same lands is a beautiful vacation spot at Palacol, a sitio of the town of
Floridablanca, which counts with a natural swimming pool for vacationists on weekends. These
advantages are not found in the case of the Clark Air Base. The defendants' lands are nearer to the
poblacion of Floridablanca then Clark Air Base is nearer (sic) to the poblacion of Angeles, Pampanga.
The deeds of absolute sale, according to the undersigned commissioners, as well as the land in Civil Case
No. 1531 are competent evidence, because they were executed during the year 1959 and before August
10 of the same year. More specifically so the land at Clark Air Base which coincidentally is the subject
matter in the complaint in said Civil Case No. 1531, it having been filed on January 13, 1959 and the
taking of the land involved therein was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on January
15, 1959, several months before the lands in this case were taken by the plaintiffs ....
From the above and considering further that the lowest as well as the highest price per square meter
obtainable in the market of Pampanga relative to subdivision lots within its jurisdiction in the year 1959
is very well known by the Commissioners, the Commission finds that the lowest price that can be
awarded to the lands in question is P10.00 per square meter. 26
The lower court did not altogether accept the findings of the Commissioners based on the documentary
evidence, but it considered the documentary evidence as basis for comparison in determining land
values. The lower court arrived at the conclusion that "the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three lots of the defendants subject of
this action is fair and just". 27 In arriving at its conclusion, the lower court took into consideration,
among other circumstances, that the lands are titled, that there is a rising trend of land values, and the
lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328, this Court said:
A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or modify the report of the
commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount of the award if the facts of the case so justify.
While great weight is attached to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute therefor
its estimate of the value of the property as gathered from the record in certain cases, as, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, or where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either palpably
inadequate or excessive. 28
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings are not binding, but merely
advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned. 29 In our analysis of the report of the
commissioners, We find points that merit serious consideration in the determination of the just
compensation that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their lands. It should be noted that
the commissioners had made ocular inspections of the lands and had considered the nature and
similarities of said lands in relation to the lands in other places in the province of Pampanga, like San
Fernando and Angeles City. We cannot disregard the observations of the commissioners regarding the
circumstances that make the lands in question suited for residential purposes — their location near the
Basa Air Base, just like the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark Air Base, and the facilities that
obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar central of the Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the
flourishing first class town of Floridablanca. It is true that the lands in question are not in the territory of
San Fernando and Angeles City, but, considering the facilities of modern communications, the town of
Floridablanca may be considered practically adjacent to San Fernando and Angeles City. It is not out of
place, therefore, to compare the land values in Floridablanca to the land values in San Fernando and
Angeles City, and form an idea of the value of the lands in Floridablanca with reference to the land
values in those two other communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded the just compensation for
his property. We have carefully studied the record, and the evidence, in this case, and after considering
the circumstances attending the lands in question We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of
P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is
quite high. It is Our considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation
of the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In arriving at
this conclusion We have particularly taken into consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee
on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959 the land of
Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could
be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances relating
to this expropriations proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being expropriated the
Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the commissioners and
approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also taken judicial notice
of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30
Considering that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each other, and are of the same
nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all these lands.
3. The third issue raised by the Republic relates to the payment of interest. The Republic maintains that
the lower court erred when it ordered the Republic to pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum
on the total amount adjudged as the value of the land of Castellvi, from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959. We
find merit in this assignment of error.
In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the total value of the land of Castellvi from July 1, 1956 to
July 10, 1959, the lower court held that the Republic had illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from
July 1, 1956, after its lease of the land had expired on June 30, 1956, until August 10, 1959 when the
Republic was placed in possession of the land pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the court.
What really happened was that the Republic continued to occupy the land of Castellvi after the
expiration of its lease on June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi filed an ejectment case against the
Republic in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 31 However, while that ejectment case was
pending, the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain in the present case and was placed in
possession of the land on August 10, 1959, and because of the institution of the expropriation
proceedings the ejectment case was later dismissed. In the order dismissing the ejectment case, the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga said:
Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an agreement with defendants, whereby she
had agreed to receive the rent of the lands, subject matter of the instant case from June 30, 1956 up to
1959 when the Philippine Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the Court upon
depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial Appraisal Committee with the Provincial
Treasurer of
Pampanga; ...
If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August 10, 1959, she should be
considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could
not at the same time be entitled to the payment of interest during the same period on the amount
awarded her as the just compensation of her land. The Republic, therefore, should pay Castellvi interest
at the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her land, minus the provisional value that was deposited,
only from July 10, 1959 when it deposited in court the provisional value of the land.
4. The fourth error assigned by the Republic relates to the denial by the lower court of its motion for a
new trial based on nearly discovered evidence. We do not find merit in this assignment of error.
After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic filed a motion for a new trial,
supplemented by another motion, both based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
alleged newly discovered evidence in the motion filed on June 21, 1961 was a deed of absolute sale-
executed on January 25, 1961, showing that a certain Serafin Francisco had sold to Pablo L. Narciso a
parcel of sugar land having an area of 100,000 square meters with a sugar quota of 100 piculs, covered
by P.A. No. 1701, situated in Barrio Fortuna, Floridablanca, for P14,000, or P.14 per square meter.
In the supplemental motion, the alleged newly discovered evidence were: (1) a deed of sale of some
35,000 square meters of land situated at Floridablanca for P7,500.00 (or about P.21 per square meter)
executed in July, 1959, by the spouses Evelyn D. Laird and Cornelio G. Laird in favor of spouses
Bienvenido S. Aguas and Josefina Q. Aguas; and (2) a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land having an
area of 4,120,101 square meters, including the sugar quota covered by Plantation Audit No. 161 1345,
situated at Floridablanca, Pampanga, for P860.00 per hectare (a little less than P.09 per square meter)
executed on October 22, 1957 by Jesus Toledo y Mendoza in favor of the Land Tenure Administration.
