2002

Migration and the Labour Market in Asia

RECENT TRENDS AND POLICIES

Migration and the

Labour Market in Asia

This publication presents an analysis of recent trends in migration movements and policies in Asia.
It highlights the contribution of immigration to the labour force and describes the changes that have
taken place in the sectoral distribution of foreign workers. Particular attention is paid to human
resource development and mobility of the highly skilled against the background of globalisation.

This book is available to subscribers to the following SourceOECD themes:

Emerging Economies
Employment
Social Issues/Migration/Health
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RECENT TRENDS AND POLICIES

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RECENT TRENDS AND POLICIES

Migration and the Labour Market in Asia

The book provides individual reviews of recent developments in migration trends and policies in
Australia, China, Hong Kong China, Chinese Tapei, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Detailed statistics on the inflow and stocks of foreign workers and
information concerning their situation on the labour market enable meaningful cross-country
comparisons.

www.oecd.org
OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members

ISBN 92-64-09985-9
81 2003 04 1 P

-:HSTCQE=U^^]ZW:

THE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF LABOUR

2002

Migration and the Labour

Market in Asia
RECENT TRENDS AND POLICIES

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

AND DEVELOPMENT
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OECD 2003
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)25(:25'

The impact of economic growth on employment opportunities in Asian labour markets and on
international migration has been the general theme of a series of workshops for policymakers and
experts organised by the Japan Institute of Labour (JIL), with the co-operation of the Japanese
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (JMHLW), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the International Labour Office (ILO). The eighth workshop of this series
was held on 4-5 February 2002 with the aims of examining the current situation of international
migration and related policies in Asian countries, and to enhance the exchange of knowledge and
information between the regions policymakers and experts.
As usual, the workshop started with its special session, focusing this year on International
Migration of the Highly Skilled. It began with the keynote speech of Prof. Yasushi Iguchi of the
Kwansei Gakuin University, centered on the notions of brain drain and brain exchange. Prof.
Iguchi drew attention to key points to avoid the most harmful effects of this phenomenon, and
presented a number of policy options to profit from the movement of the highly skilled. This keynote
report stimulated active debates in the panel that followed, composed of experts from Malaysia,
Thailand and Japan (Prof. Dr. Kassim Binti Azizah, Prof. Yongyuth Chalamwong and Prof. Manami
Takekuma). These debates mainly focused on three points: 1) evaluation of the experiences of each
country; 2) the utilisation of the highly skilled to promote economic development and avoid the risk of
brain drain; and 3) the formulation of regional policies to respond to external competition to acquire
highly skilled workers. The afternoon session of the special session included reports by country
experts, reflecting the differing experiences of each individual country. Overall, these reports outlined
the widening gap between countries. Some have already had experiences with and measures for highly
skilled workers; and have had a wide use of information technologies. Other countries are just starting
in these fields. There was also reporting of the one-way migration of students towards more
technically advanced countries, and the phenomenon of brain waste happening when these trained
students are unable to find jobs back home to utilise the skills they have acquired. Reports, including
of experiences in Europe, showed the importance of investment in education, and the necessity to
create scientific and research centres to attract and to keep skills where they are needed.
The general session, monitoring current developments in migration and migration policies,
heard reports on current economic developments, the movements of foreign workers and of national
workers, the situation of illegal immigration, social integration of foreign workers, data on remittances
and information on employment services across borders. These reports generally discussed the
slowing of economic growth in the United States, Japan and Europe, and how the economies of many
countries and regions in Asia are either stagnant or decelerating. There was also discussion of how this
is affecting the labour market. The issue of illegal immigration was raised, with reference also to
criminal organisations, and the need for international co-operation was reaffirmed.
The second part of the general session, which took place in the next morning, heard reports on
policy changes, policy-making processes and competences, and possible forms of international cooperation. Comments from the floor pointed to recent trends in policymaking towards redesigning the
trainees visa system, in order to make a more productive use of the migrant workforce, which would
3

also better match the workforces needs. A consensus was present on the importance of the
immigration of highly skilled workers for economic development. In this regard, the linkage between
economic and immigration policies was also underlined, as well as co-operation between industry and
government, and between sending and receiving countries.
In the closing session, all participating nations and territories agreed on the necessity to search
for ways to take the maximum advantage from the movements of the highly skilled, for the economic
and social development of the region. The necessity of a more regular and comprehensive exchange of
information between nations and territories to address the specific issues raised in the special session
was also emphasised. International co-operation was also outlined with regard to combating illegal
immigration. This workshop provides an ideal forum to enhance the exchange of information and
ideas among the participating nations and territories, and the ILO and the OECD.
This publication is intended to provide the world at large with information and data concerning
migration trends and policies in Asia. It is the product of close collaboration between the JIL, the
JMHLW, the ILO, the OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA) and
the OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members (CCNM), and is published on the
responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.
Prof. Dr. Tadashi Hanami
Chairman
Japan Institute of Labour

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Background and major recent trends .................................................................................................. 9
Highly skilled workers ...................................................................................................................... 11
A brain drain? .................................................................................................................................... 12
Unskilled workers .............................................................................................................................. 15
Undocumented workers ..................................................................................................................... 16
Migration policies .............................................................................................................................. 17
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 19

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Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 29
Definition and scope of the highly-skilled (HS) ................................................................................ 31
Discussions on the policy related to the movement of HS ................................................................ 36
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 40
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Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 51
The old economy: bricks and mortar ................................................................................................. 51
Thailand vs new economy in Asia: click and mortar ........................................................................ 52
Education and training in IT human resources .................................................................................. 52
Current situation of highly skilled workers ....................................................................................... 53
Demand .............................................................................................................................................. 53
Immigrants ......................................................................................................................................... 54
Emigrants ........................................................................................................................................... 54
Emigration and immigration policies ................................................................................................ 55
Policies of national cooperation and support ..................................................................................... 56

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Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 65
H-1B program .................................................................................................................................... 66
Whither H-1B? .................................................................................................................................. 66
Policy implications ............................................................................................................................ 68
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Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 71
Linked processes: globalisation, trade in services, and skilled mobility ........................................... 71
Dimensions of highly-skilled migration ............................................................................................ 72
What are the expected effects of the emigration of the highly-skilled? ............................................ 72
Briefs on country studies ................................................................................................................... 73
Summary of general findings from case studies ................................................................................ 75
Trends in major classes of skilled mobility ....................................................................................... 76
Supplying transnational corporations and short-term labour shortages ............................................. 76
Impact of skilled emigrants on specific occupations ......................................................................... 77
Policy responses to highly skilled mobility ....................................................................................... 78
What migration policies are needed in a global economy? ............................................................... 78
GATS trade in services ...................................................................................................................... 80
Development assistance and education ............................................................................................. 80
Strengthening institutions and human rights ..................................................................................... 81
Targeted economic development ....................................................................................................... 81
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 81

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School of African and Asian Studies, University of Sussex

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The fragility of East and Southeast Asian economies was revealed in the aftermath of the
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11 2001. Just as they appeared
to be recovering from the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, these economies were once again
thrust into an environment of declining regional and global demand. There are, of course, significant
variations but most Asian economies had resumed growth by 1999 and several, including Hong Kong,
Singapore, Korea and Malaysia had achieved rapid growth by 2000 (see Table 1). Then came a rapid
reversal. In 2001, Singapore was in its first recession since independence; Hong Kong, too,
experienced negative growth and Japan, which had never really recovered from the collapse of its
bubble economy in 1989, was in full recession. Even Chinese Taipei, which had avoided the worst
effects of the Asian financial crisis, appears to be entering a period of slower growth. Only Korea may
be on a more sustained course to recovery.
Even during the brief recoveries in economic growth in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis, unemployment proved persistent and rose markedly in the renewed downturn in 2001. It is now
at all-time highs in the recent histories of Hong Kong, Singapore and Chinese Taipei with no
suggestion of a reversal in the immediate future (see Table 2). The structural adjustments that these
tiger economies and Japan are undergoing that have seen an export of labour-intensive manufacturing
and an increasing reliance on high-tech industries, underlies this persistence of unemployment. While
labour deficits emerge in modern sectors, labour surpluses increase in more traditional sectors.
It is against this economic background of renewed stagnation and decline and rising
unemployment that the current trends in population migration in the region need to be viewed. Perhaps
one of the apparent paradoxes is of the increasing international migration towards Asian economies in
the face of rising domestic unemployment, a paradox that finds parallels, if for somewhat different
reasons, with the contradictions between rising urban unemployment and increasing rural-to-urban
migration in developing countries several decades ago (Todaro, 1969).
This introduction attempts to draw together the major trends in the international migration of
labour migrants to, from and within the East and Southeast Asian region over the last few years. The
basic information comes from country reports compiled by country experts and reproduced in this
report. It bears reiterating that the deficiencies in the migration data and incompatibility of definition
make any attempt at comparative analysis hazardous. Nevertheless, the data are sufficient to identify
the major underlying trends even if the detail must await more specialized surveys and analyses.
The East and Southeast Asian economies under consideration are all characterized by
movements both into and out of their respective territories. It is altogether too simple to conceptualize
9

economies into sending and receiving areas. All have inflows as well as outflows, although the
composition and relative volume of the flows vary. For example, the Philippines can be considered as
a country of emigration par excellence with over 7 million of its citizens living or working overseas,
but that country, too, also imports highly skilled migrants to assist in certain key sectors of the
economy. In 1999, there were almost six thousand foreign workers in the Philippines, the majority of
whom were Japanese executives, a tiny number compared with the number of emigrants but
nevertheless significant for the local economy (Go, 2002). Indonesia also follows this general pattern,
while Thailand and Malaysia both import and export large numbers of workers and Japan, Korea,
Chinese Taipei, Singapore and Hong Kong are all economies of net immigration.
Any population movement in Asia has to be placed in its demographic context of declining
fertility in the region. Fertility levels have fallen precipitously in Japan and most of the Chinese
culture areas (see Table 3). With the exception of China itself, these areas tend to be the destinations
for migration as economies come to terms with very slow growth in their labour forces. Conversely,
those countries with higher fertility tend to be areas of origin of migration. This statement should not
be interpreted to mean that demography dictates the patterns of migration, as fertility itself is a
function of differential economic development in the region. Nevertheless, different levels of fertility
profoundly influence the supply of that key factor of production, labour.
The stock of foreign workers has increased steadily throughout the 1990s in Japan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Korea (see Table 4). Among these countries, only in
Korea can an Asian financial crisis effect be seen, with a sharp reduction in the number of foreign
workers during 1998. The situation among those economies lower down the development hierarchy is
different. There, the crisis effect was more marked in population migration with the numbers of
foreign workers declining in Malaysia and Thailand as well as in Indonesia. Here, however,
considerable caution needs to be used in the interpretation of the available figures. In contrast to Japan
and the tiger economies, data-gathering systems are not as well developed in those Southeast Asian
nations. More important, is the fact that the long land and sea borders, so common in that part of the
region, are difficult to control adequately and it is easy for people to cross from one country to another
without detection. Undocumented movements account for a very significant proportion of total
international migration among the large countries of Southeast Asia and it is difficult to know to what
extent the figures provided represent the real situation. These will be discussed in more detail below.
The summary figures on foreign workers in Asian countries have been subdivided as far as
possible to indicate three sub-classes: the legal and highly skilled; the legal unskilled; and the
undocumented unskilled. These data are not available for all countries and again it must be
emphasized that differences in definition and coverage make ready comparison deceptive.
Nevertheless, general trends can be identified with respect to the various categories. It should be
pointed out that for Hong Kong there is a class of immigrant that is virtually unique among the
countries under consideration. This covers one-way permit holders from China who are granted
residence rights in the Special Administrative Region (SAR). Essentially, this category refers to a
family reunification or settlement programme with the majority entering the city under this category as
either minor children or spouses of Hong Kong men. Their number is currently set at 150 a day. As
these migrants are not directly entering the labour force in large numbers, no further reference will be
made to them in this chapter. Particular attention will be directed towards the highly skilled, unskilled
and undocumented workers.
It is worth reiterating that many of those who leave Asian economies as immigrants or as
more or less permanent settlers are highly skilled. The points criteria of Australian and Canadian
immigration policy and the increased emphasis on independent rather than family migrants in all the
immigration programmes in North American and Australasian countries emphasizes the increasing
10

competition for brains in the global economy. For example, although the proportion of emigrants from
the Philippines who fell into the professional and executive classes fell from 1975 to 1995 from 30.2
to 10.6% of all emigrants from the Philippines, the absolute number increased from 4 369 to 5 955
(Go, this volume), reflecting a common pattern of an increasing proportion of lower skilled migrants
as the migration evolves over time. Policies in destination countries seek to counteract this trend.
Almost one third of the emigrants from Hong Kong to Australia and one seventh of
immigrants arriving in Canada in the early 1990s were holders of a university degree. The fact that
many choose not to become permanent immigrants but become either return migrants, migrants to
third country destinations or transnational circulators after obtaining a new citizenship does not
invalidate the essentially longer-term intent of this migration flow. While these groups will not be
entirely ignored in the following discussion, the focus will be more on highly skilled worker and
student flows. The settler flows have been considered in more detail in earlier reports in this series (for
example, OECD, 2002; Hugo, 2002) and will only be incorporated when relevant in the following
paragraphs.
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One of the principal difficulties is to decide just who is a highly skilled worker. Three
dimensions are considered essential: educational background; professional qualifications; and work
experience. However, agreement on definitions that are both flexible and comparable has proved
elusive even in developed areas where the exchange of highly skilled migrants is common, such as
within the European Union, let alone in Asia where the process is more recently developed (Iguchi,
this volume). OECD itself has attempted to systematize categories in human resources in science and
technology (Auriol and Sexton, 2002) but much more work will be required on data from Asian
countries before these can be incorporated into a comparative system.
Students attending tertiary institutions, despite their lack of work experience and apparent
skills, now tend to be included as a significant category of the highly skilled. Professionals,
executives, and all types of company transferees, are all clearly seen as among the highly skilled.
Nurses, however, despite the specialized nature of their training, may not be considered within the
prescribed category. The movement of investors or entrepreneurs is more ambiguous, with these
migrants often not possessing any easily recognizable skill except an ability to generate capital. The
situation becomes yet more complex when professionals may not be able to practice their profession in
destination areas owing to a lack of accreditation by local bodies, whether medical, legal or
engineering, for example. Thus, the migration of some of the highly skilled may not be part of a highly
skilled migration system at all, with the deskilling of the skilled as they are thrust into more lowly
occupational categories in destinations. This situation can apply more to migrants from Asian
economies who move to North American, Australasian or European destinations, although the
increasing numbers of professionals moving is stimulating greater efforts towards the fast-track
recognition of skills and the development of truly global skill markets (see Iredale, 2001). The
deskilling can operate at more lowly levels such as in cases where women with tertiary-level
qualifications choose to enter into domestic service as in the case of Filipinas moving to Hong Kong
or Singapore. Almost 30% of domestic workers surveyed in Hong Kong from the Philippines were
degree holders, for example, with a further 32% having attended some form of tertiary education
(AMWC, 1991).
The above issues have become a more pressing policy concern with the transformation of the
global migration system away from Europe as a region of origin of migrants to North America and
Australasia towards much greater participation of Asians (as well as Latin Americans and others from
11

the so-called developing world). During the second half of the 1990s, Asians made up between one
third to two fifths of settler arrivals to Australia and a significant trend has been the substantial shift
towards skills and business migration and away from family-based criteria (Hugo, this volume).
Canada was the pioneer of managing its migration through a points-based system of selection and now
takes over a quarter of its total intake from just two countries, China and India. The United States,
while still maintaining its emphasis in its immigration on family reunification, has adjusted its intake
to increase the proportion of independent, qualified and business immigrants.
Quite apart from these trends in long-term immigration policy an equally significant shift has
been towards admitting increasing numbers of workers to North American countries and Australia
under some form of temporary admission programme. In the United States, the numbers admitted
under the H-1B programme, introduced in 1992 with an annual ceiling of 65 000. The ceiling was
increased to 115 000 in 1999 and then again to 195 000 between 2001 and 2003 showing the marked
growth in importance of this channel (Martin, this volume). China, India, Japan and the Philippines
accounted for almost two thirds of the 65 000 intake in 1999, with India accounting for the vast
majority. Migrants who enter with a H-1B visa are entitled to remain in the United States for up to six
years. Australia, too, appears to have shifted towards a greater reliance on temporary entrants who
may, in the late 1990s, have reached over 400 000, or 2-3% of the resident population (Hugo, this
volume).
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While destination countries have increased their intake of the highly skilled through shifts in
settler intake and by developing shorter-term entry programmes, the countries of origin can consider
the loss of personnel not to be in their best interests. The so-called brain drain has tended to be seen
as negative for countries of origin. Evidence presented in this volume, however, as well as elsewhere,
suggests that the outcomes can be variable in Asia, at least, and that the brain drain has to be
considered in the context of brain gain and brain exchange. It is important to bear in mind that the
total number of highly skilled who are moving in, among and from Asian countries is quite small
relative to the total populations of the economies concerned and even relative to the available pool of
skilled labour itself.
Nevertheless, the movement of small numbers of highly qualified people can have a
significant impact on particular sectors of the labour market and on social and economic development,
particularly in the context of an increasing competition for skills in the globalised economy. The
debate can perhaps be best illustrated by examining the movement of students from Asian economies
to tertiary institutions overseas. The United States has for long been the principal destination with 30%
of the 34 232 foreign students in 1954/55 coming from Asian countries. By 2000/01, there were
547,867 foreign students registered in degree-granting institutions in the United States, with seven of
the leading eight sources of the students being Asian countries (see Table 5). Nearly 21% came from
China and India alone (IIE, 2001).
Taking the example of Chinese Taipei (Lee, this volume), it can be seen that relatively few
students returned during the early period of student migration overseas in the 1960s and 1970s. The
numbers of those returning accelerated throughout the 1980s until the mid-1990s when government
subsidies for return were removed and many returnees, coming back on their own account, may not
have registered. Thus, the more recent data are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that, by the 1990s, development in Chinese Taipei had reached the level where significant numbers of
students returned and fewer chose to leave in the first place, being able to receive a quality education
at home. Only 937 students returned to Chinese Taipei in 1980 compared with some 6 510 in 1994
12

(Lee, this volume) and the return rate in 1988 was estimated at around 32%, three times the return rate
in 1980 (Luo and Wang, 2002).
While many highly skilled migrants may have returned to Chinese Taipei, or to Korea, return
rates for countries at lower levels of development such as Malaysia and China appear to be much
lower. Perhaps about 14% of Chinese students to the United States returned during the period 19781999 (Zhang and Li, 2002). Whether these countries will follow a similar path to the tiger economies
and see greater numbers of returnees over time remains to be seen. The Asian financial crisis did affect
the numbers of students going overseas, however, with reduced government grants and personal
finances among the middle classes bringing about either a reduction or very slow growth in the
number of students from Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.
The loss of students from the East Asian economies from the 1960s coincided with the entry
of these economies into a period of very rapid and sustained economic growth that saw Chinese
Taipei, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore emerge as developed economies by the twenty-first century.
It is difficult to imagine these economies growing even faster if the students had stayed at home,
undermining any easy conclusion that the brain drain had a negative impact on their development.
Returning students contributed positively to both economic and political developments in these
economies, supporting the idea of a brain gain.
What does appear clear is that the situation with the movement of the educated and highly
skilled is that the situation is highly heterogeneous (Iguchi, this volume). Key issues include the
following:
x

Whether the students are funded by state or private funds before leaving for continuing
education overseas. Many of those in India, for example, appear to have been educated
using private funds, hence reducing the cost to the donor country. It is difficult to oblige
people to return to pay back the costs of their education. Some countries impose bonds
on students who go overseas for further education that involve substantial financial
penalties if they do not return for at least a set number of years. Information on the
number of students who are bonded and go overseas would be useful for policy makers.

Whether the educated are gainfully employed in their countries of origin. An oversupply
of educated youth can lead to the problem of the educated unemployed, which seems to
have been a characteristic of India at times in its recent past and Thailand today
(Chalamwong, this volume). An aggravating factor for those in Thailand, for example, is
that even the educated lack the linguistic skills to make them readily marketable in the
global economy where English is the unquestioned lingua franca.

Whether those leaving are replaced by educated and skilled migrants coming in to fill
key positions in the economy, that is, there is a brain exchange rather than a brain drain.
The stock of highly skilled has been increasing steadily in most of the economies under
consideration. The recession in Japan and other economies that provide so much of the
foreign direct investment (FDI) can, however, directly affect the numbers of these
migrants. For example, the reduction in FDI in Indonesia (by 50% between 2000 and
2001 alone) and the decline in the number of resident expatriates is hardly coincidental.
Japan and Singapore account for around two thirds of FDI in the region.

Whether highly skilled workers are leaving permanently or only temporarily. Countries
in the region welcome skilled migrants as residents as the vast majority will go home, or
move on, after completing their contracts. This pattern applies equally to the highly
13

skilled from regional economies or from developed core western countries. Current
policy in the major settler countries of Australia, Canada and the United States is not just
to increase temporary immigration programmes, as seen above, but also to facilitate the
change of status of those who have entered temporarily to more permanent settler or
immigrant status. However, even those highly educated and highly skilled who entered
as permanent immigrants from Asian economies to the major settler countries appear to
have a high propensity to return (Kee and Skeldon, 1994). Partial return is also an
integral part of the strategy whereby family members are left in Australia, Canada or the
United States and the principal breadwinner returns to Hong Kong or Chinese Taipei, for
example in a transnational system of circulation (Skeldon, 1994).
x

Whether the loss of the highly skilled is compensated to some extent by a flow of
remittances from the migrants back to their home economy. In terms of value, flows of
remittances have become one of the principal items of international trade exceeding over
US$ 70 billion a year (Russell, 1992). It is notoriously difficult to estimate the sums
involved because so much is transferred through informal channels, and it is even more
difficult to separate flows from the highly skilled and those from unskilled migrants. A
further complicating factor is that much FDI may originate among the professionals and
businessmen in overseas communities as, for example, among the non-resident Indians
and the Chinese overseas.

Paradoxically, the rate of creation of domestic talent, or the increase in the proportion of the
highly educated so necessary for development, may be related to the possibilities for emigration that
exist from an economy (ILO, this volume). People deliberately choose to pursue education specifically
because it will give them a greater chance of emigrating. Thus, some loss of skilled personnel may be
in the best interests of an economy as it is a factor in the generation of overall human capital. Where
the loss, however, is greater than either the supply or the net exchange, then negative consequences
may be more apparent, giving rise to the interesting idea that there may be an optimal level of
emigration. Be that as it may, ILO studies suggest that two-way skill mobility, that is, the exchange
of brains, make an economy more attractive for foreign investment than in cases where there is no
emigration of the educated at all.
The loss of skilled personnel cannot be seen, however, simply in economic terms; there are
significant social impacts. For example, the loss of large numbers of nurses from the Philippines has
almost certainly led to a deterioration in health services in that country. Over 70% of the annual
number of 7 000 nurses who graduate each year leave the Philippines and there are an estimated
30 000 unfilled positions in government and private sectors, particularly in rural areas (Yukawa,
1996).
Other important considerations revolve around policies that affect citizenship. For example,
the granting of citizenship by a destination country may deprive a migrant of certain rights in his or
her home country such as the right to own land. The recognition of dual citizenship may therefore be
in the interests of both origin and destination as it is then more likely that an immigrant will take up
the possibilities for fuller participation in the host nation while not losing rights in an area to which he
or she may wish to retire later in life. Policies that will encourage the circulation of talent need to be
investigated closely for potential benefits to both areas of origin and areas of destination.
Additional social issues revolve around the position of highly skilled migrants in host
societies. Most remain unassimilated and have no intention of assimilating as the migrants see
themselves as but temporary residents. Whether this pattern is distinct from that of less skilled
migrants remains largely unknown, as does any intermarriage with the local populations and a trend
14

towards the establishment of more permanent foreign or mixed communities. Clearly, in the long term,
any such trend would have implications for citizenship and social and race relationships with local
populations.
Finally, centres for the training of brains are evolving within the Asian region itself. Japan
traditionally has been a magnet for students from other Asian countries, particularly China in the early
years of the last century, and universities in Hong Kong and Singapore have emerged as centres of
excellence in their respective regions. Satellite campuses of core western universities are proliferating
throughout the region and a series of centres in China are emerging as significant destinations for
students. For example, there were 78 812 foreign students in Japan in 2001, up from 51 047 in 1997,
some 44 711 in China in 1999, 23 000 in Malaysia in 2000 and 7 300 in Chinese Taipei in 2000
(Takekuma, this volume). The majority of these students come from other Asian countries. Thus, the
creation of brains is increasingly occurring within the region. A key policy issue will be how to retain
this talent within the region.
8QVNLOOHGZRUNHUV
In terms of numbers, unskilled workers make up the largest number of migrant workers in
the Asian region. There are two principal components; documented workers, or those moving through
formal legal channels to fill specific jobs under contract, and undocumented workers. It should be
emphasized, however, that in both of these streams, the documented and the undocumented, educated,
even skilled people may be moving to undertake unskilled jobs as in the case of domestic workers to
Hong Kong mentioned above.
Asian economies have emerged as labour-deficit areas over the last 10-15 years and several
have seen a transition from areas of net-emigration to areas of net-immigration (Abella, 1994). The
pattern of the legal importation of workers over the second half of the 1990s has been one of sustained
growth in Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and Japan and of growth punctuated by the Asian financial
crisis in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. In the latter cases, the stock of legal workers declined
somewhat from 1997-1998 but resumed an upward course quite quickly in Korea and Malaysia. The
official data suggest that the number of legal migrants stabilized in Thailand, but at a considerably
lower level than before the crisis . The onset of the recession in 2001 has seen lower numbers of
unskilled workers in Chinese Taipei but not in Hong Kong. In early 2002, there are reports of large
numbers of Indonesians being expelled from Malaysia, either those who are found to be illegally in the
country or those whose contracts have expired. Malaysia would like to reduce its dependence on
workers from Indonesia who can easily disappear into the local population and increase recruitment
of workers from a greater diversity of sources. Given Malaysias geography, and the demography of
neighboring countries, any such policy would not appear to have a high probability of success.
Thus, from the official figures, there would indeed appear to be some kind of direct
relationship between the number of workers in an economy and levels of economic activity. However,
any such simple conclusion would have to be taken with a great degree of caution. First, as discussed
below, there may be a shift from documented to undocumented workers in some economies that
obscures any real trend in the total number of foreign workers. Secondly, as mentioned earlier in this
discussion, the structural shift in East Asian economies towards service and high-tech industries has
generated a changing demand for labour towards higher skill levels. However, such a shift does not
necessarily imply that the demand for lower skill workers will disappear, but simply that the nature of
the employment changes. Many of the high-tech industries that East Asian economies are promoting,
for example, also require substantial numbers of unskilled workers who are involved with packaging
and dispatch of high-tech products. These activities are low-paid, involve long hours are boring and
15

involve hard work that an increasingly highly educated local labour force is unwilling to undertake
(Lee, this volume).
The third reason that caution needs to be used in drawing any simple positive relationship
between economic activity and the number of foreign workers is that the trend is not observed in all
economies. In Hong Kong, for example, the numbers of foreign workers increased markedly between
1999 and 2001 in the face of rapidly rising unemployment. Curiously, this increase is accounted for
primarily in the rise in the number of domestic workers rather than workers in other sectors whose
number indeed declined. The increase in the number of foreign domestic workers, also seen in the data
for Chinese Taipei, allows the release of local women from middle-income families into the labour
force where they can realize returns from their education.
However, the increase in the number of domestic workers in Hong Kong in the context of
such a sharp rise in unemployment does not simply seem to be entirely accounted for by such an
explanation. Domestic workers are on a fixed stipend of HK$3 760 per month with board and lodging
supplied. This stipend is not a high wage by Hong Kong standards and it seems possible that Hong
Kong employers are bringing domestic workers into the SAR and channeling them into other activities
such as into retailing, services or even manufacturing. The increasing proportion of Indonesians
among the foreign domestic workers, who, unlike the Filipinas, do not have the English language
skills often demanded by middle-income Hong Kong residents to reinforce the abilities of their
children, would also be suggestive of such a diversion of foreign domestic workers into a wider labour
market.
Several of the East and Southeast Asian countries are still significant suppliers of unskilled
workers through official labour recruitment programmes, both government and private. The
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and China all fall into this category. China sends workers to some
181 countries and territories, plus large numbers to regional fishing fleets. In November 2001, China
had 460 000 workers abroad who were involved with contracts worth US$13.3 billion in 2001
(Zhang,, this volume). The Philippines is the country of origin of workers par excellence, with some
866 590 workers overseas in 2001, up from 837 020 in 1999 (Go, this volume). The numbers of
Filipinos employed in Asia, however, actually declined over this period, with markets in Europe and
the Middle East compensating for these losses. Remittances from these workers that pass through
official channels were estimated to have exceeded US$6 billion in 2000 although this figure was down
from a record US$6.8 billion in 1999. Thailand, perhaps because of its greater reliance on Asian
markets, particularly Chinese Taipei, saw a slight decline in the number of workers overseas from
202 416 in 1999 to 193 041 in 2000 (Chalamwong, this volume). Thai workers overseas remitted some
US$1.5 billion in 2000. As emphasized earlier, a considerable amount of the monies remitted passes
through informal channels as do many of the workers themselves and it is to the issue of
undocumented migration that we now turn.
8QGRFXPHQWHGZRUNHUV
The total numbers of undocumented workers are much more significant in the countries of
Southeast Asia than they are in East Asia. Also, the data on those who entered illegally or who entered
legally and overstayed their visas or changed their designated terms of entry are likely to be much
more reliable for economies in the latter region than for Southeast Asian countries.
The numbers of illegal entrants to Hong Kong, primarily from China, who were caught and
deported declined markedly from 14 892 in 1998-1999 to only 4 397 in 1999-2000 (Chiu, this volume)
a far cry from the tens of thousands of would-be entrants to the city of just a few decades ago. The
16

creation of widespread opportunities in the Pearl River delta region and continued tight control along
the border have all but eliminated irregular migration as a major policy concern in the SAR. In
Singapore, too, the number of illegal immigrants apprehended declined sharply from 23 000 in 1998 to
16 500 in 2000 (Yap, this volume). The principal reason given for the decline is the Asian financial
crisis although, like the relationship between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, the creation of intervening
opportunities for migrants across the causeway in Malaysia surely played a part.
In Chinese Taipei, on the other hand, rising illegal migration from China appears to be a
growing problem and the figures on the number of undocumented workers presented in 7DEOH
almost certainly grossly underestimate their true number (Lee, this volume) despite the fact that
changed policy has increasingly tied workers to employers. It is estimated that just over half of all
those who enter legally into Korea as trainees disappear into the wider labour force and become
overstayers. Korea, the worst affected of the original tiger economies, saw a sharp reduction in
undocumented workers from 148 048 in 1997 to 99 537 in 1998 following an amnesty for illegal
workers that allowed them to leave the country without paying a fine (Yoo, this volume). As the
Korean economy resumed rapid growth the number of undocumented workers, too, accelerated
markedly from 1998 to reach 250 756 in November 2001.
Estimates of up to 1.43 million illegal migrants have been made for Malaysia before the
onset of the financial crisis (ILO, 1998). Official estimates of illegal migration in Malaysia are based
on annual apprehensions that are difficult to translate into stock estimates. Since 1997, however, the
numbers of those apprehended under the 2SV 1\DK exercises have increased (Kassim, this volume)
and it would seem doubtful that the number of those eluding capture and residing illegally in Malaysia
had declined. The social distance between certain Indonesian groups, such as the Minangkabau of
Sumatra, for example, and ethnic Malays in peninsular Malaysia is much less than between the
Minangkabau and the Javanese of the capital, Jakarta. In both peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia,
there are virtually invisible minorities from neighboring countries.
Similarly, in Thailand, the data on the numbers of undocumented workers appear to be
distinctly spongy. Under the new Prime Minister, Taksin Shinawatra, a concerted effort has been
made to register undocumented workers and by the end of October 2001, 562 527 workers had
registered for legal work permits, although it was estimated that a further 300 000400 000 undocumented workers remained in the country. Despite statistics to show that
319 629 workers were arrested in 1999 and 444 636 in 2000 (Chalamwong, this volume) these
apprehensions do not seem to have decreased significantly the numbers of undocumented workers in
the country.
0LJUDWLRQSROLFLHV
Two generalisations can be advanced in terms of policy response in the Asian region: first,
that the responses have been various depending upon the priority of each economy and, second, that
there is little evidence to suggest that any policy intervention has been effective in controlling numbers
or managing migration in desired directions over anything but the immediate short term. Clearly,
policies vary depending on whether they are directed towards receiving workers or sending workers
overseas. If we examine policies directed at receiving migrants, of the countries participating in the
discussions only Australia could be said to have a well-developed policy that essentially achieves its
objectives. The Australian policy is well described in Hugo (this volume) but, because of its settler
tradition, cannot be used as a model for the majority of Asian countries at this stage of their
development. Apart from Hong Kongs policy to allow the entry of one-way permit holders from
China, no Asian country actively seeks immigrants sensu stricto or extends the benefits of citizenship
17

to foreigners. Those few examples, such as Singapores policy to bring skilled and semi-skilled
workers from Hong Kong in the early 1990s or Thailands assimilation of long-term migrants from
Vietnam in the late 1990s, were all limited target and short term. Singapore and, from February 2002,
Hong Kong both have investor programmes that grant permanent residence to those willing to invest
large sums of money in the economies. In the case of Hong Kong, some US$830 000 is required, a
considerably larger sum than investor programmes in Canada or Australia. Policies in Asian
economies are designed essentially to deal with workers, not immigrants. And the worker policies
implemented are still strongly biased towards the unskilled, leaving vague or unstated any policy
towards the attraction or retention of the highly skilled.
Within Asia, the general approach is to welcome and encourage highly skilled migrants but to
discourage or closely control unskilled workers. Policies for the latter often stipulate ceilings on
intake, sectors in which foreign workers can be employed and terms and conditions of employment.
Japan only laid down the basic principle for a migration policy as recently as August 1999 and even
then it only addressed skilled migrants leaving unskilled workers for future careful study (Iguchi,
country paper, this volume). The policies can be project-specific or of limited life. For example, the
policy to allow workers into Hong Kong for the construction of the airport indeed terminated with the
completion of the project in March 1999 and the General Labour Importation Scheme, introduced in
May 1989 to allow employers to bring in up to 14 700 workers was wound down after a review in
1995 (Chiu, this volume). Local legislators and union leaders were instrumental in opposing the
scheme in the face of rising domestic unemployment.
In other economies, policies are aimed fundamentally at dealing with undocumented migrants.
Thailand has seen the evolution of a series of policies that attempted to regularize the number of
foreigners already working illegally in the country. From virtually a total ban on foreign workers,
Thailand has moved through identifying particular parts of the country, and particular sectors of the
economy, where foreigners would be permitted to work, to the present policy that is countrywide and
that includes 10 general types of business occupations (Chalamwong, this volume). Chinese Taipei,
Japan, Malaysia, Korea and Singapore all have policies that have been implemented at one time or
another to deal with the issue of undocumented migrants. Policies to return migrants forcibly to their
home areas appear to have had little more than short-term impact and can be expensive. Again,
amnesties have met with limited success. The substitution of newly unemployed domestic labour for
foreign labour is unrealistic as the domestic employed are often to be found in other parts of the
country from where foreign labour is employed and, more importantly, the domestic unemployed are
unwilling to undertake the kinds of jobs that foreign labour is willing to do. Policies like the current
Thai policy, that seek to register all those already working in the country without threat of deportation,
are more realistic. The likely impact of that policy on the volume and direction of future migration is,
however, unknown. It seems probable that, as in the case of skilled migration, countries need to plan
for the exchange of unskilled migrant workers, facilitating their circulation between origins and
destinations.
Three other types of migrant worker policy are relevant to the region. The first relates to
emigrant worker policy or attempts by countries of origin to seek out markets for their workers. In the
wake of the Asian financial crisis, for example, Thailand sought to find countries that could absorb the
newly unemployed. Vietnam plans to increase its export of workers, skilled and unskilled, to 100 000
by 2005 and provide a special fund for their training and loans for prospective migrant workers
(Nguyen, this volume).
The second type of policy refers to the protection of migrants: to ensure that they are
accorded the same rights and privileges as local workers and to guarantee that they are not
discriminated against because of citizenship or ethnicity. To achieve this objective, countries need to
18

become party to international conventions aimed at protecting migrant workers and their families, the
elimination of child labour and the suppression of trafficking. Clearly, these objectives are of greater
importance to countries of origin of migrants but their implementation lies in the hands of destination
countries. The Philippines, in particular, has worked extensively, though not always successfully,
through international forums to reach agreements on the protection of the large number of its workers
overseas.
The third and last type of policy deals with issues of return and reintegration. Migrant workers
accustomed to regular employment or high wages relative to their areas of origin may face problems
of adaptation and re-integration when they either return, or are returned, home. They may not find
employment or remuneration at levels similar to those overseas and their overseas experience may not
be relevant, recognized or even applicable. Although the cases of forced return may pose greater
problems of readjustment than for those who have returned voluntarily, both can and do experience
difficulty. It is not only the migrant worker who returns home; those from settler societies, too, go
back to retire after a working life in Australia, Canada or the United States. As Hugo (this volume)
makes clear, Australia is also a country of emigration and much of that is of immigrants returning to
their origins. Children may be left behind and loyalties are divided within families. As mentioned
earlier, governments need to make provision to allow migrants to participate in two societies. As
globalization proceeds, these issues will loom ever larger.
&RQFOXVLRQ
The overriding impression gained from an overview of labour migration in and from Asian
economies is one of heterogeneity. There is the problem of data quality and availability. Nevertheless,
certain generalizations can be made and trends can be identified and this introductory chapter has
attempted to do this, despite the difficulties inherent in any such task. Clear differences exist by level
of development between those advanced economies in East Asia, the tigers and Japan, and those in
Southeast Asia. The former have seen a transition from emigration to immigration and are concerned
with labour deficits and the need to recruit highly skilled migrants. The latter are concerned with
finding new markets for their domestic labour and dealing with an influx of undocumented migrants.
The demographic context influencing the supply of labour through different fertility levels
has been raised as a significant factor influencing the relative surpluses or deficits within the region.
Thus, in terms of policy, migration needs to be considered within broader population policies that look
at the long-term implications that the trends in fertility may have for population movement. The
relationship between fertility and migration still remains an under-researched topic and is one with
significant policy dimensions.
The critical policy issues in the East and Southeast Asian region remain, first, how to attract
and retain the skilled labour that is so essential in the process of economic development and, second,
how to manage overall migration in such a way as to reduce the volume of undocumented or irregular
movement. Central to achieving the latter objective will be the broadening of existing channels of
legal migration and the creation of new channels that can permit greater numbers of the needed labour
to enter economies legally. There is also a significant relationship between the entry of the highly
skilled and the demand for unskilled labour. Several of the industries that are high-tech and that
require skilled labour also imply increasing demand for low-skilled and routine jobs. Also, the highly
skilled themselves will generate a demand for particular services as varied as chefs and waiters in upmarket restaurants, domestic workers, office cleaners, laundry workers and so on. Thus, the nature of
the unskilled migration system in the region is changing, and changing in tandem with the increasing
demand for the highly skilled.
19

All these factors emphasize the inter-related nature of the migration system, not only the
relationships between different types of migrants but also the links with fertility and other elements in
society and economy. For example, reducing the number of public housing units in either Hong Kong
or Singapore may encourage the migration of both the young professional and the elderly in search of
cheaper accommodation in peripheral parts of the cities in China and Malaysia. Any such movement
will have implications for transport policy, cross-boundary facilitation and the provision of health
services. East and Southeast Asian economies remain, despite recent and current setbacks, among the
most dynamic in the world. Societies are experiencing rapid change and part of that change is a
function of migration. There needs to be a greater awareness of the integrated nature of the various
migration systems in the region, and the close relationship that these systems have with long-term
trends in fertility and mortality. Migration policy thus needs to be part of wider population policies. As
important, however, is a clear understanding among policy makers of the important relationships
between these population policies and other policies in, among others, the housing, transport and
public health areas. The creation and diffusion of this understanding will be among the principal
challenges in the region over the next decade.

20

5()(5(1&(6

ABELLA, M. (1994), Turning points in labor migration, $VLDQDQG3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO, vol.

3(1), special issue.
AMWC (1991), )RUHLJQ'RPHVWLF:RUNHUVLQ+RQJ.RQJ$%DVHOLQH6WXG\, Hong Kong, Asian
Migrant Workers Association.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, .H\,QGLFDWRUVRI'HYHORSLQJ$VLDQDQG3DFLILF&RXQWULHV,
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2002/default.
AURIO, S. and SEXTON, J. (2002), Human resources in science and technology: measurement
issues and international mobility, in OECD, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RIWKH+LJKO\6NLOOHG, Paris,
OECD, pp. 13-38.
GO, S.P. (2002), The Philippines, in OECD, 0LJUDWLRQDQGWKH/DERXU0DUNHWLQ$VLD5HFHQW
7UHQGVDQG3ROLFLHV, Paris, OECD, pp. 257-280.
HUGO, G. (2002), Introduction, in OECD, 0LJUDWLRQDQGWKH/DERXU0DUNHWLQ$VLD5HFHQW
7UHQGVDQG3ROLFLHV, Paris, OECD, pp. 7-16.
IIE (2001), 2SHQ'RRUV5HSRUWRQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO(GXFDWLRQDO([FKDQJH, New York,
Institute of International Education.
ILO (1998), 7KH6RFLDO,PSDFWRIWKH$VLDQ)LQDQFLDO&ULVLV, Bangkok, Regional Office for Asia and
the Pacific of the International Labour Organization.
IREDALE, R. (2001), The migration of professionals: theories and types, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ,
vol. 39 (5): 7-26.
KEE, P. and SKELDON, R. (1994), The migration and settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in
Australia, in Ronald Skeldon (ed.), 5HOXFWDQW([LOHV"0LJUDWLRQIURP+RQJ.RQJDQGWKH1HZ
2YHUVHDV&KLQHVH, New York, M. E. Sharpe, pp. 183-196.
LUO,Y-L. and WANG, W-J. (2002), High-skill migration and Chinese Taipeis industrial
development, in OECD, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RIWKH+LJKO\6NLOOHG, Paris, OECD, pp. 253269.
OECD (2002), ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RIWKH+LJKO\6NLOOHG, Paris, OECD.
OECD (2002), (FRQRPLF2XWORRNNo. 71, June 2002, Paris, OECD.
RUSSELL, S. (1992), Migrant remittances and development, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ, vol. 30(3/4):
267-287.

21

SKELDON, R. (1994), Hong Kong in an international migration system, in Ronald Skeldon (ed.),
5HOXFWDQW([LOHV"0LJUDWLRQIURP+RQJ.RQJDQGWKH1HZ2YHUVHDV&KLQHVH, New York, M. E.
Sharpe, pp 21-51.
TODARO, M.P. (1969), A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed
countries, 7KH$PHULFDQ(FRQRPLF5HYLHZ, vol. 59 (1): 138-148.
YUKAWA, J. (1996), 0LJUDWLRQIURPWKH3KLOLSSLQHV$Q$QQRWDWHG%LEOLRJUDSK\,
Quezon City, Scalabrini Migration Center.
ZHANG, G. and LI, W. (2002), International mobility of Chinas resources in science and
technology and its impact, in OECD, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RIWKH+LJKO\6NLOOHG, Paris,
OECD, pp. 189-200.

22

Table 1.5HDO*'3JURZWK$VLDQHFRQRPLHV


Chinese Taipei
Hong Kong
Japan
Korea
Singapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
China
Vietnam
Australia


6.1
4.5
3.5
6.8
7.7
8.0
10.0
5.8
5.9
9.6
9.3
4.0


6.7
5.0
1.8
5.0
8.5
4.5
7.3
5.2
-1.4
8.8
8.2
3.5


4.6
-5.3
-1.1
-6.7
0.0
-13.2
-7.4
-0.5
-10.8
7.1
4.4
5.4


5.4
3.0
0.7
10.9
6.9
0.9
6.1
3.3
4.4
7.8
4.7
4.5


5.9
10.5
2.4
9.3
10.3
4.8
8.3
4.0
4.6
8.0
6.1
3.4


-1.9
0.1
-0.4
3.0
-2.0
3.3
0.4
3.4
1.8
7.3
6.8
2.4

6RXUFH: Asian Development Bank, .H\ ,QGLFDWRUV RI 'HYHORSLQJ $VLDQ DQG 3DFLILF &RXQWULHV ,
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2002/default.asp and Country chapters, this
volume. For Australia, Japan and Korea, see OECD (FRQRPLF2XWORRNNo. 71, June 2002, Paris.

Table 2./HYHOVRIXQHPSOR\PHQW$VLDQHFRQRPLHV

Chinese Taipei
Hong Kong
Japan
Korea
Singapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
China
Vietnam
Australia


2.6
2.8
3.4
2.0
3.0
4.9
2.5
8.6
1.1
3.0
5.9
8.2


2.7
2.2
3.4
2.6
2.4
4.7
2.6
8.7
0.9
3.1
6.0
8.3


2.7
2.7
4.1
6.8
3.2
5.5
3.2
10.1
3.4
3.1
6.9
7.7


2.9
2.9
4.7
6.3
4.6
6.4
3.4
9.7
3.0
3.1
6.7
7.0


3.0
3.4
4.7
4.12
4.4
6.1
3.1
12.0
2.4
3.1
6.4
6.3


4.4
6.7
5.0
3.5
5.0
3.7
3.6
6.7

6RXUFH Country chapters, this volume, supplemented by information from Asian Development Bank, Asia
Recovery Information Centre, http://aric.adb.org/pre_defined_indicators.asp?id=2, and OECD
(FRQRPLF2XWORRNNo. 71, June 2002, Paris.

23

Table 3.)HUWLOLW\OHYHOVLQ$VLDQHFRQRPLHV

Chinese Taipei
Hong Kong
Japan
Korea
Singapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
China
Vietnam

1980
2.5
2.0
1.8
2.6
1.9
4.3
4.2
4.8
3.5
2.5
5.0

1990
1.8
1.3
1.5
1.8
1.7
3.0
3.8
4.1
2.2
2.1
3.6

1999
1.6
1.0
1.5
1.6
1.5
2.6
3.0
3.3
1.9
1.9
2.3

6RXUFH Asian Development Bank, .H\,QGLFDWRUVRI'HYHORSLQJ$VLDQDQG3DFLILF&RXQWULHV, New York,

Oxford University Press, 2001.

Table 4.2IILFLDOHVWLPDWHVRIWRWDOQXPEHUVRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVLQ

$VLDQHFRQRPLHV

Chinese Taipei
Hong Kong1
Japan2
Korea2
Singapore
Indonesia3
Malaysia2
Philippines3
Thailand2
China3
Vietnam3
Australia4


164.3
610.0
210.5
24.9
745.2
4.3
1,033.9
80.0
-


245.7
171.0
630.0
245.4
24.4
1,471.6
6.1
1,125.8
82.0
-


255.6
180.6
660.0
157.7
21.3
1,127.7
5.3
1,103.5
83.0
200.0+


278.0
193.7
670.0
217.4
530.0
14.9
818.7
6.0
1,089.7
85.0
-


326.5
216.8
710.0
285.5
612.2
16.8
799.7
1,102.6
30.0

Notes:
1
Includes an estimate of foreign domestic workers only; there are no stock figures for the highly skilled.
2
Includes estimates of undocumented workers.
3
Estimate of foreign experts only, primarily professionals, the highly skilled and teachers
4
Estimate of number of temporary entrants with the right to work.
6RXUFH Country chapters, this volume.

24


330.2
805.0
60.0
-

Table 5.1XPEHURIVWXGHQWVVLQGHJUHHJUDQWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV

WRSFRXQWULHVRIRULJLQDVUDQNHGLQ

China
India
Japan
Korea
Chinese Taipei
Canada
Indonesia
Thailand
Turkey
Mexico
Germany
Brazil
United
Kingdom
Malaysia
Hong Kong
:RUOGWRWDO


1.7
1.6
1.2
2.6
4.7
1.2
0.8
0.7


9.7
5.9
3.4
10.3
8.4
6.3
4.0
2.8


59.9
54.7
46.5
45.7
28.6
25.3
11.6
11.2
11.0
10.7
10.1
8.8
8.8



11.1


8.1
7.8


6RXUFH Institute of International Education, 2SHQ 'RRUV  5HSRUW RQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (GXFDWLRQDO
([FKDQJH, New York, Institute of International Education, 2002 and various years.

25

3$57,

7+(029(0(172)7+(+,*+/<6.,//('
,1$6,$

27

7+(029(0(172)7+(+,*+/<6.,//(',1$6,$
35(6(176,78$7,21$1')8785(35263(&7
E\
<DVXVKL,JXFKL
Max-Planck-Institut F.A.I.S.R., Munich1

,QWURGXFWLRQ
2EMHFWLYHVRIWKHSDSHU
This paper aims to explore possibilities in Asia to reduce risks of brain drain and increase
chances of movement of the highly skilled in the context of regional economic integration.
It seems timely now in 2002 to discuss this issue in a regional forum, as political interests are
growing in establishing an institutional regional regime of economic integration. The movements of
the highly skilled must be one of the important elements necessary for regional integration of this area. 
The European Union has already laid stress on facilitation of the highly skilled especially in
1980swithin the framework of free movement of workers under the Rome Treaty in 1957. The North
American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 also stipulated measures to simplify the procedure to
facilitate movement of professionals within the region.
Therefore, the structure of this paper is the following:

1.

First, we will discuss the scope and classification of the highly skilled by considering
definitions by the OECD and the ILO as well as commitments based on the General
Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) on the movement of natural persons.

Second, with the classification of the highly skilled adopted here, we will make
international comparisons of the movement of the highly skilled, between Japan and the
US, and then in selected East Asian countries. By doing so, we can formulate some
stylised facts on migration of the highly skilled in Asia.

Third, we will review policy discussions made by the ILO, the OECD as well as the EU
concerning the movement of the highly skilled. At the end, we will formulate policy
options according to the different flows of this group and discuss possibilities of regional
initiatives and strategies in Asia

The author is very grateful for the cooperation of the OECD and ILO, especially for the detailed
comments by Mr. Garson and the statistics provided by his colleagues in the OECD as well as
documents provided by Mr. Abella and Mr. Wickeramacekara of the ILO.

29

%DFNJURXQGGLVFXVVLRQV
Since the second half of the 1990s, the discussion on the effects of international migration of
the highly skilled has intensified. The present discussion is somewhat similar to that of the 1970s on
brain drain, with its emphasis on the potential disadvantages such as loss of economic growth and
income for the sending countries. Furthermore, the present argument is strengthened by the newly
developed endogenous growth models, in which loss of human capital and technology may bring
about cumulative negative effects.
In Europe, while the movement of top-level researchers and competent managers to the
United States has been raised by some media in the 1990s, the movement of professionals and students
from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe has been remarkable since the fall of the
communist regimes. Under such circumstances, many of countries including the United Kingdom,
Germany and France have taken measures to facilitate acceptance of the highly skilled, especially ITspecialists, in order to cope with the globalizing competition for such workers(OECD, 2001b; Werner
and Hnekopp, 2001).
In Asia, the emigration of the highly skilled, especially of IT workers to the United States,
has attracted much attention in the second half of 1990s, as the flow of highly-skilled workers had
peaked in some countries.
However, sending countries' reactions are not unique. Although India supplies the largest
number of IT-workers to the United States and to other developed counties, the fear of brain-drain has
never been very great, probably because many IT workers finance their own education (Gayathri,
2001). In contrast, countries like China finance the cost of education of university students within the
countries almost solely by public funds and the fear of brain drain leads to discussions on how to
internalise costs and encourage these people back to their home countries (Luo and Wang, 2001). The
collapse of the IT-bubble in the United States in 2000, and the aftermath of the terrorist attack of
11th September in New York and Washington D.C. have changed the labour market situation of IT
workers world wide. Some foreign workers with H1-b visa status are losing their jobs (Martin,
2002). Enterprises outside the United States, who could not recruit these specialists until 2001, are
now intensifying their activities to attract them. In Germany also, it was reported that some foreign ITworkers holding a Green Card had been dismissed as the result of this recession. Some of them are
now seeking alternative job opportunities in their home countries. It can be expected that more return
migration of IT-workers may take place in 2002.
%UDLQGUDLQYV%UDLQH[FKDQJH
Before discussing the present situation of the highly skilled, it is important to clarify the
theoretical framework of the paper. The traditional discussion on brain drain was initiated under a
much less globalized economic setting. However, the effects of the movement of human resources
should be considered now in combination with the movement of capital, goods and services. Largescale foreign direct investment and growing trade in services are new phenomena that did not exist
thirty years ago. The brain-drain effect will be modified and compensated, when a number of countries
form regional economic integration. In consequence, intra-regional movement and inter-regional
movement of the highly skilled may have different economic effects.
Returning to the notion of traditional brain drain, it can be understood as permanent
emigration of the highly skilled that may result in irreversible loss of technological development,
economic growth, income and employment for the sending country. Nevertheless, there are several
30

ways to avoid or mitigate such effects. First, brain drain does not occur, when the highly skilled are
unemployed so they do not form a bottleneck for economic growth. Second, the temporary movement
of natural persons can avoid "brain drain". Even the permanent migrants are able to move
internationally. Third, the highly skilled are heterogeneous. Whereas the highly skilled of type A may
emigrate, the highly skilled of type B immigrate. Forth, emigration of the highly skilled may entail
strong network effects, which may facilitate introduction of new technology and even create new
international division of labour. Fifth, the emigration of the highly skilled provokes incentives for
higher education in the home country, as the cost of education will be well compensated in the longterm. Sixth, the remittances from the highly skilled may to some extent mitigate the negative effects of
brain drain. 
In general, with the inflow of foreign direct investment, it is not reasonable to assume that
brain drain exerts irreversible negative effect on the economic structure and its economic growth.
From this perspective, Findlay (1993, pp. 149-159) examined the notion of EUDLQ H[FKDQJH, which
implies the movement of the highly-skilled between integrated advanced economies in both directions.
Based on such a discussion, Iguchi (1997, pp. 258-264 analysed conditions for brain exchange
between GHYHORSHGDQGGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV with GHIDFWRregional economic integration in Asia. He
also recognisedtheEUDLQZDVWHproblem as an important issue of international migration in Asia.
More recently, Wolburg (2001, pp. 87-151) made theoretical and empirical approaches to
brainexchange on the basis of European experiences and classified several economic effects of the
migration of the highly skilled into two groups. According to him, the real effects of the movement of
the highly skilled will be determined by the combination of the two different components. However, to
adapt his framework to the Asian economic situation, the author recognises the necessity to modify
them (Table 1). Namely, in addition to the six different economic effects already mentioned above,
especially under the Asian context, brain waste of the highly skilled with low wage level and
inadequate working conditions is to be curbed (with * in the table).
A mixture of the two different components in the two columns can explain the actual
situation we are now faced with. Normally speaking, the extreme case of brain drain does not come
into reality.
'HILQLWLRQDQGVFRSHRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG+6
)DFWRUVGHILQLQJWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG
The question of how to define the highly skilled is both technical and political in nature. The
definition and scope correspond with each other. Effects of the movement of the highly skilled depend
on their scope. If the effects of the movement of a certain category of the highly skilled are deemed to
be negative for a country, then the country may insist that the category should be out of the scope. In
this way, it is almost impossible to reach any consensus on the definition and the scope of the highly
skilled. How then can we approach the highly skilled without common definition and scope?
As there are different categories of highly skilled workers, it is possible to select some
indicators to define them. They are 1) educational background (like four years of university education
or bachelors degree), 2) official professional qualification, such as lawyer, doctors, public accountants
etc.; 3) experience in a certain occupation or vocational activities or 4) combinations of at least two
indicators for example 1), 2) and 3).

