Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the Decision

* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe,

Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information
charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate
intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino
Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body
thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen
Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her
sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking
advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the
hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the
place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga.
After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs.
Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's
office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46,
April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the
victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February,
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the
victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused
the procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it
my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he
spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of
his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to
her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6)
months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder.
Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent
medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his
monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple,
instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987,
she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not
used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid;
chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the
fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach
ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain
therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no
longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned
home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard
from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed").
She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the
barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is
the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would
not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even
in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma
Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay

official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay
official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN,
pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that
the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17,
1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo
was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that
his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able
to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali
Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs.
Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was
already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the
accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr.
Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left
side weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified
that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN,
pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for
the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as
follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual
damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act.
The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He
was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order
to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane
when he committed the crime.

It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendantappellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful
act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person
from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v.
Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion
is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible
under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion
test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would
believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he
has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency
being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or
conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by
disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such
as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in
issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the
act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:

thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine
whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused
was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and
impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The
accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and
did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder,
the lucid intervals unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated
with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent,
the manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987,
thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of
time the patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I
may be allowed to scan my record, the record reveals that the patient
had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract
expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the
first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted
to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe
headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that was
about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of
1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of

medical and psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However,
We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of
the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane,
has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of
the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the
latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly
against the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met
the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February
1987, when you met the accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted,
accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife why she was
asking so many documents: why she was requiring him to be
interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the
DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want to
transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his
deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987
that your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him
the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are
you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent
somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.

Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was
the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making
things difficult for the transfer of the landholding in the name of my
father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person
who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from
impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts.
This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid
intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not
necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the whereabouts
of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that
he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did
not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the case
and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you
consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your
conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made
a laboratory examination, in short all the assessment necessary to
test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one
situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may
elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the
illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason

out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless
motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have
encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we
prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the members
of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for
example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular
moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted
that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he
shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN,
pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of
the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of
what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act
charged. As stated by the trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was
sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was
carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that
the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the
attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused
ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he
was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in
order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was
conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p.
63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
(People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth
or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the
defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden
of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the
starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800,
Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all

acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done
unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes
insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52
Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an
accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of
overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea
of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.

Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion