The European Pentarchy and The Congress of Verona 1822
The European Pentarchy and The Congress of Verona 1822
The European Pentarchy and The Congress of Verona 1822
AND THE
CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822
THE EUROPEANPENTARCHY
AND THE
CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822
by
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1110-9
e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2725-0
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2725-0
TO MY MOTHER
CONTENTS
PREFACE
XI
PART I
GENESIS OF THE CONGRESS: FEBRUARY 1821-0CTOBER 1822
PROLOGUE
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF
1.
2.
3.
4.
THE
CoNGRESS
3
3
5
8
13
CHAPTER I
19
19
23
25
27
34
CHAPTER II
40
40
42
48
54
59
CONTENTS
VIII
PARTn
63
CHAPTER ill
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Exodus
The Canning Instructions
The Villcle Instructions
Reunion in Verona: The Congress at Play
Agenda and Procedure
65
65
68
72
75
81
CHAPTER IV
84
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
84
88
107
112
127
133
CHAPTER V
Genesis
Wellington's Dissent
The Villcle-Montmorency Vendetta Revisited
The British Brief
The AngIo-Continental Impasse
The Gameiro Affair
The British Reservation
A Retrospect
137
137
144
145
147
148
151
154
159
CHAPTER VI
Genesis
The Impossible Quest
The Black Tide
The Six Points
161
161
165
171
176
CONTENTS
IX
180
186
189
CHAPTER VII
191
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
191
195
200
205
211
212
215
215
216
CHAPTER VIII
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GOLDEN MAXIM
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
218
218
229
244
258
262
CHAPTER IX
264
1.
2.
3.
4.
264
266
267
272
PART III
275
CHAPTER X
WELLINGTON AND THE CoNGRESS
277
277
277
CONTENTS
3. The Defense
4. The Verdict
280
284
CHAPTER XI
CHATEAUBRIAND AND THE CONGRESS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
286
286
288
292
295
299
The Debate
Ambition and Intrigue
The Mission
Reception at Verona
A Retrospect
CHAPTER XU
CHATEAUBRIAND'S
1.
2.
3.
4.
WAR
302
302
307
312
315
EPILOGUE
FROM CoNGRESS SYSTEM TO CONCERT OF EUROPE
1.
2.
3.
4.
317
317
320
321
324
BmuOGRAPHY
327
INDEX
349
PREFACE
For one reason or another. modem historians have neglected the Congress
of Verona. some because they thought the field already had been thoroughly
plowed. while others doubted that enough material could be found for more
than an article or two on the subject. Indeed. not a single book-length
monograph of this international assembly has ever been published in any
language. This study. therefore. attempts to fill the gap by (1) explaining the
genesis of the Congress. (2) furnishing a comprehensive account of its work.
(3) revising some of the interpretations of Sir Charles K. Webster. Harold
W. V. Tempedey. and others. and (4) analyzing the significance of the
Congress. with emphasis on its contribution to the fall of the Quintuple
Alliance. a consequence aided by the dissimilar and often contradictory
interests of the allies themselves.
This book is essentially a diplomatic history. but diplomats. of course.
do not live in a vacuum. Numerous political. social. commercial. financial.
and sometimes even religious factors. impinge upon their consciousness.
It soon became apparent. therefore. that the scope of this work would be
enormous and that its span would stretch from the eighteenth to the
twentieth century. if the alpha and omega of every issue discussed at Verona
were recounted. Yet anything less than a catholic approach would reduce
the claim of comprehensive coverage to an empty pretense. Included within
the purview of the study. perforce. are questions which range from Black
Sea commerce to the Atlantic slave trade. from the Greek insurrection to
Latin American independence. from the navigation of the Rhine to the
interdiction of foreign trade with Russian America. and from intervention
in the Iberian Peninsula to the persecution of Piedmontese Vaudois.
The present volume is an outgrowth of researches which began twentythree years ago in Professor James Logan Godfrey's seminar at the University of North Carolina. By 1949 the paper had grown into a master's
thesis which six years later at the University of Michigan envolved into a
doctoral dissertation: "Great Britain and the Congress of Verona." But
hardly more than the foundation for this work had been laid. for the greater
XII
PREFACE
task of giving equal and adequate treatment to the diplomacy of the four
great continental powers remained. There were. moreover. other important
questions which required investigation: what impact. if any. did the negotiations at Verona have upon the balance of power in Europe. the foreign
policy of the United States. or on Habsburg hegemony in Italy? Nonetheless.
the obvious need for a central theme in the midst of involved negotiations
on multitudinous issues led me to retain the focus on British diplomacy.
