ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A.

COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 6
Aruelo vs. CA [G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993]
THE COMELEC CANNOT ADOPT RULES THAT MAY BE APPLIED TO PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COURTS OF LAW. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No.
343-M-92) with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the
Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1,
Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2,
Rule 1, Part I provides:
"SEC. 2.
Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to
all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by
courts of general or limited jurisdiction."
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it
provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Section 7
Cua vs. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. L-80519-21, December 17, 1987]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE PROVIDING DECISION BY MAJORITY OF EACH
COMMISSION APPLIES TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND IN
DIVISION DESPITE ANY RULE OF THE COMMISSION TO THE CONTRARY. After
considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court holds
that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who
voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who
deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the
aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of
the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his
seat in the House of Representatives.
It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seemingly
interminable debates on this matter that have been festering for quite some time
now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the COMELEC. The
indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and application of its
own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our people who remain
unrepresented to date in the House of Representatives despite the fact that the
congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.
Acena vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 90780, February 6, 1991]

DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE

COURT OF APPEALS THROUGH PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT. The proper remedy which petitioner should
have taken from the resolution of public respondent Civil Service Commission is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of said rules. Although Rule 65 does not provide
for a period, the petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission should be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution as
provided under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. (Pacis v. Secretary of
Science and Technology, G.R. No. 89165, August 10, 1989). Error in the title of the
petition is a defect in form that may be disregarded as it does not affect the merits
of the case. Considering the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition, we consider
the same as a special civil action under Rule 65.
DECISIONS OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD MAY BE APPEALED TO
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE
DECISION OR RESOLUTION. Based on the above provisions of law, the decision of
the MSPB is appealable to the Civil Service Commission within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the copy thereof. Perfection of the appeal within the prescribed
period is jurisdictional so that the failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory
(De Los Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83927, June 28, 1989; Andaya et al. v. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 73726-28, August 2, 1990). Moreover, the right to appeal is a statutory
right and the party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the
requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost (Ozaeta v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 83281, December 4, 1989).
Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service Commission has the jurisdiction to
review the decision of the MSPB. However, said authority to review can only be
exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of the MSPB has filed an
appeal with the Commission within the reglementary period.
Here, it is admitted by public respondent Commission and not disputed by private
respondent Estolas that the petition for review which can be considered as an
appeal from the decision of the MSPB dated March 23, 1988 was filed outside the
reglementary period. This being so, the public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction
when it entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with the Office of the
President. Having exceeded its jurisdiction public respondent committed a
reversible error when it set aside the order dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB
which had long become final and executory. Final decision or orders of the MSPB is
an adjudication on the merits conclusive on the parties, hence, it can no longer be
subject to review (San Luis, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80160, June
26, 1989).
Vital-Gozon vs. CA [G.R. No. 101428, August 5, 1992]
THE COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COERCIVE WRITS FOR THE
EXECUTION OF ITS DECISIONS. Now, final and executory judgments are enforced
by writ of execution and not by another, separate action, whether of mandamus or
otherwise. Hence, execution of the Civil Service Commission's decision of August 9,
1988 should have been ordered and effected by the Commission itself, when de la
Fuente filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so, however, on the alleged ground,
as de la Fuente claims he was told, that it "had no coercive powers unlike a court
to enforce its final decisions/resolutions." That proposition, communicated to de
la Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its final
judgments, is incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous acts of the Commission of
actually directing execution of its decisions and resolutions, which this Court has
sanctioned in several cases; and it is not in truth a correct assessment of its powers
under the Constitution and the relevant laws.
2

In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938

entitled "Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service
Commission, et al.," this Court declared that in light of the pertinent provisions of
the Constitution and relevant statutes
" . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission
the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been
exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the
authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the
grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to
hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it
thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution
has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases."
Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal to
execute its final and executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended proceedings
have taken place in the Court of Appeals and certain issues have been expressly
raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issues appear to the Court to be important
enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead of simply being given
short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court of Appeals were
totally unnecessary because the Civil Service Commission actually had the power to
execute its final and executory Resolution.
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer [G.R. No. L-31455,
February 28, 1985]
FINAL ORDERS AND DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS WHICH ARE
REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI ARE THOSE RENDERED IN
THE EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDIACIAL POWER. We are however, far from
convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as
a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation
to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly
appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final
orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the
award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein
the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the
questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued
pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In
short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
3

