School of Law

Compilation of
Questions and Suggested Answers

Book 2
(Property & Land Title and Deeds)

Submitted by:
CIVIL LAW (Weekday & Weekend) CLASS
(A.Y. 2015-2016)

Submitted to:
ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLO
Civil Law Review Professor

December 17, 2015

Table of Content
PROPERTY.......................................................................................................................1
Property....................................................................................................................1
Spouses Vergara vs. Sonkin.........................................................................1
Republic vs. Cortez, Sr.................................................................................3
Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.......................................5
Hortizuela vs. Tagufa...................................................................................7
Republic vs. Vda. De Joson.........................................................................9
Republic vs. Zurban Realty & Development Corporation........................10
Cabrera vs. Ysaac......................................................................................12
Francisco vs. Rojas...................................................................................13
Spouses Fortuna vs. Republic...................................................................15
Spouses Vilbar vs. Opinion........................................................................17
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sanchez...............................................19
Republic vs. Cortez....................................................................................21
Teodoro vs. Espino....................................................................................23
Cotoner-Zacarias vs. Spouses Revilla.......................................................24
Abadilla, Jr. vs. Spouses Obrero................................................................25
Mangaser vs. Ugay....................................................................................27
Department of Education vs. Tuliao..........................................................28
Quintos vs. Nicolas....................................................................................30
Mercado vs. Spouses Espina.....................................................................32
Guido-Enriquez vs. Victorino....................................................................33
Spouses Cabahug vs. National Power Corporation..................................35
Republic vs. De Asis, Jr.............................................................................36
Pilar Development vs. Dumandag.............................................................37
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran............................................38
Republic vs. Santos III...............................................................................40
VSD Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.............42
Republic vs. Lorenzo.................................................................................44
Marcado vs. Espinocilla............................................................................46
EASEMENT.....................................................................................................................48
Easement................................................................................................................48
Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.....................................48
Right of Way..........................................................................................................49
Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin........................................................................49
Jopauen Realty Corporation vs. Spouses Dominguez...............................51
Star-Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City Corporation...........................53
LAND TITLE...................................................................................................................54
Collateral Attack....................................................................................................54
Bagayas vs. Felicidad................................................................................54

Judicial Reconstitution of Torrens Title.................................................................55

St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Bretheren Foundation, Inc. vs.
Riel.............................................................................................................55
Land Registration...................................................................................................57
Spouses Peralta vs. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon......................................57
Restitution of Titles................................................................................................59
Republic vs. Camacho...............................................................................59
Tax Declaration vs. Original Certificate of Title...................................................60
Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. Rabadon.....................................................60
NUISANCE......................................................................................................................62
Per Se & Per Accidens...........................................................................................62
Rana vs. Wong...........................................................................................62
OWNERSHIP..................................................................................................................64
Accessory Follows the Principal; Exception.........................................................64
Villasi vs. Garcia.......................................................................................64
Accretion................................................................................................................66
Republic vs. Santos III...............................................................................66
Builder in Good faith.............................................................................................68
Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa.........................................................68
Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development, Inc....................................................70
Benedicto vs. Villaflores............................................................................71
Co-ownership.........................................................................................................73
Arambulo vs. Dela Cruz............................................................................73
Recio vs. Heirs of Spouses Aguendo.........................................................75
Co-Ownership; Partition; Inchoate right...............................................................76
Quijano vs. Amante...................................................................................76
Co-Ownership; Pro-Indiviso Share........................................................................77
Torres, Jr. vs. Lapinid................................................................................77
Period of Redemption of Foreclosed Property......................................................78
Ermitao vs. Paglas..................................................................................78
Property Obtained in Fraud...................................................................................80
Romero vs. Singson...................................................................................80
Protection Over Right of Possession.....................................................................81
Suarez vs. Emboy.......................................................................................81
Registration of Title...............................................................................................83
Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc......................................................83
Right of Accession; Builder in Bad Faith / Good Faith.........................................84
Vda. De Roxas vs. Our Lady's Foundation, Inc........................................84
Tax Declaration, Not a Proof of Ownership..........................................................86
Heirs of Paciano Yabao vs. van der Kolk..................................................86
POSSESSION...................................................................................................................87
Possession..............................................................................................................87
Gabriel vs. Crisologo................................................................................87

Agricultural Lands.................................................................................................89
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Ramos....................................89
Forcible Entry........................................................................................................90
Pabalan vs. Heirs of Simeon A. B. Maamo, Sr..........................................90
Movable Property..................................................................................................92
Subic Bay Legend Resorts & Casino, Inc. vs. Fernandez.........................92
Right of Possession................................................................................................94
Estanislao vs. Estanislao...........................................................................94
Unlawful Detainer.................................................................................................97
Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. Galabo.........................................97
QUIETING OF TITLE...................................................................................................99
Quieting of Title.....................................................................................................99
CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development &
Housing Corporation................................................................................99
Heirs of Pacifico Pocido vs. Avila...........................................................101

PROPERTY
Property

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Spouses Vergara vs. Sonkin

G.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015

Contributor

: Quiron, Maria Cristina

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A and B are adjoining landowners in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The property
owned by B is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by A.
B raised the height of his partition wall and caused the construction of his house thereon.
The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a portion thereof became part
of the wall of the master's bedroom and bathroom.
A on the other hand levelled the uneven portion of the of his Property by filling it with
gravel, earth, and soil making it to become even higher than that of B Property by a third
of a meter. Eventually, B began to complain that water coming from A Property was
leaking into his bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to
the paint and the wooden parquet floor. B repeatedly demanded that A build a retaining
wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that he had dumped thereon, but the
same went unheeded. Hence, B filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining
order.
Will Bs case prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Bs case will not prosper. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Bs property
is lower in elevation than the As property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the
waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code which provides:
Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth
which they carry with them.
The law further provides that owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which
will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which
will increase the burden.
In this light, B should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the
necessary adjustments to his property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal
easement. Instead of doing so, he disregarded the easement and constructed his house
directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins A property, thereby also violating the
Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which shall be at least
2 meters from the property line.

II.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. Cortez, Sr.

G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015

Contributor

: Sayson, Gerlyn Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
CL , established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaiu Island, San Vicente, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of the 50
hectares of land located in the western part of Palaiu Island. Together with the Aetas and
the people under him, they develop the land for agricultural purposes to support his
charitable activities. However, his peaceful possession was disturbed when the Palaui
Island was declared to be a marine reserve through a series of presidential proclamation
issued in 1967 and in 1994but subject to private rights. To protect his right over the land,
he filed a writ of preliminary injunction. He alleged that he has been in peaceful
possession of the property for 30 years and such, his possession ripened to ownership. Is
the contention of CL tenable? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contention of CL is untenable because possession in the concept of an owner under
Art 530 of the Civil Code can only ripen to ownership if the property is susceptible of
being appropriated.
To prove that the property can be appropriated or alienable, the existence of a positive act
of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be
established.
In the case at bar, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island
has been declared alienable and disposable when CL started to occupy the same in 1962.
Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be
appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the
Civil Code.

CLs possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no
matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be
lawfully possessed in the first place.

III.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.

G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

Contributor

: Udtohan, Liljoy
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A and B are co-owners of an unregistered agricultural land who filed a complaint for
Easement of Right-of-Way against XY Realty. They contend that they had been denied
access from their property to the nearest public road and vice versa due to the residential
subdivision developed by XY Realty. XY Realty pointed out that A and B failed to show
the requisites for the grant of easement of right-of-way. It presented the Municipal
Assessor who testified that the Provincial Assessor denied the application for issuance of
tax declaration by As husband since one had already been issued to Z. A and B asserted
that As husband had been in continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof for 50
years.
Can A and B demand for an easement of right-of-way from XY Realty?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. A and B cannot demand for an easement of right-of-way from XY Realty.
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded by
the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use the same.
In this case, the property is still an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a
land of the public domain, A and B in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through
prescription, must first be able to show that the State has expressly declared through
either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the
subject [property] is no longer retained for public service or
the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.

Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a

property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.
Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from XY Realty for lack of
personality.
Moreover, while As husband indeed attempted to declare the subject property for
taxation purposes, his application, as previously mentioned, was denied because a tax
declaration was already issued to Z.

IV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Hortizuela vs. Tagufa

G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015

Contributor

: Baquero, Hope Cesely

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
By virtue of the special power of attorney executed by Mari Horti, Jo Tagu instituted this
case against defendants Gregoria Tagu praying for the peaceful surrender of the property,
located in Isabela, unto them and further ordering the latter to reconvey in plaintiffs
favor the same property which was titled under her name via fraud. Said property was
originally owned by plaintiffs parents, although untitled, mortgaged the same to DBP,
but was foreclosed due to failure to redeem the property, sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez
who, in turn, sold it back to Red Tagu, husband of Gregoria Tagu using the fund sent by
plaintiff Horti who was in America and with the agreement that Red will reconvey the
said property to her sister when demanded. However, plaintiff discovered that the same
unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria Tagu, and was able to title the
said property by virtue of a free patent application before the DENR and the execution of
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Spouses Leandro Tagu and
Remedios Talo. Does the action for reconveyance and recovery of possession filed by
Mari Horti, constitute an collateral attack on the validity of the subject certificate of title
which is prohibited by law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Direct attack means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless
made as an incident thereof. Plaintiffs plainly question the title generated in the name of
defendant Gregoria Tagu having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. However,
in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action.
What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another's name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration
of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a

mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the
property.
The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest
ownership upon her of the subject land. "Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein.
In the case of MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA vs. GREGORIA TAGUFA, G.R. No.
205867, February 23, 2015, a private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of
a parcel of land even if the title thereof was issued through a free patent since such action
does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the
questioned property is not the real owner thereof.

V.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. Vda. De Joson

G.R. No. 163767, March 10, 2014

Contributor

: Corbo, Rhobie
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
In the early, 1900s Don Teburcio owned a vast parcels of land which composed
primarily of ricefields in the Negros Occidental. More than twenty years thereafter or in
1926, he decided to sell a portion of his ricefield with an area of 12,342 sq.m. to Senyora
Elisa and upon her death was inherited by her twin sister Donya Elisondra. Donya
Elisondra had his unico hijo named Joselito who was the sole heir to his mothers wealth.
In 1963, Donya Elisondra boarded on a plane bound to Manila which unfortunately
crashed. Joselito, inherited the parcel of land which was originally owned by Don
Teburcio by virtue of succession and owning and possessing it openly, publicly,
uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of owner since
then as well as the taxes due on the property. Sometime in 1981, Joselito filed for an
application for land registration over the property under the courts of Negros.
Will Joselitos application for land registration be granted?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared
alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR. This
doctrine means that the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not
suffice to support the application for registration, because the applicant must also submit
a copy of the original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
In this case there was no evidence was presented that the subject land had been declared
alienable and disposable by the State.
Thus, the application for land registration cannot be granted.

