Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80 94 2

April 1994

Vol. 7, No. 2

From the Commandant

Special Warfare
Machiavelli noted more than 400 years ago,
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor
more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to
handle, than to initiate a new order of things.
This is as true today as it was then. We, the military, are a bureaucracy, and everything we
know suggests that bureaucracies are hard to
change and, in reality, are designed not to
change. However, we know that bureaucracies
and the military do innovate. The question is,
what process is used? One manner in which the
Army Training and Doctrine Command and the
Army are influencing change and responding to
immediate needs is through the initiative of battle labs.
Battle labs capitalize on the experience of soldiers, technology and emerging concepts to
influence change and make advances in six
areas: doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel and soldiers. The battle lab is not
a lab per se, but an organization of thinkers
and doers, who, with their combined talents,
and because of their experience in the field, are
able to leverage emerging technology and develop concepts that close gaps and make improvements to those six areas.
Currently, there are six TRADOC battle labs,
each oriented toward a particular battle dynamic. They are: Depth and Simultaneous Attack, at
Fort Sill, Okla.; Early Entry, Lethality and Survivability, at Fort Monroe, Va.; Mounted
Warfighting, at Fort Knox, Ky.; Dismounted
Warfighting, at Fort Benning, Ga.; Battle Command, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; and Combat
Service Support, at Fort Lee, Va.
The focus in each battle dynamic is to test
concepts and technology by experimentation,
simulation and actual demonstration. The idea
is to find out if a new technology or concept adds
value. If it doesnt, the idea is discarded with
minimal loss of resources, and valuable time can
be used to explore ideas with more merit. But if
an idea does have value, the system is designed
for a quick turnaround to put it into the force.
The battle-lab process does not negate the need
for combat developments and the concept-based
requirements system; it acts to complement
them.

Army special-operations forces are active

players in the battle-lab system. We have participated in demonstrations and studies involving
terminal-guidance operations, reduction of sensor-to-shooter time lines, and early-entry operations, all in conjunction with the TRADOC battle labs. We will now dramatically expand our
efforts with the battle labs, capitalizing on our
unique experiences across the full spectrum of
conflict, including operations other than war.
Todays world demands unprecedented cooperation among all services. There is a need to
exploit readily available solutions to problems,
develop new systems and concepts, and to do
both with increasingly scarce resources. Battle
labs, staffed with capable, imaginative people
and supported by the Army at large, can provide
an effective and timely means for determining
our requirements. The Army special-operations
community is part of this effort.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Contents

PB 80 94 2
April 1994

Special Warfare

Commander & Commandant

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow
Editor
Jerry D. Steelman
Associate Editor
Sylvia McCarley

Features
2

Peace Operations: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and

Restoration-Assistance Missions
by Dr. Richard H. Shultz

The Organized-Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and

Operations Other than War
by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse

by Dr. Paul A. Goble

Graphic Art Director

Bruce S. Barfield

VE R

IT

AS

ET

LI B

ER

12

The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Operations

by James Adams

14

Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and

the Peacekeeping Environment
by Cols. John P. Abizaid and John R. Wood

21

USSOCOM Creates Clearinghouse for New Ideas

by Brig. Gen. William F. Kernan

22

ODA Planning: Tips from the JRTC

by Capt. Kevin Christie

28

The Subjective Side of Cross-Cultural Communication

by Lt. Col. James K. Bruton

32

Legal Aspects of Civil Affairs

by Maj. (P) Neil Porter

36

Managing Special-Operations Forces Doctrine

by Steven E. Cook

40

Interview: William Colby, former director, Central

Intelligence Agency

TAS

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission
is to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of both established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented in
other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and
should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:
DSN 239-5703 or commercial (910) 432-5703. Special
Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where
copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and
the author.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special-operations units. Individuals desiring a private
subscription should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Milton H. Hamilton
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Departments
44

Letters

45

Enlisted Career Notes

46

Officer Career Notes

48

Foreign SOF

50

Update

52

Book Reviews

05740

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Vol. 7, No. 2

Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

Peace Operations:
Post-Conflict Reconstruction
and Restoration-Assistance
Missions
by Dr. Richard H. Shultz

ith the end of the Cold

War, the international
security environment has
undergone several important
changes. This is certainly true of
the nature and dimensions of crisis,
conflict and war. Will these developments affect U.S. interests and
opportunities abroad? How do they
alter the uses of military power in
general and, in particular, the roles
and missions of the U.S. Army and
other armed services?
These questions are addressed in
former Secretary of Defense Les
Aspins Report on the Bottom-Up
Review, which purports to provide
the direction for shifting Americas
focus away from a strategy designed
to meet a global Soviet threat to one
oriented toward the new dangers of
the post-Cold War world that
threatens important U.S. national
interests. What does this entail?
The Review discerns a major shift
in the security paradigm from a
global to a regional focus. Within
this context, it envisages two categories of regional conflicts largescale aggression by major regional
powers and smaller, often internal, conflicts based on ethnic or religious animosities, state-sponsored

This article is a summary of a

larger paper to be presented later
this year by the Army War College.
2

terrorism, and subversion of

governments.
According to Aspin, these conflicts will affect U.S. interests and
values. Regional dangers can jeopardize specific economic, political
and strategic concerns. However, he
also asserts that there are core values which we have an interest in
promoting abroad. These include
democracy, human rights and the
peaceful resolution of conflict.
Regional challenges, defined in
this way, require two very different
kinds of responses. With respect to
aggression by major regional powers, the Review maintains that the
U.S. will employ military forces to
deter or defeat those that threaten
our interests or allies. This involves
traditional combat missions. What
do these encompass?
Some have labeled them as nontraditional, others use non-combat,
while they have also been designated peacetime engagements for hostilities short of war. The Review
identifies peacekeeping, peace
enforcement, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other
intervention operations as fitting
into this category. It also includes
post-conflict restoration and reconstruction-assistance missions.
While identified in the Reviews section on Building an Overall Force
Structure, nowhere are the post-

conflict uses of military power

delineated or the linkages between
it and other non-traditional missions specified.

Internal conflicts
The kinds of internal conflicts
taking place today are not easily
understood. Neither are the
requirements for their resolution or
for post-conflict reconstruction. A
global survey of current trends in
ethnic, religious and communal violence and the factors causing their
escalation will bear this out. Before
becoming involved in such situations, whether alone or on a multilateral basis, the U.S. will require a
thorough understanding of the historical, cultural and political context. Answers to the following questions are necessary: Why is collective political violence occurring in a
given situation? What are its specific dimensions? At what level of
magnitude and intensity is it taking
place? Answers to these and related
issues are essential before undertaking any of the non-traditional
missions identified in the Report on
the Bottom-Up Review.
In order to begin an assessment,
it is first necessary to locate the situation under examination on the
conflict continuum. The continuum
comprises five operational environSpecial Warfare

ments: stability, crisis, armed conflict, chaos and war. Location on the
continuum will determine the specific non-traditional mission to be
considered.
The situation should be assessed
in terms of several generic characteristics that appear to precipitate
internal conflicts today and which
have to be addressed in the conflict
resolution and post-conflict reconstruction phases. These include cultural, political, economic and security factors. They are indicative of the
difficulties and challenges common
to post-Cold War internal conflicts
and wars.
Cultural factors today center on
ethnic, religious and communal differences. The antecedents of these
kinds of conflict are complex and
can vary significantly from case to
case. They should be understood in
terms of both long-term discontentment factors and short-term precipitants that ignite ethnic or religious
violence. These factors can result in
conflict situations that destroy
many, if not all, aspects of a states
societal infrastructure.
Political factors generic to internal conflict include, in many
instances, the breakdown and disintegration of the political system.
The collapse of authority can result
in a situation of chaos and
ungovernability, marked by the
emergence of increasingly militant
ethnic groupings who eschew any
form of compromise. Such situations are exceedingly difficult to stabilize, let alone resolve. A lack of
stable political institutions ensures
that the post-conflict phase will be
as protracted and complicated as
the actual period of fighting.
The economic conditions resulting
from internal war are directly related to the cultural and political ones.
Urban and rural economic infrastructures are in disarray. There is
serious damage to roads, railways
and shipping facilities for trade and
the import of vital supplies, such as
foodstuffs, medicine and other
necessities. Economic arrangements
April 1994

with neighboring or regional states

are often severed. Access to vital
energy supplies is reduced by a lack
of funds or by sanctions.
Finally, there are serious security
problems that have to be dealt with
in the post-conflict reconstruction
phase. For instance, achieving a
cease-fire and disarming of those
involved is difficult. Likewise, even
after large-scale violence has been
halted, disorder may continue by
random armed bands, organized
criminal groups and other disruptive elements that emerge in situations of chaos and ungovernability.
The security concerns of neighboring or regional powers involved or
threatened by the conflict and its
possible future recurrence must
also be addressed. Finally, and most
importantly, the need to reorganize
or disband and rebuild the security
forces is a major aspect of the postconflict reconstruction period.
Somalia is a case in point of the
complexities involved in communal
conflict and the ease with which
they can be misunderstood. While

it was relatively uncomplicated to

provide humanitarian-relief supplies, resolving the conflict among
the clans and moving to a post-conflict situation have proven quite
problematic for the U.N. and
Washington.

Peace operations
The aftermath of the Cold War
generated a great deal of interest in
peace operations. As was noted
above, the international environment and the causes of regional
instability have undergone significant change, and this has had an
important impact on the scope of
peace operations. However, there
also has been a lack of understanding about the complexities of these
activities.
Peace operations during the Cold
War were synonymous with U.N.
peacekeeping missions. A prerequisite for the deployment of peacekeeping troops was the consent of
the parties to the conflict and a
truce or cease-fire. Among the tac-

A U.S. Air Force

plane makes a drop
of PSYOP leaflets in
Somalia to inform
residents of food distribution points.
U.S. Army photo

tics employed in peacekeeping operations were observations, separation and limited mediation to facilitate and encourage implementation
of agreements between the parties
to the dispute. These operations did
not include the direct use of coercive
military power to compel the combatants to stop fighting (although
political and economic pressures
could be applied for such purposes).
Peace operations, as they are
emerging today, are different from
those that took place during the
Cold War. They are focused, more
often than not, on intrastate aggression and conflict that is the result of
ethnic, religious and communal differences. These situations appear
exceedingly difficult to resolve.
Peace operations for these internal
wars bring two important international norms national sovereignty and human rights into conflict
with one another. Many now argue
that it is necessary for third parties
to violate the sovereignty principle
because of the serious abuse of
human rights in these internal conflicts. As a result, a prerequisite for
Cold War peacekeeping operations,
consent of the parties involved in
the conflict, is no longer regarded as
essential. In fact, in these internal
wars there may be no recognized
political body or government to give
consent. Ethnic and religious conflicts may result in situations where
state authority is extremely weak,
divided or nonexistent.
In addition to being more difficult
to undertake, post-Cold War peace
operations will involve more than
traditional peacekeeping missions.
This was first signaled in U.N.
Agenda for Peace, by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. He
called for an expansion of U.N.
peace operations to include peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace
enforcement. However, the dimensions and the differences among
these missions were not specified
by the Secretary General and have
generated both confusion and disagreement. For example, are these
4

peace operations in the traditional

sense, or do they involve third parties in armed conflict and war situations? Are some of these operations equivalent to a new form of
limited war for the intervening parties? Do armed peace interventions
address the factors that generate
ethnic, religious and communal
internal conflicts? If not, are there
yet other non-traditional missions
that have to be considered to deal
with the post-conflict setting? Are
peace operations political-military
or military-political in focus? These
and related questions have been
raised about peace operations.
What do these post-Cold War
peace operations and nontraditional
military missions entail? A review
of the professional literature and
government documents on the subject suggests a spectrum of missions. These include peace promoting, peacemaking, peacekeeping,
peace enforcement and post-conflict
restoration and reconstruction operations. Each may employ diplomatic
and military means and can be conducted on a unilateral, ad hoc-coalition or international-organization
basis. With respect to the latter,
they can take the form of Chapter
VI and VII actions. What do they
include?
Peace promoting involves thirdparty diplomatic initiatives prior to
or in the early stages of a conflict.
This could also include the deployment of a peacekeeping force to
prevent a confrontation from starting or escalating to armed conflict.
Some propose that a standing force
will be required if the U.N. or a
regional organization is to be able
to conduct peace-promoting operations that involve preventive peacekeeping activities. This would allow
for timely preventive actions
through the rapid deployment of
peacekeepers to the region of potential conflict.
Peacemaking consists of diplomatic programs and initiatives to
end an armed conflict and bring
hostile parties to a settlement

through political means. It will

either precede or take place without
the deployment of a peacekeeping
force. Within the context of the
U.N., this falls under Chapter VI of
the Charter Pacific Settlements
of Disputes. It identifies negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement as appropriate mechanisms
for resolving disputes, and authorizes the Security Council to call
upon the contending parties to settle their disputes by such means.
These measures could be supplemented with the provision of aid,
humanitarian assistance, election
monitoring and related support, as
well as the use of sanctions, blockades and other forms of coercion
short of the introduction of forces.
Peacekeeping pertains to the
implementation and monitoring of a
cease-fire agreed to by the parties
involved in a conflict. It can work
only in an atmosphere in which hostilities have stopped. The parties
involved in the conflict must agree
to halt the fighting and accept the
presence of peacekeepers. The military forces deployed for peacekeeping are, in effect, truce-keepers.
They are deployed when a cease-fire
is in place and serve as an earlywarning mechanism for potential
breaches of the peace. A PKO will
succeed or fail not because of the
capabilities deployed, but because of
its neutrality and the consent of the
combatants.
Peace enforcement, which is also
known as military peacemaking and
peace-imposition operations, is very
different from traditional peacekeeping missions. The context is an
ongoing armed conflict, with no
truce or cease-fire on the horizon.
Consequently, unlike peacekeepers,
peace enforcers are apt to be
involved in combat situations. The
objective is to separate the combatants and impose a cease-fire as the
first step toward conflict resolution.
Peace enforcement is military intervention. It is likely to violate
sovereignty, particularly if one or
Special Warfare

A U.S. soldier from the 7th SF

Group assists civilian law-enforcement personnel in apprehending suspected snipers following Operation
Just Cause.

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

more of the parties to the dispute

opposes the deployment. Peace
enforcers will lose the neutrality of
peacekeepers because they must
fight against those who oppose an
outside-orchestrated cease-fire and
settlement. A peace-enforcement
operation cannot resolve the causes
of the conflict. The problems are
political and solvable only through
political agreements that cannot be
imposed by third parties. However,
peace enforcement can lay the foundation for a settlement by breaking
the cycle of violence.
The foregoing focus on armed
conflict or the potential for it.
Their goal is to prevent violence
from occurring or to bring the
fighting to a halt. They do not
address the complex issue of what
takes place after the termination of
hostilities. Another nontraditional
use of the military, particularly following peacekeeping and peace
enforcement, is post-conflict
restoration and reconstructionassistance missions.

Post-conflict missions
In the future, the U.S. is likely to
find itself involved in the aftermath
of conflict situations where it may
or may not have been one of the iniApril 1994

tial belligerents, but is part of a

bilateral or multilateral effort to
assist in the restoration and reconstruction of the political, security,
social and economic infrastructure.
This is what lies ahead in Somalia
and a multilateral reconstructionassistance mission under consideration for Haiti.
To be sure, U.S. restoration and
reconstruction-assistance operations involve both civilian and military agencies of government. They
are far more than a Department of
Defense mission and, in addition to
including several civilian agencies,
may be conducted in conjunction
with international or regional organizations. Nevertheless, the military has an important contribution
to make.
In addition to peacekeeping and
peace enforcement, two other situations may result in U.S. involvement in a restoration operation.
The first follows the direct use of
force, as in Operation Just Cause.
In the post-Cold War world, following armed intervention, the U.S.
will require a post-conflict program
that contributes to stability and
development. Second, it appears
that the Clinton administration is
developing a policy to actively promote democracy on the world scene.

It is likely to involve planning for

and execution of a post-political crisis plan of support for infrastructure restoration and democratization in former dictatorial regimes
(e.g., Russia).
To summarize, we have identified
four post-conflict or post-political
crisis situations that may result in
the U.S. undertaking a restoration
operation either on its own or as
part of a multilateral arrangement.
To reiterate, these missions would
follow in the aftermath of:
Peacekeeping
Peace enforcement
Direct U.S. military intervention; and
State transition from dictatorship or authoritarian rule.
Unfortunately, U.S. policy and
strategy for post-conflict missions
is, at best, in a very rudimentary
state. This is particularly true for
the various civilian agencies that
have a role to play. However, DoD
is only marginally more advanced,
as the case of Panama demonstrated. It lacked the appropriate doctrine, programs, force structure and
training to carry out such operations in an integrated manner following Operation Just Cause.
How can active- and reserve-component military forces be used for
5

reconstruction and restorationassistance missions? Which of the

political, economic, security and
social challenges that characterize
post-conflict environments can military forces perform? What are these
non-combat military tasks? Among
the most important are:
Help in restructuring and
reorientation of security forces
from instruments of repression to
ones that serve and support elected
government
Basic infrastructure restoration
Host-country transportation
support and the distribution of
resources provided as part of the
reconstruction effort
Immediate humanitarian and
disaster relief
Support for the establishment
of host-country governmental
administration and processes
Communication and informational technical assistance
Liaison arrangements with
international and regional organizations, as well as private voluntary
organizations.
Some of these capabilities already
exist and only have to be expanded,
reoriented and assigned to restoration and reconstruction-assistance
missions. However, others are not
part of the standard operating procedures of the armed services and
will have to be developed. Each of
these tasks has to be examined individually, and its specific contribution to reconstruction operations
specified. Each also should be
appraised in terms of how it can be
configured and integrated into larger bilateral or multilateral actions.
A model of military capabilities for
restoration and reconstructionassistance missions has to be developed that can be adapted for the
particular context in which it is
employed as a planning instrument.
In a turbulent world, escalating
regional conflicts will affect critical
U.S. interests. These situations cannot be overlooked. Responding to
the period following conflict and crisis is as critical as those actions
6

taken to bring the discord to a halt.

If this issue is not addressed, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and
other peace operations will achieve
only a pause in the hostilities.

Dr. Richard H. Shultz is director

of the International Security Studies
Program and associate professor of
international politics at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University, Medford, Mass. He is a
frequent lecturer to U.S. military
academies and war colleges and a
consultant to various U.S. government departments and agencies concerned with national security
affairs. Most recently, he wrote In
the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support
for Reconstruction and NationBuilding in Panama Following Just
Cause (1993), and co-edited Security Studies in the 1990s (1993). Dr.
Shultzs articles have appeared in
more than 20 professional journals.

The OrganizedCrime Dimension

of Regional Conflict
and Operations
Other than War
by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

s U.S. national-security planners seek to define, anticipate or

react to a host of security problems
around the post-Cold War world,
they are faced with familiar, enduring problems as well as with security issues that, in terms of content,
scale and impact, seem strikingly
new. Among these many challenges
is the appearance of an organized
criminal dimension that increasingly shapes regional stability particularly as separatist movements,
terrorist groups and parties to ethnic conflict in Europe, Asia, Latin
America, the Middle East and
Africa have become more closely
associated with organized crime in
a variety of ways.
In security environments where
state institutions have been rendered ineffective by sweeping political change, war, internal challenges
or other factors, well-organized,
cohesive, criminal groups with
access to wealth and the latest technologies have been quick to fill vacuums or seize new opportunities.
Organized crime in the form of
arms and drug trafficking, the
smuggling of strategic materials
and other profitable contraband,
This article is a summary of a
larger paper to be presented later
this year by the Army War College.
Special Warfare

extortion and robbery, hostage-taking for ransom, sophisticated financial crimes, and other illegal activities are increasingly an integral
part of ethnic conflict, insurgency
and civil war.
It is also in areas where state
institutions are fragile, economic
resources limited and interethnic
tensions high, that criminal activity
founded primarily on ethno-national linkages is particularly disruptive. The appearance of armed or
paramilitary groupings acting in
support of criminal agendas and
organized along ethno-national
lines is a phenomenon associated
with a number of areas. Clearly,
too, criminal charges against
minorities in homelands and abroad
are used also to discredit the aspirations of ethno-national groups and
to justify repressive measures by
governments.
Legal and illegal immigration
(facilitated by people smuggling
efforts on several continents) is taking place at an unprecedented rate,
as are large refugee and population
dislocations associated with internal
conflict and political or economic
disruption. This movement of peoples and the creation of ethnic diasporas in many areas of the world
have facilitated the operation of conflict-associated organized criminal
(or terrorist) activities, and provided
external bases for rendering financial and other support to factions in
ethno-national homelands.
Some security problems that had
in the past been driven by ideological, political or other imperatives
now have strong criminal motivations as well. For example, the disappearance of the USSR, the socialist bloc and regional surrogates has
removed immediate sources of
April 1994

financing, arms, training, safe

havens and other support for client
states, insurgencies and terrorist
organizations. To a growing extent,
organized crime is providing an
alternative means of support, as
well as a seductive source of personal, criminal profit that transforms ideological or political fervor
and changes the ways in which factions respond to peace initiatives,
incentives, coercion, successes and
setbacks.
The organized-crime dimension of
regional instability has implications
for the U.S. military concept of
operations other than war, or
OOTW, which comprises support to
insurgency and counterinsurgency
operations and a range of contingency operations. Because of its
effectiveness, success and impact
and the extent to which the illegal
diversion of resources, directed
criminal violence, and other criminal undertakings may undermine
the effectiveness or intent of U.S.
programs organized crime is a
more powerful part of the overall
environment in which OOTW take
place.
In this regard, organized crime is
a factor for U.S. military planners
evaluating the goals, motivations
and financing of belligerent forces;
assessing the security of U.S. military bases, deployed forces and
many aspects of their operations;
determining the type and quality of
military, law-enforcement and other
interagency planning and cooperation deemed desirable and feasible;
identifying optimum levels of support and humanitarian assistance,
as well as its most effective application; planning and executing postconflict activities; and developing
campaign planning for foreign secu-

rity-assistance programs. Overall,

given specific examples as diverse
as states of the former Yugoslavia
and USSR; Turkey and Spain;
Colombia and Peru; Sri Lanka and
India; Lebanon and Syria; and a
host of others, a careful consideration of the impact of organized
crime on OOTW assumptions, planning and execution is a clear
requirement in a threat environment that is still rapidly evolving.

Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. is a senior

analyst with the Foreign Military Studies
Office, U.S. Army
Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and research coordinator for that offices Low-Intensity
Conflict Section. He served previously with the Defense Intelligence
Agency as chief of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Strategic Operations
Branch, and in a number of other
assignments dealing with combinedarms operations. Dr. Turbivilles
work has been widely published in
the U.S. and abroad. He is the editor for the international journal,
Low-Intensity Conflict and Law
Enforcement, which addresses a
range of transnational and other
security issues associated with operations other than war and militarylaw enforcement interaction.

Ethnicity as Explanation,
Ethnicity as Excuse
by Dr. Paul A. Goble

thnicity or more precisely,

its political expression, ethnonationalism has become
an all-purpose explanation for analysts who seek to comprehend postCold War conflicts under a single
rubric. And it has become an allpurpose excuse for political elites
who, reflecting to the wishes of populations eager to rid themselves of
foreign commitments, seek to justify
a retreat from the world by suggesting that ethnic conflicts are by their
very nature insoluble.
Neither of these uses of the term
is justified. Ethnonationalism certainly does not explain all the conflicts in the world. In many cases, it
is not involved; and even where it
is, it is never the only factor. And it
does not excuse Western governments from action because ethnic
conflicts, like all other kinds, can be
ameliorated or even ended by various mechanisms that already exist.
To say this is not to argue for
intervention in any particular conflict or in any particular way, but
rather to suggest that until we
understand both the nature of ethnicity and its role in conflicts, we
will remain handicapped in both
our analyses and our choices about

This article is a summary of a

larger paper to be presented later
this year by the Army War College.
8

actions. The purpose here is not to

provide any final set of guidelines
but rather to advance the discussion by focusing on three main
issues: first, the nature and variety
of the latest flowering of ethnonationalism; second, the kinds of ethnic conflict such ethnic assertiveness can lead to; and third, the likely outcomes of such conflicts and, in
particular, the role of third parties
in promoting their resolution.

A new age of nationalism?

During the Cold War, Western
and Soviet analysts assumed that
the world or at least Europe
had moved beyond nationalism,
that ethnicity was a survival of the
past that would soon be overcome.1
But the dramatic role of nationalism, both in the destruction of the
Soviet monolith and in the conflicts
that have followed, has led many
who denied any role for ethnonationalism in the past to make the
equal and opposite error that ethnonationalism is the only force
worth speaking about in the current
environment. To get beyond such
simplistic and extreme judgments,
we need to consider why there has
been this new upsurge in nationalism, why it may be more limited
than many people now assume, and
what forms of ethnonationalism are

in fact out there now.2

Perhaps the best explanation for
the new rise of nationalism the
notion that a human community
defined by actual or assumed primordial ties must be recognized as
deserving special treatment, autonomy or even independence is that
many of the forces which led to a
rise of nationalism in the 18th and
19th centuries have exact and even
more powerful analogues in the current environment:
First, nationalism, both then
and now, represents an effort to
replace a discredited alternative
model of political integration, in
this case, the collapse of Marxism.
Second, the vast expansion of
media penetration across state borders reduces the legitimacy of any
stratum between the community
and its participation in the international media in the 18th century
because of the rise of public education and the penny press; now, by
the globalization of CNN.
Third, the increasing importance of the state to society makes
control of the state an ever more
important issue to the various population groups under its control.
The 18th century saw a dramatic
expansion in the state sector; so did
the late 20th century.
Fourth, the increasing internationalization of economic life proSpecial Warfare

duces migration flows that create

new minorities and greater crosscultural awareness of differences in
status and economic position. Both
periods saw increasing contacts and
comparisons between groups: no
one wants to live in a hovel once
someone else has built a palace.
Fifth, the increasing rapidity of
social change has increased the
level of alienation among virtually
all populations. That, in turn, has
spurred the search for new communities, the most available and
apparently stable of which are primordial ones that we usually group
under the rubric ethnic.
Because these forces already
affect much of the world, there has
been growing concern that they and
the ethnonationalism they produce
will soon overwhelm the capacity of
the international system to cope.
But there are three good reasons to
assume that this will not happen.
First, most of the worlds 6,500 ethnic communities are too small or
are too satisfied to engage in political life to become politicized. Second, the power of ethnicity is undercut by other group loyalties which
in many cases are far stronger than
ethnic ones. Thus, while my ethnic
attachment may be very important
to me, my political or professional
identities may override it in my
choice of action. And third, the
place where ethnicity has exploded
the most is precisely where the
state manipulated ethnicity for so
long, namely the former Soviet
Union and the former Yugoslavia.
This last point is particularly
important. The Soviets and, following their lead, the Yugoslavs, politicized, territorialized and arranged
into a hierarchy the ethnic groups
under their control, thus increasing
the salience of ethnicity and
decreasing the importance of other
collective memberships of the populations under their control. Thus, it
should come as no surprise that in
these two regions, there is a general
confusion about the difference
between ethnicity and citizenship
April 1994

and even between language and

ethnicity.3 Consequently, we should
stop blaming the victims of this policy and recognize that this peculiar
pattern is unlikely to be repeated
elsewhere.
Because these impulses have
affected a variety of communities
whose current status, size and location vary enormously, they have
produced a wide variety of ethnonationalisms. Perhaps the following
groupings can organize our thinking
before we turn to the relationship
between ethnonationalism and ethnic conflict. In the European context, there are five obvious types of
ethnonationalism:
Classical nationalism, the
striving of a previously submerged
community to achieve state
independence;4
Irredentist nationalism, the
demand that borders be rectified to
take into account ethnic or cultural
divisions;5
Unexpected nationalism, the
use of ethnic symbols to build political authority in a state whose
independence occurred independently of the efforts of its elites and
populations;6
Xenophobic nationalism, the
attacks against ethnically differentiated groups who may live within a
larger community in order to relieve
tensions and to reinforce the psychic borders of the larger group;7
and
Retrenchment nationalism, the
articulation of an identity for a
group that has lost its imperial possessions and is unsure of its psychological barriers. The model is postOttoman Turkey; the current problem is Russia.8
In all these cases, it should be
noted, ethnicity serves as an instrumental value, as a resource used by
elites and masses to advance their
interests, and not simply as a
source of virtual identity. And to
the extent that this is true, ethnic
mobilization and countermobilization should be analyzed just as
other mobilization and countermo-

bilization tools routinely are. Unfortunately, that has seldom been the
case to date.

Conflict classifications
Before attempting to classify ethnic conflicts, three preliminary
observations are in order. First, not
all ethnic assertiveness leads to ethnic conflict most, but not all.
Moreover, in some cases, it may
even lead to the amelioration of conflicts, ethnic and otherwise, by
resolving issues that had agitated
society. Second, ethnicity is in no
case the only issue involved in such
conflicts it may frame them,
power them and even justify them,
but ethnicity is about access to
resources, psychic and otherwise
and it is not necessarily divorced
from the state. (Indeed, much of the
discussion about ethnic conflict is
actually about the deterioration of
state authority rather than about
ethnonationalism per se. This is
particularly the case in discussions
about Bosnia and about several of
the former Soviet republics.) In that
sense, it is a filter as well as a
weapon. And third, ethnic conflicts
are even more varied than the kinds
of ethnic groups described above.
Among the ways that ethnic conflicts can be classified are by the following criteria:9
Goals of the group involved:
irredentism, state independence,
domestic stability through the creation or maintenance of ethnic solidarity, mobilization of populations
for national efforts including war,
conflicts over resources, expulsion
of minorities, and assertion of a
comfort level for members of the ingroup;
Kinds of participants in the conflicts: communal, individual, state
vs. minority, state vs. state, and by
whether outside groups are
involved, either in order to use the
competitors as proxies for larger
goals or to end the conflict; and
Intensity of the conflict, ranging
from latest interpersonal hostility
9

to communal violence to interstate

war.
Cutting across all these divisions
is the issue of the importance of the
conflict to outsiders. Sometimes a
conflict may be important because
of who is involved; at other times
because of the potential role of
other outsiders; and at still other
times, because of its intensity or
propensity to spill over or snowball
into other, potentially more serious
conflicts. In discussing any particular ethnonational conflict, we need
to be extremely precise as to what
we mean and what we care about
just as we would for conflicts of any
other type.

Outcomes and strategies

These observations about the
nature of ethnicity and the nature
of ethnonational conflict allow us to
confront the question of how we
should react. Before doing that we
need to make yet again three preliminary observations. First, ethnic
conflicts are not by their nature
either rational or irrational, and
nonethnic conflicts are not necessarily rational. Irrational behavior
can be driven by nonethnic means,
and rational behaviour may be dictated by ethnic considerations. Second, ethnonational conflicts are
never simply the result of ancient
ethnic animosities. This phrase
may please editorialists and pundits, but it seriously distorts reality.
Anyone who asserts that a conflict
is the product of these must explain
why there has not always been
fighting at a particular level of
intensity. Once that explanation is
made, it becomes obvious that ethnonational conflicts are powered by
immediate as well as longstanding
feelings and conclusions. Third, precisely because both ethnic and
nonethnic issues are invariably
involved, outsiders considering
what to do should not forget all the
means that have worked on past
conflicts that were traditionally if
not always accurately described as
10

United Nations photo

A United Nations patrol passes an area damaged by shelling during ethnic

conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
nonethnic.
Because we can assume that we
will seek to get involved only in
those conflicts that we deem for our
own reasons to be significant, we
can usefully group them into the
following four-part schema:
Conflicts where ethnic involvement is low relative to the importance of other factors and the intensity of the conflicts is also low. In
such cases, we would generally look
to the local authorities to act.
Conflicts where ethnic involvement is high relative to the importance of other factors and the intensity of the conflicts is low. In such
cases, we would also tend to rely on
local authorities or international
human-rights organizations.
Conflicts where ethnic involvement is low relative to the importance of other factors and the intensity of the conflicts is high. In such
cases, our strategies should be chosen primarily from those used for
conflicts we would describe as
nonethnic.
Finally, conflicts where ethnic
involvement is high relative to
other factors and the intensity of
the conflict is high as well. In these

cases which are usually the ones

we are referring to when we speak
of ethnonational conflicts we
must employ strategies drawn up
for other kinds of conflicts and specific strategies for ethnonational
conflicts.
There are five important categories of strategy that can be
employed to deal with the ethnic
dimension of conflicts of the last
type:
Changing international support
of and tolerance for ethnic assertiveness. One of the major reasons for
greater amounts of ethnic assertiveness in the period after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
is that the international community
dramatically changed its approach
for rewarding ethnic assertiveness.
Prior to that time, the Wests
approach to such conflicts was to
oppose secession, as in Biafra, and
that opposition by itself sent a signal that ethnic assertiveness would
not pay. This observation also
applies to irredentism, communal
violence and other forms of ethnonational conflict. Sanctions may
or may not work, but a clear statement that such actions will not be
Special Warfare

rewarded will serve as a constraint.

Using countermobilization techniques. This can involve providing
supports for other kinds of identities in the situation or introducing a
new outside threat that will dwarf
existing divisions. An example is
economic aid: If it is carefully targeted, it can reduce ethnic conflict;
otherwise, it will only make the situation worse.
Removing irritants or making
compromises. Some conflicts can be
resolved by doing one or the other.
Ethnic conflicts are not forever.
They emerge, intensify and disappear. All the resolutions may not be
pretty, and they are certainly not
what everyone would like, but the
conflicts themselves will eventually
disappear.
Containing the conflict and letting the two or more sides wear
themselves out. Perhaps the most
important strategy in dealing with
ethnic conflicts is to prevent outsiders from becoming involved,
either through alliances or the supply of arms and other aid, thus
making the conflicts more serious.
Using military force. In many
ethnic conflicts, this is the ultimate
answer. Sometimes, as when the
conflict is communal, military force
must do more than end the conflict,
it must engage in state-building.
Other times, when the conflict is
state-to-state, this need not be the
case. Sometimes limited force can
provide the breathing room for the
other strategies outlined above to
work.
Obviously, ameliorating or ending
ethnic conflicts is not going to be
easy, but neither is this task beyond
our means. We may decide that any
particular conflict is unimportant,
and we may be right. But in thinking about such conflicts, especially
in Europe, we should remember
Winston Churchills description of
the world following World War I:
To the faithful, toil-burdened
masses the victory was so complete
that no further effort seemed
required. Germany had fallen, and
April 1994

with her the world combination that

had crushed her. Authority was dispersed; the world unshackled; the
weak became the strong; the sheltered became the aggressive; the contrast between victors and vanquished tended continually to
diminish. A vast fatigue dominated
collective action. Though every subversive element endeavored to assert
itself, revolutionary rage like every
other form of psychic energy burnt
low. Through all its five acts the
drama has run its course; the light
of history is switched off, the world
stage dims, the actors shrivel, the
chorus sinks. The war of the giants
has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.10
Churchills words were written in
1929. They capture as in a distant
mirror our own mood and inclinations now. They were written only
four years before Hitler came to
power and a decade before the
world was plunged into general
war.

Dr. Paul A. Goble is

a senior associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington,
D.C., working on the
problems of the postSoviet successor states. Before joining the Endowment in January
1992, he served as desk officer for
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and
as special adviser on Soviet nationality problems to the assistant secretary for European affairs at the U.S.
Department of State. Earlier he
worked as director of research at
Radio Liberty, as special assistant
for Soviet nationalities in the State
Departments Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, and as a Soviet
affairs analyst at the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service and
the Central Intelligence Agency.

nic Mobilization, Annual Review of Sociology, 9 (1983): 355-374; and Francois Nielsen,
Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in
Modern Societies, American Sociological
Review 50 (1985):133-149.
2 For a fuller discussion of the issues
raised in this section, see Paul A. Goble, A
New Age of Nationalism, in Bruce Seymour
II, ed., The Access Guide to Ethnic Conflicts
in Europe and the Former Soviet Union
(Washington, D.C., 1994), pp. 1-8, and the
recommended readings on pp. 9-16.
3 For an especially egregious example of
this, see the report of the Gorbachev Foundation, Russkie v blizhnem zarubezhe,
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 September 1993. Cf.
the analysis of it in Paul A. Goble, Can We
Help Russia to be a Good Neighbor?
Demokratizatsiya, forthcoming. On the
broader process of politicization of ethnicity
and the creation of nationality in the Soviet
case, see Paul A. Goble, Gorbachev and the
Soviet Nationality Problem, in Maurice
Friedberg and Heyward Isham, eds., Soviet
Society Under Gorbachev (Armonk, N.Y.,
1987), pp. 76-100.
4 For a useful discussion of this kind, see
Isaiah Berlin, Nationalism: Past Neglect
and Present Power, Partisan Review 46
(1979):337-358.
5 See J. Gottman, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesville, Va., 1973).
6 See Paul A. Goble, The 50 Million Muslim Misunderstanding, Chanteh 1 (1993):
36-39.
7 On this phenomenon, see Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, Us and Them:
The Psychology of Ethnonationalism (New
York, 1987), esp. p. 87 ff.
8 See Paul A. Goble, Russias Extreme
Right, The National Interest 33 (Fall
1993):93-96.
9 See the various works of Horowitz, Rothschild and Royce for surveys of the various
ways ethnic activism can be categorized.
10 Winston Churchill, The Aftermath (New
York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1929), p. 17.

Notes:
1 On these assumptions and their limitations, see Susan Olzak, Contemporary Eth-

11

The Role of the Media

in Peacekeeping Operations
by James Adams

eacekeeping and warfare

today are taking place in the
world the like of which we
have never seen. All the old certainties have disappeared: there is no
Cold War, no superpower rivalry to
provide both tension and stability.
Instead a series of relatively small
crises have emerged unexpectedly.
These have provided some fresh
challenges for the policy-makers,
the politicians and the media that
report on them.
But it is not just the end of the
Cold War that has transformed the
debate. The end of that era has heralded a new generation in the political leadership in many democratic
countries and has consolidated
changes that have been under way
for some time in the media. Consider this: The President of the United
States is 46, the Prime Minister of
Britain is 50. The average age of
staff working in the White House is
around 33. The average age of staff
on my own newspaper has fallen in
the past 10 years from around 45 to
30 as we struggle to reach the
younger readers we need to win the
fierce battle for circulation.
This means that many of the
political leaders and most of their
This article is a summary of a
larger paper to be presented later
this year by the Army War College.
12

advisers have no concept of the

political and personal consequences
of warfare. There have been no
world wars such as those that so
scarred our parents and grandparents. Thus there is no real conception of the horrors of wars. In the
media, there are very few reporters
and editors who have covered conventional conflicts. In 10 years of
reporting on wars, revolutions and
terrorism around the world, I have
covered only two conflicts that
might be considered conventional:
the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War
against Saddam Hussein. The balance was made up by a large number of smaller wars, low-intensity
conflicts and acts of terror.
It is hardly surprising, then, that
the current generation that is leading the media and politics have a
very limited vision of war and the
capability of the armed forces. It is
a view formed by their own experience, which is confined almost
entirely to what they have seen on
the television and in the movies,
and to some extent, what they have
read in the newspaper. This is a
small world, where action is concentrated on human drama, the big picture writ small so that it is understandable to the average person. It
is a world where attention spans
are short and where casualties
should be counted in single figures

to be acceptable.
It was striking in both the Falklands and the Gulf War that casualties were extraordinarily light.
Even so, every single one was analyzed and agonized over and investigated in an attempt to find unrealistic certainties in the chaos of war.
It is that drive to minimize loss of
life that is going to be a fact of decision-making for the foreseeable
future.
Reducing casualties is, of course,
a laudable goal. But death and
injury are unfortunate consequences of committing military
forces to conflict. Soldiers are
trained to kill people, and yet there
seems to be a broad view that crisis
management today can somehow be
handled without loss of life.
The media have played a large
part in developing this view. The
media always demand excellence in
others, and in terms of crisis management, that translates as a successful resolution with minimum
cost to our side. In the past 10
years, the way the media form opinion has changed dramatically. CNN
is everywhere, and where CNN
goes, all the other media outlets
swiftly follow. Censorship today is
virtually impossible, with backpack
satellite-broadcast systems and
telephones that allow reporters to
file their copy from anywhere in the
world. That access gives the news
an immediacy that drives the political process in ways that can be very
unhealthy, particularly when so
many of the decision makers have
no experience of the world about
which they are making decisions of
life and death.
A century ago, a single incident
that was deemed to impinge on
national sovereignty would provoke
an immediate and violent act of
retribution. When General Gordon
was killed in Khartoum, the British
dispatched a punitive expedition
Special Warfare

that years later punished the perpetrators of the act. Today, when the
body of a single American is
dragged through the streets of
Mogadishu, the American government reverses its foreign policy and
begins a withdrawal from the country. This momentous change in the
way foreign policy is handled bodes
ill for the future.
With an attention span so short
and a world view so limited, it is
difficult to conceive how whatever the good intentions on paper a
consistent policy for crisis management can be developed by the
worlds leading democracies. Is it
conceivable that the American
administration would send any
troops to a similar environment?
Under the present circumstances,
the answer is no.
War, peacekeeping and crisis
management have never been about
consensus and opinion polls. These
may have been an influence, but
they have never been paramount.
The successful prosecution of any
military operation is about leader-

ship, about a strength of resolve

that allows principle and conviction
to ride over the often ill-formed
media criticism and the snapshot
reporting.
But as we look around the world
today, it is difficult to find the leadership qualities that successful crisis management demands. With
this lack of resolve, it is difficult to
see just what future peacekeeping
has. The Pentagon and all the other
defense ministries around the world
have been war-gaming the almost
infinite number of scenarios that
the current unstable world can produce. There is no doubt that the
military can change its tactics and
train its people. But what will persuade this new generation of leaders in the media and politics to
understand that peace has a price?
I fear there are not enough politicians with the courage to pay the
price or enough members of the
media who respect the bold decisions that may cost lives. Instead,
there is a drive for quick, easy solutions to complex problems, and if

those easy solutions do not work,

then there appears to be no will to
find the real answers.