the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Mateo vs. CA [G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995]
APPEAL OF THE DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SHALL BE FILED
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No.
292, 10 and Rule II, section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the
Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against
illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private
respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if
he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. So we held in
Mancita v. Barcinas, viz:
"[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Civil Service Commission,
and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. We quote.
'SECTION 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.'
The Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable
and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment."
Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular
No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect
on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the
present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered y the Civil Service Law.
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
1.
Scope. These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasijudicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification
Administration,
Energy
Regulatory
Board,
National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments and Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission.
2.
Cases Not Covered. These rules shall not apply to judgments and
final orders or resolutions issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3.
Where to Appeal. An appeal under these rules may be taken to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
4.
Period of Appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
B.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 2
Trade Union of the Phils. and Allied Services vs. National Housing Corp. [G.R.
No. 49677, May 4, 1989]
ONLY GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL
OR LEGISLATIVE CHARTERS ARE COVERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE. The rule,
however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the corresponding provision
whereof declares that "(t)he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters."
Consequently, the civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of
Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a
general legislation. As We recently held
". . . , the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution
and expressed by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case .
. . appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987
Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters and therefore,
by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include governmentowned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries
of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general
corporation law."
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS FOR
PURPOSES ALLOWED BY LAW, BUT MAY NOT ENGAGE IN STRIKE. The workers or
employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees'
organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly
recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private
sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."
This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on
Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. . . ."

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is

recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he right
to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The rationale of
and justification for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid
provision was explained by its proponents, as follows:
". . . The government is in a sense the repository of the national
sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be held in reverence if not in
awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does perform a
mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word
except that terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil
Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in the
Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship and we all
know that the accumulated grievances of several decades are now
beginning to explode in our faces among government workers who feel
that the rights afforded by the Labor Code, for example, to workers in
the private sector have been effectively denied to workers in
government in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the
equal protection of the laws. For example, . . . there were many
occasions under the old government when wages and cost of living
allowances were granted to workers in the private sector but denied to
workers in the government for some reason or another, and the
government did not even state the reasons why. The government
employees were being discriminated against. As a general rule, the
majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions.
What they really add up to is that the employees of the government
form their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages
because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum
where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic)
promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own
bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is
the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of selforganization that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and
corruption and for exposing it.
De los Santos vs. Mallare [G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950]
FOR CAUSE AS A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF SERVICES OF A CIVIL
SERVICE PERSONNEL MUST BE ONE RECOGNIZED BY LAW AND NOT DEPENDENT
ON THE WILL OF THE OFFICER. The Constitution leaves it to the Congress to
provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that the President's pleasure is
itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers
has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and sound
public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and
not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may
deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of
those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the cause
must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public.
POSITIONS EXEMPTED FROM THE MERIT SYSTEM. As has been seen, three
specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These
positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in
nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that

appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer
that makes them.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor
highly technical.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is
reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining.
A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of
its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference
to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him
by section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial
in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A
city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly
technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of
technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower
than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are
eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by nontechnical men possessing executive ability.
Salazar vs. Mathay [G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976]
TWO MODES OF DETERMINING WHETHER A POSITION IS PRIMARILY
CONFIDENTIAL. The crux of the problem in this appeal hinges on the nature of the
position held by the petitioner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS whether it is
primarily confidential or not. If it is, then her services as confidential agent can be
terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power. There are two
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil
Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2)
In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office,
there exists "close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving
or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." In the case before
Us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ". . . confidential agents in
the several departments and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed
by the President, to be primarily confidential" brings within the fold of the
aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential. Since
the position of the petitioner falls under the first category of primarily confidential
positions, it is no longer necessary to inquire into the nature of the functions
attached to the office in order to determine whether her position is primarily
confidential or not. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot
complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS is in violation of her security of tenure. In the case of Delos
Santos vs. Mallari, supra, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the
merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed
by the Constitution, although in Ingles vs. Mutuc, this assumption was held to be
inaccurate. According to the Court, the proper expression to be used is that the
term of the incumbent merely expires. Thus in said case, the Court held:
"This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a
primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the
appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such
7

pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or

"dismissed" from office his "term" merely "expires," in much the
same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of
the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and
cannot be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom upon the
expiration of said term. The main difference between the former the
primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is
fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but
indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes
fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its
decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this
even takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office
his term has merely "expired."
Corpus vs. Cuaderno [G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965]
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF SERVICES OF
PERSONNEL WHO ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL. The tenure of officials holding primarily
confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon
loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in
them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is
different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and
qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from
the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter
incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our
fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a
clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not
be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist or a
scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No
technical man worthy of the name would be willing to accept work under such
conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that highly
technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked
at the humor of their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical
positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes- men, who must rely not on
their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to carry favor with the powerful.
The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil
Service on the basis of merit, would be thus negated.
Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]
APPROVAL OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IS MERELY AN
ATTESTATION OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE APPOINTEE. Indeed, the approval
is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is
qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held,
such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check
to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then
the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
THE COMMISSION CANNOT REVOKE THE
THERE ARE BETTER QUALIFIED THAN
Commission on Civil Service acknowledged
respondent were qualified for the position

APPOINTMENT ON THE GROUND THAT

THE APPOINTEE.
Significantly, the
that both the petitioner and the private
in controversy. That recognition alone
8

rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon
except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no
authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment
on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA [G.R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995]
SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION OF THE REQUIRED SERVICE ELIGIBILITY DOES NOT
AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE APPOINTMENT TO A PERMANENT.
Private
respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time he was appointed Assistant
Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate
examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility
made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is
dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private
respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having
passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his
temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such as the one at bench,
what is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the
appointing authority.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CANNOT MAKE THE APPOINTMENT ITSELF. The
foregoing is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing
authority. Time and again, the Court has defined the parameters within which the
power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service
Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled that CSC has
the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have
the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to
change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the
eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it
must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC
is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in
the appointment process ceases. In the case at bench, CSC should have ended its
participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it
confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service
eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it
stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the
discretion vested solely upon the latter.
SSS Employees Association vs. CA [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MAY FORM UNIONS, BUT MAY NOT STRIKE. The 1987
Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself
fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service
Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that
"[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
9

Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent

as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When
we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of
government employees, it does not mean that because they have the
right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done
because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go
on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in
Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from
the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable VicePresident is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve
this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to
this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we
allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen
to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion
in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed
by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
Sec. 11.
Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The
terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law
and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in
their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation
to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions and not
those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.

10

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized
the right of employees of government corporations established under the
Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service
to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its
amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the
Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for
such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D.
No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of
government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment
by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees . . .
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to
do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At
this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is
not at issue].
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor
and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it
furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act,
R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his
position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with
approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:

11

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to
public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present
in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and
those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13.
Terms
and
conditions
of
employment
or
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the
subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16.
The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures,
whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any
dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies
under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the
dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for
appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If
there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages,
like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization,
which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof."
Section 7
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]
THE EXCEPTIONS IN SECTION 7, PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE IX-B OF THE
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT,
MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND THEIR DEPUTIES AND ASSISTANTS.
The
threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
12

or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned

or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There
was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and governmentowned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes
of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were
designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government
was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. This condemnation
came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983
Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure
No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B
already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution
was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far
as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
13

while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required
by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do
no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences,
among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986).
Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of
National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this
Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and
members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.
Flores vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993]
ELECTIVE OFFICERS CANNOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE OR POSITION IN THE
GOVERNMENT UNLESS THEY RESIGN FIRST. Since the ineligibility of an elective
official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency,
he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionallyattached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The
deliberation in the Constitutional Commission is enlightening:
"MR. DAVIDE.
On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term"
with TENURE.
"MR. FOZ.
The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign
from his position.
"MR. DAVIDE.
Yes, we should allow that prerogative.
"MR. FOZ.
Resign from his position to accept an executive position.
"MR. DAVIDE.
Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say, incapacity, he
may leave the service, but if he is prohibited from being appointed within the
term for which he was elected, we may be depriving the government of the
needed expertise of an individual."
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible
for appointment to another public office.
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the
Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to
the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in
view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be
confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member
14