VI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. Zurban Realty & Development Corporation

G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014

Contributor

: Labella, Margaret
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) an
application for original registration of land in Cabuyao, Laguna, which it had purchased
in 1992 from one Jane de Castro Abalos. The application alleged that the Corporation and
its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation of the property in the concept of an owner, but did not state when possession
and occupation commenced and the duration of such possession.
The RTC granted the registration in favor of Zurbaran Corporation. The CA likewise
promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the reports made by the
concerned agencies and testimonies of those familiar with the land had buttressed the
court a quos conclusion that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.
The Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor-in-interest
did not show any proof that they had not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of land since June 12, 1945, that they did not present
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and that the land
was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to private
appropriation. As a consequence thereto, the Republic argues, that the application must be
construed to be based on acquisitive prescription, not open possession of the land.
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the (Zurbaran) Corporation and its averments in
the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section
14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The distinction is that Section 14(1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the
basis of prescription.
With the application of the respondent corporation having been filed under Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had

already been converted to patrimonial property of the State. As there is no evidence

showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to
be the patrimonial property of the State, the Republic asserts that Zurbaran Corporations
application must fail as it was unable to establish that the land has been declared
patrimonial, which is essential if its predecessor-in-interest had acquired the land by
prescription.
Should the application for registration be granted to respondent Corporation? Decide with
reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the application must be denied. The corporation did not make any allegation in its
application that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
nor did it present any evidence to establish such fact. The Director of Lands is correct in
saying that the application must be construed to be based on acquisitive prescription, not
open possession of the land.
Under the law, distinctions on the requirements for original registration of land depend on
what basis the application was filed. An application for registration under Section14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 must establish that applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Since the evidence presented by the Corporation and its averments in the other pleadings
reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), the crucial
query is NOT open, continuous and exclusive possession but whether the land subject
of the application had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State.
In other words, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive
prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code.
In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription
pursuant to the Civil Code. For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being
possessed and occupied must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of
the State. Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right in the possessor if the
property has remained land of the public dominion.
An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously
been declared alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared
patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of
possession and occupation required under the law on acquisitive prescription.

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of
Civil Code). Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service,
shall form part of patrimonial property of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code).

VII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Cabrera vs. Ysaac

G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014

Contributor

: Tejano, Misaellee
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Henry, Harvey and Harry are the heirs of Spouses Hector and Hazel Hughes and thus, coowners of Lot 123 with an area of 1000 square meters. Harry sold 333 square-meters of
the property to Harold for a consideration P500,000.00 without the consent of Henry and
Harvey.
Is the sale valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of
the land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the
undivided interest of the co-owned property.
The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or
"proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to specific
metes and bounds of a co-owned property.
The rules allow co-owner to sell his undivided interest in the co-ownership. However,
this was not the object of the sale between Harry and Harold. The object of the sale was a
definite portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease
contract to petitioner, respondent has "no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is
represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication." Without the
consent of his co-owners, respondent could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned
property.

VIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Francisco vs. Rojas

G.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014

Contributor

: Tirol, Mark Jason

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Subject of the controversy is a portion of the 3,181.74 hectares of a vast track of land,
known as the Hacienda de Angono, in Angono, Rizal. Sometime in September 1911,
Decreto No. 6145, covering the same 3,181.74-hectare portion of Hacienda de Angono
was issued in favor of the Rojas brothers. On the basis thereof, Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 633 over the same 3,181.74 hectares was issued in the names of the two
(2) brothers.
It appears, however, that, an Application for Registration of Title over four (4) parcels of
land are overlapping a portion of the area covered by OCT No. 633, was filed with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 10, by Rosalina, Rodolfo, Carmela
and Carmen, all surnamed Francisco (the Franciscos).
Subject parcels of land were eventually registered in the names of the Fransciscos on
July 29, 2000 with the issuance of TCT Nos. M-102009, M-102010, M-102011, and M102012. Less than a year later, on January 3, 2001, the Rojas brothers already filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Does the principle that Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked applicable in this
case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No.
Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a
final decree has not yet been entered by the LRA and the period of one (1) year has not

elapsed from date of entry, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it.
Therefore, the principle that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked does not apply.

IX.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Spouses Fortuna vs. Republic

G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014

Contributor

: Araas, Nia Grace

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application in the RTC for registration of
a Lot situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. They acquired the lot through a
deed of absolute sale from Rodolfo dated May 4, 1984. The spouses claimed that they
and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the said lot for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots
survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment. The Republic opposed
the application, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation
from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land. The Spouses Fortune presented evidence, which includes a notation in
the survey plan, which states that, This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as
per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940.. The spouses also relied
on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land
application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel. The Spouses claim
documents presented are adequate proof of a positive act from the government
reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
If you were the judge, would you grant the Spouses Fortunas claim of title through a
public land grant under the PLA?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a
public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant has failed to show such positive act from the government. Mere

notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties
alienable and disposable character. The applicant, must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO
certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and
released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the
President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.

X.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Spouses Vilbar vs. Opinion

G.R. No. 176043, January 15, 2014

Contributor

: Manuales, Eisone Brix

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Sps. Vilbar claimed that on July 10, 1979, they and Dulos Realty entered into a Contract
to Sell involving two (2) lots, LOT20-B and LOT 20-A. They took possession of Lot 1-B
in the concept of owners sometime in August 1979 after making some advance payment.
Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20 on June 1, 1981, Dulos Realty
executed a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Sps. Vilbar and delivered
the owners duplicate copy covering Lot 20 to Sps. Vilbar.
Sps. Vilbar were not able to register and transfer the title in their names. Sps. Vilbar and
Dulos Realty also executed a Contract to Sell covering Lot 21. The spouses Vilbar have
been in actual, open and peaceful possession of Lot 21 and occupy the same as absolute
owners since 1981.
On the other hand, Angelito L. Opinion claimed that he legally acquired Lots 20 and 21
through extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage constituted over the said properties by
Gorospes. They defaulted in payment, prompting Opinion to file a petition for ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. Subsequently, the subject properties were
sold at a public auction where Opinion emerged as the highest bidder. A Certificate of
Sale was issued in his favor on December 18,1995 and annotated on the TCTs of the
properties. Thus, the issuance of the titles to Opinion.
Sps. Vilbar now contends that they have better title and/or has preference over the subject
properties because it was sold prior to the acquisition of Opinon. Is the contention of Sps.
Vilbar correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Court recognizes the settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the

fact that the properties involved were duly covered by the Torrens system which works
under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity
to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. This Court has ruled that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. Having no certificate of title issued in
their names, Sps. Vilbar has no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to
support their claim. Further, it is an established rule that registration is the operative act
which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.

XI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sanchez

G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014

Contributor

: Sumampong-Espejo, Marietes
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Greta, Xiaxel and Ruby are sisters who owned a parcel of land located in Subangdaku,
Mandaue City. On June 2012, Gabby, owner of VVer Subdivision developer, offered to
buy the subject land for P2M. The parties thereafter agreed with the following terms; the
sisters will have to surrender the documents necessary for the reconstitution of the lost
title and for the transfer the title in his favour; upon surrender the earnest money of
P50,000.00 be given; that upon full payment the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Sale be executed for Gabby.
On October 2012, Gabby issued six checks for the purchase price of the land but two of
which are post dated. To further protect their interest, a written agreement was
constituted that once the all of the checks be encashed the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale be executed but if any of the checks be dishonoured by the
bank for whatever reason, the sisters have the right to rescind the contract, forfeit the
earnest money, and pay for damages.
The bank dishonored the last two cheks for being drawn against insufficient funds. Greta
demanded from Gabby several times for replacements but remained unheeded. On the
other hand, Gabby took possession of the said property, started to construct several town
houses, caused the advertisement to sell the units and eventually sold some of it without
the knowledge and consent of the sisters. Hence, the latter wrote the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) informing the latter of the existing public advertisement
offering for sale townhouses illegally constructed on the subject property and urging the
HLURB to cancel any existing permit or license to sell the said townhouse units or to
deny any application therefor, filed complaint in the office of the city building officials
for the illegal constructions and later found out that none of the offices mentioned issued
corresponding permits to Gabby. HLURB then issued Cease and Desist Order to stop
whatever activities going on in the said property. Gabby replied that only ground
levelling was done but upon actual inspection thereof several constructions were almost

done. This prompted Greta, Xiaxel and Ruby in filing for the rescission of the contract
and recovery for the possession of the land with damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff but on appeal affirmed the decision with
modification declaring both parties acted in bad faith thereby making them to comply
under art. 448 of the civil code. It is on the failure on the part of the plaintiff to file
injunction prohibiting the illegal construction, thereby making them equally in bad faith
with the respondent.
Did the plaintiff acted in bad faith? Rule on the decision of the appellate court.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Article 453 of the Civil Code relevantly states:
If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on
the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and
the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was
done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
The three sisters did take action to oppose the construction on their property by writing
the HLURB and the City Building Official of Mandaue City wherein, the HLURB issued
Cease and Desist Order against Gabby which was left unheeded. The respondent took
possession and made construction therein without the knowledge and consent of the
petitioner. During this period they were demanding the full payment of the subject lot
and were exercising their right of extrajudicial rescission of the Agreement. They did not
sleep on their right to find remedy under the law by resulting and consulting the different
offices of the government to seek redress. Thus, they cannot be declared to be acting in
bad faith and cannot in anyway find shelter in our laws. Under art. 449 and 450, the
provisions state:
Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what
is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person
who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of
the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Hence, as the owners of the subject property who were in good faith are entitled to the
remedy provided under the above provisions. The ruling of the appellate court was
misplaced by declaring them in bad faith or in pari delicto with the respondent therefore
the applicable provision in the civil code is art. 448.

XII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. Cortez

G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014

Contributor

: Perias, Christine Joymarie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
X filed an application for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land as there was
no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and X was allowed to present
his evidence ex-parte. X claimed that the subject parcel of land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that it was inherited by his mother from
her parents in 1946 and that the subject property had been in the possession of his family
since time immemorial. RTC granted X application for registration. The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA,
alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application pointed out that, although X
declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject parcel
of land since time immemorial, the subject property was not classified as alienable and
disposable land that may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years over which title by prescription
can be acquired. Thus, the requirement that those who are in possession of alienable and
disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and
exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land was
not satisfied.
Is the contention of the Solicitor General correct? What are the legal requirements for the
registration of property under PD 1529 and in the Civil Code?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, The requirement was not satisfied in this case, X failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed
alienable and disposable. Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for
registration of title must sufficiently establish;
1.
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain;

2.
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
3.
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Pursuant to Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription.

XIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Teodoro vs. Espino

G.R. No. 189248, February 5, 2014

Contributor

: Siega, Mar Teresa

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Teo , along with the children of his first cousins inherited from their ancestor Lot No.
2476 which is still registered under the name of the ancestor Genaro. In one portion of
the land an ancestral house stood until its demolition in June 2004 at the instance of Teo.
Such ancestral house was devised to Teo through a Holographic will by his ancestor
Petra. Teo effected the demolition of the ancestral house, intending to use the subject
property for other purpose. After the demolition, the children of his first cousins who
resided at portions of Lot 2476 that surrounded the subject property on which the
ancestral house previously stood, erected a fence on the surrounding portion, barricaded
its frontage and put up a sign thereat, effectively dispossessing Teo of the property
bequeathed to him by Petra. After Teos demand for the respondents to vacate the subject
property went unheeded, he filed the complaint for forcible entry against the respondents.
MTC dismissed the case since Teo has not proven exclusive ownership thereof. Was the
MTC correct in dismissing the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO.
Exclusive ownership of Lot 2476 or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teo
for him to be entitled to possession. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons (Art. 484).
Certainly the whole Lot 2476, owing to the fact that it has remained registered in the
name of Genaro who is the common ancestor to both parties herein, is a co-owned
property.All, or both Teo and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession
as co- owners. Neither party can exclude the other from possession.

XIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Cotoner-Zacarias vs. Spouses Revilla

G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014

Contributor

: Dacudao, Ron Juko

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Alfredo and Paz Revilla (Revilla spouses) own an unregistered parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite. Faced with financial difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo's travel to Saudi
Arabia, Paz borrowed money from Amada Zacarias (Amada), with the said property as
security.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled
"KasulatanngBilihanngLupa" before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, with the Revilla
spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the property. Consequently, Amada sold the
property to the spousesRodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses) who had no knowledge of
the forgery.
Upon discovery that the property's tax declaration was already in the name of the Sun
spouses, the Revilla spouses filed a complaint before the Tagaytay Regional Trial Court
for the annulment of sales and transfers of title and reconveyance of the property. The
Sun spouses argued good faith belief that Amada was the real owner of the property as
Amada showed them a tax declaration in her name and the "KasulatanngBilihanngLupa"
allegedly executed by the Revilla spouses. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The defense of the Sun spouses must fail. The rule in land registration law that the issue
of whether the buyer of realty is in good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of
the sale is registered land and the purchase was made from the registered owner whose
title to the land is clean. Necessarily, those who rely in good faith on a clean title issued
under the Torrens system for registered lands must be protected. On the other hand, those
who purchase unregistered lands do so at their own peril.

XV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Abadilla, Jr. vs. Spouses Obrero

G.R. No. 199448, November 12, 2014

Contributor

: Imperial, Christine
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Complainant Sps. Bonifacio P. Obrero and Bernabela N. Obrero initiated a case for
forcible entry against defendant Rolando S. Abadilla, Jr. Complainants claimed that they
are the registered owners of the land in question based on a TCT registered under the
name. They claimed they were in possession thereof based on improvements erected
therein utilized for residential and business purposes prior to the alleged acts of
Respondent who forcible fenced the perimeter of the land with barbed wire.
By way of defense, defendant claimed that the land was sold by complainants to his late
father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Being one of the heirs, he is one of the
owners thereof. In fact, they left a caretaker to oversee the land. Despite the sale,
complainants supposedly attempted to remove the fence and even built concrete
structures on the land using it for dwelling purposes.
a)
b)

Is title or ownership to the property essential for an ejectment case to proper?

Discuss the nature of a Torrens Title.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
In an ejectment case, title is not involved as the sole issue is the determination of
who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de
facto. Thus, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue but only to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property. As such, any adjudication of the ownership issue is
not final and binding; it is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.

b)
A certificate of title is evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A title issued under the
Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily
includes possession.A Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.
The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished except in a direct proceeding. Thus, issues as to the validity of a partys title
can only be definitively resolved in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title before the
RTCs.

XVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Mangaser vs. Ugay

G.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014

Contributor

: Nalia, Ellen
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Ellen Bryant filed Forcible with damages against Louie Millan. She presented the
original certificate of title and tax declarations evidencing her ownership over the
property occupied by Louie Millan. However, Louie contended that Ellen has failed to
prove prior physical possession over the property despite her presentation of the original
certificate of title and tax declarations. He reiterated that when the law would speak of
possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as
distinguished from possession de Jure. What Ellen proved was legal possession, not her
prior physical possession. On the other hand, Ellen argued that in ejectment cases,
possession of the land does not only mean actual or physical possession or occupation but
also by the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will or by proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. Is Ellens contention tenable? Defend
your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ellens contention is tenable.
In the case of Mangaser vs. Ugay G.R. No. 204926, December 03, 2014, the court
categorically ruled that possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to
which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory
information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in
the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was
able to subject the property to the action of his will.
In the given circumstance, the issuance of an original certificate of title to Ellen
evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows. It goes

further. Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations presented by Ellen
strengthens her claim of possession over the land before her dispossession by Louie.

XVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Department of Education vs. Tuliao

G.R. No. 205664, June 9, 2014

Contributor

: Macatangay, Maria Theresa

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
In March 2000, upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the land in
dispute, X demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the property as well as
pay for reasonable rent. But these demands were ignored. On October 8, 2002, X filed an
action for recovery of possession and removal of structure with damages against the
Department of Education (DepEd) with the MTC. X alleged that he was the registered
owner of the subject parcel of land, evidenced by a certificate of title and with a tax
declaration and a tax receipt, and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his
predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an
access road for the schoolchildren in going to and from the school. DepEd denied the
material allegations, averred that it did not state a cause of action, and even if there was,
the same was already barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject
land was adverse, peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than
fifty (50) years, evidenced by the testimony of testimony of a lone witness who is a
retired teacher. It also alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice
to vacate. As owner of the school site, it could not be compelled to pay rent or its
reasonable value.
a)
b)

Who has a better right to the subject property?

Is X not barred by laches, in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
The plaintiff X showed as evidence tax declarations and a certificate of title over
the property, the lone testimonial evidence the DepEd presented is not sufficient to
controvert the landowners case.As between a certificate of title, which is an
incontrovertible proof of ownership, accompanied with a tax declaration and a tax receipt
on one hand, and a testimony of a lone witness who is a retired teacher on the other, the

former prevails in establishing who has a better right of possession over the property,
following the rule that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence
b)
The landowners claim is not barred by laches when the schools possession
of the property is not adverse, and when the landowner brought suit two years
after he learned that the school is constructing a gymnasium over the property.

XVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Quintos vs. Nicolas

G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

Contributor

: Parilla, Dave Edward Velasquez

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A, B, C, D, E, F and G are siblings. Their parents passed away, leaving to them
ownership of a parcel of land situated along Purok 8, Barangay Kamputhaw, Cebu City
with TCT Number 14344.
Subsequently, A and B brought an action for partition over the parcel of land against C,
D, E, F and G. However, for failure of the parties to appear despite due notice, the case
was dismissed.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, C, D, and E siblings instead
resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication on September 21, 2004 to transfer the
property in favor of the seven siblings.
Subsequently, C, D and E siblings sold their undivided share over the property in favor of
their co-respondents, the spouses F and X. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses F and X, an Agreement of Subdivision
purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 14344 was partially canceled and
TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the spouses F and X.
On June 1, 2009, A and B filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against C,
D, and E wherein they alleged that during their parents lifetime, the couple distributed
their real and personal properties in favor of their seven children. Upon distribution A and
B alleged that they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as
their share. They likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled
to equitable title thereto. They also deny any participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of
Subdivision.

If you were the Judge, decide on whether or not A and B were able to prove ownership
over the parcel of land.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A and B were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property. The
cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Regrettably, plaintiff,
in this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed upon them in proving legal or
equitable title over the parcel of land in issue.

XIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Mercado vs. Spouses Espina

G.R. No. 173987, February 25, 2013

Contributor

: Parawan, Eula
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
X inherited a parcel of land from A & B. Shortly thereafter, Y claimed ownership over the
parcel of land alleging that he bought the same from W who in turn, previously bought it
from C who allegedly purchased the property from A before his death. X alleged that C,
through fraudulent machinations, was able to obtain a title over the subject property in his
name. X prayed for the declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale between W & C and
between C & A. Should X be declared the owner of the disputed property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Since the subject property was already covered by a Torrens title at the time Y bought
the same, the law does not require him to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.
The lot has, thus, passed to Y who is presumed to be an innocent purchaser for value, in
the absence of any allegation to the contrary.

XX.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Guido-Enriquez vs. Victorino

G.R. No. 180427, September 30, 2013

Contributor

: Ygana, Angeline
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Sometime in Feb. 1980 Marie Agwanta filed in the RTC an Application for Registration
of Title over a 10,603 square-meter lot, situated in Rizal.Marie Agwanta asserted that she
and her predecessor-in-interest "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adversed possession and occupation" of said land.However, the Republic, opposed for the
ground that the subject lot is not for private appropriation. Furthermore, as per Report,
dated July 17, 1981of the Division of Original it appeared that the subject lot is a portion
of a large parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-1000, registered under the name of Lizel
Uy, et al., and, at the same time, overlapped with another lot which was also a subject of
an application for registration. On August 15, 1988, the RTC-Pasig issued a Decision
granting Marie Smith's Application. Meanwhile, on November 21, 1991, the Supreme
Court issued a Decision and declared TCT 23377 issued under the name of Lizel Uy et.
al. true and authentic. The Supreme Court, however, took judicial notice of the fact that
prior to the reconstitution of the title, "certain portions of the area were in possession of
occupants who successfully obtained certificates of title over the area occupied by them
and also of occupants who had not obtained certificates of title over the area possessed
by them but the lengths of their possession were long enough to amount to ownership,
had the land been in fact unregistered." On December 4, 2002, Petitioner Kris Uy-Sy
filed an MR that the assailed Decision and Orders of the RTC are in derogation of the
established laws and principles on land registration and that petitioner contends that TCT
No. M-1000 has become indefeasible.Is the Kris Uy Sy contention meritorious?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of Kris Uy- Sy is not meritorious. Although the primary purpose of the
Torrens system of registration is to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable and
indisputable. That the registration shall bind the land and shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons including the national government and all the branches thereof. The
registration only confirms ownership and does not vest or give title to the land.

