Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80993

Summer 1999

Vol. 12, No. 3

From the Commandant

Special Warfare

The 1999 Special Forces Conference and

Exposition was an unqualified success.
This years conference theme, Regional
engagement and the future, gave the SF
community an opportunity to examine our
future role, our future training, and the
values that will sustain us.
The conference consisted of three symposiums that allowed senior SF soldiers to discuss topics that will ultimately influence
the direction of Special Forces. From the
symposium Special Forces Ideology, we
will eventually prepare the statement of our
core ideology. From Army Special Operations Task Force/Regional Engagement
Force, we will outline concepts for the
future employment of SF units. From SF
Assessment and Selection/SF Qualification
Course, we will determine the changes necessary in the training of future SF soldiers.
Junior and mid-grade SF soldiers participated in workshops and generated recommendations for resolving a number of contemporary issues.
The National Defense Industrial Association, or NDIA, hosted an exposition of contemporary and future equipment, weapons
and technology that are relevant to the SF
mission area. Conference attendees were
able to observe equipment that is in production as well as some that is in prototype.
The Family Readiness Conference helped
reinforce the link between the welfare of
families and SOF readiness. SOF unit family-advocacy representatives were updated
on the available training materials that can
help families learn to cope with the stresses
associated with special operations.
The conferences activities gave us a
chance to see old friends and to make new
acquaintances. The dedication to fallen
comrades allowed us to remember those
who are no longer in our ranks, and to
honor their sacrifices.
This years conference was a cooperative
effort by the Special Warfare Center and

School, the Special Forces Command, the

Army Special Operations Command, the
NDIA, and the Special Forces Association.
The special guests attending General
Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs;
General John M. Abrams, commander of the
Army Training and Doctrine Command;
General Peter J. Schoomaker, CINC USSOCOM; Ross Perot; and Wayne Newton
showed the wide range of support for Special
Forces and its activities.
But the true stars of this years conference
were the soldiers themselves: the participants
in the symposiums and in the workshops who
contributed with their own insights. The SF
Conference was not the final word on REF, core
ideology or SF assessment and training. Those
issues will continue to be tested, debated and
studied elsewhere. The real success of the SF
Conference is that members of the SF community came together, discussed the topics, gained
a consensus, and recorded their recommendations. Those recommendations and the support
of the SF community will be invaluable as we
build a force relevant for the future.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

Contents

PB 80993
Summer 1999

Special Warfare

Commander & Commandant

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra
Editor
Jerry D. Steelman
Associate Editor
Sylvia W. McCarley
Graphics & Design
Bruce S. Barfield
Automation Clerk
Gloria H. Sawyer

VE R

IT

AS

ET

LI B

ER

Features
2

Special Forces Conference: Looking to the Future,

Celebrating the Past
by Private First Class Jon Creese

Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces

by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Chris Tone

16

Building Special Forces to Last: Redesigning the

Organizational Culture
by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Larry E. Bush Jr.

21

Army Values: Duty

22

Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs

of the Force in 2020
by Michelle M. Zazanis, Robert N. Kilcullen, Michael G. Sanders
and Doe Ann Crocker

32

The History of the 1st Special Service Force Air

Detachment
by Ray Cart

36

Special Forces at West Point: Planting the Seed

by Major Rich Young

40

Special Forces: In Search of a Core Ideology

by Sergeant Major Edward A. Berg

TAS

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission
is to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented
in other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and
should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:
DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.
Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where
copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare
and the authors.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special-operations units. Individuals desiring private
subscriptions should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special
Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web.
(http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Dennis J. Reimer
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Joel B. Hudson
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
05233

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Vol. 12, No. 3

Departments
43

Letters

44

Foreign SOF

47

Enlisted Career Notes

48

Officer Career Notes

50

Update

52

Book Reviews

Special Forces Conference: Looking

to the Future, Celebrating the Past
by Private First Class Jon Creese

any of the Armys best war fighters and humanitarians met April
19-22 to discuss the future of Special Forces, or SF. They also celebrated
their past.
The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School sponsored the
annual Special Forces Conference and
Exposition at the Holiday Inn-Bordeaux in
Fayetteville, N.C. The conference, attended
by more than 500 current or former SF soldiers, was designed to bring members of the
SF community together to discuss important topics.
The real benefit of the conference was in
having an open debate in an open forum to
identify perceived issues and challenges of
the future so we could start working on
solutions today, said Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph Celeski, chief of staff of the U.S.
Army Special Forces Command.
To ensure open debate and to gather
input from senior and junior SF soldiers,
SWCS divided the conference attendees
into two groups. Senior SF soldiers, including lieutenant colonels and higher,
sergeants major and higher, and chief warrant officer four and higher, participated in
three symposiums.
The symposia concentrated on the
nature of Special Forces, the way SF participates in regional engagement, and the
selection and training of SF soldiers.
Junior SF soldiers participated in 10
workshops that examined topics such as

enhancing force protection; establishing

alternate methods by which to train
advanced skills; and refining materiel
requirements.
It was really important to (Major) General Bowra (the SWCS commanding general) that he receive the input from junior
soldiers, said Lieutenant Colonel Dan
Adelstein, director of the Special Operations Proponency Office, the office in
charge of the conference. This conference
was unique because he insisted that it be
outcome based that we come away with
recommendations for some of the topics we
discussed.
Each symposium and workshop had an
action officer whose job was to distill the
discussions, suggestions and recommendations into a concise report.
We wanted a conference to produce
(results) and engage junior levels of the SF
community, Adelstein said. We received a
lot of input from the field, and once the
reports are received, we expect many useful recommendations.
Special Forces units perform five doctrinal missions foreign internal defense,
unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, direct action and counterterrorism.
Foreign-internal-defense missions are the
main peacetime initiatives; they include
humanitarian and civic projects in friendly
developing nations.
General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the SF solSpecial Warfare

diers in his speech to the conference attendees April 21: Each of you is a true national asset perhaps the best we have in the
Department of Defense.
While at Fort Bragg, Shelton participated in a high-altitude, low-opening parachute jump with SF soldiers and members
of the U.S. Army Parachute Team.
Besides Shelton, there were other distinguished guests who supported the conference by celebrating with the SF community.
Entertainer Wayne Newton and Texas businessman H. Ross Perot joined about 700 soldiers and their guests during the Special
Forces 12th Anniversary Ball, April 22.
Newton has been a supporter of the SF
community since the Vietnam era. He
accompanied Bob Hope on several trips to
Vietnam, entertaining troops during USO
tours. While in Vietnam, Newton collected
family-contact information from the soldiers. Upon returning to the states, Newton contacted the family members of
approximately 7,000 soldiers he had met.
Perot, also a long-time SF supporter, has
contributed significantly to special-operations soldiers and their families over the
years. In 1997, he provided funds to erect a
statue honoring the late Major Richard J.
Meadows. The statue is located outside the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
headquarters. Perot has also commissioned
a statue of retired Colonel Arthur Bull
Simons, which is slated to be dedicated in
November at the John F. Kennedy Plaza.
For their support, Newton and Perot
received green berets and honorary memberships to the 1st Special Forces Regiment. Newton ended the formal part of the
ball by entertaining the crowd.
Then the band struck up, and the members of the SF community and their guests
took to the dance floor. Perhaps it was only
fitting that after having spent three days
looking to the future and celebrating the
past, the SF community took time to enjoy
the present.

Photo by Jon Creese

Photo by Jon Creese

Top: Retired Command Sergeant Major Franklin Miller, a Special Forces Medal of Honor
recipient, participates in the laying of the wreath during the fallen-comrades ceremony
at the Army Special Operations Forces Memorial Plaza. The ceremony kicked off the
four-day Special Forces Conference.
Bottom: A Special Forces rifle party prepares to fire a three-volley salute to honor fallen comrades during the fallen-comrades ceremony.

Private First Class Jon Creese is

assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S.
Army Special Operations Command.

Summer 1999

Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose

of Special Forces
by Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major Christopher Tone

s a mission and as a concept,

unconventional warfare, or
UW, is the heart and soul of
the United States Armys Special
Forces, or SF. Since SF was created
in 1952, UW has provided its values, its focus and its uniqueness.
Although our UW doctrine is outdated, current and future political,
social and economic situations
promise continued relevance for
UWs core tasks.
At a commanders conference held
by the U.S. Army SF Command in
October 1998, an SF group commander asked if UW is still a relevant mission. If not, he asked, why should
we train for it? Major General
William Boykin, the USASFC commanding general, directed the commanders present to examine the relevance of the UW mission and to present their findings at the commanders
conference in January 1999.
This article contains the response
that the 3rd SF Group presented in
January. By publishing it in Special
Warfare, the authors hope to reach a
larger part of the SF community and
to contribute to the current debate
on the core ideology of SF and on the
future of UW.
Unlike other combat units that
are required to perform several
missions, SF was developed for one
4

purpose: to conduct guerrilla warfare, or GW, whose definition in the

1950s was as follows:
Guerrilla Warfare is defined in
[Special Regulation] 320-5-1 as
operations carried out by small
independent forces, generally in
the rear of the enemy, with the
objective of harassing, delaying
and disrupting military operations of the enemy. The term is
sometimes limited to the military
operations and tactics of small
forces whose objective is to inflict
casualties and damage upon the
enemy rather than to seize or
defend terrain; these operations
are characterized by the extensive
use of surprise and the emphasis
on avoidance of casualties. The
term includes organized and
directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage
and propaganda, and, in some
cases, ordinary combat. Guerrilla
warfare is ordinarily carried on by
irregular, or partisan, forces; however, regular forces which have
been cut off behind enemy lines or
which have infiltrated into the
enemy rear areas may use guerrilla tactics. FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla
Warfare (October 1951)1

Over the years, the GW terminology has been replaced by UW, but
the concept has remained constant.
It provides the fundamental principles for SF organization, doctrine,
training and recruitment. SF operational detachments, battalions and
groups were manned and equipped
to accomplish the UW mission in
remote areas with little or no support. SF required mature, self-disciplined and physically fit soldiers
who could operate independently,
communicate across cultural barriers, accurately assess complicated
problems, create innovative solutions, and function well when
placed in small groups of similar
soldiers for long periods of time.
Improvise - adapt - overcome
was the mantra of the SF soldier.
The ability to perform those activities was required for success in UW,
and SF sought to nurture and develop that ability through its training.
The SF A-detachment had to be versatile, capable and self-reliant: It
would have to accomplish the UW
mission with little or no support. The
team also had to be cohesive, because
there would be no one else upon
whom its members could depend in
their remote area of operations. The
fact that the ODA has proven very
capable of conducting other missions
Special Warfare

must not detract from its intended

purpose.
According to the vocabulary of the
current debate on SF core ideology,
core ideology is composed of two elements: core values (the organizations essential and enduring tenets);
and core purpose (the organizations
fundamental reason for existing).2
The authors believe that the core
purpose for SF is, and always has
been, to conduct UW. The core values
may be debated, but all of them are
related to the uniqueness of the UW
mission.
SF soldiers and units are doing
excellent work around the world,
and they continue to add to SFs
reputation for excellence and versatility. However, we have lost
touch with our core purpose UW.
In a recent letter published in Special Warfare, Master Sergeant
Brian Duffy, team sergeant of
ODA-376,
astutely
observed,
When you get lost, you go back to
your last known position and get
your fix. We should do the same
with our core ideology.3 We must
clearly establish what UW is. After
having established our position, we
must then move forward.

The past as prologue

UW has been SFs raison detre
since 1952. The other Army components have focused on the conventional battlefield, which envisions
states at war, professional armies
clashing on the field of battle, and
clear winners or losers.
Having observed the war in
Korea, and drawing directly on
their experiences of World War II,
General Robert McClure and two
of his sharp subordinates, Colonel
Aaron Bank and Colonel Russell
Volckmann, recognized a need for a
capability that our postwar Army
did not possess units capable of
fighting on unconventional battlefields. The Ranger battalions were,

Summer 1999

by structure,
training and
attitude, incapable of the
task. There is a
significant diff e r e n c e
between elite
units
that
develop high
levels of proficiency in conventional combat skills and
units, elite or
otherwise, that
develop unconventional warfare skills.4
World War II
was not the
first war in
which GW had
been used, nor
was it GWs
best showcase.
Much
better
Courtesy USASOC archive
examples
of
GW are T.E.
Colonel Aaron Bank, commander of the first Special Forces unit, the
Lawrence and
10th SF Group. Bank, General Robert McClure and Colonel Russell Volthe
Arab
ckmann recognized the need for a postwar UW force.
Brotherhoods
support to General Allenbys operathe Nazi ability to fight on the battlefields of France.
tions in Palestine during the First
In Yugoslavia, British commanWorld War, and the Spanish guerrilla support to Wellington during
dos provided assistance to the
resistance forces of both Tito and
the Iberian peninsular campaign
against Napoleon. But in the early
Mikhailovich. In Burma, U.S.
1950s, our WWII experience was
Detachment 101 trained and
employed
Kachin
tribesmen
recent, and the lessons were fresh
in our memory. During World War
against the Japanese. Even though
II, the U.S. and its Allies had realthere were no Allied conventional
ized significant successes by supefforts in these theaters, the UW
porting partisan resistance in all
actions had two purposes: First,
they were designed as an economy
theaters.
In France during the later part
of force effort that would interfere
of the war, Jedburg teams helped
with the administration of the
train and organize the French
occupied territories, and force the
resistance forces. The activities of
enemy to devote large numbers of
resistance forces were coordinated
military forces to secure the strateto assist Allied conventional efforts
gic infrastructure. Second, these
by targeting forces, supplies and
small efforts demonstrated Allied
infrastructure that would affect
solidarity with the defeated peo5

ples and encouraged their continued resistance.

On those unconventional battlefields, there were no battles, and
there were no clear winners or
losers. The states were not at
war: one state had surrendered
and was being occupied by the
other. Most of the partisans were
not professional soldiers: They
fought either as members of auxiliaries or as members of the undergrounds. It was for this type of scenario that the 10th Special Forces
Group was established in June
1952. Bank took command of the
group, while McClure and Volckmann continued the good fight in
Washington.
Unconventional warfare consists
of military, political, psychological, or economic actions of a
covert, clandestine, or overt
nature within areas under the
actual or potential control or
influence of a force or state
whose interests and objectives
are inimical to those of the
United States. These actions are
conducted unilaterally by United
States resources, or in conjunction with indigenous assets, and
avoid formal military confrontation. FM 31-21, Special Forces
Operations (February 1969)5
During the three decades following the establishment of the 10th
SF Group, the U.S. witnessed
numerous insurgencies around the
world, most of which were sponsored or assisted by our Cold War
adversaries as just wars of national liberation. The U.S. military
struggled with the counterinsurgency issue with limited success.
SF was frequently called upon to
combat insurgencies for two reasons: First, their employment
would give the U.S. the capability
to take advantage of perceived
opportunities to develop or support
insurgencies against the commu6

Photo by Keith Butler

The unconventional-warfare exercise conducted at the end of the SF Qualification Course, Robin
Sage, is essentially the same as the guerrilla-warfare exercise conducted by Aaron Bank in 1952.

nist bloc. Second, the experts in

conducting insurgency would be
most useful in fighting hostile
insurgencies as advisers and trainers. Who better to fight guerrillas
than the trainers of guerrillas?
As SF and the other Army components developed their roles in
foreign internal defense, or FID,
doctrine writers incorporated a
portion of the insurgents doctrine
into our UW doctrine. The excerpt
from the 1969 edition of FM 31-21
reflects the incorporation of the
insurgents doctrine, but this doctrine has never been tested in an
insurgency or incorporated into our
UW training.
Unconventional Warfare: A broad
spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of
long duration, predominantly
conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized,
trained, equipped, supported, and
directed in varying degrees by an
external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct
offensive low-visibility, covert, or

clandestine operations, as well as

the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape
(E&E). Joint Pub 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
(April 1998)6
The current joint definition of
UW (shown above) would lead us to
believe that our UW mission is relevant and that our UW doctrine is
sound. Unfortunately, when our
supporting doctrine interprets this
broad joint definition, it limits SFs
UW role to training indigenous
forces and leading them in the conduct of guerrilla war or insurgency. This UW=GW+Insurgency equation must be revised if
UW is to have relevance as a mission for SF in the next century.
In the minds of most SF soldiers,
UW doctrine has been oversimplified. UW is just FID in a denied
area is the often-stated justification for the Ts (trained) on our
UW mission-essential task lists, or
METLs, which are presented during quarterly training briefs. While
Special Warfare

this is clearly incorrect, it is indicative of the state of our UW doctrine. Our force has lost sight of its
purpose. Our teams today are more
comfortable conducting a longrange surveillance mission (disguised as special reconnaissance)
or a Ranger-platoon raid (disguised
as direct action) than they are of
assessing and developing a UW
operational area and creating
havoc in a denied area.
Even if we could accept the
UW=GW+Insurgency equation as
valid, the training to prepare SF
for UW would be outdated and
insufficient, because todays SF
does not train for insurgency. There
are no training materials to support insurgency training. Except
for one block of classroom instruction on the theory of insurgency in
the SF Detachment Officer Qualification Course,7 our UW training
focuses on GW. The culmination
exercise of the SF Qualification
Course, Robin Sage, is essentially
the same GW exercise conducted
by Aaron Bank in 1952.
Although it conforms nicely to
conventional TRADOC standards,
the 1988 UW Mission Training Plan
(ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP) is very
thin on detailed training guidance
for the core UW tasks.8 Of the 56
tasks listed, only 15 are UW-specific; and these are devoted to GW,
combat operations and link-ups
with friendly conventional forces. A
task as complicated as develop the
area complex has two pages of
broad subtasks, but these subtasks
are no real help to the ODA leadership looking for guidance.
In 1994, the Special Warfare
Center and Schools Directorate of
Training and Doctrine distributed
the initial draft of FM 31-20-2,
Unconventional Warfare Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces.9 While the draft FM 3120-2 was a better effort than
ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP and was
Summer 1999

more focused on UW, it focused on

the UW of yesteryear. The manual
was never published in final form,
and we understand that SWCS is
working on another effort.
In light of our outdated UW doctrine, the misconception in the SF
community regarding SFs core
purpose is understandable. UW, as
currently defined in SF doctrine, is
not relevant as an SF mission,
either in todays security environment or in that of the future. While
there is and will continue to be a
need for forces with UW capabilities, filling that need will require

Our teams today are

more comfortable conducting a long-range surveillance mission (disguised as special reconnaissance) or a Rangerplatoon raid (disguised
as direct action) than
they are of assessing and
developing a UW operational area and creating
havoc in a denied area.
more than simply revising our doctrinal definitions. The doctrine,
training, leader development,
organization, materiel and soldier
skills, or DTLOMS, that were adequate for UW during Colonel
Banks era are inadequate for the
UW battlefield of the 21st century.
If the SF community can agree
that our UW doctrine must evolve,
we still would have to develop the
other elements of DTLOMS for the
improved UW mission. In fact,
updating our UW doctrine will be

the easiest task.