31

It is important to avoid DXWRPDWLFDOO\ classifying university graduates, persons with a certain

official qualification or persons with a certain work experience ashighly skilled as this is not always
the case.
In addition, it can be said that the highly skilled may have some 5) company specific
knowledge or technology that can be acquired through experiences with the company, but this cannot
be objectively evaluated. We must also bear in mind when we make an analysis on the movement of
students as part of the highly skilled, that generally students have not as yet academic degrees, neither
official qualifications, or work experience and no specific knowledge and technology.
Another contestable group is the business travellers. They can be engaged in negotiations,
advertisements as well as lectures. But, their competence is not supported by academic degrees,
professional qualifications etc. We may thus conclude that the scope of the highly skilled is varied and
difficult to define.
'HILQLWLRQSURSRVHGE\WKH2(&'(XURVWDWDQGWKH,/2
How then do international organisations define the highly skilled? The OECD and Eurostat
agreed on the so-called Canberra Manual, which was used as a measure of Human resources
devoted to Science and Technology (HRST). It has been recommended that the definition of HRST
should be refined, when the Canberra Manual should be revised (Auriol and Sexton, 2002, pp. 1337).
According to the Canberra manual, HRST are people who fulfil one or other of the
following conditions: 1) successfully completed education at the third level in an S&T field and study;
2) not formally qualified as above, but employed in and HRST occupation where above qualifications
are normally required (OECD, 2001a, pp. 4-5). The ILO refers in its most recent work, to the
movement of the highly skilled as the movement of tertially educated persons, primarily those with
at least four years of education after primary and secondary school (12 years). The mobility refers also
to any types of international movement from one-time target to recurrent or permanent patterns
(Lowell and Findlay, 2001, box p. 6).
By the way, the OECD has been analysing the movement of students as an important
element of the movement of the highly skilled, although students do not conform to such definition
(OECD, 2001b, pp. 93-117). The ILO does not include students in the highly skilled either. However,
the ILO also discusses the movement of students. In the case study, India is rated as the major supplier
of foreign students (Lowell and Findlay, 2001, pp. 11-14).
We can draw certain conclusions from such a discussion. Both OECD/Eurostat and ILO
definitions of the highly skilled lack flexibility and are not operational in comparative studies. It seems
that even the EU, within which free movement and settlement of EU citizens are guaranteed, are not
able to measure intra-EU mobility of the highly skilled. Therefore, these unique definitions can be
useful only in the case where common statistics with common indicators are available across
countries.
7KHFRPPLWPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJ0RGHEDVHGRQ*$76
In contrast to the OECD/Eurostat and ILO definitions, the commitments made by the
Member countries of WTO based on the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) reflect a
32

variety of national definitions of the highly skilled workers of one country, who are defined as
directly related to and necessary for the provision of services of one country in another country
(GATS Art. 1/Art. 16). GATS regards such movement of persons as the Mode4 of trade in services
(cf. the cross border movement of services from one country to another (Mode1), the movement of
consumer from one country to another (Mode2), and provision of services through commercial
presence in another country (Mode3).
First, through comparison of commitments by the US, the EU, Japan and Canada, we can
generally draw some conclusion that the executives, senior managers and specialists are covered in
such movements (Iguchi, 1997, pp. 76-78). However, the notion of specialist also has a variety of
definitions. According to US definitions, the specialists should possess proprietary knowledge in the
company, whereas according to the Japanese definition, they should conduct activity using the high
level of knowledge acquired through university education or its equivalent experience. Second,
mobility takes place mainly through intra-corporate transfer between two commercial bodies located
in different Member countries (Iguchi, 1997, pp. 80-82).
However, the concept of the intra-corporate transferees is different. The US definition may
include transfer of lawyers between two different partnership corporations. The EU definition is not
unique, because there are fifteen different company laws in the EU. The Japanese commitment is also
very difficult, because intra-company transfer is not explicitly defined for professionals in the
Japanese national laws.
Third, the duration of work and stay of transferees is normally limited to between three and
five years in many of countries, while duration is not explicitly defined in commitments of EU
Member states (Iguchi, 1997, pp. 80-82). Fourth, only the Canadian commitment includes the
movement of persons engaged in supplying services on a contract basis, although their application is
limited to certain occupation. However, many of service providers on a contract basis may be moving
as business travellers and not as service suppliers (Iguchi, 1997, p. 78).
An overview is now possible on the commitments by selected East Asian countries.
Naturally there are so many different concepts of the movement of natural persons in the national
commitments (Table 2). With all these differences of commitments, we can say that even in East Asia,
a certain harmonisation is apparent concerning the movement of natural persons who are employed by
the Foreign Service supplier under the GATS.
7\SHVDQGFODVVLILFDWLRQVRI+6IRULQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSDULVRQ
Based on the above-mentioned discussions, we may conclude that it is practical to define a certain
type of movement of the highly skilled so as to make an international comparison. These types are
different in national legislation, but they are internationally comparable.
x

Type A indicates Core HS, which mean temporary movement of the highly skilled
and either intra-corporate transferee", researcher (professor)", specialist or
professional". In this case, specialist should have a certain academic degree, while
professional should have passed a certain official examination or obtained
accreditation of qualification.

Type B indicates Additional channels to HS which cannot be included in the Core

HS, but they should be counted as the part of the highly skilled. First, business travellers
include those who are employed by Foreign Service providers and engaged in supply of
33

services on a contract basis. In reality, statistical distinction between service provider on

the contract basis and the other business travellers is almost impossible. Second, students
are not the highly qualified SHUVH, but they may have better access to the foreign labour
market after graduation
 Type C indicates Permanent HS which includes those highly-skilled who have
obtained permanent residence status either through an employment-based immigration
system or through a points system, which gives higher points to this group than any
other. In addition, in some countries, HS workers have better access to long-term
residential permits than less skilled workers.
 Type D indicates 2XWVLGH+6, which signify all workers not always acknowledged as
highly skilled. Discussions on such highly skilled are often so confusing. Therefore, we
should explicitly indicate that nurses (care workers), entertainers and the other skilled
workers are excluded in the highly skilled category, as the majority cannot be regarded
as HS. 3.
Using the type and the classification of the highly skilled indicated in Table 3, Iguchi (2002)
tried to measure the inflow of the highly skilled in Japan and United States as indicated in Table 4.
According to this estimation, the share of the highly skilled in the inflow of foreigners in total is about
30% in Japan while it is about 50 % in the United States. In comparing these two countries, see foot
note. We will now compare statistics of East Asian countries. By doing so, we can identify basic
findings concerning the movement of the highly skilled in Asia.
&RUH+6DVWHPSRUDU\PLJUDQWV
In several East Asian countries, Core HS can be identified in the immigration statistics. In
the place of intra-company transfer, data of investment promotion or expatriates are available in
some countries. Between Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong China and Indonesia, data on inflow should
be compared, while between Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and China, stock data is
comparable (Tables 5 and 6).
Using foreign direct investment statistics in Japan, local employment as well as the number
of expatriates in Japanese affiliated companies (with 10 % or more of capital participation) is
comparable across East Asian countries. In addition, the outflow data of Japanese, who are departing
to work with Japanese affiliates can be compared (Table 7).
We may formulate some important characteristics of the movement of Core HS in East Asia.
Finding 1: Intra-company transferees are still dominant in Core HS Migration in many Asian
countries, while movement of specialist and professionals are small in number.
In Japan and the US, movements of specialists are supported by some visa (resident) status
and the number is relatively large. The movement of professionals is promoted under the NAFTA
scheme in the case of United States, while the number from Mexico is limited by numerical quota
(OECD, 2001b).
Finding 2: Movement of researchers may be small in number probably because of the
number and its location of R&D facilities within Asia.

34

The study of UNCTAD (2001) shows location of the R&D centres. The R&D centres are
concentrated in Japan in the case of East Asia in the middle of the 1990s, although there are some
information that establishment of R&D centres is growing in China and India. The UNESCO data also
reveals that the number of researchers are still low in Asia in comparison with Europe and North
America.
Finding 3: Asian nationals occupy the majority of Core HS in Asian countries, as is the case
for HI-B visa holders in USA.
Asian nationals make up the majority of the Core HS. It means that the movement of Core
HS in Asia is intra-regional, while the majority of H1-b workers are also occupied by Asian nationals
in the United States (Martin, 2002).
$GGLWLRQDOFKDQQHOVRI+6
There have been a small number of studies on business travellers, although the movement of
service providers on a contract basis is attracting attention (Iguchi, 1997; Pacific Basin Economic
Council, 2001; European Service Forum, 2001),. Detailed data on activities by business travellers are
not available in Asia, either. We can see some detailed statistics from Japanese immigration data
(Table 8). While the movement of short-term visitors in total is increasing, the number of business
travellers appears to be growing significantly.
The movement of students is also regarded as a movement of consumers in the frame of
trade in services. Traditionally, the internationally comparable data on students are provided by
UNESCO (Tables 9 and 10). On the one hand, the percentage of foreign students in Asian universities
is relatively low. On the other hand, the ratio of Asian students among foreign students in many of the
European and American countries are already high. It means that the intra-regional movement of
students in Asia is still limited and inter-regional movement is greater than intra-regional movement.
The findings can be summarised as follows:
Finding 4: Movement of service providers as natural persons on a contract basis may be
numerous, but difficult to grasp in statistics for Asia.
Finding 5: In Asian countries, the rate of foreign students is still low in comparison with the
industrialised countries who are attracting many Asian students.
In addition to this, there are statistics and estimates on the ratio of returned students. As more
industrialised countries are introducing procedures for foreign students to change their status after
graduation to working status, the need for such statistics is very great. According to the estimates in
China, the ratio of returned Chinese students abroad is especially low in the US in comparison with
other host countries. The procedure of adjustment of status after graduation is not so popular in Asian
countries except in Japan and Korea.
3HUPDQHQWKLJKO\VNLOOHGZRUNHUV
Concerning permanent immigration to the traditional settlement countries, there are several
schemes to attract HS so as to assure the quality of immigrants. Canada and Australia have a points
system to select permanent immigrants. The Asian share of such immigrants is especially high when
35

we look at the highly skilled. In the United States too, 50 % of the employment-based immigrants are
from Asia. Therefore we may conclude:
Finding 6: Countries with a Points system or employment-based immigration are
attracting this group especially from Asia.
It is estimated that the adjustment of status from temporary to permanent acts a magnet for
attracting HS in these countries (Giegerlich and Wolfrum, 2000; Christian; 2000). With these basic
findings on the situation of Asia, we are about to start policy discussions.
'LVFXVVLRQVRQWKHSROLF\UHODWHGWRWKHPRYHPHQWRI+6
,/2SURSRVDOVWRVWD\WKHQHZWKUHDWRIEUDLQGUDLQ,/2
Recently, the ILO conducted a project on migration of highly skilled persons from
developing countries with close co-operation with the government of the United Kingdom (Lowell and
Findlay; 2001; Khadria, 2001; Findlay, 2001). According to the ILO, the problem lies in that the
demand for highly skilled workers is largely met by developing countries. While the ILO
acknowledges that some amount of movement of the highly skilled is necessary for the developing
countries to become integrated into the global economy, there also exists WKHWKUHDWRIEUDLQGUDLQ
which can adversely affect growth and development. The ILO maintains that the developed countries
should also share such a threat. Therefore, the project attempted to demonstrate the impact of highly
skilled migration on developing countries and policy options open to developed countries.
The reports showed that 10 to 30 percentage of the highly educated workforce left for
developed country in some of the developing countries in the 1990. Although the brain drain effects
have not been clearly demonstrated, it created a challenge for developing countries. The report
emphasises that the net impact of skilled migration from developing countries is a balance of direct
and indirect effects. The report acknowledged that while there are negative effects caused by skilled
labour emigration, there are also positive effects, which promote economic growth. It showed that
return migration and expatriates in developing countries exert a positive influence. Such migration
also stimulates individuals to pursue higher education. It also points out that brain exchange among
developing countries has positive effects for globalisation of economies.
Although the report regards the problem of net balance of the effects by the skilled labour
migration as open, it proposes six Rs (reparation for direct loss like brain drain tax, return
restriction and recruitment, resourcing namely inviting Diasporas to come home as well as grand
policies of retention through building educational institutions, assisting economic development etc.).
The report concludes that developed countries should encourage international migration, but
the policies should promote economic growth of developing countries, including encouragement of
temporary and return migration, control of recruitment from at-risk countries and establish best
practices as well as standardisation of GATS commitments etc. Additionally, transfer of technologies
and development of human resources should be strengthened. These reports have led to a variety of
findings especially in India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. The policy discussion is comprehensive
and very instructive.
However, these studies do not cover aspects of regional integration, although regional cooperation and integration open-up more possibilities to curb brain drain effects as we have
discussed. The reports also present some restrictive measures to curb permanent migration in
36

developed countries and encourage only temporary migration, which is not always realistic in the
current international context. There is no discussion on the balance of development of human
resources and international migration. In some cases, the reports discuss skilled labour migration and
not the highly skilled migration.
But, these points are not defects of these reports. The reports should get high evaluation
especially in the sense that the developed countries should share the fears of "brain drain" too and they
succeeded in encouraging rational discussions with development aspects in the international society.
2(&'VDSSURDFKWRJOREDOFRPSHWLWLRQRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG
The OECD clearly detected first occurrences of JOREDOFRPSHWLWLRQ in the labour market of
the highly skilled (OECD, 2000a). In the OECD, there have been several studies on the movement of
highly skilled, which had been implemented in the first half of the 1990s. The focus at that time was
whether the movement of the highly skilled might be reduced with localisation of personal in
multinational enterprises and with development of transportation and information technologies or even
be increased with higher speed of transfer of technologies (Salt, 1997; Iguchi, 1996). However, these
findings have not been reflected in recent discussions on the movement of highly skilled workers.
For a long time, the majority of the OECD countries were not keen to open their doors wide
to the highly skilled, as unemployment of highly skilled nationals as well as those foreigners already
settled, has been of great concern. In traditional settlement countries like US, Canada and Australia,
the rights enjoyed by the highly skilled immigrants have not been much different from the other
categories of immigrants, although they had been taken measures to facilitate the immigration of the
highly skilled.
Although the brain drain aspects have not been the central theme in the OECD countries
for the past ten years, the Directorate of Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs has
recently been assessing the effects of international migration of the highly skilled on economic
development in cooperation with the Centre of Economic Development. At the same time, it is
expected that relationship with the science and technology policy will be further explored (OECD,
2001b).
The OECD is also strengthening activities concerning what we call additional channels in
this paper. Namely, the movement of natural persons under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services as well as the movement of students are under study in co-operation with WTO and
UNESCO.
The recent study on student migration has contributed to new discussion on the movement of
the highly skilled since last year. This study has demonstrated that student mobility is constantly
growing, host countries benefit greatly while the effects on the sending countries are less
advantageous, with the conclusion that the migration of students should be encouraged (OECD,
2001b, pp. 93-115). The OECD has also been paying close attention to the demographic changes
especially in developed countries and its relationship with international migration. The linkage
between demographic changes and migration policies including the permanent immigration of the
highly skilled will be an important issue in the near future. The brain drain effects will have to be
discussed again.
Overall, the outcomes of studies by the OECD show that the policies concerning the
migration of the highly skilled is far beyond the migration policies SHUVH. Any policy recommendation
is impossible without reorganising the whole economic strategy of the countries concerned. In this
37

sense, the tasks of the OECD concerning the movement of the highly skilled may not be limited to
development of migration policies. It should also be devoted to formulation of new economic policies
in the developed countries and to create new economic co-operation with the developing countries
under the globalisation of economies.
It is also hoped from the Asian point of view, that the linkage between regional economic
integration and international migration of the highly skilled should be more explicitly discussed, so as
to give more stimuli to regional co-operation and integration in Asia.
7RZDUGVDFKDQJHRIPLJUDWLRQSROLF\(8
With the long-term projections of declining populations and the labour force within the
European Union, the EU Commission reported to the European Council and the European Parliament
on the future of migration policies in the European Union (Europische Kommission, 2000; FriedlichEbert-Stiftung; 2000; Deutscher Bundestag; 2000).
The EU commission proposed clearly, that the official recruitment stop of foreign workers
from outside the European Union since the 1970s should be changed to adapt the migration policy to
the new circumstance in Europe.
However, this has no direct impact on the migration policies in Member States and, with the
ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU Commission has the power to do some co-ordination
on European migration policy. For a long time, there have been no regulations by the EU Commission
on migration policies for the third country nationals. However, with the deepening of economic and
political integration of the EU, the EU Commission has proposed to change the paradigm of migration
policy, which has been maintained since the first oil shock at the first half of 1970s. Already in
Germany, discussion on reforms of national migration systems has been under way. In 2001, the report
of an independent study committee proposed to introduce new immigration regulations and
strengthening of integration measures (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2001a).
The Federal Internal Ministry drafted the new law (Bundesministerium des Innern 2001b)
and the draft law is presently being discussed in the %XQGHVWDJ (Diet), after having undergone several
amendments during the negotiations with the parties concerned, as the ruling coalition parties do not
have majority in the %XQGHVUDW (Senate). The draft law intends on the one hand to utilise the existing
domestic workforce as much as possible. On the other hand, it will institutionalise permanent
immigration by introducing a points system with an annual quota. The highly skilled, who fulfil
several conditions, may be allowed to stay and work in Germany almost automatically.
At the same time, measures to integrate foreigners should be strengthened. The whole system
of immigration and working should be simplified and be made transparent. It is expected that more
developed countries will prefer highly skilled migration and provide adjustment procedures from
temporary to permanent status for these workers.
Asia, still being the biggest supplier of the permanent emigrants to the traditional settlement
countries like the US, Canada and Australia, should have a long-term strategy to retain and attract the
highly skilled to cope with new developments in migration policy in Europe.
As we have seen above, policy discussions on the highly skilled until now have not taken
into consideration regional specific issues and do not reflect different types of their international
migration. Therefore, we should examine several policy options concerning the highly skilled by types

38

and classifications of international migration, paying close attention to the effects of regional
integration, which may compensate or even cancel the effects of brain drain.
Table 13 shows several policy options for Asian countries. Among them, we discuss the
following important points:
1.

Widening the scope and improving transparency of procedure for intra-corporate

transferees are of great importance. This scheme may eventually serve for transfer of
technology. Under the rapid technological development and changing business
circumstances, the widening of scope for intra-company transfer does not necessarily
damage localisation policy (Iguchi, 1997, pp. 265-274).

2.

It is more realistic, in the medium term, to acknowledge foreigners with at least a

bachelors degree when accepting them as specialists, than to realise mutual recognition
of professional qualifications in the long term, as the experience in Japan and the US
shows. Naturally, other problems will arise such as steeper competition between national
and foreign workers who have similar academic degrees. It depends on the employment
situation in domestic labour market of academics.

3.

Mutual recognition of professionals may be easier on a bilateral basis, as the experience

of NAFTA shows. It is more complicated and difficult to realise this in multilateral
schemes except accountants, especially in Asia.

4.

It is important to encourage multinational enterprises to establish more R&D centres in

Asian countries using the resident highly skilled. This may automatically contribute to
strengthening of R&D capacity and extending its networking. The small inflow of
researchers cannot in itself improve through facilitating inflow of researchers in
migration policies.

5.

Under the Asian situation, deregulation concerning the movement of HS risks misuse.
Effective checks on recruiters/intermediaries are important. Under the constraints of
wide income gaps, it is necessary to assure adequate wages level and working conditions
of the highly skilled.

6.

Persons who provides on a contract basis are not always acknowledged legally in many
of the Asian countries. If some of them stay longer than for a short-term period, there
should be effective measures to guarantee their equal treatment: namely, the equivalent
wages and conditions with those of nationals in the host country.

7.

Establishing what we call centres of excellence, or their branches is important to enhance

student's mobility in Asian countries. In addition, deregulation of issuing working status
after graduation of students should be examined within a reform of migration policy.

In addition to the measures specific to the types of the highly skilled, it is of great
importance to take measures to facilitate their families to enter and stay in host countries and to
provide enough social infrastructure, which includes adequate accommodation, safety environment, a
wade range of social protection and possibility of language training, as well as education for children
with high standard. It should not be overlooked that the decision to enter, stay, work and settlement of
the highly skilled is much influenced by that of their families. Without having more consciousness on
integration policies of foreign nationals, it seems almost impossible for Asian countries to attract the
highly skilled who are willing to emigrate to the developed countries other than Asia.
39

Finally, aside from individual policy measures, it is naturally important to acknowledge that
the brain drain effects will be mitigated and even cancelled, when these measures are encompassed
under regional economic integration.
&RQFOXVLRQ
Because of lack of statistical information, it is not possible at present to fully verify
functioning and / potential of brain exchange within the Asian region. However, it may well be said
that regional economic integration driven by the market forces may reduce risks of brain drain
effects in Asia, mainly because growing intra-regional foreign direct investment has helped establish
networking and forming channels of highly skilled migration in both directions.
In addition, further networking effects are expected in R&D activities in Asia, as R&D
centres have been reorganised and, dislocated from developed areas to developing areas. It is also the
case, when centres of excellence establish their branches within the region. This may also lead to
movement of students within the region. Until the middle of 1990s, R&D centres in Asia were
concentrated in Japan and Singapore and capacities of universities in Asian countries were still limited
in their quantity and quality. Recently, the boom to establish R&D centres in China and India is
changing the situation of R&D activities and their networking in Asia.
The inter-regional movements of the highly skilled are still dominated by the movement of
intra-company transferees in Asia. Although the significance of such movement still remain
unchanged, it is also desirable in many of the countries, that restrictions on movement of specialist and
professionals should be gradually lifted.
In addition, there are more risks for the highly skilled in Asia to enter into brain waste
rather than brain exchange, because intra-regional income gaps are much bigger in Asia than in
Europe or North America. Even when the channels of the highly skilled are improved, there will be
risks that such channels will be misused by illegal undertakings.
Except in an emergency, it is unrealistic and undesirable to restrict movement of the highly
skilled by immigration and labour market regulations. Some undesirable effects like brain drain
should be encountered by positive measures like improvement of education and research as well as
their infrastructure. Facilitating return migration has also great potential for host countries now faced
with returning migration.
It is very importance to take measures to facilitate their families to enter and stay in host
countries and to provide enough social infrastructure, including accommodation with good
environment, a variety of social protection and language assistance for the family, as well as education
facilities for children with high quality. The decision to enter, stay, work and settlement of the highly
skilled is much influenced by that of their families.
The initiatives of migration policies as well as those of the related policies will be more
effective when conducted on the regional level. Asia should change its course of just supplying the
highly skilled to the other regions of the world to that of utilizing them more effectively for the
development of Asia itself. It is therefore timely now to acknowledge that the brain drain effects will
be mitigated and even cancelled when these measures are taken under the circumstances of regional
economic integration.

40

5()(5(1&(6

AURIOL, L. and SEXTON, J. (2001), Human Resources in Science and Technology: Measurement
Issues and International Mobility in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI7KH+LJKO\6NLOOHGOECD 2002.
ALBURO, F.A. (2001), Skilled Labor Migration from Developing Countries: Study on the
Philippines, Report prepared for International Migration Branch, ILO, Geneva.
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN (2001a), %HULFKWGHU8QDEKlQJLJHQ.LPPLVVLRQGHU
=XZDQGHUXQJBerlin.
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN (2001b), Gesetzentwurf zur Zuwanderung- und Imtegration
der Auslnder, Berlin.
BUNDESTAG (1999), %HULFKWGHU.RPPLVVLRQ'HPRJUDSKLVFKHU:DQGHO, Berlin.
COALITION OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES (2001), Draft Model Schedule covering the temporary
entry of persons under the GATS.
CHRISTIAN, B. P. (2000), Facilitation Highly-Skilled Migration to Advanced Industrial Countries:
Comparative Policies, March 13, 2000, George Town University.
EUROPISCHE KOMMISSION (2000), 0LWWHLOXQJGHU.RPPLVVLRQDQGHQ5DWXQGGDV(XURSlLVFKH
3DUOLDPHQWEHUHLQH0LJUDWLRQVSROLWLNGHU*HPHLQVFKDIW Kom(2000)757, Brssel.
EUROPEAN SERVICE FORUM (2001), 7KLUGSRVLWLRQSDSHURIWKH(XURSHDQ6HUYLFH)RUXPRQWKH
WHPSRUDU\PRYHPHQWRI.H\%XVLQHVV3HUVRQQHO, Brussels.
FINDLAY A.M. (1993), New technology, High-Level Labour Movements and the Concept of the
Brain Drain, in 7KH&KDQJLQJ&RXUVHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQOECD, 1993Paris.
FINDLAY, A.M. (2001), From Brain Exchange to Brain Gain: Policy Implication for the UK of
recent trends in Skilled Migration from Developing countries, Report prepared for International
Migration Branch, ILO, Geneva.
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG (2001), (XURSlLVFKH(LQZDQGHUXQJVXQG)OFKWOLQJVSROLWLN
Gesprchkreis, Arbeit und Soziales Nr.97 Bonn.
FUKUHARA, N. and ISHIGAKI, T. (2000), SOPEMI Report of Japan, Government of Japan, Tokyo.
GAYATHHRI, V. (2001), Rethinking High-Skilled International Migration: Research and policy
Issues for Indias Information Economy in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI7KH+LJKO\6NLOOHGOECD
2002.

41

GIEGERLICH, T. and WOLFRUM, R. (2000),(LQZDQGHUXPQJVUHFKWQDWLRQDOXQGLQWHUQDWLRQDO

Leske+Bundrich, Opladen.
GUPCHU, Z. and WENJUN, L. (2001), International Mobility of Chinas Resources in Science and
Technology and its Impact, in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI7KH+LJKO\6NLOOHGOECD 2002.
IGUCHI, Y.(2002), Changes in Labor Market and International Migration under Rapid Economic
Adjustment in Japan Paper presented to WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO:RUNVKRS,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ
DQG/DERU0DUNHWLQ$VLDon 4 and 5 February 2002 by Japan Institute of Labor
IGUCHI, Y. (2001a), International Migration of the Highly Skilled and Migration Policy- Initiatives
from Japan and Asia, paper presented to WKH6HPLQDU,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI+LJKO\6NLOOHG
ZRUNHUVIURP6WDWLVWLFDO$QDO\VLVWR)RUPXODWLRQRI3ROLFLHV, organised by the OECD
(DSTI/DEELSA), Paris, 11-12 June 2001.
IGUCHI, Y. (2001B), The East Asian Recovery and International Migration in Japan, in 0LJUDWLRQ
DQGWKHODERXUPDUNHWLQ$VLDWUHQGVDQGSURVSHFWV OECD 2002.
IGUCHI, Y. (1997), ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQDQG/DERU0DUNHW Japan Institute of Labor
IGUCHI, Y.(1996), The movement of the highly skilled in the Asian-Pacific region, Paper presented
to the Workshop,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQDQG/DERU0DUNHWLQ$VLD, on 30. and 31. January
1996, by the Japan Institute of Labor, Tokyo.
KHADRIA, B. (2001), Skilled Labor Migration from Developing Countries: Study in India, Report
prepared for International Migration Branch, ILO, Geneva.
KRAMER, R. (2001), SOPEMI Report of the United States, Paris.
LOWELL, B.L. (2001), Policy responses to the International Mobility of Skilled Labor, Report
prepared for International Migration Branch, ILO, Geneva.
LOWELL, B.L and FINDLAY, A.M. (2001), Migration of Highly Skilled Persons from Developing
Countries: Impact and Policy responses (Synthesis Report), Report prepared for International
Migration Branch, ILO, Geneva.
LUO, Y-L and WANG, W-J. (2001), HighSkill Migration and Chinese Taipeis Industrial
Development, paper presented to ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI+LJKO\6NLOOHGZRUNHUVIURP
6WDWLVWLFDO$QDO\VLVWR)RUPXODWLRQRI3ROLFLHV, Seminar organized by the OECD
(DSTI/DEELSA), Paris, 11-12 June 2001/12/31.
MARTIN, P. (2002), Highly Skilled Asian Workers in the US Paper presented to the ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
:RUNVKRS,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQDQG/DERU0DUNHWLQ$VLD on 4 and 5 February 2002 by
Japan Institute of Labor, Tokyo
OECD (2002), ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI7KH+LJKO\6NLOOHGOECD 2002.
OECD (2001a), (PSOR\PHQW2XWORRNParis, (Chapter 5, The Employment of Foreigners: Outlook and
issues in OECD countries).
OECD (2001b), 7UHQGVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ, Paris.
42

OECD (2001c), 2(&'6FLHQFH7HFKQRORJ\DQG,QGXVWU\6FRUHERDUG7RZDUGVDNQRZOHGJH%DVHG

(FRQRP\, Paris.
OECD (2000a), 7UHQGVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ, Paris.
OECD (2000b), 0LJUDWLRQ3ROLF\DQG(8(QODUJHPHQW, Paris.
PACIFIC BASIN ECONOMIC COUNCIL (2001), 6WDWHPHQWRQ7HPSRUDU\(QWU\RI1DWXUDO
3HUVRQV, Honolulu.
SALT, J. (1997), The Movement of the Highly Skilled, OECD Working Paper, Paris
TOYO KEIZAI SHINPO SHA (2001), 'LUHFWRU\RI2YHUVHDV-DSDQHVH$IILOLDWHG&RPSDQLHV Tokyo.
TREMBLAY, K. (2001), Student Mobility between and towards OECD countries:A Comparative
Analysis, in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RI7KH+LJKO\6NLOOHGOECD 2002.
UNESCO (2000), <HDUERRNRI81(6&2, New York.
UNCTAD (2001), :RUOG,QYHVWPHQW5HSRUW, New York.
WERNER, H. and HNEKOPP, E. (2000), Does the EU Enlargement bring a danger for German
Labor Market?, ,$%.XU]EHULFKW Nrnberg.
WOLBURG, M. (2001), 2QEUDLQGUDLQEUDLQJDLQDQGEUDLQH[FKDQJHZLWKLQ(XURSH, Nomos,
Baden-Baden.

43

Table 1.%UDLQGUDLQDQGEUDLQH[FKDQJHFRPSRQHQWVLQKRPHFRXQWU\
%UDLQGUDLQFRPSRQHQW
ZLWKEUDLQJDLQZDVWHLQKRVWFRXQWU\
1 Permanent emigration of the highly skilled:
a) Exerts a negative effect on per capita
income through reduction in the share and/or
the number of the highly skilled.
b) Increase unemployment if the highly skilled
are a bottle neck factor.
FFDQEHDFFHOHUDWHGE\SULYDWHUHFUXLWHUV
ZLWKRXWXWLOLVLQJTXDOLILFDWLRQRIWKHPLJUDQWV
ZLWKLQDGHTXDWHZDJHOHYHODQGZRUNLQJ
FRQGLWLRQV 
2 Loss of publicly provided education.

Competitiveness for human capital-intensive

products/ services decreases; the terms of trade
worsen.
If the highly skilled pay taxes above the
average, their emigration
a) Causes income distribution to worsen, if
distribution from the highly skilled to the
remaining population previously took place.
b) Reduces the average tax rates so that
government expenditures have to be reduced.
Or the deficit has to be increased.
5 If publicly provided goods are produced
under decreasing average cost, emigration
increases the user charge of these goods for
those left behind.

%UDLQH[FKDQJHFRPSRQHQW
XQGHUUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFLQWHJUDWLRQ
Emigration of the highly skilled unemployed
Reduces transfer payments and / or stops the
depreciation of human capital.
7KHEUDLQZDVWHZLWKORZZDJHDQGEDG
ZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVLQKRVWFRXQWULHVLVFXUEHG

2 Temporary emigration of the highly skilled

with possible acquisition of human capital
abroad.
Simultaneous immigration of new types of
human resources that encourages more
advanced division of labour.
4 Building up a network from abroad so that
technology transfer becomes possible/ is
increased.

The possibility of emigration makes investment

in human capital less risky so that the incentives
for education are increased.
6 Emigrants remittances and voluntary
payments from the destination country.

6RXUFH: Wolburg (2001) with modifications by the author (especially with *).

44

Table 2.&RPPLWPHQWVRIWKHPRYHPHQWRIQDWXUDOSHUVRQVDFFRUGLQJWR*$76
&RPPLWPHQWVIRU0RGHRI7UDGHLQ6HUYLFHV
Japan

Korea

Singapore

Malaysia

Thailand

Indonesia

No numerical quota but guarantee of national treatment for

executives, senior managers and high-level specialist
(including lawyers, accountants etc.) as intra-corporate
transferees (for 5 years) and business travellers (90 days)
No numerical quota but guarantee of national treatment for
executives, senior managers and high-level specialist
(including lawyers, accountants etc.) as intra-corporate
transferees (for 4 years) and business travellers (90 days)
Executives, senior managers and high-level specialist
(including lawyers, accountants etc.) as intra-corporate
transferees (for 5 years)
No quota but guarantee of national treatment for senior
managers directly subordinated by CEO or Board, max two
high-level specialist per company, additional high-level
specialists are subject to labour test and training for nationals
(for 5 years) and business travellers (90 days)
No numerical quota but guarantee of national treatment for
executives, senior managers and high-level specialist, if they
conform to the criteria on necessity in business as intracorporate transferees (for 3 years)
No numerical quota but with labour test for managers,
technical experts advisers as intra-company transferees (for 3
years)

([SODQDWLRQ
Business travellers cannot
acquire income from within
Japan
Business travellers cannot
acquire income from within
Korea
National treatment not
guaranteed; No commitments
for business travellers
Professionals are subject to
recognition by authorities,
Business travellers cannot
acquire income from within
Malaysia
The the criteria on necessity
in business is not transparent,
No commitment for business
travellers
National treatment is not
guaranteed; the liberalisation
is low with economic needs
test, No commitment for
business travellers

6RXUFH: Iguchi (1997) pp. 78-80.

Table 3. 6FRSHRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG+6DQGZRUNHUVRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRI+6

7\SH
A; Core HS as
temporary
migrants
B: Additional
Channels to HS
C: Permanent
HS migrants
D: Outside the
scope of HS

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ
Intra-corporate transferee as Executives, senior managers and specialists
Researcher or Professor
Specialist other than intra-corporate transferee
Professional with certain accreditation
Business traveller including service provider on contract basis
Student able to adjusts their status after graduation
HS qualified under employment-based immigration system or point system
HS acquired long-term resident status
Nurse and care worker as medical specialists

Entertainers
Trainees with employment contract
The other skilled and unskilled workers as well as dependents
Long-term residents and permanent migrants other than HS
1RWH: A, B and C are included in the highly skilled. D is outside the scope.
6RXUFH: By the author:

45

Table 4. ,QIORZRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG+6DQGQRQ+6LQ-DSDQDQG86

7\SH
A: Core HS
As temporary
migrants

B: Additional
Channels to HS
C: Permanent
HS
D. Outside the
Scope of HS

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ
Total
Intra-corporate
Researchers
Professionals
Specialists
Business travellers including
Students
HS immigrants accepted under
HS temporary worker applying
Non-HS Workers in Total
Medical related Specialists
Entertainers
Other workers
Traineeswith OJT
Dependents of Workers/students
Other activities
Long-term residents
Permanent residents

A+B+C/

-DSDQ
21,478(100)
4,739(22.1)
2,977(13.9)
4(0)
13,758( 64.0)
1,218,102
19,503
None
144,318
3
103,296
30,665
41,019
33,556
2,708,762
40,003
None
29.8%

86
561,423 (100)
174,797(31.1)
15,946 ( 2.8)
68,354 (12.2)
302,326 (53.8)
24,104,371
567,146
77,517 (1998)
388,665
2,046
48,471
290,039
2,986
319,349
24,379,890
None 660,477
49.2%

Note: 1) Intra-corporate transferees mean those whose status of residence Investor /Business manager and Intra-corporate
transfer in Japan while they mean Visa L-1and E holders in the US. 2) Researchers mean those whose status of residence
researcher and professor in Japan while they mean visa O-1 holders in the US. 3) Professionals mean those whose status
of residence legal /accounting service and medical service while they mean Professional workers: NAFTA in the US. 4)
Specialists mean those whose status of residence engineer Specialist in humanities and international services. and
instructor in Japan while they mean visa H1-b holders with the quota. The number of H1-b holders exceeding the quota is
not clear.
6RXUFH By the author in reliance upon Japanese and US immigration statistics. See Iguchi (2002).

Table 5. ,QIORZRIOHJDOIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
-DSDQ

4,739
18,335

7KDLODQG

23,637
-

+.&KLQD

7,294
2,533

Intra-C. transfer
Researcher, Specialist
and Professional
Core HS total
23,074
23,637
9,827
Other Workers
106,794
46,130
5,681
Legal workers
129,868
73,613
15,508
1RWH: Other workers mean workers of Category D (Outside the scope) excluding permanent residents.
6RXUFH: By the author in reliance upon national statistics.

46

,QGRQHVLD

9,785
8,152
17,973
17,123
35,096

Table 6. 6WRFNRIOHJDOIRUHLJQZRUNHUV


-DSDQ

14,351
75,201

.RUHD


0DOD\VLD


Intra-C. transfer
Researcher, Specialist
and Professional
6,712
Core HS total
89,552
Other workers
65,206
5,878
Legal workers
154,748
12,590
1RWH: * stands for peninsular Malaysia only.
6RXUFH By the author in reliance upon national statistics.

22,729*
-

3KLOLSSLQHV


&KLQD

69,636
14,376

5, 837

84,000

5,956

84,000

Table 7. (PSOR\HHVDQGH[SDWULDWHVLQ-DSDQHVHDIILOLDWHGFRPSDQLHVLQ$VLD
'HSDUWXUHIRU
$IILOLDWHVIURP-DSDQ


-DSDQHVHDIILOLDWHGFRPSDQLHV2FW
RYHUVHDVZLWKRUPRUHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIFDSLWDO
Expatriates
Local Employment

Asia total
Korea
China
HK China
Taiwan China
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Indonesia
Philippines
Vietnam
Europe
North America
Oceania

29,821
1,271
6,637
5,203
2,316
1,710
3,357
5,108
1,562
1,105
333
8,954
14,451
853

25,461
524
5,244
3,077
2,040
2,327
4,451
3,530
2,355
1,235
348
3,930
14,495
1,054

50.7
1.0
20.6
6.1
4.1
4.6
8.9
7.0
4.7
2.4
0.6
7.8
28.8
2.1

2,064,795
79,974
566,728
144,259
107,912
226,431
344,918
78,315
253,474
147,083
34,009
280,726
682,658
53,854

63.8
2.4
17.5
4.5
3.3
7.0
10.7
2.4
7.8
4.5
1.1
8.7
21.1
1.7

Other
World grand total

1,040
55,119

5,306
50,246

10.6
100.0

155,217
3,237,248

4.8
100.0

6RXUFH Ministry of Justice and Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha.

47

Table 8.0RYHPHQWRIEXVLQHVVWUDYHOOHUVIURP-DSDQ



%XVLQHVVWUDYHOOHU

Asia total
Korea
China
Hong Kong China
Taiwan China
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Indonesia
Philippines
Vietnam
Europe
North America
Oceania
Other
*UDQGWRWDO

6KDUH

1,648,217
247,967
413,321
208,874
278,034
67,990
132,879
104,252
49,334
62,502
25,435
343,378
528,257
49,143
30,178


63.4
9.5
15.9
8.0
10.7
2.6
5.1
4.0
1.9
2.4
0.9
13.2
20.3
1.9
1.2


6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice 2001.

Table 91XPEHURIIRUHLJQVWXGHQWVLQVHOHFWHG$VLDQFRXQWULHV


Student (a)
Foreign student (b)
Ratio (b)/(a) %
Asian student ratio
Postgraduates ratio

-DSDQ
3,917,709
53,511
1.3
92.1
3.5

.RUHD
2,541,659
2,143
1.9
72.8
5.0

3KLOLSSLQHV
2,017,972
4,864
0.2
68.7
4.7

,QGRQHVLD
157,695
1,147
0.0
67.8
-

6RXUFH: UNESCO,<HDUERRN 2000) and UNESCO-OECD database.

Table 10.1XPEHURIIRUHLJQVWXGHQWVLQVHOHFWHG2(&'FRXQWULHV


Student (a)
Foreign student (b)
Ratio (b)/(a) %
Asian student
Postgraduate

86
14,261,778
453,785
3.2
64.1
14.2

8.
1,820,849
198,839
10.5
46.2
-

*HUPDQ\
2,131,907
165,977
7.8
36.2
-

)UDQFH
2,062,495
138,19
6.7
13.4
-

&DQDGD
1,783,716
39.4*
6.7

$XVWUDOLD
1,041,648
102,284
9.8
64.3**
13.2

Note: *Asian student ratio in Canada includes those from Oceania.

**The ratio in Australia is calculated on the basis of offshore student visa Grant in the 2000-01 period.
6RXUFH: UNESCO, Yearbook 2000) and UNESCO-OECD database.

48

Table 11. (VWLPDWHGRYHUVHDVDQGUHWXUQHG&KLQHVHVWXGHQWVa



2YHUVHDV&KLQHVH 6KDUHE\
5HWXUQHGVWXGHQWV 5DWHRIUHWXUQ
6WXGHQWV
FRXQWU\

Total
400,000
100
100,000
25.0
USA
213,200
53.3
30,021
14.1
Japan
66,800
16.7
25,016
37.4
Canada
26,800
6.7
10,036
37.4
Germany
26,800
6.7
10,036
37.4
UK
21,200
5.3
9,924
46.8
France
14,800
3.7
7,050
47.6
Australia
13,200
3.7
5,932
44.9
Others
17,200
4.3
1,984
11.5
1RWH: The rate of return = stock of returned students/ (stock of students studied overseas students who were
studying abroad). In countries, where number of students who were studying abroad are not available, the rate of
return = total of those who returned/ total of those studying abroad.
6RXUFH: Gupchu and Wenjun (2001).

Table 12. 3HUPDQHQWLPPLJUDQWVXQGHUHPSOR\PHQWVNLOOEDVHGSRLQWV\VWHP

8QLWHG6WDWHV
HPSOR\PHQWEDVHG
Total
77,517
(1998)
100
$VLD

N. America
19
Europe
18
Others
13

&DQDGD
$XVWUDOLD
SRLQWV\VWHPVNLOOEDVHG
SRLQWV\VWHPHVWLPDWHG
Total
52,080 Total
64,800
(2000)
100% (2000-1)
100%
$VLD3DFLILF
 $VLD

Europe
21% Oceania
37%
Africa/ ME
16% UK
14%
Latin America
5% Others
9%
US
1%
1RWH: The figure for Australia refers only to those immigrants whose nationality is specified in the statistics.
6RXUFH: Calculated by the author based on national statistics.

49

Table 13. 3ROLF\UHVSRQVHVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHW\SHVRI+6ZLWKLQWKHUHJLRQ

7\SHV

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ

A: Core HS as
temporary migrants

Intra-corporate
transferee

Improving transparency,
simplifying procedure, if
possible, lifting upper limit
of stay.

Researcher

Facilitating acceptance by
simplifying procedure
strengthening Centre of
Excellences/ improving
infrastructure for research
Simplifying procedure for
foreigner at least with
bachelors degree /
effective control of
recruiters
Mutual recognition of
qualification (in line with
regional integration) /
effective control of
recruiters
Flexibility in visa procedure/
limiting length of stay or
assuring equal payment
and conditions as nationals
to avoid negative effect on
domestic labour market
Expanding suitable courses
/ exams for foreign students
/ facilitating adjustment of
status after graduation /
assistance for working

Specialist

Professional

%$GGLWLRQDO
&KDQQHOVRI+6

%XVLQHVV
WUDYHOOHU
LQFOXGLQJ
VHUYLFH
SURYLGHU

6WXGHQW



&3HUPDQHQW
+6

(PSOR\PHQW
EDVHG
LPPLJUDWLRQ
RUSRLQW
V\VWHP

,QGXVWULDOLVHG&RXQWULHV

Facilitating adjustment from

temporary to permanent status

Source: By the author.

50

'HYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
Widening scope of
acceptance and improving
transparency / lifting of
labour test, quota and
localisation clauses
Encouraging MNE to
establish R&D centres/
inviting Centre of excellence
/ encouraging researchers
to return
Improving / expanding
university education to
absorb and retain national
students
Establishing professional
qualification system which
is internationally compatible

Encouraging on-shore
services by assuring equal
payment and conditions of
service providers in the
case of service on contract
basis
Encouraging national
students abroad to return by
acknowledging foreign
degree (restricting study
abroad is not rational
Adjustment from temporary to
permanent status should be
examined as a future task

,17(51$7,21$/0,*5$7,212)+,*+/<6.,//('
:25.(56,17+$,/$1'
E\
<RQJ\XWK&KDODPZRQJ
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI)

,QWURGXFWLRQ
The 1997 crisis proved that the Thai economy has only a limited ability to cushion both
internal and external factors. The country is now experiencing weakness in the structure of its
economy in all sectors, and it needs to maintain strong competitiveness and sustainability in all areas
of development so that it can survive in the open world economy.
7KHROGHFRQRP\EULFNVDQGPRUWDU
Looking back into Thailands industrial development, we found that its overall industrial
structure and its linkages have been very weak. As far as S&T are concerned, the stage of development
of the Thai industries still belong to the old economy (Bricks and Mortar) at different stages of
technological development. To get the Thai industry and economy back on track, several strategies
with definite objectives to stimulate different SMIs sub-sectors are needed in order to generate the
right kind of employment. The government measures should focus on well-defined industrial subsectors. Strategic industry sub-sectors must be selected for a definite period of time, so that manpower
in S&T, management, and marketing capability can be built on time. To put industrial development
back on track, the government needs to strengthen S&T capacity such as S&T infrastructure, S&T-IT
manpower development and training.
Some developed countries in East Asia like Chinese Taipei and Korea did not have a better
S&T capacity than Thailand early on, but have gained international weight through export and heavy
investment in human resources development and technology development in both product and
production processes. Such favourable conditions can sustain competition of these two nations in the
world market and in turn, these industrial enterprises can carry out S&T development on their own
instead of depending on government initiatives.
Thailand cannot afford to carry on just macro strategies in S&T capacity building; it has to
focus on key industries as mentioned above. The direction of development must be clear and the
weakness must be eradicated. Both government and industrial sectors must be accountable for S&T
capacity investment. Unlike the two previous countries mentioned, judging from the current status of
S&T development, Thailand still needs support either directly or indirectly by government agencies in
order to create foundation for its S&T capacity and to develop a knowledge-base and information
communication technology (ICT)-based economy.
1

I would like to thank Mr. Kampanat Vojitsrikamol for assisting me in collecting data and information.

51

7KDLODQGYVQHZHFRQRP\LQ$VLDFOLFNDQGPRUWDU
According to the World Bank (2000), Thailand is losing competitiveness due to high-cost
structures in the competitive world market. This outcome is confirmed by the IMDs competitiveness
ranking, in which Thailand was far behind developed countries and many Asian countries (Table 1).
Compared to competitors, according to Tangkitvanich (2001), most Thai industries have very low
margins as a result of low-skilled labour, low product quality, higher production costs due to higher
rejection rates and poor material yields. The lack of domestic technical professionals is confirmed by
the survey of IMD in Figure 1, which shows that Thailand got quite low score (5.09) in Asia.
Information and communication technology (ICT) is effective in many developed countries
in providing effective cost-reduction tools for firms, especially for supply chain management. Reports
from the OECD indicate that management of supply-chain could reduce the costs by at least 10% and
provide cycle-time reductions of 41 to 87 days. Therefore, the Thai manufacturing and business
sectors should seriously consider adopting ICT in the area of business to business (B2B), business to
customer (B2C), customer to customer (C2C) or customer to business (C2B). This can be done by
moving from the old economy of traditional Thai Brick and Mortar to Click and Mortar in order
to link up to the global network economy.
It is very unfortunate that the government initiatives to promote e-commerce have
concentrated only on education rather than on the private sector. Before encouraging the private sector
to make use to the ICT, two bottom-necks must be solved. The first one is the Communication
Authority of Thailand (CAT) monopoly on the Internet (ISP) market. The second one is the issue of
shortages of qualified ICT manpower.
As indicated by the IMDs survey (2001), Thailand ranked the lowest among 49 countries.
Tables 2 and 3 confirmed the above point that even within Asia, Thailand still ranked among the
lowest in the availability of qualified ICT and the demand for IT workers.
The surveying of more than 750 manufacturing industries in Thailand conducted by the
Thailand Development Research Institute in 2001 indicated that more than 34% of these industries
have used the Internet or EDI for more than one year. About 15% were in preparation stage, about 8%
planned to use it within two years, and the remaining 42% do not intend to use it in the next 2 years.
(GXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJLQ,7KXPDQUHVRXUFHV
According to an evaluation of Tangkitvanich and Veeratiphan (2001), Thailand is far behind
several nations in Asia not only in terms of IT development, but in IT manpower as well. The weak
S&T education prevent Thai IT professionals from getting certified. The number of certified IT
professionals working in Thailand is much lower than that of neighbouring Asian countries, especially
Malaysia and Singapore (due to low wages and lack of an appropriate market). However, experiences
from the EU indicated that there was a need for demand-side policies to attract good researchers to
develop public sector research. There is a need for policies to encourage industry and commerce to
demand highly skilled research and technological development (RTD) researchers. If not, countries
investing in the training of highly skilled manpower may lose its workforce to foreign countries
(Sanker).
One of the reasons of the limited educational capability in this area is that institutions are
lacking qualified instructors, even though over 30 public and private universities offer core courses
and majoring in IT and related areas. Over 4 500 students graduate each year in computer sciences and
computer engineering, and another 4 600 in computer-related engineering fields, in addition to over
52

700 post-graduates in core computer and related computer engineering. However, it was calculated
that the demand still exceed supply significantly (Table 4). It has been said among users of IT
manpower that in these areas, it will definitely take years to Thailand to fill up the mismatches
between demand and supply due mainly to poor quality of manpower. The poor performance of
instructors is due to their inability to keep up with recent computer and IT technology.
&XUUHQWVLWXDWLRQRIKLJKO\VNLOOHGZRUNHUV
The following section briefly examines the state of the labour market for highly skilled
workers in Thailand. Due to the limitation and variety of the secondary sources of data, both formal
and informal interview-based data are shown in this paper. Therefore, the accuracy for inference of the
informal data is limited. The intention is to give the readers general ideas and an overall picture of the
labour market in Thailand.
6XSSO\
In this section quantity supplied is represented in the flow form of the number of college
graduates. Currently, in the year 2001, the number of college graduates is of about 88 000 persons,
which corresponds to a decrease of around 3 000 persons (or-3.6%) on 2000. About 23 000 and 24 000
persons of the total graduated in S&T majors and accounting in 2001 and 2000, respectively (26.1 and
26.3%). Moreover, the number of unemployed college graduates is rather high, around 76 000 persons
in 2000 and 109 062 in 2001 (Table 5).
'HPDQG
4XDQWLW\
In the year 2001, the total quantity demanded for college graduates in the industrial sector is
11 795 persons, among which only 209 persons (1.8%) had an educational background in S&T major
(Table 6). Unfortunately, the data on quantity demanded for college graduates in the other two sectors,
namely agriculture and services, are not available at this time. However, it is believed that the
surpluses of S&T manpower will be seen in Thailand for many years due mainly to an expected low
growth of the Thai economy in the next five years (around 2 to 3%). These surpluses of S&T
manpower should be retrained and shifted to the IT market.
:DJHVVDODULHVRIFROOHJHJUDGXDWHV
College graduates salaries start at 6 360 baht/month (USD 1 700/year) in the public sector
and about 7 000-15 000 baht/month (USD 1 850-4 000/year) in the private sector. The average salaries
of general full-timers and experienced workers who have been working for some time in the public
and private sectors are 13 576 (or USD 3 620/year) and 15 203 baht/month (or USD 4 050/year),
respectively (Table 7). These wage levels are not attractive at all to foreign expatriates unless they
work for institutions offering different wage structures and additional fringe benefits.

53

,PPLJUDQWV
The main 3 nationalities of foreigners working in Thailand are the Japanese, the British and
the Chinese, who accounted for 1 861, 1 257, and 1 118 persons respectively in 2000. It is very
unfortunate that the data does not specify their educational background, but they are generally highly
skilled workers and a majority of them earned college degrees. As of 2000, most of these foreigners
work as academics and specialised professionals (4 737 persons), managers and administrators
(3 981 persons), and traders (1 726 persons). British citizens, Japanese and Indians are the three main
nationalities in academia and specialised professionals, management and administration, and
commerce, respectively (Table 8).
Under the Board of Investment and Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MOLSW) law
and regulations, businesses are allowed to bring in highly skilled technicians and professionals as
needed. Individuals and investors who seek employment in Thailand can apply for work permits
directly to the MOLSW. In 2000, the MOLSW has issued more that 76 000 work permits (an increase
of about 63 000 on 1997).
(PLJUDQWV
1XPEHURIHPLJUDQWV
There are three major ways of categorising Thai emigrants. Firstly, government officials and
students under supervision of the Office of the Civil Service Commission and Government Officials.
Secondly, Thais going to work aboard who report to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, and
lastly, aliens admitted in the United States under the monitoring of the US Immigration and
Naturalisation Service.2 The details are explained as follows;
x

Thailand has long been sending government officials and students to train and/or study
abroad by granting scholarships since King Rama the fifth period (about 100 years ago).
Presently, 4 759 persons have government scholarships and 447 persons have another
kind of scholarship. These brings the total number of scholars under supervision of the
Thai government to approximately 5 200 persons. Their three most popular destination
countries are the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, respectively
(Table 9).

The number of Thais going to work abroad has declined from 202 416 workers in 1999
to 193 041 workers in 2000 (-4.6%). The most popular work destination is Asia; the
Middle East comes second, and Africa comes third, in the proportions of 90.2%, 6.6%,
and 0.9% in 2000, respectively (Table 10).

Table 11 shows that most of the Thai workers tend to work in other fields besides those that
require high skills and expertise in their fields. Among those are academia and professional specialty,
management and administration, and commerce. Commerce (8.5%) ranked first, academia (2.2%) and
management (1.2%) ranked second and third of the total number of Thai workers in 2000,
respectively. It is quite noticeable that the majority of workers going to work abroad have a low level
of education; in other words, approximately 98% of them are below college level (Table 12). Even
2

Due to time constraints, the author does not have time to survey and compile data from other
countries.

54

through they are quite skilful and experienced, it is very unlikely that these emigrants will engage in
IT-related activities.
In this section, we use the United States as a representative or example of the countries
legally admitting foreigners to work and live on its own territory. The number of foreigners admitted
in the US has been declining in recent years. In 1998, 660 477 foreigners were admitted in the US,
among whom 219 696 persons (33.3%) were originally from Asia, and only 3 102 persons (0.5%)
were from Thailand (Table 13).
By occupation, the top 3 highly skilled professions of foreigners admitted in the US in 1998
were professional specialty and technical personnel (6.8%), executive administrative and managerial
(2.8%), and sales (1.6%), respectively. Among these, there were 129, 79, and 114 Thais in the same
professional fields, respectively (0.02%, 0.01%, and 0.02%) (Table 14).
:DJHVRULQFRPHRIHPLJUDQWV
Due to difficulties to obtain official data on personal income or wages, Table 15 shows only
a small number of personal interviews of Thais working in the United States. Most of the Thais who
have bachelor and higher degrees earn incomes comparable to those earn by the natives for both S&T
and non S&T majors. The income of people who have degrees in S&T is usually higher than that in
non S&T. These incomes (excluding fringe benefits) are 8 to 15 times higher than those of Thais
working in Thailand in the same fields.
(PLJUDWLRQDQGLPPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHV
Unlike other countries in Asia, Thailand has never had any clear vision about how to make
use of highly skill professional graduates, either from Thai universities or elsewhere. Brain drain has
been a problem for over 30 years. Until recently, Thailand did not have a clear vision of how to
generate demand for S&T manpower. For over 2 decades, there were practically no directions on how
to develop industry in the country, nor any sense of thee kind of manpower needed to suit the general
orientation. No plan had been drawn for technology or IT development until recent years.
Thailand has structural employment problems, namely, a mismatch of demand and supply on
the labour market. Industries seek employment in low- and medium-skilled workers while students
prefer to seek higher education. This trend has been taking place for several decades, forcing graduates
in areas like health sciences and S&T, who are not satisfied with local conditions, to seek employment
overseas.
There is practically no restriction whatsoever for the Thais to go to work abroad as long as
they can find accommodation and job opportunities or a place to study in the destination country. The
deep love for their motherland as well as other cultural factors are probably the reasons that keep
emigration numbers low as compared to other Asian countries like the Philippines. One might say that
Thailand adopted a neutral policy on emigration, especially among highly skilled workers. No serious
efforts were made to create a special market for these group. Occasionally, the government expressed
its desire to see these highly skilled professionals return home and fill the shortages, but a poor
working environment and a lack of incentives drove these people away again and again.
What the government can do is try to protect low-skilled, low-educated workers abroad.
These measures should include: 1) protection of Thai labourers overseas from exploitation by
55

placement agencies or brokers and employers; 2) appropriate measures to deal with foreign labourers
in Thailand, taking into consideration the private sectors needs as well as the requirement to maintain
order and internal security, and 3) the need to develop domestic labour as replacement in key surpluses
areas3.
The government also seeks national co-operation and supports from surrounding countries.
These measures would include: 1) Reviving and development of better relations and co-operation for
national development among neighbouring countries and other Asian countries; 2) Continuation or
initiation of relationships and cooperation on all sides of national development for both bi-party and
multi-party levels in order to bring peaceful ways of fair beneficial seeking; and 3) International
cooperation to help develop labour skills in the industrial sector in order to be consistent with the
industrial development future orientation.
3ROLFLHVRIQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQDQGVXSSRUW
&RRSHUDWLRQSROLFLHVRQKLJKO\VNLOOHGZRUN
The industrial survey conducted by TDRI in 2001 found that over 69% of the Thai
manufacturing sector does not have R&D activities. More than 25% of these businesses have higher
costs than competitors in the world market, over 61% do not have design activities and over 32% do
not use automated machinery in their production process. More than 18% of surveyed industries were
not happy with the quality of specialised personnel in various areas, especially in S&T manpower. The
results of the survey clearly reflected the shortages of qualified personnel in all industries including IT
workers. If Thailand wants to rely more on its own technology and be able to adapt and absorb
available technology in the world more efficiently, quantity and quality of S&T manpower to serve
both engineering industry, supporting industry and process industry must be immediately improved.
Co-operation and networking with more advanced nations must be established to boost S&T
development.
The language skills have often been mentioned by employers in various fields, especially in
the IT areas where software activities are concentrated on English-speaking innovation hubs. Thailand
does not have the linguistic legacy of the colonial past (Tangkitvanich). Therefore, co-operation from
native-speaking countries to improve language literacy is urgently needed.
Currently, Thai educational institutes are seeking co-operation among higher education
institutes within the country and also abroad to help retrain and upgrade instructors and curriculum
developments both in educational and training institutions. This technology transfer should focus on
technology universities and specialised or industrial specific training institutes offering training in
S&T and IT manpower.
&RRSHUDWLRQSROLFLHVLQ,7
The National Electronic and Computer Technology (NECTEC) is a main governmental
agency promoting IT by offering numerous courses for IT professionals from basic to advance levels.
The NECTEC also offers various courses related to network and Internet technologies. The NECTEC
3

The current labour policy of H.E. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra delivered to the National
Assembly, February 26, 2001

56

has collaborated with The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) to introduce a
national IT professional examination to upgrade IT professionals in Thailand. So far, only a small
number of Thai professionals are getting this national certificate. With higher incentives, the number
of IT professionals seeking to pass this examination will be higher every year.
The National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) under the Ministry of
Science, Technology and Environment also established an infrastructure for software development
called Software Park aiming to stimulate development in the Thai software industry. The NSTDA
offers courses related to software Quality Control, object technology, web technology and vendorspecific technology (Tangkitvanich and Veeritiphan). However, the output of such programs has not
been recorded.
Lastly, the Thai-Japan Technology Promotion Association was founded in 1973 to promote
technology transfer. The TPA offers technical and linguistic training, targeting SME professionals and
managers.
Thailand is also a land of opportunity for foreign companies who wish to develop affiliated
branches abroad. A good example is the subsidiary of an Indian training company called NIIT
(Thailand) now operating 7 branches nationwide to offer advanced software development and web
programming.