Ownership is different from certificate of title while the certificate of title may be
considered as best proof of ownership, the mere issuance thereof does not foreclose the
possibility that the property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
COT or the registrant may be a trustee or other parties acquired adverse interest therein
subsequent to the certificate of title. (Source: Land Titles and Deeds by Aqcaqili)
In this case rule that while prescription is unavailing against the owners, on the ground
that they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the equitable presumption of laches may
be applied against them for failure to assert their ownership for such an unreasonable
length of time.
However, it was held that it is imperative for those possessors, whose alleged bona fide
occupancy of specific portions of TCT No. 23377 is not evidenced by Torrens Titles, to
prove their claims in an appropriate proceeding. Among these occupants was,
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Marie Agwanta who, as duly proven that, together
with her predecessor-in-interest, she has been in public, peaceful, continuous, adverse
possession against the whole world and in the concept of an owner of the subject lot for a
period of more than thirty (30) years regardless of good faith or just title which is called
an extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

XXI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Spouses Cabahug vs. National Power Corporation

G.R. No. 186069, January 30, 2013

Contributor

: Ygnacio, Marie Angelee

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Lola NiDoraowns several parcels of land in Bulacan. She was among the respondents in
an expropriation case earlier filed by the National Power Corporation. The suit was later
terminated after NPC arrived at a settlement with the land owners. For and in
consideration of P51,000,500, Lola NiDoragranted NPC a continuous easement in favor
of NPC but reserved the option to seek additional compensation as easement fee based on
the decision of the Supreme Court G.R. No. 60077 entitled NPC vsSps Gutierrez. In the
said case, the Supreme Court made NPC liable for the payment of the full market value
of the affected property despite the fact that transfer of title thereto was not required by
said easement.
Two years later, Lola NiDora filed a complaint for the payment of just compensation.
NPC argued that the reservation in the grant referred to additional compensation for
easement fee and not the full just compensation. It further argued thatto allow Lola
NiDora to again collect from it the payment of just compensation would amount to unjust
enrichment at the expense of NPC and would sanction violation of the their contract.Does
the payment of just compensation amount to a violation of the contract between Lola
NiDora and NPC?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the payment of just compensation does not amount to a violation of the contract.
From the reservation stated in the contract, it is evident that the Lola NiDoras receipt of
the easement fee did not bar her from seeking further compensation from NPC.
The rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are bound
by its stipulationswhich, when couched in clear and plain language, should be applied
according to their literal tenor.

XXII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. De Asis, Jr.

G.R. No. 193874, July 24, 2013

Contributor

: Bacalso, Vernie Rose

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Santos filed a petition for reconstitution of title under RA 26, otherwise known as An
Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title
Lost or Destroyed. Pursuant to the 30-day publication requirements of the said law,
Santos caused the publication of the notice of the petition in the December 23 and 30,
2002 issues of the Official Gazette. However, the NPO certified that the December 30,
2002 issue was officially released only on January 3, 2003, evidently short of the thirtyday period preceding the January 30, 2003 scheduled hearing. Before the RTC, Santos
argued that the requirement has been substantially complied. Rule on the contention.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Santos is not correct. Section 9 of RA 26 reads:the court shall cause a notice of the
petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of
the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render
such judgment as justice and equity may require.
The thirty-day period that precedes the scheduled hearing should be reckoned from the
time of the actual circulation or release of the last issue of the Official Gazette, and not on
the date of its issue as reflected on its front cover. Moreover, while it is true that the
thirty-day period in this case was short by only three (3) days, the principle of substantial
compliance cannot apply, as the law requires strict compliance, without which the Court
is devoid of authority to pass upon and resolve the petition.

XXIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Pilar Development vs. Dumandag

G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013

Contributor

: Solon, Roger Benjamin

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
P filed a complaint for accion publiciana with damages against R and other residents
(respondents) for allegedly building their shanties without his knowledge and consent on
his property. The trial court dismissed Ps complaint, finding that the land being occupied
by leads towards a creek and within the three-meter legal easement and thus, considered
as public property and part of public dominion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in
a similar manner.
On appeal, P argued that although the portion of the subject property occupied by
respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains
ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion.
What are the two kinds of easement according to source? Does P still retain ownership
over the 3 meter strip?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Article 619 of the New Civil Code, there are two kinds of easement according to
source: by law or by will of the owners the former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easement. A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by
necessity constituted by law has for its object either public use or the interest of private
persons.
No, P does not retain ownership over the 3 meter strip. The New Civil Code defines
easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or
more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. Thus, Petitioners right of
ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone
along the banks.

XXIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran

G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013

Contributor

: Yray, Rhea
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
The Municipalitys Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a
multi-phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the RizalPlaza. The SB initially
then authorized Mayor Antonio Luna to obtain a loan from Land Bank and incidental
thereto, mortgage a lot as collateral. On November 21, 2005, Bayan Bank extended a
P4,000,000.00 loan in favor of the Municipality (First Loan), the proceeds of which were
used to construct ten (10) kiosks at the northern and southern portions of the Imelda
Garden. On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution approving the construction of a
commercial center on the Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan and in
consequence, Bayan Bank granted a second loan in favor of the Municipality on October
20, 2006 in the principal amount of P28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).
Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction of the commercial center at
the Agoo Plaza was vehemently objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led
by respondent Andres Bonifacio, these residents claimed that the conversion of the Rizal
Public Plaza into a commercial center, as funded by the proceeds from the First and
Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "highly irregular, violative of the law, and
detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said historical
and public park."
Is the petitioners contention tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. It is well-settled that public plazas are properties for public useand therefore,
belongs to the public dominion.
Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; x xx
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.In this relation,
Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is considered voidand as such,
creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations.
Hence, as public land used for public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is
subject to the administration and control of the Republic of the Philippines.Hence,
without the said grant, the Municipality has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.

XXV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. Santos III

G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012

Contributor

: De los Santos, Naiza Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, Joel applied on
March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the RTC of Cebu City.
The property, which had an area of 1,045square meters, more or less, was located in
Brgy. Basak Pardo, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to Brian, in
the Southeast by the Mananga River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Jedd.
The City of Cebu (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it
needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion. The RTC granted the application of Joel and Brian. The CA has
affirmed.
1. Define Accretion. Requisites of Accretion.
2. Do Joel and Brian have a right to claim the dried up river as accretion
according to Art. 457 of the Civil Code?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent
to the banks of rivers.
2. No, Joel and Brian cannot claim the dried up river as accretion.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent
to the banks of rivers.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved
the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate
to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river
banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and
was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal
right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion,
we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic
it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room
for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and fundamental duty of
courts is then to apply the law.

XXVI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: VSD Realty & Development Corporation vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc.

G.R. No. 170677, October 24, 2012

Contributor

: Rivera, Clieford
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
VSD filed a Complaint for annulment of title and recovery of possession of property
against respondents Uniwide and Dolores Baello with the RTC.VSD alleged that it is the
registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan City, wherein VSD purchased the said
property from Felisa D. Bonifacio. VSD proved the identity of the land it is claiming
through the technical description contained in its title, TCT No. T-285312; the derivative
title of Felisa D. Bonifacio, TCT No. 265777; the technical description included in the
official records of the subject lot in the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City; and the
verification survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Evelyn Celzo of the DENR-NCR.On
the other hand, Baello countered that the subject property was bequeathed to her through
a will by her adoptive mother as approved by the probate court. Therafter, she entered
into a Contract of Lease with respondent Uniwide. As a consequence of the lease
agreement, Uniwide constructed in good faith a building worth at least P200,000,000.00
on the said property.
Assuming that VSD is entitled to recovery of possession of the subject property, Is
Uniwide, as a lessee, entitled to recover the amount of improvements introduced to the
land?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Uniwide cannot avail of the rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which provides for full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement
is made, as the said provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith who builds on land
with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract. Parilla v. Pilar held: Articles 448 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, applies only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not

apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property.

XXVII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Republic vs. Lorenzo

G.R. No. 172338, December 10, 2012

Contributor

: Guma, Israel
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Jose Patalo and his relatives filed a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 3980 before the RTC covering a parcel of land in Echague, Isabela. Said
OCT, however, did not contain the date when such document was issued. Petitioners
claimed that Jose and his wife bought the subject parcel of land from Tinodora Bayola
and that a deed of sale was executed for the said transaction. Hence, an Owners
Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 3980 was delivered unto the spouses. They also averred that
the owner's copy of the said title was eaten by termites while the original copy of the title
filed before the Register of Deeds of Isabela was burned when the latter was razed by
fire. Should the court grant the petition?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The court should deny the petition.
Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26, the relevant law that governs the reconstitution
of a lost or destroyed Torrens Certificate of Title, original certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources enumerated therein such as (a) The owners
duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate
of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued
by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the
decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original
certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which
the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had
been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Here, the petitioners were unable to present any of the documents mentioned in
paragraphs (a) to (e) above. Moreover, the lack of date of issuance of the OCT presented
by the petitioner is fatal to their cause as have been reiterated in Republic v. El Gobierno
de las Islas Filipinas that the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the
number of the certificate of title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does
not warrant the granting of a petition for reconstitution.

XXVIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property

Source

: Marcado vs. Espinocilla

G.R. No. 184109, February 1, 2012

Contributor

: Villamor, Cletus
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
X died leaving a property. His five children divided the property equally among
themselves. Later, D one of his children died without issue ahead of her four siblings, and
M took possession of Ds share claiming that D had donated her share to him.
M and his daughters B and Ssold225 sq. m. to his son R, husband of respondent E, and on
March 8, 1985, R 114 sq. m. to C. Per actual survey, respondent E occupies 109 sq. m., C
occupies 120 sq. m., Y 209 sq. m., and petitioner, occupies 132 sq. m.
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions and avers that he is entitled to
own and possess the said lots, having inherited it from his mother Salvacion and bought it
from his aunt.
Respondents agree that Doroteos five children each inherited 114 sq. m. of Lot No. 552.
However, Macarios share increased when he received Dionisias share. Macarios
increased share was then sold to his son Roger, respondents husband and father.
Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Is petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred by
prescription? Decide with reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good

faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.
Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession with his
assertion that Macarios fraudulent acquisition of Dionisias share created a constructive
trust. In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak
of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the
property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and
cestuique trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is for the
trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. Prescription may supervene even if the
trustee does not repudiate the relationship.

EASEMENT
Easement

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Easement

Source

: Andres vs. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc.

G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

Contributor

: Ocat, Mylene
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A and B who are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of
unregistered agricultural land filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against C.
Are A and B entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from C considering that
their parcels of lot are not registered?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be demanded
by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use the same. In the problem, A and Bs property is an unregistered public
agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain, A and B must first be able to
show that the State has expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued by the President that the subject property is no longer retained for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.