Todays UW doctrine refers to two
related missions: GW and insurgency. In both GW and insurgency,
SF units perform tasks such as raids,
ambushes, sabotage, subversion,
intelligence collection; they train
indigenous forces; and they operate
in denied areas. However, GW and
insurgency have different operational environments, campaign
objectives, and success criteria.
GW is part of a larger war. GW
consists of operations conducted by
small units that work in conjunction with resistance movements
behind enemy lines and in occupied territories. Guerrilla forces tie
up enemy forces that are necessary
to maintain control of occupied territories and rear areas; guerrilla
forces also assist conventional
efforts in theater by targeting facilities, units and infrastructure that
directly affect the enemys ability
to fight.
Insurgency is not part of a larger
war. Insurgency is a mission of longduration, whose continued operation does not depend upon the outcome of a conventional war. There
are no economy-of-force issues. The
success of an insurgency depends
upon the continued political will of
both the U.S. government and the
U.S. people to support (1) the aspirations of insurgents and the opposition to the targeted regime, and
(2) the involvement of U.S. forces,
with its associated cost in men and
materiel. Insurgency is not the war
described by Clausewitz; it is the
armed struggle described by Mao
and Che Guevara, and political concerns are paramount.
Operational environment. The
contrasts between the operational
environments of the two UW missions are striking. GW is conducted
when our nation is at war; insurgency is conducted when our
nation is at peace. GW supports a
conventional military campaign or
7

Courtesy USASOC archive

Subversion and sabotage were part of the World War II UW experience and continue to be an
important UW activity. UWs primary purpose is creating mayhem.

diverts enemy forces, resources,

effort and attention away from one.
Insurgency does not involve friendly conventional forces.
GW forces fight against an occupying army, which has a built-in
legitimacy problem with the occupied people. Insurgent forces fight
against an established regime,
which has some degree of popular
support. GW is usually supported
by the conquered government,
which may be in exile or underground. In GW, political activities
support the military. During an
insurgency, the political implications of military action are of paramount importance. In insurgency,
military activities support political
goals.
Campaign objectives. During GW,
the strategic objective is to defeat
the occupying enemy. The guerrilla
campaign may be but a sideshow for
a greater allied effort. The occupying army is the main target. The
tactical and operational objectives
are either military or military-related. GW may involve some movement for political reforms, but polit8

ical reforms are not the focus of the

military campaign. During an
insurgency, however, political goals
are far more important than military ones. The strategic objective is
to overthrow the established regime
and to replace it with one that will
support the interests of the U.S.
Although some tactical objectives
can be attained by targeting military and security forces, operational
objectives can only be attained by
reducing the legitimacy of the
established regime at home and
abroad, and by enhancing support
for the insurgent movement, of
which the armed struggle is only a
small portion.
Success criteria. Success in GW
requires that the military defeat
the occupying enemy, and that the
occupied country return to some
form of its previous condition. The
long-term political stability of the
indigenous regime is not a primary concern for the U.S. Success in
insurgency requires that the
indigenous regime undergo a
change from its previous condition.
The legitimacy and the stability of

the new regime is a primary concern for the U.S.

The differences in the environments, objectives and success criteria of GW and insurgency will
greatly influence the way we conduct UW. We must recognize that
GW is primarily a military activity
and that insurgency is primarily a
political activity. Many aspects of
the two missions will vary greatly,
including targeting, the willingness to accept U.S. and indigenous
casualties, and the role of Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations. The clandestine or covert
nature of U.S. involvement, which
is all but irrelevant in guerrilla
war, may be a tremendous factor in
our support to an insurgency.

The CINCs charge

The commander in chief, or
CINC, of the U.S. Special Operations Command, General Peter J.
Schoomaker, has charged U.S. special-operations forces to be the most
capable and most relevant specialoperations force in existence.10 Recognizing that people are SOFs
most important asset, he demands
that they be trained for certainty
and educated for uncertainty. He
insists that our organizations
maintain a broad array of relevant
capabilities. He has established a
clear standard by which to judge
our success: We provide the
National Command Authorities, or
NCA, with value-added relevant in
time, space and circumstance. As
the CINC looks to the future, he
recognizes that SOF must evolve to
remain relevant. We must determine which capabilities to develop,
which ones to maintain, and which
ones to shift to conventional forces.
The recurring theme in the
CINCs charge is relevance. SOF
must provide the NCA with capabilities that are relevant not only
to the problems that we face today

Special Warfare

but also to those that we will face

tomorrow. SOF must train to fight
todays certainties, and our organizations must provide the capabilities and the options that are relevant to todays crises. But if todays
missions and capabilities do not
appear to be relevant to tomorrows
environments, we must be ready
and willing to evolve to missions
and capabilities that are.

Analysis
To answer the CINCs charge, SF
must move beyond its current definition of UW, which is not relevant
today and is unlikely to be relevant
in the foreseeable future.
We have no peer competitor that
would force us into a GW scenario
as described in our current definition of UW. Neither of the two current major-theater-war scenarios
that we envision would be likely to
require the establishment of an
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force from an indigenous people in an occupied territory.

Granted, the GW mission is possible in several imaginable scenarios, and SF is the only force in the
U.S. military that is capable of
executing the mission. But we
must be careful not to train for
possibilities at the expense of
training for certainties.
Insurgency is also an unlikely
SF mission. With the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the ideological struggle of our generation has passed.
The U.S. is not a revolutionary
power; in fact, throughout much of
the world, we represent the status
quo. In terms of law, commerce,
finance, communications, information, etc., the current international system is one that we have
established or is one to which we
have adapted. Our ideology underpins it, and we are its primary
beneficiaries. The U.S. people and
policy-makers would be unwilling
to commit U.S. forces to the overt
support of an insurgency, and SF
is currently not capable of conducting the long-duration covert
or clandestine operations that an

Courtesy USASOC archive

Soldiers from Detachment 101 show guerrilla fighters how to load .45-caliber automatic pistols
during World War II.

Summer 1999

insurgency would require.

There is the more likely possibility of overt U.S. support to an
insurgency, either from a third
country (as from Honduras in the
1980s) or from a portion of the
adversarys country secured by
U.S. or allied forces (as in Kurdistan in the 1990s). But because
that possibility would not involve
direct U.S. combat operations or
U.S. operations in a denied area, it
does not fit our current definition
of UW.
SF will never be large enough or
have sufficient resources to conduct all possible missions. The
CINCs guidance is sound: we must
focus on relevant capabilities. And
SF must either rewrite its UW
manuals and training materials to
make them relevant, or put them
away until the world situation
changes and UW becomes a relevant mission once again.

Redefining UW
The following definition for UW
would carry SF into the next century:
Unconventional Warfare: A
broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, that are
not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating
the enemys military forces in
combat. It includes subversion,
sabotage, intelligence-collection,
training and employing surrogate forces, offensive information
operations, and offensive command-and-control
warfare.
These operations may be conducted in peace, conflict or war,
and they may be overt, covert or
clandestine in nature. If these
operations are conducted when
our nation is not at war, their
success, failure and even exposure are politically sensitive and
carry strategic implications.
Proposed definition

Many of todays hot

spots are located in parts
of the world where languages are difficult to
learn and cultures are
remote from our own.

DoD photo

The most important element

about UW is that, as its name
denotes, it is not conventional.
Conventional warfare is focused on
the contest of armies on a battlefield where the full weight of our
technological advantages can be
brought to bear on our opponent.
UW is not directly involved with
that battlefield.
We must also move beyond the
idea of GW. The fact that guerrillas
may be involved in the conduct of
our indirect activities must not be
our focus we must focus on the
activities themselves, and on their
unconventional nature.
The proposed definition also
returns to the term unconventional warfare, as opposed to unconventional operations. Earlier, the
authors had labeled their definition unconventional operations,
not because we envisioned that
these operations would not involve
war-fighting, but because we wanted to ensure that the definition
10

would cover the operational continuum of peace-conflict-war. While

our nation may be at peace, those
involved in UW would be fighting a
war at their level.
But at least one recent proposal
has included stability and support
operations in the concept of unconventional operations,11 turning the
concept away from a strict warfighting interpretation. To avoid
any confusion, the authors have
returned to the original term
unconventional warfare.
To compare the proposed definition with the one in current UW
doctrine, we can analyze it in terms
of core tasks, operational environment, campaign objectives and success criteria.
Core tasks. Most of the core UW
activities, tasks or sub-missions
would be unchanged: Subversion,
sabotage, intelligence-collection, and
the employment of surrogates were
all part of Aaron Banks Jedburg
experience in World War II. Subver-

sion is defined as actions taken to

undermine the political legitimacy
and psychological strength of a
regime or nation. Sabotage is defined
as actions taken to weaken a regime
and its military by damaging or disrupting critical infrastructure from
within. Activities directed against
the enemys military, such as raids
and ambushes, could be included in
the list of tasks, but they should not
detract from the indirect nature of
the mission. UWs purpose is not to
destroy the enemys military; it is to
create mayhem.
Our doctrine must recognize that
advances in technology, global commerce and communication have
opened many new avenues for sabotage and subversion some of
which do not require physical
access. Intelligence-collection must
evolve beyond the process of gathering information on targeting and on
enemy order of battle. It must
include the human intelligence, or
HUMINT, concerns of will, morale
and intention, which cannot be collected by our high-tech overhead
platforms. By identifying and leveraging the influence hierarchy of a
target regime, we may often be
more successful in influencing its
actions than we could be by directly
attacking the regime or its forces.
Unlike many of our HUMINT
efforts that recruit agents of questionable reliability, UW can employ
the SF soldier himself as the intelligence collector.
The proposed definition deliberately avoids using the terms partisan, guerrilla and indigenous
forces. The first two terms have
perpetuated a WWII mindset. Furthermore, the foreign forces that
we may employ in future conflicts
may be from another tribe, a different ethnic group or even from a
third country. The definition also
avoids any requirement that UW
be conducted in a denied area.
Many UW activities can be conSpecial Warfare

ducted in or from secure areas.

The spread of information-age
technology brings new opportunities for UW. According to Joint Pub.
3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations, offensive information
operations, or IO, involve the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities to
affect the adversary decision-makers or promote specific objectives.12
Offensive IO can target the enemys
decision-makers, soldiers, or population (human factors); the systems
that collect, process and store information (nodes); and the transportation and communication infrastructure that connects them (links). The
authors of Joint Pub. 3-13 address
special operations specifically: The
unique capabilities of SOF enable
the [joint force commander] to
access, alter, degrade, delay, disrupt,
deny or destroy adversary information systems throughout the range
of military operations and at all levels of war.13 The indirect nature of
information operations, and their
close relationship to sabotage and
subversion, clearly warrant the
inclusion of offensive IO in UW.
Offensive command-and-control
warfare, or C2W, is a subset of IO. At
a tactical or even an operational
level, the destruction of the enemys
C2 capability directly affects the battlefield, and C2W is a component of
conventional warfare. However, the
disruption of an adversarys C2 during periods of competition or conflict
can also send a signal or achieve a
limited goal. Also, as our doctrine for
C2W explains: Physical destruction
in support of C2W refers to the use of
hard kill weapons or other means
such as sabotage or covert actions
against designated targets as an element of an integrated C2W effort.14
For these reasons, C2W can be
included as a UW activity.
The reader may be better able to
understand UW in terms of managing chaos. As we consider the effect
Summer 1999

of the indirect UW activities

already discussed, we must recognize that we are creating chaos in
the adversarys country. Routinely
sabotage public services, transportation and communications, and
you subvert the governments
authority. The regime and its security forces will appear powerless,
and a PSYOP propaganda campaign can help drive that message
home. By creating, escalating,
reducing or eliminating chaos in an
adversarys country, as directed by
the NCA, we could achieve nationalsecurity goals without involving
conventional military forces. It is
conceivable that we could create
public chaos to overthrow an adversarial regime, and that we could
then step in to restore order in support of a new regime. We need not
even replace the old regime: Turning chaos on and off could encourage the desired behavior.
Operational environment. The

future UW operational environment will be significantly different

from the one described in our current doctrine. If UW is to be relevant, we cannot restrict it to an
unlikely GW scenario that conveniently allows us to avoid political
issues. We must recognize UWs
inherent political nature and
embrace that nature, especially
during peacetime competition and
conflict. We cannot pretend that
there will be no political consequences, domestic as well as international, should U.S. UW activity
be exposed. We must consider these
consequences during the planning,
execution and post-execution phases of UW.
The presence of uniformed SF
troops has taken on a great deal of
significance around the world.
There will be an increasing need
for covert and clandestine operations, not so much to fool the
enemy as to keep photos of our sol-

Photo by Steven Collins

PSYOP soldiers talk with the news editor of Radio Tuzla to plan a radio talk show about the stabilization force. PSYOP campaigns can help to reduce chaos and achieve national-security goals.

11

Photo by Atiba Copeland

Situations like the one in Kosovo, with a large resistance potential and committed local popular
support, present an environment ripe for unconventional warfare.

diers out of the news.

In 1994, a true tactical victory in
Somalia was transformed into a
strategic disaster by the media
frenzy. Although an objective comparison of casualties would suggest
a resounding victory for U.S. forces
in Mogadishu, those who returned
home from that battle were not
hailed as victors.
More recently, the 3rd SF Group
has seen legitimate support to
host-nation units withdrawn
because of media attention. Journalists, who had seen uniformed
U.S. servicemen in Rwanda, mistakenly reported that the U.S. military was involved in the training
of Tutsi paramilitary forces that
had participated in the attempted
overthrow of Kabilas regime.15
We must also recognize that
global demographic changes have
affected the UW operational environment. We can no longer expect
to operate only in rural or remote
areas, because the worlds populations are moving into large cities.
Most of the important players and
key targets will be in or around
12

cities, and SF must be capable of

operating in urban areas.
During the first half of the 20th
century, most of this countrys conflicts took place in western Europe.
But, today, most of our hot spots are
located in other parts of the world.
The languages in these areas are
more difficult to learn and their cultures more remote, both of which
make communication and rapportbuilding, the crucial elements of
Jedburg-style UW, especially difficult for most Americans. The U.S.
military does not have a pool of
natives or native speakers from
these areas that can be employed in
UW operations. Thus SF will have
to be capable of conducting UW
tasks unilaterally, as well as
through or with surrogates.
Campaign objectives. There will
also be significant changes in
future UW campaign objectives.
Because of the requirements of
peacetime competition and conflict,
we must identify and accept more
limited goals. In other words, we
may not be able to defeat the
enemys military (GW) or over-

throw the established regime

(insurgency). Behavioral changes,
such as complying with treaties,
halting weapons development or
observing human rights, are more
likely to be our campaign objectives. SF must expect to be
employed in UW missions that
have political goals as well as (or
even instead of) military goals.
In addition to seeking limited
goals, we will be performing limited targeting: the right message to
the right group. UW activities can
be directed against specific ministries or bureaucracies, social or
economic classes, regions or subregions, and ethnic or tribal groupings. The mayhem and chaos created during UW need not affect all of
the adversarys population equally.
Unlike air strikes or embargoes,
UW activities of sabotage, information operations and chaos-development can be selective in choosing
who feels the stick. UW actions
can easily be reinforced by targeted
PSYOP campaigns. Conceptually,
we need not destroy an opposing
militarys ability to resist in order
to attack the ruling party and its
supporters, nor do we need to punish a nation in order to force a
small leadership clique to change
its behavior.
Success criteria. The UW success
criteria have not changed substantially. In war, we win by defeating
the enemys military (as in GW). In
peacetime competition or during
conflict short of war, we win either
by replacing an unfriendly regime
with one supportive of U.S. interests (as in insurgency) or by forcing
a regime, group or leader to change
its behavior.
From the analysis of its core
tasks, operational environment,
campaign objectives and success
criteria, the proposed definition
appears to be sound, but we should
compare it to two other proposed
definitions of UW being advanced
Special Warfare

at the JFK Special Warfare Center

and School. The first definition is
taken from the initial draft of FM
31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces
Operations (December 1998),
which has been distributed to the
field for comment.
Unconventional Warfare: UW is a
broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally
of long duration, predominantly
conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained,
equipped, supported, and directed
in varying degrees by an external
source. UW includes guerrilla
warfare and the indirect activities
of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).
UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or
other armed resistance movement.
UW is thus protracted politicomilitary activity. SF units do not
create resistance movements. They
provide advice, training and
assistance to indigenous resistance movements already in existence. From the U.S. perspective, the
intent is to develop and sustain the
supported insurgent or resistance
organizations and to synchronize
their activities to further U.S.
national security objectives. When
conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on politicomilitary and psychological objectives. Military activity represents
the culmination of a successful
effort to organize and mobilize the
civil populace against a hostile
government or occupying power.
When UW operations support conventional military operations, the
focus shifts to primarily military
objectives. The political and psychological implications remain,
however. FM 31-20, Doctrine for
Special Forces Operations (Initial
Draft) (Dec 1998)16
Quoting from the manuals prefSummer 1999

ace: Field Manual (FM) 31-20 is

the keystone manual for Special
Forces (SF) doctrine. It describes
SF roles, missions, capabilities,
organization, command and control
(C2), employment, and sustainment operations across the operational continuum.17 That is a large
task for such a thin manual.
This proposed definition is a
small evolutionary step forward
from the definition in the 1990 version of FM 31-20: It clearly identifies the political nature of the mission. The definition is nearly iden-

If UW is to be relevant,
we cannot restrict it to
an unlikely GW scenario
that conveniently allows
us to avoid political
issues. We must recognize UWs inherent political nature and embrace
that nature, especially
during peacetime competition and conflict.
tical to the currently accepted joint
doctrine of Joint Pub. 3-05, but it
excludes the other direct offensive
low-visibility, covert, or clandestine
operations.
Unfortunately, this definition pursues the UW=GW+Insurgency equation that we wish to avoid, and it
perpetuates the requirement for
indigenous or surrogate forces.
However, with the inclusion of the
word predominantly, the definition does leave open a window for
unilateral operations, although it
does not embrace the idea. In
short, this definition is more of the
same: It does not address the issue
of relevance for the present and

future national-security situations.

The second definition is taken
from an article that proposes a
change to joint UW doctrine.
Unconventional Operations: The
conduct of missions and operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements
throughout the operational continuum. Unconventional operations
include, but are not limited to, a
broad spectrum of operations
which can be of long duration. UO
are conducted by elements organized, trained, equipped, supported,
or directed in varying degrees by
external sources. UO are characterized by their joint and interagency complexion and are either
overt, covert, or clandestine. Examples of UO include stability operations; guerrilla warfare; subversion; sabotage; information and
intelligence activities; evasion and
escape; special reconnaissance;
underground operations; auxiliary operations; establishing support systems; establishing command and control systems; and
direct action conducted by indigenous or surrogate elements.
JFKSWCS/DOTD Proposal for a
New Joint Definition (APR
1999)18
This catch-all definition combines UW with FID, and it includes
SR and DA as subtasks. The only
unifying concept is the requirement to accomplish these sub-missions through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate elements. Some
in the SF community have advocated that it is precisely this concept
that makes SF unique.19 While this
mantra may be worthy of consideration as SFs core purpose, we are
going too far if we attempt to make
it a mission. We train our soldiers
that a mission includes a task and
a purpose. Through, with, or by
indigenous populations is a
method, not a mission.
13

The proposed definition raises

two other issues: future relevance
and the need for adequate supporting DTLOMS. Guerrilla warfare,
evasion and escape, and underground and auxiliary operations
are taken from the experience of
World War II; these kinds of operations are unlikely to be re-fought in
the next conflict. Furthermore, by
limiting ourselves to operations
through, with or by surrogates, we
have precluded USSF from conducting UW activities unilaterally.
This will significantly limit UWs
applicability to the current security environment and UWs relevance for the NCA. Any attempt to
conduct covert or clandestine UW
operations would be greatly complicated, if not made impossible, by
requiring us to work with less reliable surrogates.
Our second concern is with the
DTLOMS requirements that would
be needed to support unconventional operations. The DTLOMS
issue appears when we attempt to
implement UO as a doctrinal mission. By including UW, FID, SR, DA
and the formerly collateral activities of humanitarian and stabilitysupport operations in UO, we have
made it much more difficult to
establish priorities.
We have already experienced the
consequences of overloading ODAs
with requirements to prepare for
too many missions. Should we
assign an ODA to prepare for UO,
as defined above, that ODA would
be required to be trained in almost
all current SF missions. In times of
limited resources, this means that
the ODA would become good at
none. When everything is a priority, nothing receives priority. Imagine the ODA METL to support UO.
And try to envision the TTP manual and the Mission Training Plan to
support these unconventional
operations. These concerns are
related only to the training piece
14

of DTLOMS. The materiel requirements to support UO are probably

an even greater obstacle. We
strongly recommend that DOTD
reconsider pursuing this addition
to our doctrine.

The way forward

Our UW doctrine, designed for
scenarios of the 1940s and the
1950s, has little relevance in 1999,
and it promises to have even less
relevance in the next century. However, the UW core tasks remain relevant. In fact, todays rapidly changing political, economic, social and
technological
situations
have
brought new opportunities for UW
operations. To capitalize on these
changes, we must redefine UW by
focusing on its core tasks. The definition proposed earlier is only a
start; we must follow up with
advances
in
the
remaining
DTLOMS so that we refocus the
entire force, not just the doctrine
writers.
Before we choose to move on, we
should be sure of what we are leaving behind. Without its core purpose of UW, SF is adrift. SF
requires a renewed focus on UW.
Renewing that focus is a tall order,
but the alternative is irrelevance.
As we complete this article for
publication (spring 1999), we are
struck by its relevance to the current
events in Kosovo. We are confronted
by a situation ripe for UW in the
terms of our current doctrine: a large
resistance potential (in Kosovo and
among the refugees), committed
local popular support, a brutal occupying army, bases and sanctuary
nearby (Albania), air superiority, and
domestic political desire to avoid the
commitment of conventional forces.
De Oppresso Liber comes immediately to mind.

Colonel Gary M.
Jones is commander
of the 3rd SF Group.
His other SF assignments include detachment commander, company commander and
plans officer, 5th SF Group; executive officer, JFK Special Warfare
Center and School; company commander and group operations officer, 7th SF Group; executive officer,
J3, U.S. Special Operations Command; battalion commander, 3rd
SF Group; and deputy chief of staff,
U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Colonel Jones is a graduate
of the Infantry Officer Advanced
Course, the Marine Amphibious
Warfare School, the Armed Forces
Staff College, the Army Command
and General Staff College and the
Army War College. He holds a bachelors degree in general law from
Louisiana State University.

Major Christopher
Tone is the executive
officer for the 3rd
Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group.
Commissioned
through ROTC as an
Infantry officer, he has served as an
SF detachment commander in the
10th SF Group and as an SF company commander in the 3rd SF
Group. His functional areas are
48E, Russian foreign-area officer;
and 6Z, strategist. He holds a
bachelors degree in international
relations and economics from Tufts
University and a masters degree in
Russian studies from Harvard
University.
Notes:
Colonel R. W. Volckmann, Department of
the Army Field Manual 31-21: Organization
and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
1

Special Warfare

Office, 5 October 1951), p. 2. Although it is

not the current practice, this FM has an
author clearly identified.
2 The catalyst for this debate has been a
book that General Peter J. Schoomaker distributed when he was commander of the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
See James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras,
Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary
Companies (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), pp. 73-79.
3 Master Sergeant Brian Duffy, letter to
the editor, Special Warfare (Winter 1999), p.
43.
4 For more on this theme, see Thomas K.
Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in
Action: The Challenge of Unconventional
Warfare (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998). While we do not like Adams
choice of a title or his definition of UW (p. 2),
we support his UW focus and most of his
conclusions (p. 287). His book is excellent
reading and a good place to start for readers
who wish to pursue UW study.
5 Department of the Army Field Manual 3121: Special Forces Operations (U.S. Army
Doctrine) (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 14 February 1969), p. 3-1.
6 Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint
Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1998), pp.
II-6 - II-7.
7 Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, Student Text 31-20-2:
Unconventional Warfare (Fort Bragg, N.C.,
July 1998), pp. 1-2 1-8.
8 ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP: Mission Training
Plan for the Special Forces Company: Unconventional Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 28 September 1988). See the
training and evaluation outlines in Ch. 5, Task
List, pp. 5-2 5-4.
9 FM 31-20-2: Unconventional Warfare
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces (Initial Draft); Fort Bragg, N.C.:
USAJFKSWCS, February 1994).
10 The italicized phrases are taken from the
slide presentation delivered in October 1998
by General Schoomaker to his incoming
subordinate commanders as his command
philosophy.
11 CW3 Michael Ivosevic, Unconventional
Warfare: Redefining the Definition in Special Warfare (Spring 1999), p. 39.
12 Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations (Washington, D.C.:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (9 October
1998), p. viii.
13 Ibid., p. I-17.
14 Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine
for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
(Washington, D.C.: Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1996), p. vi.

Summer 1999

15 A 3rd SF Group JCET to Rwanda in the

summer of 1998 was ordered to return after
the press observed a EUCOM assessment
team near the countrys western border. The
JCET was being conducted in the southeastern part of the country and was focused
on peacekeeping tasks.
16 Department of the Army, FM 31-20, Doctrine for Army Special Forces Operations (Initial Draft) (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USAJFKSWCS,
December 1998), p. 2-1.
17 Ibid., v.
18 Ivosevic, p. 39.
19 Colonel Mark D. Boyatt has published
three articles in Special Warfare on this
theme: Unconventional Operations Forces
of Special Operations (October 1994); Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?
(Summer 1998); and Special Forces Core
Purpose: What vs. How (Winter 1999).

15

Building Special Forces to Last:

Redesigning the Organizational Culture
by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Larry E. Bush Jr.

uture institutional redesigns will

change the current organizational
structure, manpower requirements
and mission profile of Special Forces. But by
maintaining its core ideology, SF will be
able to function well into the 21st century as
a relevant asset of the theater commander
in chief, or CINC.
The future fighting force of the United
States will look quite different from our
military of today. Over the years, the U.S.
has seen a gradual movement from a
threat-based military structure to a capability-based military structure that can
move quickly to anywhere in the world to
meet any foe. Shifting the paradigm from
a threat-based structure to a capabilitybased structure is a short trip for SF. The
mission profile of SF has always been
based on the capabilities of small,
autonomous units working independently
in support of the objectives of the theater
commanders in chief, or CINCs.
SFs basic mission profile will not change
for the future. The theater CINC has only
two weapons systems capable of striking
deep behind enemy lines: airborne platforms and special-operations elements.
Airborne platforms are capable of rapidly deploying and redeploying, using endless configurations of ordinance to engage
multiple targets. Airborne platforms can be
easily reconfigured and redeployed to support a theater campaign plan.
Special-operations, or SO, elements1

16

are not easily reproduced. Nor are they

easily reconfigured or maneuverable.
However, they do represent one of the
CINCs best assets for projecting influence in theater. When used as designed,
SO elements can move deep into the theater area of operations and remain there
for extended periods of time. With their
various functional capabilities, these elements can support the CINCs strategies
before, during and after hostilities. SO
elements are capable of covering the
combat continuum, from deep reconnaissance to Civil Affairs. Each element is
designed to operate independently. However, the elements do share a common
link: The theater CINC who deploys one
of these elements into his area of operations must have the highest level of
faith, trust and confidence in that element to assign it against critical targets
in his campaign plan. This article will
explore that common link in terms of the
core ideology, the core values, and the
core purpose for which SF units exist.
To understand the concept of building SF
to last, we must develop a new perspective
of SF elements. Instead of perceiving SF as
an asset that performs certain strategic
missions, we should perceive the strategic
missions as the reason for SFs existence.
This approach will emphasize change and
evolution over time. Future missions may
change, but the foundations that have
allowed SF to succeed will remain conSpecial Warfare

stant. The single most important constant

is the core ideology of SF.

Core ideology
Conceptually, the core ideology of an
organization is the philosophical foundation upon which that organization exists.
An organizations core ideology changes
seldom, if ever. To put this into context,
core ideology is the primary element in the
development of an organization. Like the
founding principles of this nation, as
embodied in the Declaration of Independence, an organizations core ideology is
built on a set of guiding principles that distinguish that organization from other
organizations.
With the signing of the Declaration of
Independence, our founding fathers established a core ideology that has not changed
in 222 years: We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. This simple core ideology is freedom and equality.
It is important to understand that the

core ideology is not affected by external

factors. For example, our founding fathers
envisioned freedom and equality as timeless ideals that would provide guidance
and inspiration to all future generations.
The core ideology of SF is trust. The
CINC can trust that SF will accomplish its
job with little or no guidance. The core
ideology results from the other two elements core values and core purpose
that enable an organization to build for the
future.

Core values
The core values of an organization are its
essential and enduring tenets. These are
not to be confused with cultural or operating practices, and they are not to be compromised in order to achieve short-term
expediency.2 Core values can be stated in a
number of ways, yet they remain simple,
clear, straightforward and powerful. The
core values of the Declaration of Independence are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. They have provided this country
with a guiding force and direction for more
than two centuries.
The enduring values that are pervasive
With his promise, We
shall pay any price, bear
any burden, meet any
hardship to assure the
survival and the success
of liberty, President
John F. Kennedy gave SF
its enduring purpose.

Courtesy USASOC archive

Summer 1999

17

in SF are a combination of qualities and

capabilities that build trust and that distinguish SF from conventional forces:
integrity, maturity, dependability, judgment and adaptability to the environment.
Throughout history, success achieved by
a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually has called for a
special combination of equipment, training, people and tactics that is not found in
conventional units. It is precisely these
kinds of resources that have enabled SF
to function in unusual ways for which the
enemy often was unprepared.
SFs core values are critical in building
trust, and all of them will remain a part of
the fabric of SF. The absence of any one of
the core values will destroy trust and damage SFs credibility. Without credibility, SF
will cease to be relevant.

Core purpose
In the 21st century, the relevance of SF
will be tied directly to SFs ability to perform
unique missions in support of the theater
CINCs campaign strategy. Unique missions
define the core purpose of SF. By definition,
the core purpose of an organization is the
organizations fundamental reason for existence. Core purpose is not to be confused with
specific goals or strategies.3
The core purpose embodied in the Declaration of Independence preserves the basic
human rights of U.S. citizens. When properly conceived, a core purpose is broad, fundamental and enduring. A core purpose
should serve to guide and inspire an organization for years.
President John F. Kennedy granted SF
its enduring purpose. He stated, We shall
pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any
foe to assure the survival and the success
of liberty. This purpose has been the guiding light in the development of SF for
almost 40 years.
Over the years, special-operations missions have changed dramatically. In support of the national-defense strategy, SOF
are currently organized and trained to conduct nine principal missions. Given their
unique capabilities, SOF are also frequent-

18

ly called upon to perform collateral activities. These activities tend to shift in

response to the changing international
environment, but our trust must remain
unchanged.
The theater CINC must trust that SF
units will perform the job they are tasked to
do. The security environment, for now and
into the foreseeable future, is marked by the
lack of a global peer competitor with the
capability to militarily challenge the U.S.
We will, however, continue to confront a
variety of regional dangers. To meet these
challenges, SF will continue to provide the
U.S. with a combat-ready, highly capable,
and flexible force a force that is structured, manned, equipped and trained to
meet current and future security challenges
in support of national-defense objectives.
Preserving trust should be the personal
mission of every SF soldier. From the soldier
on the ground to the CINC, every member
must believe that he can trust the other SO
members to get the job done. Every SO soldier who is deployed must trust that the
other members in his sustaining base will
get the job done. This feeling of trust must
be pervasive throughout the SF community,
flowing up and down the chain of command.
Achieving trust requires a two-pronged
strategy: a top-down implementation strategy and a bottom-up implementation strategy.
In the first prong of the strategy, commanders should conduct a survey of their
organizations, beginning with the senior
leadership, to get a sense of what the
organizations members believe to be the
core ideology, the core values and the core
purpose. This survey can be either a formal
or an informal process. The formal process
could be conducted by an organization such
as the Army Research Institute. The senior
leadership could conduct the informal
process, or the commander could establish
a working group composed of representatives from every level of the organization.
The information collected would provide a
point of reference for further development
of the core ideology.
The next step is to define the future. Pick
a time in the future, say 2005, and determine the missions that will be relevant to
the theater CINCs campaign plans. The
Special Warfare

Special Operations Forces Core Ideology

Think about the soldier

Teach others to do your job
Take a stand believe in something

Preparing for the future

This must be earned not demanded

Understand the mission

Use every asset available
Ultimately believe in mission success

Requirements for mission success

Support the soldier

Stick with the mission

Building the total fighting force

Tell the truth ALWAYS

Treat others with dignity
Try new things

Building credibility

Respect for others

Reach the objective
Respect is mutual
Responsibility for subordinates

relevant missions now become the future

purpose of the organization. Determine
which values in the present will support
the development of the relevant missions
of the future. These become the core values. The core values and the core purpose
form a central conceptual idea: the core
ideology.
Redesigning the core ideology of an
organization is not an easy undertaking.
Such lofty objectives are usually dismissed
by lesser organizations. However, the most
successful organizations in this country
routinely accept and even cherish big
hairy audacious goals.4 Clear and compelling goals serve as unifying focal points
of effort often creating immense team
spirit. Clear goals have a clear finish line,
so the organization can know when it has
achieved its objective. Redesigning the core
ideology of SF is itself a big hairy audacious goal: one that will inspire the members of the organization to achieve success
and that will promote cohesion. The point
is, people must have a reason or a purpose
for wanting to belong to an organization.
Summer 1999

They need an objective or a flag to rally

around.
During the next step, senior commanders should produce a video to express the
desired changes in the core philosophy. As
part of the total-force concept, every member of the organization, including civilians,
should view the video. Afterward, commanders should employ a concept known
as management by walking around
making themselves visible and accessible.5
In the second prong of the strategy,
organizations should encourage all of their
members to promote efficiency and ideas
that are relevant in accomplishing desired
objectives. Commanders should use all
available media forms as a means of
encouraging personnel and promoting
change. Symbols of the new cultural
change, such as posters and signs, should
be visible to every member of the organization. Customers at the point of service
could fill out short customer-service surveys, indicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the service provided by the
organization.
19

Surveys would provide continuous feedback of the changing culture. Divisions,

sections or units that achieve continually
high customer-satisfaction ratings could
be rewarded with incentive awards or
commendations.
As a culture changes, an interesting
social phenomenon emerges. Organizational members who embrace new ideological
concepts and who have similar beliefs will
grow and prosper within their organization. Members who have opposing values
and ideals will find it increasingly more
difficult to work within that environment.
They will find themselves isolated and,
ultimately, unable to continue working for
their organization.
In conclusion, SF will continue to be a
relevant force for theater CINCs in the
21st century. The goal of the SF commander is to support the theater CINCs, ambassadors and their country teams, and other
government agencies. To achieve this goal,
the SF commander must prepare his forces
to conduct the entire spectrum of special
operations, including Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.6 In addition, the SF
commander must ensure that trust is the
capstone of development throughout the
SF community.
The need to develop a core ideology
applies to all services, and the procedures
for accomplishing this task are the same
for any organization. The key is to define
and to codify what makes an organization
unique or important to its customer. For
SF, the one simple element is trust. The
trust chart shows some of the elements
necessary for building trust. Trust and
respect are commodities that must be
earned; they are directly linked to credibility. Losing credibility will destroy a units
effectiveness on the battlefield, and, ultimately, that unit will become an irrelevant
wartime factor.