James Adams, as
the Washington
Bureau chief of the
London Sunday
Times, is responsible
for the newspapers
reporting in the United States. He reports on American
politics, international relations and
intelligence matters. Before taking
up his current post, he was managing editor of The Sunday Times and
the newspapers defense correspondent. He has reported on wars and
revolutions all over the world and is
familiar with the operation of conventional armies and guerrilla
forces, which he has seen at first
hand. He is the author of 11 books.

Satellite-broadcast systems give

modern news coverage an access
and an immediacy that can drive
the political process.

April 1994

13

Preparing for Peacekeeping:

Military Training and
the Peacekeeping
Environment
by Cols. John P. Abizaid and John R. Wood

he incredibly quick and decisive victory in the Gulf War vindicated the warfighting doctrine and
peacetime training strategy of the
United States Army. The Army,
designed to fight and defeat the
Soviets on the plains of Central
Europe, found its tactics, equipment
and organization were more than a
match for a non-Soviet foe.
Yet since the war in the Gulf, the
Army has found itself engaged in
operations in Kurdistan and Somalia that tested not only its ability to
fight but also its ability to conduct
security operations in support of
humanitarian-relief activities. As
the worlds only military superpower, the United States finds itself
called upon more and more to provide a full range of combat, combatsupport and combat-service-support
forces to help conduct peacekeeping
operations around the world.
Many Americans regard peacekeeping as a new mission for our
armed forces. But in the Dominican
Republic in 1965, in Lebanon in

Cols. Abizaid and Wood examined

peacekeeping activities and training
of the U.S. and five other countries
armed forces during 1992-1993.
Their views do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department
of the Army, Department of Defense
or the U.S. government.
14

1958 and 1983, with the Multinational Force and Observers in the
Sinai from 1981 to the present, in
Kurdistan in 1991 and in Somalia
today, U.S. soldiers have deployed
into the highly politicized arena of
peacekeeping. Often these forces,
trained for war but with no enemy
to defeat and no war to win, occupied ground, took casualties and
maintained order in difficult, dangerous circumstances.
Defining the nature of such operations remains difficult. Continual
refinements of definitions, as well
as scholarly debate about their
meaning,1 point to obvious confusion about how military forces prepare and operate for an environment that has been described as
not war but like war.2 Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacesupport operations, for the purpose
of this paper, are referred to by the
general term peacekeeping.
The U.S. Armys reaction to its
rapidly expanding peacekeeping
role and the evolving definition of
peacekeeping itself can best be
described as pragmatic; professional
but cautious. There is concern that
Army doctrine and operational procedures determined ad hoc to suit
each deployment may establish
rules of the game different from
those determined by a more deliberate analysis of missions, objectives

and force requirements.3 The Army

has made considerable progress
lately in gathering lessons learned
and writing new doctrine to govern
operations in the peacekeeping
environment.
But misgivings persist. What are
the costs, in men and material, of
these missions and for how long will
they deploy? Will peacekeeping missions dull the warfighting edge so
carefully developed in the years
since Vietnam? Must units be
tagged as peacekeeping forces and
removed from consideration from
other missions?
Recent travel to Somalia, Britain,
Sweden and Germany, where we
met with military professionals
actively engaged in or preparing for
peacekeeping duties, confirmed our
conviction that peacekeeping
requires training and attention to
restraint, civil action, force protection and multinational military and
civilian coordination. Precisely
because it is not war but like war,
preparing for peacekeeping is not
business as usual.

Peacekeeping environment
Peacekeeping is less a specific
type of military mission and more
an operation conducted in a unique
environment. It is an environment,
just like mountain, jungle or desert,
Special Warfare

that leaders must understand and

train for. This environment can be
characterized as austere, disordered, dangerous, extremely close to
local populations, and politically
charged. Operations tend to be multiservice and multinational, and
they require much coordination
with civil agencies and organizations. The use of force typically
defined in the rules of engagement
is tempered by restraint and caution. Most difficult for many military professionals is the concept
that there are often no clearly
defined enemies for the peacekeeping force.
Even in times of peace, areas
such as Cambodia, Kurdistan and
Somalia can be regarded as underdeveloped and austere. But when
the destruction and the anarchy of
civil war are added, the military
problems for a peacekeeping force
become both operationally and
logistically complex. Adding to the
problem is that peacekeeping forces
tend to be small by military standards and must be prepared to
operate in extremely large areas
with isolated units.
While the units will be isolated in
the conventional military sense
from adjacent and higher units,
they will most certainly not be isolated from the civilian population.
In Somalia, Bosnia and Macedonia,
nearly all major military activity
takes place in and around the civilian community. Because of this
environment, work is quite unlike
that of combat units preparing for
action during Desert Storm.
Understanding the local political
and civilian situations, therefore,
becomes important at even the lowest levels of leadership. Units cannot rely only on higher headquarters for intelligence about local conditions. Intelligence must be gathered from the bottom up, using all
sources available to the local commander. Counterintelligence and
Civil Affairs assistance must be
available to task force-, companyand team level commanders.
This concept is not new. The U.S.
April 1994

Armys 1965 field manual for counterinsurgency operations stressed a

complete understanding of the
informal and actual civilian power
structure of the area where actual
social controls are in the hands of
religious, tribal, economic or other
non-governmental power structures more than in the hands of
the recognized government. The
value of Civil Affairs, PSYOP and
human-intelligence assets at the
brigade and battalion levels was
clearly recognized.4
Because of the unusual and
uncertain threat, the first task facing leaders deployed to keep or
enforce the peace is force protection.
Peace agreements, even if they do
exist, offer little protection from
renewed factional strife, random
violence, lawlessness or terrorism.
Soldiers face the prospect of confronting armed belligerents who
respond only to the use or threatened use of force.
In such an environment, coordination and control are crucial to
success. An inappropriate response
to a provocation or inattention to
security details can endanger the
peacekeeping force by provoking a
counteraction by the local populace.
Rules of engagement become especially important. The use of
restraint and minimum force,
thought by some to be more a concept of police than of military forces,
becomes a key element in the peacekeeping environment. Soldiers
trained to destroy the enemy
require a changed mindset.
The peacekeeping arena requires
the close cooperation of all services,
and while one service may be predominant in an area, all will play at
least some role in any operation.
The peacekeeping arena also tends
to be international, with civilian
agencies playing important roles.
Civilian relief agencies operating
within the peacekeeping environment require constant and close
coordination with military units.
The destruction and disorder so
often found when peacekeeping
forces arrive also force military

leaders to repair devastated infrastructure. Roads, ports and airfields

usually require repair or modification for mission accomplishment.
This, in turn, forces planners to provide a larger-than-normal engineer
contingent with deploying forces.
Since it is not unusual for local
authority to be destroyed, peacekeepers often find themselves
forced to participate in the policing
of the area. Conducting searches,
detaining criminals and seizing
weapons often become key elements
in the military forces strategy for
controlling its areas and protecting
itself.

Peacekeeping and training

Training for peacekeeping is little
different from training for any
unique or demanding environment.
The Army has long recognized the
need to structure and conduct training which simulates the unique
demands of a particular region, theater or level of lethality.
Proficiency in warfighting, in
both basic soldiering and functional specialties, underlies success in
peacekeeping. The necessary
changes can be taught as refinements to operations, expansion
of basic skills and enhancement
of fundamental procedures in a
relatively short period before
deployment.
The design of training will vary
from mission to mission, depending
on the operational environment.
What will not change is that predeployment training is essential.
Leaders must allocate time and
resources to prepare soldiers for the
unique demands of peacekeeping.

Soldier training
A former chief of staff for U.N.
forces deployed to Cyprus, Brigadier
Michael Harbottle, aptly described
the importance of the individual soldier in peacekeeping. There is no
doubt in my mind, he said, that
the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything
else on the vigilance and mental
15

U.S. paratroopers keep a Kurdish

demonstration designed to prevent
U.S. withdrawal under control.

Photo courtesy John P. Abizaid

alertness of the most junior soldier

and his non-commissioned leader,
for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of
the operations rests.5
Individual soldier training must
adapt the soldier to the specific conditions of the peacekeeping battlefield. Training in force protection,
intelligence collection and use, use
of force, and regional awareness,
coupled with certification of proficiency in common tactical tasks,
forms the heart of essential individual training for peacekeeping.
Soldiers must be trained how and
when to use force when faced with
the variety of lethal and nonlethal
situations likely to occur in a peacekeeping environment. The rules of
engagement will detail when to use
deadly force, but the majority of
confrontations a soldier will
encounter will require using a lesser degree of force. He must be
trained to use an array of other
coercive techniques such as verbal
persuasion, police support, warning
blows and carefully aimed fire.
British troops getting ready for
duties in Northern Ireland and
Nordic soldiers preparing for
deployment to Macedonia are
specifically retrained to use minimum rather than maximum force
to deal with the threats they face.
16

At one British range, soldiers were

presented with numerous targets,
only some of which were hostile.
In Sweden, soldiers faced tough,
non-lethal problems in a welldesigned, simulated peacekeeping
environment. In all cases, the exercises were recorded and reviewed,
and lessons were immediately
reinforced.
In peacekeeping, the ability of
individual soldiers to hit targets
quickly and accurately is closely
tied to the need of commanders to
employ minimum force to achieve
success. Well-placed rounds against
a sniper or warning shots delivered
as a message to a potential foe may
be just the right amount of force a
patrol leader needs.
Refinement of marksmanship procedures to present different sets of
targets to soldiers and to force selective engagements will better prepare
soldiers for a peacekeeping environment. Soldiers will face difficult
choices in the event they must use
their personal weapons. They must
be trained to think before they shoot.
Wearing body armor, building
well-designed fighting positions and
practicing proper dispersal and
cover in static locations and on the
move are all elements of force protection. Because of their presence
mission and the poorly defined

notion of friendly and enemy territory, peacekeepers are always vulnerable to unexpected acts of violence sniper fire, ambush and car
bombings can and do occur.
British soldiers are trained in a
mock village complete with civilians, terrorists and a compound
which troops use as their base. We
witnessed several types of terrorist
attacks against the secure base
and were impressed with the standard of individual force-protection
measures taken by soldiers. Drills,
signals and standard operating procedures were used to respond to
threats quickly. Mutual security
standards produced rapid reinforcement of defensive actions.
Whenever soldiers enter areas
where others have fought earlier,
they encounter large amounts of
unexploded ordnance and inevitably
operate in and around unmarked
and uncleared mined areas. The
manufacture and use of homemade
ordnance is also prevalent. The need
to train soldiers to recognize, mark
and report such dangers is obvious.
In every major peacekeeping arena
from Cambodia to Bosnia, mines and
fabricated explosives continue to
take a toll on troops and civilians.
Peacekeeping soldiers and leaders
will always have to deal with civilians. Soldiers search cars at checkSpecial Warfare

points; sentries encounter children

around their areas. Patrols are
approached by people asking for
food, wanting to give information or
just asking questions. Dealing with
civilians becomes a daily occurrence
for lower-ranking soldiers. On occasion, troops may have to detain
civilians for questioning.
While rules of engagement detail
the conditions for the use of force,
other legal questions may need to
be answered. For example, what
rights of search, pursuit, detention
and seizure do soldiers have, and at
what point are they violating the
legal rights of the citizens? What
new agreements with civil authorities affect expected actions by soldiers? By knowing their rights, soldiers are better armed to handle
diverse situations. As civil authority
is re-established, updated training
on the legal rights of soldiers and
civilians must occur.
The ethnic diversity potential
peacekeeping areas requires soldier
awareness and leader understanding, and cultural predeployment
training is essential. In Sweden,
area experts and local nationals
were brought in to acquaint troops
with their new environment. Civilian relief workers, police officials,
news correspondents and native
experts were asked to share their
recent personal perspectives.
The capacity to employ interpreters and conduct negotiations is a
vital skill for leaders at all levels.
The ability to enforce a U.N. mandate, for example, by discussion,
mediation or insistence requires as
much skill from the sergeant at his
level as it does from the diplomat at
his.
In Bosnia, junior British leaders
often confront Serbian checkpoint
commanders and must assert the
right of free passage for U.N. convoys. In Kurdistan, it was not
uncommon for U.S. officers to negotiate with both Iraqi and Kurdish
leaders in attempts to separate warring factions and enforce boundaries.
In each instance, superiors were far
away, and quite junior leaders were
April 1994

required to defuse numerous potentially dangerous situations.

In Sweden and Great Britain we
saw junior leaders placed in such
uncomfortable situations during
training. Structuring training to
stress junior leaders in such circumstances and familiarizing them with
the use of translators will pay dividends in any peacekeeping sector.
Because the peacekeeping battlefield is extended and because activity can happen anywhere within a
units boundaries, skill in using
communications equipment and
taking maximum advantage of its
range are key. Careful, rehearsed
reporting procedures to cover a wide
range of military and nonmilitary
activity are essential if commanders
are to properly respond to the problems encountered. Formatted
reports, operational code words and
key terrain reference points permit
rapid passage of information in the
often nonsecure communications
environment of peacekeeping.
In 1985, 24 Finnish peacekeepers
were taken hostage in southern
Lebanon by an armed faction.6 In
1988 Marine Lt. Col. William R.
Higgins, the chief of Observer
Group-Lebanon, was taken hostage
and murdered. Both incidents show
that the threat of hostage-taking
remains very real given the potential impact such hostage-taking
would have on world media. Given
the absence of front lines and the
potential presence of hostile forces
throughout the area of operations,
all peacekeeping soldiers face the
potential of being taken hostage.
Training on how to react, report,
negotiate and prevent hostage situations has recently been incorporated into the training programs of
Norway. Training soldiers on how
to react if captured, how to avoid
capture and how to report such incidents is essential.

Unit training
Many tactical techniques used by
units in peacekeeping are fairly
simple, easily trained and suited to

a battle drill approach. Such unit

tasks as patrolling, manning
checkpoints and observation posts,
convoy escort, assembly area
actions and area security are easily
standardized.
Squads and platoons perform the
majority of peacekeeping tasks, and
the training of these units falls comfortably within the capabilities of
the battalion and company. Help is
needed, however,to create the
unique peacekeeping environment
in training so units and soldiers can
train realistically.
Just as force protection is a major
concern for individual soldier training, so it is a primary concern for
collective training. The tragedy of
the Marine barracks bombing in
Lebanon cannot be lost on leaders.
Lax security measures, poor dispersal, unclear rules of engagement
and the inability to properly and
flexibly respond to a broad number
of threats characterize units inadequately trained in force-protection
measures.
In Britain and Sweden, force-protection measures were hammered
home in routine training. In one
example, we saw a civilian van used
as a mortar-firing vehicle against a
secure British base. In another
instance, we saw a car bomb driven
into the center of a control point.
Collective lessons learned at the
squad and platoon levels during
these exercises would guide units
once they are deployed to their
peacekeeping areas of operation.
Control points, or checkpoints,
are common means of controlling
areas of operation in peacekeeping
environments. In Somalia, we saw
numerous static checkpoints
manned primarily in urban areas
designed to interdict weapons traffic. We also heard of various methods of mobile or flying checkpoints
established by mobile forces at random points throughout an area of
operation to gain temporary control
of a particular location or situation.
While the basic concepts of building, manning and operating checkpoints seem simple enough, tech17

Course trains soldiers

for peacekeeping duty
A course taught at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School
prepares U.S. officers to serve as U.N. military observers.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Observer Course, or UNPKO, is
a nine-day course designed to prepare U.S. officers bound for U.N.
observer duty in various locations. Weve been training soldiers for
3 1/2 years in the necessary skills to stay alive on peacekeeping missions, said Maj. William Wheelehan, commander of E Company,
2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Primarily we
center training around our Individual Terrorism Awareness Course,
but weve recently expanded the course to include other training.
The Individual Terrorism Awareness Course trains students in a
variety of terrorism-awareness subjects. While serving as a U.N.
observer, the soldier becomes symbolic and therefore attractive as a
terrorist target, Wheelehan said. Because observers are U.S. citizens and a symbol of the U.N., a terrorist organization may attack
them to gain visibility for its cause.
Students in the UNPKO receive an introduction to terrorism
which emphasizes the philosophy and doctrine of terrorism and its
operations, and studies classic terrorist attacks. Later they are
trained in individual protective measures, passive techniques they
can employ to prevent or deter attacks, including detection of terrorist surveillance. A practical exercise then tests their ability to detect
surveillance.
Course emphasis then shifts to active measures: students learn
vehicle dynamics, evasive driving techniques and vehicle-barricade
breaching to allow them to escape terrorist attacks. Finally, they are
trained in hostage-survival techniques.
In addition to the terrorism-awareness training, UNPKO students
receive area-specific training to acquaint them with the politico-military situation and the customs and cultural nuances that exist within their mission area. Emergency first aid, generator operations and
maintenance, mine detection and identification, desert survival and
a refresher course on radio procedures form the remainder of the
course.
The UNPKO is open only to service members slated for U.N.
observer missions and is normally taught twice per year. For information on the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course, contact SFC
John Johnson, E Co., 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training
Group, at DSN 239-5833, commercial (910) 432-5833.

niques and actions during various

types of hostile or nonhostile incidents lend themselves to a drill
approach at squad, platoon and
company levels.
In Somalia, as in Bosnia, the success of the relief mission depends on
the movement and protection of
numerous humanitarian-relief convoys. The need to clarify techniques
and procedures for convoy and con18

voy-escort duties is apparent.

Indeed, the need for developing
drills for all types of mounted movement, from convoy protection to
movements to contact, is essential.
In almost every peacekeeping campaign, there is a maneuver phase
which requires peacekeeping units
to maneuver and take ground, often
against an armed faction. This was
true for U.N. troops first introduced

into Cyprus and was later true for

coalition forces deployed in Kurdistan. The idea that peacekeeping is a
static, observation-post business is
not true, and units must expend
necessary time training forces to
maneuver.
Patrolling is an essential skill for
all units engaged in peacekeeping
duties. Unlike combat patrols, however, peacekeeping forces send out
patrols to show presence and establish temporary security in areas not
normally occupied. Peacekeeping
patrol leaders will often be faced
with unusual problems. In Somalia,
patrols often came across banditry
in progress. In former Yugoslavia,
patrol leaders find themselves
caught in cross fire between warring factions. In both cases, leaders
must respond to the incidents with
less firepower and more mental
flexibility than normally required
on the conventional battlefield.
Training techniques in both
Britain and Sweden did much to
prepare patrol leaders for the unexpected demands of the peacekeeping
battlefield. Patrol movements were
carefully coordinated, reporting was
specific and mutual support was
ensured. Intelligence, battlefield
information and civilian reports
were quickly analyzed at patrolcoordination centers, and relevant
cautions, modified instructions or
new missions were immediately
passed to soldiers on patrol.
In Somalia, no two sectors were
alike. Different clans, different
political parties, different feuds and
different economic difficulties all
shaped the local situation. While
intelligence data about the major
militias proved generally reliable,
local commanders were forced to
divert substantial effort toward
improvising means of gathering and
processing information concerning
their tactical areas of control.
Training units to do this at the
squad, platoon and company levels
is important if commanders hope to
succeed in understanding and controlling their sectors of the peacekeeping battlefield.
Special Warfare

The U.S. Armys 1967 counterinsurgency manual stressed the need

for Civil Affairs, PSYOP and counterintelligence assets to be placed at
the disposal of brigade and battalion commanders.7 In the peacekeeping environment, such assets are
crucial to success. The addition of
new staff members at lower levels
necessitates additional team training. These assets should be trained
with the supported unit before
deployment to assure success once
deployed.

Staff training
Staff training deserves specific
attention as units adapt operations
to the peacekeeping environment.
Coordination of actions in peacekeeping is especially daunting.
Staffs at all levels have to coordinate actions with a more diverse set
of external agencies. Joint, combined, coalition and civilian components operate in most areas and,
therefore, require staff coordination
with the local maneuver commander. Civil Affairs, counterintelligence, PSYOP and communications
planning are key battalion combat
multipliers in peacekeeping.
Information channels, operational
priorities and terms of reference are
different, however. For example,

engineers, not scouts, may produce

the best intelligence. Logistics
requirements and transportation
needs may demand increased attention. And the presence of United
Nations, allied and sister services
generates a host of new terms, concepts and corresponding acronyms.
Past peacekeeping commanders
have adapted to the situation in
many ways. Brigadier Harbottle
formed a special OPS E(economic)
section designed for such nontraditional roles as arbitration of land
dispute, the movements of teachers
and the protection and distribution
of relief supplies.8
In Somalia, the resourcefulness of
U.S. Army commanders in handling
the myriad of additional staff-coordination tasks was especially noteworthy. Fire-support officers, airdefense officers, engineers and support-platoon officers were assigned
new coordination and reporting
responsibilities. Liaison established
with coalition, civil and humanitarian organizations at great cost in
scarce leader resources produced
exceptional results. The preparation
of liaison teams is not routine, however, and procedures must be established to meet the particularly high
demands for them in the peacekeeping environment.
Besides practicing the staff-plan-

ning process, joint and combined

training is the best preparation for
staff officers assigned peacekeeping
duties. We saw multinational operations at all levels in Somalia U.S.
soldiers supporting Australian base
operations, Moroccans patrolling
with the 10th Mountain Division,
Pakistanis conducting security
operations with U.S. Marines, and
Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force
logistics units sharing duties to support the entire international force.
Because peacekeeping doctrine
and the understanding of combined
operations with non-NATO forces
are not clearly defined, we found
U.S. staffs spending a great deal of
time and effort defining terms, discussing procedures and conducting
meetings simply to make things
work. Expanding staff training to
include peacekeeping scenarios with
joint and multinational players is
essential.