of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference
between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their
posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post
as well as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that
ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite
different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall
be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an
office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan,
283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to
render his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v
Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v
State, 107 Okla 272, 232 P 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitution or
statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or
appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition
has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so
that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v.
Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445)."
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence,
his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and
his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a
de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of
the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or
by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election,
or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell
[N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).
Section 8
Quimson vs. Ozaeta [G.R. No. L-8321, March 26, 1956]
WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION IS DOUBLE COMPENSATION, BUT
NOT DOUBLE APPOINTMENT. In our opinion, the present appeal can be resolved
without much difficulty. Section 691 of the Administrative Code above reproduced
refers and applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful compensation. The
appointment or employment of plaintiff-appellant Quimson as agent-collector was
not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment
and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact,
he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal
treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two
government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility. Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated as provincial
sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers like plaintiff are often appointed and designated as
deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often designated to act
as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations. The
objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to double
appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.

15

According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double
compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as members with
compensation in government examining boards like the bar examinations, or
department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government
corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not
observed. This undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had
to be coursed through different offices like the Department of Finance, the Civil
Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor General to the President for
approval. If the President approves the double compensation, well and good. The
appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning
could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will
have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was willing to
serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection. This is
another proof that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was
only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was that
plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be
taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different
offices which the appointment had to go through.

C.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 1
Cayetano vs. Monsod [G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991]
DEFINITION OF PRACTICE OF LAW. The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions
of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public
service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment
in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is
of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
16

Brillantes vs. Yorac [G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990]

NO MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MAY BE APPOINTED IN AN
ACTING CAPACITY. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the
regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised
for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at
any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent,
having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be
removed at will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no
less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without
cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation
in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The
problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them
and not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But
while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista
case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the
Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its
members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.
Section 2
Gallardo vs. Tabamo [G.R. No. 104848, January 29, 1993]
THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER
ELECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, decided by this Court
on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above posed. Speaking through
then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this
Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by
the Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial
court over cases involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the
plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the

17

hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in

recent decisions."
Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180,
otherwise known as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947.
The present Constitution and extant election laws have further strengthened the
foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present COMELEC
has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had
"exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections." exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law"
and had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.
and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the
consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform
such other functions as may be provided by law," it was not expressly vested with
the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That
power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the
necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the
Commission to "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law."
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to
promulgate such rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article
IX-C thereof reads as follows:
"SEC. 2.
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1)
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."
(Emphasis supplied)
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is
thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the
Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881),
which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
"Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this
Code or other laws which the Commission lies required to enforce and
administer, . . . ."
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid
statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to
effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions.
Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may
withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly
independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest.
peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred
right of suffrage the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses,
inter alia, the following powers:
"1)
Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over
national and local officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the
18

government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct

of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years
of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its
orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the
preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to
electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with
its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute.
Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper
authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers
or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such
violation or failure.
2)
To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and
stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda,
after due notice and hearing."
Relampagos vs. Cumba [G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995]
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE EXTRAORDINARY
WRITS OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS ONLY IN AID OF ITS
APPELLATE JURISDICTION. This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined
the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to
determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter. It
found none.
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon
the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last
paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases remains
in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section
1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put,
the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ
of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent
received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days from 1 July 1994 or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which
is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures
pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last
day for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private
respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the
trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of
the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial
court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion
was filed before the perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by
the trial court.
19

Edding vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995]

TRIAL COURTS MAY ISSUE WRITS OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE
ELECTORAL PROTEST WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN
APPEAL. But notwithstanding the aforementioned pronouncements, the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when it enjoined the order
of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's motion for immediate
execution. Private respondent's petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction before the COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in granting execution despite the filing of a notice of appeal by private
respondent within the reglementary period.
It appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent
filed his notice of appeal with the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for
immediate execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably filed within the fiveday reglementary period for filing an appeal since the decision of the RTC was
promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993.
The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial
court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion
for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting
an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing
party is of no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to
resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal
because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the records
to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at
the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and
was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party.
Galido vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991]
DECISIONS OF THE COMELEC ON ELECTORAL PROTEST DECIDED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ARE FINAL, BUT THE SAME MAY BE ELEVATED TO THE
SUPREME COURT THROUGH PETITION ON CERTIORARI. The fact that decisions,
final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. Thus

"MR. FOZ. So, the amendment is to delete the word 'inappealable.'