20

Chief Warrant Officer 3

Larry E. Bush Jr. is assigned
to the 3rd SF Group. His 24
years of active military service
include assignments in the
82nd Airborne Division, the
10th SF Group, the 7th SF
Group and the JFK Special Warfare Center
and School. He is a graduate of the SF Qualification Course, the Defense Language Institute, the SF Operations and Intelligence
Sergeant Course, the warrant officer basic
and advanced courses, and the Army Management Staff College. Mr. Bush holds an
associates degree from Mount Wachusetts
Community College and a bachelor of science degree from Fayetteville State University, and he is pursuing a masters degree in
business administration.
Notes:
A special-operations element is the smallest combat force of a special-operations unit. For Army Special Forces, this is called an A-detachment, which consists of 12 men. For the Navy SEALS, it might be a
platoon, as it would be for the Army Rangers.
2 James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, Built to Last:
Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. (New York:
HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 73-76.
3 Collins and Porras, pp. 73-76.
4 Collins and Porras, pp. 94-96.
5 James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, The Leadership Challenge: How to Get Extraordinary Things
Done in Organization (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
1987), pp. 200-201. MBWA is a standard operating
procedure in many companies, because it ensures that
managers are visible to their employees. Visibility
enhances accessibility.
6 Posture Statement, United States Special Operations Forces, 1998, General Peter J. Schoomaker, CINC,
United States Special Operations Command, p. 4.
1

Special Warfare

Army Values

Duty
Russell Volckmann
Russell Volckmann put duty to his country ahead
of his own personal safety. In April 1942, Major Volckmann, one of the defenders of the Bataan peninsula in the Philippines, refused to surrender when
Bataan fell to the Japanese. He joined with a few
other American Army officers, infiltrated Japanese
lines, and linked up with Philippine guerrillas in the
mountains of northern Luzon. There he helped
organize five regiments of guerrillas that totalled
some 20,000 Filipinos and Americans. He helped
lead the guerrillas in a desperate war against the
Japanese, tying down divisions that otherwise
might have invaded Australia. Because of the
courage of the Philippine guerrilla force, General
Douglas MacArthur found little resistance to his
landing at Lingayen Gulf in October 1944.
With the landing of conventional forces, Volckmanns partisans became part of the U.S. 6th
Army. They provided support to other units and
continued to work behind enemy lines. For his
bravery and leadership in the Philippines, Volckmann received the Bronze Star, the Silver Star,
the Distinguished Service Cross, and numerous
Philippine decorations.
After World War II, Volckmann developed the
doctrine and the policies of U.S. unconventionalwarfare forces, worked to establish a special-warfare directorate within the Army general staff,
and helped activate the first Special Forces unit
at Fort Bragg, N.C. Dr. Richard Stewart

Courtesy USASOC archive

Russell Volckmann, developer of the Armys early doctrine and

policies of unconventional warfare.

Summer 1999

21

Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the

Needs of the Force in 2020
by Michelle M. Zazanis, Robert N. Kilcullen, Michael G. Sanders
and Doe Ann Crocker

oth the selection process and

the training process designed
for Special Forces, or SF, are
inextricably linked to the requirements of the job that SF must accomplish. To meet the selection-andtraining needs of SF for the year
2020, we must establish what the job
requirements will be at that time.
As we begin, we should examine
the current job requirements and
determine how they might change
by 2020. If the job requirements
are projected to change, the selection process (Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS)
would probably also change. SFAS
is the three-week program that SF
candidates must attend prior to
attending the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC.
In the event that the job requirements change, the training process
(SFQC) may also need to change.
To explore these issues, the U.S.
Army Research Institute, or ARI,
and the Directorate of Training
and Doctrine, U.S. Army John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School, are collaborating on a
project, the SF Pipeline Review.
Previous research analyzed the
SF job requirements and identified
11 SF roles that encompass 26 basic
performance categories.1 The roles
22

and the performance categories are

shown on the facing page.

Job requirements
We have linked the job requirements to 29 attributes that are
critical to the SF soldiers effective
performance (see chart on pg. 24).
SF subject-matter experts, or
SMEs, ranked these attributes in
order of their overall importance to
SF, with lower numbers indicating
greater importance. The next five
columns show the relative importance of the attributes within each
SF military occupational specialty.
Although all 29 attributes are
important, the more important an
attribute, the more critical it is
that that attribute be included in
the SFAS or the SFQC.
Because the current selection and
training processes were developed
prior to the compilation of the critical
attributes, one of the Pipeline
Reviews first tasks was to determine
the extent to which the 29 attributes
are currently being assessed.

Mapping the pipeline

The initial question is whether
the SFAS and the SFQC are producing soldiers who have the attributes required for successful perform-

ance on the SF operational detachment-alpha, or ODA. Although the

SFAS and the SFQC have produced thousands of high-quality
soldiers over the years, and while
both processes seem to be meeting
the needs of the force, some of the
critical attributes being assessed
may have increased in importance.
For this reason, we may need to
improve our selection and training
processes.
To examine the question, we
have chosen three methods:
First, we collected ratings from
the SMEs who operate SFAS and
the SFQC. SFAS SMEs were asked
the following questions: To what
extent are the listed attributes
being assessed? How likely is it
that a candidate who scores low on
an attribute could still complete
the SFAS program?
SFQC SMEs were asked the following questions: To what extent are
the attributes required during training? How likely is it that a candidate
who scores low on an attribute could
still complete the SFQC?
Second, we reviewed research
that has identified predictors of
success in SFAS and in the SFQC.
If an attribute has been identified
statistically as a predictor of success in either SFAS or the SFQC,
Special Warfare

Special Forces Roles and Performance Categories

ROLE

PERFORMANCE CATEGORIES

Teacher

A. Teaching others

Diplomat

B. Building and maintaining effective relationships with indigenous populations

C. Handling difficult interpersonal or intercultural situations
D. Using and enhancing own language skills

Professional

E. Contributing to the team effort and morale

F. Demonstrating initiative and extra effort
G. Displaying honesty and integrity

Planner

H. Planning and preparing for missions

I. Making decisions

Soldier/Survivor

J.
K.
L.
M.
N.

Administrator

O. Handling administrative duties

Weapons expert

P. Operating and maintaining direct-fire weapons

Q. Employing indirect-fire weapons and techniques

Engineer

R. Employing demolitions techniques

S. Construction for mission-related requirements

Communications

T. Following communication procedures and policies

U. Assembling and operating commo equipment

Medic

V. Evaluating and treating medical conditions and injuries

W. Determining and administering medications and dosages
X. Ensuring standards of health-related facilities, conditions, and procedures

Leader

Y. Considering subordinates
Z. Providing direction

Confronting physical and environmental challenges

Navigating in the field
Troubleshooting and solving problems
Being safety conscious
Administering first aid and treating casualties

then that program would require a

measurable amount of that attribute. If an attribute has not been
identified as a predictor of success,
then the SFAS or the SFQC does
not require a measurable amount
of that attribute.
In the third method, we will survey members of SF ODAs to find out
whether new SF soldiers are demonSummer 1999

strating adequate proficiency in the

critical attributes.

SME ratings
A prospective SF soldier must
meet certain prerequisites before
he can attend SFAS: The candidate
must have achieved a minimum
score of 206 on the Army Physical

Fitness Test, or APFT; he must

have achieved a minimum score of
100 on the General/Technical, or
GT, of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB;
he must have achieved the minimum rank of specialist/corporal;
and his Uniform Code of Military
Justice, or UCMJ, history must
have been reviewed.
23

Critical Special Forces Performance Attributes

ATTRIBUTE

OVERALL 18A

18B

18C

18D

18E

CHANGE

REASON

Physical Fitness
Swimming
Physical flexibility and balance
Physical strength
Physical endurance

26
24
17
7

26
25
23
12

25
22
15
10

26
24
12
10

27
25
22
15

27
23
10
4

None
None
None
None

3
12
5
13
29
28
11
27
21
20
18

1
4
6
17
29
28
20
27
24
22
14

2
15
3
14
29
18
8
28
26
21
19

3
16
8
7
29
6
12
25
1
23
18

3
16
12
12
28
29
21
23
9
18
2

14
20
5
16
1
13
11
12
15
22
16

Increase
None
Increase
Increase
None
None
None
None
None
Increase
None

16
6
19
10
1
3
8
9
14
23
2

2
11
16
18
7
9
14
13
9
18
2

20
12
17
7
3
1
6
13
11
24
3

22
14
19
11
4
2
8
15
17
21
5

10
6
23
3
8
5
6
14
19
26
1

25
21
26
8
6
2
7
3
18
29
8

Increase
Increase
Increase
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Increase

Diplomatic role
Diplomatic role
Diplomatic role

15
25
22

4
7
21

9
27
23

20
27
28

17
19
10

18
23
28

Increase
None
Increase

Diplomatic role

Cognitive
Judgment and decision-making ability
Planning ability
Adaptability
Creativity
Auditory ability
Mechanical ability
Spatial ability
Perceptual ability
Basic mathematical ability
Language ability
Reading ability

Problem-solving
Problem-solving
Problem-solving

Diplomatic role

Personality/Interpersonal
Diplomacy/persuasivness
Cultural/interpersonal adaptability
Ability to motivate
Autonomy
Team player
Dependability
Initiative
Perseverance
Moral courage
Supervisory ability
Maturity

Diplomatic role

Communication
Communication ability
Writing ability
Nonverbal communication ability

Diplomatic role

NOTE: 1. Attributes are ranked numerically according to their importance to overall SF mission and to
each MOS. Lower values indicate greater importance.
2. Expected change in importance of attribute and reason for change are listed in last two columns
of chart.

24

Special Warfare

These prerequisites directly

measure the following attributes:
physical strength and physical
endurance (through the APFT);
basic mathematical ability and
reading ability (through the
ASVAB GT score); and moral
courage (through the UCMJ history). These prerequisites may also
offer limited indirect measures of
three other attributes: maturity
(through the rank restriction), initiative and perseverance (given
that applying for SFAS is voluntary and requires effort to complete
paperwork and to meet the APFT
requirements).
Next, the SF candidate must
attend SFAS. Ratings collected
from 24 SFAS cadre and board
members indicated that the attributes most extensively assessed in
SFAS are the physical-fitness attributes. Other attributes that are
highly assessed include spatial
ability and team-player qualities,

perseverance and maturity. As

shown in the chart below, SFAS
provides many or several opportunities to assess nine of the 10
most important attributes. The one
exception is cultural/interpersonal
adaptability, with only one or two
opportunities for assessment. With
regard to all 29 attributes, SFAS
SMEs perceived the set of communication attributes as having a low
overall level of opportunity for
assessment.
Responses from SFAS cadre and
board members reflected different
perceptions on some attributes.
Most notably, the board members
demonstrated more confidence
than the cadre regarding SFASs
ability to identify soldiers with low
levels of adaptability, creativity,
supervisory ability, perseverance,
and
maturity.
Disagreement
among the SMEs as to the level of
assessment for a specific attribute
may indicate that assessments of

that attribute are insufficient.

Responses from the field phases
of the SFQC indicated that some of
the attributes that are not highly
assessed in SFAS, such as judgment and decision-making ability;
planning ability; supervisory ability; oral communication ability; and
nonverbal communication ability,
become more critical during Phase
I of the SFQC. This suggests that
soldiers are being evaluated in
these attributes, and that they are
receiving feedback to improve their
weaknesses. Of the 10 attributes
listed as most critical for success in
SF, only one, cultural adaptability,
is not required during Phase I.
SME responses indicated that
all SFQC MOS courses and the
officer course require high levels
of the physical-fitness attributes
except for swimming. Oral communication ability, writing ability
and nonverbal communication
ability are among the attributes

Assessment Opportunities of the 10 Most Critical Attributes

Many

3.0

ATTRIBUTES LEGEND
A. Team player
B. Maturity
C. Judgment and decisionmaking ability
D. Dependability
E. Adaptability
F. Cultural/interpersonal
adaptability
G. Physical endurance
H. Initiative
I . Perseverance
J. Autonomy

2.5
Several

2.0
1.5

1 or 2

1.0
0.5

None

0.0
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

NOTE: 1. Results are based on the ratings by SFAS cadre and SFAS board members of the 10 most critical attributes required of SF.
2. Results of cultural/interpersonal adaptability attribute are based on a subset of these raters.

Summer 1999

25

that are required least. Although

adaptability, creativity, judgment
and decision-making ability, and
planning ability are rated as
moderately required, the medical
course and the officer course
report somewhat higher requirements for these attributes. The
MOS courses require particularly
high levels of reading ability and
initiative. And some attributes
are particularly relevant for a
specific specialty (for example,
perceptual ability for medical
specialists; and auditory ability
and language ability for communications specialists).
Robin Sage, the final exercise
of the SFQC, requires all of the
attributes except swimming and
language ability. Despite the fact
that Phase III requires such a
high number of the attributes,
the SME ratings suggested that
soldiers who receive low scores in
certain critical attributes may
still pass Phase III and graduate
from the SFQC. SME ratings suggested a 51- to 80-percent chance
that a soldier could pass Phase
III even if he had received low
scores on adaptability, creativity,
supervisory ability, initiative,
maturity, and on the set of communication attributes.
This does not suggest that the
soldiers who are graduating are
typically scoring low in these specific attributes. Rather, it suggests
that even if candidates do score low
in these attributes, and if they pass
Phase I and Phase II, there is a
possibility that they will graduate
from the SFQC. In the future, we
may need to investigate whether
high scores in one attribute can
compensate for low scores in
another attribute. For the current
project, however, the results of the
survey of ODA SMEs should provide additional information as to
whether soldiers who have
received low assessments in cer26

tain attributes are actually entering the ODAs.

Predictors of success
The second method of determining the extent to which the
selection and training processes
assess critical SF attributes is to
examine the statistical predictors
of success in both SFAS and the
SFQC. Research suggests that
the strongest predictors of performance in the SFAS are the
physical measures (including the
APFT and pullups)2 and the measures of Army experience (including Ranger qualification,3 combat-arms-branch type,4,5 and airborne qualification6,7).
It is not clear which attributes
are measured by the Army-experience variables, but it is likely
that these variables indirectly
measure an individuals initiative, perseverance and maturity.
In addition, while the APFT is
clearly a measure of ones physical
strength
and
physical
endurance, it may also provide an
indirect measure of initiative and
perseverance, given that soldiers
who prepare for an event ahead
of time and achieve a high score
on it must have demonstrated
those attributes.
Cognitive and personality measures have not been shown to predict success in SFAS. For example,
when a group of enlisted nonRanger candidates were evaluated
using 34 measures (cognitive, personality, and physical-fitness attributes as well as other demographic
information), the candidates APFT
scores were the best predictors of
SFAS selection.8
Statistical results relating to the
top 10 attributes demonstrated
that physical endurance was the
only attribute measured directly,
and that initiative and perseverance are possibly measured indi-

rectly. The relative importance of

the physical, motivational and cognitive predictors of success in
SFAS is illustrated in the chart on
the facing page.
For the most part, the statistical
results corresponded to the ratings
provided by the SFAS SMEs. The
statistical results and the SME
ratings indicated that the physicalfitness attributes are the most
highly assessed attributes in
SFAS, and that there are fewer
opportunities to measure the cognitive and personality attributes.
The statistical results, however,
suggested a lower level of measurement for cognitive and personality
attributes than did the ratings provided by the SMEs.
Measuring personality attributes is more difficult than measuring physical attributes. Two of
the mechanisms that SFAS uses
to measure personality attributes
are cadre evaluations and peer
evaluations. Recent analyses suggested that the peer evaluations
(provided by the SFAS candidates)
are the best predictors of an individuals performance in SFQC.9
The SFAS candidates evaluate
their peers in three areas: (1)
interpersonal skills, which encompass team-player qualities, maturity, and possibly cultural/interpersonal adaptability; (2) leadership, which encompasses judgment and decision-making ability;
and (3) effort/motivation, which
encompasses initiative, perseverance and possibly dependability. If
these measures are such strong
predictors of success in SFQC, it is
conceivable that they could be
given more weight in making
SFAS selection decisions.
The experience variables are logical predictors of success in the
SFQC, given that some of the candidates would have acquired similar
knowledge and skills prior to
attending SFQC. With respect to
Special Warfare

Comparison of Testing and Evaluation Methods for SFAS

60%

LEGEND

50%

Top 25%

40%

25-50%

30%

50-75%

20%

Bottom 25%

10%
0%
APFT Score

ASVAB/GT Score

Cognitive Flexibility

NOTE: 1. Results represent percentage of soldiers selected in SFAS and are based on sample of enlisted non-Rangers from five SFAS
classes in FY96 and FY97.
2. APFT failures are removed from the sample.

cognitive variables, research has

been equivocal; however, it appears
that general aptitude is a predictor
of success among the low-experience soldiers (e.g., E4s with noncombat arms backgrounds).10 Other
than the peer-evaluation research,
there has been little research published regarding the prediction of
SFQC performance based on the
personality attributes.