Force structure, doctrine

Force mobility in the peacekeeping efforts we observed and studied
was absolutely essential. Units
without the proper mix of transport
and supply vehicles are quite limited in their usefulness in the typically large areas assigned to small
units. While excellent use can be

U.S. paratroopers check a Kurdish

guerrillas weapon before he enters a
U.S.-controlled safe area in northern Iraq.
Photo courtesy John P. Abizaid

April 1994

19

made of helicopters, they should not

be used to replace vehicular assets.
Civil Affairs and PSYOP teams,
ad hoc unit civic-action officers,
counterintelligence teams, translators and additional intelligence personnel were invaluable in peacekeeping operations in Somalia.
These were precisely the type of
people and units that were in short
supply and frequently needed at the
battalion level. Nearly every commander expressed the need for
additional area experts, people with
police backgrounds or an understanding of civilian-relief agencies
to assist in solving the numerous
daily problems of peacekeeping. The
peacekeeping environment placed
unique requirements on local commanders. Adopting a more aggressive approach to linking supplemental peacekeeping resources with
units during peacekeeping training
and staff preparation can do much
to resolve this problem.
Doctrinal voids exist at every
level. Common terminology for
operational matters was lacking
within all units and at the joint and
combined levels. Trying to make
battalion commanders understand a
presence mission is quite difficult if
the terms are unfamiliar. There are
simply tactical and operational
activities that take place within the
peacekeeping environment which
are not adequately defined or
addressed by current doctrine.
We must analyze the peacekeeping environment and establish the
all-important common language
necessary to build the operational
elements of the peacekeeping battlefield. This task, however, is not
merely one for each national element to handle separately; an international military effort is required.
Any debate about the appropriate force to conduct peacekeeping
is misguided. The factors of mission,
enemy, terrain, troops and time
available will decide the best force
mix to do the job. While infantry
skills are at a premium in the
peacekeeping environment, all soldiers and specialties, along with
20

requisite equipment and armament,

can be asked to serve. The idea that
peacekeepers must be nonthreatening, and therefore lightly armed
and equipped, may be inconsistent
with mission demands. Peacekeeping forces must always be trained to
fight and equipped to accomplish
force protection.

Conclusion
There is no standard peacekeeping
mission. Each operation is conducted
in a unique setting with its own
political, geographic, economic and
military characteristics. While it is
dangerous and even deadly at times,
it presents leaders and soldiers with
the difficult requirement of using
armed restraint and minimum force
to accomplish the mission.
The essential starting point for
peacekeepers is a well-trained and
highly disciplined force, wellgrounded in warfighting skills. But
the next step in preparing forces for
peacekeeping is providing training
that allows soldiers and leaders to
adjust their mindset from combat to
peacekeeping.
To design this training and prepare the proper force for deployment, military leaders must be
guided by appropriate assessments
of the environment and recognized
peacekeeping doctrine. We should
avoid the notion that combat-ready
troops are ready for peacekeeping.
Predeployment training and mission analysis are essential, and we
should prescribe a minimum essential predeployment preparation and
training period that allows units to
adequately prepare for the complex
mission ahead.
There is no need to train peacekeeping and neglect warfighting.
With adequate notice and subsequent training, well-trained forces
are well-prepared to accomplish
peacekeeping duties. Leaders must
simply recognize that there is a cost
in additional resources to prepare
soldiers for success in this unique
environment. As the New World
Order continues to challenge our

political leaders with more and

more opportunities for peacekeeping, soldiers must train themselves
and their units for its demands.

Cols. John P. Abizaid and John

R. Wood studied the U.S. militarys,
particularly the U.S. Armys, readiness to conduct peacekeeping activities as part of their senior service
college fellowship program. Colonel
Abizaid attended the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and
Colonel Wood attended the Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service. Both officers have extensive
operational experience: Colonel
Abizaid was operations officer for
the U.N.s Observer Group-Lebanon
and was an infantry battalion commander in Kurdistan during Operation Provide Comfort. Colonel Wood
has served in a variety of command
positions as a Field Artillery officer
and commanded the 3rd/8th Field
Artillery during the Gulf War.
Notes:
1 Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement: The U.S.
Role in the New International Order
(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, February 1993).
2 Roger J. Spiller, Not War But Like War:
The American Intervention in Lebanon (Fort
Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, January 1981).
3 Snow, p. 2.
4 United States Army, Field Manual 31-16,
Counterguerrilla Operations, 1967, pp. 16-19.
5 Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.
191.
6 24 Soldiers of UN Seized by Militia in
South Lebanon, New York Times, 8 June
1985, p. 1.
7 FM 31-16, p. 19.
8 Harbottle, pp. 29-30.

Special Warfare

USSOCOM Creates
Clearinghouse for New Ideas
by Brig. Gen. William F. Kernan

he special-operations community has come a long way

since USSOCOM was created
by act of Congress in 1987. Our people, our units, our tactics and our
equipment are some of the best in
the world, but we cant rest on past
successes.
What has always made special
operations special is our top-notch
people finding new and innovative
ways to overcome incredible obstacles to get the job done. We must
continue that spirit and actively
seek creative solutions to daily
challenges.
Change, like death and taxes, is
one of the few things we can count
on in this world. The difference,
however, is that we have some measure of control when it comes to
changes in our lives and institutions. To stimulate and manage
change within the special-operations community, the U.S. Special
Operations Command has established the SOF Clearinghouse for
good ideas affecting all facets of special operations. Through the clearinghouse, Gen. Wayne A. Downing,
the commander in chief of USSOCOM, is building an institutional
climate which encourages innovation and fosters creativity.
How many times have you or
your people had a better way of
doing a job than current procedures
dictate? How often do you or your
buddies comment on the dubious
lineage of whoever designed the
tools and equipment youre working
with? When was the last time
someone in your unit said, If I
were the general for a day, Id ...?
Well, heres your chance to change
April 1994

the world.
The SOF Clearinghouse, within
the Directorate of Plans, Policy,
Doctrine and Combat Assessment
at USSOCOM, is your entry point
to the command. Although encouraged, it is not mandatory that you
submit your ideas through the
chain of command. An unfiltered
product is sometimes more valuable
than one with all the controversy
removed. If your proposal is too
hard to do, well tell you but let
us be the judge of your ideas. Topics
for consideration include, but are
not limited to: organizational structure, roles and missions, training
programs, tactics development,
standardizing procedures, command
relationships and personnel management. The only limits to this
process are your imagination and
creativity.
This program is intended for folks
in the trenches active, reserve
and alumni. Polished, fully staffed
ideas are not what were looking for.
If you can scribble your idea onto a
single sheet of notebook paper, well
help you develop and refine it. Outlines or bullet statements are fine;
just be complete enough for the
clearinghouse staff to help you capture the essence of your idea. The
only restriction is that we cannot
handle classified proposals. The
clearinghouse is an open forum for
the free exchange and development
of ideas. To be successful, the process must remain unclassified.
Once an idea is submitted to the
clearinghouse, the first thing we do
is acknowledge your submission.
You have the right to know we
have your proposal and are giving

it a fair shake. After giving your

idea as objective an appraisal as
we can, we will do one of three
things: accept your idea as is for
presentation to the CINC, help you
develop your concept further, or
send you an explanation why we
cannot accept your suggestion.
Ideas accepted by the CINC will be
sent to the appropriate USSOCOM
and component staff directors for
their consideration.
The clearinghouse will use the
service components professional
journals to provide periodic
updates, listing the ideas being
offered to the CINC and the current
status of prior initiatives accepted
for staffing or implementation.
Prompt reporting of initiatives submitted, periodic status reports, and
open discussion to help develop and
improve good ideas is one of the
best ways to keep the clearinghouse
process alive.
We must, and will, prove that this
process works so that those on the
line will have faith in the clearinghouse and the confidence to air
their ideas. We wont promise that
all ideas submitted will be implemented, but we can promise that
they will be given fair consideration. My staff will help you develop
your thoughts, and if we use your
suggestion, you will be given credit.
You, the men and women of SOF,
have proven you have the intelligence, problem-solving skills, creativity, flexibility and determination to make this process work.
Using those skills to effect changes
will keep this command at the leading edge of our nations forces well
into the next century.

Brig. Gen. William F. Kernan is

currently the director of plans, policy, doctrine and combat developments for the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.

21

ODA Planning: Tips from the JRTC

by Capt. Kevin Christie

Congratulations! Your detachment

has been selected to come play at
the Joint Readiness Training Center. Despite all the rumors and war
stories, as a Special Forces observer-controller Ive seen enough rotations to give you the real word. Im
not going to tell you how to win at
JRTC: Trying to beat the system
will just get you in trouble here. I
will tell you about some of the systemic mistakes we observe, rotation
after rotation, and how you can
avoid committing them. I hope you
can put this information to good
use, not only at JRTC but in all
your future operations.
The thing that makes or breaks
most ODAs at JRTC is the quality
of their mission planning. If a unit
has a good isolation, it has a good
chance at doing well on mission execution. A bad isolation, however,
almost always leads to serious problems or mission failure.
The majority of the problems in
isolation occur in three areas: the
ODA command estimate, intelligence integration and rehearsals.

Command estimate process

Authors note: This work is by no

means a substitute for the appropriate doctrinal references; however, it
may arouse some interest and provide a few helpful tips to SFODA
planners. Any opinions expressed
herein are solely mine and not necessarily approved by JRTC, the Special Operations Division or the
Department of the Army.
22

A lot of ODA leaders seem to

believe that only battalion and
higher echelons conduct a formal
estimate. When the ODA bypasses
this process, it frequently misses
identifying specified, implied and
mission-essential tasks in its initial mission analysis. Teams sometimes waste hours floundering in
endless brainstorming sessions and
end up going into the briefback
without a clear understanding of
their missions. Paradoxically,
ODAs use the lack of time as the
excuse for not using a step-by-step
process. Some units check the

block by following a sequence, but

dont go into the depth needed to
get a good product. They usually
end up with one well-developed
course of action, or COA, and several throwaways that are of no
value for comparison.

Intelligence integration
Everyone seems to know what
intelligence preparation of the battlefield is, but very few know how
to focus the process down to the
ODA level, or how to integrate it
into mission planning. Teams often
infiltrate without any idea of
where enemy reaction forces or
likely patrol routes may be located,
or where to start looking for the
target. The priority intelligence
requirements/intelligence requirements that the ODA receives from
the forward operational base are
almost invariably accepted without
analysis, although they may bear
little or no relation to the team
mission or capabilities. Is enemy
ability to reinforce with secondechelon divisions a valid PIR for a
combat-search-and-rescue mission?
Closely tied to the development of
PIR and IR is the ODA reconnaissance and surveillance plan, sometimes called the collection plan. I
have never seen a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan
that focuses on specific PIRs the
team needs answered in order to
accomplish the mission. Inadequate intelligence integration frequently leads to mission failure at
JRTC.

Rehearsals
Perhaps the area most neglected
in isolation is rehearsals. Our normal time line for an isolation is 4872 hours, but teams spend little, if
any, of that time rehearsing. We
have had an ODA spend four days
in isolation and never do a single
Special Warfare

rehearsal. We have had many more

spend all their rehearsal time practicing loading and unloading helicopters, or walking through the
woods practicing SOPs without
ever practicing actions at the objective. As a result, teams have probably lost more people through the
failure to practice casualty evacuation from the objective than any
other area. ODAs hardly ever
request realistic support for
rehearsals, such as target mockups. The FOB support center can
supply many enhancements, but
ODAs use the well never get it, so
why ask excuse for not requesting.
These are some of the problems
weve seen. Now lets look at an
ideal isolation, observing some
techniques that have worked well
over numerous rotations.
First, a few words about pre-isolation preparation:. Its sometimes
hard to try to sell an ODA on conventional doctrine, but most of our
current planning doctrine is
straight out of FM 101-5. Just dust
off the book issue you used in the
Advanced Course and in CAS3, and
you will have the ODA planning
process in the bag. The key references we use at JRTC for mission
planning are:
FM 101-5, Staff Roles and Relationships. Describes the estimate
process.
FM 7-70, The Light Infantry
Platoon and Squad. This handy
manual has a simplified estimate
process aimed at junior officers and
NCOs.
ST 100-9, July 92, The Command Estimate Process. This
CGSC text provides detailed techniques for implementing doctrine in
FM 101-5. You have to pick through
the Fulda Gap stuff, but Chapters
2 and 4-7 are excellent.
Ranger Handbook. Invaluable reference for developing the
ground tactical plan, planning
April 1994

Photo by Bill E. Hyatt

and executing rehearsals and

inspections.
The 34-series FMs describe
intelligence integration, in particular, FM 34-36, Special Operations
Forces Intelligence and EW Operations; FM 34-130, Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield; and
FM 34-2, Collection Management.
Better yet, you can save yourself a
lot of reading by getting a copy of
FM 34-8, Commanders Handbook
for Intelligence. This pocket-sized
guide distills the intel FMs into a
user-friendly format.
Study these references now,
before you deploy. Keep them at
hand in isolation. The next step is
to develop a detailed isolation standard operating procedure. Focus
the SOP at individual positions
and staff sections to make sure you
cover all the bases. You can also
construct some visual aids that will
help quite a bit in organizing your
time and facilitating the planning
process. Get some poster board and
write out the headings for such
things as mission statement and
intent (two levels up), specified and

Special Forces soldiers haul their

gear to a waiting helicopter during
training at the Joint Readiness
Training Center.

23

COMMAND ESTIMATE
The command-estimate schedule
helps to focus the team effort on
completing the planning process.
implied tasks, course-of-action
sketches, etc. Develop a blank
matrix for comparing courses of
action. Save one board for breaking
the command-estimate process
down into steps, by time. This
schedule will help to focus the
team effort on completing the
detailed planning process. Get
these boards laminated so you can
reuse them. Work with the charts
and the SOP in a practice isolation
or two before you get to JRTC.
Enough about mission prep on
to isolation.

Isolation
Shortly after isolating, you
should receive a warning order in
some form. If time is critical, the
key planners may begin working
with this information while the
rest of the team sets up the isolation area. Designate one man to
supervise the setup, or key leaders
will be pulled away to handle
minor details.
Staff-section locations must facilitate the information flow. The
detachment commander, team
sergeant, team tech and intel NCO
should all be located in a planning
cell, as the most critical information is shared here. Keep wall
space free for posting charts. Map
boards should have ops and intel
overlays precut and ready to be
hung. A good technique is to have
all reference materials (area study,
target intel packet, OPORD, etc.)
placed in clearly marked folders
and laid out on a large table. Make
one guy responsible for keeping
track of the references and keeping
this area organized it will save
time and trouble searching for
information later.
24

TIME BLOCK:
WHEN

WHO

13001345
13451400
14001430
14301445
14451500
15001515
15151545
15451600
16001630
16301700
17001715
17151730

STAFF
SECTS

1300-1730

WHAT
REVIEW OPORD/ANNEXES

POC
STAFF
LDR
INTEL
NCO

ALL

INTEL BRIEFING

ALL

ID SPEC/IMP/M.E. TASKS
CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS

ALL

BREAK

ALL

DEVELOP/BRIEF ODA MSN

ALL

BRIEF ENEMY COA

INTEL

STAFF
SECTS

DEVELOP COAs

STAFF
LDR

ALL

ANALYZE COAs

XO

ALL

WAR-GAME COAs

XO

ALL

COMPARE COAs

XO

ALL

BREAK

ALL

BRIEF DECISION, INTENT

AND CONCEPT

XO
OPS
NCO
TM LDR

OPS
NCO
TM LDR

NOTES: INTEL NCO CONCENTRATES ON IPB 1300-1500

Once the isolation area is set up,

anyone not involved in preliminary
mission planning should be
involved in some sort of preparation. There is no excuse for doing
routine things like making equipment lists during critical planning
time when it could have been done
prior to the mission brief. This is
also the time to establish your relationship with your liaison officer,
who will be critical to the success
of your isolation. Most LNOs are
eager to help the team but lack the
experience to be effective. The
LNO is not just a messenger boy.
He needs to be aggressive and
proactive in facilitating the information flow between the ODA and
the staff. Sit down with the LNO

and discuss his duties; give him

feedback throughout isolation as
necessary.

FOB mission brief

If the FOB staff is doing its job,
your team should get its operations
order at least two hours prior to
the mission brief. It is a good idea
to separate out the annexes to the
appropriate ODA staff sections at
this time, while the planning cell
takes the basic order and target
intel packet. Give a time for everyone to get back together and get
your initial planning guidance.
Everyone should be highlighting
specified tasks from their annexes
and noting vague or conflicting
Special Warfare

COA COMPARISON
CRITERIA

COA 1

COA 2

COA 3

3 x R&S TM 4 x R&S TM 2 x R&S TM

1 x MSS
1 x MSS
2 x MSS
1 x LZ
1 x LZ
2 x LZ

COMMAND & CONTROL

MANEUVER (INFIL/EXFIL)

MANEUVER
(AREA COVERAGE)

SURVIVABILITY

UNITY OF COMMAND

SOLDIER LOAD

SECURITY

RESUPPLY

FOLLOW-ON
DA MISSION

14

18

17

TOTALS

information. In the mission brief

itself, ask the staff hard questions.
If the FOB staff is having problems, good questions will bring
them out. When the S-2 says If
you want the photographs of the
objective, request them by RFI,
tell him up front that you want
everything he has. This is your
chance to have the battalion commander energize the people supporting you.
The most important single piece
of information you will get during
the brief is the battalion commanders intent. This must be absolutely clear, or you may waste hours of
planning time. If you are at all
unsure about the focus or desired
result of the mission, nail it down
April 1994

here. This should be given to you in

written form, so you can post it.

Command estimate
The team sergeant should have a
time schedule ready to go after the
mission brief, if not sooner. Post it
prominently. One individual must
be responsible for timekeeping, particularly during brainstorming sessions. These tend to deteriorate if
not held to strict time limits.
Immediately after the mission
brief, if you havent already done so,
give the staff sections time to go
over their sections of the operations
order. When you get back together,
each section should have a list of
specified and implied tasks, mission

The COA comparison helps in developing distinct, relevant criteria for

evaluating courses of action.
constraints and restrictions ready
to be discussed. Winnow out the
routine implied tasks like pack
rucksacks, define the significant
constraints and restrictions, and
post these on your charts. Determine which tasks are missionessential and highlight these tasks;
you derive the ODA mission statement from them. Now write the
mission statement. Make sure it is
clear and complete; it is the basis
for your subsequent planning.
IPB products such as threat and
terrain templates need to be briefed
to the team at this time. Products
that are not delivered by the FOB S2 must be developed by the team.
The enemy reaction force you should
have predicted on the threat-integration template will not be impressed
by the fact that the FOB staff didnt
do its job. The intel NCO has a critical function during this phase
that of predicting the most likely
enemy course of action. He must be
prepared to think like the enemy
commander, especially when wargaming. See Chapter 7 of ST 100-9
for a complete discussion of threat
integration into COA development.
At this point, you must develop
ODA courses of action. There are
several ways to do this. You can
brainstorm. You can have sections
or individuals develop COAs separately. You can dictate one or more
COAs and have the team try to
think up better ones. The technique
should depend on the level of experience on the team and the ability of
individuals to express themselves.
However you do it, make your
best effort to come up with at least
two supportable COAs. If a COA
will not fulfill minimum mission
requirements, why even put it on
the board? By the way, HALO,
25

Soldiers from the 7th SF Group pull

rucksacks into a UH-1H Iroquois
helicopter during training at the
Joint Readiness Training Center.

Photo by Bill E. Hyatt

static line, air land are not three

good courses of action! Infiltration
technique is important only as it
facilitates the ground tactical plan.
GTPs focus on task organization,
scheme of maneuver, main effort,
etc. Start out each COA with a distinct GTP, and then develop an
infil/exfil technique which best suits
it. Once the COAs are developed,
take them through evaluation, comparison and war-gaming.
ST 100-9 discusses these techniques in more detail. The only area
I will highlight is COA comparison.
You must develop distinct, relevant
criteria for comparison, or you are
just wasting time. If each COA you
develop is equally viable except for
one criteria, rethink either the
COAs or the criteria. Whichever
course of action turns out to be best,
post it and focus the team on it. The
other COAs, if well-thought-out,
should become the basis for contingency plans. You can now write
your commanders intent and develop a general scheme of maneuver.
You will need these to brief the mission concept, or MICON, to the battalion commander.

MICON brief
If you developed a good estimate,
this meeting will give the comman26

der confidence in your ODA mission

and make the briefback almost
redundant. One way to conduct the
MICON is to talk through your mission analysis and COA-selection
process. Use the visual aids posted
on the walls to show the logical
sequence in your thought process.
You should brief the scheme of the
maneuver, infil and commo plans in
general terms. This is also the time
to talk about mission-essential
equipment or personnel shortages
and any critical information
requirements that have not been
answered, not at the end of the
briefback! Schedule a progress
review before the briefback, if necessary. It is a good idea to give the
commander a schedule of key
rehearsals at this time; this is your
best opportunity to pump him up
for rehearsal support.

Team planning
Your ODA will be working in staff
sections for much of this time. Have
staff leaders brief you and the team
sergeant regularly on the status of
their sections, or better yet, schedule staff meetings where information can be shared. The intel NCO
must continually update the team
on changes to the enemy situation.
He also works closely with you and

the other key planners to develop

the R&S plan. The plan must tie
valid ODA PIRs into terrain, task
organization and time to answer
who, what, when and where. FM
34-8 has examples of matrixes that
you can use to help focus the collection effort.
During this time, communications planning should receive some
of your attention as well. Communicators almost always develop a good
primary and alternate means of
commo, but contingency and emergency systems are often forgotten.
You must demand commo checks on
all systems and with all stations if
it is at all possible to do so. If
commo goes down, the FOB will not
be screaming for the blood of your
senior commo NCO theyll want
yours. Minimize environmental factors and human error on the ground
by detailed inspections and checks
in isolation.
The pilots brief is critical to your
infil planning. Try to schedule it as
early as possible. Give the pilots a
written DZ/LZ list in addition to an
overlay to minimize the chance of
error. Be prepared to be somewhat
flexible, as the pilots may have terrain or threat factors that limit
their route options. However,
always remember that it is the
pilots job to support you, not the
Special Warfare

other way around. If the pilots cannot support your scheme of maneuver, bring it up to the FOB commander ASAP. Ensure that your
LZs and DZs are tied in logically to
the escape-and-evasion plan, the
resupply plan and contingency
plans. All of these must also be
coordinated in detail with the FOB
staff! Your emergency resupply may
never fly if the plan is stuck in the
S-2 safe.
As these plans are completed,
put them in the commanders briefback folder as annexes to the ODA
operations order. Dont worry
about making the OPORD pretty,
just make it legible. Consider using
mission-specific preprinted formats
to save time and improve attention
to detail. Of course, a word processor will create a good-looking product, but avoid wasting time with
endless rewrites.

Rehearsals
Ration your isolation time to
make use of every spare minute for
rehearsals. Just as important,
have a plan for each rehearsal
period. The few minutes you spend
prioritizing and coordinating will
save hours of confusion in the
rehearsal area. Consider the use of
OPFOR, MILES, mock-ups,
pyrotechnics and anything else
that will add to realism. Practicing
casualty evacuation is a must. Try
to use the same types of terrain
and visibility conditions expected
in the operational area. If time permits, move your actual infil distance on the ground with full
rucks. You will realize rather
quickly if you have to adjust the
infil plan, or at least toss out that
extra pair of socks. Dont neglect to
practice inter-team commo. Whenever possible, have a competent
outside observer watch your
rehearsals to get an unbiased criApril 1994

tique. That extra set of eyes will

pick out the obvious flaws in a
perfect rehearsal.

ODA briefback
If you have efficiently used your
time in isolation, the briefback will
be a snap. Spend only the minimum
amount of time necessary on briefback rehearsals, without all the
bells and whistles. If the commander prefers a fancy show, try
explaining in advance that you
would rather spend your time on
execution rehearsals (and then do
them!). Adjust the briefback format
to the type and complexity of the
mission. For a 24-hour mission, is it
really necessary to have the senior
medical NCO talk about diseases in
the indigenous population?
The five-paragraph OPORD format is logically organized and familiar to everyone. Strongly consider
using it as your briefback sequence,
especially for relatively simple
direct-action and special-reconnaissance missions. Briefers can refer to
notes, but people who read word-forword give the impression they dont
really know the material. Finally, if
you discover prior to or even during
the briefback that you have a potential mission stopper, tell the boss
that you need a delay. Be real sure
you can talk clearly about your risk
assessment, though, or at best you
will have to execute the mission
anyway.

your night-vision goggles as you run

to board the aircraft.
That about covers it. If you maximize the use of your time in isolation, you will have a real good shot
at a successful mission execution. I
hope some of the tips I gave you
help. Good luck!

Capt. Kevin A.
Christie is currently a
Special Forces observer-controller at the
Joint Readiness
Training Center, Fort
Polk, La. A 1983 graduate of Florida State University, he
was commissioned in Infantry and
served as a rifle and scout platoon
leader with the 193rd Infantry
Brigade in Panama. His Special
Forces assignments include serving
as commander of two SF A-detachments in the 5th SF Group, including seven months in Saudi Arabia
and Iraq during Desert
Shield/Storm.

Conclusion
Once you get the final approval,
the ODA should be able to get on the
bird immediately and accomplish
the mission. Any time before you
actually launch should be used for
conducting final inspections, sterilizing the isolation area and resting.
If youve got more time, fine-tune
your rehearsals. Just dont find
yourself adjusting the headset for
27

The Subjective Side

of Cross-Cultural
Communication
by Lt. Col. James K. Bruton

uppose you are on a mobile

training team mission to a
developing country. Your hostnation counterpart invites you to
his home for dinner. Would you
know upon arrival whether you
should bow, shake hands, bring a
gift, take off your shoes, greet his
wife, ignore his wife, or what? During dinner what subjects would you
discuss? What should you avoid
talking about? How long should you
stay? How would you tell when it is
time to leave?
The people skills of SOF personnel often share equal importance
with their technical proficiency.
Regional orientation, language skills
and the facility to work with people
of other nationalities distinguish
SOF organizations like Special
Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP.
This article outlines an approach to
cross-cultural preparation, highlighting the subjective side of interpersonal communication.
In todays challenging environment, a SOF team may be alerted
for an advisory or training mission
that requires considerable interpersonal interaction in a somewhat
unfamiliar host nation. Mission
briefings and area orientation usually follow, along with an assessment of language requirements and
the requisite cross-cultural communication skills.

28

Properly understood, cross-cultural skill entails not just learning

about another people, but also
developing the ability to learn from
and with another people. Accordingly, one of this nations prominent
cross-cultural training teams differentiates in their presentations
between what they describe as big
C culture and little C culture.1
Referring to the objective manifestations of a culture, big-C culture
pertains to what a people have created and institutionalized. It may
include a societys history, its arts
such as music, dance, theater and
literature, its artifacts, its science,
sports, national heroes, holidays and
the like. One can acquire at least a
partial understanding of big-C culture from objective descriptions
about a country readily available in
encyclopedias, The Country Study
series, or an area study. Big-C culture can instruct us about a society,
but not necessarily about how to
communicate with its people.
Little-C culture, on the other
hand, relates to subjective values
and behavior, such as customs and
etiquette, and verbal and nonverbal
communication styles. For the visitor, an understanding of little-C culture derives from an individuals
personal interactions and internal
experience though it may be
guided by an objective knowledge of

the host nations predominant values, and its customs and taboos.
Little-C culture configures the procedural matters of assisting, teaching, training, managing, leading,
socializing with, negotiating with or
otherwise influencing the host
nationals.
Big-C culture makes one educated but not necessarily competent.
Little-C culture makes one competent but not necessarily educated.
Big-C culture and little-C culture
are not so much polar opposites as
part of a continuum. Each can complement the other.2 This complementarity notwithstanding, it is the
authors contention that SOF
should give more emphasis to littleC culture in the pre-mission phase.
During Desert Shield/Storm,
members of 5th Special Forces
Group successfully displayed both
big-C and little-C cultural understanding in working with their Arab
counterparts. Through liaison and
training teams with 104 maneuver
elements, 5th Group personnel
assisted the Joint Arab Forces and
other allies in upgrading their proficiency in areas such as NBC training, close-air-support coordination,
conduct of border-security operations and other aspects of tactical
training.
It took the SF trainers longer
with some nationalities than with
Special Warfare

others to break the ice and to gain

acceptance from their Arab counterparts. But once trust and rapport
solidified, SF became what one general called the glue that held the
coalition together. Close personal
relationships developed, and in several instances, Arab commanders
accepted as confidants and as de
facto staff members both their SF
officer and NCO counterparts.3
Certain objective factors contributed to SF success. In addition
to their overall professionalism and
experience in desert operations, 5th
Group members had the advantage
of previous training with Arab
forces over the years in exercises
such as Bright Star. Many spoke
Arabic, from survival level to minimal proficiency. In general, these
men had acquired a collective familiarity with Arab cultures.
As Desert Shield/Storm showed,
SFs display of technical knowledge
by itself may not be enough to affect
host nationals. Arabs respected
American technical skill in the
abstract and were impressed by the
breadth of knowledge and instructional skills of their SF trainers. Yet
this appreciation in and of itself did
not make them receptive to individual Americans on an interpersonal
level. What produced receptiveness
was the patience, adaptability and
flexibility that characterized the SF
trainers approach. Their use of Arabic, their deference to Arab customs
and their acceptance of the gracious
hospitality that Arabs traditionally
show guests enabled them to
immerse themselves into the daily
living patterns of their Arab counterparts. Said one sergeant:
The fastest way to establish that
rapport is just to live with them, to
eat what they are eating, to share
what they are sharing. If they are
digging a hole, then you help out
digging a hole. Dont just see them
once a day, like for lunch. You are
not going to get very far with them.
... Share, work together with your
counterpart. Do these things first
and other things will fall into place.
There is no rehearsal for establishApril 1994

ing rapport. It is a play-by-ear situation. ... Be professional. Try not to

lose your cool because they are not
doing things the American way.4
Many in business and diplomacy,
as well as the military, who operate
successfully in other cultural environments attribute their competence to careful observation which
informs judgment. Knowing what to
observe is the key. Observation
includes recognizing our own American behavior patterns and being
sensitive to the presence of contrasting mindsets and alternative
behavior patterns throughout our
interactions. Intercultural communication skill,5 after all, is about
dealing with differences, not with
commonality.
Illuminating the right questions
before entering another culture can
facilitate this process. As an exer-

cross-cultural skill
entails not just learning
about another people,
but also developing the
ability to learn from and
with another people.

cise, think about a foreign culture

in which you have lived or one that
you will soon enter. Can you answer
the following? Or will you be able to
answer these questions after a short
time in the host nation?6
Is it a society that uses direct
verbal communication that is
straightforward and to-the-point,
like the U.S., or does it prefer indirect or contextual communication?
How do the people make a
refusal or tell you no?
Does yes mean yes? What
does maybe mean?
What do the people do nonver-

bally to let you know:

- They arent listening?
- They have a problem?
- They want to terminate the
conversation?
What subtleties do they use in
etiquette as a means of indirect
communication?
When connecting or making a
personal bond, what speaking patterns and body posture do they use?
Do they usually make direct eyeto-eye contact during conversation?
What physical distance do they
maintain in conversation?
When they smile, what meaning (or meanings) does their smile
connote?
To what extent do they use gestures and touching (beyond the
handshake) when conversing?
How do you know when you
have been accepted?
How do the following modes of
communication differ from what we
are used to in the U.S.? In the host
nation how do we:7
- Refuse
- Confront
- Take initiative
- Give and receive compliments
and criticism
- Conduct small talk
- Express humor
- Express opinions
- Negotiate
These questions serve as cuing
mechanisms to broaden our perceptiveness rather than as questions
that lend themselves to definitive
answers. Here one can begin to see
the significance of nonverbal communication. Most Americans, says
anthropologist Edward Hall, are
only dimly aware of this silent language even though they use it
every day. They are not conscious of
the elaborate patterning of behavior
which prescribes the handling of
time, spatial relationships, attitudes toward work, play and learning. In addition to our verbal language, we are constantly communicating our real feelings in the language of behavior.8
Subjective communication considerations also come into play for SOF
29

teams involved in assessment and

conduct of training of foreign
nationals. These questions may
apply to host-nation learning styles
and role of teachers in the host
nation.
How do host-nation students/trainees view the teacher/
trainer? Do they view him as an
expert or as a facilitator? Is he
expected to have all the answers? Is
it permissible for the teacher to
acknowledge a mistake or to admit
he does not know the answer?
Do the host-nation officers train
with their soldiers (at the risk of losing face if they err), train separately
or not at all? (In some traditional
cultures the simple fact that one is
an officer implies he has all the
knowledge needed to do his job no
further training is seen as
necessary.)
How are students taught by
didactic instruction, rote memorization, participatory student-centered
exercises, or hands-on practical
training? How are they tested?
Are students willing to display
knowledge and skill before their
peers that is, are they individually competitive, or do they avoid
standing out by deferring to the
group harmony?
Is self-critique by students (as
U.S. soldiers do in after-action
reviews) a viable concept? Do they
critique themselves if it might
reflect negatively on their leaders or
their teachers?
Intercultural communication is
an individual developmental process that cannot be learned in a formularistic or cookbook manner. One
learns it as one goes along, mostly
by confronting and responding constructively to differences in others,
or to others who are different. Since
intercultural communication occurs
face-to-face, it produces the experience sometimes gratifying, sometimes discomforting of almost
immediate feedback. We can generally assess how we are doing both in
subjective and in objective terms of
goal accomplishment.
Dealing with differences, howev30

Cross-cultural Resources
Cross-cultural preparation often combines generic content with
country- and culture-specific information. Sometimes very few
culture-specific resources on a given country may be available
when needed. The good news is that certain generic cross-cultural
models and concepts by themselves can go a long way toward
preparing one for entry into an unfamiliar culture. These models
can provide a basis for comparing and contrasting American values with those of other cultures and illustrating different mindsets. A thorough generic orientation can hone ones ability to
anticipate, readily detect and respond to behavior patterns different from our own even in the absence of area specialists or culture-specific data. The following references contain generic models and concepts that might be useful to SOF.
Hofstede, Geert H. Cultures Consequences. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1984. This presents Hofstedes extensive study on
the how national culture affects work-related values and attitudes far more than age, gender, profession, or position in an
organization. Hofstede compares cultures on the basis of four
dimensions: high vs. low individualism; large vs. small power distance; strong vs. weak uncertainty avoidance; and high vs. low
masculinity. The book contains a wealth of insightful data but is
somewhat academic and presents rather challenging reading.
Hofstede, Geert H. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the
Mind. Berkshire, UK: McGraw-Hill Book Co. (UK) Ltd, 1991. In
this more user-friendly sequel, Hofstede expands on his four
dimensions contrasting work related values of fifty countries. His
model and analyses can serve as a useful tool to help one identify
and describe anticipated differences in a foreign culture.
Kohls, L. Robert. Survival Kit for Overseas Living. Yarmouth,
Maine: Intercultural Press, 1984. An excellent handbook for
international travelers and expatriates, this widely used guide
focuses on adapting to living abroad and dealing with culture
shock. Specifically it contains a discussion of the Kluckhohn
model a relatively value-neutral way of comparing one culture
with another using five orientations: human nature orientation,
man-nature orientation, time orientation, activity orientation,
and social orientation.
Stewart, Edward C. and Milton J. Bennett. American Cultural
Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1991. An important step in understanding other
cultural values is to first understand our own American values.
This work provides a succinct basis for examining the embedded
American values that guide our thinking and behavior in ways of
which we may be only partially conscious.
Lt. Col. James Bruton

Special Warfare

A U.S. soldier (right) discusses

small-unit tactics with Arab counterpart soldiers during Operation
Desert Shield.

Photo by Thomas Witham

er, can be psychologically threatening to some. We should not assume

that special-operations schooling in
and of itself prepares all its members for effective cross-cultural
interaction. Intercultural communication skill depends as much on the
users willingness to cultivate personal growth through interpersonal
interaction as it does on formal
training in language, history, government and big-C culture.9
The emphasis the Army places on
battle-focused collective and individual training should not eclipse
the importance of subjective communication-skill development
among SOF personnel. The continuous deployment abroad of SOF
units in this post-Cold War era of
ethnic, religious and regional conflict will elevate cross-cultural ability as a high-demand skill far into
the future.

Lt. Col. James K.

Bruton, USAR, is a
Special Forces officer
who served four years
in Southeast Asia in
infantry, advisory and
Special Forces assignments. He recently managed a consulting and training business in
Oklahoma. Colonel Bruton is curApril 1994

rently doing graduate work at the

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies.
Notes:
1 The trainers are Dr. Milton J. Bennett
and Dr. Janet M. Bennett of Portland State
University. The Bennetts 2 May 1991 presentation, Exploring the Intercultural Perspective, at the annual congress of the
International Society for Intercultural Education, Training, and Research greatly influenced the structure of this article. The Bennetts derived the concept of big-C culture
and little-C culture from Peter L. Berger and
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of
Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
Also helpful to the author was Milton J. Bennett, Foundations of Knowledge in International Educational Exchange: Intercultural
Communication, in Joy Reid, ed, Building
the Professional Dimension of Educational
Exchange (Washington, D.C.: NAFSA, 1988).
2 Two sources contain excellent checklists
of background information about the host
country that encompass big-C and little-C
culture. One can use these to test ones
knowledge of a culture with which one feels
familiar or of a culture in which one desires
more information. Some of these can serve as
ice-breakers and conversational topics. See
Lets Play Fifty Questions in Robert L.
Kohls, Survival Kit for Overseas Living
(Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, Inc.,
1984); and Suggested People-Map Coordinates in V. Lynn Tyler, Intercultural Interacting (Provo, Utah: David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies Publication Services, 1987).
3 James K. Bruton and Edward C. Stewart, The Gulf War: An Analysis of American

and Arab Cross-Cultural Encounters, an

unpublished manuscript, p. 36.
4 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
5 Some use the terms cross-cultural and
intercultural interchangeably, and the
meaning often varies with the writer. Here
inter implies between or two-way. Cross
more commonly is one-way and suggests the
one doing it. V. Lynn Tyler, Miracles - Mysteries - Myths, (Provo, Utah: David M.
Kennedy Center for International Studies
Publication Services, 1988).
6 Most of these questions came from Don
Henderson of Global Selling, a New Yorkbased training company.
7 These suggested communication skills
came from Carolyn Feuille of LanguaTech, a
San Francisco-based training company.
8 Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language
(New York: Anchor Press, 1973), p. xiii. Hall
has categorized 10 separate kinds of human
activity labeled the primary message systems, or PMS. Only the first PMS involves
language. All the other PMS are nonlinguistic forms of the communication process. p.
38.
9 Intercultural communication is a growthoriented and difference-based approach.
Writes cross-cultural psychologist Edward
Stewart: With informed judgment, it is possible to abandon the idea that cultural differences are impediments to communication
and cooperation and instead accept the challenge that cultural differences are resources
that can be used for mutual benefit of members of the societies involved in cross-cultural
cooperation. Edward C. Stewart and Milton
J. Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A
Cross-Cultural Perspective (Yarmouth,
Maine: Intercultural Press, 1991), p. 176.

31

Legal Aspects of Civil Affairs

by Maj. (P) Neil Porter

odern-day Civil Affairs

units trace their roots to
the Second World War,
when the U.S. Army created civilgovernment units to assist combat
commanders in dealing with civilians in combat zones and occupied
areas.
The operations of these units
reduced the number of combat
troops diverted from their primary
mission, cut interference by civilians in combat operations, orchestrated the creation of new political
and economic infrastructures in
defeated countries and ensured the
continuation of CA units in the
Army force structure.
Although Civil Affairs operations
benefit commanders and civilians in
a number of ways, the basis for
those operations is not altruism, but
international law, and it is important to understand the legal authorities which underlie CA operations.
Joint Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint
Civil Affairs, defines Civil Affairs
as: The activities of a commander
which establish and maintain relations between his military forces
and civil authorities and people in a
friendly, neutral, or occupied country or area to facilitate military
operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil Affairs may
include exercise by military forces
or authorities of activities or func32

tions normally the responsibility of

local government. These activities
may occur prior to, during or subsequent to military action in time of
hostilities or other emergency.
Joint Pub 3-57 further states:
The nature and scope of Civil
Affairs activities will be determined
by many factors and variables
including National Command
Authority guidance and mission
orders, national security objectives,
U.S. foreign policy, participation of
allied and friendly countries, Operational Law, and requirements of the
military situation.
According to the Operational Law
Handbook, published by the U.S.
Army Judge Advocate Generals
School: Operational Law (OPLAW)
incorporates, in a single military
legal discipline, substantive aspects
of international law, criminal law,
administrative law, and procurement-fiscal law relevant to the overseas deployment of U.S. military
forces. It is a comprehensive, yet
structured, approach toward resolving legal issues evolving from
deployment activities.
Operational law has been viewed
as having two aspects: internal, or
those issues relating strictly to military operations (primarily combat
oriented); and external, or those
dealing with the relationship
between a deployed military force

and the civilian population. Civil

Affairs units assist the commander
in meeting legal obligations principally in the latter area.
Civil Affairs operations are vital
to commanders in wartime. This
usefulness in war has been mirrored in peacetime operations
designed to support friendly foreign
governments and create goodwill
toward the United States. While the
overall Civil Affairs mission
remains the same in either situation, the legal authorities which
authorize or mandate Civil Affairs
operations are different depending
upon where the units mission is
located in the spectrum of conflict.
The focus of Civil Affairs operations also differs vastly depending
on the mission of the supported unit.
During wartime, the focus is on military objectives. Civilians are an
obstacle to combat operations, and
their support is secondary to those
military objectives. Minimizing civilian interference with combat operations is the primary Civil Affairs
mission. In operations other than
war, however, the political legitimacy of the supported group or government becomes the center of gravity.

