Kristineconfesor

LAUREL V. DESIERTO
FACTS:
Pursuant to President Fidel V. Ramos issuance of Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting
the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, the
National Centennial Commission was created with Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel as
Chair. Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate
upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. Like its
predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation
(Expocorp) was created. On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction
and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon
motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Laurel, chair for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the
award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting
manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR
(Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to
government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds
infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the
anti-graft law. . Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground
that he is not a public officer because:
1)
EXPOCORP, the corporation chaired by petitioner laurel which undertook the
freedom ring project in connection with which violations of the anti-graft and
corrupt practices were allegedly committed, was a private corporation, not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
2)
the national centennial commission (ncc) was not a public office.
3)
petitioner, both as chairman of the ncc and of expocorp was not a public officer as
defined under the anti-graft & corrupt practices act.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is holding a public office? YES
HELD:
A PUBLIC OFFICE is the RIGHT, AUTHORITY and DUTY,
created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period,
either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer.
The CHARACTERISTICS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE, according to Mechem, include the (D, L,
OSC, SD)
1)
delegation of sovereign functions,
2)
its creation by law and not by contract,
3)
an oath, salary, continuance of the position,

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4)
5)

scope of duties, and the

designation of the position as an office.

Mechem describes the DELEGATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL OF SOME OF THE

SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AS [T]HE MOST IMPORTANT
CHARACTERISTIC IN DETERMINING WHETHER A POSITION IS A PUBLIC OFFICE OR
NOT. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment
or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. The E.O.
128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government.
A SALARY IS A USUAL BUT NOT A NECESSARY CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE
NATURE OF THE POSITION. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the
office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to
a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.
NEITHER IS THE FACT THAT THE NCC WAS CHARACTERIZED BY E.O. NO. 128 AS AN
AD-HOC BODY MAKE SAID COMMISSION LESS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE. The term office, it
is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely
temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice
Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the
government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to
perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining
them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to
distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the
duties from an officer.
AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THIS ELEMENT OF CONTINUANCE CAN NOT BE
CONSIDERED AS INDISPENSABLE, for, if the other elements are present it can make no
difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during
good behavior.

ABAKADA V. PURISIMA
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335[2] (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the (BIR) and the (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.

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Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law transform[s] the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption
and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to
serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

HELD: Accountability of Public Officers

Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. IT MUST BE DISCHARGED BY ITS HOLDER NOT
FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL GAIN BUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC FOR WHOM
HE HOLDS IT IN TRUST. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
PUBLIC OFFICERS ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR
and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection.
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be
overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court
do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public
policy.
Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and
employees into bounty hunters and mercenaries is not only without any factual and legal
basis; it is also purely speculative.
PUBLIC SERVICE IS ITS OWN REWARD. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES FOR
EXCEEDING THE SET EXPECTATIONS OF A PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT ANATHEMA TO
THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.

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TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO V. PEOPLE
August 9, 2006
FACTS: On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the
instance of one Aproniano Rivera, filed an Information for libel under Article 355 in relation
to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and
Rogelio J. Flaviano.
Tony Figueroa and Rogelio Flaviano, columnist and publisher-editor, respectively of the
People's Daily
From the trial courts judgment of conviction, petitioners went to the CA which affirmed the
TCs decision.
ISSUE: Is the private complainant is not a public officer, hence the published article cannot
be considered to be within the purview of privileged communication? NO

HELD:
It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this premise, they
invoke in their favor the application of one of the exceptions to the legal presumption of the
malicious nature of every defamatory imputation, as provided for under paragraph (2),
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown, except in the following cases:
2 fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
RIVERA IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE BUT A PRIVATE CITIZEN. Hence,
the published article cannot be considered as falling within the ambit of privileged
communication within the context of the above-quoted provision of the Penal Code.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual
of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive
or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are
of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
BEING A MEMBER OF THE MARKET COMMITTEE DID NOT VEST UPON HIM ANY
SOVEREIGN FUNCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, BE IT LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE OR
JUDICIAL. As reasoned out by the CA, the operation of a public market is not a
governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private
proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was in

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representation of the association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization
belonging to the private sector.
CAROLINA JAVIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, or otherwise known as the Book
Publishing Industry Development Act, was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the
State's goal in promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry,
through the active participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of
affordable, quality-produced books for the domestic and export market.
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President. Petitioner was appointed to the
Governing Board as a private sector representative for a term of one (1) year. Part of her
functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages
with international book publishing bodies. She was issued by the Office of the President a
travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain. For her failure to
attend with said bookfair, Resident Auditor Martin advised petitioner to immediately
return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled. Petitioner,
however, failed to do so.
The Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against
petitioner for MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTIES. She averred that
despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to liquidate or return to the
NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival, or in this case from the
date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713[13] for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.
Petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative,
stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives
provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing
industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the
BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes
imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Is she correct? NO
HELD:
THE NBDB IS THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY MANDATED TO DEVELOP AND SUPPORT
THE PHILIPPINE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY. It is a statutory government agency
created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the
book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement
the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to
supervise the implementation. The Governing Board was vested with powers and functions,
to wit:
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT PETITIONER CAME FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO SIT AS
A MEMBER OF THE NBDB, THE LAW INVESTED HER WITH SOME PORTION OF THE
SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, so that the purpose of the government
is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as
it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed

 Kristineconfesor
from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does
not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the
Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are
achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body.
The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that
they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to
cultivate the book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the
Anti-Graft Law, which provides that A PUBLIC OFFICER INCLUDES ELECTIVE AND
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY, WHETHER
IN THE CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED OR EXEMPT SERVICE RECEIVING
COMPENSATION, EVEN NOMINAL, FROM THE GOVERNMENT.[33]
The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No.
8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to
pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW, THE NATURE
OF ONE'S APPOINTMENT, AND WHETHER THE COMPENSATION ONE RECEIVES FROM
THE GOVERNMENT IS ONLY NOMINAL, IS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE THE PERSON SO
ELECTED OR APPOINTED IS STILL CONSIDERED A PUBLIC OFFICER.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by
direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be
a public officer.[34]
As in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No.
8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in
the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes.
In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several
rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the
country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059
January 22, 2008
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?
FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP Cebu. A student of a
state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President
Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000
and ending on December 31, 2000. In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4,
2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of
the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed

 Kristineconfesor
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent,
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent. Petitioner posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person not being a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer? YES
HELD:
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
be called upon to define a public officer. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1).
The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, it is well established
that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48 The administration of the UP is

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a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created
for profit.50
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.

LAGMAN V. OCHOA
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled
Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando
B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.
The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court
to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal
of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same.
The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
ISSUES:

 Kristineconfesor
1) Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers
by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions?
2) Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ;

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office
lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They
maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code:
1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission;
2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the
President;
3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and
4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
5) Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by
issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated
authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the
President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. OSG concludes that the power
of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may
create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and
corruption in the government.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
- reduction of personnel,
- consolidation of offices, or a
- bolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much
less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under
Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As
held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,[46]

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But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department
or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section
31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It
falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize.=
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above
provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said
law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer
appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section
20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive
Secretary.[49]
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President
to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its
last Whereas clause:
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is
well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article
VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his

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department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of
graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasijudicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe

into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official
probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x
to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially
in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations
Omitted]

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Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the
end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]

Pichay v. Ochoa
(7/24/12)
The abolition of PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created w/in
ODESLA (IAD-ODESLA) under EO 13 is within the prerogative of Pres. under his continuing
delegated legislative authority to reorganize his office pursuant to Sec. 31(1) of EO 292.
The abolition of PAGC did not require creation of a new, separate & distinct office as the
PAGC functions were simply transferred to ODESLA w/c is an existing office w/in the Office of
the President Proper. Thus, there is no usurpation of legislative power to create a public
office (Pichay vs. Ochoa, 7/24/12)
The Pres.s power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper [Sec. 31(1)] should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the Pres. under Sec. 31(2) & (3) of
EO 292.
In Sec. 31(1), he can reorganize the OP Proper by
1) abolishing,
2) consolidating or
3) merging units, or
4) by transferring functions from one unit to another.
In Sec. 31(2) & (3), his power to reorganize offices outside OP Proper but still within OP is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from OP to Departments or Agencies or
vice versa. The PAGC & ODESLA both belong to OP Proper. (Pichay vs. Ochoa)
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled,
"Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative,
Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive
Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit
respondents from administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the
assailed executive order.
FACTS:
On April 16, 2001, PGMA issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions.
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. After completing its
investigation or hearing, the Commission en banc shall submit its report and

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recommendations to the President. The report and recommendations shall state,
among others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty
recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IADODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees which arose from
the purchase by the LWUA of (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written
explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge
of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed
as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the
ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition
ISSUE: Is the E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create
a public office?
HELD:
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not
authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division,
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating
a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has
not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and
delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon
the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also
evident when weighed against the due process requirement and equal protection clause
under the 1987 Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT HAS
DEPARTMENT UNDER
otherwise known as the
authority to reorganize
economy and efficiency.

CONTINUING AUTHORITY TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE

E.O. 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing
the offices under him in order to achieve (S-E-E) simplicity,

E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another;
2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and

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3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.4
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this
purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring
either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around.Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand
in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to
take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less
drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another
THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO REORGANIZE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER
SECTION 31 (2) AND (3) OF EO 292 SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM HIS POWER
TO REORGANIZE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT PROPER.
Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one
unit to another.
In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one
hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees'
tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is,
whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O.
292.
When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two
(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9
and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the
ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President Proper.11 SINCE BOTH OF THESE OFFICES
BELONG TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT PROPER, THE REORGANIZATION
BY WAY OF ABOLISHING THE PAGC AND TRANSFERRING ITS FUNCTIONS TO
THE ODESLA IS ALLOWABLE UNDER SECTION 31 (1) OF E.O. 292.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

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A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also
be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done
for purposes of economy and efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining of
functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that
while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010
annual budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever
required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.