A-detachment ratings
In our final method, we will survey experienced soldiers on SF
ODAs regarding two questions:
What percentage of new soldiers
coming to SF teams demonstrate
adequate proficiency with respect to
the critical attributes? How difficult
is it for teams to remedy shortfalls
in each attribute, if they occur? We
plan to collect this information as
part of the 1999 U.S. Army Special
Forces Command Field Survey,

Summer 1999

which will be distributed in the

fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999.

Summary
Results of the SME surveys indicated that SFAS provides a high
level of assessment regarding the
set of physical-fitness attributes, a
moderate level of assessment
regarding the cognitive and personality attributes, and a low level of
assessment regarding the set of
communication attributes. Results
from the SFQC SME surveys suggested that nearly all of the 29
attributes are used during Robin
Sage. Results also suggested that
cultural/interpersonal adaptability,
although rated as one of the top 10
attributes, is not required until
Phase III of the SFQC. Responses
also indicated that the set of communication attributes are not highly required until Phase III. This
implies that opportunities for pro-

viding feedback and training to soldiers or for removing soldiers who

are unsuitable in the communication attributes are minimal prior to
Phase III. Examining these attributes earlier in the pipeline might
be advisable, given their importance to performance on SF ODAs.
Once the ODA surveys have
been completed, we will use the
information to determine whether
a modification is necessary. The
results will also indicate whether
we are meeting the current needs
of the ODAs. Then, we will determine what changes will have to be
made in the SFAS and in the SFQC
in order to meet the needs of the
future.

Changing for the future

The 1999 Special Forces Branch
Conference in April included a
symposium designed to determine
how SFAS and SFQC need to

27

change in order to meet the needs

of the future. In dealing with this
issue, we must not only determine
the attributes that future SF soldiers will need, we must also
determine the tactical and technical skills that our future SF soldiers will need. The methodology
used here to identify the necessary attributes could also be used
to identify changes needed in SF
tactical and technical skills.
There are three basic steps in
determining the changes needed
for the missions of the future:
First, we must determine the performance requirements of the
future or changes in the relative
importance of the current performance requirements. Next, we
must determine how these performance requirements will affect
the attributes required for successful performance. Finally, to
ensure that the attributes critical
for the future will be selected or
trained, we must determine what
changes need to be made to SFAS
or SFQC.

Identifying requirements
First, we must determine how the
performance requirements for the
future will be different from those of
today. In the Fall 1998 issue of Special Warfare, Major General Kenneth Bowra and Colonel William
Harris discussed the concept of the
Regional Engagement Force, or
REF. The REF is a proposal for
implementing preventive defense
through peacetime engagement. It
is an interagency operational concept that focuses on military information-gathering activities and
proactive measures to influence the
conditions in a given region of the
world. The REF comprises three
purposes: providing situational
awareness for the region; developing war avoidance; and preparing
the battlefield. A corresponding sol-

28

dier role was identified for each purpose: global scout gathers
human-intelligence information;
strategic shaper executes plans
developed to defuse potential crises;
and operational combat outpost
provides a forward military presence that can shape the battlespace
to provide favorable conditions.
We used the REF concept as a
basis for identifying changes in SF
performance requirements for the
future. According to the ideas
expressed in the REF article and
the discussions held during the
1999 SF Branch Conference symposium on REF, we expect some of
the performance categories to
become more important in the
future.
Specifically, the REF concept
emphasizes a continuing and
expanding role for regional orientation; a greater level of interagency work; and the increasing
importance of diplomacy-related
functions, such as building and
maintaining effective relations
with indigenous populations, handling difficult interpersonal or
intercultural situations, and using
or enhancing language skills.
Operating continuously in the turbulence of the multinational and
interagency environment, the concurrent global-scout, strategicshaper and operational-combatoutpost functions would also create
a greater need for flexibility and
problem-solving. Other performance requirements are expected to
remain largely the same.

Identifying changes
Second, we must link the
changes in performance requirements to the changes in the attributes. Given the changes in performance requirements for the
REF concept, some of the 29 critical attributes may become more or
less important; and new attributes

may have to be added to the selection-and-training processes.

The chart on critical SF performance attributes shows the attributes that are expected to contribute highly to the diplomatic
and problem-solving functions in
the future. For the diplomatic role,
the attributes include language
ability,
cultural/interpersonal
adaptability, ability to motivate,
maturity, oral communication ability and nonverbal communication
ability. For problem-solving, the
attributes include judgment and
decision-making ability; adaptability; and creativity.

Modifying SFAS, SFQC

Third, we must determine the
changes that need to be made to
SFAS or to SFQC to ensure that we
are selecting and training the attributes that will be required for success in the future. In meeting this
goal, we have to decide whether the
change should be made to selection
or to training. Two issues must be
considered: the trainability of the
attribute, and the characteristics of
the incoming population with
respect to that attribute. While
some attributes may be very trainable, others may be difficult, if not
impossible, to train. A panel of six
SME psychologists rated the trainability of the 29 critical attributes.
The chart on the facing page shows
the results.
Physical-fitness attributes tend
to be highly trainable; communication attributes are somewhat
trainable; and cognitive and personality attributes tend to be the
least trainable. On the basis of this
classification, adaptability, creativity, and judgment and decisionmaking ability appear to be the
least trainable, while the set of
communication attributes and cultural/interpersonal adaptability
are listed as more trainable.

Special Warfare

Trainability Ratings of Critical Attributes

PHYSICAL FITNESS ATTRIBUTES
Highly
Trainable

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES
Highly
Trainable

4.0
3.5

Somewhat
Trainable

3.5
Somewhat
Trainable

3.0
2.5

Somewhat
Untrainable

3.0
2.5

Somewhat
Untrainable

2.0
1.5

Highly
Untrainable

4.0

2.0
1.5

Highly
Untrainable

1.0
A.

B.

C.

D.

1.0
R.

COGNITIVE SKILLS
Highly
Trainable

Highly
Trainable

4.0

3.0

Y.

4.0

3.0
2.5

Somewhat
Untrainable

2.0
1.5

Highly
Untrainable

W.

3.5
Somewhat
Trainable

2.5
Somewhat
Untrainable

V.

COMMUNICATION SKILLS

3.5
Somewhat
Trainable

U.

2.0
1.5

Highly
Untrainable

1.0
E.

F.

M.

1.0
Z.

AA.

BB.

COGNITIVE ATTRIBUTES
Highly
Trainable

4.0
3.5

Somewhat
Trainable

ATTRIBUTES LEGEND

3.0
2.5

Somewhat
Untrainable

2.0
1.5

Highly
Untrainable

1.0
G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

INTERPERSONAL ATTRIBUTES
Highly
Trainable

4.0
3.5

Somewhat
Trainable

3.0
2.5

Somewhat
Untrainable

L.

N.

O.

A. Swimming
B. Physical flexibility and balance
C. Physical strength
D. Physical Endurance
E . Judgment and decisionmaking ability
F . Planning ability
G. Adaptability
H. Creativity
I . Auditory ability
J. Mechanical ability
K. Spatial ability
L . Perceptual ability
M. Basic mathematical ability
N. Language ability

O. Reading ability
P. Diplomacy/persuasiveness
Q. Cultural/interpersonal
adaptability
R. Autonomy
S. Team player
T. Dependability
U. Initiative
V. Perseverance
W. Moral courage
X. Supervisory ability
Y. Maturity
Z. Communication ability
AA. Writing ability
BB. Nonverbal communication
ability

2.0
1.5

Highly
Untrainable

1.0

Summer 1999

P.

Q.

S.

T.

X.

29

The second issue is the characteristics of the incoming soldiers,

and how those characteristics may
or may not change. For example,
language ability may increase in
importance, but if future Army
recruits are more likely to be multilingual, then no change may be
necessary. This second issue
requires further research. We do
know that with the militarys difficulty in meeting its recruiting
goals and with the Armys shrinking population, we can expect to
have more difficulty in attracting
soldiers to Special Forces. If the
demand for SF soldiers already
exceeds the supply, then improving
the training process, as opposed to
raising the selection gates, appears
to be the preferred course of action.

Conclusions
Using the current REF concept
as a basis, we can identify two performance areas that are expected
to become even more critical for SF
in the future: diplomatic functions
and problem-solving. Other performance requirements, such as
planning, preparing and executing
missions, and confronting physical
challenges, remain largely the
same.
According to our assessment, language ability, cultural/interpersonal
adaptability, motivation, maturity,
oral communication ability and
nonverbal communication ability
may become more critical in
enabling soldiers to perform diplomatic functions. In addition, judgment and decision-making ability
and creativity may become more
critical in enabling soldiers to solve
problems in increasingly turbulent,
ambiguous and complex situations.
It is uncertain how long the current difficulty in filling the force
will continue, but it is prudent to
assume that it will continue, and
we should plan accordingly. To

30

begin with, we could adopt a strategy that would maximize the

amount of training we provide in
the pipeline and minimize the
amount of selection we perform.
Such an orientation on training
could provide the greatest gains in
areas such as the communication
attributes and cultural/interpersonal adaptability. Although training might not provide as much
gain in areas such as judgment
and decision-making ability, and
creativity, the strategy may be
worth pursuing nevertheless.
Finally, it may not be necessary
that each soldier be extremely
strong in each area (for example,
creativity or language ability), as
long as some of the soldiers on the
ODA demonstrate the required
strengths in these areas. This teamlevel approach is a critical area for
future investigation. The results of
the 1999 field survey will be
instructive in determining whether
there are currently any notable
shortfalls in the attributes of soldiers entering ODAs.
Planning for the future is a difficult process. While it is important that we envision the future
and forecast necessary changes in
the SFAS/SFQC pipeline, it is
also important that we approach
our planning in a calculated, systematic manner in order to prevent haphazard and unnecessary
changes.

Michelle M. Zazanis is a member of

the Organization and
Personnel Resources
Research Unit of the
U.S. Army Research
Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences,
located in Alexandria, Va. Since she
joined ARI in 1991, Dr. Zazanis has
worked on a variety of research projects involving the selection and

training of SF soldiers. She has

worked to develop the training program for SF Assessment and Selection cadre, new peer-evaluation systems for both SFAS and the SF
Qualification Course, longitudinal
SFAS-SFQC databases, and a variety of performance and manpower
modeling analyses. She holds a BA
in psychology from the University of
Virginia and an MA and Ph.D. in
industrial/organizational psychology from George Mason University.
Robert Kilcullen is
a research psychologist in the Organization and Personnel
Resources Research
Unit of the U.S. Army
Research Institute for
the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Since joining ARI 10 years ago, Dr.
Kilcullen has developed measures
of leadership potential, work motivation, adaptability, and personal
integrity that have been validated
for predicting job performance and
other outcomes in the SF, conventional Army, and DA-civilian communities. He has also developed
command-climate and values-climate surveys and administered
them to various Army units. Dr. Kilcullen has written numerous scientific papers and has made several
presentations at professional conferences and to representatives of
foreign countries. He received a BA
in psychology from the University
of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. in
industrial/organizational psychology from George Mason University.
Mike Sanders has served as chief
of the Fort Bragg office of the Army
Research Institute since July 1994.
He and other ARI psychologists
provide research support to the
SOF community on topics that
address the life cycle of the soldier,
including recruiting, assessment
and selection, training and retenSpecial Warfare

tion. He began service in the Army at

Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty
aviation psychologist at the Army
Aeromedical Research Laboratory.
At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit,
his research continued on aviator
selection, screening, training, performance assessment, and retention.
Dr. Sanders has also served as chief
of the ARI field unit at Fort Gordon,
Ga., where his unit performed
research on training-technology
enhancements for Signal soldiers.
He holds a masters and a doctorate
in experimental psychology, with an
emphasis on human factors.

cullen and M.G. Sanders, Prescreening

Methods for Special Forces Assessment and
Selection [ARI Technical Report 1094]
(Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
1999).
6 Ibid.
7 Brooks, Special Forces recruitment.
8 R.N. Kilcullen, G. Chen, F. Brown and
M.M. Zazanis, Identifying High Quality
Special Forces Candidates (Unpublished
ARI research report).
9 M.M. Zazanis, Special Forces Qualification Course Longitudinal Database: FY95FY97 [ARI database] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S.
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences, 1998).
10 Ibid.

Doe Ann Crocker is

the statistician for
the Directorate of
Training and Doctrine, JFK Special
Warfare Center and
School. For the last
eight years, she has managed the
USAJFKSWCS Research Database. She is a graduate of the
Womens Executive Leadership Program and holds a BA in biology
and a masters degree in business
administration from the University
of Missouri-St. Louis.
Notes:
1 T.L. Russell, J.L. Crafts, F.A. Tagliareni,
R.A. McCloy and P. Barkley, Job Analysis of
Special Forces Jobs [ARI Research Note 9676] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994).
2 R.N. Kilcullen, G. Chen and S.T. Simsarian, Selection Measures for Special Forces,
in J.E. Brooks and M.M. Zazanis (eds.),
Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces:
Research and Applications [ARI Special
Report 33] (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences, 1997).
3 J.E. Brooks, Special Forces Recruitment
and Manpower Planning, in J.E. Brooks
and M.M. Zazanis (eds.), Enhancing U.S.
Army Special Forces: Research and Applications [ARI Special Report 33] (Alexandria,
Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1997).
4 Ibid.
5 M.M. Zazanis, G.A. Hazlett, R.N. Kil-

Summer 1999

31

The History of the 1st Special Service

Force Air Detachment
by Ray Cart

lthough much has been written

about the 1st Special Service Force,
the Canadian-American specialoperations unit that served during World
War II, little coverage has been given to the
training and activities of the 1st SSF Air
Detachment.
My association with the Air Detachment
began on Sept. 15, 1942, when War Department Special Orders #250 assigned Second
Lieutenants Jean Daly, Eben S. Lapworth, Orville B. Verdery and
Richard R. Cart to the 1st Special
Service Force, headquartered at
Fort William Henry Harrison,
near Helena, Mont. At the time,
the four of us were assigned to
the 56th Fighter Group, headquartered at Bendix, N.J., and
were flying P-47s. Once we
received the orders, we set out
across country in Jean Dalys
car and arrived in Helena seven
or eight days later.
After arriving in Helena, we met
four other pilots who were assigned to the
1st SSF: Lieutenants Hubbard, Montgomery, Chanpion and Jarrett. We were
evidently their replacements, because the
next day, they were gone. When we reported to Fort Harrison, we were told to go to
the municipal airport and report to the Air
Detachment. Commanded by Captain
James W. Bennett, the Air Detachment had
three other pilots: Lieutenants Charles
32

Raus, Brandon Rimmer and Ernest Kelly.

