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Operations: J - How Can We Operate Safely?

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J - How Can We Operate Safely?

Operations

Operating Procedures
A good set of operating procedures thoroughly covers:
Startup
Normal Operation
Emergencies
Shutdown
Define the content, scope and level of detail required
for the routine or non- routine sequencing of activities
to ensure safe and efficient operation within designated
operating envelopes.
Formally captures good operating practice.

Key Contents

Plant process description.


Plant operating envelopes.
Plant unit & location
Plant occupational health hazards & risks.
Plant safety hazards & risks.
Plant environmental hazards & risks.
Task description

Basic Steps
Task description.
Task specific assessment of HSE hazards.
Identification of any
safety/environmentally
CRITICAL STEPS.

A Safer
Site

Routine Operating
Instructions

Start-up Operating
Instructions.

Note :- Provision for the


collection of comments
from the users.

Emergency Shutdown Operating


Instructions

Temporary Operating Instructions.

Human Factors in Instructions


Good Practice Format

Clarity & exactness of instruction


e.g Fill at 1 tonne/hr.
Logical flow/sequence of actions.
Simple language & ease of reading
i.e. bullet points & flow diagrams,
use digital images.
Clear CAUTIONS & WARNINGS.
Document control.

Operating Envelopes

Operating Envelopes
Operating Envelopes define the
parameters of normal operation.
When parameters go outside the operating
envelope, one of the following is required:
Continue running and make
adjustments and monitor.
Normal shutdown.
Emergency shutdown.

Design Envelope vs Operating Envelope


Operating Envelope

Design Envelope

Availability

Integrity

Trip Envelope
Reduction in Demand

Alarm Envelope
Optimisation Envelope

Reduction in Demand

Profit

Training
Competency

Training
Qualifications for technical and field personnel.
Emphasizes the rationale for doing things and
seeks a higher level of understanding of process
hazards.
Process simulator very useful and effective.
Competency evaluation in field.
Regular refresher training.
All levels of Staff
Contractors competency verified

Competence Management
Defining of job roles and requirements
Assessment of competence against
requirements
Training program to close competency gaps
Verification of competency, re-verification
Documentation of competency

Key Process Safety Competence


Know the hazards of your work area
Understand how hazards are controlled
Follow the Golden Rules
Know how to contact Technical
Authorities
??????? (Know what you dont know)

Case History - CH1

Hoechst-Celanese - 1987

Case History 1 - Celanese


1987 Hoechst-Celanese in Pampa, Texas
Butane oxidation unit to manufacture acetic acid.
Unit was in startup phase following 24 hour
outage.
Reactor 68 m3 12 metres long; 2.5 metres
diameter was not properly purged with nitrogen
during shutdown.
Startup purge had not begun.
Operator omitted manual purge step
System was pressured to 700 psig (48 barg) at
150oC; hydrocarbon remained in reactor from
shutdown.

The Incident

What Happened
Detonation caused line to open.
Estimated release of 36 tonnes C4
Vapor cloud explosion and fire within 30 seconds.
Utility area was the suspected ignition source.
3 fatalities, 39 injuries
Fire took 12 hours to extinguish
Damage $550 millions
All fatalities were a result of projectiles and debris.

Damage Details

INCINERATOR

TANK
FARM

MEK

TANK FARM
RAIL SIDING

ACRYLATES

BUTYL ACRYLATE

COOLING
TOWERS

WAREHOUSE

BOILER

SPHERES

UTIL
UTIL
TURBINE

BUTANE
OXIDATION

ACETIC
TANK FARM
ANHYDRIDE

100% DESTRUCTION
WAREHOUSE
LAB

ADMIN BLDG
200 M

Damage Details - 2
Radius of 100% destruction 61m (200ft).
All buildings within 122m (400ft) destroyed.
Buildings within 274m (900ft) sustained heavy
damage.
House 0.8km (0.5 mile) from plant severely
damaged.
Pickup truck 4km (2.5 miles) from plant was
physically moved
Firewater system was above ground and was
destroyed as a result of the explosion.
Engineering design did not inhibit procedural
error, building siting added to the problem.

Damage Details Contd

Major Lessons Learned


Operators must be
Tr
a
thoroughly trained in startup ining/
Co
mp
procedures and know not to
et e
nce
deviate from them.
Fire suppression systems
must be protected.

Me
c

ha

ni c

al
I

nt e

gr i
ty

Non Routine Activity

SAFE WORK PRACTICES


System to ensure that hazardous work is
always done safely and consistently.

Working in confined spaces


Gas testing
Blinding/isolations
Safe work permits
Any others?

BP Golden Rules of Safety


Confined Space Entry
Working at Heights
Driving Safety

Permit to Work
Energy Isolation
Ground Disturbance
Lifting Operation
Management of Change
DETAILS

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