57

5()(5(1&(6

$6,$:((. July 30, 1999.

CHAIYAVEJ, S. (2000D), Economic Development of Thailand from 1960-2000: Lessons Learnt,
scv@kmitnb.ac.th, September.
CHAIYAVEJ, S. (2000E), Industrial Development of Thailand from Points of Views of Science and
Technology: Policy Issues, scv@kmitnb.ac.th, September.
CHAIYAVEJ, S. (2001), S&T Capacity Building for Industrial Development, scv@kmitnb.ac.th,
January.
OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY (2001), An Application of
Manpower Development to Support Industrial Restructuring: Survey of Technological Change
and Demand for S&T Manpower A Final Report submitted by TDRI, November.
SENKER, J. (2001), Changing Organization of Public-Sector Research in Europe. Implications for
Benchmarking Human Resources in RTD, 6FLHQFH DQG 3XEOLF 3ROLF\, Vol. 28, No. 4,
August, pp. 277-284.
TANKITVANICH, S. and VEERITIPAHAN, K. (2001), IT Resources in Thailand, first draft of a
paper submitted to Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), September.
TANKITVANICH, S. (2001), Linking Thai Brick-and-Mortars to Global Network Economy:
Thailands Position in the Global Network Economy, Thailand Development Research
Institute.
TEO, T.S.K. and ANG, J.S.K (2001), Singapores Manufacturing Sector as Engine for Economic
Growth: Past, Present and Future 6FLHQFH DQG 3XEOLF 3ROLF\, vol. 28, number 5, October,
pp. 361-370.

58

Table 1.:RUOGJOREDOFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVUDQNLQJRIVHOHFWHG
GHYHORSHGDQGGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
&RXQWULHV
1. USA
2. UK
3. France
4. Germany
5. Australia
6. Japan
7. Singapore
8. Chinese Taipei
9. Hong Kong, China
10. Korea
11. China (Mainland)
12. Malaysia
13. Thailand
14. Philippines
15. Indonesia


1
13
22
15
12
20
2
14
5
36
21
19
41
32
40


1
19
23
12
11
24
2
15
6
41
29
28
36
31
47


1
16
22
11
10
24
2
20
12
28
30
27
35
37
44


1
19
25
12
11
26
2
18
6
28
33
29
38
40
49

1RWH: IMD = International Institute of Management Development.

6RXUFH: IMD (2001).

Table 2. $YDLODELOLW\RITXDOLILHG,&7VNLOOVLQ(DVW$VLDQFRXQWULHV


6RXUFH

Thailand
Indonesia
Malaysia
Hong Kong (China)
Singapore
Philippines

4 369
4 414
5 325
5 905
7 373
7 873

5DQN
DPRQJ&RXQWULHV
49
48
36
28
7
4

5DQNDPRQJ(DVW
$VLDQ&RXQWULHV
6
5
4
3
2
1

6RXUFH: IMD (2001), quoted from S. Tangkitvanich, Linking Thai Brick and Mortars to The Global Network
Economy, TDRI, 2001, Table 6.

Table 3. 'HPDQGIRU,7ZRUNHUVLQ(DVW$VLDQFRXQWULHV-DQXDU\

Thailand
Indonesia
Malaysia
Hong Kong
(China)
Singapore
Philippines

7RWDOMRE
,7UHODWHGMRE
$QQRXQFHPHQWV $QQRXQFHPHQWV
1 760
760
930
4 980

213
150
250
1 727

12.1
19.7
26.9
34.7

5DQN
DPRQJ(DVW
$VLDQFRXQWULHV
6
5
5
3

3 590
870

1 165
237

32.5
27.2

2
1

6RXUFH: Tangkitvanich, op. cit., Table 7.

59

,7MREVVKDUHRI
WRWDO

Table 4. 1XPEHURI,7JUDGXDWHV
)LHOG
7RWDODW%DFKHORU/HYHO
Computer Science
Computer Engineer
Computer Subtotal
Electrical Engineer
Electronics Engineer
Telecom Engineer
Computer-related Subtotal
7RWDO*UDGXDWH/HYHO
Computer Science
Computer Engineer
Computer Subtotal
Electrical Engineer
Computer-related Subtotal
*URZWK5DWHV

7RWDO










1 743
387
2 130
3 295
783
355
4 433

295
145
440
122
122




2 415
407
2 822
3 764
838
340
4 942

544
111
655
124
124




2 789
456
3 245
34 252
960
353
5 565

601
105
706
129
129




3 848
632
4 480
3 485
832
310
4 627

569
119
688
198
198



6RXUFH: S. Tangkitvanich and K. Veeritiphan, Linking Thai Bricks and Mortar to The Global Network Economy,
TDRI, 2001, Table 1(a) & 1(b).

Table 5.1XPEHURIFROOHJHJUDGXDWHVLQ7KDLODQGXQLWSHUVRQV




2000
2001

&ROOHJH*UDGXDWHV 


&ROOHJH*UDGXDWHV
6 70DMRU 

8QHPSOR\HG
&ROOHJH*UDGXDWHV 

91 490
88 155

24 408
23 374

76 472
109 062

1RWH: The data are the quantity supplied in all sectors: industry, agriculture, and service sectors.
6RXUFHV: * TDRI; Macro Model of Labour Demand and Supply for Industrial Restructuring 2002-2006
(Final Draft) , January 2002.
** Labour Force Survey 2000 and 2001 (Round 3-August).

Table 6. 'HPDQGRIFROOHJHJUDGXDWHVLQPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXVWULHVLQ
<HDU


&ROOHJH*UDGXDWHV


&ROOHJH*UDGXDWHV
6 70DMRU

1RQ6 7PDMRU


2001

11 795

209

12 004

1RWH: The data are based on the annually incremental demand (flow) in the industrial sector, excluding
agricultural and service sectors.
6RXUFH: TDRI; Macro Model of Labour Demand and Supply for Industrial Restructuring 2002-2006 (Final Draft)
January 2002.

60

Table 7. :DJHVRIFROOHJHJUDGXDWHVXQLWEDKWPRQWK


Beginning full-timers
General full-timers

3XEOLF6HFWRU

3ULYDWH6HFWRU

6 360*
13 576***

7 000-15 000**
15 203***

Source: * Actual Government Rate; ** Roughly Estimated Range; *** Labour Force Survey 2000 (Round 3)
(1 USD = 44-45 Baht).

Table 8.1XPEHURILPPLJUDQWVE\RFFXSDWLRQDQGRULJLQDO
FRXQWU\LQ7KDLODQGXQLWSHUVRQV
Original
Countries

Occupation

Academia &
Management &
Commerce
Professional
Administration
Specialty
Japan
506
937
314
UK
774
337
112
China
470
282
244
India
203
428
338
USA
585
290
76
Philippines
496
83
29
Australia
311
177
38
Chinese Taipei
91
265
70
Germany
115
125
31
Malaysia
108
91
23
Korea
56
108
46
Singapore
44
111
51
Others
978
747
354
Total
4 737
3 981
1 726
Source: Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

Others

Total

104
34
122
19
26
18
10
26
31
14
2
4
139
549

1 861
1 257
1 118
988
977
626
536
452
302
236
212
210
2 218
10 993

Table 91XPEHURIJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVDQGVWXGHQWVXQGHUWKHVXSHUYLVLRQRI
WKH2IILFHRIWKH&LYLO6HUYLFH&RPPLVVLRQDQGJRYHUQPHQW
RIILFLDOVVWXG\LQJDEURDGXQLWSHUVRQV
Country

Government
Government
Other
Officials
Scholars
Scholars
USA
490
1 760
140
UK
177
660
289
Australia
233
199
18
Japan
320
122
Germany
92
87
France
67
75
Canada
37
43
Philippines
62
Netherlands
36
16
New Zealand
41
10
India
26
1
Sweden
17
6
Singapore
20
1
Malaysia
19
1
China
15
4
Others
78
44
Total
1 730
3 029
447
Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission and Government Officials.

61

Total
Number
2 390
1 126
450
442
179
142
80
62
52
51
27
23
21
20
19
569
5 206

Share (%)
45.9
21.62
8.64
8.49
3.43
2.72
1.53
1.19
0.99
0.97
0.51
0.44
0.40
0.38
0.36
2.34
100.0

Table 10.1XPEHURI7KDLVJRLQJWRZRUNDEURDGE\GHVWLQDWLRQ
XQLWSHUVRQV

Destination
Number
Share (%)
Number
1. Middle East
17 341
8.56
12 768
2. Africa
1 909
0.94
1 675
3. Asia
179 107
88.48
174 053
4. USA
1 094
0.54
1 340
5. EU
1 114
0.55
993
6. Others
1 851
0.91
2 212
Total
202 416
100.0
193 041
Source: Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.


Share (%)
6.61
0.86
90.16
0.69
0.51
1.14
100.0

Table 11.1XPEHURI7KDLVZRUNLQJDEURDGE\RFFXSDWLRQXQLWSHUVRQV)


Occupation
Number
Share (%)
1. Academia & Professional Specialty
4 048
2.0
2. Management & Administration
2 631
1.3
3. Commerce
13 562
6.7
4. Others (LH, general workers)
182 175
90.0
Total
202 416
100.0
Source: Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

Number
4 247
2 316
16 409
170 069
193 041


Share (%)
2.2
1.2
8.5
88.1
100.0

Table 12.1XPEHURI7KDLVZRUNLQJDEURDGE\HGXFDWLRQOHYHO
XQLWSHUVRQV

Number
Share (%)
1. Below College Degree
198 471
98.0
2. College Degree
3 931
1.9
3. Others
14
0.1
Total
202 416
100.0
Source: Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
Education Level

Number
188 827
4 181
33
193 041


Share (%)
97.8
2.1
0.1
100.0

Table 13.1XPEHURIDOLHQVDGPLWWHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVXQLWSHUVRQV

<HDU
7KDLODQG
1992
7 090 (0.73%)
1993
6 654 (0.73%)
1994
5 489 (0.68%)
1995
5 136 (0.71%)
1996
4 310 (0.47%)
1997
3 094 (0.39%)
1998
3 102 (0.47%)
Source: US Immigration & Naturalisation Service (INS).

$VLD
356 955 (36.6%)
358 047 (39.6%)
292 589 (36.4%)
267 931 (37.2%)
307 807 (33.6%)
256 810 (32.5%)
219 696 (33.3%)

62

$OO&RXQWULHV
973 977 (100%)
904 292 (100%)
804 416 (100%)
720 461 (100%)
915 900 (100%)
789 378 (100%)
660 477 (100%)

Table 14.1XPEHURIDOLHQVDGPLWWHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVE\PDMRURFFXSDWLRQ
XQLWSHUVRQV
Occupation

129
79

Share
(%)
0.28
0.42

114
68
30

1.08
0.53
0.24

4 403
4 968
3 281

41.90
39.35
26.92

10 507
12 623
12 186

100.0
100.0
100.0

28
31
128
607
No. Occupation or Not Reported
2 495
Grand Total
3 102
Source: US Immigration & Naturalisation Service (INS).

0.08
0.26
0.51
0.36
0.50
0.46

5 450
7 086
6 505
61 963
157 733
219 696

16.42
61.14
26.27
36.80
32.05
33.26

33 174
11 589
24 759
168 355
492 122
660 477

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Total

Thailand

Professional Speciality & Technical

Executive Administrative &
Managerial
Sales
Administrative Support
Precision Production, Craft and
Repair
Operator Fabricator & Labourer
Farming Forestry & Fishing
Service

Asia

Share
(%)
20 962 46.49
9 308
50.5

All
Countries
45 088
18 429

Share
(%)
100.0
100.0

Table 15.,QFRPHRI7KDL(PLJUDQWVXQLW86'\HDU

Education Level
S&T
Above Bachelor Degree
Start
60 000
3 year experience or above
75 000
Bachelor Degree
Start
35 000
3 year experience or above
55 000
Below Bachelor Degree
Start
13 000
3 year experience or above
19 000
Source: Personal Interviewed of the Thais Working in USA.

63

Non S & T
55 000
70 000
25 000
35 000
15 000
23 000

Figure 1. 'RPHVWLFVXSSO\RIWHFKQLFDOSURIHVVLRQDOVLQ$VLD3DFLILFFRXQWULHV

Chi na

4, 69

Thailand

5, 09
5, 29

Indonesia
Mal aysia

5, 63

Japan

5, 72

Hong Kong

5, 79
6, 40

Sout h Korea
Taiwan

7, 10

Phi lippines

7, 24

Si ngapore

7, 30

Australia

7, 30

India

8, 93
0

1RWH: Scale of 0-10, 10 is highest.

Source: IMD (2000), adapted from T. S. H. Teo, RSFLW Figure 1.

64

10

+,*+/<6.,//('$6,$1:25.(56,17+(81,7('67$7(6
E\
3KLOLS0DUWLQ
Consultant to the OECD ,University of California Davis

,QWURGXFWLRQ
The US has a fast and easy attestation system for admitting foreign students and highly
skilled workers, and a more costly and difficult certification process for admitting immigrants to fill
vacant jobs. As a result, the number of highly skilled nonimmigrants admitted rose sharply, while the
number of immigrants remained stable. Nonimmigrants expecting to become immigrants are
increasingly frustrated that they cannot do so in the time that their student or
H-1B visas allows them to remain in the US.
Most non-immigrants to the US are tourists and business visitors, and most immigrants are
admitted for family, humanitarian, and diversity reasons. This means that employment-based
nonimmigrants and immigrants are a small part of a much larger immigration picture:
x

In 1998, there were over 30 million nonimmigrants admitted, but only 554 000 (2%)
were foreign academic students, and 241 000 (1%) were highly skilled specialty
workers.1

In 1998, there were over 660 000 immigrants admitted, but fewer than 30 000 were
highly skilled workers, and only two-thirds had a BA degree or more.

Asians play a large role in US employment-based immigration. In 1998, Asians were one
third of US immigrants, but half of those who received employment-based immigration visas. Asians
were 67% of those admitted as needed workers with a BA degree (sponsored by US employers). The
employment-based share of immigrants admitted from Asian countries varies 68% of Indonesian
immigrants in 1998 were admitted for employment-related reasons, as were 35% of Japanese
immigrants.
Many of the Asians who receive employment-based immigration visas enter the US as
nonimmigrants, primarily as foreign students or foreign workers. Asians dominate foreign student
admissions, with Japan accounting for 83 000 foreign student admissions in 1998, followed by China
with 55 000 and Korea with 46 000. In Fall 2001, there were an estimated 515 000 foreign students in
the US on student visas and 300 000 in the US with J-exchange program visas.2 In June, 2001, there

These admission data double-count individuals who arrived several times in one year.

The J-1 cultural-exchange program grants several types of visas, including four-month culturalexchange visas or summer work-travel visas; the number issued rose from 20 752 in 1996 to 56 105 in
2000. As networks mature, concentrations of J-1 workers are appearing in some resort areas. For

65

were 500 000 H-1B foreign professionals in the US; half were in computer-related occupations, and
half were from India.
+%SURJUDP
The US H-1B program is the largest program that admits foreign professionals into industrial
countries. If the 195 000 a year limit is maintained, and some categories of H-1B visas are exempted
from the quota, there could be over 1.2 million H-1 foreign professionals in the US at any one time,
since each can remain for six years. H-1B visas are available to foreign professionals coming to the
US to fill jobs that require a BA or more if the US employer who requests them attests that he is
paying the prevailing wage in the occupation and that there is no strike in progress. The median annual
starting salary of H-1Bs was USD 45 000 in 1999, according to a GAO survey.
The H-1B program expanded quickly in the 1990s, due to (1) the dot.com boom, which
quickly increased the number of jobs in computer and related fields and (2) the development of a
migration infrastructure, recruiters who could select promising foreign professionals and persuade
them to accept US jobs. As the H-1B program expanded, current H-1Bs could tell their friends and
relatives about the program, and recruitment became less necessary.
The computer industry took the lead in efforts to raise the annual limit on H-1B visas.3 As
the annual limit on H-1B visas was raised, there were two major changes in the program:
x

H-1B-dependent employers were defined as those whose work forces include 15% or
more H-1B workers, and they had to (1) document their efforts to recruit US workers and
(2) certify that US workers were not laid off to make room for the H-1Bs in the previous
90 days, before they could have additional H-1B workers admitted.

Employers requesting H-1B workers must pay a USD 1 000 per worker fee, with the
monies collected used to provide H-1B Technical Skills Partnership Grants made to
business-education partnerships to prepare Americans for high skill jobs, reducing the
long-term dependence on foreign labor.

Asians dominate H-1B admissions.

:KLWKHU+%"
The H-1B program expanded during a boom in the IT industry, when computer-related
employment was rising sharply. In 2001, there were widespread lay offs of H-1B workers, and they
highlighted the fact that an H-1B visa attaches to the employer, not the worker, which means that a
laid-off H-1B worker is supposed to return to his country of origin as soon as he is laid off. The US
had 2.2 million engineers in 2001, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and their
unemployment rate doubled between Summer 2000 and 2001, to 2%.4
example, about 2 500 young foreigners held summer jobs in 2001 in Ocean City, Maryland, making
them 20% of the seasonal workers in the area.
3

The 1998 legislation was the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act; the 2000
legislation was the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act.

BLS reported average annual earnings of engineers to be USD 57 200 a year, and said that 35% of US
engineers are electrical, followed by 16% mechanical; 14% civil, and 12% industrial.

66

The press reported stories of bitter laid-off H-1B workers. The :DOO 6WUHHW -RXUQDO on
June 21, 2001 profiled an Indian H-1B who arrived in November, 2000 to work for ChristAm, a Texas
body shop that recruited H-1B foreigners for jobs at US companies that need temporary computer
support staff. In this case, the body shop did not abide by the contract it made with the Indian worker,
and never paid him because it could not find a job in which to place him. ChristAm finally went out of
business. US employers who request H-1B workers promise to pay them the prevailing wage, but
many of the H-1Bs who are not paid, or not paid promised wages, are reluctant to complain for fear
that they will be ordered out of the US because they do not have a job.5
Other H-1B workers complained about the contracts they signed to get into the US. Many
US employers require H-1Bs to sign contracts that include penalties if the worker leaves the employer
that brought him into the US. This means that if a ChristAm assigns an H-1B worker to IBM, and IBM
hires the worker, the H-1B must pay ChristAm a significant penalty. A San Mateo County court in
April 2001 ruled that a USD 25 000 penalty clause in a contract between one firm that brought H-1Bs
into the US and assigned them to US firms, Compubahn, was unlawful, and ordered Compubahn to
pay the affected Indian H-1B worker USD 215 050 in legal fees and other expenses. The First
Appellate District Court of Appeal dismissed Compubahn's appeal in July, 2001. In 2000, DOL
received 140 complaints from H-1B workers, up from 48 in 1997.
When the US and computer-related economies recover, will the H-1B program expand
again? Since the quota is scheduled to fall to 65 000 in 2004, the burden will be on the industry to
justify keeping it above that level. Unlike the 1990s debate, when there was little experience and a
great deal of optimism about the new economy, there is likely to be far more scepticism that guest
worker programs for highly skilled workers are different from other types of guest worker programs.
A decade of experience has shown that many of the same issues employers preferring the foreign
workers, foreign workers and employers becoming dependent on each other also occur in the H-1B
program. Thus, during the next round of debates, reports such as the one issued by the US Department
of Labors inspector general in May 1996, which concluded that the H-1B program serves as a
probationary try-out employment program for illegal aliens, foreign students and foreign visitors to
determine if they will be sponsored for permanent status, are likely to be cited.
The H-1B program is unlikely to be eliminated, but it is also not likely that US employers
will ever again obtain such easy access to foreign professionals as they enjoyed in the late 1990s. Most
US IT employers hire fewer than 5% of the applicants for jobs, and hire very few applicants over
age 40. They require applicants to apply by computer, and computers often screen applicants for age
and skills in a manner that leads to a preference for a newcomer from China or India over an older US
worker. The major question is how much effort will be made to regulate the activities of the employers
and the support industry of lawyers and consultants who depend on a continued influx of highly
skilled workers, most from Asia. Many US leaders fear long-term dependence on, for example, Indian
computer schools supplying workers to US computer firms. Ex-President Clinton reflected this fear in
a March 30, 1999 speech to the Electronic Industries Alliance: over the long run, the answer to this
problem of the lack of skilled workers cannot simply be to look beyond our borders surely a part of
it has to be to better train people within our borders to do this work."

GAO, 2000, noted Labor can certify that an employer's application form for H-1B workers is error
free, but it has no authority to verify the information on the form. Labor cannot take enforcement
action even if it believes that employers are violating the law.

67

3ROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQV
The US is a nation of immigrants that has been and continues to be enriched by the arrival of
newcomers. Supporters of immigration have traditionally opposed guest worker programs, arguing
that the US should welcome newcomers who will work alongside US workers as intending Americans,
not as foreigners who must have to depart after a period of US employment. However, most
Americans want immigration reduced, and it proved easier in the 1990s to increase nonimmigrant
admissions by increasing the number of visas available for highly skilled workers than to increase the
number of immigrant visas.
Guest worker programs aim to fill a narrow range of labour market vacancies. In the US,
employers were given more authority to determine their needs for highly skilled foreign workers, and
a migration infrastructure developed to bring especially Asian professionals into the US. There is
widespread dis-satisfaction with the current system for admitting highly skilled foreign workers, and it
is likely that, in the future, there will be an effort to expand the fee or levy system under which
employers would prove that they made a good faith effort to recruit foreign workers by paying fees,
and the fees collected from employers could be used to cover the cost of enforcement of labour laws in
affected industries, to train and retrain US workers, and to develop productivity-increasing
technologies. Leading business groups such as the Committee for Economic Development have
endorsed this approach, urging that the length of the H-1B visa be reduced from 6 to 3 years, and that
H-1B visas be auctioned to the highest bidder when demand for them exceeds supply.

68

5()(5(1&(6

COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2001), Reforming Immigration: Helping Meet

America's Need for a Skilled Workforce
http://www.ced.org/newsroom/press/press_immigration.pdf
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAO (2000), H-1B Foreign Workers: Better Controls
Needed to Help Employers and Protect Workers, HEHS-00-157.
LOWELL, L. (ed.) (1998), )RUHLJQ7HPSRUDU\:RUNHUVLQ$PHULFDQ3ROLFLHVWKDW%HQHILW$PHULFD,
Quorum Press, New York, March. http://www.greenwood.com
MATLOFF, N. (1998), Debunking the Myth of a Desperate Software Labor Shortage. Testimony to
the U.S. House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration, April 21.
http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.html
MCDONALD, M. (2000), Predatory Culture of Fraud, Abuse Emerging in India, 0HUFXU\1HZV,
November 19.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (2000), %XLOGLQJD:RUNIRUFHIRUWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ(FRQRP\
1DWLRQDO5HVHDUFK&RXQFLO, Washington, October. www.itworkforce.org
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, (PSOR\PHQWDQG7UDLQLQJ$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ)RUHLJQ/DERU
&HUWLILFDWLRQ http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign.asp
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1996), The System Is Broken and Needs to Be Fixed, Report
No. 06-96-002-03-321, May 22, Office of the Inspector General, The Department of Labors
Foreign Labor Certification Programs
http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/1996/foreign_labor_cert.pdf
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Monthly), 9LVD%XOOHWLQ, http://travel.state.gov

69

Table 1.(PSOR\PHQWEDVHG,PPLJUDWLRQDQG+%V






Employment-based
140 000
140 000
140 000
Immigration Ceiling
Employment-based
116 198
147 012
123 291
Immigration
H-1B Visa Ceiling
65 000
65 000
65 000
H-1B Admissions
110 223
92 795
105 899
GRXEOHFRXQW
1997 admissions are estimated; the INS has no data.
1999-2000 H-1B ceiling is 115 000; 2001 ceiling is 195 000.









140 000

140 000

140 000

140 000

85 336

117 499

90 607

77 517

65 000
117 574

65 000
114 458

65 000


65 000
240 947

Source: INS.

Table 2.+%YLVDVDQQXDOOLPLWVDQGYLVDVLVVXHG
)<
1992
1994 
1996 
1998

/LPLW
65 000
65 000
65 000
65 000

1999

115 000

2000

115 000

2001

195 000

2002
2003
2004

195 000
195 000
65 000

1XPEHULVVXHG
48 645
65 000
55 141
65 000
(reached in September)
115 000
(reached in June)
115 000
(reached in March)
163 200
(excludes visas for universities
and non-profits)

Table 3.+%YLVDVLVVXHGE\FRXQWU\RIRULJLQ

China
PDLQODQG
India
Japan
Philippines
France
Germany
UK
Russia
Mexico
Australia
Subtotal
Ceiling





















610

1 145

894

1 031

1 256

1 887

2 330

3 214

3 883

5 779

2 697 4 102 5 552

3 791 5 167 2 767
7 302 7 221 7 550
2 293 2 413 1 686
1 637 1 888 1 501
7 174 8 794 6 726
3 709 3 942 1 651
3 727 3 227 2 488
827 1 102
990
33 767 39 001 31 805

7 606 11 301
2 152 2 217
7 596 8 753
870 1 003
1 012 1 092
3 993 4 230
1 892 1 245
1 307 1 147
863 1 050
28 322 33 294

15 528
2 070
10 026
1 216
1 484
4 771
1 196
1 451
1 042
40 671

19 203
2 411
4 601
1 463
1 518
5 601
1 255
1 909
1 123
41 414

31 686
2 929
2 685
1 894
2 088
6 928
1 357
2 785
1 438
57 004

40 247
2 878
2 758
2 110
2 242
6 343
1 395
2 320
1 666
65 842

55 047
3 339
3 065
2 633
2 451
6 665
1 619
2 419
1 651
84 668

65 000 65 000 65 000

65 000 65 000

65 000

65 000

65 000

65 000

115 000

6RXUFH: US Department of State, Visa Office.

70

6.,//('/$%28502%,/,7<
5(9,(:2),668(6$1'(9,'(1&(
International Labour Office

,QWURGXFWLRQ
This is a brief summary report of a research project undertaken by the International Labour
Office for the United Kingdoms Department for International Development. Background papers were
written on the impact of high skilled mobility from developing countries, general policy responses,
specific processes and responses in the United Kingdom; and yet more specifics in eight countries and
two regions: Bulgaria, South Africa (and Southern Africa), Argentina and Uruguay, Jamaica (and the
Caribbean), India, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. This report summarises the highlights of 12 background
papers and suggests major policy directions that developed countries might adopt to manage the flow
of skilled workers from developing countries.
/LQNHGSURFHVVHVJOREDOLVDWLRQWUDGHLQVHUYLFHVDQGVNLOOHGPRELOLW\
During the 1980s, social scientists observed increased movements of skilled workers
between developed countries and coined the term brain exchange.1 Modern communication and
travel have reduced time and cost. Intra-company transfers between countries by employees of
transnational corporations are one factor accounting for a greater volume of movement. Migration
exchange between global cities is also driven by international recruitment agencies. Brain exchanges
are characteristic of all advanced economies, forming one component of the flow of goods,
information, and finance that bind countries to one another.
Research on economic development, trade, and highly skilled migration in the newly
industrial countries (NICs) during the 1980s suggests three important lessons.2 First, two-way skill
mobility makes developing economies more attractive to international capital investment. Second,
rapid economic growth makes a country more attractive as a destination for both non-nationals and
returning nationals. Third, the transformation from a production base to an increasingly serviceoriented economy requires an ever-greater mobility of skilled workers if a country is to be competitive
in the international trade in services.
At some point in the transition to greater trade in international services developing countries
may retain and return skilled migrants: the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China), Hong Kong (China),
and Singapore are such examples. Increases in mobility appear to be intimately tied both to the
tertiarisation of labour forces and the importance of services in world trade, especially in developing
economies.3 The acceleration of globalisation creates new patterns of international investment and skill
1
2
3

Findlay (2001) and Findlay (1988).

Findlay et al. (1998).
Held et al. (1999).

71

exchanges. While these trends may have initially benefited developed countries, ready examples exist
of developing countries engaging in and benefiting from the international trade in services.4
'LPHQVLRQVRIKLJKO\VNLOOHGPLJUDWLRQ
No international system for recording skilled emigration exists. The term skilled is often
interpreted in the literature in terms of educational attainment. There are two basic ways to measure
tertiary educated emigration. Cumulative loss measures the percent of all educated persons who
were born in a given country, who are now living outside of the country. Figure 1 shows that there are
notable differences by region of the world. The percentage loss of tertiary emigrants is greatest for
North America; about 15% of all highly skilled persons from this region were outside their country of
birth. It shows that population losses among the tertiary educated are substantially greater than those
among the secondary educated.
Educational selectivity refers only to the population abroad; it measures the percent of
emigrants only who have a tertiary education. In the case of most developing countries, it reflects the
degree to which emigration is a more attractive option for tertiary educated emigrants. The percentage
loss of tertiary skilled persons is far greater than that of secondary schooled persons, while the loss of
primary schooled persons is very small (hence not shown). When there are few tertiary educated
persons in a sending country, even a moderate number of emigrants can adversely affect that share
remaining. Emigration is selective of those who can afford it, are in demand abroad, and who stand to
benefit most (the tertiary educated).
Figure 2 shows that Eastern European emigration was the least selective of the regions while
African emigration was the most.
Blanket statements about brain drain are not warranted, but it also appears that gross
volumes of high skilled emigration are great enough to seriously challenge some developing countries.
:KDWDUHWKHH[SHFWHGHIIHFWVRIWKHHPLJUDWLRQRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG"
'LUHFWUHGXFWLRQLQHFRQRPLFJURZWK
There is considerable evidence that the average level of human capital in a society has
positive effects on productivity and growth. Conversely, low average levels of education can slow
economic growth, damage the earnings of low-skilled workers, and increase poverty. Since the first
order effect of emigration is to reduce human capital, high levels of skilled emigration can be expected
to slow economic (GDP) growth and, adversely affect those who remain.
,QGXFHGVWLPXOXVWRGRPHVWLFHGXFDWLRQ
The possibility of emigrating to higher wage countries may stimulate persons to pursue
higher education in anticipation of pursing higher paying work abroad. As enrolments increase spurred
by the chance of emigration, average human capital increases and, therefore, overall source country
growth can be stimulated. If emigration is blocked there is less incentive to pursue education, but an
4

Findlay (2001).

72

excessive level of skilled emigration can deplete the stock of skilled workers faster than it can be
regenerated. This suggests that there may be an optimal level of emigration that stimulates the
pursuit of higher education in developing countries and spurs economic growth.
5HPLWWDQFHVDQGLQYHVWPHQWV
Highly skilled workers may be more likely to invest in their home country. In India, banks
market to Indian professionals abroad bonds which are capitalised on the flow of future remittance
monies to India. Many developing countries encourage their nationals abroad to open foreign currency
accounts with prime rates of exchange and prime/assured interest rates. Such investment vehicles tend
to be solely the preserve of highly skilled emigrants.
7HFKQRORJ\DQGNQRZOHGJHWUDQVIHULQFUHDVHJURZWK
Many observers assert that knowledge or technology transfers are a primary way for
developing countries to benefit from high skilled emigrants. Whether emigrants are permanent or a
short-to-medium term temporary loss, their backward linkages to their source country can increase the
available knowledge and technology that boost productivity. Sometimes expatriates organise networks
that stimulate return flows of knowledge and lead to collaborative ventures with home-country
researchers.5 The Internet has played a key role in this regard. The South African Network of Skills
Abroad (SANSA) is one example of an active network with more than 2000 members (Bhorat, et al.).
%ULHIVRQFRXQWU\VWXGLHV
%XOJDULD
Following the collapse of the FSU over 200,000 Bulgarians left, although the numbers today
run about 50,000 per year. Tenured academics were among the first to leave, followed now by younger
scientists with records of international publication. It appears that only about 20% of emigrants return
and they are not agents of modernisation. New initiatives promote short-term employment abroad
through bilateral agreements with Germany, Switzerland, and many other countries with a strong role
played by intermediaries. Skilled workers comprise some of these flows, for example, medical
technicians are supplied to Libya (see Beleva and Kotzeva, 2001).
6RXWK$IULFD
The outflow, which began before the fall of apartheid, indicates a loss of about 13% of
yearly turnover in professional employment; white and black professionals are involved. At the same
time, increasing educational enrolments tend to be in non-scientific fields. Concern is widespread and
the skills outflow dampens economic growth. Health professionals and engineers drove a dramatic
increase in emigration to New Zealand in the 1990s. Likewise, restrictive immigration policies have
created a situation where South Africa provides its neighbours with skilled workers but there is no
reciprocal exchange. Contemplated policies to facilitate skilled immigration should change the nation
and regions skill balance (see Bhorat et al., 2001).
5

Kaplan (1997) and Brown (2000).

73

$UJHQWLQDDQG8UXJXD\
Following a scientific golden age in the 1950s and 1960s, Argentinas dictatorship triggered
an across the board retrenchment yet to be turned around. Likewise, Uruguays military dictatorship
triggered an estimated loss of one fifth of working persons though the 1980s, about 12% of Uruguays
professionals and technicians are thought to live abroad. There is increasing concern over the loss of
highly skilled persons, typically presented as symptomatic of political failure and one of the lowest
R&D expenditures in Latin America. Policy responses include support by the Inter-American
Development Bank in improving the infrastructure of research institutions. In both counties national
commissions for return were created, in Uruguay these policies were partly funded by the International
Organisation for Migration. Both countries have active expatriate organisations (see Pellegrino, 2001).
-DPDLFDDQGWKH&DULEEHDQ
The 1962 British Commonwealth Act shifted emigration to North America. One quarter of
todays outflow to the USA is professional, technical, and kindred workers in their most productive
ages. Emigration accelerated in the 1990s. Simultaneously, return of low-skill UK retirees increased,
as did non-Jamaican immigration three quarters of which is highly skilled. Still, there is a shortage of
skilled workers. Two-thirds of Jamaicas nurses emigrated over the past two decades and few return,
in their place Cuban nurses are recruited. Feedback effects are few, e.g., remittances are uncertain and
their most favourable impact is to stimulate house building. While public opinion tends to marry a
favourable view to the inevitability of skilled outflows, the brain drain fuels negative perceptions of
the regions future. Policies have included readily accessible job information, tax concessions, and
recruitment efforts including a short-lived IOM program to return expatriates (see Thomas-Hope,
2001).
0H[LFR
Renowned as an exporter of low skilled labour to the United States, Mexico in 1990 was also
the worlds third largest exporter of tertiary educated migrants. Ten percent of Mexicos tertiary
population, but fully 30% of its scientific and engineering educated resided abroad. A major recipient
of worker remittances, research nonetheless finds that educated Mexican emigrants in the United
States have a lower likelihood of remitting than their less educated countrymen. Furthermore, the
national GDP multiplier effects of remittances are less for the urban areas from which highly skilled
emigrants come. Mexico has a number of programs that capitalise on remittances including federal,
state, and local matching fund programs for development projects. It also forgives student loans for
Mexicans who study abroad but who then return and work in Mexico (see Verhaal, 2001).
3KLOLSSLQHV
Contract labour migration is largely to the Middle East and East Asia, while permanent
emigration tends to go to North America. Four tenths of the permanent outflow is college educated,
and their numbers exceed the net change of skilled workers in country. Highly skilled workers face
high rates of unemployment and there is evidence that young college educated emigrants are selected
from those with experience and high productivity. Domestic educational systems are responsive to
global demand; witness a strong increase in graduates with IT degrees. It is estimated that 30 to 50%
of information technology workers emigrate and 60% of physicians. Changes in the global economy
may help address the brain drain: the IT sector has just started in the Philippines, financial markets
74

have been liberalised, regional co-operation has improved, and there is a hope of reverse migration.
The later may be abetted by greater connectivity through the internet (see Alburo and Abella, 2001).
,QGLD
India has long been an important player in the global supply of professionals and students.
India has geared up quickly to meet hot demand in information technology (IT) producing some
120,000 graduates a year with plans to double in the future. Yet, there is an anticipatory theory that
forecasts adverse long-term impacts from the export of IT workers where projected Indian shortages
are greater than the forecast production of IT workers. Research on specific sectors, e.g., medicine and
engineering, raise concerns about adverse effects. The government perceives little problem with these
trends, but the media decries the brain drain. Memorandum of understanding on student and
academic exchange are an important way of addressing these issues (see Khadria, 2001).
6UL/DQND
Sri Lanka has become a labour exporting country and about one quarter of all households
have a family member who has migrated for employment or to reside abroad. Since the 1980s there
have been large temporary contract flows to Middle Eastern destinations, as well as more permanent
emigration to Western Europe and North America in the 1990s. Academically qualified professionals
comprise between one-quarter and one-third of the outflow. One result appears to be increased
enrolments in higher education; indeed there is overproduction for domestic markets, although
shortages exist in medical fields. Further, low public/private sector wages do not encourage return.
Policies to foster return include foreign currency banking accounts and tax breaks, though it is
believed that high skilled emigrants tend not to remit (see Korale, 2001).
6XPPDU\RIJHQHUDOILQGLQJVIURPFDVHVWXGLHV
x

A large degree of skilled emigration with little return or foreign skills exchange,
especially in the face of domestic labour shortages, is generally taken to indicate that a
brain drain is taking place. Concern is expressed in the Philippines that the best and the
brightest dominate the permanent outflow, leaving behind lesser-qualified workers. The
South African study, as well as that on Argentina, however suggests that perhaps half of
its educated emigrant outflow will XOWLPDWHO\ return. But it is observed that the least
qualified of the emigrants return and contribute little to economic vitality. In Jamaica, a
large wave of returnees to the island in the last decades came only to retire.

Most of the studies do not marshal clear evidence that their diasporas contribute in
significant ways to domestic economic growth.

 As a stimulus to domestic education, skilled emigration plays an uncertain role. In the

Philippines a globally responsive educational system churns out more graduates; yet, the
39% of its emigrants who are professionals outstrip the net change in domestic skill
levels. Nevertheless, unemployment rates in may skilled fields remains high. In South
Africa most significant increases in tertiary enrolments during the past decade were in
fields with little demand such as Philosophy or Languages, not in the sciences. In Sri
Lanka, free education has increased scientific enrolments over twofold in the past
decade, but domestic demand cannot absorb them and unemployment is high. By
75

contrast, India is a real powerhouse, responding to global demand for information

technology (IT) workers and turning out some 70-85,000 software engineers and 45,000
IT graduates with government plans to treble those numbers by 2002. But even so
forecasts are for a domestic IT labour shortage.
 In India there appears to be an increasing investment in rural places by returnees and
foreign entrepreneurs in high technology industries.
 Academic feedback into research and development are also important.
 On conditions under which diasporas and global linkages boost economic growth,
differences between national experiences may well be as great as their commonalities.
While they establish a reason for concern about adverse effects of skilled emigration, the
case studies also point to a diversity of expectations about the future.
7UHQGVLQPDMRUFODVVHVRIVNLOOHGPRELOLW\
The international mobility of highly skilled workers is likely to increase in the future because
of faster and cheaper transportation, faster and cheaper information, expansion of global labour
markets, shortages of highly educated workers in the information-age economies, the ageing of the
workforce in developed economies, just-in-time demand from industries eager to get on the front of
technology curves, and so on.6 These trends are particularly salient considering other trends: enrolment
rates in higher education are likely to continue to rise around the world (and especially in developing
countries); and the centripetal forces of globalisation drive, in part, strong pressures to liberalise
human capital flows to match the increased liberalisation of trade and international capital flows. But
while one can confidently forecast increasing volumes of international mobility, it is remarkably
difficult to forecast with accuracy specific patterns of international mobility or their impact. In the first
place, different types of migrants are found in different types of labour markets, e.g., the internal
labour markets of transnational corporations shaped by globalisation and corporate strategies; or the
open labour markets shaped by forces of supply and demand in both developed and developing
countries. In the second place, the crosscutting consequence of different types of labour markets, lags
in supply and demand, and institutional failures in education or training, means that much of the
impact of skilled migration may be limited to specific occupations.
6XSSO\LQJWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRUSRUDWLRQVDQGVKRUWWHUPODERXUVKRUWDJHV
It is likely that there will be an increase in business class mobility in the short to medium
term. Transnational companies have most labour-intensive production and service work located in
branches in developing countries, but a need for highly skilled labour in the capital cities of the
developed world and at their sites overseas. Companies are clamouring for more control and flexibility
in managing skilled labour flows between sites of their global organisation. Within the OECD
countries in recent years business migration appears to be increasingly dominated by short-term stays.
Ease of movement for intra-company transferees is generally in the interest of the developing
countries where transnationals are situated. Over the medium to long run, furthermore, transnational
companies may begin to groom and hire local managers. As transnational businesses mature, and the

Glover et al. (2000) and Martin (2000b).

76

pool of internationally experienced skilled workers increases, business may seek other ways to reduce
their costs.
At the same time, the growing specialisation of global labour markets means that as new
industries and service activities emerge within the new economy,7 so too will the demand to source
skills quickly and efficiently to allow for the development and expansion of cutting-edge sectors in the
open labour market. The most recent example is the demand for information technology (IT)
specialists that has seen India emerge as a major global supplier of skilled labour for the worlds IT
industries.
However, problems in developed countries in meeting demand for certain workers in the
short to medium term often has less to do with demand from newly evolving occupations; and much to
do with inflexibility of domestic conditions of supply. Shortages of a domestic supply of specialised
workers frequently reflect difficulties with staff retention, as well as under-investment in training. And
deeply entrenched problems of producing medical workers, along with markets in inner cities, etc.,
where natives decline to work, have generated an long ongoing demand for workers in developed
countries health care industries.
,PSDFWRIVNLOOHGHPLJUDQWVRQVSHFLILFRFFXSDWLRQV
There is likely to be a positive outcome when policies facilitate the movement of foreign
workers in specific occupations that face supply and demand bottlenecks over the short run. However,
over the longer term reliance on high volumes of foreign workers in specific occupations hinders the
labour market adjustment that might otherwise occur in developed countries. Ongoing supplies of
foreign workers may retard growth in the domestic supply of labour.
High skilled emigration affects specific occupations within a country, and/or certain groups
of countries that are closely linked by flows of highly skilled migration. Consider the experience of
Jamaican nurses.8 The United Kingdom was the major destination until the 1970s. Since then the
United States and Canada have become the major destinations. At the same time, the number of nurses
in Jamaica dropped from 3,000 to 1,000 in the late 1980s. Efforts to replace the loss with training
programs have yet to fully succeed as young nurse graduates stay only long enough to pay off their
government bonds and rarely return. Jamaica has turned instead to recruiting Cuban nurses, but has
increased the number of nurses to only 2,000. South Africas emigration losses are intimately tied up
with the United Kingdom. For historical reasons there are an estimated 800,000 South Africans who
hold British passports. The United Kingdom has always been a very popular destination for skilled
emigrants as many of the international finance, investment, and trade links of South Africa are nested
within Londons sphere of global influence.9
New patterns of recruitment will likely emerge as international recruitment agencies seek for
a global reach.10 This may lead them to shop for skills for the United Kingdom in new locations, for
example nurses from the Philippines, even if no previous migration link exists. It is not hard to
demonstrate that the United Kingdoms experience is not unique. Over the last few years highly
skilled migration to many other developed countries has reached unprecedented levels.11 Competition
7
8
9
10

11

Rothboeck (2001).
Thomas-Hope (2001).
Boyle et al. (1996).
Boyle et al. (1996).
OECD (2000).

77

for skilled workers in a global economy will combine to further the movement of highly skilled
workers from developing to developed countries.
3ROLF\UHVSRQVHVWRKLJKO\VNLOOHGPRELOLW\
In both developed and developing countries there is a range of policies that are pursued in
response to the emigration of highly skilled workers. A darling of the 1970s, UHSDUDWLRQ for the direct
loss through a brain drain tax has long since been abandoned. 5HVWULFWLYH exit policies touch on the
rights of the individual international migrant and are largely counter productive. There are UHFUXLWPHQW
policies that are pursued by some countries to bring in foreign workers to increase the nations human
capital, while for others recruitment policies are export policies where developing countries choose to
train workers to work in international markets, to export skills. There are also positive policies to
UHWXUQ expatriates which have sound objectives but are difficult to achieve. The International
Organisation for Migrations return of talent program is a significant contribution to the attempt.
Since many are likely to remain abroad, some countries pursue instead what may be called
UHVRXUFLQJ policies. These rely mainly on the creation of expatriate networks that return knowledge to
the home country, e.g., that facilitate the transfer of technology. To date, most expatriate networks are
autonomously founded and there may be a role for the expanded involvement of both source and
receiving countries. Further, UHPLWWDQFHV are a significant source of income for developing countries.
Outreach to skilled expatriates can take advantage of the greater likelihood that they will save in
foreign currency accounts in the home country, invest in remittance backed bonds, or invest in
entrepreneurial activities when incentives such as reduced tariffs or income tax breaks are offered.
Grand policies of UHWHQWLRQ are likely to be the best long run response to high volumes of
high skilled out migration. To be sure, in the short term development can actually lead to increases in
emigration, but over the long term this is the best way to reduce wage differentials and conditions that
lead to high levels of skilled emigration. The most active policies continue to be academic ventures
based on regional and international cooperation where receiving countries play an active role.
Additionally, many developing countries have individually, or in the context of regional accords,
targeted ICT development as a means of getting on the information-age bandwagon. Such projects
promise to be a fruitful way of stimulating economic growth and reducing permanent out migration of
highly educated natives.
:KDWPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHVDUHQHHGHGLQDJOREDOHFRQRP\
Migration policies that facilitate the demands of a modern economy can be to the benefit both of
receiving countries as well as developing countries.12 The balancing act comes in devising policies that
facilitate not by making everything easy to do, but by managing the process in a way that protects
domestic labour markets and the economic interests of developing countries.
x

12

Immigration policies that are flexible, efficient, and transparent. They permit increased
supplies of foreign workers when demand is high, but restricts access to foreign workers
when demand is down. It protects domestic labour markets. (IILFLHQW migration policy
delivers a foreign worker for a job in a process that is speedy and the paperwork should
be minimal. It meets employers labour demand. Transparent policy delivers clearly
defined promises: migrants and employers must know their obligations and be held

Glover (2001).

78

responsible, there should be no hidden costs or ways to game the system, and the likely
transition to permanent resident status (or not) should be clear at the outset.
x

There are a number of policy options developed countries could adopt that could help to
protect the interests of developing countries. Primary among these is the encouragement
of return migration,13 but there are complementary options including restrictions on
recruitment, establishing good practices, and regulating recruitment agencies. There is
clear evidence that the longer a migrant worker stays abroad the lower the chance that
they will return to their place of origin during their working life. Equally, it seems highly
probable that most skilled migrants receive the maximum benefit from their work
experience, new skills acquisition and career development, in the first few months if not
years of a foreign work placement.

Receiving nations in consultation with key source countries could identify countries that
are most vulnerable to skill losses taking into account sectoral strengths and weaknesses.

Less heavy-handed and reliant on inexact statistical forecasts, is to issue work visas with
the clear message that return is required after a given period of stay. One example of
such a visa is the U.S. cultural exchange visa (J) issued for varied duration of stay to
work in health care; research and development; summer programs; and other work for
the purpose of fostering international exchange and experience.

International recruitment agencies are widely used to source staff from developing
countries. Since many abuses characterise recruitment in some regions, there is a need to
set ethical guidelines in recruitment. The UK Department of Health of Guidelines on the
International Recruitment of Nurses produced in 1999 is an example of good practice.
An accreditation system could be introduced for international recruitment agencies.
 Protecting foreign workers in the developed economies is the right thing to do and
integral to protecting the domestic labour force.
 Return programs include DFWLYH ones (IOMs program of return that funds the
expatriate familys return and helps establish them in their home country), or
LQIRUPDWLRQEDVHG approaches which require the least economic or political capital.
The Internets role has increased over the past decade and governments are creating
internationally assessable job databanks in an attempt to help expatriates learn of
opportunities at their origin. Malaysia, Thailand, and South Africa have online job
listings. Industry information and economic performance are given to familiarise the
expatriate with conditions at home.

13

Many emigrant workers are reluctant to return to their developing country if they give up
the right to return to work or reside in their newly adopted developed country. However,
if they retain residency rights they can safely return to their origin. Advocates of dual
nationality or citizenship argue it encourages return and circular movement. Other
options would be to permit foreign workers to return home for periods of several years
while still retaining the right to exercise an option to once again work in the developed
country at some point.

UNESCO (1998).

79

%LODWHUDO DQG UHJLRQDO DJUHHPHQWV on worker mobility permit authorities in developed

countries to liaise directly with those governments in developing countries wishing to
temporarily export highly skilled workers whom they either see as surplus to their
infrastructural needs, or persons whom sending governments have identified as
candidates whose skills could be enhanced through working in a particular educational
field abroad. Agreements can stipulate that foreign-worker training in skills appropriate
to the needs of the developing country be part of an integrated program.

*$76WUDGHLQVHUYLFHV
The GATS agreement from the Uruguay round represents the first multilateral and legally
enforceable agreement on the international trade in services. It holds as its central objective the
progressive liberalisation of trade in services. Any developing countries having a natural advantage in
inexpensive high quality labour, liberalisation of the international trade in services should provide
them a major opportunity. Yet, restrictions by developed countries are greatest in the very activities in
which developing countries have the strongest comparative advantage. This applies in particular to
that part of GATS on the trade of services through the movement of labour.14 Further, developed
countries have more commitments in GATS under modes of (1) cross-border supply, (2) consumption
in the territory of the supplier, and (3) commercial presence abroad; while developing countries have
more commitments to (4) the delivery of services abroad. For example, the Philippines, Thailand,
China, and Brunei are good examples of countries that have more commitments under GATS Delivery
of services by natural persons abroad. In contrast, Australia and Canada have significantly more
commitments to liberalisation of services through the mode of commercial presence than through the
movement of persons. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the GATS share the
responsibility for drawing up a code of conduct for dealing with foreign workers.
'HYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFHDQGHGXFDWLRQ
The support and development of education at all levels is certainly one of the best ways to
offset brain drain. In the short run, the developing country increases its domestic supply and banks on
many of its newly educated citizens staying in country. Over the longer run, education and training
bolsters the endogenous stock of human capital and creates opportunities that help retain would-be
emigrants. There are conflicting conclusions about the value of emphasising primary/secondary or
tertiary education to offset skilled emigration. Source countries that improve their tertiary educational
institutions may unwittingly increase the rate of loss as their nationals are better prepared to compete
in industrial and information economies. Investments in primary education may actually yield more
benefits, raising the average level of human capital more effectively.15 Many poor countries underinvest in education and so there is a strong case for prioritising primary and secondary education. Yet,
if higher education is short-changed the best and brightest students having benefited from basic
education may have little opportunity for higher education other than going abroad. The tradeoffs are
difficult to generalise and each nation needs to weigh the critical need for universal primary/secondary
education against the current and projected stock of tertiary students.

14
15

Findlay and Warren (2000).

Haque and Kahn (1997); Haque and Kim (1995).

80

6WUHQJWKHQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGKXPDQULJKWV
Highly educated individuals are particularly prone to leave countries when their security and
their professional integrity are at risk. The intellectual class is often singled out in oppressive political
regimes. Such examples amply demonstrate that personal safety, right to legal redress, and human
rights are often a key factor that impels high skilled emigration in particular. Many developing
countries have fully developed judicial systems and a strong civil society, but others do not have fully
operating judicial or legal systems that foster individual rights. International efforts to improve the
mechanisms that promote protection of human rights are one influence that will encourage highly
skilled migrants to stay and contribute.16
7DUJHWHGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW
Some developing nations target specific industries or projects for economic development.
Consider the interest of many developing nations in capitalising on the information technologies that
take advantage of highly educated workers. As of 1998, there were on average 1.6 Internet users for
every 100 citizens in the world, compared with usage rates among citizens in just the developed
portion of between 10 and 20% or better. Clearly, there is a digital divide and developing countries
require infrastructure development and knowledge to develop the potential of the Internet revolution.17
At a recent ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit, heads of state signed the eASEAN Framework Agreement that sets out a plan to speed up economic integration through the
Internet. There is discussion of the creation of a regional ICT environment to reverse the regions brain
drain, to hold on to available workers in the face of a regional shortage for ICT workers.18 These
investment strategies offer one way to retain highly skilled workers, they stimulate demand for tertiary
education, they can boost economic growth that benefits everyone, and by bridging the digital divide
they create opportunities for the entire populace.
&RQFOXVLRQ
Globalisation has many complex effects on migration that directly influence future trends in
skilled migration from the developing world. First is the increasing importance of the global
organisation of production and service activity.19 Demographic and economic trends in the developed
countries are likely to lead to increased numbers of skilled immigrant admissions. In fact, it is likely
that various national policies will combine to further the movement of highly skilled workers from
developing to developed countries. One thing most experts agree upon: developed countries stand to
benefit from the contributions of highly educated foreign workers. Having accepted the principle of
opening markets to trade, and the belief that all parties win in an open regime, policymakers are more
likely to listen than in the past to those who urge more liberal regimes of international mobility.20
These current events raise the spectre of developing countries losing substantial fractions of
their educated workforce. What damage will this incur? Will the feedback loops from high skilled
emigration return some benefits that offset and even boost emigrant-source country development?
Despite three decades of discussion, there are no well-calibrated measures of whether or not a brain
16
17
18
19

20

Martin (2000a).
Slowinski (1998).
Xinhua General News Service (2001).
Salt and Findlay (1989); Findlay et al. (1996).
Chang (1997) and Staubhaar (2000).

81

drain is occurring. Even more problematic to sweeping statements about skilled emigration, it seems
clear that true long-term detrimental effects are unique to particular countries where the situation abets
the fundamental problems that led to the skilled emigration in the first place. Whether or not there are
significant adverse effects may depend on the degree to which source country wages are flexible, and
this may even vary by occupational categories. In short, institutional factors mean that the direct effect
of skilled emigration needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Developed countries should facilitate the movement of highly skilled foreign workers while
implementing policies that address possible brain drain effects. This report has mentioned several that
would be part of a developed nations immigrant admission policy regime. Policies that clearly define
temporary status and encourage return are key, as are those that attempt to avoid recruitment from
sectors and nations identified as being at risk of brain drain. Otherwise, taking advantage of a skilled
diaspora falls most directly in the kit bag of developing country policies, but developed countries can
readily aid diaspora projects. Likewise, developed countries can help develop human capital with
targeted policies on education and training, scholarly exchange, and integration in information,
communications, and technology.

82

5()(5(1&(6

3URMHFW5HSRUWV
The following unpublished papers summarised in this report were part of the research sponsored by
the International Labour Office, Geneva under the project Skilled Labour Migration (The Brain
Drain) from Developing Countries: Analysis of Impact and Policy Issues.
ALBURO, F. and ABELLA, D. (2001), Brain Drain from the Philippines, Manila.
BELEVA, I. and KOTZEVA, M. (2001), Bulgaria: Country Study on International Skilled
Migration, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and University of National and World Economy in Sofia.
BHORAT, H., MEYER, J.B. and MLATSHENI, C. (2001), International Skilled Migration: The
Case of South and Southern Africa, Development Policy Research Unit, School of Economics,
University of Cape Town, South Africa.
FINDLAY, A.M. (2001a), From Brain Exchange to Brain Gain: Policy Implications for the UK of
Recent Trends in Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, University of Dundee.
(2001b), Policy Proposals Relating to the Impacts on Developing Countries of GATS Negotiations
over the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons, University of Dundee.
KHADRIA, B. (2001), India: Country Study - Skilled Labour Migration (the Brain Drain) from
India: Impact and Policies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
KORALE, R.B.M. (2001), Skilled Labour Migration (the Brain Drain) from Developing Countries:
Sri Lanka Case Study, Colombo.
LOWELL, B.L. (2001a), Policy Responses to the International Mobility of High Skilled Labour,
Georgetown University.
(2001b), Some Developmental Effects of the International Migration of the Highly Skilled,
Georgetown University.
PELLEGRINO, A. (2001), Skilled Labour Migration from Argentina and Uruguay, Centro
Latinoamericano de Demografia.
THOMAS-HOPE, E. (2001), Skilled Labour Migration from Developing Countries: The Caribbean
Case, University of the West Indies.

83

VERHAAL, C. (2001), The Effects of High Skilled Mexican Migration to the United States: Is
Mexico Experiencing a Brain Drain? Class paper Political Economy of Latin America, Latin
American Studies, Georgetown University.
2WKHU5HIHUHQFHV
ADOTEVI, F.J.K. (1998), Science Communication for the Next Millennium: Report of the Ninth
International Conference of Science Editors, %HOODJLR3XEOLVKLQJ1HZVOHWWHU, October, Number
23. http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/bell/newsletters/News23/article6.htm
APPLEYARD, R. (1991), ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ&KDOOHQJHRIWKH1LQHWLHV, Geneva: International
Organisation for Migration.
BARRO, R. and SALA-I-MARTIN, X. (1995), (FRQRPLF*URZWK, New York: McGraw-Hill.
BEINE, M., DOCQUIER, F. and RAPOPORT, H. (1999), Brain Drain and Economic Growth:
Theory and Evidence, Seminar par l Axe Ethique et development durable du Centre
dEconomie et dEthique pour lEnvironnment et le Developpement, Universite de Versailles St
Quentin en Yvelines (http://www.cybercable.tm.fr/~jarmah/public_html/Hrapoport11.htm).
BERTELSMAN FOUNDATION (2000), Migration in the New Millennium: Recommendations of the
Transatlantic Learning Community, Gutersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers.
BHAGWATI, J. and HAMADA, K. (1973), The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for
Professionals and Unemployment: A Theoretical Analysis, -RXUQDO RI 'HYHORSPHQW
(FRQRPLFV, 1, pp. 19-42.
BOYLE, M., FINDLAY, A., LELIEVRE, E. and PADDISON, R. (1996), 'World cities and the limits
to global control'. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO-RXUQDORI8UEDQDQG5HJLRQDO5HVHDUFK, 20, pp. 498-517.
BROWN, M. (2000), Using the Intellectual Diaspora to Reverse the Brain Drain: Some Useful
Examples, University of Cape Town, South Africa.
CASTLES, S. (1999), International Migration and the Global Agenda, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ, 37,
pp. 5-19.
CARRINGTON, W.J. and DETRAGIACHE, E. (1998), How Big is the Brain Drain? A Working
Paper of the International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.
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HELD, D., MCGREW, A., GOLDBLATT, D. and PERRATON, J. (1999), *OREDO7UDQVIRUPDWLRQV.
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87

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The National Key Centre for Social Applications of Geographical Information Systems (GISCA)
Adelaide University, Australia

Australia differs significantly from most other Asian countries with respect to its
international migration experience. In particular, Australia has an extended history of an immigration
program managed by the federal government and which has focussed for most of its history on the
encouragement of permanent settlement of families. While there has long been provision for workers
in specialised areas to enter Australia on a temporary basis, this situation has changed somewhat in
recent years (Hugo, 1999a; Birrell, 1999; Birrell and Healy, 1997) with greater provision being made
for non-permanent migration of workers in the immigration program. Australia is one of the few
countries in the region, however, that has had, and is likely to continue to have, a sustained official
program of attracting migrants to settle in Australia, albeit on a planned and selective basis. It also is
one of the countries in the region most affected by migration with 23.4% of its resident population in
1996 being born overseas, 24.9% of its work-force being overseas-born and 19.2% of its population
being Australia-born but having at least one of their parents born overseas.
The last decade has seen a major increase in both the scale and complexity of international
population movements. The proportion of the global population for whom international movement is
part of their calculus of choice as they examine their life chances has increased massively. The
constellation of forces driving movement between countries are different and the context in which
migration is occurring has been transformed in both origin and destination countries. A quarter century
ago relatively few countries were influenced in a major way by international migration. Now a
majority of the worlds nations are so affected. Australia was one of a handful of the so-called
traditional migration countries (along with the US, Canada, New Zealand and Israel) which drew the
bulk of their immigrants from Europe in the three decades following World War II. Overwhelmingly
the main type of international population movement was of more or less permanent migration
involving settlement in the destination country. In the contemporary situation the drivers of
international migration have changed and as a result the international population movement
influencing Australia has changed dramatically. Temporary migrations are much more influential,
Australian international movement has greatly increased in scale and complexity, movement to and
from Australia is much more to and from the Asian region than before and Australia, like other
centres, is being increasingly affected by undocumented migration.
Australia has excellent international migration information both with respect to stock and
flow information. The quinquennial population censuses contain a series of questions which relate to
the overseas-born population of the nation and their descendants. The Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) and the Australian Bureau of Statistics maintain detailed computerised
information systems on arrivals to and departures from Australia and there are several databases
relating to them. Moreover, DIMA funds a Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants arriving in Australia
(LSIA). A summary of recent patterns of immigration to and emigration from Australia utilising these
data sets are presented in Section Three of this paper. A separate special section is devoted to a
consideration of recent developments concerning highly skilled workers which is the special session
91

theme for the 2002 meeting. A final section discusses the policy making process in Australia with
respect to immigration. Before undertaking this analysis, however, a short summary of the
contemporary Australian labour market situation is undertaken.
This is the third in a series of papers on the Australian international migration situation
prepared by the present author (see Hugo, 2000, 2001a). It is necessary to make a number of particular
comments regarding data for the 2002 report. Firstly, the Department of Immigration has experienced
considerable delays in processing data in its Movements Database (MDB) which incorporates
information supplied in the arrival and departure cards, which all persons leaving or coming to
Australia have to complete. There has been a change to a new fully electronic system and this has led
to delays in the processing of the information. Accordingly, the latest data available are for July 2000
and 2000-01 data will not be available until well into 2002.1 Hence our ability here to update several
of the tables in the paper from the 2001 paper is restricted. Moreover, Australia conducted a Census of
Population and Housing on 7 August 2001. No data have yet been made available for that census so
reliance here is on the results of the 1996 census. Most of the relevant 2001 census data will be made
available during the course of 2002.
'RPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGODERXUPDUNHW
Australia has experienced an extended period of economic growth since the recession of
1990-91 with an average annual growth of 3.5% over 1990-95, 4.2 in 1996, 3.7 in 1997, 4.5 in 1998,
5.3 in 1999 and a continuation of growth around 4.3% occurred in 2000. In line with global recession
in 2001 the Australian GNP grew by less than half the 2000 level (around 1.8%). Nevertheless, it
remained one of the fastest growing economies among the OECD nations. Australia is a developed
market economy dominated by its services sector which accounts for around two-thirds of GDP. Its
agriculture and mining sectors account for only 7% of GDP but 57% of exports of goods and services.
The relative size of its manufacturing sector has declined over the last three decades and now accounts
for only around 12% of GDP.
The second half of the 1990s has seen Australias economy not experience as substantial a
negative impact from the Asian economic crisis as was anticipated. Strong economic growth was
maintained and exports to non-Asian markets increased to compensate for decreases in exports to
Asia. The balance on current account in 2000-01 was in a deficit of A$18.6 billion or around -3% of
GDP. GDP per capita increased from A$28,594 in 1995-96 to 30,338 in 1997-98, 32,539 in 19992000 and 33,282 in 2001. Inflation rates in Australia have been low in recent years, at just below 2%
per annum but the rate rose to 3.2% in the year ending 30 June 2000 and to 6.0 by mid 2001. The
index of hourly wage rates increased by 3.2% in 1998-99, 2.9% in 1999-2000 and 3.4 in 2000-01. The
largest increases occurred in construction (4.3%) and property and business services (4.3%) and the
lowest in retail trade (2.6%). The highest increases were for professionals (3.8%) and the lowest for
intermediate clerical and service workers (3.1%) and labourers and related workers (also 3.1%).
In the strong Australian economic performance since the mid-1990s a stubborn problem has
been the high level of unemployment which was at 8.1% in 1995, 8.5 in 1996 and 8.4 in 1997.
However, in 1998 it fell to 7.9% and thereafter fell to 7% in 1999 and 6.2% in 2000. It has thereafter
steadied and rose slightly to 6.6% in 2001.
The most recent available figure for the total Australian population is 19,386,700 (for
30 June 2001). This represents 0.32% of the global population and it is the 53rd largest country in the
1

In fact, data for July to December 2001 will be made available before that of 2000-01.

92

world by population. Global population growth has slowed down from a peak of 2.04% between 1965
and 1970 to 1.33% per annum presently as a result of massive reductions in fertility in the less
developed countries (LDCs), and to a lesser extent, the more developed countries (MDCs).
Accordingly, Table 1 shows that LDC populations are growing at 1.7% per annum and MDCs at 0.3%
per annum and that Australias current rate of population growth (1.2% in 2000-01) is slightly lower
than global average levels of growth and well above the growth rates in Europe, North America and
MDCs as a whole.
It is important to dispel the myth that Australias population is static or declining in numbers.
The higher rate of growth of the Australian population compared to comparable MDCs is a function
of:
x

A higher level of immigration than many OECD nations.

A higher level of fertility than many such nations.

A somewhat younger age structure than those nations.

However, these elements have changed significantly in recent years and can be expected to
change further over the next decade.
In August 2000 the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2000a) released its latest population
projections. These projections had a standard mortality assumption, three overseas migration, three
internal migration and two fertility assumptions. Of the possible 18 combinations, three series were
analysed in detail:
Series I

A Total Fertility Rate remaining at 1.75

throughout the projection period
Net overseas migration of 110 000 per year

Series II

TFR as above
Net overseas migration of 90 000 per year

Series III

A TFR declining to 1.6 in 2008 and then

remaining constant
Net overseas migration of 70 000 per year

These projections despite the variations are based very heavily on the Australian experience
of the first half of the 1990s. The projections simply take this experience and project it forward into
the next half century. They must not be interpreted as predictions. Nevertheless, it is indicative to look
at the results of the projections in the context of the ageing of the population.
Table 2 summarises the main results of the projections. They see Australias population
growing to between 19.41 million and 19.44 million in 2001, 21.06 million and 21.7 million in 2011,
22.44 million and 23.88 million in 2021 and 24.06 million and 28.19 million in 2051. What do the
projections mean for ageing?
For Australia we will go from a current median age of 34.9 to between 38.1 and 38.7 in
2011, 40.3 and 41.5 in 2021 and 43.6 and 46.5 in 2051. The proportion aged 65 and above will rise

93

from the present level of 12.2% to between 14.0 and 14.4% in 2011, 17.8 and 18.7% in 2021 and 24.2
and 26.7% in 2051.
Population growth in Australia has contributed positively to the growth of the labour force
over the 1990s as Table 3 indicates. However, it is clear that there have been decreases in participation
rates in several years of the 1990s, especially for males. Overall participation rates for males have
been declining and by 1999-2000 had reached 72.6% while that for females has increased to 54.5%.
The nations contemporary labour force situation in Australia is depicted in Table 4 and it is
clear that there has been a steady increase in the numbers of males and females employed.
Unemployment levels fell in the late 1990s but were stuck between 8 and 9% between 1994 and 1998.
However, in 1999-2000 there has been a significant fall in the unemployment level and it fell below
7% for the first time for more than a decade. The underemployment situation in Australia, depicted in
Table 5, indicates that of the 9,138,200 employed persons aged 15 years and over in Australia in
September 2000, more than one-fifth (21.6%) worked part-time. However, only 3% (269,700) worked
part-time but wanted to work full-time and 0.5% (42,500) usually worked full-time but were working
part-time for economic reasons. Of all those wanting to work full-time among part-time workers,
53.9% were female.
The industry distribution of the Australian labour force is presented in Table 6. This
indicates that only 5.8% of Australians work in the primary sector 4.9% in agriculture and 0.9% in
mining. This reflects a long-term decline in the relative significance of primary sector employment. A
decade earlier 5.8% worked in agriculture and 1.3% in mining. However, after decades of reductions
in overall employment in agriculture the 1990s has seen a stabilisation of the numbers. Manufacturing
accounted for 12.5% of employment and again the sector has been experiencing a relative decline in
its share of employment since the 1970s. In 1988, 16.4% of workers were in the sector and there has
been an absolute decline in manufacturing workers. Hence more than four-fifths of Australian workers
are in the services sector.
,QWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQDQG$XVWUDOLD
7KHVWRFNRILQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDQWVLQ$XVWUDOLD
The numbers of foreign-born persons in Australia was estimated to be 4 517 3 in June 2000
(ABS 2001d) or 23.6% of the total population. The most complete picture of the overseas-born
population, however, is available from the 1996 Australian Census of Population and Housing (Hugo
1999b) and the analysis of characteristics of the overseas-born presented here is predominantly drawn
from this source. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the main origins of overseas-born groups in
Australia and recent trends in their growth. One of the distinctive characteristics of Australias
immigrant intake is that no single birthplace tends to dominate that intake. Moreover, over the postwar period there have been a series of waves in which particular groups have made up a major part of
the intake but then their numbers are substantially reduced and a new group become dominant.
Underlying these waves has been a substantial flow from the United Kingdom but its significance has
declined in recent years. Accordingly there are around 100 different birthplace groups who have more
than 1000 residents in Australia. The numbers in 150 different birthplace groups are listed in
Appendix A.
Table 7 shows the recent patterns of change in the overseas-born population of Australia. It
will be noted that Europe and the former USSR account for 53.2% of the Australian overseas-born and
26.9% were born in the United Kingdom and Ireland. However, it will be noted that the former group
94

increased by only 0.01% per annum between 1994 and 2000 and the UK-Ireland group declined by
0.10% per annum. On the other hand, the groups from Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Southern
Asia grew by 3.3, 4.2 and 6.2% per annum respectively over this period. Hence the proportion of the
Australian population born in Asia has increased from 1.85% (271,000 persons) in 1981 to 5.6%
(1,077,900 persons) in 1999 (Hugo 1992; ABS 2001d). Hence a substantial change is occurring in the
background of migrants settling in Australia.
It is difficult to generalise about the labour force and other characteristics of immigrants in
Australia since there is enormous diversity in the group. There are important differences according to
the background of the migrants, the length of time they have been in Australia, etc.
Nevertheless, Table 8 shows some of the main differences between the total Australia-born
and overseas-born populations at the 1996 census. It will be noticed that there is little difference in the
occupational structures of the two groups. There is a higher proportion of the overseas-born
unemployed than is the case for the Australia-born while there are slightly more in the lowest income
category. They are somewhat older on average and a higher proportion is male. A higher proportion
has university qualifications and a slightly smaller percentage own or are purchasing their own homes.
However, these percentages for the overseas-born mask a considerable degree of diversity between
and within different birthplace groups.
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQVHWWOHUPLJUDWLRQLQ$XVWUDOLD
Australia recognises the following categories of international population movement for
statistical purposes:
x

Permanent movement - persons migrating to Australia and residents departing

permanently.

Long-term movement - visitors arriving and residents departing temporarily with the
intention to stay in Australia or abroad for twelve months or more, and the departure of
visitors and the return of residents who had stayed in Australia or abroad for twelve
months or more.

Short-term movement - travellers whose intended or actual stay in Australia or abroad is

less than twelve months.

It is clear, however, that:

1.

This depends upon the intentions of movers and it is clear that these intentions change
over time so that there is significant category jumping.

2.

There are, in fact, visa categories for entry into Australia which overlap these categories.
For example, holders of Temporary Business Entrants visas may stay in Australia for
periods of up to four years and hence overlap the short-term and long-term movement
categories.

It is important to realise that people who enter Australia under its 0LJUDWLRQ 3URJUDP are
only one component of the contribution made by international migration to Australias population
growth. The other elements are:

95

New Zealand migration which refers to the arrival of New Zealanders under the TransTasman Travel Agreement.

Long-term visitors to the country.

Emigration of residents.

Category jumping.

However, the Migration Program operates within set planning levels and is made up of
humanitarian and non-humanitarian programs. The former involves:
x

7KH5HIXJHH3URJUDP which provides protection for people outside their country fleeing
persecution.

6SHFLDO +XPDQLWDULDQ 3URJUDPV (SHP) which comprise the In-country Special

Humanitarian Program for people suffering persecution within their own country, and
the Global Special Humanitarian Program for people who have left their country because
of significant discrimination amounting to a gross violation of human rights.

7KH 6SHFLDO $VVLVWDQFH &DWHJRU\ (SAC) which embraces groups determined by the
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to be of special concern to Australia
and in real need, but who do not fit within traditional humanitarian categories. This
program also assists those internally and externally displaced people who have close
family links in Australia.

A new category in the humanitarian program in recent years is the Temporary Protection
Visa (TPV). These were introduced in October 1999 and are granted to most of the asylum seekers
who enter Australia unlawfully and who are assessed as meeting the requirements for refugee status.
This is in contrast to those refugees who settle in Australia under the three traditional categories listed
above, and Table 9 shows the substantial differences between the two groups in rights and access to
services. The government maintains that this differentiation acts as a deterrent to undocumented
immigrant arrivals, while critics argue that the creation of two classes of refugees is unfair and not
within the spirit of the 1950 Convention (Mares 2001, 24-25). A later section discusses the marked
increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat or plane without
documentation. Table 10 shows the numbers of TPVs granted to asylum seekers arriving in Australia
over the 1999-2001 period.
Within the non-humanitarian part of the Program there are three main components
summarised in Table 9.
Within the Migration Program itself, some components, i.e. Business Skills, Employer
Nominated Scheme (ENS), Distinguished Talent, Spouses and Dependent Children are demand driven
and not subject to capping. Increases in demand for these visas, beyond planned levels, are
compensated by reductions in other program components, i.e. Independent and Skilled-Australian
Linked, Parents, Fiancs and Inter-dependants.
There are three main eligibility migration categories in the Migration Program - Family,
Skill and Special Eligibility. )DPLO\ 0LJUDWLRQ consists of a number of categories under which a
potential migrant can be sponsored by a relative who is an Australian citizen or permanent resident of

96

Australia. For statistical purposes the various Family Migration classes and sub-classes were grouped
in the following categories up to 1996-97:
3UHIHUHQWLDO
- Spouse
- Prospective marriage
- Child
- Adoption
- Parent (meeting the balance of family test)
- Aged dependent relative
- Remaining relative
- Orphan relative
- Special need relative
&RQFHVVLRQDO
- Non-dependent child
- Non-dependent brother or sister
- Non-dependent niece or nephew
- Parent of working age not meeting the balance of family test
The composition of Family and Skill streams changed on 1 July 1997 when the points tested
Concessional Family category moved from the Family Stream to the Skill stream, and was re-named
Skilled-Australian Linked. This reflected the shift to a greater emphasis on skill-related attributes in
the selection criteria for this category. Those skill-related attributes were further strengthened in
changes made from 1 July 1999 (Birrell, 1999). The 6NLOO 0LJUDWLRQ component of the migration
program is designed to contribute to Australias economic growth. It consists of a number of
categories for prospective migrants where there is demand in Australia for their particular occupational
skills, outstanding talents or business skills. These categories are:
x

Independent migrants - not sponsored by an employer or relative in Australia. They must

pass a points test which includes skills, age and English language ability (16,419 visas in
1999-2000).

Skilled-Australian Linked - commenced on 1 July 1997 (replacing the Concessional

Family Category). Applicants must pass a points test on skills, age and English ability
and receive additional points for sponsorship by relatives in Australia (8,882 visas in
1999-2000). Also includes Regional Linked for those sponsored by relatives in regional
areas (not points tested).

Employer sponsored - Employers may nominate (or sponsor) personnel from overseas
through the Employer Nomination Scheme (ENS), Regional Sponsored Migration
Scheme (RSMS) and Labour Agreements. These visas enable Australian employers to
fill skilled permanent vacancies with overseas personnel if they cannot find suitably
qualified workers in Australia. A total of 1,212 visas were granted in 1999-2000.

Business skills migration - encourages successful business people to settle permanently

in Australia and develop new business opportunities (5,631 visas in 1999-2000).

97

Distinguished talent - for distinguished individuals with special or unique talents of

benefit to Australia (67 visas in 1999-2000).

There are also several categories which cater for other types of visaed settler arrivals but are not
included in the categories above. These are:
x

Former citizen of Australia

Former resident of Australia

Family of New Zealand Citizen for dependents of New Zealand citizens who have settled
or intend to settle permanently in Australia.

In addition there are a number of categories for which visas were not required prior to
1 September 1994. These are:
x

New Zealand Citizens which refers to the arrival of New Zealand citizens under the
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.

Other (Non-Visaed) which refers primarily to the arrival in Australia of children born to
Australian citizens overseas. It also includes residents of Cocos (Keeling) Islands,
Norfolk Island etc., and persons granted Australian citizenship overseas.

Figure 1 presents the breakdown of the numbers in each category for the year 1999-2000 to
give an indication of the recent numbers in each category. Over recent times in Australia there has
been greater government intervention to shape the content of the intake of immigrants so that it can
better contribute to national development goals. This has seen greater emphasis on skills in migrant
selection and in the development of business migration programs involved to attract entrepreneurs
with substantial sums to invest in the destination country. Australia and Canada have micro managed
the qualifications of their migrant intake since the 1970s with the introduction of points assessment
schemes. In Australia recent years have seen a substantial shift toward skills/business migration and
away from family migration as Table 10 and Figure 2 demonstrate. Mid 1997 saw the removal of the
concessional family category and the introduction of the skilled-Australian-linked category and the
preferential family category has been reduced by capping the migration of parents.
The Skill Stream of the Australian Migration Program is aimed at attracting people with
qualifications and relevant work experience and can help to address skill shortages in Australia and
enhance the size, skill level and productivity of the Australian labour force.
In 1999-2000, there were 35,330 people granted Skill visas, an increase of 330 (0.9%) on the
1998-99 level. Of total Skill Stream visas, 13.5% (4,780) were granted to onshore applicants. The
United Kingdom accounted for 5,537 of all 1999-2000 Skill Stream visa grants. Other major source
countries included South Africa (4,615), India (4,064), Indonesia (2,741) and the PRC (2,670).
A range of changes to the requirements for migration under the Independent and SkilledAustralian Linked (SAL) categories were introduced on 1 July 1999. The points test for these
categories will place greater emphasis on targeting migrants who have skills in shortage in the
Australian labour market by awarding additional points to applicants whose occupation is on the
Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL). Further points are available to applicants with a job
offer in one of these occupations. The new points test also takes account of other attributes, including

98

Australian qualifications and work experience, fluency in a language other than English, and spouses
skills.
A number of mechanisms have been established within the Skill Stream to assist those states
and territories who wish to encourage more skilled migration to their regions.
x

State/Territory Nominated Independent (STNI) Scheme - enables state and territory

governments to sponsor Independent category applicants identified through skill
matching, who are willing to settle in their states and territories. These nominations are
based on an audit conducted by the state or territory government to establish which skills
are in short supply and where they are needed.

Skilled-Regional Sponsored Category - allows the sponsorship of applicants by relatives

to join them in designated areas and must meet threshold English language, age and skill
criteria. This category is not points tested.

Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS) - enables employers in regional

Australia to nominate overseas personnel for permanent entry where the employer has
been unable to recruit suitable skilled personnel through the local labour market.
Applicants must meet English language, age and skill criteria.

Regional Established Business in Australia (REBA) - allows people who have

successfully established a business venture in a designated area of Australia, and who are
sponsored by the state/territory government, to apply for permanent residence.

Skill Matching Database - operated by the Commonwealth, the database identifies

skilled applicants who meet threshold criteria for English language, age and skills and
who are willing to settle in areas where their occupational skills are in demand. It is
disseminated to state and territory governments and employers, to encourage skilled
migration to their regions through the RSMS or the STNI. It also assists in the targeting
of regional promotional campaigns.

There have been substantial fluctuations over time in the level of immigration intake in
Australia as Figure 3 indicates. Currently the level of settler intake is set each year by the federal
government after consultations with major stakeholders like unions, industry and the state
governments.
In Australian settlement immigration, one of the most marked trends of recent years has been
a shift in the balance between economic-skill selected migrants and those entering Australia under the
family-humanitarian categories. The former have increased their share of the total settler intake.
Recent studies (Murphy 2001; Birrell 2001) have documented four significant changes in the
immigration intake between 1995-96 and 2000-01:
The total intake fell from 85,000 to 61,000.
x

There was a marked switch toward the Skill Stream which increased from 28,000 to
33,000, while the family intake fell from 39,000 to 23,000 and the Humanitarian
Program fell from 14,000 to 9,000.

Within the Skill Stream the Skill Index rose from 66 to 70, while that for the sponsored
migrants rose from 64 to 66.
99

The age structure of immigrants shifted toward the prime working ages. The proportion
aged between 20 and 45 increased from 59 to 64%.

Over this period there was a net gain of around 40,000 managers and administrators,
57,000 professionals and 21 tradespersons. The annual net gains of these groups show an
increasing trend.

Over 1997-98 and 1999-2000 the net gain of managers and administrators was 3.8% of
the total employed stock and for professionals 2%. There was a net gain of computing
professionals equivalent to 3.2% of the employed stock and of accountants equivalent to
2%.

7UHQGVLQORQJWHUPDQGVKRUWWHUPPRYHPHQW
Over recent times new visa types involving temporary migration have been created,
especially those involving temporary migration for work (Birrell and Healy, 1997). These often cut
across the long-term and short-term categories. Table 11 shows that over the last two decades there has
been a shift in overseas movement to Australia which has seen an increase in non-permanent moves.
Firstly regarding short-term movement it is clear that there has been an acceleration in both
foreigners visiting Australia and Australians going overseas on a short-term basis. Figure 4 shows
there has been a consistent increase in the number of overseas visitors until 1997-98 when the onset of
the crisis in Asia saw a downturn in tourists and business travellers from countries such as South
Korea and Indonesia which were hit hardest by the crisis. It will be noted that while the number of
overseas visitors to Australia more than quadrupled over the period following 1982-83, the short-term
movement of Australians overseas only increased by 153%.
Nevertheless, it is clear that short-term visiting has greatly increased and this represents
much more than an expansion of global tourism. It also represents a new global regime in which many
people work for considerable periods in more than a single country. It is interesting to note in Figure 4
that visitors have increasingly outnumbered Australians going overseas in the 1990s with a small
downturn effect of the Asian crisis being evident.
Asia represented the origin of 41.5% of visitors to Australia in 1999-2000 notwithstanding
the effects of the economic crisis. New Zealand was the largest source with numbers increasing from
695,700 in 1997-98 to 718,900 in 1998-99 and to 773,100 (16.6% of the total) in 1999-2000. Japan
continues to be a large source with 15.2% of the total although the numbers declined from 797,000 in
1997-98 to 725,800 in 1998-99 and 705,500 in 1999-2000. The UK and the USA are important origins
of visitors (11.9 and 9.4% respectively) but other important Asian countries of origin are Singapore
(277,000), Hong Kong (149,000), Malaysia (146,800), Taiwan (140,900), Korea (139,400), China
(105,000), Indonesia (85,300) and Thailand (68,000).
It was mentioned earlier that Australia has long had an emphasis on attracting permanent
settlers to the country and a strongly expressed opposition to attracting temporary and contract
workers. During the labour shortage years of the 1950s and 1960s Australias migration solution to the
problem contrasted sharply with that of European nations like Germany and France when it opted to
concentrate on attracting permanent migrants to meet worker shortages rather than contract workers.
However, in recent years attitudes have changed in Australia and it has been recognised that in the
context of globalised labour markets it is essential to have mechanisms to allow non-permanent entry
of workers in certain groups. Nevertheless, this entry has not been extended to unskilled and lowskilled areas and has been open to people with particular skills and entrepreneurs. Hence there has
100

been an increase in people coming to Australia as short-term or long-term entrants and being able to
work in the country. There has been increasing pressure from some groups to include some unskilled
workers to enter the country temporarily to meet labour shortages in some areas. The most notable
example of this is in the area of harvest labour, especially in fruit, vegetables and vines where
significant seasonal labour shortages have occurred in recent years (Hugo, 2001b). Nevertheless, the
government has not responded positively to these suggestions.
The significance of people coming to work in Australia temporarily is especially evident in
the expansion of long-term entrance in Australia shown in Figure 5. This has had an impact, at least in
the short-term, on overall net migration gains in Australia. It will be noted from Figure 6 that an
increasing proportion of Australias net migration gain in recent years has been from an excess of
long-term arrivals over long-term departures and a reducing proportion has been from an excess of
settler arrivals over permanent departures. Indeed in 1999-2001 the net migration gain from long-term
movement exceeded that from permanent movement.
Figure 7 shows some recent trends in the major forms of temporary migration to Australia.
One type of short-term movement of particular significance is the increasing tempo of migration of
Asian students (Shu and Hawthorne, 1996). Over the 1987-99 period the number of full-fee overseas
students in Australia increased from 7,131 to 157,834 (DEETYA, 1995; DETYA, 2000). The crisis in
Asia had some impact as Figure 7 shows but the numbers of student visas given off-shore increased by
6% to 67,130 over 1998-99, by 11% to 74,428 in 1999-2000 and by 15.5% to over 86,000 in 2000-01.
The major sources2 are the USA (6,407 visas) and Asian countries such as the PRC (6,079), Indonesia
(5,439), Malaysia (5,900) and Hong Kong (4,544).
There is undoubtedly a strong connection between student migration and eventual settlement
of Asian origin groups in MDCs like Australia. It may occur through students:
x

overstaying their education visas;

gaining a change of status to a resident;

returning to their home country on completion of their studies and subsequently

immigrating officially to the country where they studied.

Figure 7 also shows that there has been a significant increase in working holiday maker
(WHM) temporary migration in recent years. This has been comprehensively reviewed by the
Australian Parliament Joint Study Committee on Migration (1997). WHMs are foreign nationals aged
18-30 from selected countries with which Australia has a reciprocal arrangement, who can work under
certain conditions for up to 12 months. Their numbers have increased dramatically and reached 74,454
in 1999-2000 more than doubling in the 1990s.
Kinnaird (1999) reports that while the economic impact nationally of the migration is limited
it has significant impacts in specific industries in specific areas. While Europeans dominate this
category, there are significant numbers from Japan (8,510) and Korea (1,200).
Since 1995 there has been a new visa category in Australia of Temporary Business Migrants.
These are five types:

Numbers refer to 1999-2000.

101

Business visitors who come for short periods and are in the short-term arrival category.

Temporary business residents who come for longer periods and are usually in the longterm arrival category.

Independent executives who enter Australia for the purpose of establishing, or buying
into a business and managing that business.

Medical practitioners qualified general and specialist medical practitioners where there
is a demonstrated need for employing practitioners from overseas.

Educational this visa is for qualified people to join educational and research
organisations to fill academic teaching and research positions that cannot be filled from
within the Australian labour market.

Figure 7 indicates there has been a fall in this category since a peak in 1996-97 and in 19992000 a total of 236,085 Business Visitors visas were granted and 35,006 Temporary Business
Residence visas, 3,937 Independent Executive visas, 2,515 Medical Practitioner visas and 1,700
Educational visas. Among the Business visitors, North America accounts for almost one-quarter and
the main Asian groups are from China (15%), Japan (7%) and India (5%). Among the longer term
business residents the UK make up almost one-quarter and the largest Asian groups are from Japan
(6%), China (4%), India (8%) and Indonesia (3%).
The increasing numbers of short-term worker entrants to Australia represents a huge change
in Australian immigration policy which in the past has been adamant in its concentration on permanent
settlers and its eschewing of temporary migration. Kinnaird (1999), based on DIMA data, has
estimated the stock of temporary entrants to Australia in mid 1998 and these are presented in Table 12
and suggest that there were over 200,000 people in Australia temporarily with work rights and a
similar number without work rights. This represents a substantial number of people equivalent to 2-3%
of the permanently resident population. In Table 13 we present official estimates (DIMA, 2000a) of
the stocks and flows of non-permanent entrants to Australia in 1999-2000 and limited data in 2000-01
but it would appear that Kinnairds estimates for the previous year continue to be applicable. DIMA
(2000a, p. 5) estimates that at 30 June, 2000 there were 513,900 persons in Australia on temporary
visas 181,900 had been in Australia for less than three months, 182,800 between three and twelve
months and 149,200 longer.3 The largest group of the 513,900 were from the UK (76,100), followed
by the USA (40,300), China (33,300), Japan (32,000) and Indonesia (31,300).
,PPLJUDWLRQDQGSRSXODWLRQJURZWK
Net migration now accounts for half of the population growth in the worlds More
Developed Countries (UN, 1997, p. 23) and in Australia it can be seen from Tables 14 and 15 that over
the last 20 years the proportion that net migration contributed to population change varied from a low
17.8% in 1993 to a high of 54.5% in 1989.
A key point in the recent net migration gains, however, is that in recent years an increasing
proportion of that gain has been derived from an excess of long-term (as opposed to permanent)
arrivals over long-term departures such that by 1999-2000 they accounted for over half of the net

These figures do not include New Zealand citizens.

102

gains. This points to the increasing diversification of migration to and from Australia and the
developing role of non-permanent migration in the Australian economy and society.
(PLJUDWLRQ
There is a tendency for Australia to be categorised as a purely immigration country but, in
fact, it is also a country of significant emigration. Table 16 shows that over recent years departures on
a permanent or long-term basis have been very substantial. Indeed, Table 17 shows that while the ratio
of permanent emigration to permanent immigration has varied between 14 and 52% since 1968, the
ratio has been comparatively high in recent years. Over the post-war period there has been a close
relationship between immigration and emigration trends with the later tending to follow the former
with a small time lag. This is because, as Table 17 indicates, former settlers have been a major part of
emigration over the years.
Moreover, the return migration effect has been understated in the data since a significant
number of the Australia-born are the dependent children of overseas-born returnees. In 1999-2000
permanent departures from Australia (41,078) reached the highest level since 1972-73 and the
proportion Australia-born (49.3%) was the highest ever recorded indicating an increasing trend for the
Australian population to emigrate. It is apparent from Figure 8 that there has been an upward trend in
the numbers of Australia-born permanent departures in the 1990s and this is indicative of a greater
tendency for Australia-born adults deciding to move overseas on a permanent basis.
If we look at the pattern of long-term out-movement of Australian residents, a similar pattern
emerges. Figure 9 shows that the number of Australian residents who are departing overseas for a
period of more than a year but with intentions to return has increased substantially in recent years. If
we break the long-term departures into Australia-born and overseas-born in Table 18, again this
provides evidence of greater Australia-born movement out of Australia on a long-term basis. Between
1998-99 and 1999-2000 there was an increase in the number of long-term departures from Australia
from 140,281 to 156,768 persons. The number who were Australian residents increased from 82,861
to 84,918 persons. In 1999-2000 there was a net migration loss of 5,267 through long-term
movement among the Australia-born compared with a net gain of 61,348 among the overseas-born.
There has been a similar massive increase in the number of residents travelling overseas for periods of
less than a year (Table 11). While tourists and very short-term business visits are dominant here it does
include significant numbers who are working overseas on a longer term basis but who are not to be
absent from the country for over a year.
Settler loss has been an important feature of the post-war Australian migration scene with
around a fifth of all post-war settlers subsequently emigrating from Australia, most of them returning
to their home nation. There has been concern about this settler loss among policy makers (Hugo, 1994)
but it has a number of components including a group of migrants who never intended to settle
permanently in Australia as well as people who are influenced by family changes, are not able to
adjust to life in Australia, etc. The pattern of settler loss while it varies between birthplace groups (e.g.
it is high among New Zealanders but low among Vietnamese) has tended to remain a relatively
consistent feature of the post-war migration scene in Australia and the fluctuations in its numbers are
very much related to earlier levels of immigration. With an increase in the skill profile in immigration
we can expect an increase in settler loss since skilled migrants have a greater chance of re-migrating
than family migrants.
Nevertheless, there has been a change in the level of out-movement of Australian residents
with a consistent increase being in evidence. This has begun to attract policy attention since the profile

103

of departures of residents tends to be younger and more educated than the population of the nation as a
whole and the spectre of brain drain has arisen.
There can be no doubt that the global international migration system with respect to highly
skilled labour has been transformed since the 1960s, when the first brain drain research was
undertaken. Findlay (1990, p. 15) has summarised the situation as follows:
professional transients are replacing settler migrants in the international migration systems of
many countries. Where settler emigration is still permitted, it is skilled migrants who find it
easiest and quickest to receive work and residence permits ... Most nations, however, do not
continue to favour large scale settler migration and instead seek to meet specific skill shortages
by permitting (if not promoting) transient skill movements. The transient skill flows already
dominate the migration systems of some countries such as the United Kingdom ... They involve
the international circulation of high level manpower between countries, with the migrants
neither seeking nor being encouraged to remain in any particular place for a long time period.
Foreign assignments are commonly for one to three years ... Given the circulatory nature of
these high level manpower movements, it has been suggested that these migration moves be
seen as skill exchanges rather than brain drain.
Whereas in the 1960s the dominant form of professional international migration tended to
involve permanent migration from less developed to more developed nations, the current situation
tends to be characterised by the transilience of such groups, that is, hypermobility involving
remigration and return (Richmond, 1991, p. 4). Seen in this context, it is somewhat unrealistic to
expect that Australia will be isolated from this process and have its international migration of skilled
groups dominated by traditional settler emigration movements. The greatly increased significance of
transilience in skilled labour movements has been encouraged by a number of developments over the
last decade or so:
x

Many highly skilled regional and national labour markets have been usurped by labour
markets which overlap international boundaries.

The internationalisation of capital.

The exponential development of exchanges of all types through the development of

communications.

The reduction in real time and money costs of travel.

The development of multinational corporations.

In the Australian context, the increasing tempo of emigration of Australia-born professionals

may to some extent be due to Australias increasing incorporation into these international migration
systems as well as a function of economic conditions within the country. Of course the situation
should be monitored and subjected to detailed study, but there are a number of possible (and in several
cases, probable) positive developments for the Australian economy which could accrue from this
movement:
x

Most of the movement is not permanent in that many expatriate workers eventually
return to Australia.

104

Most of the migrants are remitting substantial sums of foreign exchange to Australiabased families, investments and bank accounts. There is little to suggest that there is any
capital flight associated with this emigration (e.g. from Malaysia, Hugo, 1991).

The extension of the skills and experience of the Australian workers involved.

The linkages which this is establishing between Australians and Australian companies
and their Asian counterparts and markets will further assist in embedding Australias
economy in Asia.

It is productively absorbing skilled Australian workers at a time of lack of opportunities

in Australia.

It may be creating opportunities for Australian companies to supply goods and services
to Asian countries because the Australian expatriate workers will be most familiar with
Australian-based suppliers.

An increasing percentage of the outflow of Australians is to Asia and we may be seeing

some integration of particular labour markets between Australia and some Asian countries. This has
many significant implications for Australia in a number of areas and the emigration associated with it
needs closer investigation. It is crucial for Australia to monitor the situation in Asia for its implications
for international migration to and from Australia. On the one hand, there are the issues of skilled
labour shortage in several nations which will have implications for emigration of one kind or another
from Australia. In addition, in other nations there are surpluses of educated workers in some fields,
due largely to mismatches in the output of the education systems and the specialised demands for
employment in the economies of those nations. The latter forces will put pressures on immigration to
Australia and other destination countries. These apparent contradictory forces in Asia are a function of
the diversity of the region and the enormous differences between Asian countries with respect to
labour surpluses and shortages. However, they are also related to emerging demands for particular
skills in the rapidly growing economies of the region, which cannot be supplied immediately by their
national education systems. Moreover, in many countries human resource development policies are
mismatched with, and lagging behind, the rapidly changing labour market situation. This is producing
a complex situation where, between and even within individual Asian countries, there are strong
tendencies toward producing both immigration and emigration on significant levels.
:RUNIRUFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDQWV
Inevitably because of its younger age structure than the total population and the economic
focus in immigrant selection the proportion of immigrants in the workforce has been greater than their
proportion in the population as a whole for the bulk of the post-war years (NPI, 1975). Figure 10
indicates that the balance between economic/skill selected migrants and those entering due to family
connections in Australia has changed over the years with policy shifts within recent times the skill
criteria accounting for a higher proportion of immigrants than in most previous periods. There are, of
course, skill/education differences between the different categories of settlers coming to Australia with
those of the skill/economic immigration categories being substantially higher than those of settlers in
the family and humanitarian categories. Table 19 shows that in 1996 a larger population of the
Australia-born are in the workforce than the overseas-born largely reflecting the higher percentages
aged 65 years and over in the latter (15.9 compared with 10.1%). It is interesting, too, that the
occupational profile is almost identical between the two groups although the overseas-born have a
somewhat higher education profile. Of course the figures in Table 19 mask very wide variations in the
workforce experience between different migrant groups. There are, of course, wide variations between
105

birthplace groups as is evident in the $WODV RI $XVWUDOLDQ 3HRSOH (Hugo, 1999b). Some of the most
substantial differences are between different visa categories of immigrants.
This is evident in the results from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Australia
(LSIA) depicted in Table 20. This indicates that there was a very large difference between visa
categories of Principal Applicant immigrants who were interviewed within the first six months of
arrival in Australia (Wave 1) with respect to the proportion who were working. Those arriving under
economic visa categories had much higher levels of workforce participation than those coming under
family categories and especially those coming as refugee or humanitarian immigrants. When the same
immigrants were interviewed three years later the participation rates had increased for all visa
categories but the category differences remain.
The occupation profile of permanent settler arrivals in Australia is substantially higher than
that of the nation as a whole. Table 21 shows that managers, administrators and professionals make up
almost half of all workers among permanent settler arrivals (49.1%) and this compares to 38.8%
among the total population. On the other hand intermediate and low skill workers were 24.1% of
permanent settlers but 43.4% among the total population.
A crucial point, however, in considering the effect of international migration on the
workforce is the significance of the more or less permanent outflows discussed in the previous section.
Hence Table 21 provides occupational details of those leaving Australia permanently. It will be
noticed that although Australia receives a net gain of all occupational categories the occupational
profile of emigrants is somewhat higher than that of the permanent arrivals. The main difference is in
the highest status manager/administrator category which accounts for 18.2% of the emigrants but only
12% of the immigrants. However, it will also be noted that 61.7% of the emigrants were in
employment before moving compared with 49.8% of settler arrivals.
Another point made in the previous section was the growing significance in Australia of nonpermanent movement and the fact that at any one time over 200,000 persons temporarily present in
Australia have the right to work and the number actually working may be up to 400,000. This is a not
insignificant element in the Australian workforce so it is important to examine the workforce
characteristics of those who are on temporary visas but have the right to work in Australia. Table 22
presents information derived from passenger arrival and departure cards. One difficulty with the
information is the high proportion of not stated responses and a more comprehensive analysis should
go to the visa application forms themselves. Nevertheless, it would seem that the occupational profiles
presented in Table 22 are indicative of actual patterns. Among working holiday makers it would seem
that professionals and intermediate clerical and service workers dominate.
As would be expected, the profile of persons entering under the Temporary Business
category is somewhat higher. Indeed almost three-quarters of such entrants (73.5%) fall into the two
highest status occupation categories of managers, administrators and professionals. This compares
with 49.1% of permanent arrivals and 38.8% of the total Australian population. In sum then, the
impact of post-war immigration on the Australian workforce has been massive in both quantitative and
qualitative terms.
1HWPLJUDWLRQWUHQGV
It is instructive to examine the numbers of arrivals and departures to and from Australia
according to their categorisation as permanent, long-term and short-term and whether or not they
involved Australian residents or visitors and Australia-born and overseas-born persons. The situation

106

for the last seven years is presented in Table 23 and indicates how the settler arrivals are a very small
component of the overall flows.
Some of the most significant patterns are apparent in the net migration figures presented in
Table 24. This indicates that over the 1993-2000 period there was a net gain of 456,129 overseas-born
persons by permanent migration and a net loss of -90,299 Australia-born persons by permanent
movement. Similarly among long-term residents and long-term visitors there were substantial net
gains of overseas-born persons (51,638) but net losses of Australia-born (-30,074).
0LJUDWLRQWRDQGIURP$VLD
Recent decades have seen a major shift in the origins of people moving to Australia. There
has been an increasing focus on the Asian origin, both as an origin of people coming to Australia and a
destination of those leaving the country. Figure 11 depicts the substantial shift which has occurred in
the origins of permanent settlers to Australia over the 1970-2000 period. In 1970, settlers were
predominantly from Europe but by 1990 Southeast Asia had become more significant. However, in the
1990s the settlers came from a more diverse range of countries, both in Asia and elsewhere.
Asia has assumed increasing significance in population movement to and from Australia in
recent years although it is interesting to note in Table 25 that the proportion of all movement involving
an Asian country fell from a high of 36.1% in 1995-96 to a low of 29.6% in 1998-99 and 1999-2000
due to the impact of the economic crisis. There has been a small decrease in the proportion that Asians
make up of settler arrivals from 40% in 1995-96 to 33.7% in 1999-2000 while in permanent departures
of residents their proportion increased from 10.8 to 16.2%. Hence while Asia is more significant in
permanent arrivals than departures the gap is closing. It is interesting in the permanent out-movement
columns to observe the difference between the pattern for Australian residents and visitors. A greater
proportion of Australian residents departing permanently are moving to Asia than is the case with
visitors. This would seem to indicate that while non-Asian destinations are dominant for Australian
residents leaving the country permanently they are increasing in significance, despite the crisis in Asia.
On the other hand, rates of return of Asian migrants to their home countries are lower than those
coming to Australia from other countries. There are some exceptions to this such as Japan but in
general Asian immigrants to Australia show a low propensity to return to their home country.
Turning to long-term movement, it is interesting that Asians make up more than half of longterm visitor arrivals and departures. This indicates that the introduction of the new categories of nonpermanent movement to Australia, especially overseas students and temporary business entrants, has
particularly favoured Asian movement. Figure 12, for example, depicts the distribution of origins of
student arrivals in 2000. This indicates an overwhelming emphasis on the Asian, especially Southeast
Asian, region. Figure 13 shows the origins of Working Holiday Makers (WHMs) and a very clustered
pattern is in evidence. This is not surprising given that people coming to Australia under this visa
category are restricted to the handful of countries with which Australia has reciprocal WHM
arrangements Canada, Japan, Korea and a number of Western European nations. Figure 14 shows
the distribution of origins of Temporary Resident Arrivals in 2000. These are predominantly
temporary business migrants and a quite different pattern to those observed earlier is in evidence.
North America is a more important origin than for other forms of movement as is Japan. Other
concentrations are in Western Europe, Asia and South Africa.
The long-term UHVLGHQW movement tends to be less oriented to Asia. This indicates that
Australians leaving the country on a long-term basis are more inclined to go to non-Asian destinations.

107

The short-term resident movement also differs substantially than that of the visitors in its
degree of Asian orientation. While the proportion of visitors to Australia coming from Asia reached
half in 1995-96 and was above 40% in the other years shown in Table 25, the proportions of
Australians leaving the country on a short-term basis and going to Asia was quite low reaching a high
of 14.5% in 1995-96. The effects of the economic crisis in Asia are evident in the fall in the
proportions of short-term visitors from Asia from 50.4% in 1995 to 40.6% in 1999-2000. Moreover,
the actual numbers from Asia fell from a high of 2,102,818 in 1996-97 to 1,769,494 in 1998-99 but
increased slightly to 1,886,304 in 1999-2000.
What is striking in Table 25 are the very large numbers of international movements linking
Australia and Asia given the overall numbers of the Australian population. In 1996-97 there was more
than one Asia-Australian international movement for every four residents of Australia. The numbers
were increasing very fast until the Asian crisis-by 16.7% between 1995 and 1996 and by 5.8%
between 1996 and 1997. Thereafter, however, there was a significant decline - by 7.4% between 1997
and 1998, 4.6% between 1998 and 1999 but an increase by 6.7% between 1999 and 2000 reflecting the
impact of Asias economic crisis.
It is useful to consider the movement between individual Asian countries and Australia. The
details of this movement are presented in Appendix B and a number of the main trends are
summarised here.
x

The largest volume of movement into and from -DSDQ accounting for slightly less than
one-third of all movers between Asian countries and Australia. This is dominated by
short-term arrivals and short-term departures indicating that the dominant form of JapanAustralia movement is of tourists and business people coming from Japan to Australia
and returning to Japan.

It is interesting to note that the movement of Japanese short-term visitors to Australia is

more than 80 times greater than the numbers of Australian short-term movers going in
the other direction. Japanese also make up a significant proportion of long-term visitors
from Asia coming to Australia reflecting the significance of Japanese business and
student movement. On the other hand, the level of settler movement to Australia is very
low. In fact, in Appendix B it will be noted that 16 other Asian countries had higher
levels of percentage population movement to Australia than Japan.

The pattern of movement from 6RXWK.RUHD to Australia shows some interesting trends.
The numbers increased by 41% between 1995 and 1996 and 28% the following year to
account for 10.4% of all Asian movement (538,799 movers) in 1996-97. Thereafter the
effects of the economic crisis saw a massive decline to 308,942 moves in 1997-98,
208,341 in 1998-99 but an increase to 315,219 in 1999-2000. Virtually all of this change
occurred in the numbers of visitors travelling to Australia, mainly as tourists. Whereas in
1996-97, 250,758 short-term visitors arrived from South Korea in 1998-99 it was 87,829
and 142,230 in 1999-2000. South Korea continues to be a significant source of long-term
visitors to Australia but like Japan the numbers of permanent settlers are quite small.

In 1999-2000 the second largest migrant flow between Australia and Asia involved
0DOD\VLD. Like South Korea Malaysia too was strongly affected by the Asian crisis and
total movement increased from 331,064 in 1994-95 to 415,558 only to fall to 389,155 in
1997-98 and recover to 398,223 in 1998-99 and 455,909 in 1999-2000. Malaysia has
been an important source of permanent settlers to Australia over the last two decades
although with the burgeoning of the Malaysian economy over much of the 1990s, this
108

has declined. In 1999-2000 Malaysia was the fifth largest Asian source of permanent
settlers in Australia (1,771 persons). It is noteworthy in Appendix B, however, that the
proportion that short-term visitors make up of the total Malaysian movement is lower
than for other countries with which there is a high level of interaction. Malaysia is a
major source of long-term visitors due to it being a long-term major supplier of students
and having significant business linkages with Australia. Significantly, too, Malaysia is a
major destination in Asia of Australian residents leaving Australia on a long-term basis.
x

In 1999-2000 the fourth largest movement flow between Australia and Asia was with
6LQJDSRUH. There has been a continuous flow of settlers from Singapore to Australia over
the last two decades but in 1999-2000 it was only the eleventh largest source of
permanent arrivals from Asia. Singapore supplies around one-tenth of all short-term
arrivals in Australia and is also an important source of long-term visitors (also around
one-tenth) indicating strong links with business and student movement.

&KLQD had the third largest interaction with Australia during 1999-2000 and this
represents a steady increase from 255,985 movements in 1994-95 to 455,731 in 19992000. China is the largest single Asian origin of permanent settlers in Australia (6,809 in
1999-2000). It is interesting, however that China also is recording a significant back flow
of former settlers equivalent in 1999-2000 to almost one-quarter of the inflow. Appendix
B also shows that China was the pre-eminent destination of Australian resident shortterm travellers in Asia in 1999-2000. China also supplies about one-tenth of the longterm visitors coming to Australia from Asia.

For statistical purposes +RQJ .RQJ is still considered separately from China although
reunification has occurred. It has only a slightly smaller interaction with Australia than
the remainder of China, however, while there was a rapid increase from 264,705 moves
in 1994-95 to 406,405 in 1996-97, this fell to 311,521 by 1998-99 but increased to
332,605 in 1999-2000 due to the effects of reunification and the economic crisis. For
much of the last five years it has been the major overseas destination of Australian shortterm movers as well as being one of the major origins of short-term visitors to Australia.
Hong Kong also sees a significant volume of long-term movement in both directions.
The reunification of Hong Kong with China has seen a significant reduction in the
number of settlers coming from Hong Kong to Australia from 4361 in 1995-96 to 1918
in 1998-99 and 1,467 in 1999-2000.

7DLZDQ shows an interesting pattern of relative stability in the overall level of interaction
with Australia ranging between 320,147 in 1994-95 and 366,827 in 1997-98. In 19992000 it was the sixth largest Asian source of permanent settlers (1,699). Taiwan supplies
about 6% of Asian short-term movers to Australia, lower than each of the countries
considered so far. Short-term visitors make up a very high proportion of all moves and
tourism is a significant element in the interaction with Australia.

There is a most interesting pattern of interaction between ,QGRQHVLD and Australia

evident in Appendix B. Overall movements increased from 265,683 in 1994-95 to
357,902 in 1996-97, but the impact of the Asian economic crisis was felt most in
Indonesia and by 1998-99 the interaction had fallen to 239,394 and 232,148 in 19992000. However, also under the impact of the crisis the number of permanent settlers to
Australia increased from 1013 to 2,943 in the period. The numbers of short-term visitors
to Australia from Indonesia fell from 151,873 in 1996-97 to 88,305 in 1998-99 and
75,668 in 1999-2000. In 1999-2000 Indonesia supplied more long-term visitors to
109

Australia than any country indicating the large number of Indonesian students in
Australia and established business and cultural linkages.
x

The 3KLOLSSLQHV has been a consistent major source of settlers moving to Australia over
more than two decades and in 1999-2000 they were the third largest source of Asian
settlers (3,186 persons). However, in terms of overall interaction, nine other Asian
countries had higher levels. This reflects the fact that Filipino short-term movement to
Australia is at a relatively low level and it is one of the few Asian countries where such
movement is almost balanced by the numbers of Australian short-term moves in the
other direction. There is little long-term movement in either direction reflecting limited
student and business movement between Australia and the Philippines.

7KDLODQGV interaction with Australia is only the eleventh largest among the Asian
countries. The flow increased steadily from 160,286 in 1994-95 to 184,002 in 1996-97
but fell to 99,108 in the onset of the crisis in the following year but rose to 125,992 in
1998-99 and 143,369 in 1999-2000. Only relatively small numbers of Thais settle in
Australia. The numbers of long-term visitors are greater than for the Philippines
suggesting stronger student and business movements between the two countries. Thai
short-term movement to Australia is greater than that from the Philippines but it is five
times larger than the flows of Australians in the opposite direction.

9LHWQDPHVH represent the largest single Asian birthplace group in Australia but the level
of international movement between Vietnam and Australia is similar to that of Thailand.
Moreover, it has been relatively stable over the last few years. Vietnamese have been a
major element in Asians settling in Australia for more than two decades and in 19992000 they were the seventh largest group of permanent settlers (1,502 persons). They are
one of the very few Asian groups for which there are more short-term visitors from
Australia than to Australia largely reflecting the fact that there has been a big increase in
the numbers of Vietnamese Australians visiting their homeland for visiting family,
business and tourism since Doi Moi. Hence in 1994-95 there were 34,870 short-term
Australian resident visitors to Vietnam compared with 40,395 in 1998-99 and 47,605 in
1999-2000. On the other hand, there is little long-term movement between the two
countries.