MR. REGALADO. Before that, on page 26, line 26, we should have a
transposition because decisions are always final, as
distinguished from interlocutory orders. So, it should read:
'However, decisions, final orders or rulings,' to distinguish them
from interlocutory orders, '. . . of the Commission on Elections
on municipal and barangay officials shall be final and
IMMEDIATELY executory.'
That would be my proposed amendment.
MR. FOZ. Accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. It is understood, however, that while these decisions
with respect to barangay and municipal officials are final and
immediately executory and, therefore, not appealable, that does
20

not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
MR. FOZ. That is understood, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. At least it is on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer."
We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned
decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior
court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
People vs. Inting [G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990]
THE COMELEC HAS AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TO
DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE IN A VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS, AND DOES
NOT NEED THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR THIS PURPOSE. In effect the 1987
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information
in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
"The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment
in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly
and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to
it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from the clear
and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Section 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view

21

of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections." (Corpus v.

Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election
offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense
or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the
COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v.
Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is
no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial
Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's
preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the
ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:
"Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding
section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that
the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months
from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of
the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation
and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government.
People vs. Basilla [G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989]
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS MAY BE DEPUTIZED BY THE COMELEC TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION
LAWS. The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec
of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the
elections and only to ensure free, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections,
that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There
is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a
pinched and niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as
its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the
government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election
offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of
election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance
of physical order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city
fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election
offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not
be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger
than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the
Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the
authority, control and supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular
functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful
scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the
Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's
authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through
administrative sanctions. Such sanctions e.g., suspension or removal may be
recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987
Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt
22

and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government
where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.
People vs. Delgado [G.R. No. 93419-32, September 18, 1990]
WHEN THE COMELEC PROSECUTES A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF
ELECTION LAWS, IT IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it
is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to
decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of
a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a
prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court,
said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.
The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of
the court or unless so ordered by the court.
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court
must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of
the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation,
in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that
the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that
there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court
requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court
the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may
review its actions is certainly untenable.
COMELEC vs. Silva [G.R. No. 129417, February 10, 1998]
THE PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE
COMELEC AND NOT BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. The ultimate question concerns
the authority of the COMELEC prosecutor. More precisely, the question is, who has
authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal the
COMELEC or its designated prosecutor? The trial courts held the view that the Chief
State Prosecutor's decision not to appeal the dismissal of the cases, consistent with
his earlier decision to leave the determination of the existence of probable cause to
the trial courts, was binding on them.
We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to decide whether or not to appeal
the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution
expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has held:
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to
investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an
information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election
23

Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in Court.
The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation
and prosecution of election offenses.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies.
They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose the appeal of the
COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases
should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate
preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no
probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have
discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. If he disagreed
with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from
the cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts
and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no
probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the
manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as basis for denying due course to the
notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.

Section 3
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 105628, August 6, 1992]
ALL ELECTION CONTROVERSIES MUST BE HEARD AND DECIDED FIRST BY THE
DIVISION COMMISSION ON ELECTION. It is clear from the abovequoted provision
of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies,
and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission.
The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, preproclamation cases are classified as Special Case and, in compliance with the above
provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested
with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. Rule 27 thereof governs
Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from
rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which
they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:
"SEC. 9.
Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. (a) A
party aggrieved by an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had
stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling shall, within five days
following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of
canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a
copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.
(b)
The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the
Clerk of Court concerned.
(c)

The answer/opposition shall be verified.