We find that the lower court acted correctly when it denied the motions for a new trial.
To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear
that the evidence was discovered after the trial; that even with the exercise of due diligence, the
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of such a
nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted. 32 The lower court correctly ruled that these
requisites were not complied with.
The lower court, in a well-reasoned order, found that the sales made by Serafin Francisco to Pablo
Narciso and that made by Jesus Toledo to the Land Tenure Administration were immaterial and
irrelevant, because those sales covered sugarlands with sugar quotas, while the lands sought to be
expropriated in the instant case are residential lands. The lower court also concluded that the land sold
by the spouses Laird to the spouses Aguas was a sugar land.
We agree with the trial court. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that evidence as to the sale price
of other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove the fair market value of the land sought to be
expropriated, the lands must, among other things, be shown to be similar.
But even assuming, gratia argumenti, that the lands mentioned in those deeds of sale were residential,
the evidence would still not warrant the grant of a new trial, for said evidence could have been
discovered and produced at the trial, and they cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as
contemplated in Section 1(b) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Regarding this point, the trial court said:
The Court will now show that there was no reasonable diligence employed.
The land described in the deed of sale executed by Serafin Francisco, copy of which is attached to the
original motion, is covered by a Certificate of Title issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. There is no question in the mind of the court but this document passed through the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the title or annotating the sale on the certificate of
title. It is true that Fiscal Lagman went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to check conveyances which
may be presented in the evidence in this case as it is now sought to be done by virtue of the motions at
bar, Fiscal Lagman, one of the lawyers of the plaintiff, did not exercise reasonable diligence as required
by the rules. The assertion that he only went to the office of the Register of Deeds 'now and then' to
check the records in that office only shows the half-hazard [sic] manner by which the plaintiff looked for
evidence to be presented during the hearing before the Commissioners, if it is at all true that Fiscal
Lagman did what he is supposed to have done according to Solicitor Padua. It would have been the
easiest matter for plaintiff to move for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directing the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga to come to testify and to bring with him all documents found in his office pertaining
to sales of land in Floridablanca adjacent to or near the lands in question executed or recorded from
1958 to the present. Even this elementary precaution was not done by plaintiff's numerous attorneys.
The same can be said of the deeds of sale attached to the supplementary motion. They refer to lands
covered by certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. For the same reason they
could have been easily discovered if reasonable diligence has been exerted by the numerous lawyers of
the plaintiff in this case. It is noteworthy that all these deeds of sale could be found in several
government offices, namely, in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Pampanga, the Office of the Clerk of Court as a part of notarial reports of notaries
public that acknowledged these documents, or in the archives of the National Library. In respect to
Annex 'B' of the supplementary motion copy of the document could also be found in the Office of the
Land Tenure Administration, another government entity. Any lawyer with a modicum of ability handling
this expropriation case would have right away though [sic] of digging up documents diligently showing
conveyances of lands near or around the parcels of land sought to be expropriated in this case in the
offices that would have naturally come to his mind such as the offices mentioned above, and had
counsel for the movant really exercised the reasonable diligence required by the Rule' undoubtedly they
would have been able to find these documents and/or caused the issuance of subpoena duces tecum. ...
It is also recalled that during the hearing before the Court of the Report and Recommendation of the
Commissioners and objection thereto, Solicitor Padua made the observation:
I understand, Your Honor, that there was a sale that took place in this place of land recently where the
land was sold for P0.20 which is contiguous to this land.
The Court gave him permission to submit said document subject to the approval of the Court. ... This
was before the decision was rendered, and later promulgated on May 26, 1961 or more than one month
after Solicitor Padua made the above observation. He could have, therefore, checked up the alleged sale
and moved for a reopening to adduce further evidence. He did not do so. He forgot to present the
evidence at a more propitious time. Now, he seeks to introduce said evidence under the guise of newly-
discovered evidence. Unfortunately the Court cannot classify it as newly-discovered evidence, because
tinder the circumstances, the correct qualification that can be given is 'forgotten evidence'. Forgotten
however, is not newly-discovered
evidence. 33
The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is, as a general rule, discretionary with the trial court,
whose judgment should not be disturbed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 34 We
do not see any abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it denied the motions for a new
trial.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:
(a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as described in the
complaint, are declared expropriated for public use;
(b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square meter;
(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her one
parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she
withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited
in court;
(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for
her two parcels of land that have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00
that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands,
with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or
deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and
(f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as provided in Section 12, Rule 67,
and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
----------
G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by its President,
Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of
Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding
Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI
is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec
Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12,
1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or
periodical of said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to
enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their
platforms and programs of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. — (a) "Comelec Space" shall also be available to all candidates
during the periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial among all
candidates for the same office. All candidates concerned shall be furnished a copy of the allocation of
"Comelec Space" for their information, guidance and compliance.
(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" from newspapers or publications based in
the Metropolitan Manila Area shall submit an application therefor, in writing, to the Committee on Mass
Media of the Commission. Any candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" in newspapers or
publications based in the provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to the Provincial
Election Supervisor concerned. Applications for availment of "Comelec Space" maybe filed at any time
from the date of effectivity of this Resolution.
(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election Supervisors shall allocate available
"Comelec Space" among the candidates concerned by lottery of which said candidates shall be notified
in advance, in writing, to be present personally or by representative to witness the lottery at the date,
time and place specified in the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the lottery may appeal to the
Commission.
(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on Mass Media or the Provincial
Election Supervisor, as the case maybe, sufficiently in advance and in writing of the date of issue and the
newspaper or publication allocated to him, and the time within which he must submit the written
material for publication in the "Comelec Space".
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication

shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper
or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party
by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However,
unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the
Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI.
These letters read as follows:
This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on Elections, you are
directed to provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as "Comelec Space" or
similar to the print support which you have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections
which was 2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May
6, 1995, to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government.
We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to you their pictures,
biographical data, stand on key public issues and platforms of government either as raw data or in the
form of positives or camera-ready materials.
Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated in your publication any
day upon receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995 which is the last day for campaigning.
We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard. (Emphasis supplied)
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that
it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies,
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends
that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space"
and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary
servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI
argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.1
On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from enforcing
and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed to
various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent to file
a Comment on the Petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print
space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-
compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the
procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements
for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor
General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed
as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations
of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.2
At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec through its Chairman, Hon.
Bernardo Pardo, in response to inquiries from the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court, stated
that Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters dispatched to
various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those members to supply Comelec with
free print space. Chairman Pardo represented to the Court that Resolution and the related letter-
directives were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space which many
publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to the 11 May 1992
elections. Indeed, the Chairman stated that the Comelec would, that very afternoon, meet and adopt an
appropriate amending or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of which would forthwith be filed
with the Court.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation which
attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of this
Resolution follows:
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the Commission on Elections RESOLVED to
clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No. 2772 as follows:
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as requiring publishers of the different
mass media print publications to provide print space under pain of prosecution, whether administrative,
civil or criminal, there being no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section provided for either in
said Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, on the grant of "Comelec space."
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as constituting prior restraint on the part of
publishers with respect to the printing or publication of materials in the news, opinion, features or other
sections of their respective publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear from the last
sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall, "unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise . . . respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest."
This Resolution shall take effect upon approval. (Emphasis in the original)
While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as
having become moot and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass upon the first
constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope is to put this issue to rest and prevent its resurrection.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression. Section 1 of Resolution No.
2772-A did not try to redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 persists in its
original form. Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and
applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That Resolution
No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing
letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original
intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A written
communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a
government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the Commission presumably
legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That
the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other
sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties inhearing in the
present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would
be open to serious constitutional objection.
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for
public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory
"donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or
everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured
by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space
at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of
Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3 Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only
that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent
Commission would be used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and
programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election
information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It
seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the
Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and
regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the general
public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,
whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an
exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers
from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling
publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely in line with the theory of
democratic representative government. The economic costs of informing the general public about the
qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as widely
as possible throughout our society by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by taxation,
rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media enterprises. The benefits which
flow from a heightened level of information on and the awareness of the electoral process are
commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the same basis.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read
as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged
consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of
Comelec) to show that the police power — essentially a power of legislation — has been constitutionally
delegated to respondent Commission.4 Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in
the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the
instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. 5
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing
parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space
confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and
calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in full again:
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication

shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper
or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party
by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However,
unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.
It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in Resolution No. 2772. In any case, Section
8 should be viewed in the context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections. 6
There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for campaign or
other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid
political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b), from (b) the reporting of
news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors,
commentators or columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press:
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section
11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale
disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. Section 11
(b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcaster or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates,
their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs
are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to
be read as reaching any report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid
for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that it does not restrict either the
reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs
and activities of any and all candidates for office — constitutes the critical distinction which must be
made between the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. . . . 7 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a guideline
for implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club an effort not
blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful, does not add
substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid political
advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion
by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning
only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on
the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its
members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a
little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised —
whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's
power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of —
media of communication or information — [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly
honest, peaceful and credible elections —
is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota
thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.
Summarizing our conclusions:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March
1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to
Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE
PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No.
2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
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Today is Friday, October 27, 2023home

ConstitutionStatutesExecutive IssuancesJudicial IssuancesOther IssuancesJurisprudenceInternational

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-2089 October 31, 1949

JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner,

Guillermo B. Guevara for petitioner.

Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent.

The petition is granted without special findings as to costs.

ConstitutionStatutesExecutive IssuancesJudicial IssuancesOther IssuancesJurisprudenceInternational

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.

xxx xxx xxx

ConstitutionStatutesExecutive IssuancesJudicial IssuancesOther IssuancesJurisprudenceInternational

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

xxx xxx xxx

The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff.

Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province of

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:

G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication

Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication

Summarizing our conclusions:

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