Turning to South Asia, the largest volume of interaction is with ,QGLD and there has been
a steady increase in movement from 106,820 in 1994-95 to 174,696 in 1998-99 and
203,011 in 1999-2000. India has been an important source of settlers to Australia in the
1990s and in 1999-2000 was the second largest origin of settlers (4,631 persons). Over
the last five years the number of short-term visitors from India to Australia has almost
doubled and long-term movements have also increased more than three times reflecting
greater business and student movement.

6UL/DQND was the thirteenth largest source of settlers to Australia in 1999-2000 (73,009
persons). It is, like Vietnam, one of the few countries in Asia where more Australians
visit than people move as visitors in the other direction reflecting a strong pattern of Sri
Lankan Australians visiting their homeland frequently.

5HPLWWDQFHV
Remittances of money and goods by migrants to their families in their home areas can be a
major element in national and especially regional economies (since migrants tend to be drawn from
110

particular parts of the origin countries). In Australia the traditional predominance of permanently
settled migration has meant that little analysis has been made of foreign transfers and there are no
official data on such flows. Rod and Murphy (1997a, p. 78) report that rough estimates of remittance
outflows (based on official receipts from various receiving countries) indicate that at least $500
million is sent annually through official banking channels to family and communities overseas.
However, they estimate (Rod and Murphy, 1997b, p. 1) that in 1994-95 immigrants and temporary
residents brought in around A$1.5 billion and out-remittances totalled $520 million, a net gain of $971
million in migrant transfers. This compared to a negative balance of trade in that year of A$8 billion.
8QGRFXPHQWHGDQGLOOHJDOLPPLJUDWLRQ
Undocumented or illegal migration to Australia is of three types:
x

Overstaying whereby non-citizens enter Australia legally but overstay the term of their
visa (overstayers).

Where non-citizens entering Australia legally otherwise ignore the terms of their visa,
e.g. persons on a tourist visa working.

Clandestine entry of non-citizens who do not pass through an immigration control point
(illegal entrants).

In this section we will concentrate on the first and third of these types.
Much is known in Australia about overstayers since there is a high quality Movement Data
Base and all persons arriving in and departing from the country are required to complete a card which
facilitates matching and detection of overstayers. Table 26 shows that through the 1990s around
50,000 overstayers have been identified using this matching. In June 2000 there were 58,748
overstayers of whom 28% had been in Australia for more than 9 years and a similar proportion had
been in the country for less than a year (28.6%). Some 79.5% of overstayers were persons who had
overstayed tourist visas, 5.4% temporary residents and 7.5% students. The overstay rate was 0.2%
comprising 7.196 overstayers from 3,848,993 visitors in 1999-2000 (DIMA, 2000a, p. 56).
The origins of overstayers are shown in Table 27 and overstay rates calculated as a
percentage of total long-term and visitor entrants since 1994. This produced an overall overstay rate of
0.25% but there was quite a bit of variation between countries of origin. The largest numbers of
overstayers were from the UK (10.1%), USA (8.1), Indonesia (6.8), the Philippines (6.5), China (6.4),
Korea (4.9) and Japan (4.5).
Turning to the people who enter Australia illegally, it is clear that Australia has in recent
times become a more important target for such movements. There are, of course, no data on persons
who have been successful in such attempts but there are on the numbers that have been detected.
These can be divided into those detected arriving by air and those coming by boat. Figure 15 shows
that there has been a substantial increase in the numbers detected in recent years. Taking, first of all,
the unauthorised arrivals by air. The undocumented migrants arriving by air arrive either with no
travel documents or present documentation which is found to be fraudulent but which they might have
used for check-in at overseas airports. While many arrive as individuals, planning their own travel,
some are part of organised people trafficking organisations which have become more active across the
Asian region.

111

It will be noted that the numbers arriving by air increased markedly in the 1990s and peaked
at 2,106 in 1998-89. Thereafter they fell to 1,695 in 1999-2000 and 1,508 in 2000-01. The reasons for
the fall in unauthorised arrivals in airports are not clear but may be associated with:
x

Sanctions on air carriers for bringing in unauthorised people leading to them checking
documents of all incoming passengers more closely prior to travel.

Feedback that such arrivals unable to make a case for asylum are sent back to where they
came on the next available claim.

An increase in the use of boats among unauthorised arrivals.

The countries from which the unauthorised air arrivals originated are shown in Table 28. It
will be noticed that there has been some significant variation over the years. In the years of largest
gain Iraq, China, Indonesia and Sri Lanka were the largest groups. However, in recent years the
numbers from these origins have declined. The decline in the number of Iraqis is most interesting and
dramatic (from 325 in 1998-99 to 37 in 2000-01) given their increasing numbers among boat arrivals.
In recent times South Korea, New Zealand and Thailand have become more important with,
in some cases, these being places of transit rather than the original place of birth/residence of the
unauthorised arrivals.
Turning to people who seek to clandestinely enter Australia by boat, one small group are
those who are detected aboard incoming ships who are stowaways. In 1998-99 these numbered 61, and
in 1999-2000, 26. However, the main focus of attention regarding unauthorised arrivals has been on
the so-called boat people4. The numbers arriving on the northern shores of Australia from IndoChina over the period 1976-89 numbered only 2,059 persons, although they attracted a great deal of
attention (Viviani, 1996, p. 159). However, in the 1990s the numbers increased and in recent years
have reached unprecedented levels as Table 29 indicates. The period 1999-2001 saw 8,315 boat people
detected compared with 1,083 in the previous two years. This became the most discussed migration
issue in Australia since the previous report (Hugo, 2001a) and it was a major element in the lead up to
the 2001 national election. It will be noted in Figure 16 that in the last two years Afghanistan and Iraq
have dominated among the boat people arriving in Australia. The majority of the boat people in the
early 1990s originated from the Kompong Som area of Cambodia and comprised largely of Chinese,
Vietnamese and Cambodian nationals.
In the mid 1990s Fujian province and other parts of Southern China became more important.
However, the upswing in 1999 was predominantly of Iraqi, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Turkish, Afghan
and Bangladeshi nationals. Asia has become an important staging post for undocumented immigrants.
Boat people are now coming predominantly through Indonesia, especially the province of East Nusa
Tenggara. They come on overcrowded fishing vessels and there has been a significant loss of life
through the sinking of these vessels. For example, it was reported on 13 December 2000 that up to 163
boat people were feared drowned through the sinking of two boats in atrocious weather conditions
(DIMA, 2000e).

The term was originally coined to describe people fleeing Vietnam after communist forces reunified the
country in 1975. In Australia it has come to be applied to anyone who arrives in the country by boat in an
unauthorised manner. Some people find the term pejorative, however it is a useful and apt description and
now used widely (Mares, 2001, pp. x-xi).

112

The major nationalities represented among boat arrivals in Australia are shown in Table 30
and the increasing dominance of the Middle Eastern (especially Iraqi) and Afghan origin among boat
people is clear. A more detailed cumulative breakdown is available for the 1989-2000 period and this
is presented in Table 31 and it will be noticed at that stage that Asians dominated but they have been
swamped in the last two years by Afghans and Iraqis.
It is apparent that Australia has now been targeted by people smugglers who have been
active in facilitating undocumented migration in other parts of the world (especially North America
and Europe) for many years. The proliferation of the global international migration industry has a
major illegal element which is becoming stronger over time and more widespread in its activity so that
it is becoming one of the most substantial areas of international crime. Moreover, large international
crime syndicates, including many involved in the international drug trade, are becoming increasingly
involved. Until recently Australia has not been a major target of this activity but it is clear that this has
now changed and that we can expect more undocumented migrant arrivals.
Many of the undocumented migrants that came to Australia in the early and mid 1990s came
from Fujian province in Southern China which has long been a source area for Chinese migrants
travelling all over the world. It is an area where there is a great deal of activity of people smugglers
and there are strong linkages with North America and Europe. However, it is apparent that there are
also syndicates working to send migrants to Australia from South Asia and the Middle East and
Southeast Asia has become an important transit point for these migrants. Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and
Pnom Penh have been important but Indonesia has been a key transit area. For example, the .XSDQJ
3RVW (23 June 1999) in Eastern Indonesia reported the detection of around 130 young men from East
Java destined to travel by fishing boat to Australia to gain work on the Olympic Games site in Sydney.
Their travel had been arranged by an informal recruiter and reflects the crucial role that the
immigration industry plays in the undocumented migration. Since then there has been a build up of
several thousand such undocumented migrants in Indonesia who intend to go to Australia.
Australias policy of detention of all undocumented arrivals has been the subject of much
attention in 2000. To quote from DIMA (2000f):
x

Australias Migration Act 1958 requires that all non-Australians who are unlawfully in
Australia must be detained and that, unless they are granted permission to remain in
Australia, they must be removed from Australia as soon as practicable.

This practice is consistent with the fundamental legal principle, accepted in Australian
and international law, that in terms of national sovereignty, the State determines which
non-citizens are admitted or permitted to remain and the conditions under which they
may be removed.

The Government seeks to minimise the period of time taken to process applications made
by detainees and hence the period of detention. The majority of people in immigration
detention are held for a short time in some cases as little as a few hours. However a
number of factors can contribute to increased periods in detention, including court
appeals and delays in the procurement of travel documents for removal.

Australias treatment of asylum seekers has attracted some criticism from international
organisations, refugee lobby groups, church groups and human rights groups. These criticisms have
included the following:

113

Attention was drawn to the fact that persons who are unauthorised arrivals are treated
differently to overstayers who are generally not put in detention centres.

Some have suggested that it is in breach of fundamental human rights.

There have been allegations of poor conditions in the centres which have been drawn
attention to by hunger strikes, protests, demonstrations and breakouts of the camps.
There have been reports of sexual abuse in the camps.

Delays in the determination of refugee status.

Attention has been focused, too, on the fact that the bulk of unauthorised arrivals who are
granted entry are being given a TPV valid for three years. This has in effect created two classes of
refugee settlers in Australia although the TPV holders can apply for permanent settlement before their
visa expires if repatriation is not possible. The granting of TPVs, rather than being granted full refugee
status, is part of the governments policy of deterring more onshore claimants for asylum especially
that associated with people smuggling. The TPV holders do not have access to the same rights as those
granted full refugee status and allowed to settle in Australia. While they do have the right to work,
access to health care and had access to a special benefit for income support, they do not receive the
full package of benefits available to refugees settling in Australia under the offshore program. They
also had no automatic right of return to Australia if they leave the country. This lesser access to
services is also part of the policy to dissuade other potential onshore applicants from travelling to
Australia.
The government has adopted a number of strategies to deter people from entering Australia
without authorisation to claim asylum. This involves visits by the Minister of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs in major origin areas, information programs in those areas as well as providing
differential treatment to asylum seekers than offshore refugee and humanitarian arrivals. The TPV is
intended to not give people a migration outcome while Australian maintains its protection obligations.
In 1998-99 there were 3,574 unlawful non-citizens admitted to Australias immigration
detention facilities with a total of 201,205 detainee days. The scale of detention activities increased
substantially in 1999-2000 as Table 32 indicates. The number of detention centres has increased and
they are generally located in more remote parts of the nation. The costs of detention to the Australian
community are considerable. Crock (2000, p. 7) reports that the Australian budget for 2000-01
allocated A$130 million to the immigration portfolio for detention and associated compliance costs.
The outcomes regarding the 8,882 boat people who arrived in Australia over the last decade
is shown in Table 33. It will be noted that some 45.8% have been granted entry to Australia although
31.5% had Temporary Resident Visas and only 13.6% had been given permanent resident status. More
than a third (36.5%) had been repatriated.
There was a major shift in Australian immigration policy in late August 2001 when 438
asylum seekers were rescued from a sinking Indonesian vessel by the Norwegian freighter M.V.
Tampa. The freighter changed course to take the asylum seekers to Australia but the government
refused them entry, transferred the asylum seekers to a navy ship and took them to Nauru in the
Pacific where their claims were processed. Hitherto, asylum seekers detected en route to Australia or
on Australian islands between Indonesia and the Australian mainland were automatically taken to
Australia where they were put in detention centres to await processing of their claim for asylum. The
new pacific solution was accompanied by a government attack on the people smugglers who

114

facilitated the movement. Moreover, government rhetoric stressed the characterisation of the asylum
seekers as queue jumpers and illegal immigrants (Hawksley, 2001).
Although the new government policy came under severe attack internationally and from
prominent Australians from both conservative and more progressive sides of politics, there can be no
question that a majority of the Australian public supported it. Polls taken in the week after the 7DPSD
affair indicated that three quarters of Australians supported the decision to refuse entry to the asylum
seekers and the Prime Ministers handling of the situation (Betts, 2001, p. 42). Prior to the 7DPSD
incident the conservative government had been lagging in the opinion polls in the lead up to the
national election to be held on 10 November. In July, support for the government was at 40% while
that for the main opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) was at 47% (Paul, 2001, pp. 24-25). The
government pushed the issue to the forefront of election campaign discussion and there can be no
doubt that the governments position on asylum seekers was responsible for the government assuming
leadership in the pre-election polls.
The Australian government justified its change in asylum seeker policy as follows (Ruddock,
2001, p. 2):
x

The number of unauthorised boat arrivals in 1999-2001 was 8,316 compared with 4,114
in the previous two years.

The shift in the nationality profile away from Asian to Middle East origins.

More than 80% in the last two years claimed asylum compared with 46%.

People smuggling has increased in significance with Indonesia now becoming the main
staging point for people arriving from the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Critics argued that the government had cynically exploited fears about security and the
integrity of national borders to enhance its chances in the impending federal election.
5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVUHJDUGLQJKLJKO\VNLOOHGZRUNHUV
Section 3.6 of this report has given some details of the workforce characteristics of
international migration. It was noted there that there has been an increased focus on skill in selection
of permanent migration to Australia. It was shown that while the skill profile of permanent movement
out of Australia is slightly higher than that of permanent movement into the country there is a net gain
of skilled people through permanent migration. However, significantly higher skill profiles were
recorded among temporary business arrivals. The Temporary Business Visa category was introduced
in 1996 and as DIMA (2000a, p. 48) points out:
The employer sponsored temporary business visas allow employers to fill skill
shortages from overseas and assess new ideas, skills and technology. The visa holders
tend to be highly skilled and have relatively high income levels and therefore able to
contribute to economic growth through improved productivity and increased demand
for goods and services. The entry of managers and skilled specialists under these
categories can also enhance Australias ability to compete in international markets.
In 1999-2000 a total of 35,006 Temporary Resident Business Visas were granted an
increase of 5.5% over 1998-99. The breakdown of occupations was as follows:

115

Professionals: 43%
Associate Professionals: 24%
Managers/Administrators: 24%
Trades and Related Workers: 4%
Other: 5%
In fact, the top five specific occupations were computing professionals (12.6%), self
employed (10.4), general managers (8.3), accountants (5.1) and chefs (4.4). The main countries of
origin are as follows:
United Kingdom: 23%
USA: 10%
India: 8%
South Africa: 7%
Japan: 6%
China: 4%
Canada: 3%
Ireland: 3%
Indonesia: 3%
France: 2%
There are three other categories of skilled temporary residents:
x

Temporary Resident Medical Practitioners are recruited to fill area of need positions
often for regional and remote areas. In 1999-2000, 2,515 visas were issued 1,419
principal applicants and 1,096 dependents. The main origins are South Africa (19%),
Indonesia (15), UK (14), China (8), Singapore (6), Hong Kong (3), Taiwan (3), USA (3),
Malaysia (2) and Germany (2).

Educational Temporary Resident Visas were granted to 1,700 people to fill academic,
teaching and research positions that cannot be filled within the Australian labour market.

Independent Executives come under a non-sponsored temporary visa that enables a

person to enter Australia for the purpose of establishing or buying into a business and
managing that business. In 1999-2000, 3937 independent visas were granted. The main
countries of origin were South Africa (19%), Indonesia (15), UK (14), China (8),
Singapore (6), Hong Kong (3), Taiwan (3), USA (3), Malaysia (3) and Germany (3).

The move toward a more skilled migrant intake is evident in census data relating to overseasborn persons resident in Australia for less than five years. Table 34 shows the educational level of
recent migrants at the 1981, 1986 and 1996 censuses. This shows a clear pattern of improvement in the
educational profile. It will be noted, however, that the increased shares are concentrated in the
degree/diploma sectors increasing from 14.2% of recent migrant workers in 1981 to 36.5% in 1996.
On the other hand, the proportion with certificates fell from 19.7 to 12.1% due to the reduction of the
significance of manufacturing in the economy over the last two decades. Because of shifting
classification systems it is less possible to show shifts in the occupational profile over the same period.
Nevertheless, Table 35 shows the increasing representation of professionals among recent migrant
workers.
An increasing proportion of Australias skilled migrant workers involves onshore approval
with persons entering Australia under some other visa category and then applying to settle in the
116

country. This process has been made easier in recent times for some groups. For example, overseas
students who graduate from Australian universities can readily gain entry with their qualifications not
having to be assessed. The Assessment of Qualifications of immigrants is an issue of concern. The
degree to which there is a formal necessity to have qualifications assessed varies with the type of skill
of the immigrant. In some areas (e.g. information technology) there is little professional regulation
while in others (e.g. doctors) there is a high level of professional assessment and regulation.

,VVXHVDQGSROLF\TXHVWLRQVUHJDUGLQJVNLOOHGPLJUDWLRQ
Immigration issues are large in Australia, although there are variations from time to time in
the particular issues raised and the heat which they generate. The level and nature of skilled migration
to Australia is recognised as an important one in the Australian labour market and in national society
and politics more generally. In this section we will briefly mention some of the major issues relating to
skilled migration which are of contemporary concern in Australia:
)LUVWO\, the balance between family and humanitarian elements of the nations Immigration
Program, on the one hand, and the skilled/economic part of the program is a controversial issue. There
has been a major shift in the last five years toward skilled migration. This is not only evident in the
Permanent Migration Program but one must add the explosion of temporary migration to the skilled
migration side of the balance. There are strong lobby groups in Australia for this change (e.g.
governments, national and state, employers etc.) but there are also groups who believe there needs to
be a shift back towards family and humanitarian migration (ethnic lobby groups, non-government
organisations etc.).
6HFRQGO\, there is a debate as to the extent to which an emphasis on skilled migration and an
increase in the proportion of the skilled labour force who are overseas-born migrants is being used as a
substitute for training the native workforce to adapt to the human resource needs of the economy. This
is a longstanding debate in Australia but has gathered importance in recent times. Birrell (2000), for
example, has showed how in the rapidly expanding IT area there has not been an adequate training
response to the exponential increase in demand. The criticism here is in terms of the nation having an
excessive reliance on other countries for the workforce of strategically crucial areas of the economy.
Another dimension relates to the failure to give the native population an opportunity to participate in
the new economy and their relegation to unemployment or a marginal position in the economy.
Ideally, skilled migration should be combined with appropriate expansion of training activities in
government policy but many argue that too often skilled migration is used as a substitute for training.
7KLUGO\, there are important issues relating to recognition of qualifications obtained in other
countries. There is a longstanding problem among permanent migrants settling in Australia of people
not having their qualifications recognised in Australia by employers, professional associations or
governments (e.g. see Kunz 1988). There have been a range of developments to improve the degree in
which qualifications obtained overseas can be regarded as equivalent or better to those obtained in
Australia (Iredale, 1997). There are considerable variations between particular areas of skill in the
extent to which there are requirements for formal recognition of qualifications and the extent to which
such recognition is required. For example, there are strong and extensive requirements for medical
practitioners while there is less demands placed on IT workers. However, it is important to point out
that in the Temporary Migration Stream there is no requirement for qualifications to be recognised.
They simply have to be nominated by a future employer.
)RXUWKO\, it is argued by some that foreign-born workers experience discrimination in the labour
market. Australia and its states and territories have a strong battery of anti-discrimination legislation.
Nevertheless, it is clear that such discrimination can still operate in an informal way so that it is not
117

readily detectable and able to be directly addressed. As Australia has become more multicultural it
would appear that the extent of discrimination has declined.
)LIWKO\, there are some concerns that under the Temporary Entry Program the workers are tied to
the employer who sponsors them. Indeed, there is some evidence that employers are turning away
from the Employer Nominated Scheme (ENS) element in the Permanent Settlement Program and
using instead the 457 Temporary Entry category to attract skilled workers because under the former
workers are not tied to employment with their sponsor and under the latter they are. There is a danger
that tied workers can be possibly exploited by employers because of this. There is no evidence of this
occurring in Australia, although there is in the United States (Martin and Lowell 2000). There is some
concern, too, that such tied workers may be preferred by employers than native workers with the
same skills.
6L[WKO\, there is some concern that training and education in Australia in certain areas in
significant demand in the New Economy (e.g. information technology) is being oriented too far toward
overseas students and not sufficient places in this training is being provided to Australian students
(e.g. see Birrell, 2000). The recent changes to allow foreign students who graduate from Australian
universities to stay on and work in Australia are relevant in this context. Certainly, foreign students
have concentrated in areas of training which represent parts of the labour market which are expanding
rapidly.
6HYHQWKO\, there are some concerns raised about the role of recruitment agents in the whole
process of attracting foreign skilled workers. There is no doubt that there is increasing competition
between destination countries for workers with skills which are particularly in demand. Recently, for
example, there has been a scramble to attract Indian IT workers to a range of destinations. This has
given an expanded role to intermediaries, migration lawyers, recruitment agents etc. and they have
become an increasingly strong lobby group to modify immigration regulations and to ease the entry of
skilled immigrants into Australia.
(LJKWKO\, there is an emerging area of concern in Australia which relates to the emigration of
skilled workers which was discussed earlier in this paper. A recently introduced Innovation Program
announced by the federal government had, as one of its objectives, to stem the flow of skilled young
Australians overseas. It has been argued (Hugo et al. 2001) that there is little value in governments
attempting to stop recent graduates seeking to work overseas. Indeed, it is argued that this could even
be encouraged to allow young Australians to broaden and extend their expertise and experience and
indeed expand and strengthen Australias global linkages, especially in the economic sphere. On the
other hand, there may be value in the nation having policies which:
 encourage overseas skilled Australians to maintain strong linkages with Australia;
 bring back skilled Australians later in their careers to contribute to the economic
development of the nation.
A final issue relates to the relationship between temporary migration and permanent
migration. In Australia there can be no doubt that there has been a policy shift toward non-permanent
migration in attracting skilled workers. Certainly to some extent, this reflects the fact that many skilled
labour markets are international and a Temporary Migration Program in many ways is better fitted to
competing globally for skilled workers in these international labour markets than the longstanding
Settlement Migration Program. Moreover, it is clear that some of the non-permanent entrants under the
457 Program eventually decide to stay in Australia and apply for permanent entry. This is certainly the

118

case in the United States where gaining temporary entry can be part of a deliberate strategy of
migrants to eventually achieve permanent settlement (Martin and Lowell, 2000).
However, there are those who suggest that the expansion of the Skilled Worker Temporary
Entrant Program has undermined the skilled worker part of the Permanent Settlement Immigration
Program. There are definitely perceived advantages to the Temporary Migrant Worker Program in that
Australia does not have to pay for the training of the worker and workers who are not needed at the
end of their contract can be returned to the place of origin. However, the nation may have other goals
in its Immigration Program other than to fill gaps in the labour market and the temporary movement
may not contribute toward achieving these goals. Do temporary skilled workers lack commitment to
national development, invest in housing and other elements of social infrastructure, do they repatriate
their earnings to their home area etc.? This issue becomes of particular importance when nations have
replacement migration (United Nations, 2000) goals in their migration programs. That is, in the face
of declining and ageing populations in many OECD nations they may be anticipating that migration
can offset some of the detrimental effects of a declining workforce and a dependency ratio between the
working age and non-working elderly population. Temporary skilled migrants are unlikely to have a
major impact in this area, although they certainly will pay taxes while working in Australia and hence
contribute toward the support of the older generation. Nevertheless, the bulk of these workers will not
bring families with them and will not contribute toward affecting the ageing of the population.
6RFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ
The situation in Australia with respect to social integration of immigrants was discussed in
detail in a paper prepared for this meeting in 2000 (Hugo, 2000). This section merely seeks to briefly
update the material presented in that paper. Australias fundamental policy of multiculturalism has not
changed in the last twelve months. In updating some of the measures of integration Table 36 shows the
changes which have occurred in the Australian labour force according to birthplace in the last 12
months. The workforce has grown by 1.2% among the Australia-born, 1.1% for those born in NonEnglish Speaking (NES) countries and 1.7% among those born in Mainly English Speaking (MES)
nations. Unemployment rates rose for all three groups and were the highest among immigrants from
NES origins and participation rates remained lower among immigrants than the Australia-born,
especially those from NES backgrounds. Participation rates increased for Australia-born females but
declined for the female overseas-born groups and declined for males among the Australia-born but
increased for the male overseas-born immigrant groups. The patterns of occupations and industry
discussed in the previous report also applied in 2001.
The lower rates of labour force participation and higher unemployment among the NES
origin groups is closely related to proficiency in English (Wooden HWDO., 1994). This is well reflected
in Figure 17. It will also be noticed in the diagram that the unemployment rates tends to decline with
length of residence in Australia reflecting improved English language knowledge and greater
experience and knowledge of the Australian labour market. DIMA (2000a, p. 63) points out that initial
high rates of unemployment partly reflect the difficulty experienced by all new entrants to the labour
market. There is also a clear difference in the levels of unemployment among different immigrant
entry schemes which reflects language ability, skill level and qualifications. Hence Figure 18 shows
that unemployment rates are least in the skilled migration scheme, next greatest among family
migrants and highest among refugee and humanitarian migrants
Another dimension of adjustment which attracts attention in Australia is the extent to which
immigrants use the extensive social security system (Wooden HWDO., 1994). An analysis made by
Birrell and Jupp (DIMA, 2000a, p. 63) found that overall immigrants have lower levels of welfare
usage than the Australia-born for each age group. Figure 19 shows that there are variations with the
119

period of residence. The level varies between birthplace groups and it is highest among immigrants
unable to speak English.
A previous report (Hugo, 2000a, p. 19) gave details of citizenship in Australia. Overseasborn persons who gain Australian citizenship have the same rights as the Australia-born and settlers
can apply for citizenship after two years residence in Australia. DIMA (2000a, p. 36) reports that there
has been a downward trend in citizenship conferrals from a high of 130,312 in 1989-90. There was a
drop from 76,474 in 1998-99 to 70,836 in 1999-2000 and DIMA (2000a, p. 32) puts this down to
reductions in the immigration intake in the 1990s. While this undoubtedly is true it also reflects an
increasing pattern of movement to Australia being of a non-permanent nature. This is especially the
case among highly skilled immigrants, many of whom do not see their long-term future in Australia.
This is reflected, for example, in the data on movers with Information Technology qualifications
discussed in the previous section.
The previous paper (Hugo, 2000a, pp. 23-25) discussed the issue of racism in Australia.
There have not been any major developments in this area over the last year. Australia has strong antiracial vilification and discrimination laws but racism exists nevertheless. One development since the
last paper has been in public opinion polls regarding the scale of immigration into Australia. Goot
(2000, p. 16) has argued that there has been a discernible shift in attitudes toward immigration in
Australia:
Until a couple of years ago, around two-thirds of those interviewed said that
immigration levels were too highsurveys conducted in 1998 and 1999, however,
suggest that opinion is now more equally divided.
Figure 20 presents data from a range of sources on attitudes to immigration between 1951
and 1999 in Australia and they appear to show a downturn in the numbers who feel that immigration
levels are too high. Whether or not this shift is real, however, has been strongly contested by Betts
(2000) who argues that quite different methodologies have been used in the recent polls than in
previous polls and that one should be wary of comparing results from quite different polls and surveys.
One interesting development over recent years in Australia has been an increase in the
numbers of persons who apply for and gain residence in Australia as onshore applicants. Figure 21
shows the levels of onshore applications accepted for immigration have been substantial in the 1990s
despite the fact that overall immigration went down. Indeed 1999-2000 saw the second largest number
of onshore applicants accepted for immigration with 17,340 being accepted, 15.2% larger than in
1998-99. It will be noted that more than one-half (50.5%) of onshore applications accepted were
approved on spouse grounds.
The major issues relating to immigration and settlement which have attracted public debate
in the last years related to issues of compliance with immigration regulations and the detention of
undocumented immigrants arriving in Australia who are detected by immigration authorities. The
government has a policy of detaining all non-Australians who are unlawfully in Australia. These
include (DIMA, 2000f):
x

People who have overstayed their visas or breached conditions of their visas.

People who have arrived at airports or by sea without visas,

 while claims for asylum are processed,
 while they await repatriation.

120

There are currently six such detention centres, several in relatively remote parts of Australia,
and in March 2000 there were 3,622 people in the detention camps. The numbers in these centres has
been around this level throughout 1999 and 2000.
The detention of boat people seeking asylum came under scrutiny in the last 12 months.
Many NGOs have criticised the policy, the conditions in the detention camps and the delays in
processing the claims for refugee status among the detainees. The detention camps have been in the
news due to breakouts, hunger strikes, riots and as yet unsubstantiated accounts of abuse of children
by other inmates. Some have argued for open detention of asylum seekers, or at least women and
children among them but this is being resisted by the government. The opposition is calling for a
judicial inquiry into the detention centres but it is likely that a change in government would still see a
retention of the detention centres (an election is due in 2001).
Australias policy of multiculturalism had its origin in the early 1970s. Australian policy on
settlement of immigrants in Australia was assimilationist from the origin of the Australian nation in
1901 until the mid 1960s. It was integrationist for the next decade but in the 1970s the policy of
multiculturalism had been established. Australian multiculturalism has been defined by the
government as follows (DIMA, 2000g, p. 1):
Multicultural is a term that describes the cultural and linguistic diversity of
Australian society. It recognises that Australia is, and will remain, a culturally diverse
country.
Australian Multiculturalism is the term used to describe the public policies that manage
the consequences of this diversity in the interests of the individual and society as a whole. The
Australian Government is committed to a multicultural policy that recognises the social,
cultural and economic benefits of the nations diversity and seeks to ensure that it is a positive
force for Australia.
This policy was restated, developed and refocused in December 1999 when $1HZ$JHQGD
IRU 0XOWLFXOWXUDO $XVWUDOLD was published and this effectively became the governments policy
statement about multiculturalism. The agenda (DIMA, 2000g, p. 1):
Emphasises that multicultural policies and programs should be built on the foundation
of Australias democratic system, using the following core principles, to ensure that
multicultural Australia continues to flourish for the good of all Australians:
x

FLYLFGXW\, which obliges all Australians to support those basic structures and principles
of Australian society which guarantee us our freedom and equality and enable diversity
in our society to flourish;

FXOWXUDOUHVSHFW, which, subject to the law, gives all Australians the right to express their
own culture and beliefs and obliges them to accept the right of others to do the same;

VRFLDOHTXLW\, which entitles all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity so

that they are ale to contribute to the social, political and economic life of Australia, free
from discrimination, including on the grounds of race, culture, religion, language,
location, gender or place of birth; and

SURGXFWLYHGLYHUVLW\, which maximises for all Australians the significant cultural, social
and economic dividends arising from the diversity of our population.

121

The governments most recent statement on racial tolerance was on 30 October 1996 when
(DIMA, 2000g, p. 2):
The Prime Minister, Mr. Howard, moved a Parliamentary Statement on Racial
Tolerance, in the Australian Parliaments House of Representatives. The statement
read: That this House:
x

reaffirms its commitment to the right of all Australians to enjoy equal rights and be
treated with equal respect regardless of race, colour, creed or origin;

reaffirms its commitment to maintaining its immigration policy wholly nondiscriminatory on grounds of race, colour, creed or origin;

reaffirms its commitment to the process of reconciliation with Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people, in the context of redressing their profound social and economic
disadvantage;

reaffirms its commitment to maintain Australia as a culturally diverse, tolerant and open
society, united by an overriding commitment to our nation and its democratic institutions
and values; and

denounces racial intolerance in any form as incompatible with the kind of society we are
and want to be.

The statement was supported by the Opposition Leader, Kim Beazley, and carried unanimously.
3ROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
Australia has a federal government Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(DIMA) which plays the dominant role in the nation in developing policy relating to immigration and
settlement in Australia although the ultimate authority is the Parliament of Australia. The Migration
Act of 1958 and the Migration Regulations set out in detail the migration laws (DIMA, 2000h, p. 1)
which are administered by the Minister of Immigration and Cultural Affairs and the Department. The
Migration Act can only be amended if changes are passed by both Houses of the Australian
Parliament. DIMA is represented overseas in 62 countries and sees its efforts in the next two years
directed to delivering two main outcomes (DIMA, 2000h, p. 1):
x

the lawful and orderly entry and stay of people,

a society which values Australian citizenship, appreciates cultural diversity and enables
migrants to participate equitably.

There is a considerable apparatus set up which delivers a wide range of services in Australia
and overseas. DIMA has 6 divisions which reflect the range of its activities:
x

Migration and Temporary Entry responsible for planning and administering Australias
annual migrant intake.

Border Control and Compliance Division responsible for maintaining the integrity of
Australias borders and for action against people who try to enter Australia unlawfully or
fail to comply with visa conditions.
122

Refugee and Humanitarian Division provides advice to governments on size and

composition of Refugee and Humanitarian program.

Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship Division provides and correlates policy advice
and arranges services relating to multicultural affairs, settlement and citizenship.

Parliamentary and Legal Division.

Corporate Governance Division.

Each year the government sets planning levels for each of the components of the Migration
and Humanitarian programs. These are established after the Minister has consulted with a wide range
of stakeholders (state governments, other federal government departments, unions, non-government
organisations, ethnic community groups etc.). Usually a consultation is held in each state each year.
The major national government department agencies involved in the decision making5
process with respect to migration are as follows:
DIMA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
PM&C Prime Ministers and Cabinet
FACS Family and Community Services
HAC Health and Aged Care
DEWRSB Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business
DOFA Finance and Administrative Services
DFAT Foreign Affairs and Trade
The Treasury
DEYA Education and Youth Affairs
The main process involving these groups is an inter-departmental committee chaired by
DIMA which meets twice or more in the lead-up to consideration of the annual Migration and
Humanitarian programs by the Cabinet. There are also a range of bilateral consultations between
DIMA and the individual agencies, especially DFAT on proposed policy changes. There are also
consultations with the governments of Australias six states and two territories through the Ministerial
Cabinet of Ministers for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (MIMA) and through an associated
committee of officials from the Commonwealth, States and Territories (SCIMA).
As indicated earlier, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs also conducts
annual consultations on the Immigration program through issuing a discussion paper, calling for
written submissions, holding public meetings in each of the capital cities and a range of regional
centres (varying from year to year), the holding of meetings with peak bodies in the immigration area
and the holding of on-line discussion forums. The key elements considered include:
x
5

Estimated demand for migration places especially in demand driven categories such as
spouses and fiancs and business skills, employer nominated schemes (ENS).

Much of the material in the remainder of the paper was supplied by Mr. John Ryan of the Department of
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

123

The balance between the skill and family streams.

Skill shortages in Australia.

The economic, social and environmental impacts of immigration.

There is also a range of discussions on refugee and humanitarian issues.

124

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At sea
Not stated
7RWDO

4 170
13 086

37 058

6 479


244 318





2 863
205
368 776



* Included with Hong Kong in 1986.

6RXUFH: ABS 1986, 1991 and 1996 Censuses.

128

RI
RYHUVHDV
ERUQ


0.02
0.01
0.14
0.01
0.44
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.05
1.43
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.23
0.03
0.06


5DQN



123
139
73
135
43
131
148
86
92
17
97
103
85
62
104
89


6HWWOHU
/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
38
46
207
0.1
0.4
0.5
1356
43
70
4.2
0.3
0.2
1013
517
5656
3.1
4.0
13.6
87
31
98
0.3
0.2
0.2
1107
1683
5713
3.4
13.0
13.7
598
58
83
1.8
0.4
0.2
4116
579
695
12.7
4.5
1.7
650
667
4543
2.0
5.2
10.9
799
239
1771
2.5
1.8
4.2
5097
461
616
15.7
3.6
1.5
3708
1369
2798
11.5
10.6
6.7
4135
4539
4042
12.8
35.1
9.7
527
226
7350
1.6
1.7
17.6

6RXUFH: DIMA Overseas Arrivals and Departures (OAD) Data.

Japan

Hong Kong

China

Vietnam

Thailand

Singapore

Philippines

Myanmar

Malaysia

Laos

Indonesia

Cambodia

Brunei


No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

<HDUV 
%LUWKSODFH


67UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV
715
0.2
2545
0.8
14552
4.8
1957
0.6
43096
14.1
2364
0.8
27741
9.1
13962
4.6
5567
1.8
31427
10.3
41932
13.7
45281
14.8
5876
1.9

129

67YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
3448
0.2
1781
0.1
113923
6.7
630
0.0
114203
6.7
1410
0.1
26689
1.6
151736
8.9
72360
4.2
8144
0.5
81888
4.8
73409
4.3
744990
43.5

3HUPDQHQW
GHSDUWXUHV
5
0.5
12
0.6
122
8.7
18
1.3
192
14.3
7
0.5
172
10.3
79
5.8
74
5.4
268
18.2
703
45.7
671
49.9
73
4.8

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\

/7UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH
58
0.6
31
0.3
323
3.3
24
0.2
1417
14.6
52
0.5
455
4.7
565
5.8
184
1.9
305
3.1
1176
12.1
3131
32.3
219
2.3


/7YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH
107
0.4
18
0.1
3156
11.2
65
0.2
2933
10.4
52
0.2
941
3.3
1210
4.3
1411
5
473
1.7
3754
13.3
2876
10.2
5761
20.5


67UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH
1054
0.3
3685
1.1
15531
4.6
2028
0.6
44556
13.3
2460
0.7
27777
8.3
14871
4.4
5912
1.8
34870
10.4
47614
14.2
51597
15.4
8530
2.5

$33(1',;% 029(0(176%(7:((1$6,$1&28175,(6$1'$8675$/,$

67YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH
3426
0.2
1621
0.1
110889
6.5
664
0
116163
6.9
1424
0.1
26076
1.5
153055
9
71968
4.2
7130
0.4
71043
4.2
75024
4.4
740317
43.7

9104
0.2
11162
0.3
265683
6.4
5602
0.1
331064
7.9
8508
0.2
115241
2.8
341337
8.2
160286
3.8
88792
2.1
255985
6.1
264705
6.3
1513868
36.3

7RWDO

No.
%

Korea-Republic
No.
of
%
Macao
No.
%
Mongolia
No.
%
Taiwan
No.
%
Afghanistan
No.
%
Bangladesh
No.
%
Bhutan
No.
%
India
No.
%
Maldives
No.
%
Nepal
No.
%
Pakistan
No.
%
Sri Lanka
No.
%
Total
No.
%

Korea-People
Rep

<HDUV 
%LUWKSODFH

3908
12.1
2
0.0
54
0.2
598
1.8
1953
6.0
32376
100.0

666
2.1
68
0.2
1
0.0
794
2.5
392
1.2
709
2.2

11
0.1
135
1.0
496
3.8
12929
100.0

511
4.0
17
0.1
78
0.6
2
0.0
918
7.1

225
1.7
78
0.6

3094
7.4
77
0.2
29
0.1
1768
4.2
2
0.0
196
0.5
11
0.0
1648
4.0
80
0.2
276
0.7
293
0.7
591
1.4
41707
100.0
24194
7.9
2
0.0
140
0.0
1880
0.6
12694
4.2
305792
100.0

19276
6.3
813
0.3
960
0.3

7417
2.4
1400
0.5

130

139567
8.2
2573
0.2
125
0.0
136121
8.0
190
0.0
926
0.1
69
0.0
25858
1.5
289
0.0
561
0.0
2925
0.2
8304
0.5
1712195
100.0

77
0.0
108
6.9
21
1.6
0
0.0
170
11.5
14
0.6
16
0.7
0
0.0
134
8.8
0
0.0
1
0.0
15
0.9
43
2.9
2918
100.0

0
0.0

670
6.9
1
0.0
7
0.1
118
1.2
394
4.1
9699
100.0

231
2.4
14
0.1
75
0.8

191
2.0
58
0.6

2523
9.0
50
0.2
3
0.0
1107
3.9
6
0.0
115
0.4
9
0.0
800
2.8
29
0.1
77
0.3
243
0.9
409
1.5
28128
100.0
23454
7.0
54
0.0
92
0.0
2225
0.7
15162
4.5
334694
100.0

9225
2.8
1812
0.5
10
0.0
20392
6.1
732
0.2
1052
0.3

136329
8.0
2697
0.2
103
0.0
139776
8.2
278
0
897
0.1
61
0.0
25236
1.5
327
0.0
456
0.0
2541
0.1
6938
0.4
1694457
100.0

18
0.0

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\








6HWWOHU
/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU 67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW /7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU 67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
GHSDUWXUHV
GHSDUWXUH
GHSDUWXUH
GHSDUWXUH
GHSDUWXUH

299345
7.2
8834
0.2
271
0.0
320147
7.7
2459
0.1
5023
0.1
151
0.0
106820
2.6
784
0.0
1674
0.0
10973
0.3
46984
1.1
4174896
100.0

94
0.0

7RWDO

1793

4.5

No.

Indonesia

448

1.1

No.

Myanmar

736

1.9

No.

Thailand

No.
%

11
593
1.5

%
No.
%

Japan

Korea-Dem
people

4361

No.

Hong Kong

11247
28.5

No.
%

China

3567
9.0

No.
%

Vietnam

841
2.1

No.
%

Singapore

3232
8.2

No.
%

Philippines

1081
2.7

No.
%

Malaysia

63
0.2

No.
%

Laos

1357
3.4

No.
%

Cambodia

32.2
268
2.1

4202

1660
12.7

473
3.6

1.9

248

626
4.8

648
5.0

0.5

59

1705
13.1

37
0.3

4.1

536

30
0.2

59
0.5

9.4
7398
14.8

4680

3325
6.7

875
1.8

4.2

2121

5320
10.6

722
1.4

0.2

89

6996
14

114
0.2

13.7

6840

76
0.2

269
0.5

18.1
9784
2.7

65549

50114
13.8

37556
10.4

1.8

6357

16145
4.5

28972
8.0

0.8

3028

46457
12.8

2321
0.6

4.6

16719

2553
0.7

712
0.2

131

5.5
816509
40.9

110847

102018
5.1

9495
0.5

3.9

78284

166568
8.3

34944
1.7

0.1

1857

133919
6.7

832
0.0

6.8

136171

1610
0.1

3559
0.2

0
0.0

49.0
91
5.5

783

760
46.0

265
16.1

7.2

104

85
5.8

180
11.1

0.9

10

195
12.7

23
1.4

8.2

122

28
1.7

15
0.6

30.6
234
2.4

3007

1221
12.4

317
3.2

2.1

210

599
6.1

483
4.9

0.5

48

1482
15.1

36
0.4

3.7

366

19
0.2

50
0.5

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\

67YLVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW /7UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV
GHSDUWXUHV GHSDUWXUH
0.0

No.
%

Brunei

29
0.1


67UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV



/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
14


6HWWOHU
DUULYDOV

No.

%LUWKSODFH

SE Asia nfd

<HDUV

2
0.0

9.1
5929
19.5

2745

3189
10.5

699
2.3

5.3

1603

1440
4.7

1018
3.4

0.2

57

3097
10.2

83
0.3

12.4

3747

45
0.1

126
0.4


/7YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH

19.9
9094
2.4

75881

53868
14.1

33166
8.7

1.6

6184

18430
4.8

29405
7.7

0.6

2238

47200
12.4

2383
0.6

4.5

17304

2317
0.6

1304
0.3


67UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH

72
0.0

5.8
818725
41.2

115206

87972
4.4

8859
0.4

3.9

77411

167654
8.4

32773
1.7

0.1

1748

135120
6.8

939
0

6.8

135340

1756
0.1

3148
0.2


67YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH

74
0.0

7.9
1668625
34.2

387261

315373
6.5

95272
2.0

3.6

173258

377708
7.8

132377
2.7

0.2

9582

377252
7.7

6831
0.1

6.5

318938

9791
0.2

9271
0.2

0.0

14

7RWDO

Korea-Republic
of
No.
%
Macao
No.
%
Mongolia
No.
%
Taiwan
No.
%
Afghanistan
No.
%
Bangladesh
No.
%
Bhutan
No.
%
India
No.
%
Maldives
No.
%
Nepal
No.
%
Pakistan
No.
%
Sri Lanka
No.
%
Total
No.
%

60
0.2
603
1.5
1951
4.9
39524
100.0

3700
9.4

704
1.8
124
0.3
1
0
1638
4.1
636
1.6
759
1.9

751
5.8
2
0.0
24
0.2
121
0.9
506
3.9
13048
100.0

671
5.1
23
0.2
94
0.7

233
1.8
72
0.6

4177
8.4
88
0.2
55
0.1
2275
4.6
6
0
244
0.5
19
0.0
2616
5.2
93
0.2
356
0.7
381
0.8
830
1.7
49965
100.0
24816
6.8
4
0.0
136
0.0
2520
0.7
14058
3.9
362743
100.0

22233
6.1
638
0.2
1464
0.4

9527
2.6
1083
0.3

132

199216
10.0
2358
0.1
198
0.0
148475
7.4
450
0
1651
0.1
74
0.0
33159
1.7
220
0.0
921
0.0
4210
0.2
10853
0.5
1998412
100.0

113
7.0
21
1.3
0
0.0
219
15.2
9
0.4
3
0.2
0
0.0
117
6.3
0
0.0
0
0.0
12
0.8
41
2.7
3196
100.0
15
0.2
85
0.9
411
4.2
9833
100.0

684
7.0

231
2.3
5
0.1
71
0.7

208
2.1
51
0.5

3117
10.3
63
0.2
6
0.0
1276
4.2
9
0
126
0.4
4
0.0
1093
3.6
32
0.1
137
0.5
272
0.9
415
1.4
30330
100.0
28386
7.4
1
0.0
286
0.1
2818
0.7
13936
3.7
381575
100.0

22783
6
535
0.1
1709
0.4

10650
2.8
1699
0.4

194099
9.8
2352
0.1
188
0.0
154873
7.8
236
0
1345
0.1
59
0.0
31203
1.6
242
0.0
698
0
3633
0.2
9290
0.5
1984940
100.0

422044
8.7
7910
0.2
448
0.0
354673
7.3
2548
0.1
7466
0.2
156
0.0
126525
2.6
593
0.0
2633
0.1
14654
0.3
52290
1.1
4873567
100.0

No.
%

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

707
2.2

2966
9.2
7761
24.2
3894
12.1
485
1.5

1.8

Korea-Republic
of
No.
%

Korea-Dem
people

Japan

Hong Kong

China

Vietnam

571

No.

2.9

Thailand

925

No.

Singapore

2808
8.8

No.
%

1.2

Philippines

394

No.

3.3

Myanmar

1056

No.

Malaysia

43
0.1

No.
%

5.5

Laos

1750

No.

2.5

Indonesia

800

No.

44
0.1

Cambodia

264
2.0

444
3.4
1886
14.5
3944
30.4
278
2.1

2.0

258

4.9

642

581
4.5

0.4

53

13.1

1700

42
0.3

4.5

586

0.3

37

54
0.4

5480
9.6

1066
1.9
3853
6.7
5261
9.2
8295
14.5

4.3

2459

9.7

5526

743
1.3

0.2

110

13.6

7764

117
0.2

14.4

8202

0.2

117

320
0.6

10136
2.6

39987
10.3
51115
13.2
65523
17.0
9073
2.3

2.0

7716

4.4

16812

30719
8.0

0.6

2336

12.9

49816

2194
0.6

4.7

18247

0.6

2237

1146
0.3

133

255501
12.2

57
0.0

10578
0.5
112608
5.4
110773
5.3
805260
38.3

3.9

82007

8.1

170985

41462
2.0

0.1

1681

7.1

148293

989
0.0

7.2

151873

0.1

1784

3908
0.2

101
4.8

0
0.0

308
16.4
798
43.6
955
54.6
96
5.2

4.6

79

6.3

95

207
10.1

0.5

11

10.8

190

13
0.6

9.2

151

1.7

29

7
0.7

244
2.3

358
3.3
1281
11.9
3232
30.1
232
2.2

1.7

181

6.8

728

518
4.8

0.5

57

15.3

1636

41
0.4

3.8

402

0.4

39

48
0.4

4058
11.3

2
0.0

938
2.6
3913
10.9
3032
8.5
5912
16.5

5.4

1924

4.6

1636

1344
3.7

0.2

64

9.8

3519

91
0.3

12.3

4418

0.3

104

105
0.3

11549
2.8

40291
9.8
55336
13.5
83783
20.5
9395
2.3

1.8

7263

4.2

17268

29846
7.3

0.7

2751

12.3

50555

1888
0.5

4.7

19397

0.7

2899

1034
0.3

250758
11.9

74
0.0

10650
0.5
101938
4.8
126008
6.0
806167
38.3

3.9

81543

8.3

175155

36176
1.7

0.1

1455

7.2

151059

1142
0.1

7.3

152876

0.1

1651

3871
0.2




0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\





6HWWOHU /7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU 67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW /7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU 67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
GHSDUWXUHV GHSDUWXUH
GHSDUWXUH GHSDUWXUH GHSDUWXUH

No.
%

Brunei

%LUWKSODFH

<HDUV 

7RWDO

538799
10.4

133
0.0

107585
2.1
340489
6.6
406405
7.9
1645194
31.9

3.6

184002

7.6

389772

144404
2.8

0.2

8912

8.1

415588

6561
0.1

6.9

357902

0.2

9697

10538
0.2

Total

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

Maldives

India

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Taiwan

Mongolia

Macao

%LUWKSODFH

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

<HDUV 

2681
8.4
2
0.0
50
0.2
623
1.9
1415
4.4
32084
100.0

97
0.3
1
0.0
2180
6.8
350
1.1
481
1.5

743
5.7
1
0.0
10
0.1
157
1.2
494
3.8
12983
100.0

80
0.6
1
0.0
568
4.4
23
0.2
137
1.1

104
0.2
37
0.1
2505
4.4
4
0.0
180
0.3
11
0.0
3132
5.5
126
0.2
346
0.6
550
1.0
833
1.5
57141
100.0
31166
8.1
71
0.0
98
0.0
2930
0.8
16093
4.2
386368
100.0

24493
6.3
969
0.3
2030
0.5

1459
0.4

134

2604
0.1
432
0.0
147025
7.0
296
0.0
1432
0.1
54
0.0
37470
1.8
248
0.0
920
0.0
4039
0.2
10541
0.5
2102818
100.0

25
1.5
0
0.0
261
15.4
9
0.7
7
0.3
0
0.0
147
7.4
0
0.0
7
0.4
27
1.5
64
3.7
3587
100.0
749
7.0
1
0.0
5
0.0
109
1.0
387
3.6
10720
100.0

314
2.9
8
0.1
97
0.9

53
0.5

59
0.2
36
0.1
1561
4.4
11
0.0
155
0.4
11
0.0
1701
4.7
32
0.1
210
0.6
346
1.0
686
1.9
35868
100.0
27758
6.8
2
0.0
160
0.0
2855
0.7
16641
4.1
409517
100.0

2081
0.5
1
0.0
23707
5.8
1128
0.3
1929
0.5

2988
0.1
412
0.0
150391
7.1
388
0.0
1473
0.1
73
0.0
36479
1.7
319
0.0
739
0.0
3377
0.2
9459
0.4
2106623
100.0




0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\





6HWWOHU /7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU 67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW /7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU 67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
GHSDUWXUHV GHSDUWXUH
GHSDUWXUH GHSDUWXUH GHSDUWXUH

9550
0.2
920
0.0
353004
6.8
3187
0.1
7921
0.2
149
0.0
142026
2.8
802
0.0
2545
0.0
15014
0.3
56613
1.1
5157709
100.0

7RWDO

No.
%


No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

Korea-Republic
of
No.
%

Korea-Dem
people

Japan

Hong Kong

China

Vietnam

Thailand

Singapore

Philippines

Myanmar

Malaysia

Laos

Indonesia

Cambodia

%LUWKSODFH
Brunei

<HDUV

596
2.4

6HWWOHU
DUULYDOV
27
0.1
505
2.0
1917
7.6
30
0.1
931
3.7
170
0.7
2769
11
694
2.7
346
1.4
2311
9.2
4338
17.2
3194
12.7
508
2

346
2.4

5285
8.9

/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
52
295
0.4
0.5
68
133
0.5
0.2
809
8448
5.6
14.2
52
101
0.4
0.2
1814
7003
12.6
11.7
49
113
0.3
0.2
693
929
4.8
1.6
707
5553
4.9
9.3
290
2236
2
3.7
560
1240
3.9
2.1
2222
4754
15.5
8.0
3999
5400
27.8
9.1
268
8232
1.9
13.8

10988
2.8

67UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV
1151
0.3
3600
0.9
21880
5.5
1985
0.5
50909
12.8
3161
0.8
31920
8.0
17227
4.3
6654
1.7
41238
10.3
61068
15.3
58508
14.7
10428
2.6

135

136385
7.2

52
0.0

67YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
3784
0.2
2696
0.1
106744
5.6
982
0.1
136191
7.2
1389
0.1
41810
2.2
189547
10
39946
2.1
13095
0.7
118157
6.2
93954
4.9
800051
42.1

127
5.7

0
0.0

3HUPDQHQW
GHSDUWXUHV
14
0.7
41
1.9
219
12
25
1.1
190
9.6
14
0.5
197
8.9
84
4.5
94
3.8
374
16.8
1054
48.6
1023
50.8
115
6.2

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\

223
2.0

/7UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH
76
0.7
64
0.6
350
3.2
40
0.4
1579
14.2
53
0.5
536
4.8
736
6.6
193
1.7
417
3.8
1338
12.0
3175
28.6
264
2.4

5186
12.1

/7YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH
150
0.4
98
0.2
4626
10.8
134
0.3
3659
8.6
96
0.2
2082
4.9
1768
4.1
2135
5.0
1165
2.7
4995
11.7
3407
8.0
6919
16.2

10861
2.7

67UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH
943
0.2
4096
1.0
21669
5.3
2193
0.5
49856
12.3
2999
0.7
33267
8.2
17760
4.4
7076
1.7
38058
9.4
59933
14.7
61715
15.2
9659
2.4

138945
7.3

67YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH
4029
0.2
2913
0.2
111684
5.8
923
0.0
137024
7.2
1811
0.1
37584
2.0
195729
10.2
40137
2.1
11200
0.6
108320
5.7
96117
5.0
806149
42.2

308942
6.5

52
0.0

7RWDO
10521
0.2
14214
0.3
278346
5.8
6465
0.1
389155
8.1
9855
0.2
151787
3.2
429806
9.0
99108
2.1
109658
2.3
366179
7.7
330492
6.9
1642592
34.4

Total

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

Maldives

India

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Taiwan

Mongolia

Macao

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

57
0.2
3
0.0
1518
6
524
2.1
282
1.1
8
0
2786
11.0
1
0.0
36
0.1
435
1.7
1261
5.0
25247
100.0

801
5.6
1
0.0
12
0.1
150
1
497
3.5
14360
100.0

756
5.3
26
0.2
102
0.7

86
0.6

100
0.2
44
0.1
2452
4.1
11
0.0
267
0.4
15
0.0
4719
7.9
123
0.2
332
0.6
848
1.4
1003
1.7
59636
100.0
24405
6.1
1234
0.3
1973
0.5
20
0.0
30107
7.5
60
0.0
235
0.1
3127
0.8
15667
3.9
399075
100.0

1530
0.4

136

2492
0.1
274
0.0
150917
7.9
301
0.0
1745
0.1
50
0.0
44618
2.3
282
0.0
847
0
5114
0.3
10701
0.6
1902122
100.0

23
1.1
0
0.0
261
14.2
10
0.5
18
0.6
0
0.0
180
8.7
0
0.0
2
0.1
26
1.5
51
2.3
4142
100.0
8
0.1
113
1.0
483
4.3
11111
100.0

896
8.1

397
3.6
16
0.1
102
0.9

52
0.5

65
0.2
47
0.1
1754
4.1
19
0.0
226
0.5
9
0.0
2397
5.6
43
0.1
295
0.7
445
1.0
994
2.3
42714
100.0
27756
6.8
1006
0.2
2505
0.6
25
0.0
31765
7.8
1
0.0
220
0.1
3646
0.9
17507
4.3
406706
100.0