First Lieutenant Richard V. Brattain was
also assigned to the Air Detachment, but
he was not a pilot.
The Air Detachment also contained
approximately 20 enlisted personnel: Technical Sergeant Robert A. Broadbelt, Staff
Sergeant William H. Beck, Staff Sergeant
Francis L. Daly, Staff Sergeant Leslie P.
Rogers, Sergeant Jack D. Cassini, Sergeant
Norman W. Champagne, Sergeant
Richard L. Culver, Corporal Neno L.
Paolini, Private Harold L. Finkelstein, Technical Sergeant Anthony G. Burich, Staff Sergeant
Howard R. Martin, Staff
Sergeant Robert W. Smith, Staff
Sergeant Vernon W. Webb,
Sergeant Rex E. Fogleman,
Sergeant Wallace A. Cook,
Sergeant Russell E. Waid Jr.,
and Private Fred R. Gray Jr.
There were two other sergeants,
one whose last name was Harris,
and one whose first name was Jake.
The Air Detachments equipment consisted of two C-47s (used for parachute
jumps and for hauling equipment); two
Cessna C-78s (small twin-engine, five-passenger planes used for transporting personnel and light equipment); two Stinson
L-9Bs (small two-seater planes with dual
controls, used for reconnaissance and for
transporting personnel); one L-74 (a powerful, highly stable, high-winged monoSpecial Warfare

plane that flew very slowly and landed

very slowly used for reconnaissance and
for flying in and out of airfields that had
short runways).
Colonel Frederick, the 1st SSFs commanding officer, was a precise but fair man.
He promoted every one of us after we arrived
at Fort Harrison.
The Air Detachments duties consisted of
flying the planes during jump training;
performing reconnaissance work for the
1st SSF; transporting personnel and equipment; and generally making ourselves useful in every way possible. Our organization
was loose-knit. We were required to do certain things on schedule, but when nothing
was scheduled, we were permitted to fly as
often as we wished, in order to maintain
our proficiency. We lived to fly, and we kept
the planes ready at all times.
Once we received a call from the governor of Montana. There had been a mine
accident in his state, and several miners
were trapped. The governor had called in

rescue teams from other places and needed

to get them to the scene as rapidly as possible. He asked us to pick up the rescue
teams at the airport in Billings and fly
them to Butte. We were in the air almost
immediately. The teams were waiting for
us at the Billings airport, and we flew them
to Butte, where emergency vehicles were
waiting to take them to the scene. We
learned later that all of the miners died in
the accident, but we had done our best.
Although we supported the 1st SSF, we
had little contact with the troops, and we
never knew who was in the group. When
the troops were scheduled to jump, we flew
from the airport to Fort Harrison to pick
them up, or they arrived at the airport in
trucks. They usually loaded immediately
into the cargo bay; we took off, flew to the
drop zone, and out they went. When we
were off duty, the troops were generally on
training missions, so even our off-duty contact with them was limited.
At first, the 1st SSF intended that the
Members of the 1st Special Service Force practice exiting a C-47 during
their training at Fort
William Henry Harrison,
near Helena, Mont.

National Archives

Summer 1999

33

Members of the 1st Special Service Force take

jump training at Fort
William Henry Harrison,
near Helena, Mont.

National Archives

pilots would receive the same training as

the troops, and that the pilots would
accompany the troops to their intended
destinations. Our training was supposed to
have included parachute training. But the
plan was later changed, and the idea of
extra training for the pilots was dropped.
We did, however, receive training in handto-hand combat from Pat ONeil, a civilian
judo expert who was hired to train the 1st
SSF. Pat was the best in his field and was
a nice guy. Pat and I became close friends,
and when he married a girl from Helena,
he asked me to be his best man.
All went well with our training until
Dec. 21, 1942. That afternoon, Orville
Verdery and a Lieutenant Mansfield took
off in a Stinson L-9B. They did not return
that day, and the next morning they were
reported missing. We began a search
34

from the air early that morning, and at

about 11:30 a.m., Eben Lapworth and I
located the plane and landed nearby to
investigate. The plane had crashed into
the side of a mountain just outside Fort
Harrison. It had been demolished in the
crash, and both men were evidently
killed instantly. There were no witnesses
to the crash, and I do not know what kind
of mission the two soldiers were on, but
they certainly gave everything that day.
There were no other deaths during our
training.
Early in January 1943, the 1st SSF
traveled east to Camp Bradford, near Norfolk, Va., for training with the Navy in
marine landings. The Air Detachment
went to Langley Field, Va., and waited for
the rest of the force to complete its training. The 1st SSF then went to Fort Ethan
Special Warfare

Allen, Vt., near Burlington, Vt., for mountain training in the Green Mountains and
in the White Mountains. The Air Detachments duties there were the same as in
Helena, and we were based at the municipal airport in Burlington, too. Our planes
were the same, except that we no longer
had the two Stinson L-9Bs.
While we were in Vermont, we received
orders to equip the Air Detachment for
operations overseas. I was in charge of requisitioning, and I acquired a large gasoline
tanker truck, a tractor and trailer, and 10
crates of aircraft mechanics tools for maintaining our aircraft in a war zone. The tools
were sealed in large wooden crates for
overseas shipment. All our efforts proved
to be for nothing. When the 1st SSF left for
Europe, the Air Detachment and all its
equipment were left behind. Of the Air
Detachments pilots and ground crew, only
Lieutenant Rimmer accompanied the 1st
SSF when it left Burlington. Rimmer
remained with the 1st SSF as late as the
Italian campaign, but he was not with it
when it was disbanded Dec. 5, 1944.
After the 1st SSF left Burlington, it
was my job to return all of the equipment
to the air depot at Grenier Field, N.H.
The sergeant there said that the equipment was expendable and that he did not
want it back. The equipment was already
in the depot yard, so I left. I dont know
what happened to the equipment, but I
know I returned it, and my conscience is
clear.
The Air Detachment remained at Fort
Ethan Allen for two months with no duties.
In July 1943 the Air Detachment of the 1st
SSF was officially disbanded, and its members were reassigned to various units in
the Army Air Corps.
The members of the Air Detachment
were highly trained, and they were excellent soldiers. I am sure that wherever they
went, they were a credit to their assignment. I would love to know how they fared.
This, then, describes the Air Detachment
of the 1st SSF. We did what was asked of
us, and when we were released, we accepted our lot with no questions asked. As far
as I know, I am the only member of the Air
Detachment to have participated in 1st
Summer 1999

SSF functions. We respected the 1st SSF

then and now, and I feel honored to have
been affiliated with such a great and proud
outfit.

Ray Cart is president of the 1st Special

Service Force Association. He entered the
Army Air Corps in September 1941. Cart
received his primary, basic and advanced
pilot training and was assigned to Mitchell
Field, N.Y., and Bendix Field, N.J., prior to
his service with the 1st Special Service
Force. Following the disbanding of the 1st
SSF Air Detachment, he was assigned to
the Air Technical Service Command. Discharged from the Army Air Corps in 1946,
he worked in sales until his retirement in
1982. A native of Iota, La., he is a 1941
graduate of Louisiana State University. He
lives in Crowley, La.

35

Special Forces at West Point: Planting

the Seed
by Major Rich Young

ecruiting in the United States Army

and in Special Forces, or SF, is becoming increasingly more difficult
because of three factors: (1) A smaller Army
population due to post-Cold War downsizing; (2) A generation of Americans who are
not familiar with or interested in serving in
the armed forces; and (3) Competition with
the economic sector for personnel who have
specialized technological skills.
Given these formidable recruiting challenges, SF must work harder to maintain
the quality and quantity of future SF
detachment commanders. With these challenges in mind, a small group of SF officers
and NCOs at the U.S. Military Academy, or
USMA, have begun a campaign to educate
and recruit Americas outstanding future
leaders for service in SF and in the specialoperations community.
The USMA commissions approximately
1,000 new lieutenants each year roughly 25 percent of the Armys officer population. The selection process is rigorous
USMA accepts about one applicant in 14.
Those accepted spend four years learning
to become leaders who have character, a
quality required in all SF officers. Cadets
receive a top-rated undergraduate education in various disciplines, undergo rigorous military education and training, and
execute demanding physical training
throughout their tenure at the academy.
The result is a pool of candidates rich in
potential for service in SF and in the spe-

36

cial operations. Although women are not

allowed to join the SF branch, they can
serve in combat-support and combat-service-support roles in SF group headquarters
and in Psychological Operations and Civil
Affairs units.
Because SF is a nonaccession branch,
cadets cannot be commissioned directly
into SF after graduation. Why, then, spend
time and effort recruiting and educating
them? SF needs to win the hearts and
minds of cadets at an early, formative
stage to plant the SF seed that will yield
a harvest a few years later. Providing
cadets with exposure to SF personnel,
briefings, training and classes will motivate many of them to join SF at their earliest opportunity. Cadets who do not join SF
will still have gained valuable exposure
that will facilitate their relationships with
SF when those cadets become leaders of
conventional forces.
Master Sergeant Tony Douglas realized
the potential strategic payoff of a recruiting campaign when he began his assignment in 1996 in the only SF position at the
academy. He, along with a few SF officers,
developed an operational plan to ensure
that cadets would be educated about the
SF branch. The objective of the plan was to
increase the probability that more cadets
would choose SF after completing their initial branch assignments. The SF contingent arranged for cadets to conduct cadet
troop-leading training, or CTLT, with SF
Special Warfare

Progressive Success of the SF Initiative at West Point

1995
5/5 passed pre-SCUBA, conducted by the 10th SF Group at West Point.
5/5 graduated from the CDQC, conducted at Key West, Fla.

1996
10/10 passed pre-SCUBA, conducted by ODA 585 (Master Sergeant Barchers, team
sergeant; and Captain Prairie, detachment commander).
10/10 graduated from the Combat Diver Qualification Course.
2/2 graduated from the Military Free-Fall Course. (Cadets Jason Sabat and Chris
Rose were national intercollegiate skydiving champions.)
4/4 graduated from the SERE Course.
Two cadets conducted CTLT with the 5th SF Group.

1997
12/12 passed pre-SCUBA, conducted by ODA 385 at West Point (Master Sergeant
DeGroff, team sergeant; and Captain John Wheeler, detachment commander).
11/12 graduated from the Combat Diver Qualification Course at Key West. (Cadets Tim
Marvich and Alan Deware were the distinguished honor graduate and the honor graduate.)
5/5 graduated from the Military Free-Fall Course (Cadets Travis Mcintosh, Mark
Weaver, and Neal Gouck).
Four cadets conducted CTLT with the 5th SF Group (participated in JTF-6 mission planning).
Three cadets conducted CTLT with the 3rd SF Group (traveled to France; trained
with French commandos).
Two SF ODAs from the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, trained 1,100 cadets in smallunit tactics at West Point.

1998
18/18 passed pre-SCUBA at 5th SF Group, conducted by ODA 525 (Master
Sergeant Perrigo, team sergeant; and Captain Franks, detachment commander;
and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Gomoluh).
15/17 graduated from the CDQC. (Cadets Matt Powell and Jason Hawksworth
were the honor graduate and the leadership award recipient.)
Two cadets conducted CTLT with the 7th SF Group.
Four cadets conducted CTLT with the 3rd SF Group (local training and CONUS
missions).
Four cadets conducted CTLT with the 5th SF Group (local training and training in
Africa and Kuwait).
Two SF ODAs from the 7th SF Group trained 1,100 cadets in small-unit tactics at West
Point.

1999
Four cadets are conducting CTLT with the 7th SF Group.
Four cadets are conducting CTLT with the 5th SF Group.
Two cadets are conducting CTLT with the 3rd SF Group.
24/25 passed pre-SCUBA run by ODA 535, 5th SF Group.
22 cadets are attending the CDQC.
Two SF ODAs from the 1st SF Group will train 1,100 cadets in small-unit tactics
at West Point.
Summer 1999

37

Cadets Matt Powell and

Jason Hawksworth receive
honor-graduate and classleadership awards from
Major Mark Peasely, commander of the Combat
Diver Qualification Course
at Key West, Fla.

Photo courtesy Rich Young

operational detachments-alpha, or ODAs,

and to attend SF training courses, such as
Military Free-Fall; the Combat Diver Qualification Course; and Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape. The SF soldiers
involved in the training explain to the
cadets what SF does and how SF units
should be utilized, either alone or with conventional forces.
The plan should start paying dividends
for SF soon, as the first cadets to train with
SF become eligible to submit applications
for SF Assessment and Selection. The initiative is becoming increasingly popular
with cadets and with SF teams. Comments
from the cadets have been positive: Professional soldiers, extremely mature, the
kind of soldiers I want to be associated
with, is typical of cadet responses. The SF
teams appreciate having motivated cadets
accompany them on deployments (CONUS
and OCONUS), and they enjoy having the
opportunity to influence future detachment commanders.
With the assistance of Lieutenant
Colonel Charlie King (the former chief of
the SF Branch), the USMA now has a
coded 18A position in its Department of
Military Instruction Course Director,
MS360: Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC). The officer who is selected to fill this position attends the Naval
Postgraduate SO/LIC masters program,
38

with a three-year follow-on assignment at

West Point as an instructor and as the SF
Branch representative.
The MS360 course is a popular elective
with cadets because of its relevance to current events. The course offers a broad view
of SO/LIC and introduces cadets to the various special-operations units. MS360
invites distinguished special operators to
brief cadets and faculty about SF and the
special-operations community. Former
guest speakers include Colonel (P) Stan
McChrystal, former commander of the
75th Ranger Regiment; Brigadier General
William J. Leszczynski Jr., former deputy
commanding general, U.S. Army Special
Operations Command; Colonel Stan Florer,
commander, Special Operations Command,
U.S. Atlantic Command; Retired Command
Sergeant Major Joe Lupyak, a Son Tay
raider; and Command Sergeant Major Carron and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas of the
Joint Special Operations Command.
The continuous USMA recruiting campaign is linked to two key SOF imperatives: Consider the long-term effects and
Ensure long-term sustainment. With our
busy operational tempo, we need to look
inward for force sustainment and preservation. SF is renowned for the exceptional
job it does training indigenous forces.
According to Douglas, Sometimes we need
to look at the benefits of training our own
Special Warfare

forces for the future good of SF. The SF initiatives at West Point are accomplishing
that training. In the rich recruiting and
educational environment of West Point, the
SF initiatives are planting the seed whose
harvest will sustain and preserve the SF
Branch.

Major Rich Young is an

instructor in the Department
of Military Instruction at
West Point. He teaches the
Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine Course and will teach
the Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict Course in academic year
1999-2000. Commissioned as an Infantry
officer, Young served as an Infantry platoon
leader and as company executive officer
with Company B, 1/15th Infantry (Mechanized) in Korea. He served as a company
training officer and as the battalion S3
with Company D, 3/61st Infantry and
with the 2/39th Infantry at Fort Jackson,
S.C. His SF assignments include detachment commander for ODAs 181 and 174;
and S1, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group.
Young holds a masters degree in management from Webster University and a masters degree in public affairs from the John
F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
Notes:
Lieutenant Colonel Gunner Sepp (former commander of Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group);
Colonel David McCracken (former chief of PERSCOMs SF Branch, and former commander of the 3rd
SF Group); and Lieutenant Colonel Al Aycock (former
commander of the 2nd Battalion, 1st SWTG) were
instrumental in steering the SF initiative at West
Point.
1

Summer 1999

39

Special Forces: In Search of a Core

Ideology
by Sergeant Major Edward A. Berg

n January 1999, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command held a commanders conference in Colorado
Springs, Colo. Attendees discussed the
idea of core ideology, as
expressed in the book Built To
Last. 1 Afterward, Major General William Boykin invited conference attendees to share in
a debate regarding SFs core
ideology.
After the conference, I
discussed SFs core ideology with friends in the
10th SF Group, with my
teammates at the III
Corps Special Operations
Coordination
element and with a
number of other III
Corps soldiers. The
discussions
proved interesting. Many of us
initially equated
ideology
with religions
and
philosophies,
and we had never thought
of the U.S. Army, SF in particular,
as having an ideology.
Webster defines ideology as The body
of doctrine, myth, symbol, etc., of a social
movement, institution, class, or large
group.2 According to the authors of Built

40

to Last, core ideology is the combination

of core values and core purpose.3

Core values
The Armys leadership manual, FM 22100, Military Leadership, states, Values
are attitudes about the worth or importance of people, concepts, or things. Values
influence behavior because we use them to
evaluate alternatives.4 Not surprisingly,
the Army is taking steps to refocus on its
core values.5 It has expanded its professional military ethics of loyalty, duty, selfless-service and integrity to include honor,
respect and personal courage. These are
now the Armys values, so why does SF feel
the need for something unique? Do the
Armys values fail to give us the emphasis
we are seeking? Are the Armys values
truly core values? Do all soldiers share
them equally? Did the Army require consensus on its core values? Is consensus necessary for core values to be core?
The Army is an institution that demands
loyalty. In fact, the Armys first value is loyalty. Prove to be disloyal and you could face
swift and terrible consequences. But suppose, because of political necessity, the
Army were to modify its position on loyalty
to its soldiers? Would the change be acceptable? After all, we are adults who understand that such things happen. If the Army
stands its ground in defense of its core values, how far should it go? By the same

Special Warfare

token, what if the Army were to place a

demand on SF that challenged one of SFs
core values? Would we in SF stand our
ground, and, if so, how far should we go? If
we do not stand our ground because of our
loyalty to the Army, then would our value
have been a core value?
After serious consideration, I believe
that SF has four core values: courage, candor, competence and commitment.6 These
will neither compromise the Armys values
nor will they threaten the changing attitudes of our society.
Courage. There are two types of courage:
physical and moral. Our emphasis should
be on moral courage, the courage to tell the
truth not the calculated truth articulated by experts of legalese, but the plain
truth. Truth is the bedrock upon which we
build trusting relationships.
Candor. SF highly values candor. Candor
allows us to communicate our opinion, to
argue constructively, or simply to disagree.
Sometimes our use of candor lacks proper
protocol or etiquette, and occasionally we
ignore the consequence of its misuse, but
largely we do well with it.
Competence. Competence is another area
in which we do well, but we could always
do better. Competence is so vital to SF that
without it, SF would cease to exist. Every
year SF units measure their soldiers proficiency by various internal and external
means, including the SF Commands certification, situational training exercises, and
live-fire exercises. Units also conduct afteraction reviews of their operations.
Commitment. Commitment is an individuals pledge to his nation, the Army, SF, SF
missions, and SF soldiers. Equally important is our organizations commitment to
helping SF soldiers develop into professionals that our own country as well as
other countries will look upon as the best
in the world.
I doubt that SF will ever achieve a consensus on its core values, but if we insist on
trying to formulate them, perhaps the SF
Command should initiate a global mailing
list on the Army Special Operations Command Network, and request that each SF
soldier nominate 3-5 values. The command
could input the results into a database. The
Summer 1999

values that receive the most nominations

would warrant consideration as SFs core
values, and we would instill these values in
SF soldiers.
In an article on SF core ideology in the
Summer 1998 issue of Special Warfare,
Colonel Mark Boyatt wrote that new core
values cannot be instilled.7 But no one is
born with values; we must learn them. I
have served a considerable time in SF
long enough to know that I can instill, or
modify, any value deemed fit into nearly
any SF soldier. SF soldiers attach great significance to wearing the Green Beret. They
come to the unit motivated and ready to
learn. You simply get their attention, tell

SF soldiers attach great significance to wearing the Green Beret. They come to the unit
motivated and ready to learn. You simply get
their attention, tell them what you want them
to be, and they will usually assimilate it or
adapt to it. Those who cannot do either will
eventually get out of the way.
them what you want them to be, and they
usually assimilate it or adapt to it. Those
who cannot do either will eventually get
out of the way.