Right of Way

II.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Easement; Right of Way

Source

: Reyes vs. Spouses Valentin

G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

Contributor

: Armenion, Ramy
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Rudy filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court for easement of right of way
against Grace. Rudy alleged that he was the registered owner of a 450-square-meter
parcel of land. The property was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons. Rudy
also alleged that Grace's 1,500-square-meter property surrounded his property, and that it
was the only adequate outlet from his property to the highway. A 113-square-meter
portion of Grace's property was also the "point least prejudicial to her." In her Answer,
Grace contended that the property chosen by Rudy as easement was also the most
burdensome for her. After an Ocular Inspection the trial court found that the proposed
right of way would pass through improvements, such as Grace's garage, garden, and
grotto. The trial court also noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access to
the public road. However, the trial court pointed out that "other than the existing
irrigation canal, no permanent improvements/structures can be seen standing on the
subject rice land." Moreover, the nearby landowner was able to construct a bridge to
connect a property to the public road. Should the easement of right of way be constituted
on Grace's property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Access to the public highway can be satisfied without imposing an easement on
Grace's property. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law
as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can
be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Also in
Floro v. Llenado, we refused to impose a right of way over petitioners property although
private respondents alternative route was admittedly inconvenient because he had to

traverse several ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention
that said passage is impassable during the rainy season.
Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate."
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement
of right of way, the requirement of "least prejudice to the servient estate" trumps
"distance between the dominant estate and the public highway." "Distance" is considered
only insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least prejudice." This court had
already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least prejudice" over distance
of the dominant estate to the public highway. Thus, in Quimen, this court granted the
longer right of way over therein respondents property because the shorter route required
that a structure of strong materials needed to be demolished.

III.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Easement; Right of Way

Source

: Jopauen Realty Corporation vs. Spouses Dominguez

G.R. No. 212725, August 4, 2014

Contributor

: Amores, Ernesto Miguel

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Cedric Realty Corporation (Cedric Realty) filed a Complaint for specific performance
and damages against Sps. Josephus and Abegail Bernz (Sps.Bernz) and the National
Badminton Association (NBA) claiming that they conspired to block its immediate access
to the Yellow Brick Road or private way, thus, depriving it of direct access to said road
and causing substantial and undeserved inconvenience.
On September 8, 2004, an ocular inspection was conducted which found that the subject
property impeded Cedric Realty's access to the national road. The ocular inspection
yielded the following findings:
The disputed property lies between plaintiff's property and the national road. Technically,
the said lot impedes plaintiff's access to the national road. Ingress and egress to plaintiff's
property is through a strip of land which abuts the bordering creek and which was
allegedly formed by natural accretion.
On May 4, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. It found that
Cedric Realty did not have the legal personality to institute an action for reversion.
Aggrieved, Cedric Realty appealed its case to the Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA said that the case was not one of reversion of
public land but one for the enforcement of a right of way, the CA found that Cedric
Realty failed to prove its entitlement to a compulsory easement of a right of way because
an outlet already exists, in particular, a strip of land by the creek, which leads to Yellow
Brick Road.
Was the CA correct in affirming the decision of the RTC?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the CA was correct in doing so.

Under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, to be entitled to a compulsory easement of a
right of way, the following must be established: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In the case presented, the first element is absent. As stated in the Commissioner's report,
an outlet already exists, a strip of land which abuts the bordering creek, which in turn
leads to Yellow Brick Road. As found by the trial court, plaintiff-appellant is using
another parcel of land as its access road to Yellow Brick road, although the same is not
the direct or shortest route
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of
right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting
up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without
imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.

IV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Easement; Right of Way

Source

: Star-Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Paper City Corporation

G.R. No. 169211, March 6, 2013

Contributor

: Avenido, Anna Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
XYZ company applied and was granted a loan from ABC bank. The loan was secured by
a Deed of Continuing Chattel Mortgage over their machineries inside XYZs plant. Later
on, the Chattel Mortgage was cancelled and was replaced with Real Estate Mortgage
the buildings on the plant of XYZ Company. The company defaulted in its payment. Can
the Bank ask for the foreclosure of the mortgaged buildings including the machines
inside the building?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The machineries are considered as real properties and should be included in the
foreclosure. Law and jurisprudence provide and guide that even if not expressly so stated,
the mortgage extends to the improvements.
Art. 2127 of the New Civil Code Provides: The mortgage extends to the natural
accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received
when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing
to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation
for public use, with the declarations, amplifications and limitations established by law,
whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor, or it passes into the hands
of a third person.
In the early case of Bischoff v. Pomar and Cia. General de Tabacos, the Court ruled that
even if the machinery in question was not included in the mortgage expressly, Article 111
of the [old] Mortgage Law provides that chattels permanently located in a building, either
useful or ornamental, or for the service of some industry even though they were placed
there after the creation of the mortgage shall be considered as mortgaged with the estate,
provided they belong to the owner of said estate.

LAND TITLE
Collateral Attack

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Land Title; Collateral Attack

Source

: Bagayas vs. Felicidad

G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013

Contributor

: Isidro, Dalisay
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Does a complaint for annulment of sale and partition which requires a resolution on the
issue of ownership, constitute a collateral attack upon the certificate of title or Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., which is an action for partition premised on the existence
or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The title
referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document.

Judicial Reconstitution of Torrens Title

II.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Land Title; Judicial Reconstitution of Torrens Title

Source

: St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Bretheren Foundation, Inc.

vs. Riel
G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015

Contributor

: Jaen, Bea Marie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
ABC claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had
been burnt and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late
80s. In order for the petition to be granted, what are the acceptable bases for judicial
reconstitution of an existing Torrens title?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Section 2 and Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly
listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens title, to wit:
Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may
be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original
had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or
destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original
had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Land Registration

III.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Land Title; Land Registration

Source

: Spouses Peralta vs. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon

G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014

Contributor

: Calvo, Mario Dennis

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A certain parcel of land registered under the name Bernadette Gonzales was fraudulently
transferred to Alden Mendoza, who in turn subdivided the land and sold separately to
Spouses Tinidora with a xerox copy of the TCT and to Pauleen, Ann and Jose, all
surnamed Aldub another portion of the land. Thereafter, they individually registered their
respective portions of the land. The heirs of Bernadette were claiming back the land
alleging that it was sold under fraudulent circumstances and no valid title passed upon the
buyers. The Aldubs and SpsTinidora averred that they are buyers in good faith. Heirs of
Bernadette claimed their family has the poseesion of the said property through their
tenant Wally Belen and to his son Paolo Belen and alleged that Alden Mendoza never set
foot in this parcel of land. The RTC rendered the decision ordering the restoration of the
OCT and ordering the Sps. Tinidor and the Aldubs to peacefully surrender such lots. The
RTC conclude that the said document was a mere forgery the fact that only a xerox copy
of the purported deed of sale between Mendoza and Gonzales was presented before the
Register of Deeds for registration. The CA reversed the decision holding that the Aldubs
are innocent purchasers for value while the TCT registered under SpsTinodora shall be
cancelled for being null and void for they are buyers in bad faith.
a.) Can a forged instrument become the root of a valid title?
b.) Is the CA correct in declaring the Aldubs as innocent purchasers for value thus
the transfer of the parcel of land to their names deemed valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a.) The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the
exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the
registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, there must
be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the
original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to
the forger must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the
transferee. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value. The new title under the name of the forger was
registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value. Hence, it was clear that
there was a complete chain of registered titles.
b.) Yes, the CA is correct. Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as
one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to
or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase
or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from whom they
receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not
close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that
they are acting in good faith.
The Aldubs were a buyer in good faith, despite its determination that fraud marred the
sale between Bernadette Gonzales and Mendoza, a fraudulent or forged document of sale
may still give rise to a valid title. The appellate court reasoned that if the certificate of
title had already been transferred from the name of the true owner to that which was
indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have been
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid. The CA
concluded that this was the case for the Aldubs. On the other hand, Sps. Tinidora are
indeed buyers in bad faith, in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the
photocopy of the title provided by Mendoza, a mere photocopy of the title should have
made them suspicious that there was some flaw in the title because he was not in
possession of the original copy.

Restitution of Titles

IV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Land Title; Restitution of Titles

Source

: Republic vs. Camacho

G.R. No. 185604, June 13, 2013

Contributor

: Ramirez, Gemma
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A holder of an original certificate of title (OCT) filed a petition for its reconstitution
because the OCT number therein is no longer legible due to wear and tear.
What is the nature of the proceeding for the reconstitution of a certificate of title under
R.A. 26 which was lost or destroyed.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The nature of the proceedings for reconstitution of a Certificate of Title under R.A. 26
denotes a revocation of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed
in its original form and condition. The purpose of such proceeding is merely to have the
Certificate of Title reproduced after proper proceedings in the same form it was in when
its loss or destruction occurred.

Tax Declaration vs. Original Certificate of Title

V.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Land Title; Tax Declaration vs. Original Certificate of Title

Source

: Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. Rabadon

G.R. No. 65014, July 31, 2013

Contributor

: Regudo, Marion Thursday

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On October 19, 1993, X filed before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and
possession of the subject property from Y. X alleged that: (a) the subject property was
owned by her predecessor-in-interest, XXX, pursuant to Decree No. 12345;(b) while the
foregoing decree was lost during the last World War, its existence could still be shown by
a certification (LRA certification) issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and
a certified copy from page 19 of the daybook of cadastral lots issued by the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Cebu City (daybook entry);(c) after XXXs death, XX took over the
possession of the subject property and upon his death, his child, X, took over its
possession until 1988;(d) in 1989, X discovered that the said property was already in the
possession of Y and some of her children and their families already constructed their
houses thereon; and(e) when she confronted Y, the latter claimed that her predecessor-ininterest, YY, previously bought the said property; however, when she asked to see a copy
of the deed of sale, Y could not produce the same.
For their part, Y countered that(a) they inherited the subject property from their
predecessor-in-interest, YY, who bought the foregoing even before the second World
War;(b) the subject property was issued a certificate of title in the name of YY, however,
the said title was lost;(c) Y inherited the subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and after its execution, she and her children, took over the possession of the
same; and(d) the subject property had been declared by them for taxation purposes and
they paid the corresponding realty taxes due thereon.
As the RTC Judge, decide who has the better right to the ownership and possession of the
subject property.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
X has the better right to the ownership and possession of the subject property.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose
or may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the
land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the
Property Registration Decree.
Jurisprudence provides that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area
covered therein, an original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership
by the registered owners over the disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly,
respondents Decree No. 12345 for which an original certificate of title was issued should
be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by
petitioners in this case.

NUISANCE
Per Se & Per Accidens

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Nuisance; Per Se & Per Accidens

Source

: Rana vs. Wong

G.R. No. 192862, June 30, 2014

Contributor

: Andales, Ziazel
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Tim, Kawhi and Dirk lives in Spursville. Tims property abuts the subdivision road. On
the opposite side of the road are the adjacent lots of Kawhi and Dirk. The said lots follow
a rolling terrain with Dirks property standing 2 meters higher than and overlooking
Kawhis property which is at the same level with the subdivision road.
Without prior consultation with the homeowners association, Dirk elevated and
cemented a portion of the subdivision road that runs betweenhis and Tims properties in
order to level the said portion with his gate. He likewise backfilled a portion of the
perimeter fence separating his and Kawhis properties without erecting a retaining wall
that would hold the weight of the added filling materials.
With the developments introduced by Dirk to his property, the ingress and egress of Tim
to his lot "in the usual and normal manner has been affected, such that he now have to
practically jump from the elevated road to gain access to his lot and scale the same
elevation in order to get out". As for Kawhithe backfilling done by Dirk would pose a
clear and present danger to the his life and limb arising from the premature weakening of
his perimeter fence due to the seeping of rain water from the Dirks property that could
cause its sudden collapse.
What is a nuisance? Give its classification according to (a) object/s they affect; (b) legal
susceptibility to summary abatement.

