The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Act was passed to override the judgement in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum which had applied Section 125 of the CrPC to grant maintenance to divorced Muslim women. The petitioner argued that denying Muslim women relief under Section 125 violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not violate these articles and that Muslim husbands have a liability to make fair and reasonable provisions for divorced wives, including maintenance beyond the mandatory iddat period.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Act was passed to override the judgement in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum which had applied Section 125 of the CrPC to grant maintenance to divorced Muslim women. The petitioner argued that denying Muslim women relief under Section 125 violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not violate these articles and that Muslim husbands have a liability to make fair and reasonable provisions for divorced wives, including maintenance beyond the mandatory iddat period.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Act was passed to override the judgement in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum which had applied Section 125 of the CrPC to grant maintenance to divorced Muslim women. The petitioner argued that denying Muslim women relief under Section 125 violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not violate these articles and that Muslim husbands have a liability to make fair and reasonable provisions for divorced wives, including maintenance beyond the mandatory iddat period.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Act was passed to override the judgement in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum which had applied Section 125 of the CrPC to grant maintenance to divorced Muslim women. The petitioner argued that denying Muslim women relief under Section 125 violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not violate these articles and that Muslim husbands have a liability to make fair and reasonable provisions for divorced wives, including maintenance beyond the mandatory iddat period.
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DANIAL LATIFI v UNION OF INDIA
FACTS OF THE CASE
In this case, the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was challenged before the Supreme Court.The Act was passed to appease a particular section of the society and with the intention of making the decision in case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum ineffective. In the Shahbanos case, the husband had appealed against the judgment of the MadhyaPradesh High Court which had directed him to pay to his divorced wife Rs. 179/- per m o n t h , e n h a n c i n g t h e p a l t r y sum of Rs. 25 per month originally granted by t h e Magistrate. The parties had been married for 43 years before the ill and elderly wife had b e e n t h r o w n o u t o f h e r h u s b a n d ' s r e s i d e n c e . F o r a b o u t t w o y e a r s t h e h u s b a n d p a i d maintenance to his wife at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. When these payments ceased s h e p e t i t i o n e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 2 5 o f t h e C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e ( C r .P.C . ) . T h e husband immediately dissolved the marriage by pronouncing a triple talaq. H e p a i d Rs.3000/- as deferred mahr a n d a f u r t h e r s u m t o c o v e r a r r e a r s o f m a i n t e n a n c e a n d maintenance for the iddat period and he sought thereafter to have the petition dismissed on the ground that she had received the amount due to her on divorce under the Musilml a w a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e p a r t i e s . T h e i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f t h e c a s e w a s t h a t w i f e h a d managed the matrimonial home for more than 40 years and had borne and reared five children and was incapable of taking up any career or independently supporting herself att h a t late state of her life - remarriage was impossibility in that c a s e . T h e h u s b a n d , a successful Advocate with an approximate income of Rs. 5,000/- per month provided Rs.2 0 0 / - p e r m o n t h t o t h e d i v o r c e d w i f e , w h o h a d s h a r e d h i s l i f e f o r h a l f a c e n t u r y a n d mothered his five children and was in desperate need of money to survive ARGUMENTS T he petitioner argued, (a) that the rationale of Section 125 Cr.P.C. wasto offset or meet a situation wherein a divorced wife was likely to be led into destitutiono r v a g r a n c y. I t w a s u r g e d t h a t S e c t i o n 1 2 5 C r .P.C .
w a s e n a c t e d t o p r e v e n t s u c h a situation in furtherance of the
concept of social justice embodied in Article 21 of theConstitution. (b) That the object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. being to avoid vagrancy, theremedy thereunder could not be denied to a Muslim woman otherwise it would amount toviolation of not only equality before law but also equal protection of laws (Article 14)and inherent infringement of Article 21 as well as basic human values. (c) That the Act was unIslamic, unconstitutional and had the potential of suffocating the Muslim womenw h i l e a l s o u n d e r m i n i n g t h e s e c u l a r c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h w a s t h e b a s i c f e a t u r e o f t h e Constitution. And thus there was no rhyme or reason to deprive the Muslim women fromthe applicability of the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C.Defending the validity of the enactment, it was argued on behalf of the respo ndents that( a ) i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , a s a m a t t e r o f p o l i c y, w a n t e d t o a p p l y S e c t i o n 1 2 5 C r .P.C . t o M u s l i m s , i t a l s o m e a n t t h a t t h e s a m e l e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d , b y n e c e s s a r y i m p l i c a t i o n , withdraw such an application of the Act and make some other provision in that regard. (b) Parliament could amend Section 125 Cr.P.C. so as to exclude it application and apply personal law instead. (c) That the policy of Section 125 Cr.P.C. was not to create a rightof maintenance dehors the personal law and therefore could not stand in the way of the Act JUDGEMENT U pholding the validity of the Act, the Supreme Court held as follows; 1) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for thefuture of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance aswell. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 2) Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period, 3) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able tomaintain herself after iddat period can proceed as provided under Section4 o f t h e A c t a g a i n s t h e r r e l a t i v e s w h o a r e l i a b l e t o m a i n t a i n h e r i n proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to M u s l i m l a w
from such divorced woman including her children
a n d parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay m a i n t e n a n c e , t h e Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance. 4) T h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Ac t d o n o t o f f e n d Ar t i c l e s 1 4 , 1 5 a n d 2 1 o f t h e Constitution of India.