Wartime Civil Affairs

The highly mechanized and technological nature of the modern batSpecial Warfare

tlefield, combined with a war-fighting doctrine which calls for the

swift concentration of massed forces
and firepower against enemy weak
points followed by a swift drive into
the enemys rear areas, assures the
complication of battle plans by the
presence of civilians in the area of
operations. The Civilian Convention
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
provides that civilians in occupied
territories are protected persons
and charges commanders of occupied territories with certain legal
obligations toward them. Civil
Affairs operations specifically
directed at compliance with these
requirements are known as civil
administration. Some of the more
salient points addressed by the Convention are that:
Family honor and rights, the
lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions
and practice will be respected.
Civilians who are not nationals
of the power whose territory is
occupied have the right to leave the
territory.
Forcible individual or mass
transfers or deportations of protected persons from one occupied territory to the territory of the occupying
power or any other country are prohibited. This does not prevent evacuation of a given area on grounds of
security of the population or military necessity. Such persons should
be returned to their homes as soon
as hostilities have ceased.
Placement of protected persons
in an area exposed to the dangers of
war is prohibited.
Deportation or transfer by the
occupying power of members of its
own civilian population into the
occupied territory is prohibited.
The occupying power must
facilitate the care and education of
children.
The occupying power must
ensure availability of adequate food
April 1994

and medical supplies, providing

them from its own stocks if the
resources of the occupied territory
are inadequate.
The occupying power must
ensure and maintain hospital establishments and services, public
health and hygiene in the occupied
territories. Medical personnel of all
categories shall be allowed to carry
out their duties.
Another wartime function of Civil
Affairs is to assist the commander
in the acquisition and control of
property. Commanders are authorized to exercise control over prop-

again, no compensation is required.

Seizure refers to the taking of
enemy private movable property. As
with confiscated property, seized
property becomes the property of
the capturing state. Generally, payment of compensation to the owner
is required but is not made until the
termination of hostilities.
Enemy private movable and
immovable property may be requisitioned, for use in the occupied area
only, in order to meet the needs of
the occupying force. Housing, factory output, farm produce, etc., may
be requisitioned. Immediate pay-

Civil Affairs operations are vital to commanders in

wartime. This usefulness in war has been mirrored in
peacetime operations designed to support friendly foreign
governments and create goodwill toward the United States.
erty in enemy and occupied territory. Such control reduces the strain
on logistical trains by supplying
operations with locally obtained
materials and preserves assets
required by the civilian population.
Property control is generally classified as follows: destruction, confiscation, seizure, requisition and control. The type of control a commander may lawfully exercise depends
on whether the property is privately
owned or government property and
whether it has military application.
Property of any type may be
destroyed when justified by military
necessity, and no compensation is
required. Commanders may confiscate enemy public movable property
(limited generally to that having
either direct or indirect military
application this includes private
property being used by enemy
troops). Confiscated property
becomes the property of the victor;

ment of compensation to the owner

is required when property is requisitioned. Finally, commanders may
exercise the degree of control necessary (including denial of access) to
prevent the use or destruction of
property in the occupied territory.
To maintain order in occupied territories, existing law and legal structures should be retained. Where
laws are inimical to U.S. objectives,
however, they should be amended or
repealed. Commanders may augment or supplant existing law
through Civil Affairs enactments.
There are six types of enactments
proclamations, ordinances, notices,
directives, laws and regulations
each of which has a different purpose and effect. Initially, Civil
Affairs units, under the staff supervision of the commanders G-5, are
responsible for enforcement of these
enactments. Violators are prosecuted before a military tribunal or in
33

Members of Fort Braggs 27th Engineer Battalion construct a

school in Honduras. The U.S. often uses military forces to
achieve political objectives during peacetime.

Photo by Mike Edrington

local civil courts if authorized by the

commander.
The goal of civil administration is
to create an effective civil government which supports U.S. objectives
and to return it to local control as
soon as possible. Civil Affairs personnel screen the local population
and identify suitable individuals for
leadership positions. Civil Affairs
units identify needs and organize
local inhabitants, under reliable
leadership, to restore the damaged
infrastructure.

Peacetime Civil Affairs

The U.S. often uses military
forces to achieve political objectives
during peacetime. Civil Affairs projects in these operations include construction, medical, dental and veterinary activities by military personnel. Civil Affairs units are also
used extensively in contingency
operations such as noncombatant
evacuation operations, disaster
relief and refugee operations.
34

Civil Affairs personnel also augment military units during overseas operations such as joint training exercises. The civil-military
operations officer bears the responsibility for coordinating the Civil
Affairs activities conducted by the
command.
Fiscal-law considerations intrude
into these operations. With minor
exceptions, operations and maintenance appropriations funding,
known as O&M, may not be used to
conduct humanitarian and civicassistance activities, or HCA, or to
fund the activities of foreign armed
forces. Commanders and CMOs
must understand the parameters of
their funding sources because the
distinction between activities is
often shaded.
Funding for HCA is appropriated
annually by Congress and distributed to the regional unified commands. Each CINC validates HCA
projects within his area and assigns
missions to specific units. These
may not duplicate social or

economic-assistance programs being

administered by other U.S. agencies
in the area. HCA funds may not be
used, either directly or indirectly, to
support foreign military or paramilitary activities. Title 10, U.S. Code,
Section 401 provides the legal
authority to conduct HCA and
specifically authorizes:
Medical, dental and veterinary
care provided in rural areas of a
country.
Construction of rudimentary
surface-transportation systems.
Well-drilling and construction
of basic sanitation facilities.
Rudimentary construction and
repair of public facilities.
There is one exception to the prohibition against using O&M funds
for small HCA projects not previously identified. Congress has recognized the unique mission of special-operations forces (defined in
Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 167 and
including Civil Affairs) and has
authorized O&M funds to be used to
pay the incremental expenses of forSpecial Warfare

eign armed forces when the primary

purpose is the training of U.S.
forces. An annual report of expenses
paid under this exception must be
provided to Congress. This Special
Forces exception is codified in Title
10, U.S. Code, Section 2011 and
authorizes payment of:
Expenses of training specialoperations forces assigned to that
command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces
and other security forces of a friendly foreign country.
Expenses of deploying such
special-operations forces for that
training.
In the case of training in conjunction with a friendly developing
country, the incremental expenses
incurred by that country as the
direct result of such training.
The success of HCA in overseas
operations has motivated Congress
to authorize the use of U.S. armed
forces to perform HCA in domestic
operations. Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 410 provides for armed forces
to engage in civil-military cooperative action programs to meet the
domestic needs of the United
States.
Although the President is commander in chief of the armed forces,
Congress approves their budget. By
limitations in funding appropriations and application of Title 31,
U.S. Code, Section 1301a (the purpose statue), which prohibits any

April 1994

expenditure of funds for other than

the intended purpose, Congress is
able to shape military operations to
a certain extent.
The dichotomy between command
and funding can place the military
in an awkward position when there
is public and congressional opposition to a presidents foreign policy
(as there was to President Reagans
policies regarding Central America).
Military operations will be subjected to close scrutiny by Congress and
the press. Fiscal-law violations
could not only be embarrassing to
the armed forces but also subject
commanders to criminal sanctions.

Conclusion
Civil Affairs units are an indispensable tool for commanders in
meeting their legal obligations.
They are an important force-multiplier during wartime as well as an
effective means for generating goodwill toward the United States and
providing support for democratic
governments in developing nations.
By integrating Civil Affairs into the
overall concept of operations, U.S.
forces can preserve combat assets,
reduce civilian interference and promote mission legitimacy in support
of U.S. national policy in the area of
operations. All CA operations have
their basis in law, and whether they
are meeting wartime obligations to
civilians or fulfilling fiscal-law

responsibilities in peacetime, commanders must ensure that they

remain within that legal authority.

Maj. (P) Neil Porter

is currently Chief for
Reserve Law in the
Office of the Staff
Judge Advocate for
the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command.
His other assignments include service as deputy staff judge advocate
for the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
and as staff judge advocate for Joint
Task Force-Guantanamo during the
Haitian relief operation. He has also
served as civil-military operations
officer attached to the 7th SF Group
during the joint training exercise
Fuerzas Unidas Uruguay 93. A
graduate of the Command and General Staff Officer Course and the
Civil Affairs Course, he holds a
bachelors degree from the Monterey
Institute of International Studies
and law degrees from Gonzaga University, Spokane, Wash., and the
University of Miami.

35

Managing
Special-Operations Forces Doctrine
by Steven E. Cook

Doctrine is the groundwork for all

missions of Army special-operations
forces, and development of that doctrine is the job of the JFK Special
Warfare Center and School.
As the branch proponent for Special Forces and the functional proponent for Psychological Operations
and Civil Affairs, the SWCS commander must implement and execute the SOF doctrinal-development
responsibilities of both the U.S.
Special Operations Command and
the Army Training and Doctrine
Command.
The Army Special Operations
Command has also appointed the
SWCS as its executive agent to
review combined, joint, multiservice
and Army doctrinal literature and
publications and to develop Army
SOF doctrine and training material.
Within the SWCS, producing that
material is the job of the Doctrine
Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine.
Within SOF doctrinal and training publications, there is an established hierarchy to provide a structure for their design, development,
integration and promulgation. The
hierarchy organizes the content of
the publications to be comprehen36

sive without being redundant.

The hierarchy also aligns these
publications with the needs of the
target audience and helps trainers
and soldiers identify the publication
most relevant to their needs. Thus,
it serves the managers and developers of doctrinal and training literature as well as their users.
All ARSOF field manuals are
linked to FM 100-25, Doctrine for
Army Special Operations Forces.
They are oriented toward commanders, staffs and operational personnel from operational elements
through the Army Special Operations Command and cover all
ARSOF mission areas. Production
of these manuals proceeds through
two stages: the initial and final
drafts. The average time for completion of these manuals from concept
to distribution of the final Department of the Army-approved copy is
between 18 months and two years.
The title, scope and status for each
ARSOF doctrinal publication is listed below:
FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army
Special Operations Forces, is the
integrating manual for ARSOF. It
describes ARSOF roles, missions,
capabilities, organization, command

and control, employment and sustainment in all operational environments and at all levels of war,
across the range of military operations. It serves as the doctrinal
foundation for subordinate ARSOF
doctrine, force design, materiel
acquisition, professional education,
sustainment and individual and
unit training.
FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special
Forces Operations, is the SF principles manual. It is directly linked to
and must be used in conjunction
with the doctrinal principles found
in FM 100-25, and FM 100-5, Operations. It describes SF roles, missions, capabilities, organization,
command and control, staffing,
employment and sustainment
across the range of military operations. It provides the authoritative
foundation for SF subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education and
individual and collective training.
FM 31-20 is under revision with a
fielding date of June 1995.
FM 31-20-1, Special Forces Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
This manual will contain the tactics, techniques and procedures that
are basic to most SF missions. It
Special Warfare

will cover subjects such as regional

threats, environments, staff procedures, training management, premission activities, mission-tasking
procedures, deliberate and timesensitive planning and post-mission
activities. This publication will link
FM 31-20 to the five mission manuals. FM 31-20-1 is in development,
with a scheduled fielding date of
March 1995.
FM 31-20-2, Unconventional
Warfare Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Special Forces, will
cover the principles of unconventional warfare at operational
detachments A, B and C levels. Topics will include rural and urban
resistance organizational concepts,
infiltration, contact procedures,

resistance buildup, organization,

training, operations, demobilization
and exfiltration. FM 31-20-2 is in
development, with a scheduled
fielding date of June 1995.
FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal
Defense Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Special Forces. Subjects will include command and control, staff procedures, intelligence,
training, adviser techniques, civil
defense, pacification operations,
hand-off procedures, counterinsurgency and other operational techniques. This manual is scheduled to
be published and fielded in June
1994.
FM 31-20-4, Direct Action Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Special Forces. Subjects include

rural and urban assault techniques,

raid, ambush, standoff attack, terminal guidance, mining and demolition, sabotage and incendiarism.
This manual is scheduled to be published and fielded in September
1995.
FM 31-20-5, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. This
manual defines special-reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SF to obtain or verify, by
visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and
activities of an actual or potential
enemy or to secure data concerning
the meteorologic, hydrographic, geographic or demographic characteris-

SWCS Doctrine Hierarchy

FM 100-5
OPERATIONS
FM 100-25
DOCTRINE FOR
ARSOF

FM 33-1
PSYOP

FM 31-20
SF

FM 41-10
CA

FM 33-1-1
PSYOP TTP

FM 31-20-1
SF TTP

April 1994

FM 41-11
CA TTP

FM 31-20-2
SF UW TTP

FM 31-20-3
SF FID TTP

FM 31-20-4
SF DA TTP

FM 31-20-5
SF SR TTP

FM 31-19
SF MFFP TTP

TC 31-24
SF AIR OPNS
TTP

TC 31-25
SF WATER OPNS
TTP

FM 31-27
PACK ANIMALS
TTP

FM 31-20-6
SF CT TTP (U)

37

tics of a particular area. It includes

target acquisition, area assessment
and post-strike reconnaissance.
This manual was published and
fielded in March 1993.
FM 31-20-6, (U) Counterterrorism, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces (U). This
manual will standardize doctrine on
SF counterterrorism operations for
regional contingencies. FM 31-20-6
(U) is in development, with a scheduled fielding date of September
1995. Distribution is restricted and
controlled by the commander of the
SWCS.
FM 31-19, Military Free Fall
Parachuting Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures, describes proven
techniques and guidelines that are
essential for safe, successful military free-fall operations. The procedures contained in this publication
apply to multiservice free-fall operations. This publication supersedes
FM 31-19, dated February 1988,
and was published and fielded in
February 1993.
TC 31-24, Special Forces Air
Operations, is a guide for SF commanders, staffs and operationaldetachment personnel in planning
and conducting air operations
across the range of military operations. It establishes a coordinated
and common planning base for
units participating in multiservice
and joint operations. This manual
will be nominated for revision as a
joint publication.
TC 31-25, Special Forces Waterborne Operations, provides a consolidated reference for training and
employing SF personnel in all types
of waterborne operations. It provides detailed operational planning
considerations for small-boat operations, surface-swimming operations,
and operations involving underwater breathing apparatuses. This
manual will be nominated for revision as a joint publication.
38

Doctrine terms
have different meanings
In discussing doctrine, the terms doctrine, tactics, techniques,
procedures, drills and tactical standing operating procedures are
sometimes used interchangeably, but they have specific meanings:
Doctrine is composed of the fundamental principles by which
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of
national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in
application.
Tactics are the employment of units in combat; the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or
to the enemy in order to realize their full potential.
Techniques are the general and detailed methods used by troops
or commanders to perform assigned missions and functions. Specifically, they are the methods of using equipment and personnel. Techniques describe a way, not the only way.
Procedures are detailed courses of action that describe how to
perform a task.
Drills provide small units with standard procedures essential
for building a strong, aggressive force. They provide standardized
actions that link soldier and collective tasks at platoon level and
below. There are two types of drills that apply to all types of units
battle drills and crew drills.
Battle drills are collective actions that can be rapidly executed
without applying a deliberate decision-making process.
Crew drills are collective actions that the crew of a weapon or
piece of equipment must perform to use the weapon or equipment.
Tactical standing operating procedures are sets of instructions
covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The
procedure is applicable unless soldiers are ordered otherwise.
Steve Cook

FM 31-27, Use of Pack Animals

in Support of Special Forces, will
describe the tactics, techniques and
procedures for staffers and operators at group level and below for
planning and using packing and
pulling animals in all environments
and SF missions. Topics to be
included in the manual are rigging,
employment, transporting, care and
feeding of animals, veterinary
medicine and use of indigenous
handlers. Production of this manual
is currently on hold.

FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, describes PSYOP employment, command and control, and
support across the range of military
operations. It is the doctrinal guide
for commanders, planners and
users of PSYOP and a guide for
those who must consider the psychological effect of military operations on a target audience. The
manual is the basis for PSYOP force
design and materiel acquisition. It
was published and fielded in February 1993.
Special Warfare

 FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures,

sets forth techniques and procedures for implementing U.S. Army
PSYOP doctrine contained in FM
33-1. This manual was published
and fielded in June 1994.
FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, is the keystone doctrinal
manual for U.S. Army CA operations. It defines the CA mission and
describes roles, capabilities, organization, command and control, combat support, combat-service support
and employment in all environments across the range of military
operations.This manual was published and fielded in January 1993.
FM 41-11, Civil Affairs Procedures, is the procedures manual for
FM 41-10. It provides general guidance for commanders, staffs and
employers of CA operations in all
operational environments and
across the range of military operations. This manual is scheduled to
be published and released in March
1995.
To receive these publications as
they are fielded, units should
ensure that their publications
accounts are current and that their
requirements are accurately shown
on DA Form 12-11-E, on file with

April 1994

the AG Publications Center; 2800

Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD
21220-2896. Block numbers must be
included on DA Form 12. The block
numbers are:
Publication
FM 100-25
FM 31-20
FM 31-20-1
FM 31-20-2
FM 31-20-3
FM 31-20-4
FM 31-20-5
FM 31-20-6 (U)
FM 31-19
TC 31-24
TC 31-25
FM 31-27
FM 33-1
FM 33-1-1
FM 41-10
FM 41-11

Block no.
4654
0531
5281
4870
5096
5097
5098
Restricted
1110
1113
1114
5100
1116
5177
0347
5180

A final point on ARSOF doctrinal

publications is that they are generic
guides; they do not eliminate the
requirement for a well-written standard operating procedure at all levels, driven by a mission-essentialtask list.
For more information on the SOF
doctrinal system or status of current SOF doctrinal publications,

contact Steve Cook, Chief, Doctrine

Management Branch, at DSN 2398689, commercial (910) 432-8689.

Steven E. Cook is
currently the chief of
the Doctrine Management Branch of the
Special Warfare Center and Schools Directorate of Training and
Doctrine. His other Army civilian
assignments include serving as an
instructor on the Special Forces
Operations and Intelligence Committee and as a project officer in the
Directorate of Combat Developments. His military service includes
four tours in Southeast Asia as an
NCO in airborne, infantry,
pathfinder and reconnaissance
units. As an officer he served in airborne and airborne-school assignments and in Special Forces as an
A-detachment executive officer,
detachment commander, company
commander and battalion executive
officer.

39

Interview:
William Colby,
former director,
Central Intelligence Agency

William Colby served with the

Office of Strategic Services in World
War II, both as a member of a Jedburgh team in France and as a
member of an operational group in
Norway. Following the war he
earned a law degree at Columbia
University and worked in the law
firm of former OSS commander
William Donovan. When the Korean
War began in 1950, he entered the
Central Intelligence Agency. From
1951-1959, he served with American
embassies in Stockholm and Rome.
As first secretary to the American
Embassy in Saigon from 1959-1962,
he helped develop the strategic-hamlet program. Returning to Saigon in
1968, he replaced Robert Komer as
director of Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS, the Vietnamese
pacification program designed to
weaken Vietcong influence. He later
served as executive director-controller of the CIA and as deputy
director of operations before his
40

appointment as director in 1973. He

retired from the CIA in 1976.
SW: What made you volunteer to
serve with the Office of Strategic
Services?
Colby: Well, Id say there were
probably three factors. One is that I
was a son of an Army officer in the
interwar era, so I had some familiarity with the service. Secondly, I
had decided a long time ago that
the war was coming and that we
should have been much more active
in getting ready for it than we were,
and I went into the Army in the
summer of 41. And the third reason
was that Id always been interested
in international affairs Id lived
in China, spent a summer with a
French family and studied the
Spanish Civil War during my time
in college. When I got in the Army,
they first sent me to Fort Bragg to
the Field Artillery Replacement
Training Center, then to Fort Sill to
go to the Battery Officers Course.