Of all the great powers. only Britain. by virtue of her empire. commerce.
and ambivalent position in Europe (at once insular and continental). had
interests which were truly global. Further research. writing. revision. and
the occasional pUblication of findings have occupied my attention for the
last decade and a half.
For the sake of clarity. I have modernized the spelling and punctuation
of most quotations - retaining some archaic forms for their dramatic effect and have translated foreign titles of nobility and office into English. Also
to avoid confusion. all Old Style dates have been converted to New Style.
During the nineteenth century. the Russian. Old Style calendar was twelve
days in arrears of the Gregorian. New Style calendar.
Both the organization of this book and my own historiographical creed
hang on five basic assumptions. First. the author should take the reader
into his confidence at frequent intervals. not just in the Preface and the
concluding chapter. Secondly. the essence of history is problems. not chronicles. though no theory of historical interpretation or system of social
dialectics in definitive. because such factors as human courage. faith. and
ambition are indefinable and unpredictable. Thirdly. notwithstanding the
influence of complex material forces. accidents and men's free choice also
have produced dynamic results throughout the continuum of history. Does
not aio often seem capricious? Fourthly. symbols. such as the martyred
Joan of Arc or the modem propaganda image. are sometimes greater than
the reality. Fifthly. the interpretation of events is the proper function of the
historian and is as important as their narration. Since analyses are subjective
and cannot be guaranteed. however. each reader must judge for himself
whether a particular conclusion is astute or naive. proven or unwarrented.
germane or irrelevant. In conformity with these suppositions. at least one
section of each chapter analyzes problems of causation. relationships. and
significance. while all of Part III (three chapters and the Epilogue). focuses
on questions of historiography and interpretation.
Most of the published materials for this study and all of the manuscript
collections (except the Adams Papers). are deposited in London. at the
British Museum and the Public Record Office. and in Paris. at the Biblio-
PREFACE
XIII
theque Nationale and the Quai d'Orsay. While I have not consulted the
governmental archives of Vienna, Berlin, and Leningrad (St. Petersburg),
this omission, in my opinion, does not present any serious difficulty in
understanding the policies of those cabinets. The British and French
archives, especially the embassy files, contain rich deposits of documents
pertaining to the diplomacy of the three eastern courts, and these holdings
are supplemented by many published collections of Austrian, Prussian, and
Russian diplomatic dispatches, memoirs, and diaries. Almost all of the
Austrian papers found in the Vienna Staatsarchiv, Kongressakten, Verona,
Fascs. 43, 45, and 50, moreover, have been printed in Wellington's new
Despatches. Vol. I. I have, of course, made use of the secondary accounts
of historians who have labored in foreign archives: Bertier de Sauvigny,
Cresson, Schroeder, Sweet, Temperley, and Webster, among others.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude all who have assisted me
in the preparation of this manuscript: the North Texas State University
Faculty Research Committee, which materially facilitated my work with
eight grants-in-aid, spanning the period 1956-1968; Professors Robert B.
Holtman of Louisiana State University and R. John Rath of Rice University,
who read and criticized sections of this book in their original (article) form;
Emeritus Professor Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky of the University of
Michigan, who gave me several insights into Russian policy during the reign
of Alexander I; Robert Lee Ellis, James Willard Hurst, and Richard Allen
Ward, three former graduate students who undertook theses on problems
tangent to this study; Mrs. Vinita B. Davis and Miss Ruth Gray of the
North Texas State University Library staff, who helped me locate and
obtain needed materials; Miss Patricia Fleischer, Miss Karen Temple, and
Miss Linda Cox, student assistants who deciphered my cryptography and
typed the first draft of the manuscript; and Mrs. Shirley W. Taylor, who
typed the final revision in its entirety.
Chapter V and sections of Chapters II, IV, VIII and XII have been rewritten from articles of mine which appeared in The Historian. Journal of
Central European Affairs. Pacific Historical Review, and the Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly. I am grateful to the editors of these periodicals for
permission to use these articles in revised form.
A special commendation is reserved for Margaret. my research assistant,
literary critic, egeria, and wife, who has contributed more to this book than
she knows and I can acknowledge.
Irby C. Nichols, Jr.
Denton, Texas
November, 1970