Core purpose
When I attended Phase III of the SF
Qualification Course, it was my belief that
the core purpose of SF was to conduct guerrilla warfare. That belief was reinforced by
every team sergeant for whom I ever
worked. We have since changed our focus
to unconventional warfare, but it is still
our reason for being. Ask any SF soldier to
name our core purpose, and his response
will be UW.
But if we acknowledge that guerrilla
warfare is only one component of unconventional warfare, and if we accept the fact
that the unconventional attracts those
who disdain traditional institutions (much
to the chagrin of some of our senior mem-

41

bers), then perhaps we should propose a

core purpose.
SF soldiers and the SF organization do
not have the same purpose. The core purpose of SF soldiers is to support national
policy as part of the nations armed forces
by working to achieve tactical, operational
or strategic objectives for which generalpurpose forces are unsuited. The core purpose of the SF organization is to prepare
SF soldiers (1) to be technically and tactically proficient; (2) to be competent decision-makers, whether they are discussing
tactics with the local guerrilla chief, or U.S.
engagement with an American ambassador; and (3) to use critical thinking skills
appropriate to the operational and strategic levels of war.

Core ideology
If you were to ask several SF soldiers to
define SFs core ideology, you would probably get several different opinions, none of
which would be the response you were
seeking. SF soldiers do not believe that
they joined SF because of an ideology. They
joined because they had seen the movie,
heard the song, or read the book. They
come to SF because they believe themselves to be extraordinary soldiers who are
looking for extraordinary challenges. We
give them the challenges they are looking
for. We teach them our doctrine. We help
them become rugged individuals. We make
them savvy in the ways of unconventional
warfare. Then, we adorn their heads with
our symbol of excellence and deliver them
to an SF group.
SF already possesses the components of
its core ideology. But we have not written it
in stone, nor are we ready to articulate it.
First, we must determine our core values
and our core purpose. Then we will be able
to articulate SFs core ideology.
Meanwhile, we must consider some serious questions: Will this ideology work?
Who will decide what is to be visionary and
what is to remain traditional? Will the
architecture remain in place after the leadership has changed hands several times?
What mechanism can we emplace to
ensure that some future commanders per-

42

sonal politics do not realign the architecture to suit his or her own agenda? I
encourage every SF soldier to read Built to
Last, and then to join in the debate regarding SFs core ideology. You make SF what it
is. Dont let someone else determine SFs
core ideology without you.

Sergeant Major Edward A.

Berg is assigned to the 5th
SF Group, with duty as the
sergeant major of the Special
Operations
Coordination
Element, III Corps, Fort
Hood, Texas. He has held a
variety of technical and leadership positions and has served in the III Corps, the
Southern European Task Force, the 7th
Infantry Division and the 10th SF Group.
Notes:
James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, Built to Last:
Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (New York:
HarperBusiness, 1997).
2 Websters Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of
the English Language (New Jersey: Gramercy Books,
1989).
3 Collins and Porras, pp. 221-28 (paperback edition).
4 FM 22-100, Military Leadership, July 1990, p. 23.
5 DA message, DAPE-HR-L, 080/98, subject: Army
Soldier Cards and Tags.
6 FM 22-100, pp. 23-24.
7 Colonel Mark D. Boyatt, Special Forces: Who Are
We and What Are We?, Special Warfare, Summer
1998, p. 37.
1

Special Warfare

Letters
Special Warfare

Other U.S. agencies support

humanitarian demining
In the article Humanitarian
Demining Operations: Relieving
Human Suffering Worldwide
(Spring 1999), Sergeant First Class
Paul Clarke mentions many of the
great initiatives being made in
humanitarian demining. He points
out the U.S. contributions of more
than $246 million in humanitarian
demining assistance since 1993,
and he provides well-deserved
recognition of the comprehensive
range of Department of Defense, or
DoD, humanitarian-demining initiatives conducted over the years.
I was pleased to read such an indepth discussion of DoDs Humanitarian Demining Program, or HDP,
efforts. It is my understanding that
Special Warfare is circulated to a
diverse population who may be
interested in the HDP in a broader
context. I would like to complement
Sergeant First Class Clarkes article by highlighting the substantial
role played by other U.S. agencies
in the U.S. HDP.
In FY 1999, the U.S. Department
of State will provide more than $35
million in humanitarian-demining
assistance from a Congressionallyfunded account called Non-proliferation, Antiterrorism Demining and
Related activities, or NADR. The

NADR-funded program supports

mine-action programs in 30 mineaffected countries around the
world. The Department of State
also manages a separate $28-million program that provides assistance to mine-affected nations in
the Balkans. This initiative is a
joint endeavor with the Republic of
Slovenia. In addition, we provide
humanitarian demining funding
from the Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, which targets its assistance to demining in
support of refugee repatriation.
The U.S. Agency for International
Development focuses on mine-victim assistance efforts through the
Leahy War Victims Fund.
The U.S. Senates action (in May
1999), giving advice and consent to
ratification of the Amended Mines
Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, is also worth
noting as another example of the
progress the United States has
made in this arena. The protocol
does not ban antipersonnel land
mine use, but it strengthens international restrictions on their use
and transfer and establishes technical precautions designed to
address the humanitarian problem
caused by land mines.
An interagency working group,
chartered by the National Security Council in 1993, provides coor-

dination and policy guidance for

all U.S. humanitarian-demining
assistance. The programs objectives are to reduce civilian casualties, allow for the return of
refugees and displaced persons to
their villages and homes, and
enhance a nations economic stability by establishing sustainable
indigenous demining programs in
mine-affected nations. The U.S.
HDP seeks to relieve human suffering while promoting U.S. foreign-policy interests. We believe
that reducing human suffering
and permitting people everywhere
to return to normal, productive
lives is in the interest of America.
Donald F. Patierno, Director
Office of Humanitarian
Demining Programs
Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs
Department of State

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles
they have read in Special Warfare or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine
article. With more input from the field, the Letters section could become a forum for new ideas and for the
discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full
name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM;
JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Summer 1999

43

Foreign SOF
Special Warfare

44

Colombia reports growth

of insurgent militias

The Colombian Administrative Department of Security, or DAS, has

reported a continuing increase in so-called insurgent militias in major
cities like Medellin, Cali, Barrancabermeja, Cucuta and Bogota. Formerly,
the presence of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or
FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, in large urban areas
was associated with logistics support. Now, however, the FARC and the
ELN appear to have achieved coercive and military capabilities in their
own right, and they are able to create disorder and extort money in some
areas. According to Colombian security specialists, each guerrilla front in
the field is represented by an urban cell run by a zone commander and
special commissions. These militias possess money-raising, intelligence,
and shock troop components. The latter are responsible for undertaking
direct armed actions against selected urban targets, including kidnapings.
With the FARC and ELN cells gaining in strength, they have been able to
control a number of urban neighborhoods and city areas, while financing
themselves through extortion, kidnapings and other criminal activity.

Turkey cites Iranian

terrorist acts

According to the Turkish media, a May 1999 assessment by Turkeys General Directorate of Security, or GDS, found deep Iranian involvement in
subversive activities affecting the Ankara regime and the Ankara region.
In addition to supporting Hizbullah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Organization, among others, Iran is also believed to be supporting the Kurdish
Workers Party, which has been waging a war of separatism against Turkey
for 15 years. GDS accuses Iran of being directly and indirectly involved in
arms and narcotics smuggling because of its regional and international
support for terrorism, and its involvement with around 100 radical terrorist groups worldwide. Also, because Iran supplies arms, ammunition, and
explosives to the terrorist organizations it directs or the militants of these
organizations it trains.

Kashmir again center

of military conflict

Kashmir, the geographic subject of two of the three wars that Pakistan and
India have fought against each other, is again the center of military conflict,
according to Indian, Pakistani and international sources. Pakistani insurgents destroyed an Indian Army ammunition dump at Kargil in May 1999
and occupied a number of sites in the area. At an elevation of 9,000 feet,
Kargil is one of the coldest and most hostile battlegrounds in the world. It is
important to the Indian Army because it protects the main supply route for
the Armys forces in the high country of Kashmir, and because it overlooks a
large area of northern Pakistan. The Indian Armys Northern Command
headquarters advises that there is no evidence that the Pakistani Army has
come across the line of control (the de facto border between the two nations
in Kashmir). However, heavily armed infiltrators estimated at 100-300 had
crossed into the Indian sector and occupied some of the heights and the outposts that are not manned by the Indians during the winter. Indian comSpecial Warfare

mandos and three brigades of conventional ground forces with artillery support were able to regain control of most of the sites. Ten Indian soldiers were
killed, as well as an estimated 30-40 insurgents. There have also been
reports of civilian casualties. Reports indicate that approximately 48,000
civilians have been displaced from the immediate area because of the fighting. Indian sources see the current infiltrations as an attempt by Pakistan
to gain a decisive advantage in Kashmir while India has a caretaker government. There are now reported to be at least 44 armed organizations
involved in the insurgency in the Indian sector of Kashmir. Most of these
seek the union of the sector with Pakistan. Since 1989, 24,000 people have
been killed as a result of the fighting. The demonstration of nuclear-weapons
capability by India and Pakistan in 1998 has created great concern about
the potential consequences of any escalation of the current fighting. Pakistani sources report that nuclear capacity is a deterrent against Indias
overwhelming conventional-weapons capability. Notwithstanding the Kashmir dispute, the two countries have already begun negotiations regarding
their nuclear and missile technology, and they are slated to consider a draft
agreement to exchange information on these matters.

Haitian security concerns

increase

Summer 1999

Haitian political exiles living in France are reported by the French media to
have established a committee to seek the trial of former dictator JeanClaude Baby Doc Duvalier for crimes against humanity during his dictatorship (1971-86). Within two weeks following the reports, Duvalier, in a
French television interview, asserted that he is considering returning to
Haiti. Asked about the continuing presence in Haiti of Tontons Macoutes
(Duvaliers private paramilitary group), Duvalier denied such a presence,
but he asserted that there are more Duvalier supporters in Haiti than most
people ever could imagine. In Haiti, President Preval dissolved Parliament,
mayoralties and the Departmental Community Administrative Councils
nationwide on Jan. 11, 1999, creating alarm in opposition parties, labor and
business sectors about the ruling partys intentions. Media sources report
concerns about criminal acts and violent demonstrations that threaten the
future stability of Haiti and the presidential election that is to be held within the next nine months. The Haitian National Police, or PNH, created after
the return of Aristide in 1994, are at the center of these concerns. PNH statistics for April 1-8, 1999 report 20 assassinations, 12 attempted murders
and 86 assaults nationwide. A series of demonstrations in Port-au-Prince
resulted in heavy property damage and the interruption of business activity for weeks. Blame for this violence and disorder has been placed in different hands, depending upon the source. Haitian government sources charge
that right-wing supporters of the coup of 1991 are seeking to destabilize and
demoralize Haiti. On the other hand, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries in Haiti asserts that government authorities have not
attempted to restore order; that the authorities have not prosecuted those
responsible for the violence; and that the violence is a means of avoiding
elections. There are other views as well: An opposition party leader from the
National Peoples Assembly places the blame on rivalries within the domestic politics of the United States. Reported Haitian government responses to
these events and criticisms include the announcement of a National Security Plan designed to ensure security for the upcoming elections. The plan recognizes some of the weaknesses of the judicial and law-enforcement system.
It calls for greater efforts by concerned agencies in fighting corruption,
intensifying police patrols, and securing the streets at night. The PNHs general director points to the dismissal of 500 PNH members and to the elimi45

nation of many paramilitary gangs as progress toward security. Meanwhile,

the PNH has received equipment valued at $200,000 through the United
Nations Police Mission in Haiti. This equipment will help provide security
measures during the election period.

Colombian insurgency
spillover intensifies

The March 1999 murder of three U.S. hostages, presumably by rebels of

the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FARC, in Venezuela (near
the border) has underscored the still-increasing spillover of the Colombian
conflict. Colombian, Venezuelan, and U.S. authorities are investigating the
murders. Overall, a whole complex of related problems has centered on
Colombian insurgent activity (from FARC and the National Liberation
Army, or ELN): drug and arms trafficking by guerrillas and criminal
groups; extortion, kidnaping, and other criminality and violence; and illegal immigrants all of which are affecting Colombias border areas with
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Panama. In addition, the rise of so-called
self-defense groups has added to border lawlessness and bloodshed, as
group sponsors pursue their own, sometimes criminal, agendas. As a consequence, some of these countries have increased their military and police
presence opposite Colombia, a strategy that the Colombian defense minister acknowledges is fully understandable. For Peru, well-experienced from
its own insurgent problems, the increased border dangers from both the
FARC and the ELN have precipitated the deployment of the Peruvian
Armys Fifth Division to the Amazon border area. This division includes
counterguerrilla units that successfully fought Perus Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) guerrillas. In deploying these forces, Peru indicated that
FARC incursions have been occurring since 1993. Ecuador is also considering what measures it should take in light of the FARC activities and the
violence inside Colombia.

Polish counterterrorist unit

to be resubordinated

The Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration currently controls the Operational Maneuver Reaction Group, or GROM. However, this
special unit will be reassigned to the Defense Ministry in the near future.
Military Unit 2305, as it is also known, has been in the news recently, with
reports of some 10 GROM commandos present in the Balkans and in Kosovo, where they have been performing bodyguard duties for William Walker,
chief of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in
Kosovo. The resubordination would be part of needed programs of military
reform and modernization. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Romuald
Szeremietiew judged that in the case of uncontrolled local conflicts, special
forces are gaining significance. He believes that Poland, now part of NATO,
should develop light, highly capable forces like GROM that are capable of
striking enemy targets precisely. Under the Defense Ministry, GROM would
form the basis of a larger special-operations establishment. Elements of the
special unit, said to total some 200 personnel, have been used in at least two
peace operations: Haiti and East Slavonia in Croatia. In the latter, which is
the sole remaining Serb enclave in Croatia, GROM forces under U.N. auspices reportedly captured a wanted war criminal.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Colonel Harold Daniels of the U.S. Armys
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
46

Special Warfare

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

CMF 37 MSG selection rate

exceeds Army average

The CY 1999 CMF 37 selection rate for promotion to master sergeant was
28 percent, vs. the Army average of 16.9 percent. CMF 37 had 13 soldiers in
the primary zone and 12 soldiers in the secondary zone; six were selected
from the primary zone and one from the secondary zone. CMF 37 selectees
were better educated and younger than the Army average. They generally
had a good mix of successful field and staff assignments, and they sought out
leadership positions. CMF 37 promotions are likely to be near the Army
average for the next 2-3 years. For more information, telephone MSG Julius
Storch, CMF 37 manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

1998 SGM selection board

analysis reveals promotion
pointers

The review and analysis for the 1998 sergeants major selection board
revealed the following information about CMF 18 soldiers:
Performance and potential. In some instances, raters, senior raters and
reviewers failed to support their block checks with strong statements.
Utilization and assignments. Numerous soldiers had significant time-ingrade as E8s, but they had little SF team-sergeant time. Successful SF team
sergeants stood out. No other assignment equals this experience. Senior E7s
and junior E8s should strive for SF team-sergeant positions and for other E8
leadership assignments. CSMs and commanders should ensure that E8s
serve at least two years of SF team-sergeant time. In addition to serving as
team sergeants, E8s should serve in other positions at the E8/E9 level that
will afford them at least four years in leadership positions. If possible, commanders should avoid moving E8s from team-sergeant positions to firstsergeant positions prematurely. Staff and instructor positions should be filled
only with senior E8s who have completed their team-sergeant and other leadership assignments.
Training and education. Most of the soldiers records reflected some civilian
higher education. NCO professional development was good in most records.
Soldiers should ensure that their records reflect all civilian education, as well
as college credits available from NCOPD schools. Some soldiers in leadership
positions have not completed the Static-line Jumpmaster Course, which is a
violation of regulations.
Physical fitness. The force is in good physical condition. Much of the force showed
either individual APFT scores of 290 or above, or excellent block checks with
strong comments (e.g., x-mile march with x-lb. rucksack in x hours). Raters need
to put AFPT scores in the block even at the success level and make strong, specific comments that reflect high physical conditioning. Raters also need to show
how the NCOs leadership has improved unit physical readiness.
For more information, telephone MSG Bennett at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

Summer 1999

47

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Army releases FY 2000

Command Select List

The Army has released the FY 2000 Command Select List, or CSL, for lieutenant-colonel and colonel commands. The following SF officers were
selected by CSL category:
LTC Tactical: Raymond Bateman, Kent Bolster, Max Bowers, David Fox,
Joel Johnson, John MacNamara and David Maxwell
LTC Training and Strategic Support: Stephen Boston and Mark Lowe
LTC Institutional: James Burton, James Campbell, and Michael Warburton
COL Tactical: David Fridovich and Mark Phelan
COL Institutional: John Peska
For more information, see the SF branch newsletter at PERSCOM Online.