They kept me there teaching after I

finished, and I was afraid I was
going to miss the war. This was
mid-42. I saw a notice about volunteering for parachuting, and that
would have to be forwarded; your
commander couldnt turn it back. So
I signed up. I had to cheat through
the eye exam. I sat down next to the
eye chart to take my clothes off for
the exam, and I memorized the
20/40 line. I zipped it off, and then
the doctor said, Now do it backwards, and I was trying to do it,
and he said, You really want to be
a parachutist? and I said, Youre
damn right I do. He said, I think
youll be able to see the ground OK,
go ahead. I went to jump school
and came back to Fort Bragg in the
parachute artillery battalion and
was prepared to stay there. A guy
came down from OSS recruiting
people to go jump into France, and
that sounded a hell of a lot more
interesting than struggling around
with a 75mm gun on the ground.
Special Warfare

SW: What was your first OSS

assignment?
Colby: I went through the selection
and training process, and when I
finished the training, I joined a Jedburgh team. The idea of the Jedburghs was to drop one American or
Brit, one French officer and a radio
operator of one of the three nationalities; mine was French. Theyd
drop them a month or two ahead of
the armies. If you sent them too
early and they raised too much
resistance, the Germans would chop
them all down. If you sent them in
too late, they were incidental. So it
was a very complicated process.You
got in touch with the local resistance nets. The idea was to make
contact with the Resistance, train
the people, get them coordinated
and working together, ambush the
Germans, slow them down so that
they couldnt get back to Germany
to regroup. It was the summer of 44
in France; this was after D-Day. We
were in uniform; the Germans said
theyd shoot us if they caught us,
whether in a uniform or not. Their
theory was that any fighting outside the regular military battle
lines was improper. They were
wrong, but they did shoot a few. My
particular position happened to be
sort of on the right flank of Pattons
Third Army. We did some ambushes and slowed the Germans down to
a degree so that Patton could drive
for the German border and not
worry about his flanks, because he
had ample warning if any problem
arose. It was a useful operation.
SW: Didnt you have some experience on an operational group, too?
Colby: Yes. After the Jedburgh
operation, my boss said he wanted
me to take a group up to Norway, so
I did. We blew up a railroad a couple of times, but I dont think we
changed the course of the war very
much. We lived as a unit up in the
hills. They originally wanted to
send 30-odd of us in the first batch,
and we got 16 in; the rest didnt
make it.
April 1994

SW: Were the others captured as

they were jumping in?
Colby: No. The first night we had
eight Liberator B-24s, and four of
them dropped people on the target,
one dropped 50 kilometers away in
Sweden, and the other three went
home; they couldnt find it. And
then a few days later they tried
again with the remaining three, and
one of them crashed in the Orkneys
and they were all killed. They tried

The one thing I think

I did learn ... is that ...
youve got to be
aware of the political
component of the
effor t. That is an
absolute vital part of
this kind of irregular
warfare.
again a few days later, and one of
the planes hit a mountaintop near
us. They were all killed, and at that
point we said, No more.
SW: What types of missions did you
perform?
Colby: Well, the mission there was
that the Germans had about
400,000 troops up in northern Finland that had been pushed up there
by the Russians, and they were

bringing them down through Norway to take them back to Germany.

Our mission was to slow down that
process. We were scattered along a
railroad in northern Norway. The
idea was just to interrupt it every
now and then. We blew one small
bridge. Another time we blew a long
stretch of track, and they shot at us
a few times one of my Norwegians was wounded.
SW: What do you think are some of
the most important things to remember about your OSS experience?
Colby: I think it was important
that we learned the desirability of
language, sort of as a precursor to
the present stress that Special
Forces put on it. And, of course, one
of the Jedburghs was Col. Aaron
Bank. He is one of the great names
in Special Forces, because he came
out of the World War II experience
and then fought to keep the concept
alive. I think the one most important thing was that the Jeds
became exposed to the political
aspects of the operation, the limitations you dont raise a rebellion
unless you have some way of reinforcing it. I thought the idea of not
sending us too soon was very bright,
very intelligent. They realized
youre going to raise a lot of people
up in resistance. Youve got to have
some reinforcements coming in very
soon, or theyll be cleaned out.
When youre dealing with a resistance, youve got to be aware of the
political component of the effort.
That is an absolute vital part of this
kind of irregular warfare. Why are
people doing it? Theyre either there
with you or theyre not. They can go
home, its up to them. Youve got to
have a political appeal. Why are
they going to do it? Of course Ive
been interested in politics and revolutionary war for a long time. My
experiences just reinforced that
belief.
SW: Thats part of what Special
Forces training emphasizes today:
an appreciation of the political and
cultural aspects of a problem.
41

Colby: Special Forces today is so

much better than we were. Its
unbelievable. And I dont mean just
the equipment I mean the training, the subtlety of it. In the Jedburghs, they taught us how to
sneak around and shoot and use
knives. But there was absolutely no
training in the politics of the problem: how to get along with people.
So I read Lawrence of Arabias
book, and he had all sorts of things
in there about how you get along
with a strange culture, how to
relate to them and handle yourself,
how to defer and suggest. You dont
take command, you dont boss people, you just have to work your way
through it. It was good training in
the basic principles of how you get
along.
SW: You were later the director of
the CORDS program in Vietnam.
How successful do you think we
were there in understanding the
political aspect?
Colby: Well, I wrote a whole book
about it, Lost Victory, which I think
points out that the CIA did understand the political component of
that peoples war and, in its initial
programs of the early 60s, got some
programs going that were then
taken over by the local government,
particularly the strategic-hamlet
program, which had its troubles,
but it seized the initiative from the
enemy. I always thought the military aspect was almost irrelevant
because the enemy was fighting the
peoples war, not a soldiers war.
Our previous experience was in
Korea, and we approached it as a
conventional struggle, except for
CIA. We had some Special Forces
assigned to my station when I was
there. They were the first teams
that came in. And we put them up
in these little Montagnard villages
and they taught self-defense and
helped the Montagnards get organized, trained them and so forth,
but essentially, the local leadership
was in command. And they began to
clear out substantial areas. Then
we asked for more Special Forces
42

and they sent them, and at one

point we had 400 Special Forces
working under the CIA station.
Once they got under the Military
Assistance Command, their mission
changed, and they were told to
develop an offensive guerrilla force.
So they took the guns away from all
these people in the little villages,
and they used the reinforcement
forces, the so-called strike forces, to
reinforce among several villages.
And they took them and moved
them over to the Cambodian border.
That lost the entire local-defense
philosophy behind the effort, and
they spent their time running up
and down the border town trying to
find people on the Ho Chi Minh
trail. They did a lot of very heroic
things, but I think it just turned
away from the whole base-building,
defensive approach. My line has
always been that you could conduct
a strategic offensive through defensive tactics. And then, finally, President Johnson got impatient and
said, Weve got to get after this
other war, because his political
background was that youve got to
get an appeal to the people; youve
got to help the people. So he said,
That other war has been totally
passed aside when we were chasing
around on search-and-destroy all
the time. Lets get back to priority
on that. Then this raised the problem again, how do you keep a unity
of command? It took Bob Komer to
straighten out how you could do
that. He first kicked all the agencies
in Washington to start to work
together better, and then they conceived the idea that General Westmoreland would have a civilian
deputy for pacification. That deputy
would handle all aspects of pacification, while the rest of the military
handled the other, but you had the
unity of command in the single
headquarters. It was a genius idea.
Previous to that time, the civilian
agencies had resisted the militarys
taking the thing over. They said the
same thing will happen again:
theyll go chasing off after the
enemy instead of building under-

neath. But they didnt, and so Bob

got it going, and I followed him, and
my contention is that we essentially
won the war. Thats why I called it
Lost Victory. We had a victory. The
test I think was between 68 and
71. We essentially cleaned the communists out of the countryside in
South Vietnam; there were practically none left, certainly not a
threat to the state. We had so
improved the situation that when
the communists saw this all happening, they saw that they were losing. So they mounted up a soldiers
war, a very conventional military
attack at three points on the frontier, and they came across in the
spring of 72. And we, between 69
and 72, had removed about 500
thousand American soldiers from
the country. There were no more
combat troops left. There were some
logistics and advisory and some air,
but no combat troops. But when
this attack came, it was met on the
ground by the Vietnamese Army,
not the Americans, and it held.
Some units broke, but essentially, it
held. Over the course of the next
month or two, the enemy was
pushed back across the border. Now
it wasnt without American participation, but the American participation was enormous logistics. You
train a foreign army to use American weapons and American tactics,
youd better provide it with American logistics or it isnt going to
work. And secondly, U.S. air power,
which we used quite lavishly and
very effectively, worked out very
well. So here, the combination of
the Vietnamese on the ground plus
the enormous American support,
but not participation, threw the
enemy back. I call that victory, if
South Vietnam could sustain itself,
not with American troops but with
American support. That was what
we were after; that was our national objective. Of course after that,
the logistics was cut way back, and
by 1975, when the second major
attack took place, there was no possibility of using American air
power, with the Congress in the sitSpecial Warfare

uation it was, and bingo, it fell

apart, so thats the lost part of the
lost victory. But the lesson to me
is, dont try to run it with soldiers,
dont try to run it with sweetness
and light, combine it. Use your
intelligence, use your special operations, use your regulars where
theyre appropriate. But dont just
use one or the other, use them all in
combination.
SW: What do you think we need to
remember about that experience as
we look to what we call operations
other than war?
Colby: I wrote a piece in the
Defense Intelligence Journal here
about a year ago, and it seems to
me that the CORDS experience
offers some good advice to us
that you dont have the military
intelligence, the tactical intelligence
working just by itself. Because the
military, with the best will in the
world, are not very political, and
they are not very sensitive to political problems. The CIA is basically
inclined to look upward rather than
downward with where the information goes. So what do you do? You
put them together. Dont think CIA
does it all by itself or the Army does
it all by itself. They work as a team,
and they work very well. It seems to
me that there really is better liaison
between the agency and the military than there used to be, and
thats to be praised.
SW: What is your opinion of our
modern special-operations forces?
Colby: I think theyre doing a fine
job. Im a great supporter. I applaud
the way the military as a whole has
really taken to special operations as
an important element of our military structure. Granted it took the
Congress to sort of force it down
their throats, but nonetheless, its
there. The fact that theres a CINC,
and you have the kind of structure
there is and the budget that they
have, apparently being reasonably
protected, is a good sign. My line
has always been that the most likely forces youre going to use are the
April 1994

special operations. Theyre the ones

youll use more often, and I think
thats been demonstrated.
SW: Do you think that likelihood
will continue into the future?
Colby: Albert Einstein said in the
late 1940s that the advent of the
nuclear weapon has changed everything but the way we think. Well, I
think that if he were alive today, he
would say the end of the Cold War

My line has always

been that the most
likely force youre
going to use are the
special operations,
and I think thats
been demonstrated.

approach to a problem, not merely

the application of force the kinds
of things that the special-operations
people have done in Panama, and
with the Kurds. The question will
be, do we want to intervene in some
of these faraway places? I think
that there are a lot of them in which
we wont. But if we want to intervene, I think special operations are
some of the best ways to intervene
with a modest force as part of a
multilateral, multinational force.
There is a question of how far the
American people want to go. I dont
think they are willing to go a long
way, and theyre not willing to go
alone. I think that they would agree
to participate in a multilateral force
as maybe one-quarter or one-fifth of
the force involved. But that means
we have to figure out the whole
relationship who works for
whom? Its a complicated problem.
It took us 20 years to figure out the
logistics and the communications
and command structures in NATO,
and that was in the face of the Red
army, so we had to. We havent figured out those relationships for
peacemaking, and the question is,
can we do it now? The administrations partnership for peace has the
elements of how to approach it: a
flexible approach of different relations with different nations, bringing them into some sort of coordinated effort. Thats going in the
right direction, but were a long way
from home.

has changed everything but the way

we think. With all the benefits of
the Bottom-Up Review, I think we
need a better intelligence assessment as to what kinds of problems
were going to face and what we
need forces for. I think there are
potential savings in that. I think
that special-operations forces come
out very well in that assessment,
because you are essentially talking
about small engagements, and
youre talking about an engagement
which will involve a rounded
43

Letters
Special Warfare

Trainer term incorrect

It was with great pleasure I
recently read SWs interview with
Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert, Lt. Col.
Frank Pedrozo and Col. J.S. Roach
regarding the role of Special Forces
during the course of El Salvadors
12-year civil war (October 1993). As
a former SOF operator during the
initial advisory training effort
(1981-1984), I would only point out
Lt. Col. Lamberts error in offering
those Special Forces personnel
working in-country never were
advisers ... They never were legally
authorized to advise. In all fairness
to the colonels statement, it is my
professional observation he erred in
favor of being politically correct
regarding an issue which is sorely
misunderstood not only by the public, but the U.S. military community
as a whole.
Special Forces personnel assigned
to the U.S. MilGroup in El Salvador
were both trainers and advisers, as
is evidenced by formal MilGroup
documentation as well as further
documentation to this effect recently issued by a number of respected
civilian and military offices.
The operative term adviser is
used to describe U.S. military personnel assigned to fight in this conflict throughout the two most
important studies published on the
war in El Salvador, American Military Policy in Small Wars. The Case
of El Salvador (Lt. Cols. A.J. Bacevich, James D. Hallums, Richard H.
White, and Thomas F. Young), and
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, by Benjamin
C. Schwarz of the RAND Institute
for National Defense Research.
Contrary to Lt. Col. Lambert,
SOF operators acted as combat
44

advisers from 1981 onward as hostile-fire pay statements signed by

Col. Moody E. Hayes, COMISMILGP, El Salvador, demonstrate.
Engaged in combat in the field
(high-risk areas), in urban areas
(i.e., San Salvador, 1983/84/89) and
in their cuartels (i.e., San Miguel,
La Union, Usulutan) by often massive FMLN guerrilla forces, they
served with documented honor and
distinction.
As Special Forces soldiers we
have much to be proud about
regarding the civil/military victory
of our counterparts over the Marxist forces of the FMLN. For the sake
of advisers such as SFC Gregory
Fronius, who died fighting alongside those Salvadoran soldiers
whom he was responsible for, lets
not dishonor this brilliant chapter
of Special Forces history by assuming a politically correct stance
when it is no longer necessary.
Greg Walker
Senior editor, Behind the Lines
Festus, Mo.

Sniper program result

of one mans efforts
Having been there during its
inception, I particularly enjoyed the
article on the 10th Special Forces
Groups sniper-training program
(October 1993). I would like to add a
couple of purely historical comments to this excellent article.
First, the start of the sniper
training program was largely due to
the efforts of one man, SFC Bill
Amelung. He was one of those true
believers that are sometimes found
among the possessors of demanding
skills. He believed in large-bore
marksmanship and in its applica-

tion in sniping. Buoyed by this conviction, he took it upon himself to

convince the Group that it should
do something in this field. At that
time, continuation of the then-new
sniping training program at the
IMA was very iffy. It had few supporters and many opponents. SFC
Amelung first convinced the Group
S-3, Maj. Ken Getty, then the DCO
and the CO. He was given the obvious reward for his efforts the
instruction. He did it, overcoming
numerous obstacles. That the program was started, developed, survived and succeeded is largely
attributable to SFC Amelungs
efforts.
The other comment concerns the
sniping range so well described in
the article. This facility was entirely built by the 10th SFG with
external help consisting mostly of
permission and tolerance. Included
in the shooting house were areas
for weapons maintenance, storage
areas and facilities for overnight
guards. construction was to residential standards. It was turned
over to the post only when it was
completed.
Retired Col. J.H. Crerar
Vienna, Va.

Special Warfare welcomes letters

from its readers but may have to
edit them for length. Please include
your full name, rank, address and
phone number. Address letters to
Editor, Special Warfare; Attn:
AOJK-DTP-B; JFK Special Warfare
Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC
28307-5000.

Special Warfare

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

DA PAM 600-25 to contain

chapters on SOF MOSs

The proposed DA PAM 600-25, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide, has chapters covering active- and reserve-component soldiers
in CMF 18 (SF), CMF 37 (PSYOP), and CMF 38 (Reserve CA). The chapters
contain information about institutional training, operational assignments
and self-development that SOF soldiers can use to help manage their
careers. The chapters should be fielded during 1994. For further information, contact Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie, proponent sergeant major, or MSgt.
Danny Carpinetti, CMF 18 manager, SWCS Special Operations Proponency
Office, at DSN 239-9002/2415, commercial (910) 432-2415, fax -9406.

Army filling 37F slots

in 4th PSYOP Group

The Army Special Operations Command needs active- and reserve-component soldiers to fill 37F slots in the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, N.C.
Applicants should be airborne-qualified or airborne-volunteer privates and
specialists. For more information, call SSgt. Stewart Marin, PERSCOM 37F
career adviser, at DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (703) 325-8340/6044.

Enlisted SF soldiers may

apply for SF warrant officer

The Army Recruiting Command is looking for enlisted SF soldiers to apply

for SF warrant-officer training. Applicants must have fewer than 12 years
active federal service (waiverable with DA approval). They must also be in
the grade of staff sergeant or above, have three years ODA experience, have
a DLPT rating of 1+/1+ or a DLAB score of 85, be an SF O&I graduate, have
recommendations from company, battalion and group commanders, and be
under 36 in the active component or under 42 in the reserve component. For
more information, contact the SF warrant-officer recruiter at DSN 4640820/0832/ 8779/8789, commercial (502) 624-0820/0832/8779/8789.

PERSCOM points of contact

The following points of contact may be useful to enlisted SOF soldiers who
need information about assignments or career development:
Maj. Christopher Allen
MSgt. Philip Taxiera
Mrs. Faye Matheny
Ms. Jacqui Velasquez
Ms. Dyna Amey
SSgt. Stewart Marin
Mrs. Loretta Spivey

SF Enlisted Branch chief

Professional-development NCO
18 B, C and D assignments manager
18 E, F, Z and ROTC assignments,
ANCOC manager
SFQC accession manager
37F assignments, ANCOC manager
SF Branch secretary

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the appropriate assignment managers and career-development questions to the professionaldevelopment NCO. Students attending the SF Qualification Course with
assignment-related questions should contact their student PAC. Branch
phone numbers are DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (703) 325-8340/6044.
Address correspondence to: Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 200 Stovall St.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.

April 1994

45

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

SOF officers eligible for

advanced degree in SO/LIC

Warrant-officer actions
have implications for SF

Under a recent agreement between the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Chief of Naval Operations, qualified SOF officers
will be selected for an advanced degree program at the Naval Post Graduate
School leading to a master of arts in special operations and low-intensity
conflict. The purpose of the program is to provide highly qualified officers,
with advanced academic schooling, to SOF positions requiring extensive
expertise in SO/LIC. The SF Branch at PERSCOM will select 10 officers for
each course of instruction. Selected officers will be senior captains or junior
majors with above-average performance fiches. The quota for attendance by
branch and functional area will be six 18A54 and two 18A39 officers per
course. One Ranger Regiment officer and one SOF-aviation officer will also
be selected by the Infantry and Aviation branches. The academic program
will last 18 months, followed by a three-year utilization tour. Positions so far
identified for utilization are joint billets in theater special-operations commands. Interested officers should send a completed DA Form 1618R to Commander; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall
Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414. For more information, contact Capt.
Ernie Benner at the SF Branch, phone DSN 221-3175/3178.
Several ongoing warrant-officer actions can have implications for Special
Forces warrant officers:
The revision of AR 611-112, Manual of Warrant Officer MOSs, will not
only provide standards of grade for MOS 180A, but will also regulate the
grade-coded assignments of all SF warrant officers. All W-1/W-2 positions
are on A-detachments; two A-detachments will remain coded W-3, the company position is coded W-3, the battalion position W-4, and both grouplevel positions are coded W-5. AR 611-112 as a standard of grade will stipulate that all entry-level SF warrant officers will initiate a special background investigation for a top-secret security clearance to provide better
assignment potential as senior and master warrant officers.
The revision of DA Pamphlet 600-11, Warrant Officer Professional Development, will include a chapter on MOS 180A. This pamphlet will provide
career guidance for SF warrant officers and promotion guidance for DA
selection boards. This guidance will include the recommended minimum of
5-7 years on the operational A-detachment (and up to 14 years, if required)
in the warrant ranks of WO1, CWO2, and CWO3. This guidance will also
emphasize the assignments of 180As in authorized grade-coded positions
and explain the possible negative connotations of an assignment in an
unauthorized position. Warrant officers and their commanders should
understand these important implications.
AR 621-1 now provides partially funded degree-completion opportunities
for most CWO2s and CWO3s. CWO2s will be eligible for associate-level
training and CWO3s for baccalaureate-level training on Army time. These
degrees have an impact on promotions to the next higher grades.
The MOS 180A is changing its MOS title and principal duty titles to
eliminate the ambiguities sometimes associated with the term technician
and to better define the duty title of the SF warrant officer. Because SF

46

Special Warfare

warrant officers frequently command A-detachments (sometimes as many

as 60 percent and a substantial cumulative portion of most SF warrants
team time is in command), a more concise title was sought and found: one
that includes the word commander. The changes are: MOS 180A, Special Forces technician, to MOS 180A Special Forces warrant officer;
detachment technician to assistant detachment commander; company
technician to company operations warrant officer; battalion technician
to battalion operations warrant officer; and, at the group level, group
technician to group intelligence warrant officer and group operations
warrant officer. Titles should be entered as appropriate in Part IIIa of the
OER, DA Form 67-8, and on the Officer Record Brief in Section IX, Assignment History, under Duty Title.
Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, the commanding general of the SWCS, has
instituted a policy to cap the age of SF warrant-officer applicants at 36
years. All future DA selection boards will be briefed on the desired maximum age of the MOS 180A selectee. The reserve component will use a 42year age cap for an interim of two years, after which it will adopt the 36year age cap. As MOS 180A accessions decrease, this qualitative measure
will assist the SF community in selecting those candidates with the best
physical potential required by the rigors of the A-detachment.
MOS 180A will continue to recruit and select warrant officers even
though the accession requirements will be reduced in FY 95 and FY 96.
Because of the reduced accession requirements, selection into the only true
combat warrant-officer MOS will become increasingly difficult. Applicants
who exceed the DA-mandated active federal service of 12 years will be subject to waiver action from HQDA. The SF proponent will recommend
waivers for qualified soldiers who have 12-14 years of active federal service. Applicants beyond 14 years of AFS will no longer be competitive or
present adequate future-service potential. MOS 180A will be very competitive, and applicants should consider this aspect of selection when preparing their applications. Key areas of selection will include the applicants
service potential, qualifications, experience and language rating.
Qualified NCOs applying for candidacy as SF warrant officers should ask
their commanders for an interview and a letter of recommendation. These
letters should be individualized and not generic endorsements. Applicants and their commanders must recognize the importance of the recommendations as a qualitative tool for the DA Selection Board.
The CWO3, CWO4 and CWO5 promotion board for active-component warrant officers will convene May 31, 1994. Zones of consideration will be for:
CWO3 Above zone: All CWO2s with ADOR 30 Sep 88 and earlier
Primary zone: All CWO2s with ADOR 1 Oct 88 - 30 Sep 89
Title 10 does not provide for below-the-zone promotion to CWO3
CWO4 Above zone: All CWO3s with ADOR 30 Sep 88 and earlier
Primary zone: All CWO3s with ADOR 1 Oct 88 - 30 Sep 89
Below zone: All CWO3s with ADOR 1 Oct 89 - 30 Sep 90
CWO5 Above zone: All CWO4s/MWO4s with ADOR 30 Sep 87 and earlier
Primary zone: All CWO4s/MWO4s with ADOR 1 Oct 87 - 30 Sep 89
Below zone: All CWO4s/MWO4s with ADOR 1 Oct 89 - 30 Sep 90

Eligible warrant officers should update their DA photographs, Official Military Personnel Folders and Officer Record Briefs. For more information on
Special Forces warrant-officer issues, contact CWO3 Shaun P. Driscoll, SF
warrant-officer manager, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at
DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

April 1994

47

Foreign SOF
Special Warfare

Turkey bolsters efforts

against terrorist group

In August 1993 Turkey announced its intention to begin increasing police

and military forces designated to conduct operations against the terrorist
Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK. Under this plan, special teams within the
General Directorate of Police would be strengthened with personnel who will
receive six months training in police schools. Some 3,000 troops will be
selected from commando units for the military component. They will have
served in southeastern Anatolia, be especially well-paid and be expected to
live like the PKK members live in the mountains. While under the Special
Operations Department of the Turkish armed forces, the teams will operate
under the control of ground-force and gendarmerie commanders. An associated intelligence organization of military and civilian personnel will provide
information on PKK bases, deployments and operations.