In the case at bar, classify what type of nuisance the developments introduced by Dirk to
his property are and advice the affected parties Tim and Kawhi on possible action/s to
take.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as "any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3)
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or
impairs the use of property."
Based on case law, however, the term "nuisance" is deemed to be "so comprehensive that
it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the
citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort."
Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that
they affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which
"affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"); or (b)
a private nuisance (or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" [or, as case
law puts it, one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a
few persons"]).
Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to
summary abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this
regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which "affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity"); or (b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which "depends upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot
be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")
Based on the definition mentioned above, the improvements introduced by Dirk to his
property may be classified as a private nuisance and a nuisance per accidens.
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not
be summarily abated.Thus, in the case at bar, Tim and Kawhi may seek abatement
judicially through a civil action. In addition, they can also file a civil action to recover
personal damages. To note, the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative;
hence, both may be demanded.

OWNERSHIP
Accessory Follows the Principal; Exception

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Accessory Follows the Principal; Exception

Source

: Villasi vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014

Contributor

: Bernaldez, Josephus
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment ordering ROYALE CORP. to return the excess
payment made by Virnee on their contract for a construction of a condominium building.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building which was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of ROYALE CORP. who is in actual possession of the said
building. All the court processes in a near lier collection suit between ROYALE CORP.
and Virnee were served, thru the formers representative Mr. Cuatro, at No. 140 Kalayaan
Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is located. Nonetheless, the lots in
which such building was erected were registered in the names of Spouses Cuatro.
Spouses Cuatro filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim claiming that they are the lawful
owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff. They contended
that since they have the title over the land the law presumes them to be owners of the
improvements built there on under the doctrine that the accessory follows the principal.
Is the contention of Spouses Cuatro meritorious?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of Spouses Cuatro is without merit.

The Supreme Court held in the case of Villasi vs. Garcia that in cases where there is a
clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned
by one and the same person or entity, the presumption that the accessory follows the
principal shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. It further provides
that actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes coupled with actual
possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.
In the case at bar, although Spouses Cuatro were the registered owners of the lot where
the subject property is located, they failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the
building in question. They were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove such
ownership. Furthermore, ROYALE CORP. was in actual possession of the property and at
the same time paid the tax due it.

Accretion

II.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Accretion

Source

: Republic vs. Santos III

G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012

Contributor

: Tohay , Ada Bonita

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Takya and Pedro applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B in the RTC. Accordingly, the
said Lot was bounded in the Northeast by the lot of Pedro and in the Southeast by the
Paranaque River and in the Southwest by an abandoned road and in the Northwest by Lot
owned by Takya. They alleged that Lot 4998-B had been formed through accretion and
had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years. The City of Paranaque opposed on the ground that the property could
not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard
that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. The RTC granted the application
for land registration.
Is the RTC correct? Why or Why not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. The RTC is not correct.
Under the Civil Code, Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be gradual and
imperceptible, it must be made through the effects of the current of the water and it takes
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. Accordingly, the process of drying up of a
river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and
the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current.

In the given case, Takya and Pedro did not show the gradual and imperceptible deposition
of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed the contested property.
They did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.
Thus, the RTC's ruling is not correct.

Builder in Good faith

III.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Builder in Good faith

Source

: Heirs of Victorino Sarili vs. Lagrosa

G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014

Contributor

: Bautista, Mel-Lisanina
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A land was sold by an agent on the basis of a SPA where there was palpable irregularity
in its acknowledgment. Yet, the buyer relied solely on the said document without further
investigation on the alleged agents authority. Thereafter, a new certificate of title was
transferred to the name of buyer and he built his house. Is he a builder in good faith?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. He is a builder in bad faith.
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land
on which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be
unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It
implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought
to put the holder upon inquiry.
The buyer knew or at the very least, should have known from the very beginning that
they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property
considering the palpable irregularity in the subject SPAs acknowledgment. Yet, relying
solely on said document and without any further investigation on the agents capacity to
sell, the buyer still chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a house thereon.
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be seriously doubted that the buyer was actually aware

of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the
house on the subject property in bad faith under legal contemplation.

IV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Builder in Good faith

Source

: Mirallosa vs. Carmel Development, Inc.

G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013

Contributor

: Digaum, Lucks Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
X owned two parcels of land by virtue of the contract he entered into with the
government. Subsequently, P.D. 5 was passed declaring void the contracts entered into by
the government with X and declared such lands as open for sale to members of ABC
Association. X filed a case assailing the constitutionality of P.D. 5 while reluctantly
allowed Z, a member of ABC Association to occupy one parcel of land of X which Z
eventually ceded to Y who build his house over the said lot.
Later on, the P.D. 5 was declared unconstitutional. With the law being declared
unconstitutional, X sent a notice to vacate against Y which the latter refused to heed. This
prompted X to file a case against Y asking the court to vacate the said land and remove
what he had build over the property. Y filed a motion to dismiss alleging that X has no
cause of action against himthe declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. 5 should not
affect the rights of other persons not party to the case and that he is a builder in good
faith. The MTC ruled in favor of Y on the ground that he is not a privy to the case
previously filed by X and that he is also a builder in good faith for he has no knowledge
as to the infirmity of P.D. 5. Is the ruling of the MTC correct? Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO, the ruling of the MTCis not correct.A builder in good faith is one who builds with
the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to
build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.
In this case, at the time Y occupied the said lot and build improvements on the land, the
case filed by X was already pending before the court.He ought to have been aware of the
binding effects of the case filed by X and the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 5, a
matter of mandatory judicial notice. Thus, he could not be considered as a builder in good
faith.

V.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Builder in Good faith

Source

: Benedicto vs. Villaflores

G.R. No. 185020, October 6, 2010

Contributor

: Tabada, Ian Rene

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A owns a lot situated in Cebu City having an area of 277 square meters under TCT No.
1435. In 1980 he sold a part of it to her nephew B through a deed of absolute sale but B
failed to register the same with the register of deeds. B immediately took possession of
the portion sold to him and built thereon a house made of concrete materials and fenced
it. In 1994, A sold again the said parcel of land to C but this time it was the whole 277
square meters that was sold through a deed of absolute sale and registered the same with
the register of deeds of Cebu City. As a result TCT 1435 in the name of A was canceled
and TCT No. 1988 was issued in the name of C. In 1995, C demanded that B should
vacate the portion he occupied because the former had bought it from his aunt and had
registered the same in his name. B refused to vacate contending that he is the owner of
said lot as he also bought it from his aunt as evidenced by an unregistered deed of sale. C
instituted a suit with the RTC to recover said lot. The RTC ruled that B is a builder in
good faith but declared that C has a better right to the land being the first to register the
sale. Both parties appealed but the RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. If you are the Justice of the Supreme
Court handling this case how are you going to resolve this case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The only question to be settled in the instant case is whether B as a builder in good is
entitled to reimbursement of his necessary expenses over the lot. To answer the above
issue, article 448 of the Civil Code is very explicit as it provides that the owner of the
land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right
to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the

building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
In the case at bar, B being a builder in good faith is entitled indemnity and reimbursement
of his necessary expenses if the owner choses to appropriate the improvements as his
own. However the owner may compel the owner of the improvements to pay the price of
the land if the value of the improvement exceeds the value of the land.

Co-ownership

VI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership

Source

: Arambulo vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014

Contributor

: Cataquis, Jasmine Rawen

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Rosa and Pedro Castro had three children named Nicolas Castro, Miguel Castro and
Luisa Castro-Lim, who is married to Antonio Lim. When Pedro Castro died, he left two
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 233 square meters in Tagbilaran, Bohol where
there were existing coconut trees and mango trees. The property was then co-owned by
the siblings with their mother. On September 2, 2005, Luisa died due to illness and was
succeeded by her husband, Antonio Lim and son Michael. On February 11, 2006, the coowners, excluding Luisa, decided to sell their respective shares of the property including
Luisas share. Nicolas and Miguel sought judicial relief based on Article 491 of the Civil
Code alleging that Antonio and Michael intentionally withheld their consent to prejudice
the common interest. However, in their answer, Antonio and Michael stated that they
were not made aware of the intention of the other co-owners to sell the property and
raised their defense based on Article 493 which provides that they are the full owners of
their share of the property and that any alienation of their share without their consent is
void. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Antonio and Michael are correct. Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the
coowner, clearly establishing that each coowner shall have full ownership of his part
and of its fruits and benefits.
Art. 493. Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it[,] and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or [the] mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be

limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the coownership.
Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as coowners with full ownership
of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by some co-owners of their parts
shall not affect the full ownership by the other co-owner the part that belongs to them.
It may be deduced that since a coowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other coowners is not
null and void. However, only the rights of the coownerseller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a coowner of the property.

VII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership

Source

: Recio vs. Heirs of Spouses Aguendo

G.R. No. 182349, July 24, 2013

Contributor

: Canasa, John Paul

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
AA entered into lease contract with BB in a parcel of land inherited by the latter from his
deceased parents. BB has several siblings one of whom is CC(one of the co-owners of the
property). BB offered to sell the subject property to AA and without hesitation the latter
accepted the offer. Unfortunately the sell did not push through, but AA continued to
occupy the property. CC by representation of the rest of the heirs contracted a sale with
AA with the subject property but it was not put into writing. AA later found out from his
friend working in Register of Deeds that the said property was under a different name.
Was the sale entered by one of the co-owners valid in the absence of special power of
attorney.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the sale was valid but only up to the aliquot share of the co-owner. When AA relied
only on the words of CC without securing a copy of the SPA, AA is bound by the risk
accompanying such trust on the mere assurance of CC. Hence, it is valid only up to the
share of the co-owner.

Co-Ownership; Partition; Inchoate right

VIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership; Partition; Inchoate right

Source

: Quijano vs. Amante

G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014

Contributor

: Melicor, Joreyna Mae

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A, B, C and D inherited from their father. Prior to any partition among the heirs, C sold a
portion of the share to X.
A, B, C and D executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father's estate. The
partition resulted earlier in the portions sold by C to X being adjudicated to D instead of
C.
D demanded X to vacate the property but X refused, prompting petitioner to file a
complaint for ejectment and damages. Was the sale of the subject property void?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and
partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir the
right to exercise acts of ownership.
Accordingly, when C sold the disputed property to X, the sale did not vest ownership of
the disputed property to X, but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share to him,
consequently making X, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is
partitioned. As C's successor-in-interest or assignee, X was vested with the right under
Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the
partition undertaken without his consent.