FY 99 colonel promotionselection board to convene

The FY 1999 colonel promotion-selection board will convene July 26, 1999. The
primary zone of consideration will be officers whose date of rank is July 2,
1994 to May 1, 1995. MILPER message 99-155 outlines the eligibility requirements for above-zone, in-zone, and below-zone. PERSCOM will notify officers
in each zone of consideration. SF branch recommends that eligible officers
check their photos, Officer Record Briefs, and microfiches. Physicals should be
up-to-date, and photos should be current (within the last two years).

Army Acquisition Corps

to conduct accession board

The Army Acquisition Corps will conduct its annual accession board in
November 1999. YG 93 is the target year-group for this years board,
although officers from prior year-groups may still apply. Interested officers
can contact Rick Yager at DSN: 221-3127, or they can call their branch for
more information.

SF Accessions Board
to convene in September

The annual PERSCOM Special Forces accession selection board will convene Sept. 21-23, 1999. The board will consider YG 96 and some YG 97 officers selected for promotion to captain. Interested officers should contact
the Special Forces recruiters for applications, or call CPT Josh Noble at SF
Branch.

PERSCOM announces CF
designations for YGs 80, 86

PERSCOM has released the results of the Career Field Designation Board
for YGs 80 and 86. The results bode well for the future of OPMS XXI and
for the Army. No officer was designated out of the Operations Career Field
who had not requested to do so. However, not every officer who asked to be
designated to a career field other than operations received his request. The
selection to serve in one of the other career fields is very competitive. Only
those officers who had previously served in their requested functional area
or who had demonstrated the potential to do so were selected. The officers
who were selected will continue to serve the Army either in functionalarea assignments or in officer-generalist assignments. A small number of
FA 48 officers (foreign-area officers) will remain in the Operations Career
Field but will still be able to serve in FA 48 billets essentially dual-track-

48

Special Warfare

ing. All FA 39 officers, whether designated branch or FA 39, will remain in

the Operations Career Field, since FA 39 is the only functional area within the Operations Career Field. All FA 39-trained field-grade officers will
remain eligible for FA 39 assignments. However, only officers designated
as FA 39s will be eligible to compete for FA 39 command. For more information concerning career-field designation, preferences, functional areas,
or board dates, officers should contact their assignment officer or check
PERSCOM Online.

Four FA 39 officers selected

for LTC command

The FY 2000 lieutenant-colonel command selection board considered 40

officers in FA 39 and selected four. The FA 39 officers who were selected
were from YG 1982 and were on their first look.

CF designation boards set

for YGs 81, 87, 90

Officers in YGs 81 and 87 will appear before a career-field designation

board Oct. 5, 1999. Officers in YG 90 will have their career-field designation board immediately following their promotion board next spring (June
1-15, 2000). If you are in the window next year, ensure that your branch
has your current addresses mailing and e-mail. Eligible officers should
have received their career-field designation preference packets in June;
they should return their preference statements by Sept. 5.

SF Officer Branch
points of contact

By the end of July, the Special Forces branch will be staffed as follows:
LTC Charlie Cleveland
MAJ Ed McHale
CPT Les Brown
CPT Josh Noble

PERSCOM to re-establish
colonels division

Selection boards
for 4th Qtr FY 99

Summer 1999

Chief SF Branch DSN 221-3173

Lieutenant colonels and branch-qualified majors DSN 221-3169
Captains and non-branch-qualified
majors DSN 221-3175
Accessions and future readiness
DSN 221-3178

PERSCOM is re-establishing a separate division for the management of

colonels, regardless of their branch or career field. Within this division
there will be one assignment officer for FA 39 and Branch 18 colonels.
Major Steve Herczeg (18/39) will have this duty. The division should be
operational around Sept. 1.
Board

Dates

Joint Specialty Officer

Colonel (Army)

June 15-21, 1999

July 26-Aug. 16, 1999

CGSC (Army)
SF Accessions

Aug. 24-Sept. 24, 1999

Sept. 21-23, 1999

Career Field Designation (YGs 81, 87)

LTC Command (CA)

Oct. 5-22, 1999

Oct. 5-22, 1999

Professor of Military Science

Army Acquisition Corps

Oct. 13-15, 1999

Early October 1999

49

Update
Special Warfare

CAPEX, AUSA symposium

highlight SOF capabilities
The U.S. Army Special Operations Command held its capabilities exercise at Fort Bragg, N.C.,
March 1-2.
The exercise included capabilities demonstrations by soldiers
from the 3rd Battalion, 75th
Ranger Regiment; the 3rd Special
Forces Group; and the 1st Special
Warfare Training Group. There
were also displays of SOF weapons,
equipment, vehicles and aircraft.
Members of the 4th Psychological
Operations Group, 528th Special
Operations Support Battalion,
112th Special Operations Signal
Battalion and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment also participated in the exercise.
The audience for the first days
exercises were the soldiers of the
XVIII Airborne Corps. In attendance the second day were civilians from the Association of the
United States Armys eighth annual special operations forces symposium in nearby Pinehurst, N.C. The
two-day symposium was arranged
by the AUSAs Industry Affairs
Directorate and was held in cooperation with USASOC.
General Peter J. Schoomaker,
commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command, told the
symposium audience that his soldiers, sailors and airmen must be
able to cover the spectrum of missions because we are without
question going to see something we
call war in the future. Our real
strength is to be able to operate at
the low-end, no-tech level, he said.
Retired General William Hart50

forces) is being developed in a

series of experiments.
Colonel Michael Mehaffey of the
Army Training and Doctrine Command said that some of the ideas
that will be tested are what such a
headquarters would do for other
high-end, war-fighting units, and
how information-age technology
can be better used in specially-tailored units. He said that he expects
a prototype headquarters to be
operating by the fall of 2000 and
that it will participate with the
XVIII Airborne Corps and the U.S.
Atlantic Command in a major joint
exercise. From USASOC and
AUSA press releases
File photo

The thermal weapon sight.

zog, the former commander of the

Armys Training and Doctrine
Command, told the audience:
Operations like those in Haiti and
Panama may be more like what we
see in the near future. In those situations, he said, SOF have an
important role to play from the
day before the battle through the
day after the battle.
Youre certainly intelligencegathering often in the negotiating business, Hartzog said, and, in
the case of Haiti, working with 21
other nations whose languages,
customs and religions vary widely.
Using the lessons learned in
Panama and Haiti, the U.S. Special
Operations Command is studying
the idea of establishing a standing
joint task force for a variety of missions in each theater. The concept
of that regional engagement force
(a mixture of heavy and light

USASOC units to receive

thermal weapon sight
Some units in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command will soon
begin receiving a new weapon sight
designed to improve target acquisition at short and long ranges.
The thermal weapon sight, or
TWS, is a lightweight, self-contained, day-or-night thermal-imaging device. It can be used with a
variety of weapons, including
rifles, machine guns and shoulderlaunched missiles. The recognition
range of the TWS meets or exceeds
the effective range of all the
weapons systems it supports. The
sight can also be used for longrange surveillance and for command-and-control operations.
The TWS consists of a common
sensor body with interchangeable
telescope assemblies and disposable power sources. Its advanced
display provides excellent brightness with a low power consumpSpecial Warfare

tion. The new sight is designed to

operate in adverse weather and to
see through light foliage, smoke,
dust and camouflage.
The TWS is constructed of
advanced plastic-composite materials that provide strength while
reducing weight. The sight uses a
silent, thumbnail-sized thermoelectric cooler that eliminates the
need for heavier mechanical coolers or gas coolant bottles.
This summer, fielding teams will
deliver the TWS to the 75th
Ranger Regiment, the U.S. Army
Special Forces Command, the
160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment and the JFK Special
Warfare Center and School. Training teams will conduct TWS operator and maintenance training.
Operator training includes the use
and identification of controls and
indicators, mounting and dismounting procedures, operation,
zeroing and sight alignment. Maintenance training includes troubleshooting, and preventive-maintenance checks and services.
The Force Modernization Branch,
Combat Development Division,
USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for
Force Development and Integration, is responsible for planning,
coordinating and managing the
fielding of the TWS to USASOC
units. For more information, call
Johnathan James, chief of the Force
Modernization Branch, at DSN 2396144 or commercial (910) 432-6144.

SF ANCOC conducts pilot

distance-learning phase
The JFK Special Warfare Center
and Schools NCO Academy conducted its pilot distance-learning SF
Advanced NCO Course April 12-30.
Previous resident-only classes of
the SF ANCOC lasted 18 weeks,
with soldiers assigned to SWCS for
the duration of the course. Soldiers
assigned to Fort Bragg in a temporary-duty status incurred significant costs in money and in time
Summer 1999

away from their home station and

their families.
By using computer technology, digitization, and distance-learning concepts, the NCO Academy has reduced
the SF ANCOC resident course to 13
weeks. The remaining five weeks
have been reduced to three weeks of
distance-learning instruction at the
soldiers home station. Soldiers are
still placed on orders to the SWCS
NCO Academy to alleviate any command-and-control issues, but they
will remain at their home station during the DL portion.
The 42 students in the pilot DL
course included soldiers assigned
to each of the SF groups, including
the reserve-component 19th and
20th SF groups.
Future courses for SF ANCOC
will refine the pilot-course concept,
and course material will be updated
as necessary. For more information
about the DL phase of SF ANCOC
courses, telephone the NCOA
course manager at DSN 239-3728
or commercial (910) 432-3728.

SWCS adds light-infantry

POI to 18B training
The Special Warfare Center and
School has added a light-infantry
program of instruction, or POI, to
the training for Special Forces
weapons sergeants.
The POI has been added to the
second phase of the Special Forces
Qualification Course, during which
soldiers receive training in their
military occupational specialty.
The light-infantry POI gives
prospective SF weapons sergeants
who come from non-combat-arms
branches a chance to gain technical
knowledge and experience.
The new POI, taught by Company
B, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare
Training Group, gives students two
days of classroom training in troopleading procedures, operations
orders, the military decision-making process, and offensive and
defensive operations. Students then

spend four days in the Special Operations Simulation Center, where

they focus on company- and battalion-level tasks. Students perform
detailed mission planning and
input their plans into the simulation centers computer, which executes the mission as a war game
during a battalion exercise.
Students then parachute into
Camp Mackall, near Fort Bragg,
for a three-day field-training exercise, or FTX, during which they
conduct company defense, raids,
ambushes and a movement to contact. The third day of the FTX is a
platoon live-fire exercise.

Cambria takes command

of 7th SF Group
Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria
took command of the 7th Special
Forces Group at Fort Braggs
Meadows Parade Field June 11.
Cambria, formerly a strategic
analyst for the Army deputy chief of
staff for operations at the Pentagon,
has held a variety of assignments,
including service as an SF detachment commander in the 10th SF
Group at Bad Tlz, Germany.
Cambria replaced Colonel Ed
Phillips, who has spent 20 years of
his Army career in the 7th SF
Group. Phillips will become the
executive officer to General Peter J.
Schoomaker, commander in chief of
the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Fla.

New PSYOP ARTEP

available online
The final draft of ARTEP 33-72560, Mission Training Plan for the
Psychological Operations Task
Force, is complete. The PSYOP
MTP is available from the SWCS
PSYOP Training and Doctrine
Division on the ASOC internal web
(http://asociweb/swcs/dotd/PSYpage.htm).

51

Book Reviews
Special Warfare

Built to Last: Successful Habits

of Visionary Companies. By
James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras. New York: HarperCollins, 1994.
ISBN: 0-88730-739-6. $16. 368
pages.
This analysis of what makes
great companies great is one of the
best business titles since In Search
of Excellence. It has been hailed
everywhere as an instant classic.
The authors, James C. Collins and
Jerry I. Porras, spent six years in
research, and they freely admit
that their findings devastated
their preconceptions about business success.
Built to Last identifies 18
visionary companies and sets out
to determine whats special about
them. To get on the list, a company
had to be world-famous, have a
stellar brand image, and be at least
50 years old.
Whatever the key to the success
of the 18 companies, the key to the
success of this book is that the
authors didnt waste time comparing them to business failures.
Instead, they used a control group
of successful-but-second-rank
companies to highlight whats special about their visionary picks.
The great myth about success,
according to the authors, is that
visionary companies must start
with a great product and be pushed
into the future by charismatic leaders. There are examples of that pattern, they admit: Johnson & Johnson, for one. But there are also just
too many counter examples in
fact, the majority of the visionary
companies, including giants like
3M, Sony and Texas Instruments
52

that dont fit the model. They were

characterized by total lack of an
initial business plan or key idea
and by remarkably self-effacing
leaders.
Collins and Porras were more
impressed with something else
that successful companies shared:
an almost cult-like devotion to a
core ideology or identity, and the
active indoctrination of employees
into ideological commitment to
the company.
Built to Last identifies other
myths about successful companies:
Talent should be hired from the
outside. Visionary companies find
their CEOs from within Jack
Welch of GE is a prime example of
homegrown management.
Companies should maintain a
conservative approach. Visionary companies rely more on
what the authors call big hairy
audacious goals than on con-

servative practices.
Companies should rely on tight
internal controls. Visionary companies experience some of their most
important changes as a result of
trial and error, experimentation
and luck try a lot of stuff and
keep what works.
Companies should focus on profits. Visionary companies do not
exist primarily to maximize profits
or shareholder wealth. They are
guided by a sense of purpose
beyond that of making money.
Companies should hold universal values. Visionary companies
develop strong values, but they are
not necessarily the same from company to company. It is the fact that
these values exist, not their specific manifestation, that distinguishes visionary companies.
Companies should have a great
idea. Starting a company with a
great idea might be a bad idea
few visionary companies begin life
with a great idea, and some begin
with outright failures.
The comparison with the business B-team does tend to raise a
significant methodological problem: Which companies are to be
counted as visionary in the first
place? Theres an air of circularity
here, as if you achieve visionary
status by achieving visionary
status. So many roads lead to
Rome that the book is less practical than it might appear. But
thats exactly the point of an eloquent chapter on 3M. This wildly
successful company had no master
plan, little structure, and no
prima donnas. Instead it had an
atmosphere in which bright people were keen on seeing the comSpecial Warfare

pany succeed, and unafraid to try

a lot of stuff and keep what
works.
No tables, charts or obfuscatory
language interfere with the presentation and development of
Collins and Porras premise that
visionary companies withstand
fads and tests of time. On the basis
of their research, Collins and Porras pinpoint six characteristics of
the best American institutions: (1)
premier in their industry, (2) widespread admiration from business
people, (3) multiple generations of
CEOs, (4) an indelible imprint on
society, (5) multiproduct (or multiservice) cycles, and (6) pre-1950
roots. The authors findings confirm a few management theories
but contest many others, and they
include guidelines for companies
that are striving for long-lasting
success.
This book contains great qualitative and quantitative research, expressed in simple words. It aptly
explains how complex things
should be put together in order to
build an organization that can
transcend others. The unique
emphasis that the culture of an
organization is also its underlying
strength is expressively relevant to
the U.S. Army.
Chaplain Thomas Murray
7th SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

bility was evident. Graham Brammer has created a vivid portrayal

of dedicated professional leadership and the way that leadership
style affects the inner workings of
a small, elite unit conducting
selected low-visibility missions.
The book describes an extremely difficult patrol conducted by a
five-man reconnaissance team of
the Australian Special Air Service at the height of the Vietnam
conflict. The story reveals the
human face of jungle warfare and
vividly portrays the inner workings of the team, led by Sergeant
Rowan Ashton. The account is
realistic in its depiction of the
teams understanding of, and
reliance on, small-unit-developed
standing operating procedures, or
SOPs. From the infiltration of a
landing zone to the conduct of
reconnaissance activities, the
book continually emphasizes use
of SOPs.
Brammer places great emphasis
on movement techniques, signals,
actions at security halts, and
establishment of rest-overnight
sites. His portrayal of the teams
actions is extremely graphic and

contains a wealth of tips for conducting operations in a jungle

environment.
As with any writing of this
nature, the book contains some
faults in its depiction of some of the
teams techniques. One error particularly noticed by this reader was
the characters practice of smoking
on patrol, a no-no in virtually all
situations.
Those faults aside, Uncertain
Fate abounds with examples of
every facet of the preparation
for, and the conduct of, smallunit patrol activities. These
include issuing the operations
order, infiltration techniques,
recon techniques, setting and
conducting an ambush, and executing a hot exfiltration. Providing excellent food for thought,
the book continually emphasizes that thinking and moving
as one element is the key to
patrol survival.
Uncertain Fate is a must-read for
Special Forces soldiers. It would
also make an excellent addition to
the reading list for students
attending the Special Forces Qualification Course and to all team
libraries within the Special Forces
Command.
CWO 3 Thomas Rogers
USAJFKSWCS
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Uncertain Fate: An Australian

SAS Patrol in Vietnam. By Graham J. Brammer. St. Leonards,
NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin,
1997. ISBN: 1-86448-793-3 (paper).
312 pages. $14.95.
This reviewer approached the
book, Uncertain Fate, with some
skepticism that it might be just
another instance of an author cashing-in on the experiences of specialized units involved in the Vietnam conflict. However, after the
first few pages, the authors crediSummer 1999

53

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army

JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK DT MDM
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 5000

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