Czechs resume
Semtex exports

The on-again, off-again export of the general-purpose plastic explosive Semtex, manufactured in Czechoslovakia during the height of the Cold War and
linked to terrorist groups around the world, is scheduled to resume. The
Czech Republic recently announced that exports were beginning to selected
countries. The first Semtex shipment under the resumed exports will
reportedly go to the British Defense Ministry. Czech reporting suggests that
the British authorities intend to run experiments on the explosive that is
often used by Irish Republican Army terrorists including the October
1993 destruction of a building in Belfast. According to the 1991 international convention signed in Montreal, Semtex intended for industrial applications is to be a bright red-orange color and detectable by security-monitoring equipment. Variants of the explosive produced for civilian purposes are
also less powerful than the nearly odorless version that became a favorite
weapon of terrorists. Despite this and the export ban that had earlier been
in place, Semtex continues to be smuggled across borders. Substantial
quantities of the explosive have been stolen from industrial enterprises in
the Czech and Slovak republics for sale on the black market. Shortly before
the most recent ban was lifted, Czech police seized 100 kilograms of industrial Semtex from a group of Czech citizens who were planning its illegal
sale abroad. In Slovakia last October, some 900 kilograms of the explosive
were stolen from the warehouse of a private firm, together with more than
2,000 detonators. Czech officials candidly admit that they have no idea how
much Semtex has been stolen or illegally diverted, and the continued blackmarket trade in the explosive seems certain.

Andean Ridge governments

increase counterinsurgency
resolve

48

In late November, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru made a dramatic

rejection at the United Nations in New York of a proposal by the Sendero
Luminoso guerrillas for peace negotiations. The Peruvian government has
taken an unconditional surrender approach, although an amnesty law,
the Law of Repentance, allows for individual surrender and impunity for
past association with the guerrilla group. Sendero Luminoso has become
synonymous with fanaticism, though there seems to be more continuity
and vision to the organization than would be expected from a simple personality-based movement that had lost its top leadership. In the euphoric
Special Warfare

aftermath of SL leader Abimail Guzmans capture last year, Fujimori

promised to eliminate the group by 1995. Now the government seems to be
backing off from that goal in light of SLs apparent resilience. Nevertheless, Fujimoris tough policy is both an indicator of government confidence
and a morale booster for the stressed Peruvian public. Problems with
armed local self-defense committees in rural areas, car bombings in Lima
and criticism of the presidents governance by decree are balanced by a
measure of efficiency in the counterguerrilla efforts of the security forces
and by generally positive economic trends. In sum, while Sendero Luminoso may be a resilient foe, the Peruvian state is more robust than it was
sometimes thought to be.
In Colombia, there also appears be a renewed commitment to overcome its
leftist armed opposition. Security-force budgets continue to rise and major
reforms, both of the military forces and, more importantly, of the police,
are on the verge of implementation. Police reforms include short- and longterm projects to improve internal order. Higher pay scales and higher educational requirements for police personnel are tied to a new organizational
structure. The police will stay under the ministry of defense to assure their
apolitical professionalism, but they will have a new look and more missions. Lightly armed urban police will patrol Colombias major cities while
two other distinct subdivisions provide security services in rural areas.
One of these would be given the capability and mission to counter organized internal armed groups. The hope is to eventually withdraw the
Colombian Army as the primary countersubversive force in the country.
Meanwhile, drug trafficking remains a challenge. New twists include the
production and export of liquid marijuana (a more transportable marijuana extract) and an apparent reassertiveness of the ancient emerald
mafia. Colombian society, however, seems to be increasingly unified in
meeting the challenge. Special operations against internal enemies of the
state may fall increasingly to police departments and less to military
forces. Whether or not the Colombian police can develop the level of professionalism and public legitimacy necessary to assume missions now falling
to the military is in great measure dependent on funding commitments by
the Colombian government.

Opium poppy cultivation

reported in Peru

Peruvian authorities are monitoring reports of opium-poppy cultivation in

traditional Peruvian coca-growing areas. According to Peruvian assessments, limited numbers of poppies are being grown in the Amazonas and
Cajamarca areas, with Colombian narco-traffickers reported to be distributing poppy seeds in Perus Sisa River Valley, San Martin Province.
Poppy cultivation in Colombia itself increased rapidly in the late 1980s,
although earlier reports were sparse. Heroin laboratories soon appeared,
and by the early 1990s a vigorous, profitable heroin trade with the U.S.
and Europe had developed. Peruvian specialists assert their intention to
prevent the establishment of significant poppy cultivation in Peru. They
point out that a glut of cocaine on world markets, falling prices for the coca
cultivators and high profits to be made from heroin are factors that advise
early Peruvian countermeasures.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest of the Foreign
Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
April 1994

49

Update
Special Warfare
Dorschner or SSgt. Brad Kingston
at DSN 766-3737, commercial (801)
576-3737.

Jedburgh veterans dedicate

memorial stone
Members of an elite World War II
unit gathered at the JFK Plaza Jan.
28 to dedicate a granite marker to
the memory of their unit and fallen
comrades.
Hosted by Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott,
commander of the Army Special
Operations Command, the dedication ceremony paid tribute to the
Jedburghs, units of the Office of
Strategic Services that operated
behind enemy lines in three-man
teams.
This stone memorializes the
courage and accomplishments of the
Jedburghs and reminds us of the
need for special-operations soldiers
soldiers willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their country,
Scott said.
The OSS created 99 three-man
Jedburgh teams during World War
II to provide special-operations support for the allied invasion of German-occupied France and the
Netherlands. The teams, normally
consisting of one French officer, one
American or British officer, and an
enlisted radio operator, penetrated
deep behind enemy lines to work
with resistance groups in harassing
German forces.
The Jedburghs became a tremendous combat multiplier in Europe,
disrupting the movement of thousands of German troops and their
supplies. The standards they set
and the traditions they established
live on in modern special-operations
forces, Scott said.
Jedburgh team member and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Colby was
guest speaker for the ceremony.
Although technology, equipment
50

Soldiers must meet

course prerequisites

Photo by Keith Butler

Jedburgh veterans join modern-day USASOC

soldiers in dedicating the memorial stone.

and training are better today than

they were in the 1940s, Colby said,
there is a direct link between the
Jedburghs and modern Special
Forces soldiers through the emphasis placed in both training programs
on cultural preparation. Susan
Jackson, USASOC PAO

19th SF Group looking

for MI soldiers
The 19th Special Forces Group is
looking for NCOs qualified in military intelligence.
The unit has openings for NCOs
in MOSs 96D, 96B, 97B, 97E, 98C,
98G and 98H.
The 19th SF Group has units in
Utah, Colorado and West Virginia.
Members will have opportunities
for advanced military schooling,
OCONUS deployments and realworld missions, according to Capt.
James P. Dorschner, Group S-2.
For more information, contact

The JFK Special Warfare Center

and Schools 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group,
reports that some students are
turned away once they show up for
training in military free fall, underwater operations and operations
and intelligence courses because
they do not meet the prerequisites.
Prerequisites for the courses are
listed below:
Military Free-Fall Parachutist
Course Open to active- or
reserve-component officers, warrant
officers or enlisted personnel in special-operations forces who are
assigned to, or on orders for assignment to, a military free fall-coded
position; or selected DoD personnel
or allied personnel who are qualified military parachutists. Applicants must have passed the highaltitude, low-opening physical
examination in accordance with AR
40-501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-5,
within one year prior to class date
and must report with complete
medical records, including original
HALO examination, on day of inprocessing. Applicants must have
nine months remaining in service
upon graduation.
SF Combat Diver Qualification
Course Open to active- or
reserve-component Army or selected
DoD personnel assigned or on
orders to a special-operations-forces
unit. Applicants must be male commissioned officers, warrant officers
or enlisted personnel. They must
pass a scuba physical examination
Special Warfare

in accordance with AR 40-501,

Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-8, within
one year before the course completion date and must report with
medical records on the day of inprocessing. Applicants must pass
the Army Physical Readiness Test
with a minimum of 70 points in
each event and an overall score of
210 or above (scored on the 17-21year age group) and must meet
height and weight standards outlined in AR 600-9.
SF Assistant Operations and
Intelligence Sergeant Course
Applicants must be members of
active- or reserve-component Special Forces units. They must be staff
sergeants or above, be MOS 18series qualified for at least three
years and have served in an SF
operational unit for at least three
years. They must also pass the
APRT within 30 days before attending the course (verified by the commander), have a current periodic SF
physical in accordance with AR 40501, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-3, and
be airborne-qualified, able to participate in airborne operations and on
jump status.
For more information on courses
in the SWCS 2nd Battalion, contact
SFC Robert De Groff at DSN 2394420, commercial (910) 432-4420.

USSOCOM develops
Civil Affairs data base
A global Civil Affairs data base is
being developed under the supervision of the U.S. Special Operations
Command.
The data base, which will be
available to all CA soldiers via
modem, will become the primary
source for all Civil Affairs information, according to Pamela Dover, a
Civil Affairs data base action officer
in the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.
Maps, which will identify monuments, artifact locations, transportation assets and population
statistics, will be quickly retrieved
by telephone and then downloaded
into portable lap-top computers
April 1994

throughout the CA community in

the future, Dover said.
A prototype of the data base was
recently presented to members of
USACAPOC at its headquarters at
Fort Bragg. At the presentation,
programmers stressed that the system being developed compiles information in a format compatible with
FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.
Covering the 22 CA functional
areas, the data-base information is
organized into a system that CA soldiers can quickly understand and
retrieve, said Juergen Buehring, a
computer specialist in the USSOCOM J-9 section.
Training and user manuals are
now being developed for the system,
Buehring said. He expects the system to be operational in about a
year. Gerard Healy, USASOC
PAO

FM 100-5 package released

on CD-ROM
The Army Training and Doctrine
Command has released an educational package to accompany the
release of the new Field Manual
100-5, Operations.
Developers say the package can
be a valuable tool that will assist
commanders and leaders in developing training and leader-development programs.
The package has three elements:
a CD-ROM computer disk, a 35mm
slide presentation with a script, and
a VHS videotape.
The CD-ROM disk contains both
the 1986 and 1993 versions of FM
100-5 and copies of FM 25-100,
Training the Force, FM 25-1-1, Battle Focused Training, The National
Security Strategy of the United
States and The U.S. National Military Strategy.
Three audio-visual animations on
the disk explain the concept of battle space, the dynamics between
operational offense and defense,
and the concept of simultaneous
attack in depth. Teaching points
accompany each animation.
The slide presentation and script

explain the new FM 100-5 in terms

of new concepts and the strategic
context in which it was developed.
The videotape gives viewers historical insight into the production of
Army keystone doctrine and its relevance to the Army.
Initial distribution of the training package sent 1,200 copies of
the CD-ROM disk and 650 copies of
the slide presentation and videotape to active- and reserve-component Army units. For more information, contact Lt. Col. Pat Ritter,
TRADOC School of Advanced Military Studies, at DSN 5522138/3345.

ACAP services
ease job transition
Soldiers and civilians leaving the
Army because of downsizing can
make a smoother transition by
planning ahead and taking advantage of the Armys program for transition assistance.
The Army Career and Alumni
Program, known as ACAP, has been
developed to ensure that Army personnel experience a successful transition into civilian life. It is open to
Army personnel, family members
over 18 and DA civilians affected by
force alignment or reduction.
ACAP provides a number of services, including individual transition plans, automated career planning, quarterly job fairs, small-business counseling, workshops and
benefits counseling. Personnel may
attend ACAP as many as 180 days
prior to their terminal leave or ETS
date.
To take full advantage of the
program, affected soldiers and
civilians should register as early as
possible. Commanders, first
sergeants and unit leaders can
assist by affording personnel every
opportunity to participate. For
more information, contact the
ACAP office on your installation.

51

Book Reviews
Special Warfare
Getting It Right: American Military Reform After Vietnam to
the Gulf War and Beyond. By
James F. Dunnigan and Raymond
M. Macedonia. New York: William
Morrow & Company, 1993. ISBN 0688-12096-2. 320 pages. $23.
Everyone is getting involved in
the reform business even our
Defense Department. Historically,
Americas military forces have had
a lackluster performance, in spite of
several reorganizations and
inspired leadership. This has been
particularly true following the first
battle of a major conflict. In February, 1991, the American military
did something unique. For the first
time in history, U.S. troops won the
first battle of a war and did it with
minimal losses. The Gulf War was
an unqualified success.
The recent work by James F.
Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia
traces the sweep of reforms in our
armed services over nearly two
decades from the painful aftermath of Vietnam to the Gulf War.
The authors appear to be well-qualified to speak on the subject of military reform. Dunnigan has been
designing war games for the U.S.
military since 1966 and helped to
re-establish war-gaming at the U.S.
Army War College.
Retired Army Col. Raymond
Macedonia, educated at the University of Pittsburgh, the Wharton
Business School and New York University, later served on the faculty
at the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point. He also held several
key assignments on the Joint Staff,
including directing interagency analytical study efforts which led to
negotiations with the former Soviet
Union on mutual and balanced force
52

reductions.
Written primarily for civilians,
Dunnigan and Macedonias work
focuses on their concept of a victory
disease, an affliction caught by
most armies after they have fought
a war. The authors summarize the
symptoms of this disease by exploring the following issues:
It worked so well last time,
lets do it again next time. The
authors contend that the victory
disease tends to make winners
blind to needed technological and
organizational changes.
Congratulations, youre
fired! According to the authors,
nations, particularly democracies,
do not willingly spend large
amounts of money on troops in
peacetime.
What exactly did we do in
order to win? Losers want to
dump old habits and winners are
reluctant to fiddle with what is
obviously a winning combination.
The books strong suit lies in

telling the story of early visionaries

whose impacts are still felt in
todays military. These include
Army Gen. William DePuy, of
whom the authors say, He led the
way in breaking the mold by creating an Army trained and ready to
win its first battles quickly, decisively, and with minimum casualties. DePuy is credited with establishing the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, which recently
celebrated its 20th year of contributing doctrinal, training and
force-structure enhancements to
our modern Army.
Also included in this list of visionaries are Retired Army Gen. Paul F.
Gorman, former commander in
chief for U.S. Southern Command
from 1983-84, who is praised for his
efforts in helping to establish the
National Training Center at Fort
Irwin, Calif.; Retired Army Gen.
William R. Richardson, who is credited with establishing the AirLand
Battle doctrine; and Retired Army
Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman, An
extraordinary man with exceptional
talent and creativity, who was
instrumental in turning the volunteer Army into a quality fighting
force.
If this volume has a weakness, it
lies in the highly generalized shotgun descriptions of the condition of
the Armys noncommissioned officer
corps following the Vietnam War.
The authors describe this group of
warriors as drifting toward booze,
brawling, and (having) complicated
love lives. Nothing could be further
from the truth. Having benefited
from the experience and wisdom of
some of these outstanding individuals during his early military career,
this reviewer can certainly vouch
for their many contributions to
Special Warfare

todays Army.
Getting It Right describes some of
the crucial issues facing todays military. It provides the reader with
plenty of material from which to
develop informed opinions of our
military forces and their role in a
New World Order.
Maj. Michael E. Long
360th CA Brigade
Columbia, S.C.
Understanding War: Essays on
Clausewitz and the History of
Military Power. By Peter Paret.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN: 0-691-00090-5
(paper). 229 pages.
Peter Paret, professor of history
at the Institute for Advanced Study
at Princeton University, is perhaps
Americas foremost expert on Karl
von Clausewitz and his politicalmilitary writings. Therefore, any of
Parets thoughts and opinions need
to be taken seriously.
This book is a collection of Parets
essays and speeches on Clausewitz
and war in 19th-century Europe,
compiled over his illustrious academic career. Paret provides dozens
of insights into Clausewitzs thinking and the times in which he
wrote. As such, this book is an
excellent companion to Parets and
Michael Howards translation of
Clausewitzs On War the best
translation of Clausewitz on the
market. Perhaps a better title for
this latest work would be, Understanding Clausewitz and His
Times for this is what the book
does best.
Since Clausewitz lived and fought
during the Napoleonic era, Paret
gives much space to the discussion
of Napoleon and his war-fighting
strategies and their effect on political and military figures and theorists of the day. Paret deserves congratulations for his synthetic
approach to the subject. By examining the social, economic, political
and military means for making war
in the 19th century, he enhances
our understanding of the total enviApril 1994

ronment of central Europe at that

time.
As in all compilations of different
works, Parets book suffers from a
lack of continuity, but this observation need not be interpreted as criticism. In fact, because of the way the
book is divided into three parts,
with 16 chapters, it makes superb
bedtime reading. No essay is so long
that it would keep you up late.
Although many of his chapters
make for interesting reading,
Parets expositions on Nationalism
and the Sense of Military Obligation, and Conscription and the
End of the Ancien Regime in France
and Prussia, are most thought-provoking. These two essays go to the
heart of the body politic and its
relationship to nationalism
which is what made Napoleons
draft of two million Frenchmen into
his military possible. Many of
Parets observations about the 19th
century retain value today.
For instance, he writes, Nationalism implies a measure of sacrifice of
mens immediate concerns for the
greater good; but on occasion the
common cause may appear to be
imperfectly represented, and However men have felt about fighting for
their country ecstatic, resentful,
resigned whatever their attitude,
it has rarely been in perfect harmo-

ny with the principles and expectations of their governments.

Parets discourse concerning the
American Revolutionary War and
its effect, or more correctly, its lack
of effect, on European military
thought is also fascinating. Of particular interest to Clausewitzian
scholars will be Parets observations
in Clausewitz: Life and Thought,
and his publication, with commentary, of two of Clausewitzs previously unpublished letters concerning strategy.
A possible criticism is that the
book assumes knowledge the reader
may not possess. Parets essays
appear targeted at graduate-level
audiences who have already read
On War and have studied the wars
of 19th-century Europe. If the reader does not have this scholastic
background, then the book may be
of limited utility.
Moreover, Parets style of writing
tends toward the old academic
his sentences are sometimes overly
long and complex. Paret also
assumes the readers knowledge of
19th-century French, British and
German history. This is understandable, but unfortunately, again,
limits his audience to graduate students or well-read military-history
buffs.
Overall, and with an understanding of their limitations, Parets
essays are illuminating and interesting. Understanding War,
although too grand a title for a collection of any one persons essays, is
enlightening reading.
Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
Joint Special Operations Cmd.
Fort Bragg, N.C.

53

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army

JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK DTP B
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 5000

BULK RATE
U.S. Postage
PAID
Rochester, NY
Permit No. 1025

PIN: 072070000