Co-Ownership; Pro-Indiviso Share

IX.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Co-Ownership; Pro-Indiviso Share

Source

: Torres, Jr. vs. Lapinid

G.R. No. 187987, November 26, 2014

Contributor

: Jordan, Rebecca
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Vicente, Mariano, Carlos and Jesus are co-owners of a land. On 1993 before partition,
Jesus without notice to the other co-owners, sold 3000 sq. meter of the parcel of land to
Lapinid. Vicente, Mariano and Carlos filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment
of the sale on the ground that it was without notice and that what was sold was a definite
and specific portion of a co-owned property. Can Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a
portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another person?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YES. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code: Art. 493. Each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free
from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the
same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale. The Supreme Court
had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion
before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or
alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before
partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will

be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the
partition.

Period of Redemption of Foreclosed Property

X.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Period of Redemption of Foreclosed Property

Source

: Ermitao vs. Paglas

G.R. No. 174436, January 23, 2013

Contributor

: Jurolan, Marymar
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
On May 21, 1989, Ali entered into a contract of lease with Baba over the 5 storey
commercial building of the latter located at # 134 Pusong Bato, Cebu City for a period of
15 years. Unknown to Ali, Baba already contracted a prior mortgage over the said
property in favor of Caca and the same was already foreclosed with Caca as the purchaser
of the disputed commercial building in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was
registered on January 13, 1990. Caca later offered to sell the subject property to Ali and
the latter entertained the said offer and negotiations followed thereafter.
On March 20, 1990, Ali bought the subject property from Caca for P9,500,000.00. A
Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of the contract.
However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject to Baba's
right of redemption. Baba filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in
favor of Caca. Meanwhile, on April 10, 1990, Baba sent 2 demand letters to Ali
demanding to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased premises but to no
avail. Baba then filed a case for unlawful detainer against Ali claiming that he is still the
owner of the property pending the expiration of the redemption period. Is Babas
contention correct? Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Babas contention is correct.
Under the law, it is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the
mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is

that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period
of redemption has expired without the right being exercised. The title to land sold under
mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the
redemption period and conveyance by the master's deed. Indeed, the rule has always been
that it is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor
having made use of his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes
consolidated in the purchaser.
In the problem given, since the period of redemption has not yet expired, Babas right
over the mortgaged property is still subsisting. Thus, he is still the valid owner of the said
property.

Property Obtained in Fraud

XI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Property Obtained in Fraud

Source

: Romero vs. Singson

G.R. No. 200969, August 3, 2015

Contributor

: Esmea, Kimberly Marie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Will the registration of a property obtained fraudulently be sufficient to vest the one who
did the fraudulent act the title to the property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of
the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to
theproperty. A certicate of title merely conrms or records title already existing and
vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate
fraud against the rightful owner of real property.

Protection Over Right of Possession

XII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Protection Over Right of Possession

Source

: Suarez vs. Emboy

G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014

Contributor

: Maylon, Ron Stephane

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Siblings Feliz and Marilou have been occupying for decades a house from a partitioned
lot that they inherited from their ancestors. The siblings were asked by their cousins to
vacate said lot and transfer to a different one but they refused insisting that their
inheritance pertained to the lot in which they were staying at.
Carmencita purchased from the cousins the lot that the siblings were occupying. She then
sent a demand letter to the siblings to vacate the house. When the siblings filed for nullity
of the partition, Carmencita filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them alleging
that she is entitled to possession since she bought the lot from the cousins who were the
real owners and that the siblings were occupying the same by mere tolerance, therefore
she had the right to demand for them to vacate. Is Carmencita correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Carmencita is not correct.
The law provides that every possessor has a right to be protected in his possession; and
should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by
means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. Under the Rules of Court, one
requirement of unlawful detainer is that possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, Carmencita failed to prove how and when such tolerance came about.
Firstly, the siblings have been occupying the lot for decades as owners thereof.

Carmencita only had bare allegations that the siblings occupation was lawful by virtue of
tolerance by the registered owners, and that they became deforciants unlawfully
withholding the subject lot's possession after she, as purchaser and new registered owner,
had demanded for the former to vacate the property. She failed to sufficiently aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

Registration of Title

XIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Registration of Title

Source

: Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc.

G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

Contributor

: Gula, Maria Monica

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Under P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, what must an applicant
establish for him to register his title over a land?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Right of Accession; Builder in Bad Faith / Good Faith

XIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Right of Accession; Builder in Bad Faith / Good

Faith

Source

: Vda. De Roxas vs. Our Lady's Foundation, Inc.

G.R. No. 182378, March 6, 2013

Contributor

: Apatan, Rosane
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
ABC, the subdivision management decided to widen its subdivision road. In doing so, it
encroached upon the property Mr. X, one of the subdivision land owners. The value of
the land when it was purchased by Mr. X was only P10,000. The current fair maket value
of the land is P500,000. Mr. X filed a complaint against the subdivision management to
recover the value of this land.
a.
Is Mr. X allowed to do so? If yes, how much should be reimbursed to him?
b.
If instead of a road, the subdivision management built a building worth P450,000,
can Mr. X compel the management to buy the encroached portion of his land? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
Yes, Under Article 448 pertaining to encroachments in good faith, as well as
Article 450 referring to encroachments in bad faith, the owner of the land encroached
upon Mr. X herein has the option to require respondent builder ABC to pay the price
of the land.
As to the value of the reimbursement. jurisprudence provides that the present or current
fair value of the land is to be reckoned at the time that the landowner elected the choice,
and not at the time that the property was purchased. Hence, ABC should reimburse him
P500,000.00 not P5,000. (Vda de Roxas vs. Our Ladys Foundation Inc. G.R. No.
182378, March 6, 2013)

b.
No, Mr X cannot compel the management to buy his land. If the present or current
value of the land, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built
thereon, the subdivision management cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property,
but it must pay Mr. X reasonable rent for the same. The subdivision management and Mr.
X must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms. (Art. 448
of the Civil Code).

Tax Declaration, Not a Proof of Ownership

XV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Ownership; Tax Declaration, Not a Proof of Ownership

Source

: Heirs of Paciano Yabao vs. van der Kolk

G.R. No. 207266, June 25, 2014

Contributor

: Solatorio, Carol
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Mr X filed a complaint for ownership and possession over a parcel of land against Mr Y
who is currently occupying the land. Mr X presented a tax declaration as evidence of his
ownership over the land. For failure to file an answer, Mr Y was declared in default. The
trial court decided in favor of Mr X based on the allegations of the complaint. Is the
action of the court proper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. While under Section 3 of Rule 9, when a defendant is declared in default, the court
has the option to either proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as
his pleading may warrant or require the claimant to adduce his evidence ex parte, the
court should have required Mr X to present evidence ex parte to substantiate their claims.
The basis of respondents claim of ownership was a mere tax declaration. However, a tax
declaration is not a proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of ownership of
real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of
the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. It can only be a strong indication of
ownership if coupled with possession. In the case at bench, it was Mr Y who was in
possession of the property and not the Mr X. Consequently, the tax declaration, standing
alone, is not an acceptable proof of ownership.

POSSESSION
Possession

XXIX.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Possession

Source

: Gabriel vs. Crisologo

G.R. No. 204626, June 9, 2004

Contributor

: Geli, Cheska Marie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
David Lee was the registered owner of two parcels of land in Baguio City covered by
TCT No. 13935 and T-13936. The properties were covered by an assessment of real
property and the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were updated. He
eventually discovered that Julius Cane constructed a house in the subject property
without her prior consent and knowledge. Upon discovery of his occupation, David
offered Julius to buy the property to which the latter assent. David gave Julius time to
produce the said amount, but Julius reneged on their promise to buy them and refused to
vacate the subject properties despite several demands. Julius believes that Davids titles
of the subject properties were void based on Section 1 of PD No. 1271, "An Act
Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Town site
Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211. Who between David and Julius have a
better right of possession over the subject parcels of land?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
David Lee has a better right. His certificates of title give him the better right to possess
the subject parcels of land. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title
to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive
evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is also settled that
the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including
possession.

Further, Julius attack on the validity of Davids title by claiming that fraud attended its
acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to
defend their possession of the properties in an "accionpubliciana," not in a direct action
whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.

Agricultural Lands

XXX.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Possession; Agricultural Lands

Source

: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Ramos

G.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013

Contributor

: Legaspo, Marje
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
In the application for registration of land title, the law provides that the applicant must be
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain. What constitutes possession and occupation of agricultural
lands?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The word possession contemplated in the law is actual, not fictional or constructive.
Taken together, occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
It must be shown that at the time of the filing of the application, the applicant must
possess the same in concept of owner. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the possession is characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to the applicant's own use and benefit;
and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood.

Forcible Entry

XXXI.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Possession; Forcible Entry

Source

: Pabalan vs. Heirs of Simeon A. B. Maamo, Sr.

G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013

Contributor

: Mamao, Arief
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Harvey Specter executed a sale of parcel of land situated in the Butuan City for the stated
consideration of P500,000.00 in favor of Jessica Zane. Faulting Louis Ross with forcible
entry into the property, Jessica, represented by Rachel Zane, later filed the ejectment
complaint. Invoking the decision redeemed in favor of Jessica Zane in said Civil Case,
Rachel Zane maintained that her parents later relented to Louis Ross' entreaty to be
allowed to stay on the property as administrator. On the other hand, Mike Ross, heir of
Louis Ross, insisted that he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the
litigated portion in the concept of owner since then. He contended that the court erred in
relying that judgment rendered in a forcible entry case is conclusive with respect to the
issue of material possession. Is Mike Ross correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mike Ross is not correct.
While it is true that a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title or ownership, the rule is settled that such a
judgment is conclusive with respect to the issue of material possession. The rule on
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties and their privies on a different claim or cause of
action.
Under Articles 444 and 1942 of the Civil Code, possession of real property is not affected
by acts of a possessory character which are merely tolerated by the possessor, or which

are due to his license. Granted that long, continued occupation, accompanied by acts of a
possessory character, affords some evidence that possession has been exerted in the
character of owner and under claim of right, this inference is unavailing to Mike Ross
since Louis Ross continued possession of the property after his defeat in the ejectment
suit was clearly upon the tolerance of Rachel Zanes predecessors-in-interest.