(d)
The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set
the case for hearing." (Emphasis supplied)
24

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be

filed within five (5) days from its promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division
shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the
Commission en banc. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall
calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification.
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the
abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently,
the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.
Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro [G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995]
ONLY DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE
SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the
COMELEC, raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filing of the present
petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, 7 of the Constitution because under this
provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari.
This is correct. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders and
rulings of COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari" the
Constitution in its Art. IX, A, 7 means the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65. Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first
file a motion for reconsideration, it follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to
his present action.
Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only
question raised in his petition is a question of law. This is not correct. The questions
raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore,
not pure questions of law.
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is
required for the filing of a petition for certiorari is clear from the following
provisions of the Constitution:
Art. IX, C, 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(2)
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.

25

Id. 3. The Commission on Elections may be sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Conformably to those provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including preproclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a
party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, 7, "may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari."
Section 4
National Press Club vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992]
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE
MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION. The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by
the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information.
The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out
in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of
such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums
among candidates."
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press
(Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with the Article IX (C)
(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited
period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the
special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a
democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the
electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall
have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are
accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free
speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important
and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society,
equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article
II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law."
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that
no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.
For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly
and convincingly proving that assertion.
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon
basic principles relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for
26

constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The essential question is whether or

not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether
such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations
so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the
character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being
assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential
considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of
speech and freedom of the press Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain
important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328
dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority
by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January
1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application.
Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and
sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air
time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in
any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications,
and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs
are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment
upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for
office constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant
case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections.
In Sanidad, the Court
declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which
provided as follows:
"Sec. 19
Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign
for or against the plebiscite issues."
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the
plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167
constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a

27

newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
". . . [N] either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2476 has no statutory
basis." (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied).
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section
11 (b). exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of
print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required
to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual
candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently
apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space"
on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions
materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations
effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at
least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the
benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out.
It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral
Commission 7 that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession
of the power or authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human
society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the
Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much
the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is
commanded by statute to bur or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in
mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory
command. There is no indication, so far as the record here would show, that
Comelec would not in fact carry out its statutory duty in this connection, and if it
does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have
judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not
cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their
qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and
television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal
information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any
intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content
of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political
advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their
respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious
functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or ideas reporters,
broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV
screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section
11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political
advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space" in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4)
and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of
print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially
28

affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core
problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and
the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism
which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political
candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. vs. GMA Network,
Inc. [G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998]
RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED TO GIVE AIR TIME TO THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FREE OF CHARGE. Petitioners' argument is without
merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance
with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires."
The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of
charge is not new. It goes back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388), which
provided:
SEC. 49.
Regulation of election propaganda through mass media.
(a) The franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations
are hereby amended so as to require each such station to furnish free
of charge, upon request of the Commission [on Elections], during the
period of sixty days before the election not more than fifteen minutes
of prime time once a week which shall be known as "Comelec Time"
and which shall be used exclusively by the Commission to disseminate
vital election information. Said "Comelec Time" shall be considered as
part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the
Government for the dissemination of public information and education
under their respective franchises or permits.
This provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code
(P.D. No. 1296), which provided:
SEC. 46.
COMELEC Time. The Commission [on Elections] shall
procure radio and television time to be known as "COMELEC Time"
which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
within the area of coverage of said radio and television stations. For
this purpose, the franchises of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to require such stations to furnish
the Commission radio or television time, free of charge, during the
period of the campaign, at least once but not oftener than every other
day.
Substantially the same provision is now embodied in 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was
brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but
even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed
29

of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that
broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are
responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can
constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public
affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations
may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. 12 Thus,
Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law School, in urging
reforms in regulations affecting the broadcast industry, writes:
Elections. We could do a lot to improve coverage of electoral
campaigns. Most important, government should ensure free media
time for candidates. Almost all European nations make such provision;
the United States does not. Perhaps government should pay for such
time on its own. Perhaps broadcasters should have to offer it as a
condition for receiving a license. Perhaps a commitment to provide
free time would count in favor of the grant of a license in the first
instance. Steps of this sort would simultaneously promote attention to
public affairs and greater diversity of view. They would also help
overcome the distorting effects of "soundbites" and the corrosive
financial pressures faced by candidates in seeking time on the media.
Adiong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992]
PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF POSTERS AND DECALS DURING ELECTION PERIOD
CURTAILS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile
places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so
as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be
stilled:
"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's
power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is
perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is
balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment . .
. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of
the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . .
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due
process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation.
Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]."
(Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the question prohibition is not
so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
30

freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car,

to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but
once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression
becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in
the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or
columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased
opinions with less reason can sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who
pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.
Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990]
THE SUPERVISION OR REGULATION OF MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION DOES NOT
APPLY IN THE CASE OF PLEBESCITE.
However, neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was
assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power
of the state "to prevent the perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus
and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented
in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In
a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a
plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167
does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the
Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is
still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No
reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this
form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to
be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.
D.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Section 2
Guevarra vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17115, November 30, 1962]
31

EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL. Under our Constitution,

the authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the
Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property
pertaining to, or held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities
thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a
determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose;
Whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity
with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract
have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested
to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the
officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have
been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in
audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or
authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned
contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable. If he
entertains such belief, he may do more than discharge the duty imposed upon him
by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper
administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty implies a negation of
the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its
disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the
aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken
by the General Auditing office, and, hence render the imposition of said duty
unnecessary.
Orocio vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992]
THE COA IS NOT BOUND BY THE OPINION OF LEGAL COUNSEL OF GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS. In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency
or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the legal counsel
of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned
disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing
function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should
be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COA, DUE PROCESS SHOULD BE OBSERVED.
Respondent Agustin then cannot be faulted when in his Certificate of Settlement
and Balances No. 01-04-83, he disallowed NPC's questioned disbursement.
However, in his notation as to the persons to be liable therefor, he mentions only
Mr. M.V. Villafuerte (the Approving Authority) whose liabilities are primary; E.
Gamama and P. Gajasan (Management's Examiners) whose liabilities are secondary
and joint"; and H.L. Hermosura (Chief Accountant) whose liability is primary.
Petitioner was not found to be liable. He was made jointly and severally liable with
Villafuerte, Gajasan and Hermosura only in the Memorandum of respondent Agustin
dated 30 June 1986.
It may be noted that in his Memorandum he excluded
Gamama. Considering that what was sustained up to the level of the General
Counsel of the COA was the disallowance made in the aforementioned Certificate of
Settlement and Balances and necessarily, his ruling thereon as to who are the
parties liable therefor, Agustin acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion
when, without prior notice to petitioner, he made the latter liable for the
disallowance and worse, he directed, in the guise of a request, the Chief Accountant
of the NPC, Metro Manila Regional Center, to book the disallowance in the name of
petitioner. Petitioner was not made a party to the motion for reconsideration which
the General Counsel of the COA acted upon. Respondent Agustin effectively denied
petitioner of his right to due process.
Osmea vs. Commissionner on Audit [G.R. No. 98355, March 2, 1994]
32

Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela [G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992]

Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit [G.R. No. 103309, November 27, 1992]
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the
exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of
the NPC, Board of Directors for it leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board
of Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a
resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by
the majority of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power
and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular
expenditure or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering inutile
this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's
property.
Saligumba vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. L-61676, October 18, 1982]
DECISIONS OF THE COA THAT MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME COURT ARE
LIMITED ONLY TO THOSE WHICH INVOLVE MONEY MATTERS. Our power to review
COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving
the discipline of its personnel.
Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative
matters as mentioned above, We can not do so on factual issues; Our power to
review is limited to legal issues.
Section 3
Philippine Airlines vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 91890, June 9, 1995]

Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization [G.R. No. 112399, July 14, 1995]

ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 8
Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998]
FOR THE THREE-TERM LIMIT TO APPLY, THE LOCAL OFFICIAL SHOULD BE ELECTED
TO THE OFFICE AND COMPLETES THE FULL TERMS. To recapitulate, the term limit
for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the
following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason
of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he
33

resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in
the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by
succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term
expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the
purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary
renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for
which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the
term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be
considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an
interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he
is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next
election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions
for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely,
that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that
he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local
official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three
times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive
times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by
succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for
the purpose of applying Art. X, 8. Suppose he is twice elected after
that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had
he served the full term because he only continued the service,
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but
also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the
situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand,
he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to
office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of
the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of
the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

34