2189
0.5

2626
0.1
332
0.0
156611
8.2
523
0.0
1585
0.1
72
0.0
42523
2.2
353
0.0
695
0
4174
0.2
9440
0.5
1911498
100.0

9220
0.2
699
0.0
366827
7.7
3670
0.1
8805
0.2
199
0.0
160791
3.4
863
0.0
2682
0.1
18078
0.4
57604
1.2
4776611
100.0

239
1.8

4335
7.0

2
0.0

/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV
49
280
0.4
0.5
64
146
0.5
0.2
552
8891
4.2
14.3
36
136
0.3
0.2
1298
5986
9.9
9.7
51
144
0.4
0.2
548
1186
4.2
1.9
602
6027
4.6
9.7
226
2357
1.7
3.8
353
1359
2.7
2.2
2180
6853
16.7
11.1
4165
5600
31.9
9.0
212
7613
1.6
12.3

Korea-Republic
No.
of
%

627
2.3

6HWWOHU
DUULYDOV
39
0.1
322
1.2
2491
9.2
41
0.2
1296
4.8
142
0.5
3318
12.2
650
2.4
498
1.8
2137
7.9
6133
22.6
1918
7.1
578
2.1

2
0.0


No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

No.
%

Korea-Dem
people

Japan

Hong Kong

China

Vietnam

Thailand

Singapore

Philippines

Myanmar

Malaysia

Laos

Indonesia

Cambodia

%LUWKSODFH
Brunei

<HDUV 

11059
2.6

275
0.1

67UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV
768
0.2
5284
1.2
22433
5.3
2658
0.6
53684
12.6
3424
0.8
33337
7.8
17691
4.1
8336
2.0
47429
11.1
68347
16
54288
12.7
10918
2.6

137

89551
5.1

54
0.0

67YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
3729
0.2
2866
0.2
88505
5.0
1299
0.1
137635
7.8
2101
0.1
43302
2.4
170669
9.6
51700
2.9
14304
0.8
118583
6.7
87030
4.9
735594
41.6

211
10.6

0
0.0

3HUPDQHQW
GHSDUWXUHV
16
0.3
62
2.1
336
13.7
23
2.4
291
10.1
10
0.2
183
4.3
143
4.6
109
4.8
455
15.9
1427
38.3
1375
50.9
118
3.1

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\

254
2.4

6
0.1

/7UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH
68
0.6
60
0.6
318
3.0
44
0.4
1457
13.8
56
0.5
464
4.4
664
6.3
198
1.9
504
4.8
1358
12.9
2807
26.6
297
2.8

3150
10.7

/7YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH
44
0.1
144
0.5
2875
9.8
87
0.3
2143
7.3
78
0.3
2001
6.8
742
2.5
1626
5.5
1153
3.9
5136
17.4
1721
5.8
3283
11.1

11086
2.6

212
0.0

67UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH
1092
0.3
6019
1.4
23224
5.4
2854
0.7
51017
11.8
2521
0.6
31960
7.4
19851
4.6
9999
2.3
50395
11.7
67595
15.7
57827
13.4
9606
2.2

87829
4.9

110
0.0

67YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH
3589
0.2
2921
0.2
89769
5
1402
0.1
143415
8.0
1580
0.1
39548
2.2
178333
10
50942
2.9
12682
0.7
112730
6.3
94789
5.3
742269
41.6

208341
4.6

661
0.0

7RWDO
9673
0.2
17888
0.4
239394
5.3
8581
0.2
398223
8.7
10107
0.2
155847
3.4
395372
8.7
125992
2.8
130771
2.9
390342
8.6
311521
6.8
1510488
33.1

Total

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

Maldives

India

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Taiwan

Mongolia

Macao

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

56
0.2
1
0.0
1556
5.7
767
2.8
419
1.5
5
0.0
2557
9.4
5
0.0
33
0.1
613
2.3
917
3.4
27119
100.0

699
5.4
2
0.0
5
0.0
166
1.3
438
3.4
13064
100.0

955
7.3
16
0.1
122
0.9

84
0.6

109
0.2
38
0.1
2487
4.0
7
0.0
418
0.7
22
0.0
5610
9.1
125
0.2
332
0.5
665
1.1
1236
2.0
61964
100.0
33560
7.9
74
0.0
521
0.1
3361
0.8
18508
4.3
427150
100.0

26646
6.2
1222
0.3
1992
0.5

1334
0.3

138

2943
0.2
183
0.0
148925
8.4
906
0.1
2266
0.1
61
0.0
49765
2.8
238
0.0
1018
0.1
4096
0.2
12171
0.7
1769494
100.0

26
0.5
0
0.0
516
28.6
8
0.1
19
0.3
0
0.0
193
7.3
0
0.0
2
0.0
24
0.4
75
1.4
5622
100.0
890
8.4
1
0.0
20
0.2
106
1.0
455
4.3
10559
100.0

397
3.8
13
0.1
91
0.9

31
0.3

31
0.1
47
0.2
921
3.1
25
0.1
168
0.6
7
0.0
2453
8.3
38
0.1
284
1.0
443
1.5
870
3.0
29470
100.0

1863
0.4
2
0.0
25497
5.9
1162
0.3
2214
0.5
1
0.0
31624
7.3
3
0.0
238
0.1
3013
0.7
20530
4.8
431407
100.0

2796
0.2
229
0.0
151834
8.5
664
0.0
2445
0.1
87
0.0
47345
2.7
313
0.0
614
0
3897
0.2
11046
0.6
1783177
100.0

9273
0.2
501
0.0
359733
7.9
4789
0.1
10155
0.2
183
0.0
174696
3.8
798
0.0
3067
0.1
16384
0.4
66246
1.5
4559027
100.0

215
1.5

46
0.3
65
0.5
433
3.1
54
0.4
1270
9.1
58
0.4
664
4.8
647
4.6
28
1.6
411
2.9
2443
17.5
4529
32.4
232
1.7

Korea-Republic
No.
of
%

768
2.5

33
0.1
250
0.8
2943
9.5
17
0.1
1771
5.7
156
0.5
3186
10.3
884
2.8
527
1.7
1502
4.8
6809
21.9
1467
4.7
553
1.8

4357
6.2

16
0.0

286
0.4
146
0.2
9477
13.5
164
0.2
6912
9.9
169
0.2
1233
1.8
6478
9.2
2994
4.3
1770
2.5
9330
13.3
6299
9.0
7921
11.3



/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV

5
0.0

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%


6HWWOHU
DUULYDOV

No.
%

Korea-Dem
people

Japan

Hong Kong

China

Vietnam

Thailand

Singapore

Philippines

Myanmar

Malaysia

Laos

Indonesia

Cambodia

Brunei

%LUWKSODFH

<HDUV 

10817
2.4

987
0.2

1260
0.3
5350
1.2
26928
6.0
2737
0.06
54322
12.1
3327
0.7
32951
7.3
19724
4.4
8143
1.8
44989
10.0
74031
16.5
56810
12.7
12101
2.7


67UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV

139

142230
7.5

130
0.0

3724
0.2
3249
0.2
75668
4.0
1774
0.1
163536
8.7
1755
0.1
44493
2.4
196327
10.4
60729
3.2
15112
0.8
140781
7.5
99209
5.3
707219
37.5

191
2.9

8
0.1

12
0.2
65
1.0
447
6.7
30
0.4
315
4.7
18
0.3
220
3.3
180
2.7
130
1.9
458
6.9
1802
27.0
1585
23.8
131
2.0

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\
67YLVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW
DUULYDOV
GHSDUWXUHV

261
2.4

14
0.1

48
0.5
83
0.8
398
3.7
46
0.4
1578
14.8
52
0.5
478
4.5
637
6.0
201
1.9
545
5.1
1424
13.4
2676
25.1
291
2.7


/7UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH

3414
9.5

13
0.0

60
0.2
179
0.5
5400
15.0
106
0.3
2185
6.1
111
0.3
1875
5.2
1067
3.0
1887
5.2
1360
3.8
5442
15.1
2045
5.7
3961
11.0


/7YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH

12991
2.8

538
0.1

1409
0.3
7526
1.6
27412
6
3101
0.7
55553
12.2
2370
0.5
33416
7.3
19068
4.2
8771
1.9
47605
10.4
73670
16.1
57121
12.5
11512
2.5


67UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH

139975
7.4

211
0.0

3563
0.2
3257
0.2
83042
4.4
1473
0.1
168467
8.9
1535
0.1
42454
2.2
203044
10.7
59959
3.1
14610
0.8
139999
7.4
100864
5.3
712246
37.4


67YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH

315219
6.5

1922
0.0

10441
0.2
20170
0.4
232148
4.8
9502
0.2
455909
9.4
9551
0.2
160970
3.3
448056
9.2
143369
2.9
128362
2.6
455731
9.4
332605
6.8
1456167
29.9

7RWDO

Total

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

Maldives

India

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Taiwan

Mongolia

Macao

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

4631
14.9
1
0.0
114
0.4
892
2.9
1280
4.1
31057
100.0

43
0.1
2
0.0
1699
5.5
745
2.4
784
2.5

831
5.9
1
0.0
8
0.1
118
0.8
484
3.5
13974
100.0

77
0.6
1
0.0
1015
7.3
17
0.1
121
0.9

126
0.2
30
0.0
2456
3.5
6
0.0
729
1
20
0.0
6450
9.2
112
0.2
426
0.6
733
1.0
1439
2.1
70084
100.0

1634
0.4
2
0.0
26722
6.0
1429
0.3
2066
0.5
1
0.0
34951
7.8
2
0.0
440
0.1
4209
0.9
21619
4.8
448743
100.0

140

3126
0.2
305
0.0
142529
7.6
793
0.0
3181
0.2
135
0.0
58331
3.1
341
0.0
1138
0.1
4429
0.2
13892
0.7
1886304
100.0
1
0.0
19
0.3
99
1.5
6667
100.0

229
3.4

663
9.9
9
0.1
11
0.2

35
0.5

6
0.1
104
1.0
448
4.2
10658
100.0

872
8.2

337
3.2
14
0.1
93
0.9

39
0.4

30
0.1
55
0.2
898
2.5
18
0.1
235
0.7
12
0.0
3626
10.1
33
0.1
316
0.9
560
1.6
1066
3.0
35961
100.0

1466
0.3
1
0.0
28702
6.3
1446
0.3
1931
0.4
1
0.0
35374
7.7
3
0.0
403
0.1
4892
1.1
19699
4.3
457127
100.0

2736
0.1
279
0.0
143915
7.6
569
0.0
2897
0.2
107
0.0
57716
3.0
468
0.0
925
0.0
4356
0.2
12983
0.7
1903534
100.0

9312
0.2
675
0.0
348936
7.2
5046
0.1
12048
0.2
276
0.0
203011
4.2
961
0.0
3777
0.1
20312
0.4
73009
1.5
4864109
100.0

4068
2.2

Korea-Republic
No.
of
%

210
0.1
4590
2.4
11907
6.4
281
0.1
7242
3.9
1908
1.0
19429
10.4
4644
2.5
3477
1.9
17580
9.4
39996
21.3
18969
10.1
3244
1.7

0
0.0

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%


6HWWOHU
DUULYDOV

No.
%

Korea-Dem
people

Japan

Hong Kong

China

Vietnam

Thailand

Singapore

Philippines

Myanmar

Malaysia

Laos

Indonesia

Cambodia

Brunei

SE Asia nfd

7RWDOWR

%LUWKSODFH


1522
1.9

7
0.0

306
0.4
307
0.4
3433
4.3
252
0.3
9470
11.8
328
0.4
3713
4.6
3891
4.8
1289
1.6
2702
3.4
11760
14.6
25378
31.6
1484
1.8

26728
7.8

18
0.0

1657
0.5
688
0.2
47514
14.0
730
0.2
40374
11.9
708
0.2
5508
1.6
33447
9.8
13938
4.1
6926
2.0
30913
9.1
31282
9.2
46809
13.7



/7UHVLGHQW /7YLVLWRU
DUULYDOV
DUULYDOV

59944
2.6

1262
0.1

5752
0.2
21569
0.9
120759
5.2
13852
0.6
298284
12.8
17640
0.8
185640
8.0
101561
4.4
42773
1.8
242626
10.4
346607
14.9
345959
14.8
58180
2.5


67UHVLGHQW
DUULYDOV

141

962450
8.5

370
0.0

14
0.0
22152
0.2
13986
0.1
672884
5.9
6506
0.1
833777
7.3
10193
0.1
232700
2.0
1045832
9.2
385026
3.4
70728
0.6
674035
5.9
575222
5.1
4609623
40.5

851
3.3

8
0.0

69
0.3
237
0.9
1397
5.3
132
0.5
1373
5.3
70
0.3
1159
4.4
666
2.5
590
2.3
2128
8.1
6544
25.0
6392
24.5
624
2.4

0RYHPHQW&DWHJRU\
67YLVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW
DUULYDOV
GHSDUWXUHV

1381
2.2

20
0.0

348
0.6
296
0.5
2157
3.4
231
0.4
9149
14.6
318
0.5
2934
4.7
3929
6.3
1167
1.9
2446
3.9
7798
12.5
18028
28.8
1537
2.5


/7UHVLGHQW
GHSDUWXUH

21448
10.6

17
0.0

592
0.3
588
0.3
24222
12.0
566
0.3
17536
8.7
458
0.2
9261
4.6
7863
3.9
10586
5.2
5788
2.9
26429
13.1
15826
7.8
31765
15.7


/7YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH

66362
2.7

750
0.0

6836
0.3
26542
1.1
124537
5.1
14447
0.6
298737
12.3
15339
0.6
185671
7.7
107248
4.4
45205
1.9
244385
10.1
358016
14.8
387924
16.0
57796
2.4

947935
8.3

485
0.0

21626
0.2
14119
0.1
683600
6.0
6543
0.1
851248
7.5
9553
0.1
214611
1.9
1072970
9.4
381960
3.4
65131
0.6
622002
5.5
608008
5.3
4625873
40.6



67UHVLGHQW 67YLVLWRU
GHSDUWXUH GHSDUWXUH

2092690
7.4

2936
0.0

14
0
59548
0.2
82922
0.3
1692411
6.0
43542
0.2
2367191
8.3
56515
0.2
860626
3.0
2382051
8.4
886015
3.1
660440
2.3
2124099
7.5
2032989
7.2
9436934
33.2

7RWDO

Total

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

Maldives

India

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Taiwan

Mongolia

Macao

No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%
No.
%

445
0.2
9
0.0
9385
5.0
3414
1.8
3434
1.8
13
0.0
20263
10.8
11
0.0
347
0.2
3764
2.0
8777
4.7
187407
100.0

477
0.6
2
0.0
4476
5.6
122
0.2
654
0.8
2
0.0
4743
5.9
7
0.0
70
0.1
847
1.1
2915
3.6
80358
100.0

604
0.2
233
0.1
13943
4.1
36
0.0
2034
0.6
98
0.0
24175
7.1
659
0.2
2068
0.6
3470
1.0
5932
1.7
340497
100.0

8440
0.4
2
0.0
143775
6.2
6305
0.3
10485
0.5
21
0.0
178794
7.7
213
0.0
1570
0.1
18027
0.8
98639
4.2
2329871
100.0

142

16096
0.1
1517
0.0
873992
7.7
2936
0.0
11201
0.1
443
0.0
249201
2.2
1618
0.0
5405
0.0
24813
0.2
66462
0.6
11371345
100.0

151
0.6
0
0.0
2090
8.0
59
0.2
74
0.3
0
0.0
1000
3.8
0
0.0
13
0.0
123
0.5
373
1.4
26132
100.0

284
0.5
0
0.0
1907
3.0
70
0.1
529
0.8
0
0.0
4761
7.6
3
0.0
61
0.1
635
1.0
2578
4.1
62580
100.0

298
0.1
194
0.1
7517
3.7
88
0.0
1025
0.5
52
0.0
12070
6.0
207
0.1
1319
0.7
2309
1.1
4440
2.2
202471
100.0

11110
0.5
14
0.0
148837
6.1
6009
0.2
11340
0.5
27
0.0
178361
7.4
64
0.0
1399
0.1
19449
0.8
103475
4.3
2421026
100.0

16195
0.1
1543
0.0
897400
7.9
2658
0.0
10642
0.1
459
0.0
240502
2.1
2022
0.0
4127
0.0
21978
0.2
59156
0.5
11384229
100.0

54099
0.2
3514
0.0
2103320
7.4
21699
0.1
51418
0.2
1114
0.0
913869
3.2
4801
0.0
16378
0.1
95415
0.3
352746
1.2
28405919
100.0

5()(5(1&(6

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PRB.
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (2000), :RUOG3RSXODWLRQ'DWD6KHHW
Washington: PRB.
PRICE, C.A. (1979), Australian Immigration: $%LEOLRJUDSK\DQG'LJHVW. No 4. Canberra: Department
of Demography, Australian National University.
RICHMOND, A.J. (1991), International Migration and Global Change. Paper presented at
International Conference on Migration, Centre for Advanced Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social
Sciences, National University of Singapore, February.
ROD, T. and MURPHY, J. (1997a), Remittances Among Recently Arrived Immigrants, 3HRSOHDQG
3ODFH 5(2), pp. 78-80.
ROD, T. and MURPHY, J. (1997b), ,PPLJUDQW7UDQVIHUVDQG5HPLWWDQFHV. Canberra: DIMA.
RUDDOCK, P. (2001), Background Paper on Unauthorised Arrivals Strategy. Canberra: DIMIA.
SHU, J. and HAWTHORNE, L. (1996), Asian Student Migration to Australia. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
0LJUDWLRQ 24(1), pp. 65-96.

146

UNITED NATIONS (1997), World Population Monitoring, 1997: Issues of International Migration
and Development: Selected Aspects, New York: United Nations.
UNITED NATIONS (2000), Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Aging
Populations?, New York: United Nations.
VIVIANI, N. (1996), 7KH,QGRFKLQHVHLQ$XVWUDOLD Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
WOODEN, M., HOLTON, R., HUGO, G. and SLOAN, R. (1994), $XVWUDOLDQ,PPLJUDWLRQ$6XUYH\
RIWKH,VVXHVCanberra: AGPS.

147

Table 1.$YHUDJHDQQXDOUDWHVRISRSXODWLRQJURZWK

&RXQWU\5HJLRQ

<HDUV

5DWH3HU$QQXP

World
1990-2000
World
1980-1990
LDCs
1990-2000
MDCs
1990-2000
Europe and the New Independent States
1990-2000
North America
1990-2000
ESCAP Region
1999-2000
Indonesia
1998-1999
Australia
2000-2001
6RXUFHMcDevitt (1999); ESCAP (1999); Population Reference Bureau (1999 and 2000); ABS (2001a).

1.4
1.7
1.7
0.3
0.1
1.0
1.5
1.4
1.2

Table 2$XVWUDOLDSURMHFWHGSRSXODWLRQJURZWK

3RSXODWLRQ
3URMHFWLRQ
6HULHV

*URZWK5DWH


0HGLDQ$JH












18966.8

19444.7

21705.4

23825.9

28194.7

+0.76

43.6

II

18966.8

19421.3

21288.8

22926.4

25408.5

+0.56

46.0

III

18966.8

19411.2

21056.5

22440.2

24059.0

+0.46

46.5

Australia

1. For Projection Assumptions please see text.

6RXUFHABS (2000a).

Table 3./DERXUIRUFHFRPSRQHQWVRIFKDQJHDQQXDODYHUDJH
















0.9
1.5

0.9
1.5

1.3
1.5

1.3
1.6

-0.6

-0.6

-0.3

-0.3

1.6
1.5

1.0
1.4

1.8
1.4

2.7
1.3

0.1

-0.4

0.4

1.5

0DOHV
Age change in labour force
Age points change due to
population growth
Labour force participation

0.5
1.2

0.9
1.2

1.5
1.3

1.5
1.5

-0.7

-0.3

0.2

0.1

)HPDOHV
Age change in labour force
Age points change due to
Population growth
Labour force participation

0.9
1.2

2.2
1.2

3.2
1.3

2.7
1.6

-0.4

1.0

1.9

1.1

3HUVRQV
Age change in labour force
0.7
1.4
Age points change due to
1.2
1.2
Population growth
Labour force participation
-0.5
0.2
6RXUFHABS (1999), p. 117, ABS (2001b), p. 216.

2.2

2.0

1.2

1.0

1.5

1.9

1.3

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.5

1.5

0.9

0.5

-0.3

-0.5

0.0

0.4

148

Table 4. &LYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQDJHGDQGRYHUODERXUIRUFHVWDWXVDQQXDODYHUDJH

8QLW





000

4396.9

4472.3

4628.8

4178.3

000
000
000
000
000
000
%
%

531.3
50.2
581.5
4978.4
1760.0
6738.3
11.7
73.9

500.0
49.0
549.0
5021.3
1797.0
6818.3
10.9
73.6

414.4
51.1
465.5
5094.3
1810.4
6904.6
9.2
73.8

400.0
53.4
453.4
5171.7
1833.2
7004.9
8.8
73.8

000

3237.0

3308.3

3463.0

000
259.8
262.3
000
99.3
104.2
7RWDOXQHPSOR\HG 000
359.0
366.4
Labour force
000
3596.0
3674.7
Not in the labour force
000
3356.7
3360.5
Civilian population
000
6952.7
7035.3
Unemployment rate
%
10.0
10.0
Participation rate
%
51.7
52.2
6RXUFHABS (1999), p. 118; ABS (2001b), p. 217.

224.7
103.5
328.2
3791.9
3335.1
7127.1
8.7
53.2

Employed
Unemployed
Searching full-time work
Looking for part-time

7RWDOXQHPSOR\HG
Labour force
Not in the labour force
Civilian population
Unemployment rate
Participation rate
Employed
Unemployed
Searching full-time work
Searching part-time work



 
0DOHV





4757.0

4818.9

4914.2

5023.3

400.9
58.5
459.4
5126.4
1892.0
7108.4
8.8
73.4

386.0
59.2
445.5
5264.3
1949.9
7214.3
8.5
73.0

357.5
58.6
416.1
5330.3
1993.4
7323.7
7.8
72.8

312.5
62.9
375.4
5398.6
2042.5
7441.1
7.0
72.6

3582.93

3623.9

3677.5

3766.5

3893.3

210.7
100.3
310.9
3893.9
3343.8
7237.7
8.0
53.8

223.8
109.3
3.0
3956.7
3390.3
7347.0
8.4
53.9

215.2
103.6
318.8
3996.3
3454.2
7450.5
8.0
53.6

194.9
107.3
302.1
4068.7
3486.6
7555.3
7.4
53.9

179.0
107.0
286.0
4179.0
3486.5
7665.8
6.8
54.5

)HPDOHV



Table 5. 8QGHUHPSOR\PHQWVWDWXVRIHPSOR\HGSHUVRQV6HSWHPEHU


0DOHV

Fully employed workers

Full-time workers
Part-time workers
Usually work full-time but worked part-time for
economic reasons
Usually work part-time and want more hours
Usually work part-time and want more part-time hours
Usually work part-time and want full-time hours
Employed persons

6RXUFH ABS (2001c), p. 9.

149

)HPDOHV

7RWDO

4893.6
4399.2
494.5
39.6

3759.3
2281.9
1477.5
8.2

8653.0
6681.0
1972.0
47.8

166.7
42.4
124.3
5099.9

270.8
125.3
145.4
4038.3

437.4
167.7
269.7
9138.2

Table 6.(PSOR\HGSHUVRQVE\LQGXVWU\ DQQXDODYHUDJH 



0DOHV

No.000

)HPDOHV

Proportion
Employed
%

No. 000

Proportion
Employed
%

7RWDO

No. 000

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

302.7
6.0
134.9
3.5
437.5
Mining
69.0
1.4
9.2
0.2
78.2
Manufacturing
812.2
16.2
300.9
7.8
1113.1
Electricity, gas and water supply
52.9
1.1
11.6
0.3
64.5
Construction
609.6
12.2
85.8
2.2
695.4
Wholesale trade
341.7
6.8
153.3
4.0
494.9
Retail trade
643.4
12.8
681.2
17.6
1324.6
Accommodation, cafes and
192.5
3.8
240.3
6.2
432.8
restaurants
Transport and storage
308.7
6.2
98.6
2.5
407.3
Communication services
114.3
2.3
55.0
1.4
169.3
Finance and insurance
145.9
2.9
181.6
4.7
327.5
Property and business services
552.3
11.0
436.4
11.3
988.7
Government administration and
190.0
3.8
155.8
4.0
345.8
defence
Education
197.4
3.9
411.9
10.6
609.3
Health and community services
175.6
3.5
652.5
16.8
828.1
Cultural and recreational services
116.7
2.3
100.4
2.6
217.1
Personal and other services
184.0
3.7
168.3
4.3
352.3
All industries
5008.8
100.0
3877.7
100.0
8886.5
a.
Classified according to the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC).
b.

Annual average of quarterly data.

6RXUFH:

ABS (2001b), p. 230.

150

Proportion
Employed
%
4.9
0.9
12.5
0.7
7.8
5.6
14.9
4.9
4.6
1.9
3.7
11.1
3.9
6.9
9.3
2.4
4.0
100.0

&RXQWU\RI%LUWK

Table 7.(VWLPDWHGUHVLGHQWSRSXODWLRQE\FRXQWU\RIELUWK -XQH



Australia

(XURSH WKH)RUPHU8665
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
United Kingdom & Ireland
Former Yugoslav Republics
Former USSR & Baltic States
Other

0LGGOH(DVW 1RUWK$IULFD
Egypt
Lebanon
Turkey
Other

6RXWKHDVW$VLD
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Vietnam
Other

1RUWKHDVW$VLD

+1.04

7RWDO

37.2
295.9
26.4
25.3


40.3
374.9
27.4
39.5


+1.30
+4.02
+0.62
+7.71


7RWDO

119.9
143.4
27.3
264.1
55.1
97.0
70.5
1223.5
179.4
50.4
171.1


120.2
141.2
28.0
241.7
54.9
90.6
68.3
1215.9
210.0
54.9
177.9


+0.04
-0.26
+0.42
-1.47
-0.06
-1.13
+1.37
-0.10
+2.66
+1.44
+0.65


7RWDO

37.8
77.2
31.3
56.9
202.6

37.7
79.9
31.6
80.7
229.8

-0.04
+0.57
+0.16
+6.00
+2.12

7RWDO

39.7
81.6
93.2
27.2
150.4
59.1
451.2

67.6
97.6
123.0
30.7
174.4
71.4
564.8

+9.28
+3.03
+4.73
+2.04
+2.50
+3.20
+3.81

7RWDO

102.2
74.7
27.6
40.5
245.1

168.1
56.3
41.4
47.3
313.1

+8.65
-4.60
+6.99
+2.62
+4.17

7RWDO

75.6
46.6
17.5
139.7

110.2
56.0
33.7
200.0

+6.48
+3.11
+11.54
+6.16

7RWDO

26.1
50.2
0.4
76.6

29.0
65.0
0.5
94.5

+1.77
+4.40
+3.79
+3.56

7RWDO

26.5
55.4
81.9

25.4
56.3
82.2

-0.70
+0.45
+0.06

80.1
67.1
147.2
4517.3


+5.83
+3.94
+4.94
+1.66
+

China (excl. SARs & Taiwan Province)

Hong Kong & Macau (SARs of China)
Korea
Other

6RXWKHUQ$VLD
India
Sri Lanka
Other

1RUWKHUQ$PHULFD
Canada
United States of America
Other

6RXWK$PHULFD&HQWUDO$PHULFD 
WKH&DULEEHDQ
Chile
Other

$IULFDH[FO1RUWK$IULFD

*URZWKSD

14639.8

2FHDQLDE
Fiji
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Other

S

1376.1

South Africa
Other

57.0
53.2
7RWDO
110.2
7RWDORYHUVHDVERUQ
4093.6
7RWDO

a. Countries with more than 25,000 or more residents at the 1996 Census.
b. Excluding .6RXUFH: ABS (2001b), p. 102.

151

Table 8.$XVWUDOLD$XVWUDOLDDQGRYHUVHDVERUQSRSXODWLRQDWWKHFHQVXV

&KDUDFWHULVWLF
2FFXSDWLRQVNLOOOHYHO

$XVWUDOLDERUQ
3HUVRQV


Managers/Admin/Prof
Technician/Assoc Prof
High Skill-Trade Clerical
Intermediate Skill
Low Skill-Clerk Labourer

1 507 034
638 994
994 496
1 408 106
1 001 112

/DERXU)RUFH6WDWXV
Employed
Unemployed
Not in Labour Force

Less than $300 per week

$800 per week or more

$JHDQG6H[6WUXFWXUH
$JH

27.2
11.5
17.9
25.4
18.0

499 717
215 519
318 685
456 330
326 021

3HUVRQV



5 691 026
535 711
3 466 611

91.4
8.6
35.8

,QGLYLGXDO,QFRPH

2YHUVHDVERUQ
3HUVRQV

3HUVRQV



4 659 806
1 020 803

49.8
10.9


27.5
11.9
17.5
25.1
18.0

3HUVRQV



1 870 384
225 081
1 545 674

89.3
10.7
42.5

3HUVRQV



1 861 471
379 793

52.8
10.8

0DOHV

)HPDOHV

3HUVRQV



0DOHV

)HPDOHV

3HUVRQV



1 769 646
1 063 626
2 341 873
758 015
593 855
6H[5DWLR: Males per 100 Females

1 683 043
1 034 250
2 376 508
781 936
825 025

3 452 689
2 097 876
4 718 381
1 539 951
1 418 880

26.1
15.9
35.7
11.6
10.7
97.4

115 745
193 865
897 776
448 700
295 095

110 369
191 956
927 097
401 873
325 836

226 114
385 821
1 824 873
850 573
620 931

5.8
9.9
46.7
21.8
15.9
99.7

0-14
15-24
25-49
50-64
65+

1DWXUHRI2FFXSDQF\
Owner/purchaser
Tenant
Other

+LJKHVW4XDOLILFDWLRQ

Degree/Diploma
Skilled/Basic vocational

(QJOLVK3URILFLHQF\

Uses English only

Speaks English very well/well
Speaks English not well/at all

3HUVRQV



9 107 000
3 426 330
113 920

72.0
27.1
0.9

3HUVRQV

1 579 222
1 382 423

3HUVRQV

12 309 535
638 681
94 210

0DLQ/DQJXDJHVSRNHQDWKRPH

5HOLJLRQ

1. English
2. Italian
3. Greek

1. Western Catholic
2. Anglican
3. No religion nfd
6RXUFH ABS 1996 census.





16.2
14.1
94.1
5.2
0.7



94.3
1.2
1.0



29.1
26.4
18.3

152

3HUVRQV
2 579 906
1 100 056
31 057


69.5
29.6
0.8

3HUVRQV

705 560
481 491

3HUVRQV

2 027 102
1 401 176
435 154



19.2
13.1



52.5
36.3
11.3



51.9
5.5
4.2



31.0
17.7
16.5

Table 9.3URJUDPPDQDJHPHQWVWUXFWXUHPLJUDWLRQ

QRQKXPDQLWDULDQSURJUDP
6NLOO

)DPLO\

6SHFLDO(OLJLELOLW\

Skilled Independent & SkilledAustralian Sponsored*

- Points tested
- Planning level adjusted subject to
demand in Business Skills and ENS

Parents and Preferential Family

Can be capped subject to demand in
all other Family categories
Fiancs & Interdependents

Can be capped

Business Skills, ENS & Distinguished

Can be capped subject to demand for

spouse and dependent child places

Talent
Demand driven
Contingency Reserve
To be utilised
Territories,

if

States

Business employers and regional

authorities generate additional demand

and

Spouses & Dependent Children

- Demand driven
- Exempt from capping
Contingency Reserve

Legislation defeated in Senate October 2000

* Formerly Independent and Skilled-Australian Linked (until July 1999)

6RXUFH: DIMA (2000a).

153

1 700



5 600
6 200
200
29 400

41.9

26 300
7 200
2 000
2 000
18 100

56.5

91-92


1 400



4 800
3 300
200
13 000

31.4

27 800
5 300
2 700
1 700
7 700

66.7

92-93


1 300



4 000
1 900
200
11 800
500

29.1

25 100
4 500
2 500
1 700
9 400

68.8

93-94


1 600



3 300
2 400
100
15 000
9 600

39.7

26 100
5 100
2 500
3 100
7 700

58.2

94-95


1 700



4 640
4 900
200
10 600
3 800

29.2

33 550
8 890
2 830
3 450
8 000

68.7

95-96


1 730



5 560
5 820
190
15 000
980

37.3

25 130
7 580
2 200
2 330
7 340

60.3

96-97


1 100



5 950
5 360
180
13 270
9 540
370

51.7

25 790
1 080
2 190
2 250

46.7

97-98


890



5 650
6 080
210
13 640
9 240
180

51.5

24 740
3 120
2 070
2 100

47.2

98-99


2 850



5 390
6 260
110
15 610
7 900
60

50.3

99-2000

26 330
1 900
2 160
1 600

45.6

2 420
J


7 520(g)
7 360(g)
230
22 380(g)
7 200(g)
60
J
55.5

2000-01

28 360(f)
1 120
2 120
1 910

41.5

1 600
L


6 000
7 900
170
25 100
6 300
30
L
53.5

2001-02

32 400(f)
500(h)
2 150
2 850

44.6

6RXUFHDIMA 3RSXODWLRQ)ORZV,PPLJUDWLRQAspects, various issues and DIMIA (2001a).

154

Please note that figures have been rounded and total may not be the exact sum of components.
a.
From 1 July 1997 the Concessional Family Category was replaced by the Skilled-Australia Linked category and transferred from the Family to the Skill Stream. On 1 July 1999 it was renamed the SkilledAustralian Sponsored Category.
b.
Includes Employer Nomination Scheme, Labour Agreements, and Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme.
c.
Business Migration Program changed to Business Skills during 1991-92.
d.
Named independent prior to 1 July 1999.
e.
Please note that figures have been rounded and total may not be the exact sum of components.
f.
Net outcome as places in the Migration Program taken by provisional visa holders such as spouses, fiancs and interdependents who do not subsequently obtain permanent visas are returned to the Program in the
year that the temporary visas expire - a total of 1 450 in 2000-01.
g.
Includes 4450 additional places from the Skill Stream contingency reserve made up of - 1 820 from demand generated by business, State/Territory Governments and regional certifying bodies and 2 630 for ICT
professionals with Australian qualifications as announced in the January 2001 ICT Industry Innovation Plan.
h.
Does not include a contingency reserve of an additional 1,000 places in 2001-02 and an additional 4,000 places per year thereafter available subject to support from the community and opposition parties in
Parliament
i.
Does not include a contingency reserve of an additional 8,000 places available for use:
i.
subject to business, State/Territory Governments and/or regional certifying bodies being able to generate additional demand through migration mechanisms specifically designed for their use; and
ii.
to accommodate overseas students who successfully obtain an Australian qualification in an occupation in national shortage (that is occupations on the Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL))

1 200



7 500
7 000
100
35 100

44.4

6NLOO
Employer Nominations(b)
Business Skills(c)
Distinguished Talents
Skilled-Independent(d)
Skilled-Australian Sponsored(a)
1 November Onshore
7RWDO6NLOO
% of Total Program

6SHFLDO(OLJLELOLW\
7RWDO3URJUDP

24 500
10 300
2 000
2 000
22 500

54.6

90-91

Migration category/ component

)DPLO\
SPOUSES/FIANCS
Parents
Dependent Children
Other
Concessional Family(a)
7RWDO)DPLO\
% of Total Program

Table 10. 0LJUDWLRQSURJUDPYLVDVJUDQWHGWRSODQQHG

Table 11.*URZWKRISRSXODWLRQPRYHPHQWLQWRDQGRXWRI$XVWUDOLD
WR


$UULYDOV
Permanent
Long-term

Short-term

'HSDUWXUHV
Permanent
Long-term

Short-term

*URZWK






- residents
- visitors
- total
- residents
- visitors
- total

83,010
48,990
30,740
79,730
1,240,800
930,400
2,171,200

107,391
62,920
63,861
126,781
2,072,400
2,519,700
4,592,100

92,272
79,651
133,198
212,849
3,299,900
4,651,800
7,951,700

+11.2
+65.6
+333.3
+167.0
+165.9
+400.0
+266.2

- residents
- visitors
- total
- residents
- visitors
- total

24,830
47,020
25,440
72,460
1,259,100
907,500
2,166,600

29,122
67,191
47,971
115,162
2,173,500
2,473,700
4,647,100

41,078
84,918
71,850
156,768
3,332,300
4,635,200
7,967,500

+65.4
+80.6
+182.3
+116.4
+164.7
+410.8
+267.7

6RXUFHBureau of Immigration and Population Research (1993); DIMA (2000a).



Table 12. (VWLPDWHGVWRFNRIWHPSRUDU\HQWUDQWVLQ$XVWUDOLD

E\PDLQYLVDFDWHJRU\-XQH

9LVDFDWHJRU\FODVV
:LWKZRUNULJKWV
Student 560
WHM 417
Business (long stay) 457
Business (short stay) 456
All others
6XEWRWDOZRUNULJKWV
1RZRUNULJKWV
7RWDO

6RXUFHKinnaird (1999), p. 49.

1R
100.6
35.2
31.6
7.6
28.4
203.4
217.6


155


23.9
8.4
7.5
1.8
6.7
48.3
51.7


Table 13.7HPSRUDU\HQWUDQWVWR$XVWUDOLD


)ORZ

)ORZ

6WRFN-XQH

3,057,147
74,428
74,454
236,085
35,006
37,880
4,215


3,540,000
86,000
76,000
n.a.
37,000
n.a.
n.a.
QD

184,270
121,140
45,264
13,910
50,400
61,224
24,590
13,100


Visitors
Overseas students
Working holiday makers
Temporary business visitors
Temporary business residents
Bridging visa holders(1)
Social, cultural, international relations program
Other
7RWDO

1. Bridging visas provide lawful status to non-citizens who would otherwise be unlawful.

6RXUFHDIMA (2000a); Ruddock (2002).

Table 14. &RPSRQHQWVRISRSXODWLRQJURZWK

Population Growth
1DWXUDO,QFUHDVH

Year Ended
30 June
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Total Population
14,192,200
14,359,300
14,515,700
14,695,400
14,923,300
15,184,200
15,393,500
15,579,400
15,788,300
16,018,400
16,263,900
16,532,200
16,814,400
17,065,100
17,284,000
17,494,700
17,667,100
17,854,700
18,071,800
18,310,700
18,532,200
18,730,400
18,937,200
19,157,100

Total Persons
115,500
118,300
115,100
117,000
121,500
126,100
128,800
129,700
127,600
123,000
126,700
125,700
131,400
132,400
141,600
138,400
138,600
134,800
132,000
124,000
126,400
119,900
121,687
120,918

% of Total Growth
66.6
65.4
67.6
60.7
50.5
49.6
63.7
72.5
63.4
55.1
50.2
45.7
45.5
51.5
62.1
66.9
82.2
74.4
62.2
54.4
59.2
58.1
58.8
55.0

1HW2YHUVHDV0LJUDWLRQ
Total Persons
57,900
62,700
55,100
75,900
119,200
128,100
73,300
49,100
73,700
100,400
125,700
149,300
157,400
124,600
86,400
68,600
30,000
46,500
80,100
104,100
87,100
86,400
85,120
99,056

% of Total Growth
33.4
34.6
32.4
39.3
49.5
50.4
36.3
27.5
36.6
44.9
49.8
54.3
54.5
48.5
37.9
63.1
17.8
25.6
37.8
45.6
40.8
41.9
41.2
45.0

Note: Differences between the total growth in each year and the sum of the components of that growth arise from
retrospective adjustments which are made after each census to eliminate any intercensal discrepancy.

6RXUFHDIMA (1999), p. 94; ABS (2001a).

156

Table 15. &RPSRQHQWVRIQHWRYHUVHDVPLJUDWLRQ

Year Ended
30 June



















Long-Term Movement

Permanent Movement
$UULYDOV

'HSDUWXUHV

1HW

93.0
68.8
77.5
92.6
113.5
143.5
145.3
121.2
121.7
107.4
76.3
69.8
87.4
99.1
85.8
77.3
84.1
92.3

24.8
24.3
20.4
18.1
19.9
20.5
21.6
27.9
31.1
29.1
27.9
27.3
26.9
28.7
29.9
32.0
35.2
41.1

68.2
44.5
57.1
74.5
93.6
123.0
123.7
93.4
90.6
78.3
48.4
42.5
60.5
70.5
55.9
45.3
49.0
51.2

$UULYDOV 'HSDUWXUHV
79.7
76.5
85.7
93.8
90.9
98.8
104.6
110.7
114.7
126.8
127.4
137.6
151.1
163.6
175.2
188.1
187.8
212.8

72.5
74.4
74.9
74.4
75.4
78.6
91.0
100.2
110.5
115.2
113.2
112.7
118.5
124.4
136.7
154.3
140.3
156.8

1HW
7.3
2.0
10.9
19.4
15.5
20.2
13.6
10.5
4.2
11.6
14.2
24.9
32.6
39.2
38.5
33.8
47.5
56.1

Category
-XPSHUVD 120 3HUPE /WE



-2.2
2.6
5.7
6.4
16.6
6.1
20.2
20.8
-8.3
-21.3
-32.6
-20.8
-12.9
-5.5
-7.3
7.2
-11.0
-8.2

73.3
49.1
73.7
100.4
125.7
149.4
157.4
124.6
86.4
68.6
30.0
46.5
80.1
104.1
87.1
86.4
85.1
99.1

90.4
95.6
84.0
79.3
85.8
85.9
90.1
89.9
95.6
87.1
77.3
63.1
65.0
64.3
59.2
57.3
50.7
47.7

a.
Category jumping is the net effect of persons whose travel intentions change from short-term to
permanent or long-term, or vice versa.
b.
The percentage contributions of permanent and long-term movement are based on the net migration
totals before adjustment for category jumpers.

6RXUFHDIMA (2000a), p. 106; ABS (2001a), p. 29.

157

9.6
4.4
16.0
20.7
14.2
14.1
9.9
10.1
4.4
12.9
22.7
36.9
35.0
35.7
40.8
42.7
49.3
52.3

Total Permanent
143,220
and
Long-Term Net Gain
% Net Migration
14.1
from Long-Term
Movement

3HUPDQHQW0LJUDWLRQ
Arrivals
143,480
Departures
20,470
Net
123,010
Long-Term Movement
Arrivals
98,780
Departures
78,570
Net
20,210

1987-88

103,866

10.1

9.9

110,695
100,199
10,496

104,590
90,991
13,599

137,242

121,227
27,857
93,370

1989-90

145,316
21,647
123,669

1988-89

4.4

94,757

114,711
110,512
4,199

121,688
31,130
90,558

1990-91

12.9

89,888

126,781
115,162
11,619

107,391
29,122
78,269

1991-92

158

22.7

62,671

127,436
113,190
14,246

76,330
27,905
48,425

1992-93

36.9

67,381

137,600
112,707
24,893

69,768
27,280
42,488

Year
1993-94

35.0

93,042

151,095
118,533
32,562

87,428
26,948
60,480

1994-95

35.7

109,661

163,578
124,386
39,192

99,139
28,670
70,469

1995-96

Table 16. $XVWUDOLDVHWWOHUVDQGORQJWHUPPLJUDWLRQ

40.8

94,396

175,249
136,748
38,501

85,752
29,857
55,895

1996-97

42.7

79,162

188,114
154,294
33,820

77,327
31,985
45,342

1997-98

49.3

96,483

187,802
140,281
47,521

84,143
35,181
48,962

1998-99

52.3

107275

212,849
156,768
56,081

92,272
41,078
51,194

1999-2000

Table 17. $XVWUDOLDSHUPDQHQWPRYHPHQWILQDQFLDO\HDUV


Financial
Year

Settler
Arrivals

1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000

175,657
185,099
170,011
132,719
107,401
112,712
89,147
52,748
70,916
73,171
67,192
80,748
110,689
118,030
93,010
68,810
77,510
92,590
113,540
143,470
145,320
121,230
121,688
107,391
76,330
69,768
87,428
99,139
85,752
77,327
84,143
92,272

3HUPDQHQW'HSDUWXUHV
$XVWUDOLD%RUQ 
% of
No.
Departures

)RUPHU6HWWOHUV 
% of
No.
Departures
23,537
26,082
28,244
32,280
31,961
26,741
20,184
17,150
15,447
13,972
13,797
12,044
10,888
11,940
15,390
14,270
11,040
9,560
10,800
10,716
15,087
19,458
21,640
19,944
18,102
17,353
16,856
17,665
18,159
19,214
17,931
20,844

74.3
72.3
71.8
72.8
71.2
67.8
64.0
62.5
62.8
60.5
54.3
54.7
55.8
57.2
62.0
58.7
54.2
52.8
54.2
52.3
69.7
69.8
69.5
68.5
64.9
63.6
62.6
61.6
60.8
60.1
50.1
50.7

8,141
10,000
11,072
12,439
12,945
12,699
11,361
10,277
9,141
9,124
11,632
9,973
8,608
8,940
9,440
10,040
9,340
8,540
9,130
9,755
6,560
8,399
9,490
9,178
9,803
9,927
10,092
11,005
11,698
12,771
17,250
20,234

25.7
27.7
28.2
27.8
28.8
32.2
36.0
37.5
37.2
39.5
45.7
45.3
44.2
42.8
38.0
41.3
45.8
47.2
45.8
47.7
30.3
30.2
30.5
31.5
35.1
36.4
37.4
38.4
39.2
39.9
49.0
49.3


Total

Departures as
percentage of
Arrivals

31,678
36,082
39,316
44,719
44,906
39,413
31,545
27,427
24,588
23,096
25,429
22,017
19,496
20,890
24,830
24,300
20,380
18,100
19,930
20,471
21,647
27,857
31,130
29,122
27,905
27,280
26,948
28,670
29,857
31,985
35,181
41,078

18.0
19.5
23.1
33.7
41.8
35.0
35.4
52.0
34.7
31.6
37.8
27.3
17.6
17.7
26.7
35.3
26.3
19.5
17.6
14.3
14.9
23.0
25.6
27.1
36.6
39.1
30.8
28.9
34.8
41.4
41.8
44.5

Sources: DIMA Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update, various issues.
*
Data 1988-89 to 1997-99 constitute permanent overseas-born departures due to a change in definition by
DIMA. Data prior to this constitute former settler departures.
** Data prior to 1988-89 constitute permanent departures other than former settlers.

159

Table 18. $XVWUDOLDORQJWHUPPRYHPHQWWR



$UULYDOV

Australian
Residents

Overseas
Visitors

'HSDUWXUHV

Total

Australian
Residents

Overseas
Visitors

1HW2YHUVHDV0RYHPHQW

Total

Australian
Residents

Overseas
Visitors

Total

1959-60

16,049

11,748

27,797

24,730

7,838

32,568

-8,681

3,910

-4,771

1960-61

16,870

13,320

30,190

28,542

11,823

40,365

-11,672

1,497

-10,175

1961-62

19,301

13,423

32,724

33,370

12,591

45,961

-14,069

832

-13,237

1962-63

21,376

13,971

35,347

34,324

13,219

47,543

-12,948

752

-12,196

1963-64

23,066

14,170

37,236

39,931

12,325

52,256

-16,865

1,845

-15,020

1964-65

24,065

16,484

40,549

42,702

13,640

56,342

-18,637

2,844

-15,793

1965-66

27,279

18,461

45,740

51,785

11,808

63,593

-24,506

6,653

-17,853

1966-67

31,161

20,078

51,239

53,750

12,707

66,457

-22,589

7,371

-15,218

1967-68

37,032

23,341

60,373

51,847

12,516

64,363

-14,815

10,825

-3,990

1968-69

37,376

24,442

61,818

53,296

13,817

67,113

-15,920

10,625

-5,295

1969-70

38,711

29,842

68,553

63,454

17,414

80,868

-24,743

12,428

-12,315

1970-71

43,554

31,225

74,779

66,463

19,928

86,391

-22,909

11,297

-11,612

1971-72

51,356

27,713

79,069

68,069

23,328

91,397

-16,713

4,385

-12,328

1972-73

58,292

26,733

85,025

67,379

23,579

90,958

-9,087

3,154

-5,933

1973-74

64,297

27,212

91,509

60,636

21,246

81,882

3,661

5,966

9,627

1974-75

60,239

23,615

83,854

72,397

24,386

96,783

-12,158

-771

-12,929

1975-76

60,224

21,687

81,911

64,475

21,528

86,003

-4,251

159

-4,092

1976-77

59,193

26,133

85,326

68,792

19,724

88,516

-9,599

6,409

-3,190

1977-78

57,311

28,043

85,354

60,099

19,194

79,293

-2,788

8,849

6,061

1978-79

60,947

34,064

95,011

57,255

21,216

78,471

3,692

12,848

16,540

1979-80

59,963

29,586

89,549

52,114

19,228

71,342

7,849

10,358

18,207

1980-81

59,871

34,220

94,091

47,848

18,778

66,626

12,023

15,442

27,465

1981-82

57,860

34,760

92,620

46,500

20,310

66,810

11,360

14,450

25,810

1982-83

48,990

30,740

79,730

47,020

25,440

72,460

1,970

5,300

7,270

1983-84

49,190

27,280

76,470

49,490

24,950

74,440

-300

2,330

2,030

1984-85

53,770

31,980

85,750

51,710

23,160

74,870

2,060

8,820

10,880

1985-86

56,560

37,250

93,810

49,690

24,670

74,360

6,870

12,580

19,450

1986-87

53,597

67,325

120,922

48,854

26,538

75,392

4,743

40,787

45,530

1987-88

54,804

43,978

98,782

50,499

28,054

78,553

4,305

15,924

20,229

1988-89

53,798

50,766

104,564

57,733

33,258

90,991

-3,935

17,508

13,573

1989-90

53,967

56,728

110,695

62,300

37,899

100,199

-8,333

18,829

10,496

1990-91

59,062

55,649

114,711

66,883

43,629

110,512

-7,821

12,020

4,199

1991-92

62,920

63,861

126,781

67,191

47,971

115,162

-4,271

15,890

11,619

1992-93

69,594

57,842

127,436

65,446

47,744

113,190

4,148

10,098

14,246

1993-94

75,600

62,000

137,600

64,786

47,921

112,707

10,814

14,079

24,893

1994-95

79,063

72,032

151,095

68,377

50,156

118,533

10,686

21,876

32,562

1995-96

79,206

84,372

163,578

70,253

54,133

124,386

8,953

30,239

39,192

1996-97

80,170

95,079

175,249

73,777

62,971

136,748

6,393

32,108

38,501

1997-98

84,358

103,756

188,114

79,422

74,872

154,294

4,936

28,884

33,820

1998-99

67,910

119,892

187,802

82,861

57,420

140,281

-14,951

62,472

47,521

1999-2000

79,651

133,198

212,849

84,918

71,850

156,768

-5,267

61,348

56,081

Source: DIMA Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update, various issues.

160

Table 19. $XVWUDOLDERUQDQGRYHUVHDVERUQSRSXODWLRQZRUNIRUFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRFFXSDWLRQ

DQGHGXFDWLRQ

$XVWUDOLD%RUQ
%

Characteristic

2YHUVHDV%RUQ
%
Resident < 5
Years

:RUNIRUFH&KDUDFWHULVWLFV
% not in workforce
% of workforce unemployed
Occupation
Manager, Professional
Technician, Paraprofessional
High Skill Trade
Intermediate Skill
Low Skill
Educational Qualification
Degree/Diploma
Skilled/Basic Vocational
6RXUFHHugo (1999b).

35.8
8.6

42.5
10.7

41.6
10.0

27.2
11.5
17.9
25.4
18.0

27.5
11.9
17.5
25.1
18.0

28.3
10.4
16.3
20.2
24.8

16.2
14.1

19.2
13.1

29.6
9.8

Table 20. /RQJLWXGLQDOVXUYH\RILPPLJUDQWVLQ$XVWUDOLDZRUNIRUFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVE\YLVD

FDWHJRU\:DYHDQG:DYH
6SRXVH )DPLO\ &RQFHVVLRQDO 0DUULDJH +XPDQLWDULDQ 6NLOO ,QGHSHQGHQW %XVLQHVV 7RWDO
)DPLO\

LQ:RUNIRUFH
W1
53.1
22.1
W3
58.6
28.7
RI:RUNIRUFH8QHPSOR\HG
W1
38.6
57.0
W3
17.4
33.9

6RXUFHUnpublished tabulations.

79.2
88.2

57.8
64.0

47.5
61.2

88.4
91.4

85.8
90.4

65.4
94.0

57.9
65.0

35.6
10.7

33.6
12.3

85.6
37.3

2.2
2.5

26.4
3.8

4.2
0.8

39.1
15.6

161

Table 21.$XVWUDOLDDUULYDOVDQGGHSDUWXUHVE\RFFXSDWLRQ

6HWWOHU$UULYDOV
1XPEHU

5,519
12.0
17,065
37.1
4,788
10.4
6,075
13.2
1,395
3.0
5,487
11.9
1,525
3.3
2,638
5.7
1,453
3.2
45,945
100.0
49.8
4,134
4.5
41,228
44.7
965
1.0



Occupations

MANAGERS & ADMINISTRATORS

Professionals
Associate professionals
Tradespersons
Advanced clerical & service
Intermediate clerical & service
Intermediate production & transport
Elementary clerical, sales, service
Labourer & related workers
Total workforce
Total in employment
Not in employment
Not in labour force
Not stated
7RWDO

6RXUFHDIMA (2000b).

3HUPDQHQW'HSDUWXUHV
'LIIHUHQFH
1XPEHU

4,605
18.2
+914
8,965
35.4
+8,100
2,899
11.4
+1,889
1,844
7.3
+4,231
990
3.9
+404
3,483
13.7
+2,004
555
2.2
+970
1,458
5.8
+1,180
532
2.1
+921
25,351
100.0
61.7
569
1.4
+3,565
15,079
36.7
+26,199
79
0.2
+886




Table 22. $XVWUDOLDWHPSRUDU\HQWUDQWVWRDXVWUDOLDZLWKWKHULJKWWRZRUN

E\RFFXSDWLRQ

Occupation

Managers /Admin
Professionals
Associate Professionals
Tradespersons
Advanced Clerical & Service
Intermediate Clerical & Service
Intermediate Product &
Transport

Working Holiday
Makers
Number
%
2,214
7,652
2,548
3,024
1,214
6,677
536

ELEMENTARY CLERICAL, SALES,

SERVICE

Labourers
Total Workforce
Not in Workforce
Not in Employment
Not Stated
TOTAL

6RXUFH: Unpublished data supplied by DIMA.

8.3
28.8
9.6
11.4
4.6
25.1
2.0

Temporary Business
Entrants
Number
%
17,100
16,270
6,788
1,020
458
2,310
150

37.7
35.8
15.0
2.2
1.0
5.1
0.3

2,106

7.9

1,038

2.3

607
26,578
15,182
12,598
25,546
79,904

2.3
100.0

262
45,394
18,326
350
29,872
93,942

0.6
100.0

162

%LUWKSODFH

39 399
36 201
42 298
36 765
42 869
36 337
43 973
36 197
46 188
38 170
35 907
32 003
44 200
35 451

560
61 440
605
71 427
629
83 743
683
94 396
651
103 105
897
118 995
847
132 351

1 307 052
938 507
1 376 272
1 010 689
1 462 731
1 106 611
1 616 250
1 169 796
1 762 263
1 257 834
1 856 350
1 335 277
1 901 688
1 398 227

87,663
3,081,298
89,512
3,445,753
95,211
3,870,950
100,630
4,152,025
108,269
4,111,737
118,039
4,169,988
119,029
4,532,756

163

9,927
17,353
10,094
16,854
11,013
17,657
11,704
18,153
12,789
19,196
17,264
17,917
20,265
20,813

38,699
26,087
40,947
27,430
42,543
27,710
45,192
28,585
49,144
30,278
53,440
29,421
54,943
29,975

777
47,144
931
49,225
924
53,209
858
62,113
1002
73,870
3705
53,715
4,858
66,992

1,327,329
976,634
1,374,289
1,047,694
1,480,535
1,143,824
1,619,427
1,217,780
1,746,860
1,285,038
1,839,515
1,349,177
1,898,565
1,433,693

78,313
3,040,620
82,807
3,403,557
90,134
3,819,995
97,453
4,119,563
106,278
4,092,044
104,268
4,174,825
108,959
4,526,243

&$7(*25<2)029(0(17
6HWWOHU /75HVLGHQW /79LVLWRU 675HVLGHQW 679LVLWRU 3HUPDQHQW
/7 /79LVLWRU 675HVLGHQW 679LVLWRU
$UULYDOV $UULYDOV $UULYDOV $UULYDOV
$UULYDOV 'HSDUWXUHV 5HVLGHQW 'HSDUWXUHV 'HSDUWXUHV 'HSDUWXUHV
'HSDUWXUHV

Australia-born
336
Overseas-born
69 432
1994-95
Australia-born
489
Overseas-born
86 939
1995-96
Australia-born
551
Overseas-born
98 588
1996-97
Australia-born
376
Overseas-born
85 376
1997-98
Australia-born
351
Overseas-born
76 976
1998-99
Australia-born
276
Overseas-born
83 867
1999-2000 Australia-born
378
Overseas-born
91 894
6RXUFH: DIMA Movement Data Base.