Movable Property

XXXII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Possession; Movable Property

Source

: Subic Bay Legend Resorts & Casino, Inc. vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014

Contributor

: Lumantas, Jessa Faith

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Brothers Bernard, Ludwin and Deoven owned a car shop and received casino chips as
payment for the car services they rendered to a Chinese customer. Eager to spend the
casino chips, Ludwin and Deoven went to Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. to
play. The surveillance staff of the establishment paid close attention to them simply
because it was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar-denominated chips. They
were accosted and was made to confess that such casino chips really came from one of
their employee, Michael Cabrera with which it was contended that said chips were stolen
from the casino. No criminal charges were filed however, either against the said brothers
or the said employee. Nonetheless, it claimed that it is the lawful owner hence has the
right to recover from the person in possession of the same. Is Subic Bay Legend Resorts
and Casinos, Inc. correct in saying this? Who has the burden of proof to show lawful
ownership?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The onus fell on the petitioner to prove that the casino chips were stolen from them.
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law that prohibits their use
or trade outside of the casino, which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual that a
Chinese client at the brothers car shop could pay it. The said transaction, if not common,
is nonetheless not unlawful. Given this premise that casino chips are considered to have
been exchanged with their corresponding representative value, it is with more reason that
this Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly and persuasively that the chips
it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick

or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their
representative value in exchange therefor.
If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the presumption that the
chips were exchanged for value remains.

Right of Possession

XXXIII.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Possession; Right of Possession

Source

: Estanislao vs. Estanislao

G.R. No. 173166, March 13, 2013

Contributor

: Trias, Parker
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Guditos are the owners of a residential lot being leased by Estanislao family on a monthto-month basis. The latter had been renting and occupying the subject lot since 1934 and
were the ones who built the house on the subject lot in accordance with their lease
agreement with one Gaspar Vasquez. When Gaspar Vasquez died, the portion of the lot on
which petitioners' house was erected was inherited by his son Victorino Vasquez, married
to Ester Vasquez (Vasquez couple). In the 1980's, the Vasquez couple wanted the
Estanislao family and the other tenants to vacate the said property, but the tenants refused
because of laws allegedly prohibiting their ejectment therefrom.
In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Vasquez couple in favor of
Norma Vasquez Gudito. Hence, in October 1994, the latter notified Sps. Estanislao to
remove their house and vacate the premises within three months or up to January 31,
1995, because of their urgent need of the residential lot. In a letter dated March 5, 1995,
Noma reiterated the demand and gave the spouses another three months or up to June 30,
1995, within which to remove their house, vacate the subject lot and pay the rental
arrearages. However, the latter failed to comply. Accordingly, on November 10, 1995,
Norma Gudito filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer/Ejectment against Sps. Estanislao
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Sps. Estanislao strongly argue that Norma Gudito cannot evict them from the subject
property pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, as the
subject property is allegedly within one of the 245 Proclaimed Area for Priority
Development and/or Urban Land Reform No. 1967, as amended by Presidential
Proclamation No. 2284. They further contend that they were not aware that the subject
property had been acquired by Norma Gudito via a Deed of Donation executed by the

Vasquez couple. Thus, they assail that said donation was merely simulated in order to
deprive them of their right of first refusal to buy the subject property.
IS THE CONTENTION OF THE SPOUSES ESTANISLAO CORRECT?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of the spouses are not correct.
In the case under review, Spouses Gudito have overwhelmingly established their right of
possession by virtue of the Deed of Donation made in their favor. Moreover, they have
complied with the provisions of the law in order for them to legally eject the petitioners.
Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 states:
Sec. 5. Grounds for judicial ejectment. Ejectment shall be allowed on the following
grounds:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c)
Legitimate need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for
the use of any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or
immediate member not being the owner of any other available residential unit within the
same city or municipality: Provided, however, that the lease for a definite period has
expired: Provided, further, that the lessor has given the lessee formal notice within three
(3) months in advance of the lessor's intention to repossess the property: Provided,
finally, that the owner/lessor is prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing its
use by a third party for at least one year.
Here, it is undisputed that respondents do not own any other lot or real property except
the herein subject lot. They have urgent need of the same to build their own house to be
used as their residence. Also, Estanislaos had already been asked to leave the premises as
early as 1982, but sternly refused, When the same property was donated to Sps Gudito,
Estanislao family were allowed to continue occupying the subject lot since Sps. Gudito
did not as yet have the money to build a house of their own. Clearly, since the latter have
complied with the requirements of the law, their right to possess the subject property for
their own use as family residence cannot be denied.
It is also worthy to note that Estanislao have failed to prove that the transfer of the subject
property was merely a ploy designed to defeat and circumvent their right of first refusal
under the law. The Deed of Donation executed in favor of Sps. Gudito was signed by the
parties and their witnesses, and was even notarized by a notary public.
By the same token, Estanislaos insistence that they cannot be evicted in view of Section
6 of P.D. 1517 is misplaced, which states
SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones
legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their
homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract,

continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be
allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at
reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone
Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, Estanislao cannot use P.D. 1517 as a shield to
deny Gudito of their inherent right to possess the subject property. Under P.D. 1517, in
relation to P.D. 2016, the lessee is given the right of first refusal over the land they have
leased and occupied for more than ten years and on which they constructed their houses.
But the right of first refusal applies only to a case where the owner of the property
intends to sell it to a third party. If the owner of the leased premises do not intend to sell
the property in question but seeks to eject the tenant on the ground that the former needs
the premises for residential purposes, the tenant cannot invoke the land reform law."
Clearly, the circumstances required for the application of P.D. 1517 are lacking in this
case, since respondents had no intention of selling the subject property to third parties,
but seek the eviction of petitioners on the valid ground that they need the property for
residential purposes.

Unlawful Detainer

XXXIV.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Possession; Unlawful Detainer

Source

: Nenita Quality Foods Corporation vs. Galabo

G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013

Contributor

: Patatag, Arnel
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
Nenita Quality Food Corp. (NQFC) filed a case complaint for forcible entry against
Galabo on Lot No. 102. NQFC claimed ownership over the land because it purchased the
same from Santos Nantinas evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. According to NQFC,
Nantin acquired the land from Galabo sometime in July 10, 1972 as shown in the Deed of
Transfer of Rights. On the contrary Galabo, contended that he is in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession over the land since 1948. NQFC contended that it has
the rightful possession of the property because it validly acquired ownership over Lot No.
102 when it purchased it from Santos, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess
the property as ancillary to such ownership. The court ruled in favor of NQFC stating
that the right of NQFC was anchored on the Deed of Absolute Sale. Is the decision of the
court correct?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. The
possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the
possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only
to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of
ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the law provides different
remedies for recovery of possession. The word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers

to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de
jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue.
In the case at bar, NQFC merely anchored its claim to possession over said property on
its alleged ownership. It did not prove its prior physical possession. On the other hand,
Galabos allegation of prior physical possession had not been refuted. Since in an
unlawful detainer case, physical possession is the issue not ownership. The ground relied
upon by NQFC to claim right of possession is misplaced.

QUIETING OF TITLE
Quieting of Title

I.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Quieting of Title

Source

: CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development &

Housing Corporation
G.R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015

Contributor

: Repaso, Jurdelyn
-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
A Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Injunction filed by CC Corporation
against DD Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila. CC claims that it is
the registered owner and actual possessor of sixteen (16) parcels of land in Baesa,
Caloocan City. CC claimed that it had been in actual, open, notorious, public, physical
and continuous possession of the 16 parcels of land before 1980 up to the present. It
fenced said parcels of land in 1980 and 1991. CC presented a chart showing that the 16
parcels of land were derived from and were part of Lot 26, originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title It alleged that based on official records of the office of respondent
Register of Deeds and the Land Registration Authority, DD was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013, covering a parcel of land situated in Caloocan
City. CC claimed that an actual plotting of the relative position of Lot 26 as particularly
described in DDs TCT No. T-177013 in relation to the positions of all the lots covered by
CCs transfer certificates of title, respectively, proved positively that said TCT No. T177013 of DD overlaps CCs parcels of land. CC contended that DDs TCT No. T177013, although apparently valid or effective, is in truth and in fact, invalid and
ineffective, and unless declared as such by the court, will inevitably prejudice CCs title
over its 16 parcels of land, as said title of DD is a potential cause of litigations between
CC and DD, as in the present suit, as well as suit/s involving CC and transferee/s of DD
of the entire and/or a portion of Lot 26 in question. Did DDs TCT No. T-177013 impose
a cloud on CCs titles to the 16 parcels of land subject matter of the case, as provided in
Article 476 of the Civil Code?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The New Civil Code provides the basis for an action for Quieting of Title. Article
476 of the Civil Code provides that whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to
prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In the case of CLT Realty Development Corporation vs. Phil-Ville Development and
Housing Corporation, the Supreme Court held that in order that an action for quieting of
title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. Thus, both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title to prosper have
been met in this case: (1) CC had established its equitable title or interest in the 16
parcels of land subject of the action; and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles
to said properties of CC, was previously declared invalid. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals both arrived at the conclusion that respondent Phil-Ville had a valid title to the
16 parcels of land subject of the complaint, and that petitioners title is invalid despite its
prima facie appearance of validity. This conclusion was arrived at after a thorough study
of the pieces of evidence presented by both parties.
The Supreme Court said that there is no cogent reason to reverse and disturb the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals quoted above, affirming the RTC Decision, likewise
extensively quoted above, especially as they are supported by the evidence on record. It
has been held in a long string of cases that as a general rule, findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are deemed final, conclusive, and binding on this Court.
Hence, TCT No. T-177013 does not impose a cloud on CCs titles to the 16 parcels of
land subject matter of the case.

II.
Civil Law Topic

: Property; Quieting of Title

Source

: Heirs of Pacifico Pocido vs. Avila

G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014

Contributor

: Maico, Ma. Noelle

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:
In 1950, Adolfo Arum began his occupation and claim on three lots situated in Albay.
Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) for lots 1 and 2 were issued by the DENR
in 1990. Lot 3, however, was not approved due to a memorandum issued by the DENR
Secretary.
Aurelio Arum (Aurelio), an heir of Adolfo, ceded his rights over the three lots to his
brother, Arnel Arum (Arnel) in exchange for a one hectare lot to be taken from Lot 3.
Aurelio then entered into a contract with Anita Agila (Anita) authorizing the latter to
undertake the segregation of his one-hectare land from Lot 3 in accord with the brothers
agreement. In exchange, Aurelio would award to her 2,000 square meters from Lot 3.
Accordingly, the subdivided lots were declared for tax purposes and the corresponding
tax declarations issued with 8,010 square meters going to Aurelio and 1,993 square
meters to Anita. A Certificate of Exclusion of 993 square meters of Lot 3 (disputed
property) was then issued to Anita. Arnel then filed a complaint to quiet title alleging that
Anita unlawfully claimed the disputed property which belonged to him as part of his
inheritance from his father, Adolfo. Is the action for quieting of title proper in this case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Arnel has no legal or equitable title to the disputed property.
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for an adjudication that a
claim of title or interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from
the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale
or unenforceable claims or demands exist. Under Articles 47611 and 47712 of the Civil
Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff
has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim,

encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative

despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
In this case, the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 3, remains a public land as
Arnels predecessor-in-interest, Adolfo, was not granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land
Claim over the same lot.