1993-94

<HDU
2,890,055
8,294,716
3,018,244
9,196,333
3,227,140
10,258,624
3,536,546
10,983,984
3,833,795
11,088,248
4,029,661
11,365,185
4,153,732
12,268,395

7RWDO

Table 23.$XVWUDOLDQXPEHUVRISHRSOHPRYLQJWRDQGIURP$XVWUDOLDE\FDWHJRU\RIPRYHPHQW5HVLGHQWVWDWXVDQGELUWKSODFH


Table 24. $XVWUDOLDQHWPLJUDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRFDWHJRU\RIPRYHPHQWUHVLGHQWVWDWXVDQG

ELUWKSODFH
<HDU
1993-94


Australia-born
Overseas-born
1994-95
Australia-born
Overseas-born
1995-96
Australia-born
Overseas-born
1996-97
Australia-born
Overseas-born
1997-98
Australia-born
Overseas-born
1998-99
Australia-born
Overseas-born
1999-2000 Australia-born
Overseas-born
Australia-born
7RWDO
Overseas-born


1HW0LJUDWLRQ
3HUPDQHQW /75HVLGHQW /79LVLWRU 675HVLGHQW 679LVLWRU
-9591
700
-217
-20277
9350
52079
10114
14296
-38127
40678
-9605
1351
-326
1983
6705
70085
9335
22202
-37005
42196
-10462
326
-295
-17804
5077
80931
8627
30534
-37213
50955
-11328
-1219
-175
-3177
3177
67223
7612
32283
-47984
32462
-12438
-2956
-351
15403
1991
57780
7892
29235
-27204
19693
-16988
-17533
-2808
16835
13771
65950
2582
65280
-13900
-4837
-19,887
-10,743
-4,011
3,123
10,070
71,081
5,476
65,359
-35,466
6,513
-90,299
-30,074
-8,183
-3,914
50,141
456,129
51,638
259,189
-236,899
187,660

6RXUFH: DIMA Movement Data Base.

164

$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO
$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO
$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO
$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO
$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO
$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO
$VLDQ&RXQWLHV

5HVWRI:RUOG

7RWDO

1R

1R

1R
1R

1R

1R
1R

1R

1R
1R

1R

1R
1R

1R

1R
1R

1R

1R
1R

1R

1R

6RXUFH: DIMA Movement Data Base.

7RWDO













2ULJLQ'HVWLQDWLRQ

32376
37.0
55052
63.0
87428
39524
39.9
59615
60.1
99139
32084
37.4
53668
62.6
85752
25247
32.6
52080
67.4
77327
27119
32.2
57024
67.8
84143
31057
33.7
61215
66.3
92272
187407
35.6
338654
64.4
526061

12929
16.4
66134
83.6
79063
13048
16.5
66158
83.5
79206
12983
16.2
67187
83.8
80170
14360
17.0
69998
83.0
84358
13064
19.2
54846
80.8
67910
13974
17.5
65677
82.8
79651
80358
17.1
390000
82.9
470358

305792
12.8
2081170
87.2
2386962
362743
14.1
2206599
85.9
2569343
386368
13.9
2399677
86.1
2786046
399075
13.2
2621022
86.8
3020097
427150
13.4
2764477
86.6
3191627
448743
13.6
2851171
86.4
3299914
2329871
13.5
14924116
86.5
17253987

41707
57.9
30325
42.1
72032
49965
59.2
34407
40.8
84372
57141
60.1
37938
39.9
95079
59636
57.5
44120
42.5
103756
61964
51.7
57928
48.3
119892
70084
52.6
63114
47.4
133198
340497
56.0
267832
44.0
608329

165

1712195
48.4
1823070
51.6
3535265
1998412
50.4
1967749
49.6
3966161
2102818
49.4
2149836
50.6
4252654
1902122
45.1
2317883
54.9
4220005
1769494
41.3
2518533
58.7
4288027
1886304
40.6
2765481
59.4
4651785
11371345
45.6
13542552
54.4
24913897

2918
10.8
24030
89.2
26948
3196
11.1
25474
88.9
28670
3587
12.0
26270
87.9
129857
4142
12.9
27843
87.1
31985
5622
16.0
29559
84.0
35181
6667
16.2
34411
83.8
41078
26132
13.5
167587
86.5
193719

&DWHJRU\RI0RYHPHQW

9699
14.2
58678
85.8
68377
9833
14.0
60420
86.0
70253
10720
14.5
63057
85.5
73777
11111
14.0
68311
86.0
79422
10559
12.7
72302
87.3
82861
10658
12.6
74260
87.4
84918
62580
13.6
397028
86.4
459608

'HSDUWXUHV

28128
56.1
22028
43.9
50156
30330
56.0
23803
44.0
54133
35868
57.0
27103
43.0
62971
42714
57.0
32158
43.0
74872
29470
51.3
27950
48.7
57420
35961
50.1
35889
49.9
71850
202471
54.5
168931
45.5
371402

334694
13.8
2087288
86.2
2421983
381575
14.5
2242784
85.5
2624359
409517
14.4
2427690
85.6
2837207
406706
13.4
2625191
86.6
3031897
431407
13.5
2757285
86.5
3188692
457127
13.7
2875131
86.3
3332258
2421026
13.9
15015369
86.1
17436395

1694457
48.6
1791906
51.4
3486363
1984940
50.8
1925189
49.2
3910129
2106623
50.0
2110392
50.0
4217015
1911498
45.5
2286823
54.5
4198321
1783177
41.7
2495916
58.3
4279093
1903534
41.1
2731668
58.9
4635203
11384229
46.0
13341894
54.0
24726123

6HWWOHU /RQJWHUP /RQJWHUP 6KRUWWHUP 6KRUWWHUP 3HUPDQHQW /RQJWHUP /RQJWHUP 6KRUWWHUP 6KRUWWHUP
DUULYDOV UHVLGHQWV YLVLWRUV
UHVLGHQWV YLVLWRUV GHSDUWXUHV UHVLGHQWV
YLVLWRUV UHVLGHQWV
YLVLWRUV

$UULYDOV

Table 25. $XVWUDOLDPRYHPHQWVWRDQGIURP$VLDE\FDWHJRU\RIPRYHPHQW

4174896
34.2
8039681
65.8
12214577
4873567
36.1
8612198
63.9
13485765
5157709
35.5
9362819
64.5
14520528
4776611
32.0
10145430
68.0
14922041
4559027
29.6
10835819
70.4
15394846
4864110
29.6
11558017
70.4
16422127
28405916
32.7
58553963
67.3
86959879

7RWDO

Table 26. $XVWUDOLDQXPEHURIRYHUVWD\HUV

31 December 2000
58,674*
30 June 2000
58,748*
December 1999
53,131*
June 1999
53,143
June 1998
50,949
December 1996
45,100
June 1995
51,307
June 1993
79,755
April 1992
81,400
April 1990
90,000
*:
Excludes unauthorised arrivals by air and by boat.
Note:
The introduction of the bridging visa scheme on 1 September 1994 influences the figures since prior to this time persons
who do not have a valid visa but had come to the Departments attention and were waiting for a visa determination or to leave the
country were regarded as overstayers. Subsequently these people were not considered overstayers.
6RXUFH: DIMA (2000a and c); DIMIA (2001b).

Table 27.6WRFNHVWLPDWHRIXQODZIXOQRQFLWL]HQVLQ$XVWUDOLDDVDW-XQH
Country of
Estimate Number of %age of
Country of
Estimate Number of %age of
Citizenship
of unlawful visitors and unlawful
Citizenship of unlawful visitors and unlawful
a
a
temporary citizens to
temporary citizens to
citizens
citizens
total
entrants to
total
entrants to
Australia temporary
Australia temporary
Jan 1995 entrants
Jan 1995 entrants
b
b
June 2000 and visitors
June 2000 and visitors
Ecuador
104
1,591
6.54 Russian Fed
169
31,975
0.53
Tonga
1,084
20,750
5.22 Ireland
873
193,425
0.45
Burma
150
5,284
2.84 Thailand
1,632
362,596
0.45
(Myanmar)
Vietnam
1,055
37,778
2.79 Spain
218
50,828
0.43
Pakistan
526
20,063
2.62 Norway
249
60,681
0.41
Samoa
417
15,940
2.62 Israel
209
55,843
0.37
Peru
113
4,344
2.60 Argentina
112
33,710
0.33
Bangladesh
279
11,527
2.42 Italy
822
255,914
0.32
Lebanon
452
19,129
2.36 Republic of
2,906
925,392
0.31
Korea
Iran
246
10,672
2.31 Netherlands
817
279,143
0.29
Nepal
169
7,334
2.30 Papua New
367
127,033
0.29
Guinea
Colombia
198
9,443
2.10 France
1,137
395,016
0.29
Philippines
3,796
201,593
1.88 Sweden
409
150,128
0.27
Brazil
280
14,889
1.88 Denmark
62
105,547
0.25
Greece
662
39,586
1.67 Malaysia
1,911
777,416
0.25
Poland
364
25,356
1.44 Austria
239
101,518
0.24
Turkey
254
17,942
1.42 USA
4,759 2,056,030
0.23
Egypt
142
10,723
1.32 South Africa
484
235,045
0.21
Chile
191
14,889
1.28 Germany
1,478
760,594
0.19
Sri Lanka
666
52,575
1.27 UK
5,931 3,148,431
0.19
Fiji
1,447
114,427
1.26 Switzerland
369
206,986
0.18
c
658
69,690
0.94 Singapore
1,250 1,049,760
0.12
HKSAR
PRC
3,746
407,183
0.92 Taiwan
966
852,897
0.11
Stateless
696
80,668
0.86 Japan
2,648 4,266,200
0.06
Portugal
230
29,873
0.77 Canada
997 2,056,030
0.05
Hungary
132
18,402
0.72 Australia
190
759,083
0.03
India
1,473
209,038
0.70 Other
3,834 2,280,966
0.17
 

Indonesia
3,977
647,292
0.61 7RWDO
a.
Estimate based on the cumulative number of unlawful citizens since January 1996 who are still living in Australia.
Unauthorised arrivals are not presented in this table.
b.
Number includes all unlawful non-citizens who arrived in the 12 months before January 1996.
Also, includes some entrants who have visited more than once in the period January 1995 June 2000.
c.
Disaggregated data only available since 1996-97.
6RXUFH: DIMA (2000a), p. 107.

166

Table 28. 0DLQVRXUFHFRXQWULHVIRUSHRSOHUHIXVHGLPPLJUDWLRQYLVDV

DW$XVWUDOLDQDLUSRUWV
Source Country
PRC
Iraq **
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Somalia
Thailand
Kuwait**
New Zealand
South Korea
Algeria
Other
7RWDO
**

1995-96
92
34
110
15
87
25
0
49
6
21
224


1996-97
235
90
124
205
110
94
19
40
12
61
360


1997-98
268
140
132
118
78
77
61
59
52
51
519


1998-99
112
325
97
58
30
93
32
92
159
87
1021


1999-2000
73
157
54
47
11
74
4
107
108
14
1045


2000-01
65
37
92
29
3
100
2
111
136
2
931


The figures used refer to the origin country of arrivals because citizenship is sometimes difficult to determine.

Source: DIMA (2000d); DIMIA (2001c).

Table 29. 1XPEHUVRIERDWVDQGSHUVRQVDERDUGDUULYLQJFODQGHVWLQHO\

LQ$XVWUDOLDDQGGHWHFWHG
Year
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000
2000-01
2001-02*
*

No. of Boats
3
5
3
4
6
21
14
13
13
42
75
54
6

Total Arrivals
224
158
78
194
194
1,071
589
365
157
920
4,174
4,141
1,212

Min/Max on Board
26/119
3/77
10/56
2/113
4/58
5/118
4/86
4/139
3/30
2/112
3/353
2/231
60/359

1 July to 8 November 2001.

6RXUFH: DIMA (2000d); DIMIA (2001c).

Table 30. $XVWUDOLDXQDXWKRULVHGERDWDUULYDOVPDLQRULJLQ
1999-2000
Nationality
Total
Iraqi
2,297
Afghan
1,263
Iranian
227
PRC
135
Sri Lankan
31
Turkish
26
Kurdish
22
Syrian
19
Bangladeshi
19
Other
136

6RXUFH: Ruddock (2001).

Nationality
Afghan
Iraqi
Iranian
Palestinian
Sri Lankan
PRC
Pakistani
Syrian
Kuwaiti
Other

167

2000-01
Total
2,269
994
544
159
59
25
13
13
10
55

%
54.0
24.0
13.0
3.8
1.4
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.2
1.3

Table 31. $XVWUDOLDQERDWSHRSOHE\HWKQLFLW\RUQDWLRQDOLW\

(WKQLFLW\
Chinese
Iraqi
Afghani
Sino-Vietnamese
Cambodian
Vietnamese
Turkish
Iranian
Bangladeshi
Sri Lankan
Irian Jayan - Indonesian Province
Kuwaiti
Algerian
Indian
Pakistani
Kurdish
East Timorese
Polish
Macau citizens
Romanian
Syrian
Indonesian
Palestinian
Moroccan
Jordanian
Senegalese
Sudanese
Hong Kong citizen
Kazakhstan
Nigerian
Papua New Guinean
Saudi Arabian
Somali
Bahrain
Myanmar
Malaysian
Stateless
To be determined
7RWDOERDWSHRSOHLQFOELUWKVLQ$XV

6RXUFH: DIMA (2000d).

168

1XPEHU
1 867
1 734
1 141
1 061
271
171
168
92
87
60
51
32
27
23
24
20
18
13
13
12
9
7
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1 348


Table 32. $XVWUDOLDGHWHQWLRQRIXQDXWKRULVHGDUULYDOV

Year

6RXUFH:

1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000

No. Unlawful
Non-Citizens
Detained
1 410
2 095
2 548
3 574
8 205

% Increase on Previous Costs for Detaining % Change on Cost

Yrs No. of
Unlawful
in Previous Yr
Overstayers Located
Non-Citizens $
n.a.
10.4 million
n.a.
45.0
9.3 million
-11.0
21.7
14.4 million
55.4
40.3
17.3 million
20.1
129.6
n.a.
n.a.

DIMA unpublished statistics.

Table 33. $XVWUDOLDERDWSHRSOHFXUUHQWVWDWXV

6RXUFH:


Granted Refugee Status
Temporary Protection Visa
Entry on Other Grounds
Total Granted Entry
Released on Bridging Visa
Escaped from Custody
In Custody
Total Remaining in Australia
Departures
7RWDO

1R
1212
2802
55
4069
24
6
1541
1571
3252



13.6
31.5
0.7
45.8
0.3
0.1
17.4
17.7
36.5


DIMA (2000f).

Table 34. $XVWUDOLDRYHUVHDVERUQSHUVRQVUHVLGHQWLQ$XVWUDOLDIRUOHVVWKDQ\HDUV

LQZRUNIRUFHE\HGXFDWLRQDOFDWHJRU\DQG
(GXFDWLRQDO&DWHJRU\
Higher Degree
Graduate Diploma
Degree
Diploma
Trade Certificate
Other Certificate
No Qualifications
7RWDO


2.3
0.7
6.7
4.5
10.1
9.6
66.1



2.5
0.6
8.1
4.7
8.7
10.4
65.0


6RXUFH: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1981, 1986 and 1996 One percentage Sample Tape of Population Census.


5.8
1.3
18.9
10.5
9.4
2.7
51.4


Table 35.$XVWUDOLD2YHUVHDVERUQSHUVRQVUHVLGHQWLQ$XVWUDOLDIRUOHVVWKDQ\HDUV
LQZRUNIRUFHE\RFFXSDWLRQDQG
2FFXSDWLRQDO&DWHJRU\
Managers, Administrators
Professionals
Associate Professionals
Trade and Related Workers
Advanced Clerical and Services


8.4
14.5
6.1
15.9


5.6
22.7
10.4
13.3
3.0

14.5
Intermediate Clerical, Sales
Elementary Clerical and Sales
Intermediate Production and Transport

13.3

14.0
7.6
10.4

27.2
Labourers and Related Workers
7RWDO



6RXUFH: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1986 and 1996 One percentage Sample Tape of Population Census.

169

13.6


Table 36. $XVWUDOLDFKDQJLQJSDWWHUQVRIHPSOR\PHQWE\ELUWKSODFH

-XQH-XQH
9DULDEOH

Total Workforce

Growth
Unemployment Rate
Participation Rate

M
F

6RXUFH: ABS (2000 and 20001d).

$XVWUDOLD%RUQ

2001
2000
2000-01
2001
2000
2001
2000
2001
2000

7,420,000
7,297,000
123,000
6.5
6.2
75.3
76.2
60.0
58.7

170

1RQ(QJOLVK
6SHDNLQJ
%RUQ

0DLQO\(QJOLVK
6SHDNLQJ%RUQ

1,383,700
1,369,100
14,600
8.2
7.4
63.2
62.8
44.4
45.8

1,015,400
998,300
17,100
5.8
5.2
73.1
72.3
54.8
55.4

Figure 1.&DWHJRULHVRILPPLJUDWLRQWR$XVWUDOLD
Refugee
3,429
Humanitarian
7,267

Special Humanitarian Program

3,022
Special Assistance Category
816
Spouse/ Fiancs
16 ,197
Parents
1,177

Family
19,896

Other
2,522

Employer Nominations
1,212
Business Skills
5,631
Distinguished Talents
67
Total Immigrants
92 ,272

Migration Program
52 ,377

Skill
32,350

Independent
16,419
Skilled Australian Linked
8,882
Regionally Linked
139

Special
131

Other Non Program

1,018
Other
32,628
New Zealand
31,610

6RXUFH: From data in DIMA (2000b).

171

Figure 2. $XVWUDOLDPLJUDWLRQSURJUDPRXWFRPHVE\VWUHDP

70000
60000
50000

UH
E 40000
P
X130000
20000
10000
2000-01
(planned)

1999-00

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

1990-91

1989-90

<HDU
Family

Skill

Special Eligibility

6RXUFH: DIMA Population Flows: Immigration Aspects, various issues.

Figure 3.$XVWUDOLDDQQXDOPLJUDWLRQ



Total Net
Settler Arrivals
Bristish Net(ethnic stock)
Australian Long-term Net

Total British immigration

Assisted immigration

180
160

180
160

140

140

120

120

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

-20

-20

-40

-40
-60

-60
1850

1860

1870

1880

1890

1990

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

<($5
6RXUFHPrice (1979); Hugo (1986); ABS Overseas Arrivals and Departures Bulletins; DIMA (2000b).

172

2000

Figure 4.$XVWUDOLDVKRUWWHUPPRYHPHQWVWR

5000000
4500000
4000000
3500000

UH 3000000
E 2500000
P
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2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
1998-99

1996-97

1994-95

1992-93

1990-91

1988-89

1986-87

1984-85

1982-83

1980-81

1978-79

1976-77

1974-75

1972-73

1970-71

Year

9LVLWRUV$UULYLQJ

5HVLGHQWV'HSDUWLQJ

6RXUFH: DIMA Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update, various issues.

Figure 5.$XVWUDOLDORQJWHUPDUULYDOVDQGGHSDUWXUHVWR

Source: DIMA$XVWUDOLDQ,PPLJUDWLRQ&RQVROLGDWHG6WDWLVWLFV and ,PPLJUDWLRQ8SGDWH, various issues.

140000

120000

100000

UH 80000
E
P
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60000
40000

20000

<HDU
Australian Residents Returning
Australian Residents Departing

173

Overseas Visitors Arriving

Overseas Visitors Departing

1999-2000

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

1991-92

1989-90

1987-88

1985-86

1983-84

1981-82

1979-80

1977-78

1975-76

1973-74

1971-72

1969-70

1967-68

1965-66

1963-64

1961-62

1959-60

Figure 6.$XVWUDOLDQHWSHUPDQHQWDQGORQJWHUPPRYHPHQWDVDSHUFHQWDJHRIWRWDOQHWPLJUDWLRQJDLQ

6RXUFHDIMAImmigration Update, various issues.

100.0
Permanent Movement
(%net)
Long-term Movement
(%net)

90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0

<HDU

174

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

0.0
1983

HJ
WDQ
HF
UH
3

Figure 7.7HPSRUDU\PLJUDWLRQWR$XVWUDOLDE\FDWHJRU\

2YHUVHDV6WXGHQWV

100000
90000
80000
70000

UH 60000
E 50000
P
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30000

<HDU

<HDU

1999-2000

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

1990-91

1989-90

1988-89

1987-88

7HPSRUDU\%XVLQHVV(QWUDQWV

1986-87

<HDU

<HDU

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

1990-91

1989-90

1988-89

1987-88

7RWDO

1986-87

GH 500000
XV 450000
V,
GH 400000
QWD 350000
U 300000
*
VD 250000
LV9 200000
I 150000
RU 100000
HE
50000
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1999-2000

V
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LV 150000
HP
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RU WQ 100000
HE ( 50000
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2000-01

1999-2000

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

1990-91

1989-90

1988-89

1987-88

:RUNLQJ+ROLGD\0DNHUV

1986-87

V
DV 80000
L9
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NU G 40000
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:
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10000
P
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2000-01

1999-2000

1998-99

1997-98

1996-97

1995-96

1994-95

1993-94

1992-93

1991-92

1990-91

1989-90

1988-89

1987-88

1986-87

20000
10000
0

6RXUFH: DIMA 3RSXODWLRQ)ORZV,PPLJUDWLRQ$VSHFWV, various issues; Ruddock (2002).

175

Figure 83HUPDQHQWGHSDUWXUHVRI$XVWUDOLDQERUQDQGRYHUVHDVERUQSHUVRQV
IURP$XVWUDOLDWR

50000
Overseas-born
Australia-born

45000
40000
35000

UH 30000
E 25000
P
X1
20000
15000
10000
5000
1999-2000

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

1991-92

1989-90

1987-88

1985-86

1983-84

1981-82

1979-80

1977-78

1975-76

1973-74

1971-72

1969-70

1967-68

1965-66

1963-64

1961-62

1959-60

<HDU
6RXUFH DIMA Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update, various issues.

Figure 9.$XVWUDOLDQUHVLGHQWORQJWHUPGHSDUWXUHVIURP$XVWUDOLD
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90000
80000
70000
60000

UH
E 50000
P
X 40000
1
30000
20000
10000

1999-2000

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

1991-92

1989-90

1987-88

1985-86

1983-84

1981-82

1979-80

1977-78

1975-76

1973-74

1971-72

1969-70

1967-68

1965-66

1963-64

1961-62

1959-60

<HDU

6RXUFH: DIMA Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update, various issues.

176

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

UH200000
E150000
100000
P
X1 50000

<HDU

177

1998
1999
2000

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1995

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1994

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1994

2WKHU1HZ=HDODQG
1993

40000
UH30000
E20000
P
X110000
0
1993

0
1992

+XPDQLWDULDQ

1992

<HDU

1991

1991

1989

1988

6NLOO

1990

1989

1988

<HDU

1990

1989

<HDU

1988

1987

80000

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

UH 60000
E 40000
P
X1 20000

1987

1986

UH
E20000
P
X110000

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

30000

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1977

Figure 10.$XVWUDOLDWUHQGVLQLQWDNHRIGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIVHWWOHUV


80000
UH 60000
E 40000
P
X1 20000
0

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6RXUFH: DIMA Immigration Update and Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics, various issues.

Figure 11. 'LVWULEXWLRQRIELUWKSODFHRIVHWWOHUVWR$XVWUDOLD




6RXUFH: DIMA, Immigration Update, various issues.

178

Figure 12.$XVWUDOLDVWXGHQWDUULYDOV

6RXUFH: Drawn from data in DIMA (2001).

Figure 13.$XVWUDOLDZRUNLQJKROLGD\PDNHUVDUULYDOV

6RXUFH: Drawn from data in DIMA (2001).

179

Figure 14. $XVWUDOLDWHPSRUDU\UHVLGHQWDUULYDOV

6RXUFH: Drawn from data in DIMA (2001).

Figure 15.$XVWUDOLDXQDXWKRULVHGDUULYDOVWR

6RXUFHDIMIA (2001c).

180

Figure 16.$XVWUDOLDERDWDUULYDOVE\QDWLRQDOLW\

4500
4000
3500

1XPEHU

3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500

Afghan

Iraqi

Other

2000-2001

1999-2000

<HDU

2001*

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

Total

6RXUFH: DIMIA (2001c); Ruddock (2001).

Figure 17. (VWLPDWHVRISULQFLSDODSSOLFDQWXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVE\PLJUDWLRQHQWU\VWUHDPDQGWLPHVLQFH
DUULYDO

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Family
5 Months

Skilled Humanitarian Total

18 Months

6RXUFH: DIMA (2000a)

181

3.5 years

Figure 18.(VWLPDWHVRISULPDU\DSSOLFDQWXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVE\(QJOLVKSURIHVVLRQ

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
English
Is Best/
Only
Lang.

Very
Well

5 Months

6RXUFH: DIMA (2000a).

Well

Not Well

Not At
All

Total

3.5 years

18 Months

Figure 19. :HOIDUHUHFLSLHQWUDWHVE\DJHJURXSVRIRYHUVHDVERUQDQG$XVWUDOLDERUQ

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
15 - 24
Years

25 - 44
Years

45 - 64
Years

65+
Years

Arrived before July 1986

Arrived 1991 - 1996

Arrived July 1986 - 1990

Australian - born

6RXUFH: DIMA (2000a).

182

Figure 20. 2SLQLRQSROOVRQDWWLWXGHVWRLPPLJUDWLRQWR

100
90

Too many

80

Too few

70
60
50
40
30
20
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0
195153 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

6RXUFH: Betts (2000).

Figure 21.2QVKRUHUHVLGHQFHJUDQWVWR

20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Year
Spouse

Skill

6RXUFH: DIMA Population Flows: Immigration Aspects, various issues.

183

Other

5(&(176,78$7,212)(&2120,&'(9(/230(17
$1'0,*5$7,21(03/2<0(17,1&+,1$
E\
=KDQJ)HQJ
Office for International Organisation Studies
,QWURGXFWLRQ
In 2001 the opening year of China's 10th Five-year National Economy Development Plan
the Chinese economy has managed to overcome unfavourable trends in the world economy and to
maintain a healthy growth. The GDP has passed a major turning point (the critical threshold of 9 000
billion yuan), reaching up to 9 580 billion yuan. At present, the Chinese economy is the 6th most
important in the world and its international competitive power has risen further.
The increase in the income tax went over 200 billion yuan that year, and the whole nations
revenue reached 1 400 billion yuan (+20%). The foreign exchange reserve reached USD 200 billion
for the first time. Savings deposit in urban and rural areas made a breakthrough of 7 000 billion yuan,
also for the first time, an increase of 800 billion yuan compared with the beginning of the year. An
overall increase has been recorded in fixed assets investment, real estate investment and foreign capital
investment. This reflects the full confidence of investors in the Chinese economy. The fixed assets
investment in 2001 surpassed 200 billion yuan, an increase of over 16%. The real estate investment
also increased quickly by 30%. More than USD 100 million of foreign capitals were being brought
into China every day in 2001, and the amount of FDI reached USD 47 billion. The total value of
foreign trade imports and exports went over USD 500 billion for the first time, reaching 509.77 billion
USD (an increase of 7.5%). The total export value was USD 266.16 million, an increase of 6.8%,
while import amounted to USD 243.61 million, an increase of 8.2% that adds up to a favourable trade
balance of USD 22.55 billion. In spite of a worldwide recession, the GDP was to increase further by
7.3% in 2002.
/DERXUPDUNHWDQGHPSOR\PHQW
The total volume of employment in China has been augmenting continually and the
employment structure has improved in 2000. By the end of that year, 711.5 million people were
employed, among whom 355.75 million in the primary sector, 160.09 million in the secondary sector
and 195.66 million in the tertiary sector, accounting for 50%, 22.5% and 27.5% of the total
respectively. 212.74 million were from urban areas, and among them, 116.12 million were from urban
units. In persons employed in urban units, 81.019 million worked in state-owned units, 14.993 million
in collectively owned units and 20.113 million in other ownership units. The registered unemployment
rate was 3.1% in 2000.
The effort in establishing basic living conditions and to guarantee re-employment for laid-off
workers from state-owned enterprises has achieved remarkable success. By the end of 2000, out of
6.57 million workers laid-off by state-owned enterprises, 93.5% entered re-employment service
centres established by enterprises with the help of local authorities. The 4.92 million laid off workers
185

who were re-employed in 2000 represent a 35.4% re-employment rate. By the end of June, 2001,
6.32 million people had been laid-off by state-owned enterprises.
The coverage of the unemployment insurance system has expanded continuously in 2000. By
the end of the year, 104.08 million persons were covered by this system, an increase of 5.56 million
(6%) over the previous year. The annual revenue of the unemployment insurance fund amounted to
16 billion yuan, an increase of 28%, and its expenditure was 12.3 billion yuan. The function of
unemployment insurance system has been obviously enhanced, with 3.3 million unemployed workers
receiving payments for unemployment benefits in 2000.
From January to June 2001, the average wage in urban areas was of 4 707 yuan, a 2.7%
increase on the previous year. Workers from state-owned units earned an average wage of 4 824 yuan,
an increase of 12.4% comparing with the previous year, while those from collectively-owned and
other units earned 3 037 yuan and 5 466 yuan respectively (+9.4% and +11.5%).
2YHUVHDVHPSOR\PHQW
Overseas employment in China started in the late 1970s and has developed remarkably in
recent years. It consists of two categories, project engineering and international labour co-operation,
and overseas employment of individuals. Project engineering refers to the contracting and
implementing of engineering projects abroad for foreign governments, enterprises, individuals and
international organisations on the basis of international bidding; international labour co-operation
refers to the export of labourers abroad for economic, social and science/technology activities under
contracts with foreign governments, institutions, enterprises and individual employers with a view to
earning remuneration. Overseas individual employment refers to labourers going abroad for
employment as individuals through arrangements made by employment service agencies. Among
these categories, the former has been carried out for over 20 years, while the second has developed in
the 1990s. Individual overseas employment, small in scale at present, is increasing gradually.
Project engineering and labour co-operation abroad are the major forms of overseas
employment for Chinese citizens. Most contracts are short-term (1-2 years) and workers have to return
to China after their expiration. The competent government department for these matters is the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation. In the past 20 years, the value of project engineering
and labour contracts has amounted to USD 120 billion, with more than 2.4 million workers overseas.
From January to November 2001, USD 9.5 billion worth of contracts were completed and 34 000 new
contracts worth USD 13.3 billion were signed. By the end of November, 460 000 workers were
working abroad.
In terms of market shares, Chinas projects in engineering and labour co-operation have
spread to about 180 countries and territories, forming a multilateral market structure of which Asia is
the centre. At present, 1 600 enterprises are allowed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Co-operation to engage in international projects. Thirty-four Chinese enterprises are listed among the
225 biggest international contractors in the world by the Engineering News Record (ENR) of the
United States.
Some problems remain, however, in project engineering and international labour cooperation. Compared with traditional labour exporting countries, China does not prioritise
international labour co-operation as much as international trade; the legislation and management
system in this matter are not perfect; there are not enough labour exporting channels to meet the needs;
some labour exporting activities are unlawful; labourers have difficulties adapting to the environment
186

and competition abroad; and the legal rights and interests of labourers are not sufficiently guaranteed.
In view of this situation, the government has taken a series of measures, such as taking labour
exporting as part of service trade and improving its regulations and rules, developing more
international labour co-operation channels and simplifying procedures for labourers going abroad, and
carrying out training to increase the workers technical and personal skills, including language ability
and knowledge on foreign countries.
The export of seamen including fishermen is an important part of overseas employment.
Since the 1970s, 140 000 seamen have been employed on foreign ships; 20 000 are working abroad at
present. The competent government department for matters concerning seamen working abroad is the
Ministry of Communications. The government has also adopted regulations in an effort to accelerate
the development of this sector and protect the interests of Chinese seafarers.
Individual overseas employment occupies a relatively small share in the total overseas
employment. The competent department responsible for the administration of this matter is the
Ministry of Labour and Social Security. According to its data, labourers employed abroad under the
arrangement of overseas employment service agencies have added up to over 80 000 since the early
1990s. The sectors in which they mainly engage are agriculture, garment, household activities, and
restaurants.
Concerning the overseas employment of professionals and skilled workers in China, there is
no data available from the government. The majority of overseas workers under contracts of project
engineering and international labour co-operation should be in this category. In addition, tens of
thousands of students study abroad every year. In 2000, for instance, about 40 000 students went
abroad to study, including 2 800 sent and subsidised by the government, 3 900 by units and
institutions and 32 000 travelling at their own expenses. According to statistics, about half of the
students who go abroad return after completing their studies, and the rest are employed as
professionals in foreign countries. There is no data about the number of students who entered the IT
industry abroad.
By the end of 2001, 46 employment agencies were operating with a license given by the
Ministry of Labour and Social Security to engage in overseas employment service. According to the
Provisional Regulation on Sino-foreign Joint and Co-operative Employment Service Agency issued in
December, 2001, the business of such agencies include, among other things, service for Chinese
labourers going abroad for employment. Foreign-funded employment service agencies, however, are
not allowed in China to this day.
(PSOR\PHQWRIIRUHLJQHUVLQ&KLQD
The employment of foreigners in China can be divided into two categories.
The first category consists of foreigners working in China with a status of invited foreign
experts. They are classified as experts in economics, technology and management; and experts in
education, science, culture and public health. The department responsible for foreign experts matters is
the State Bureau of Foreign Experts. Economy, technology and management experts include
engineers, senior technicians and managerial staff members. Their working areas are technology,
management and other service under agreements or economic and commercial contracts signed by the
Chinese government with foreign governments, international organisations and foreign partners;
contracted projects or key construction projects; and senior technicians and managers in foreignfunded companies. Education, science, culture and public health experts include teachers and
187

professionals engaging in education, media, and publication. This category of foreign experts also
includes those working in scientific research centres, academies, as well as public health, culture, art
and sports institutions.
In the past 20 years, the number of invited foreign experts has added up to over a million,
from more than 50 countries and territories. The services of foreign experts have developed in many
fields including industry, agriculture, key projects, culture and education, finance, commerce, health
and sport, news and publishing, law service, etc. By the end of 2000, 1 500 working units were
allowed to invite foreign experts in education, science, culture and public health. In the year 2000,
220 000 foreign experts were invited to work in China, that is, 8 times more than 10 yeas ago. In 2001,
50 foreign experts with outstanding contributions in their fields were awarded by the Friendship
Prize issued by the government (600 foreign experts from 51 countries in total have obtained this
award up to now).
The second category of foreigners working in China are those who have no permanent
residence status and are engaging in remunerated work in China. As opposed to some other countries
who sometimes suffer from a shortage of labour force, China has rich labour resources and low labour
costs; thus, the government has not adopted a policy that would attract external labourers. However,
along with the reform and the opening on the outside world, more and more exchanges develop in
economic, social and cultural fields, and the number of foreigners employed in China has increased.
To face the situation, the Chinese government has implemented a policy with a view to attracting
senior technical and managerial personnel but restricting the entry of unskilled foreign labourers.
In an effort to regulate the employment of foreigners in China, the government issued the
Rules for the Administration of Employment of Foreigners in China in 1996. According to these
Rules, employers have to apply for permission for the foreigners they wish to employ and obtain an
Employment License for Foreigners. The posts to be filled by foreigners should be those that cannot
be filled by qualified domestic employees at the time being.
The Rules stipulates that one of the following categories of foreigners can be exempted from
getting employment license and permission from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security:
Lforeign experts invited by the government or government departments and institutions that have the
Foreign Expert Card issued by the State Bureau of Foreign Experts; LL foreign workers engaging in
off-shore oil drilling operations without needing to go ashore; and LLL foreigners making commercial
performance with the Provisional Permit on Commercial Performance issued by the Ministry of
Culture.
The Rules also stipulates that wages and other remuneration of foreigners are to be provided
by the units employing them in accordance with the law and regulations concerned. The wages of
foreigners might be determined through consultation but can not be lower than minimum wage
standards. Their working time and holiday, vocational safety and health, as well as their social
insurance are to be handled in the light of provisions concerned.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security is responsible for the administration of
foreigners employment in China. According the Ministry, about 120 000 foreigners were employed in
China between 1996 and 2001. By the end of 2001, work permit holders amounted to 60 000.
The above two categories of foreigners employed in China are professional and managerial;
there is no data on their distribution by industry and no figure for the ones engaging in IT activities.
The number of foreigners working in China is obviously quite small compared with the huge labour
market of the country and the situation will not change a lot in the near future. However, the scale of
188

foreign employment in China has been growing gradually since the further opening of the country.
Along with the participation in the WTO, the labour market relations between China and the world
will be tighter and the opening of the tertiary sector will also attract more foreigners.
,OOHJDOIRUHLJQHPSOR\PHQW
The phenomenon is rare in China at present and strictly prohibited by the government.
According to the Implementing Rules of the Law on Control of Exit and Entry of Foreigners in China,
illegal foreign employment should be terminated and tined when detected and the foreigners
concerned are sent out of the country within a stated time if the case is serious. There is no available
data from the governmental department concerned about this phenomenon.

189

Table 1*URVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFWPLOOLRQ\XDQ

<HDU

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

*URVV
1DWLRQDO
3URGXFW
34560.5
46670.0
57494.9
66850.5
73142.7
76967.2
80579.4
88189.6

*URVV
'RPHVWLF
3URGXFW
34634.4
45759.4
58478.1
67884.6
74462.6
78345.2
82067.5
89403.6

3ULPDU\
VHFWRU
6882.1
9457.2
11993.0
13844.2
14211.2
14552.4
14472.0
14212.0

6HFRQGDU\
VHFWRU

7HUWLDU\
VHFWRU

16428.5
22372.2
28537.9
33612.9
37222.7
38619.3
40557.8
45487.8

11323.8
14930.0
17947.2
20427.5
23028.7
25173.5
27037.7
29703.8

3HUFDSLWD
*'3<XDQ
2939
3923
4854
5576
6054
6307
6547
7078

Table 2.0DLQLQGLFDWRUVRIQDWLRQDOODERXUVWDWLVWLFV
,WHP





,QFUHDVH5DWH


7RWDOSRSXODWLRQ







(PSOR\PHQWHQGRI\HDU





Urban employment
Unit employment
State-owned units
Collectively-owned units
Other ownership units

21 014
12 130.2
8 572.1
1 711.8
1 846.3

21 274
11 612.5
8 101.9
1 499.3
2 011.3

1XPEHURIVWDIIDQGZRUNHUV





8 336.1
1 651.9
1 785.4
3 466.9

7 877.5
1 446.5
1 934.5
3 404.0

(FRQRPLFDOO\DFWLYHSRSXODWLRQ







1.2
-4.3
-5.5
-12.4
8.9


SHUVRQV

State-owned units
Collectively-owned units
Other ownership units
Employment in urban private enterprises
and individuals
Rural employment

49 572

49 876

0.6

(DUQLQJVRIWKHXUEDQXQLWV













(PSOR\PHQW

-5.5
-12.4
8.4
-1.8

PLOOLRQ\XDQ

State-owned units
Collectively-owned units
Other ownership units
Total wages of staff and workers
(100 million yuan)
State-owned units
Collective-owned units
Other Ownership Units

995.8
1 870.1
9 875.5
7 160.8

950.7
2 259.1
10 656.2
7 612.9

-4.5
20.8
7.9
6.3

962.7
1 752.0

919.0
2 124.3

-4.5
21.3

$YHUDJHHDUQLQJRIWKHXUEDQXQLWV







(PSOR\PHQW\XDQ

State-owned units
Collectively-owned units
Other ownership units

8 443
5 758
10 142

$YHUDJHZDJH\XDQ



State-owned units
Collectively-owned units
Other ownership units

8 543
5 744
9 829

8UEDQXQHPSOR\PHQWUHJLVWHUHG

9 441
6 241
11 238

11.8
8.4
10.8





9 552
6 626
10 984


11.8
8.5
11.8





1XPEHURIUHWLUHG



190







Table 3)RUHLJQWUDGHDQGHFRQRPLFFRRSHUDWLRQ
,WHPV



7RWDOYDOXHRILPSRUWDQGH[SRUW











12 576.4
11 557.4
1 019.0

15 160.7
11 806.5
3 354.2

15 231.6
11 626.1
3 605.5







50%PLOOLRQ<XDQ

Total exports
Total imports
Balance
7RWDODPRXQWRIIRUHLJQFDSLWDOWREH





16 159.8
13 736.5
2 423.2





83.85
521.02
27.14

83.60
412.23
24.62

20 635.2
18 639.0
1 996.2


XVHGLQWKHVLJQHGDJUHHPHQW 
FRQWUDFWV86'PLOOLRQ

Foreign Loans
Foreign direct investment
Other foreign investment

79.62
732.77
3.71

5HJLVWHUHGIRUHLJQIXQGHG

58.72
510.04
41.82





623.80
87.50







7 742.29
4 672.87
3 137.12

7 785.68
4 635.49
3 166.82

8 246.75
4 839.50
3 371.99

HQWHUSULVHV
1XPEHURIUHJLVWHUHGHQWHUSULVHV

Total investment (USD 100 million)

Registered capital (USD 100 million)
Capital from foreign partners
(FRQRPLFFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKIRUHLJQ

7 153.22
4 414.85
2 897.96

7 534.70
4 598.14
3 029.87











92.43
23.90

101.99
26.32

117.19
29.91

FRXQWULHV WHUULWRULHV86'

PLOOLRQ
&RQWUDFWHGYDOXH

Contracted projects
Labour service

77.28
25.45

85.16
28.40

Table 4.(FRQRPLFFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKIRUHLJQFRXQWULHVRUWHUULWRULHV
<HDU

7RWDO
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
&RQWUDFWHG
3URMHFWV
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
/DERXU&R
RSHUDWLRQ
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

1XPEHURI
FRXQWULHVRU
WHUULWRULHVZLWK
FRQWUDFWVVLJQHG


178
181
188
187
181

1XPEHURI
FRQWUDFWV

&RQWUDFWHG
YDOXH

9DOXHRI
EXVLQHVVIXOILOOHG
86'PLOOLRQ


24 891
28 442
25 955
21 126
23 565


102.73
113.56
117.73
130.02
149.43


76.96
83.83
101.34
112.35
113.25

1 634
2 085
2 322
2 527
2 597

77.28
85.10
92.43
101.99
117.19

58.21
60.36
77.69
85.22
83.79

22 723
25 743
23 191
18 173
20 474

22.80
25.50
23.90
26.32
19.91

17.12
21.65
22.76
26.23
28.13

191

+21*.21*&+,1$*
E\
6WHSKHQ:.&KLX
Chinese University of Hong Kong

,QWURGXFWLRQ
Since the mid-1980s, Hong Kong has undergone significant economic restructuring. With
the emergence of new low cost competitors in the Asian-Pacific region and the erosion of its own cost
advantage, the growth of manufacturing industries and the mainstay of its economy began to slacken.
Consequently, a wave of outward investment commenced, leading to de-industrialisation and
structural transformation into a service-based economy. In 1997 and 1998, this trend was amplified by
the Asian financial crisis. The crisis and the resultant hike in interest rate burst the property bubble late
in the year, triggering off a process of downward adjustment in asset prices. This sent ripples to the
whole economy and companies embarked on retrenchment measures to cut cost and raise productivity.
Unemployment has risen and output contracted. Although in 2000 there were signs for economy to
pick up, the global slow down since the second half of 2001 quickly plunged Hong Kong back into a
deep recession.
In contrast to the economic upheaval, the dire forecasts concerning the return of Hong Kong
to Chinese sovereignty did not materialize. The Chinese government continued to take a back seat to
Hong Kong local administration and a healthy respect for the autonomy of local affairs appears to be
evident. As the changeover in sovereignty has not caused major changes in the political framework
and personnel, there is also a fundamental continuity in international migration policies, both in and
out of the territory. One controversial area was actually the demands for a change to colonial policy,
LH the right of abode issue which I will discuss in greater length below. Issues related to the
employment of foreign domestic helpers in Hong Kong also arose, which will be tackled in this paper.
This study undertakes the task of sketching recent economic changes in Hong Kong and
examines the relationship between the process of restructuring and the trends in international labour
migration. I will first review some of the major indicators of Hong Kongs macroeconomic conditions
and the structural transformation in the economy. The second section will examine the combined
effects of macroeconomic trends and industrial restructuring on the labour market. With these
backgrounds, this paper will move on to the third section, where the patterns of international
emigration and immigration of labour is discussed. The fourth section will describe the policy-making
process on immigration.
*

The author wishes to acknowledge the kind support of the Labour Department and Immigration
Department by providing unpublished information on immigration into Hong Kong. Comments and
supplementary information from the Labour Department, the Immigration Department, and other
government bodies on various versions of this paper are gratefully acknowledged. Particular thanks
have to be extended to Mr Arthur Fung Ying-lun of the Labour Department for commenting on the
drafts of this report. All omissions and errors are my responsibility.

193

$QRYHUYLHZRIWKHHFRQRP\
Stepping into the nineties, the Hong Kong economy appeared to have settled down to a
pattern of slow growth. Real economic growth rates in the first few years of the nineties were
obviously lower than in the late 1980s but GDP growth rebounded to 6.3% and 6.1% in 1992 and 1993
respectively. Such a revival was much less spectacular than the ones to which Hong Kong was
accustomed in the previous decades, but the economy has apparently become more stable. The real
GDP growth rate, however, still exhibited a long-term downward trend, dropping steadily to the 4.5%
in 1996. With the high interest rate induced by the crisis and a (property and stock) market slump,
GDP growth began to slacken in 1997. While the annual figure still recorded a 5% growth, the
economy stepped into recession since October. The recession was even more pronounced in the
second half of 1998 and the year 1998 eventually charted a 5.3% decline in real GDP change, a record
since the early 1980s. In the second half of 1999 and in 2000, the economy appeared to pick up again,
reaching 10.5% in 2000. Stepping into 2001, however, it was obviously slowing down and in the third
quarter, negative growth was registered once again because of the repercussions of the global
recession (Table 1).
On the external trade front, total exports of goods continued to grow in real terms until 1998,
albeit at a much slower rate. Of course, by the mid-1990s, much of Hong Kongs exports consisted of
re-exports rather than exports of domestic production. This appears to signal Hong Kong's
transformation from an export-oriented economy to a trans-shipment centre. The year 2000 saw
substantial growth (17.1%) in exports, only to be in the red again in 2001. Gross domestic fixed capital
formation recorded an impressive growth rate in 1997 after a long period of slow growth in the
eighties, while the public sector played an important role in this revival of investment. government
infrastructural projects and private sector property development contributed to the high rate of growth
in 1997 but the bursting of the bubble economy led to a substantial downturn in investment activities.
Growth in private consumption expenditures, on the other hand, began to slacken in 1995 and 1996,
but 1997 saw a rebound in private consumption owing to the handover celebrations and bubble
economy. As Table 1 shows, private consumption declined in the wake of the financial crisis.
Government consumption has been holding steady and continued to be an important component of
overall economic growth. Consistent with the reversal of trends in 2001, all major components of GDP
recorded much lower rates of growth in the first three quarters, with the contraction of exports and
imports contributing to the overall negative growth in the third quarter.
More importantly, the cyclical downturn coincided with the tremendous structural
transformation of the economy. In the 1980s, the share of manufacturing industries in the national
product declined relative to other sectors. The tertiary sector also overtook manufacturing as the highgrowth sector. In terms of contribution to the GDP, financing and business services had very
impressive growth rates in the past few years, so had the commerce (wholesale, retail, export and
import trades, hotels and restaurants) sector.
The structural transformation of the Hong Kong economy is partly a reflection of the
restructuring in the manufacturing sector since the mid-1980s. While the employment implications of
the industrial restructuring will be discussed in the next section, here I will focus on the underlying
mechanism of the process: massive outward relocation of manufacturing production (see also Lui and
Chiu, 1993, 1994). An abundant supply of low-cost land and labour and the implementation of market
reforms have prompted manufacturers in Hong Kong to relocate their production sites across the
border and into South China. Direct investments in both directions between Hong Kong and China
have further tied the two economies together, so that besides the inflow of Chinese investment to
Hong Kong, Hong Kong investment topped all other countries and grew at a rapid rate. At the end of
1995, the value of realized Hong Kong direct investments in China reached USD 20.4 billion. Some
194

42% of all foreign direct investment came from Hong Kong (&KLQD 6WDWLVWLFDO <HDUERRN, 1996,
p. 598).
The prime variable in Hong Kongs labour market changes is undoubtedly the dazzling pace
of industrial restructuring and structural change. The magnitude of the change can perhaps be gauged
by the sectoral distribution in employment, as shown in Table 3. Even in absolute terms, the number of
workers employed in manufacturing was dwindling in the 1980s. In line with the relocation of
manufacturing production to low-cost countries, the number of workers engaged in manufacturing as
reported by the General Household Survey was almost halved from 918 600 in 1987 to 558 300 in
1994. The commerce sector (wholesale and retail trade and import/export) now becomes the largest
employer, increasing its employment from 627 900 to 849 000 during the same period. The financial
and business services sector also recorded a growth in workers engaged. During the decade before
1994, manufacturing employment slumped by 39.2%, while financial and business services and
transport and communication shot up 132% and 64% respectively. Growth rates were equally
impressive in commerce and community services. The trend continued well into 1998, with the share
of manufacturing employment dropping further and the commerce sector increasing.
7KHODERXUPDUNHW
After a period of tight labour market, labour market began to loosen up in the 1990s.
Between 1992 and 1994, 181 000 more persons entered the labour market than those who exited.
Coupled with the relocation of low-skill manufacturing jobs overseas, the level of unemployment
steadily climbed up. Unemployment rate started to drop in 1996. However, since the onset of the
Asian financial crisis, unemployment began to rebound. In 1998, unemployment rate stood at over 5%,
but by 1999 it finally exceeded 6%, an all-time high since the 1980s. During the short-lived rebound
of the economy in 2000, unemployment dropped back from 6% to below 5%. In the first three quarters
of 2001, however, unemployment rate climbed steadily again and approached 5.3% during the third
quarter while underemployment reached 2.5%.
Real wages grew at a slow rate for craftsmen and operatives, and had actually declined in
1994, 1995 and 1998. Middle level employees like clerical and sales workers enjoyed a more healthy
growth, but their wages also dropped by 1.3% in 1995. During the height of the Asian Crisis, real
wage changes were negative and zero for craftsmen and middle-level employees respectively. Before
1997, the high inflation rate had eroded the growth in money wages but after 1998, deflation had
actually turned stagnant or declining money wages into positive real wage growth. Aggregate figures
are also likely to mask divergent trends across the different sectors, as Hong Kong experienced a rapid
structural transformation. Operatives in the manufacturing industries, for example, suffered a real
decline in wages over the last decade, while clerical, technical and supervisory employees in the same
industries had a handsome growth (Census and Statistics Department, 1999D). In retailing, wages grew
quickly, but restaurants and fast food shops had only a sluggish growth. The banking and insurance
industry also recorded faster wage hike. The differentiation of the market position between rank and
file workers and managerial and professional employees is also becoming obvious, as pay rises of the
latter categories have exceeded those of all workers in the past few years. Even after the Asian Crisis,
managers and professionals continued to enjoy much higher real wage growth than other employees.
(PLJUDWLRQ
Hong Kong has no legal restriction nor precise records on emigration. Hong Kong residents
now enjoy as much freedom of travelling out of the SAR as under British rule. Because of this, when a
195

Hong Kong resident departs from the territory, no question is asked about his or her departure
(permanent/temporary; purpose of the trip). Hence, the crucial question in a emigration move is
whether the host country is willing to accept or reject the migrant. Even though the government has no
precise information about the number of emigrants, it does make an estimate of the overall annual
number, based on three sources, namely, information supplied by various foreign diplomatic
representatives in Hong Kong on the number of visas issued, the number of certificates of no-criminal
conviction issued by the Hong Kong police (often used for visa application), and the balance of
departures and arrivals of Hong Kong residents over the year (Skeldon et al., 1995, p. 91). The precise
method of estimation is unknown and the estimates are also understandably crude.
From Figure 2, it is obvious that emigration out of Hong Kong accelerated after 1987,
jumping from 30 000 to 45 800 between 1987 and 1988. From 1989 to 1990, the annual figure of
emigrants further surged from 42 000 to 62 000, by some 48%. In 1992, emigration peaked at 66 000.
The increase in emigration after 1987 was undoubtedly related to the anxiety generated by the 1997
issue and the prospective restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. In particular, the 1989
Tiananmen Incident triggered off the surge in emigration after the turn of the 1990s. After 1989, it
appeared that a larger number of people in Hong Kong wanted to obtain a foreign passport as a form
of insurance policy. Even if they do not intend to stay permanently in their host countries, they feel
the need for an exit door if the situation in Hong Kong turned to the worst.
The favoured emigration destinations are Canada, the United States and Australia, which
accounted together for about 85% of all departures. However, owing to the economic recession in the
western economies and a general tightening of immigration policies in these countries, there has been
a consistent decline in emigration from Hong Kong. Domestic unemployment has forced countries like
Australia and Canada to cut back on its annual intake of immigrants (Skeldon, 1994). Furthermore, as
1997 was drawing near, it appeared that Hong Kong people were accepting the IDLW DFFRPSOL of
returning to Chinese sovereignty and that their confidence about the future of Hong Kong was
beginning to rise. For example, the number of departures from Hong Kong to Canada dropped from
1995's 31 663 to 29 954. The number of applicants also declined precipitately from 13 292 in 1995 to
11 298 in 1996 and further to 2 224 during January to August in 1997.1 In 2000, the estimated number
of emigrants reached 11 900, an all-time low since 1987.
In recent years, the return movement of emigrants has become more commonplace, as the
pool of potential returnees has been much enlarged by the surge in emigration in previous years. As
the early emigrants fulfil the residence requirement for citizenship in their host countries, the
likelihood of their returning increases. Added to this is the economic recession in Canada, the most
popular destination for Hong Kong migrants, and the lack of good employment opportunities for new
Asian immigrants in other destination countries. A government estimate states that at least 12% of the
total number of persons who emigrated in the ten years before 1994 have returned (Government
Information Service, 1995, p. 116). An unofficial study also estimates that the percentage of returnees
climbed sharply from 27.9% of all emigrants in 1994 to 60.3% in 1995.2 While there were some
earlier concerns that these returnees might add to Hong Kong's employment problems, the fact that
they are mostly professionals should actually help Hong Kong alleviate its skill shortages.

$SSOH'DLO\, 17 November, 1997.

$SSOH'DLO\, 11 September, 1997.

196

,PPLJUDWLRQ
While in the early 1990s, the primary concern over international migration in Hong Kong
was with emigration and the brain drain problem, by the mid-1990s, the focus of public discussion
shifted to that of immigration, mainly over the inflow of immigrants from China (Skeldon, 1994).
Before October, 1980, while immigration control was maintained between the border of China and
Hong Kong, a touch-base policy was adopted, which allowed illegal immigrants from China to stay
if they reached the city. In late 1970s, there a wave of illegal immigrants came from China, so that in
1980, the touch-base policy was abolished (Government Information Service, 1981). From that time
onwards, only legal immigrants from China were allowed to stay, and an informal agreement was
reached between Hong Kong and China allowing only 75 people to come to Hong Kong every day on
one-way exit permits. Thus, the new system allows a yearly maximum of 27 000 to 28 000 immigrants
from China. When 1997 drew closer, the daily quota was lifted to 105 and then further to 150 in July,
1995. Since the exit permits were mainly issued by the Chinese government to those who had direct
relatives in Hong Kong, the increase in the daily intake was deemed as necessary to minimize the
shock after 1997 when a large number of Chinese family members of Hong Kong residents would then
acquire the legal right to settle in Hong Kong. The number of legal entrants for residence from China
therefore rose steadily from 38 218 in 1994 to 61 179 in 1996.
Apart from Chinese immigrants, people of other nationalities can reside in Hong Kong with
residence visas. In 2000, a total of 13 708 did so, mostly on the ground of family reunion (Table 5).
Despite the increase in the daily quota, the return to Chinese sovereignty has not changed the basic
policy on Chinese immigration, that is, it has to be regulated within a limit manageable to the SAR.
Border control has actually been implemented with more vigilance since the handover, as the
reunification brought about a higher level of cooperation between the SAR government and the local
authorities in neighbouring Mainland region.
The return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty did bring some changes in its immigration
polices. One change was the end put to the previous practice of allowing British citizens to stay for
one year without a visa. Now they are allowed to stay for 6 months and British visitors are subject to
visitors conditions with effect from 1 April, 1997, meaning restrictions have been placed on their
employment in Hong Kong. According to government figures, about 25 500 Britons resided and could
take up employment in Hong Kong in 1996. As a journalist reported at the eve of the handover: Once
the Union Jack is hauled down for the last time on the night of June 30, the British in Hong Kong will
be just another group of expatriates seeking to make the best of Hong Kongs famous ability to breed
fortunes overnight ((OHJDQW, 1997, p. 52).
Another major change in immigration policy is the definition of permanent residents.
According to the Basic Law, Article 24, the definition of permanent residents with right of abode
includes:3

1.

Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the HKSAR;

2.

Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of
not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the HKSAR;

3.

Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in
categories (1) and (2).

7KH%DVLF/DZRIWKH+RQJ.RQJ6SHFLDO$GPLQLVWUDWLYH5HJLRQRIWKH3HRSOH
V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD,
Chap. 3, Art. 24.

197

4.

Persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered Hong Kong with valid travel
documents, have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less
than seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of permanent residence before
or after the establishment of the HKSAR.

5.

Persons under 21 years of age born in Hong Kong of those residents listed in category
(4) before or after the establishment of the HKSAR; and

6.

Persons other than those residents listed in categories (1) to (5), who, before the
establishment of the HKSAR, had the right of abode in Hong Kong only.

Hence, under the Basic Law all children who are of Chinese Nationality and who were born
of parents who are permanent residents would also be considered as Hong Kong citizens under
category (3) above. This is a major change from the previous policy under the colonial government
because while children of Hong Kong citizens born in Mainland China were not considered as Hong
Kong citizens, they now enjoy the right to permanent residence. This policy change, however, led to a
major controversy between the government on the one hand and persons born in the Mainland to Hong
Kong permanent residents on the other, and even created a constitutional crisis. I shall review this
controversy in details in the last section.
Another category of people allowed to take up residence in Hong Kong are those with an
employment visa (Figure 3 and Table 6). British citizens used to be the exception because they were
allowed to stay for a 12-month period and could take up employment during their stay. As mentioned,
this privilege was repealed at the return to Chinese sovereignty. People of other nationalities, if they
are highly skilled or have professional qualifications, can apply for an employment visa with the
guarantees of employment from their company or employer. What constitutes skilled and
professional, however, often has to be judged on a case-by-case basis but the general rule is that the
granting of such employment visas is limited to professionals, specialists, administrators and
managerial personnel who possesses skills, knowledge or experience that are of value to and not
readily available in Hong Kong. The number of employment visas approved increased steadily since
the late 1980s, probably due to the local shortage in managerial and professional personnel, especially
those with good English proficiency. Since 1995, the total number of employment visas approved has
been on a decline, largely as a result of the slowing down in local economic activities. Into the new
century, however, the government has stepped up with its efforts to draw mainland professionals into
Hong Kong (see below).
Apart from the skilled and professional employees, the large group of migrant labourers are
the foreign domestic helpers (FDHs). Their entrance is not subject to a quantitative quota; any family
with a need for a domestic helper can apply for a permit to hire one from overseas, mainly from the
Philippines but also Thailand and Indonesia. Mainland Chinese cannot be hired as domestic helpers
this way because of the official fear of the administrative difficulty of monitoring their activities since
they are indistinguishable in appearance from the locals. If mainlanders could be employed as FDHs,
it would be difficult to prevent abuse, such as Hong Kong residents seeking to bring in their family
members from the Mainland on the pretext of employing them as domestic helpers. Furthermore, any
change in the FDH policy in the direction of relaxing the restriction against Mainlanders might be
misinterpreted as a general relaxation of Hong Kong's immigration control.4
The number of FDHs in Hong Kong increased by over 10% in the first few years of the
1990s, only to slow down since 1996 (Table 6). The reduced inflow of FDHs is possibly due to two
4

Private correspondence from the Labour Department, 23 January, 1998, p. 3.

198

reasons. First, there is a saturation effect as many families needing a FDH have already hired one.
Second, the slow-down in the economy and the rise in unemployment in 1995 probably had a
dampening effect. Surprisingly, the onset of the financial crisis had no significant impact on the
coming of FDHs as their number continued to grow over 1998. In 2000, the total rose further to
216 790 or by 11.9% since the year before (Table 6). While the aggregate number of FDHs in Hong
Kong has apparently not been adversely affected by the recession, the latters effect can still be felt in
another area, that is, the terminations of FDH contracts by existing employers. According to records of
the Immigration Department, the number of applications by FDHs for pre-mature change (LH., before
the normal expiry date of the contract) of employers (for a variety of reasons, but it should be a major
cause) rose from 20 913 in 1997 to a high 28 617 in 1998. However, the number dropped in 1999 to
23 388 and to 14 729 in 2000. Between January and November, 2001, a total of 7 504 applications
were received.5 This suggests that after the initial impact of the Asian Crisis, the employment
relationships of FDHs have in fact become more stable over time. Moreover, these numbers are fairly
small compared with the total number of FDHs in Hong Kong, indicating Hong Kong employers are
not prone to dismiss their FDHs so easily. Nor do FDHs leave their employers easily, as the number of
applications for change of employers also dropped between 1999 and 2000. In terms of national
origin, according to official records, Filipinas are still the largest group of FDHs in Hong Kong, but
the number of Indonesians has been growing fast in the second half of the 1990s. In 1995, they
accounted for 10.6% of all FDHs, but by 2000, they were already more than a quarter of the total
(Table 7).
The resilience of the number of FDHs amidst the recession perhaps suggests how important
they are. The coming of foreign domestic helpers has done a great service to many middle-class
families (including the authors family); in fact, many married women would not have been able to
stay in the labour market if FDHs did not take up the household chores and child-caring. As the
government maintains: They enjoy the same rights and benefits as local workers do under existing
labour legislation. They are entitled to all rights and benefits under the Employment Ordinance such as
rest days, statutory holidays, etc. We take a serious view on non-compliance of labour laws."6 While
obviously there are still rooms for improvement and criticisms from migrant worker groups can be
heard from time to time, one must give credit to the Hong Kong government for its vigilance on the
basic rights of FDHs.7 Apart from enforcing the regulations, the Labour Department also organizes
various promotional activities to enhance the FDH's awareness of their employment rights and
benefits. A guidebook on the regulations over the employment of FDHs and their rights has been
published in five languages (English, Chinese, Tagalog, Thai and Indonesian) and widely distributed
to employers and FDHs free of charge.
Of course, the best regulation could not entirely eliminate abuses, and reports of verbal
abuse, overwork, helpers not receiving sufficient food and even cases of physical assault can be seen
from time to time in the local press.8 The Labour Department handled 2 461 cases of claims lodged by
FDHs. These cases account for only 1% of the total number of 213 100 FDHs in Hong Kong,
suggesting that the large majority of the employment relationships are amicable. These cases,
however, accounted for some 7.9% of the total number of claims handled by the Department (FDHs in
turn account for about 6% of the total labour force in 2001), which indicates the Departments central
5

Unpublished information supplied by the Immigration Department.

Government Information Service press release, Foreign domestic helpers urged to report
deprivations, March 12, 2001. http://www/info.gov.hk/gia/general/200103/12/0312212.htm.

For a critical view, please see Asian Migrant Centre, 1999, $VLDQ0LJUDQW<HDUERRN.

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 14 October, 1997.

199

role in regulating and mediating disputes between FDHs and their employers. Most of these cases are
resolved through the conciliation of the Labour Department, while others are transferred to the Labour
Tribunal and the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board for adjudication.
Other areas of concern regarding FDHs are the overcharging of commissions by employment
agencies and the underpayment of salaries. Under the Employment Ordinance and Employment
Agency Regulations, the operator of an employment agency is not allowed to charge a job-seeker a
commission of more than 10% of her first months salary or any other fees, such as processing or
registration fees. The maximum penalty for violation is $ 50 000 for each offence. In 2000 and 2001,
the operators of two employment agencies were convicted for overcharging FDHs and were fined
$ 30 000 each. In the same period, the Labour Department has revoked the licenses of two
employment agencies for overcharging and aiding and abetting the breach of condition of stay of
FDHs respectively.9 Despite this regulation and vigorous enforcement, it is difficult for the authorities
to control overcharging if it happens outside of Hong Kong. Hence, they may not be able to come to
the FDHs assistance if their agency at home overcharges them.
Besides, there are also occasional press reports about underpayment of FDH salaries. It is
reported in newspapers that Indonesians are particularly vulnerable to such abuses. Agencies and
employers sometimes conspired to enter into false contracts with the FDH by paying them less than
the contracted salaries, sometimes as little as half of the contracted salaries. The government, on its
part, made public its concern over such cases and issued statements urging underpaid FDH to report
their cases. It also maintained that if a FDH was dismissed as a result of reporting the above offences
and the case was verified to be true after investigation, the Immigration Department would exercise
discretion and consider the FDH application for change of employment in Hong Kong.10
The magnitude of the inflow of foreign labour can also be gauged by a stock measure,
namely, the number of foreign (excluding Chinese) nationals in Hong Kong as reported by the 1991
Census, the 1996 By-Census and the 2001 Census (Table 9). Not all of them are migrant workers,
because some could be dependant of expatriates working here. Still, their number rose sharply from
282 707 to 369 627 from 1991 to 2001. The share of foreign nationals in the total population was 5.1%
and 5.5% in 1991 and 2001 respectively. In 2001, the Filipinos were by far the largest group,
accounting for 38.9% of the total, and their number more than doubled from 64 658 in 1991 to
143 662 in 2001. The population of British nationals (with right of abode outside Hong Kong) dropped
drastically from 68 502 in 1991 to 25 418 in 2001. The stability of the share of foreigners in the total
population is therefore largely a result of the drop in the coming of Britons to Hong Kong after the
return to Chinese sovereignty.
7KHPLJUDWLRQRIKLJKO\VNLOOHGZRUNHUV
As mentioned earlier, highly skilled workers are allowed to apply for an employment visa
and take up residence in Hong Kong (Figure 3 and Table 6). While the inflow from other countries
through this channel is declining (see the above section), the business community has been demanding
for a relaxation of entrance of Mainland Chinese professional and highly-skilled employees. It is
argued that Hong Kong has a severe shortage of highly-skilled staff to sustain research and
development efforts as well as the surge of Mainland operations of local companies.

I am grateful to the Labour Department for supplying this information.

10

Government Information Service press release, 28 February, 2000.

200

Furthermore, the scheme will also serve to resolve the previous anomaly that although Hong
Kong has always extended an open hand to overseas professionals, the restriction on highly-qualified
Mainland Chinese had always been much stricter. After the conclusion of an earlier pilot scheme in
December, 1999, the government finally implemented an Admission of Talents Scheme to attract
Mainland Chinese talents into Hong Kong. While primarily aimed at Mainland residents, it is also
open to Mainland residents currently living overseas, former Mainland residents who have settled in
Macao, nationals of Bulgaria, Romania and Mongolia, and other persons who may be admitted for
employment under the existing policy. Successful candidates will usually be granted employment
entry permits/visas with an initial stay of 12 months upon entry. The candidates may apply for an
extension their limit expires. The extension of stay will be approved only if the candidates continue to
fully meet the eligibility criteria.11
The applicants under the Admission of Talents Scheme must possess outstanding
qualifications, expertise or skills which are needed but not readily available in Hong Kong. They must
have good academic qualifications, normally a doctorate degree in the relevant field. They may also
supply supporting documents, such as their publications, research studies or relevant documents on
experience, to demonstrate that their outstanding abilities or achievements are not readily available in
Hong Kong.12 A Selection Committee composed of the Secretary for Security (the Chair) and 14 nonofficial members was formed to screen all applications. The membership of the Committee comes
from a wide range of backgrounds: trade unionists, academics, researchers and businessmen.13
In 2000, 369 visas were granted under the scheme and between January and August, 2001,
169 applications were approved.14 The applications have been vigorously vetted. For example, by 7
October, 2000, 349 entry applications were received under the Scheme and only 74 were approved.15
Some 166 were turned down, 53 were withdrawn, and the remaining 56 cases were still being
processed by that time. On their part, the government denied that the low approval rate is due to its
stringency in handling applications under the Scheme but instead reflected the great care it has
exercised in processing the applications. Some applications, for example, had been turned down
because the level of salaries offered to the appointee is unreasonable and in many cases lower than
the level in the local market. Some applicants did not have the relevant training or work experience or
failed to show they could enhance Hong Kong's competitiveness. Besides, competition for the best
talent is also intense throughout the region.16 The government maintained that its purpose is to attract
the best talent, not to import cheap labour through the back door. It argued that more time is necessary

11

Government Information Service press release, 16 December, 1999, Government announces details
of Admission of Talents Scheme, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia.

12

Answer to a question from the Hon Yeung Yiu-chung by the Secretary for Education and Manpower,
Mr. Joseph W.P. Wong, in the Legislative Council. 17 November, 1999.
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199911/17/1117147.htm

13

Government Information Service press release, 9 December, 1999, 14 appointed to Selection

Committee on Admission of Talents Scheme,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199912/09/1209091.htm.

14

Immigration Department, December, 2001, http://wwwi.info.gov.immd/admission/eng_index.htm.

15

Immigration Department, 28 March, 2000, Report on The Admission of Talents Scheme, paper
presented at the Manpower Panel meeting of the Legislative Council.

16

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW October 7, 2000, Mainland job-seekers turned back despite shortage of

skilled workers.

201

for the Schemes effects to be seen because companies need some time to take advantage of the Scheme
and look for the right talent.17
In May, 2001, the Immigration Department announced a second scheme to let in highly
skilled mainland human resources, namely, the Admission of Mainland Professionals Scheme.18
According to the government spokesperson, the Scheme aims to attract Mainland professionals to
come to work in Hong Kong in order to meet local manpower needs and to enhance the
competitiveness of local companies in the globalised market with a view to facilitating the economic
development of Hong Kong. The Scheme is open to all Mainland residents, including those currently
working or studying overseas and in Hong Kong. The candidate must be a qualified professional with
skills or knowledge not readily available or in shortage locally. Initially, only those engaged in the IT
and financial services sectors are eligible to apply. They must be offered a job by a Hong Kong
registered company with a remuneration broadly comparable to the local market rate. There is no
ceiling or quota set on the Scheme.
The Immigration Department will issue an employment entry permit to the employer for
onward transmission to the successful candidate. The candidate needs to obtain an Exit-entry Permit
for Travelling to Hong Kong and Macao (EEP) with an exit endorsement from the relevant Public
Security Bureau office in the Mainland and affix the entry permit issued by the Immigration
Department onto the EEP. For a successful candidate who is currently working or studying in Hong
Kong, he/she is required to return to the Mainland to obtain a proper EEP and the relevant exit
endorsement before taking up employment under the Scheme.
Successful candidates will normally be granted an initial stay of 12 months upon entry.
Extension of stay will be approved if the candidate continues to meet the eligibility criteria.
Application for change of employment will not normally be considered in the first year of admission.
This restriction will be lifted one year after admission provided that the candidate continues to fulfil
the eligibility criteria and is employed in a job relevant to his/her qualifications and expertise.
As most other schemes to bring overseas talents into Hong Kong, the scheme draws both
appreciation and criticisms. On the one side are trade unionists who quested the need for bringing in
overseas talents. On the other are businessmen and economists who regarded the Scheme as the right
move to help Hong Kong stay competitive internationally.19 The government, on its part, pledged to
guard against abuse of the Scheme. The Financial Secretary remarked that a similar scheme introduced
in 1994 failed to take off due to excessive restrictions. Clearly this time the SAR government will
have to balance against the prevention of abuses and the imposition of excessive restrictions on the
Scheme.20 Judging from initial results, the Scheme has been reasonably well received; during the first
three months (June to August) of its operation, 130 employment entry permits have already been
processed through this channel.21

17

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, May 27, 2000, Slow build-up to brain-gain.

18

The following description of the Scheme is based on the Immigration Department's press release on
the Scheme. http://www.info.gov.hk/english/notice/press/20010518e.htm.

19

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 2001, Academic supports move to import mainland talent, April 9.

20

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 2001, Pledge on Professionals' Scheme, April 9.

21

Immigration Department, 2001, http://www.info.gov.hk/immd/admission_pro/eng_index.htm.

202

,PSRUWDWLRQRIQRQSURIHVVLRQDOZRUNHUV
Hong Kong has always welcomed the immigration of highly skilled and professional
personnel from abroad in order to satisfy the almost insatiable demand for high-level employees under
high economic growth. The coming of foreign domestic helpers is also not controversial because of
the manifested difficulty in the 1970s and 1980s to hire local domestic helpers due to a tight labour
market and the manifested reluctance of locals to enter this occupation. Nevertheless, another aspect of
labour migration into Hong Kong, namely the importation of non-professional workers as craftsmen,
operatives and technicians, has stirred up a highly divisive political debate between labour and capital,
with the government caught in the middle trying to balance conflicting demands.22 In the end, a
limited number of imported workers have been inducted under the various schemes of labour
importation since the 1980s.23
In the late 1980s, business organizations began to complain about the problem of labour
shortage and put pressure on the government for possible solutions. Initially, the government resisted
calls for labour importation. Due to the general shortage of skilled labour in the local market, a special
scheme allowing employers to recruit a total of 14 700 skilled workers from outside Hong Kong was
introduced in May, 1989 (Commissioner for Labour, 1991, p. 8). Subsequently, in 1992, the
government expanded the labour importation scheme to allow the import of a maximum of 25 000
skilled and semi-skilled workers at any point of time for a maximum duration of two years but without
specification or allocation of quotas to any particular industry.24
Despite their ideological differences, the major trade union federations in Hong Kong shared
in common their opposition to labour importation and called for the schemes to be scrapped. Due to
the weak mobilisational power of the local trade unions, however, they could not wage a sustained and
militant protest to block the scheme. Small demonstrations were staged and they called for a general
strike, but these threats were not enough to overhaul the governments decision. What organized
labour had succeeded in achieving was basically to sensitise the government to the potential
explosiveness of policy changes that do not take into account the interests of labour. The allocation of
the import quotas was based on the vacancy and unemployment rates reported in the industry. In 1994,
the largest number of imported workers went to retailing, restaurants, and import/export trades. The
decision to construct the new airport in Chek Lap Kok then led to another scheme of bringing in up to
5 500 construction workers. Lastly, by the end of 1994, another new pilot scheme of bringing in
employees was implemented, this time to import 1 000 skilled and professional personnel from China.
22.

This discussion of importation of foreign worker is based on Chiu and Levin (1993).

23

I am grateful to the Labour Department for pointing out the difference between foreign worker and
imported worker as the majority of the workers imported under the various schemes are from the
Mainland. In this paper I called the workers coming from outside of Hong Kong (whether from the
Mainland or elsewhere) imported or guest workers rather than foreign workers to highlight this
fact. Private correspondence from Labour Department, 23 January, 1998, p. 2, and also 19 January,
2000.

24.

The relaxation of restraints on importation of labour was the government's short-run strategy for coping
with a labour shortage and loss of talents due to emigration. Its medium-term strategy was to encourage
the return to Hong Kong of former migrants. One form this has taken is a joint venture between the
government, the Hong Kong Institute of Personnel Management and the Hong Kong Bank to develop an
advanced communication network to assist local employers in recruiting suitable staff from abroad
(Chan, 1991). After the Tiananman Incident in June, 1989, an additional strategy aimed at encouraging
key workers to remain in Hong Kong was to offer them access to foreign passports, most notably the
British nationality scheme for granting 50 000 British passports to key persons and their families.

203

The official reason given for this final scheme is the need to have people familiar with the situations in
China in order to facilitate the growing economic integration between China and Hong Kong.
The government insisted that the labour importation schemes are by no means a measure to
increase the labour supply with a view to suppress wage increase in Hong Kong. To minimize the
impact on local wage levels and to protect imported workers, the government has stipulated that these
guest workers have to be paid at a level not lower than the median wages for comparable jobs in the
sector done by locals.
In 1995, an economic downturn and rise in unemployment then fuelled public resentment
over the presence of legal and illegal imported workers. After the last Legislative Council election
under British rule in 1995, trade unionists and other grassroots representatives occupied a majority
of the seats in the legislature. Legislators, trade unionists in particular, therefore moved to curb the
importation of workers by threatening to introduce a bill of their own (normally new legislations are
introduced by the government). After a review of the general scheme in 1995, it was decided that the
scheme should end and be allowed to run down naturally having regard to the labour market situation
(Commissioner for Labour, 1997, p. 37). Instead, a Supplementary Labour Scheme was established to
allow the entry of imported workers to take up jobs which cannot be filled locally. Yet the quota on
construction workers for the new airport remains intact (Levin and Chiu, 1997).
The Labour Advisory Board was given a pivotal role in monitoring the new SLS. Although
the Secretary for Education and Manpower makes the final decision over applications, the LAB's
opinions will usually be considered. The government reviewed the scheme when 2 000 work visas had
been issued under the SLS and the revamped SLS took effect on 2 March, 1998; it is subject to annual
review. In principle, applications will be approved only when the employer can satisfactorily
demonstrate vacancies could not be filled by local workers (Levin and Chiu, 1997). Any employer
applying for imported worker permissions will have to participate in the Labour Department's Job
Matching Programme (JMP) for six weeks (or four weeks since February, 2001). Only if the employer
still fails to find an appropriate worker will his application be approved.
Furthermore, in 1992, partly to pacify the unions over the imported labour issue, the
government announced the retraining of workers displaced from the manufacturing sector. It
established an Employees Retraining Board (ERB) to provide training to unemployed workers,
especially those who are adversely affected by the industrial restructuring. It offered career
counselling, job placement service, and retraining programs, which sought to teach workers job search
skills, general skills like computer application and languages, and a wide range of job-specific skills
such as clerical work, estate management, hotel room services, Chinese computer input, and retail
sales. It was financed by a set-up grant of HK$ 300 million from the government and a levy on
employers of imported workers under importation of labour schemes at the rate of HK$ 400 per person
a month. This would yield theoretically about HK$ 240 million from all 25 000 imported workers
(assuming all contracts last for 2 years) but the actual levy income is actually dwindling in view of the
winding down of the GS and SLIS and the small number of imported workers admitted under SLS.
Therefore, the government made another capital injection of HK$ 300 million in June, 1996 and a
further grant of HK$ 500 million in March, 1997. Recently, the government granted an additional
HK$ 500 million to ERB in the financial year of 1999-2000.25
The issue of importing guest workers keeps coming back to the public agenda, however. In
late 1998, some textile and garment-making manufacturers asked for the expanded importation of
25

Private correspondence from Labour Department, 17 January, 2000, p. 2.

204

workers into these industries.26 Their reason was that the rule of origin provision of the international
textile quota system imposes that production should be physically done locally in Hong Kong. Rather
than letting the industries vanish, they demanded the government to allow the coming of about 10 000
workers from outside of Hong Kong into the industries so as to allow them to continue production and
comply with the quota rules. They also argued that the plan to import workers is part of a larger plan
to revitalize the textile and garment industries in Hong Kong.
The government reacted cautiously to the demand, maintaining that its labour importation
policy is anchored in the twin cardinal principles of ensuring the employment priority of local workers
and allowing employers with genuine difficulty in local recruitment to import labour (under the
Supplementary Labour Scheme) to fill the available vacancies.27 Furthermore, according to local
newspapers, the government is concerned that the large scale importation of workers would only allow
the local textile and garment industries to maintain their current low-tech and labour-intensive
production methods rather than move up the technology and value-added ladder. There is also no
guarantee that manufacturers will not ever use again the method of illegal transhipment to export
mainland-made garments overseas.28 By August, 1999, however, there were signs that in view of the
strong opposition from labour groups and the lukewarm attitude of the government, the textile industry
might just allow the proposal to gradually fade away (0LQJ 3DR, 16 August, 1999). It has not been
brought up again since then.
The phrase illegal workers refers here to those who come to Hong Kong on two-way exit
permits (from Mainland China) or visitor visas and take up employment in breach of the conditions of
stay under Section 41 of the Immigration Ordinance. Visitors include those who entered with visit
visas or visa-free but does not include imported workers and foreign domestic helpers. The number of
illegal workers from outside of Hong Kong (the Mainland and elsewhere) is a big unknown. In 19992000, the number of illegal immigrants apprehended and repatriated was 11 076, dropping from
14 892 in 1998-99. That year, the total number of illegal workers arrested was 5 593 and in 19992000, the total dropped to 4 397.29 This suggests that the number of people illegally staying and
working in Hong Kong can be substantial. The police have routinely rounded up tens of illegal
workers hired as operatives in factories and for odd jobs in restaurants or construction sites, especially
those in the New Territories. In 1999 and 2000, the Immigration Department's Immigration Task Force
carried out special operations at construction sites, factories, restaurants, commercial offices and
residential premises to combat illegal employment and overstayers. In 1995, enforcement operations,
including 63 large-scale joint operations with the Police Force, were carried out, resulting in the arrest
of 1 530 immigration offenders. 30
Under section 17I of the Immigration Ordinance, it is an offence to employ a person who is
not lawfully employable. In 1999 and 2000, the number of prosecutions of employers of illegal
workers (two-way permit holders, FDHs, imported workers, illegal immigrants and other visitors
26

0LQJ3DR, November 30, 1998; $SSOH'DLO\, December 2, 1998.

27

Private correspondence from the Labour Department, 17 January, 2000, p. 2.

28

0LQJ3DR 1-16 December, 1998.

29

The figures include visitors, two-way permit holders, FDHs, imported workers and illegal immigrants
who have engaged in illegal employment. Immigration Department, $QQXDO 'HSDUWPHQWDO 5HSRUW
2000. http://www.info.gov.hk/immd/a_report/right4.html.

30

The figures include visitors, two-way permit holders, FDHs, imported workers and illegal immigrants
who have engaged in illegal employment. Immigration Department, $QQXDO 'HSDUWPHQWDO 5HSRUW
2000. http://www.info.gov.hk/immd/a_report/right4.html.

205

working illegally) was 391. 31 In order to combat unlawful employment on construction sites, the
government amended the legislation in February, 1999 to hold controllers of construction sites
responsible when persons not lawfully employable are found taking up. A construction site controller
found guilty of the offence is liable to a fine of HK$ 350 000.32 In 2000 and 2001, it appeared that the
problem of illegal work has intensified, as in the first nine months of 2001 alone, 5 693 illegal workers
and 739 employers of illegal workers were arrested, already exceeding the respective figures in 2000.33
However, the government has encountered difficulties in gathering sufficient evidence to
prosecute employers of illegal workers. One reason is that there are often no employment contracts.
Another reason is that many illegal workers are unwilling to testify against their employers. Especially
problematic is the prosecution of employers on construction sites, due to the sub-contracting system of
the industry that makes it sometimes difficult to identify the employer. Section 38A of the
Immigration Ordinance was introduced in 1990 to hold construction site controllers liable for illegal
immigrants found on their sites but this did not cover other kinds of illegal workers such as two-way
permit holders and visitors taking up illegal employment on construction sites ('DLO\ ,QIRUPDWLRQ
%XOOHWLQ DIB, 29 July, 1998). 34
In February, 1999, the government introduced amendments to the Immigration Ordinance
with a view to tackling more effectively the problem, especially of employment of Two-way Permits
(TWP) holders on construction sites. The number of TWP holders arrested on the sites had increased
from 42 in 1991 to 651 in 1997 and 975 TWP holders were arrested in the first eight months of 1998.
Almost half of all TWP holders arrested for illegal employment (excluding prostitutes) during the first
eight months of 1998 were arrested on construction sites, compared with 29.4% in 1996. Under the
Bill, if a person who is not lawfully employable has breached a condition of stay by taking up
employment on a construction site, the construction site controller commits an offence and is liable to
a fine of HK$ 350 000.35
The problem of illegal employment has also arisen in connection with foreign domestic
helpers. Some employers have illegally deployed their FDHs to take up non-domestic duties, which
presumably takes away work opportunities that might otherwise be available to locals.36 In other cases,
FDHs illegally take up additional employment. Employers convicted of employing FDHs for illegal
31

The figures include visitors, two-way permit holders, FDHs, imported workers and illegal immigrants
who have engaged in illegal employment. Immigration Department, $QQXDO 'HSDUWPHQWDO 5HSRUW
2000. http://www.info.gov.hk/immd/a_report/right4.html.

32

$QQXDO5HSRUW, Immigration Department. (http://www.info.gov.hk/immd/a_report/1-5.5eng.html)

33

Hong Kong Information Services Department,

http://www.info.gov.hk/hkbi/enghkbi/16/16-5a-htm.

34.

A construction site controller means a principal or main contractor and includes a sub-contractor, owner,
occupier or other person who has control over or is in charge of a construction site.

35

However, it is a defence in proceedings for the controller charged to prove that he took all practicable
steps to prevent persons who are not lawfully employable from taking employment on the site. Also, a
construction site controller would not be liable simply because a person not lawfully employable (other
than an illegal immigrant), such as a TWP holder, is found on his site but would be liable only if the
person in question takes up employment on the site (',% 22 October, 1998).

36.

For example, legislators were informed by the Deputy Secretary for Education and Manpower in October,
1998 that foreigners hired as domestic helpers are to be prevented from being employed as chauffeurs.
This followed calls by unionists for a crackdown, amid evidence that a growing proportion of private
drivers in Hong Kong were foreign helpers. These foreign domestic helpers then received HK$ 3 860 a
month while drivers while drivers could earn at least $8 000 (HK$ 23/10/98).

206

+RQJ .RQJ %DFNJURXQG ,QIRUPDWLRQ

employment numbered 176 in 1995, 122 in 1996, 97 in 1997 and 88 in November, 1998. A number of
measures have been taken over the last four years to prevent abuses relating to the employment of
FDHs, including (1) with effect from 13 December 1995, identity cards prefixed with "W" issued to
FDHs applying for a new or replacement identity card to enable law enforcement agencies to identify
readily FDHs immigration status; (2) to facilitate the prosecution of employers of contract workers,
the Immigration Ordinance was amended, with effect from 25 October, 1996, to require employers to
inspect the identity cards and travel documents of job-seekers to ensure that they are lawfully
employable; (3) operations have been conducted against FDHs taking up or employers offering
part-time work and other unauthorised work; (3) proactive measures have been taken against doubtful
employment agencies; (4) guidelines have been provided for officers to look out for suspicious
employers; (5) publicity has been stepped up to educate the public that employing illegal workers is a
criminal offence; (6) members of the public have been encouraged to report illegal employment
through the Immigration Department Hotline or Fax line; and (7) the level of penalties imposed on
illegal workers and employers is closely monitored. Cases where the sentence is manifestly inadequate
can be further reviewed by the Court (',%, 16 December, 1998).
5HFHQWLVVXHVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
Two issues figured prominently in this year's public agenda on international migration of
workers. The first one is the on-going political and legal struggles over the right of abode issue. The
second one is the current discussion surrounding the policy over FDHs.
Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong permanent residents have the right of abode in Hong
Kong, including the right to land in Hong Kong, the right to be freed from any condition of stay in
Hong Kong, and the right not to be deported and removed from Hong Kong.37 Children of Hong Kong
permanent residents born elsewhere theoretically also have the right of abode, but for those who were
born in the Mainland, complications arose after the reunification. After July, 1997, the Immigration
Department faced an influx of illegal immigrants and a large number of applications from persons
born in the Mainland to Hong Kong permanent residents to exercise their right of abode immediately.
The government therefore moved to amend the Immigration Ordinance by introducing the Certificate
of Entitlement Scheme, whereby persons claiming the right of abode in Hong Kong would need to
have their claims verified by the relevant authorities and issued with Certificates of Entitlement before
they could exercise their right of abode in Hong Kong. This requires the applicants in the Mainland to
apply through the relevant Chinese authorities. Some parents of children smuggled into Hong Kong
therefore applied for the judicial review of the governments denial of their childrens residence
status., their ground being that since their children enjoyed the status of permanent residents under the
Basic Law, they should be allowed to stay now that they are physically in Hong Kong even though
they were born in China.
In October 1997, the High Court ruled that the government was not violating the Basic Law,
because while stipulating who should be considered permanent residents in Hong Kong, the Law did
not lay down clearly the procedure of affirming such status and rights. Hence, it is legal for the
government to legislate on the concrete procedures regarding the implementation of the provisions in
the Basic Law regarding permanent residence.38 Parents and organizations supporting them have

37

This section is based on various news reports and the Immigration Departments account.
http:www.info.gov.hk/immd/a_report/right.htm.

38

([SUHVV'DLO\1HZV, 10 October, 1997.

207

vowed to challenge this decision, but at the same time other disputes around the Basic Laws
definition of Hong Kong residents are arising.
However, in late January, 1999, the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) ruled unanimously that the
immigration law amendment could not be made retrospective, allowing many mainland children who
arrived before July 10, 1997 to stay. It also awarded right of abode to children who were born before a
parent became a permanent resident and to illegitimate offspring. A key problem for the administration
that followed from the CFA's ruling in late January was to find out how many migrants would be eligible
to come to Hong Kong. Specifically, it needed to find out (1) how many children were born outside
marriage on the mainland to a parent who is a Hong Kong permanent resident and (2) how many people
had grandchildren or great-grandchildren there, inside or outside of wedlock (since if a grandmother
became a permanent resident today, her children could all come to Hong Kong and in seven years' time
these children would qualify for permanent residence and their children in turn, hence creating seven-year
waves of migration). A three- month survey of 20 000 Hong Kong households (with about 40 000 adults)
was initiated (6&03, 6 May, 1999).
With only half the survey completed, the Secretary for Security has released figures stating
that an estimated 692 000 mainlanders would have the immediate right to live in Hong Kong (the socalled first generation, including 172 000 born within marriage and 520 000 outside marriage) and
983 000 (the so-called second generation of those eligible after their parents meet the seven-year
permanent residency requirement; of these an estimated 645 000 are children of those born outside
marriage). This came to a total of 1.67 million or about one-quarter of Hong Kong's current population
(6&03, 29 April, 1999).
The government estimated the cost of accepting the 1.67 million mainlanders eligible for
right of abode would come to HK$ 710 billion over the next ten years, taking into account the costs of
providing housing, education, health care, welfare and employment training. Government economists
estimated that the first generation of arrivals would push the unemployment rate up to 12-13% in 2002
and, with the arrival of the second generation, to 24-25% in 2009. Although some pointed out there
were serious flaws in the survey on which these estimates were based (and also claimed that the
consequences were being exaggerated to manipulate public opinion), the administration took the view
that they were accurate enough to conclude that accepting mainlanders eligible for right of abode
under the CFA ruling would have, in the Chief Executive's phrase, unimaginable consequences for
Hong Kong's standards of living and quality of life.
Hence, after considering four possible options39, the Chief Executive announced on May 18th
that he had decided to seek the Central Authorities' assistance in requesting the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress (NPCSC) through the State Council to reinterpret the relevant articles
on right of abode [Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3)] of the Basic Law (',%, 18/5/99). The upshot is that if
the NPCSC reinterprets the relevant articles of the Basic Law in a manner desired by the
administration, it would prevent children born before their parents became permanent residents of
Hong Kong from claiming SAR right of abode. It would reduce the number eligible for right of abode
to an estimated maximum of 200 000. It would also allow the administration to re-impose measures
that would enable it to control the pace of migration of those eligible for right of abode. Some

39.

The four options were: (1) allow all the persons who are eligible for right of abode by virtue of the CFA
judgment to be allowed to come to Hong Kong for settlement; (2) seek a new ruling to be delivered by
CFA through new cases; (3) request the NPC to amend the Basic Law; and (4) request the NPCSC to
interpret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law.

208

members of the community view this as a pragmatic step to maintain Hong Kongs stability and
prosperity. Others, however, see it as the beginning of the end of the rule of law.40
In December, 1999, the CFA upheld the reinterpretation of abode laws by the NPC and
stated that the courts in the HKSAR are constitutionally under a duty to follow. The same month, a
first batch of right-of-abode seekers were sent back to the mainland. In July, 2000, another court
decision went in favour of the government over the issue of who among the right-of-abode seekers
should be covered by the NPC reinterpretation. In December, 2000, the CFA ruled again in favour of
the government. While a lingering legal battle still continues, the NPC reinterpretation and subsequent
court judgements basically established the legality of the governments restrictive view of the right of
abode and its system of regulating the inflow of right of abode seekers.
With the legal struggles going against them, frustrated right of abode seekers turned to
protests and demonstrations to voice their discontent and to put pressure on the government. Between
July and August, 2000, these protests turned violent as protesters clashed with police and immigration
officers. Finally in August 3, right of abode seekers set off a fire inside the Immigration Department.
The attack came after a four-hour standoff following repeated attempts by the abode seekers to
demand Hong Kong ID cards from immigration officials. Twenty-three immigration officers and 27
protesters were taken to hospital. Both an immigration officer and an abode-seeker died a few days
later. The issue has turned out to be highly divisive in the society, with vocal opinions for and against
the right of abode seekers. It has also spilled over to other areas, including a debate over the
governments regulations over public assemblies.
In July, 2001, the legal battles ended when a three-year-old boy born in Hong Kong to
mainland parents won a landmark battle against the government when the CFA granted him the right
of abode. He was born while his parents were in the SAR on two-way permits, and according to the
judges was entitled to stay under Article 24(2)(1) of the Basic Law. However, in another key ruling
delivered on the same day, the court denied the right of abode to mainland children adopted by Hong
Kong couples. According to a government spokesperson, the first decision means 2 202 children born
in the SAR to mainland mothers after 1997 were entitled to the right of abode and might lead to more
pregnant women coming to Hong Kong to deliver babies. 41 In January, 2002, the CFA again ruled on
the remaining issues of the right of abode dispute affecting some 5 000 persons. The legal implications
of the verdict are still unfolding, but most commentators regard it as likely to put an end to the longdrawn legal battle.42
Meanwhile, new issues arose in 2001. In the Fall, the government banned 170 children
seeking right of abode and waiting for the outcome of the protracted court proceedings from attending
school. A spokesman for the Security Bureau said the legal basis for the ban was Immigration
Regulation No. 2, laying down conditions for people who are given permission to land in Hong Kong
as a visitor. One of the restrictions is that people in this position shall not become a student at a
school, university or other educational institution. The ban is enforced through an Education
Department circular that tells schools they cannot grant places to such children without permission
from both the Director of Education and Director of Immigration.43 This move has drawn criticisms
40

For a summary of the different responses, see Frank Ching 1999, Reality Check, )DU (DVWHUQ
(FRQRPLF5HYLHZ June 3, pp. 10-16.

41

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW 21 July, 2001, Boy wins landmark abode battle.

42

Government Information Services press release. January 10, 2001, Government respects CFA
judgment, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200201/10/0110287.htm

43

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 14 December, 2001, Schooling ban denies basic right.

209

from the Bar Association and the Catholic Church. The latter has encouraged church-operated schools
to admit these children if there are vacancies. At last in December, Security Bureau officials
announced they would reconsider the outright ban on mainland right-of-abode seeking children going
to school, saying cases would be examined on an individual basis. The Security Bureau spokesman
stressed that allowing the children to attend school did not imply that they had been allowed to remain
in Hong Kong. The government source said the review would consider factors such as how long the
children were likely to be in Hong Kong awaiting the results of their abode applications and the
possibility of repatriation.44 While the government has denied the review represents a U-turn on the
policy, one newspaper editorial applauded the decision: Simply put, the decision shows that the
government can take a moral standpoint and set aside the strict application of rules in accordance with
the wishes of the public.45
As discussed earlier, the economic downturn has apparently not dampened the inflow of
FDHs into Hong Kong, as the number of FDHs continued to increase over 1998. Large-scale
repatriation of guest workers seen in other countries has not even been contemplated in Hong Kong.
This does not, however, prevent debates to emerge over FDHs, the largest group of imported workers.
The first issue arising out of the background of a recession is the review over FDH salaries. Ever since
the Asian Crisis, there has been constant demands by employer groups to reduce FDH's minimum
allowable wage. In February, 1999, the government after its annual review announced that the
minimum allowable wage for employment contracts of FDHs in Hong Kong would be set at
HK$ 3 670 a month, a 5% reduction from the previous HK$ 3 860.46 One of the reasons mentioned
was the economic recession and the economic difficulties that FDH employers were facing. The
government stated that in 1998 SHU FDSLWD GDP dropped by about 7% and the median household
income fell by 5.2% in the third quarter of 1998. Nominal wage index of local service workers was
also stagnant over the same period of time. The official announcement also came with a warning
against employers paying less than the minimum wage and reminded them that they are free to pay
their FDHs a salary in excess of the minimum allowable wage in recognition of their loyalty, long
service and experience.
Since that adjustment, the government has kept the minimum allowable wage unchanged for
two years. The last review was conducted at the end of 2000 and the government decided to keep it at
HK$ 3 670. In November, 2001, the government announced the beginning of its annual review of
FDH salary to ensure its continuing comparability with wages of local workers with similar job
duties.47 An employer group has proposed that the minimum pay be cut by about 15% or HK$ 500.48
As always, the local community is divided over the issue. While employer groups demanded it, local
labour organizations have been apprehensive. A local union representative expressed worry that if the
minimum wage of FDHs is lowered, it will affect the pay of local domestic helpers."49 The result of
the review was to be made public in early 2002.

44

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 18 December, 2001, U-turn on abode schooling.

45

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW 19 December, 2001, Editorial: Moral right prevails.

46

Government 'DLO\ ,QIRUPDWLRQ %XOOHWLQ, 2 February, 1999, Minimum allowable wage for foreign
domestic helpers. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia.

47

Government Information Service press release, November 24, 2001, Annual review on foreign
domestic helpers' wage being conducted,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200111/24/1124137.htm.

48

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 11 December, 2001, Pay talks fail to appease maids.

49

6RXWK&KLQD0RUQLQJ3RVW, 25 November, 2001, United they gather.

210

Meanwhile, several other proposals regarding the FDH policy have also been aired lately.
The second issue is the move to encourage the hiring of local domestic helpers to replace FDHs in an
attempt to help relieve unemployment. The government hopes that local women, most of them parttimers, could be retrained through the Employee Retraining Board to be domestic helpers. The
government is providing more placement services for prospective job-seekers and has even
contemplated the offering of travel allowance for part-time local domestic helpers who lived in the
countryside to travel to the Hong Kong Island, where most of the demands for domestic helpers are.
Nevertheless, the initial results of such efforts suggest that the demand for local part-timers is not as
high as expected because local employers are unwilling to pay a higher wage of local part-timers
(some offering as low as HK$ 20 an hour) and locals are unwilling to work after hours.50
In connection to this is the demand from some local interest groups to cap the number of
FDHs. Some of them have maintained that the presence of a large number of FDHs has a negative
effect on local unemployment and wage levels and have demanded a restriction on their incoming.
One such proposal set the cap of their numbers to 100 000, less than half of the current total. Another
proposal is to impose a levy on employers of FDHs. Right now, Hong Kong does not have a levy on
the employment of FDHs which means that their minimum allowable salary could stay high relative to
other countries in the region. Any such measure would effectively entail a corresponding cut in the
salary. The government is not overly enthusiastic with these proposals. This is understandable because
any major change in the FDH policy in this direction is going to have a divisive effect on the local
community, hurt the interests of migrant workers and draw complaints from the sending countries.
3ROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGLPSRUWHGZRUNHUV
In Hong Kong, the structure of the government can be divided into the Executive,
Legislative, and Judiciary branches (see Figure 3). The Executive branch is headed by the Chief
Executive, who is also the head of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Executive
Council assists the Chief Executive with policy making, and the administration is organised into the
government Secretariat and departments. The government Secretariat bureaux formulate policies and
initiate legislative proposals. Departments implement laws and policies and provide direct services to
the public. In the Legislative branch, the Legislative Council legislates, approves public expenditure
and monitors the performance of the Administration. On immigration matters, the most important
intervention by the legislature is the July, 1999 amendment of the Immigration Ordinance to regulate
the inflow of right-of-abode seekers.
As the rule of law is followed in Hong Kong, the Judiciary operates on the principle,
fundamental to the common law system, of independence from the Executive and the Legislature. The
Court of Final Appeal has the power of final adjudication. As immigration issues take on
constitutional overtones, as the right-of-abode case shows, the role of the judiciary is pivotal. A
number of legal battles have been fought in the courts. Nevertheless, as constitutionally the NPC has
the right to interpret the Basic Law, local courts are obliged to follow the NPCs interpretation. Still,
the rule of law is important because government decisions have continued to be challenged in the
courts of law.
Two policy bureaux are central to the policy-making process on immigration and imported
worker matters. The Education and Manpower Bureau has overall responsibility for the formulation,
coordination and implementation of education and manpower policies in Hong Kong. Its portfolio
includes the formulation and implementation of the importation of labour schemes. Under the
50

0LQJ3DRNovember 11, 2001.

211

Education and Manpower Bureau, the Labour Department is the principal agency in the Hong Kong
SAR government responsible for the execution and co-ordination of major labour administration
functions.
The Security Bureau, on the other hand, is responsible for the formulation, coordination and
implementation of policies related to internal security, maintenance of law and order (including the
operation of various law enforcement agencies) and controlling immigration. The Immigration
Department is under the Security Bureaus purview and the agency responsible for the execution of
immigration-related policies. Apart from controlling the movement of people in and out of the
HKSAR, the Immigration Department provides services to local residents including the issue of
HKSAR passports and other travel documents, visas and identity cards, the handling of nationality
matters and the registration of births, deaths and marriages.
A major focus of the Department is the detection and prosecution of immigration law
offenders and the repatriation of illegal immigrants. The screening and approval of employment visas
is another area of the Departments responsibilities, which includes, for example, the admission of
FDHs. It has to ensure that the FDHs admitted are working under the prescription of the relevant
regulations. Unlawful employment of FDHs will be investigated and prosecuted by the Departments
Investigation Division. The overall coordination of various immigration-related policies is the
responsibility of the Security Bureau, but as some of the policies overlap with the portfolio of the
Secretary for Education and Manpower, higher level coordination is forged at the Chief Secretariat and
if necessary, by the Executive Council and Chief Executive.
In addition to these two departments, as the issue of educating right-of-abode seeking
children shows, sometimes other government agencies, this time the Education Department, will be
drawn into immigration matters. This is unavoidable as immigration matters become more complex
and spilled over into other policy areas.
Finally, if legislative changes are necessary, a bill will be formulated and drafted by the
various policy bureaux and then submitted for approval by the Chief Secretary and Chief Executive
with the assistance of the Executive Council. If legislative changes are required, a bill will then be
submitted to the Legislative Council for deliberation. If the Council approves the bill, the relevant
departments will implement it accordingly. Trade unions, community groups and professional and
business associations can submit their views either directly to the relevant policy bureaux or through
individual Legislative Councillors. Apart from Legislative Councillors elected from geographical
constituencies, there are also functional constituencies representing various businesses, professional
and labour interests. For example, three Legislative Councillors are currently elected by trade unions
through their functional constituency. In addition, trade union and employer representatives are also
present at the Labour Advisory Board which offer advice to the Commissioner for Labour on a variety
of labour matters. Some immigration-related measures, however, do not require legislative changes
and hence do not involve the process of legislation; the Admission of Talent Scheme mentioned above
is one such example. In these cases, the decision of the Chief Executive and Executive Council based
on the proposals by the policy bureaux would be sufficient although the opinions of the Legislative
Council will also be sought.
&RQFOXVLRQ
Immigration has always been a politically controversial issue in most countries. Although the
right of abode issue has more or less been settled to the governments favour, the special relation
between Hong Kong and China still means that a steady stream of immigrants from the latter has to be
212

reckoned with. Since many of the mainland immigrants are economically dependent and Hong Kong
cannot select the kind of immigrants to take in, the short-run effect of the increase in immigration from
the mainland towards and after 1997 is likely to add to the burden on the government to provide
necessary social services to them. Yet new immigrants are also likely to increase the supply of labour
force and contribute to the long-run competitiveness of the economy. The challenge for the
community is to assist their entrance into the labour market and provide the right kind of training for
them. The irony is perhaps that at a time when Hong Kong need to control more tightly the coming of
immigrants from the mainland, it is also opening its doors to, and indeed are actively soliciting, highly
skilled migrants from China. This is certainly a dilemma that the Hong Kong government shares with
many counterparts in other places.
The recession has also sparked off new debates over the importation of migrant workers in
Hong Kong. The salary reduction of FDHs reflected employers concerns in a difficult time. The range
of other proposals to reduce the demand for FDHs is also a natural response to the recession. The
government, in a sense, has been caught in the crossfire. So far, government policies have striven to
balance the interests of employers, local and migrant workers. Whether it can continue to do so
depends both on its own political skills and on the situation of the local labour market.

213

5()(5(1&(6

ASIAN MIGRANT CENTRE (1999), $VLDQ0LJUDQW<HDUERRN.

CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (2001), 3RSXODWLRQ&HQVXV6XPPDU\5HVXOWV,
Government Printer, Hong Kong.
CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (1991/1999D), +RQJ.RQJ$QQXDO'LJHVWRI6WDWLVWLFV,
Government Printer, Hong Kong.
CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (1999E), +RQJ.RQJ0RQWKO\'LJHVWRI6WDWLVWLFV
2FWREHU, Government Printer, Hong Kong.
CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (1999F), (VWLPDWHVRI*URVV'RPHVWLF3URGXFWWR
Government Printer, Hong Kong.
CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (1998), The Characteristics of Persons from the
Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for Less than 7 Years, +RQJ.RQJ0RQWKO\'LJHVWRI
6WDWLVWLFV-DQXDU\, pp. FC1-FC16, Government Printer, Hong Kong.
CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT (various years), 4XDUWHUO\5HSRUWRQ*HQHUDO+RXVHKROG
6XUYH\, Government Printer, Hong Kong.
CHAU, L-C (1993), Labour and Employment, pp. 127-146 in Choi Po-King and Ho Lok-sang (eds.),
7KH2WKHU+RQJ.RQJ5HSRUW, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.
CHINA STATISTICAL BUREAU (various years), &KLQD6WDWLVWLFDO<HDUERRN, China Statistical Bureau,
Beijing.
CHIU, S.W.K. and LUI T-L. (1995), Horizontal Expansion and Spatial Relocation: Production and
Employment Restructuring of the Electronics Industry in Hong Kong, 10th World Congress
International Industrial Relations Association, Washington DC, 31 May-4 June.
CHIU, S.W.K., LAI O-K. and LEE, C-K. (1995), $6WXG\RIWKH,PSDFWRI,QGXVWULDO5HVWUXFWXULQJRQ
:RPHQ:RUNHUV$Q,QWHULP5HSRUW, Mimeograph.
COMMISSIONER FOR LABOUR (various years), $QQXDO'HSDUWPHQWDO5HSRUW. Government
Printer, Hong Kong.
ELEGANT, S. (1997), Expatriates: A New Breed, )DU(DVWHUQ(FRQRPLF5HYLHZ,26 June,
pp. 52-53.
FEDERATION OF HONG KONG INDUSTRIES (1993), ,QYHVWPHQWLQ&KLQD6XUYH\RI
0HPEHUVRIWKH)HGHUDWLRQRI+RQJ.RQJ,QGXVWULHV, Federation of Hong Kong Industries,
Hong Kong.
214

FRIEDMAN, J. (1995), The World City Hypothesis, in Paul Knox and Peter Taylor (eds.), :RUOG
&LWLHVLQD:RUOGV\VWHP, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 317-331.
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICE (various years), +RQJ.RQJ$QQXDO5HSRUW,
Government Printer, Hong Kong.
Government Information Service (various issues), 'DLO\,QIRUPDWLRQ%XOOHWLQ,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia.
INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT (1990/1994), +RQJ.RQJ
V0DQXIDFWXULQJ,QGXVWULHV, Government Printer,
Hong Kong.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998), :RUOG(FRQRPLF2XWORRN2FWREHU
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weo1098/index.htm.
LEVIN, D.A. and CHIU, S.W.K. (1993), Dependent Capitalism, A Colonial State, and Marginal
Unions: The Case of Hong Kong, in Stephen Frenkel (ed.), 2UJDQL]HG/DERXULQWKH$VLD
3DFLILF5HJLRQ ILR Press, Ithaca.
KWONG, P.C.K. (1989), Population and Immigration, in T.L. Tsim and Bernard H.K. Luk (eds.), 7KH
2WKHU+RQJ.RQJ5HSRUW, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, pp. 369-380.
LEVIN, D. and CHIU, S.W.K. (1997), Country Report: Immigration for Employment: The Hong Kong
Experience, paper presented at the Workshop on International Migration and Labour Markets in
Asia, Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo, 30-31 January.
LUI, T.L., and CHIU, S.W. K. (1994), A tale of two industries: the restructuring of Hong Kong's
garment-making and electronics industries, (QYLURQPHQWDQG3ODQQLQJ$, Vol. 26, pp. 53-70.
RIEDEL, J. (1974), 7KH,QGXVWULDOL]DWLRQRI+RQJ.RQJ, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat
Kiel, Kiel, Germany.
6,1*7$2(9(1,1*3267 (1995), Capitalists Profit from Exploitation of Illegal Foreign Workers,
23 December (in Chinese).
SKELDON, R. (1990), Emigration and the future of Hong Kong, 3DFLILF$IIDLUV, No. 63, pp. 500523.
SKELDON, R. (1994), Immigration and Emigration: Current Trends, Dilemmas and Policies, in
Donald McMillen and Man Si-wai (eds.), 7KH2WKHU+RQJ.RQJ5HSRUW The Chinese
University Press, Hong Kong, pp. 165-186.
SKELDON, R. (1995D), Labour Market Changes and Foreign Worker Policy in Hong Kong, paper
presented at the Conference on Migration and the Labour Market in Asia in the Year 2000
organized by the Government of Japan, the OECD, and the Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo,
19-20 January.
SKELDON, R. (1995E), Emigration from Hong Kong, 1945-1994: The Demographic Lead-up to
1997, in Ronald Skeldon (ed.) (PLJUDWLRQIURP+RQJ.RQJ, The Chinese University Press,
Hong Kong, pp. 51-78.

215

SKELDON, R. (1995F), Immigration and Population Issues, in Stephen Y.L. Cheung and Stephen
M.H. Sze (eds.), 7KH2WKHU+RQJ.RQJ5HSRUW, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.
SKELDON, R., JOWETT, J., FINDLAY, A. and LI, L. (1995), An Assessment of Available Data
Sources for the Analysis of the Trends in Migration, in Ronald Skeldon (ed.), (PLJUDWLRQIURP
+RQJ.RQJ, The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, pp. 79-110.
YOUNGSON, A.J. (1982), +RQJ.RQJ(FRQRPLF*URZWKDQG3ROLF\, Oxford University Press, Hong
Kong.
ZENG, J.C. (1995), Dont Let the Vampires Swig Again, 0LQJ3DR, 4 December (in Chinese).
ZENG, Y.C. (1995), The Hong Kong Government is the Culprit in the Deduction of Foreign
Workers Wages, $SSOH'DLO\ 29 November (in Chinese).

216

$11(;,
0$-25(&2120,&,1',&$7256


5.4


3.9


4.5


-5.3
30238


3.0
89109


10.5
68784

114446

190762

502127

110.8
(-0.27%)

108.8
(-1.8%)

107.1
(-1.6%)

107.3
(0.2)

108.3
(6.3%)

114.7
(5.8%)

117.9
(2.8%)

113.2
(-4.0)

108.9
(-3.8)

122718
(0)

127751
(4.1%)

119974
(-6.1%)

122429
(2.0%)

134064
(9.5%)

Craftsmen & operatives

-2.2
-3.3
2
1.4
-0.8
3.9
Non-production workers
1.5
-1.1
1
1.7
0
1.8
to supervisory level
Middle management and
4.1
3.8
3.3
3.5
2.9
4.4
professionals
6RXUFH Census and Statistics Department, +RQJ.RQJ$QQXDO'LJHVWRI6WDWLVWLFV, various issues.
Note: 2000 figures are provisional and subject to adjustment.

1.7
3.8

Real GDP growth (%)

Current account balance
PLOOLRQ+.
Foreign direct investment
PLOOLRQ+.
Producer price index
 

108.2
(2.1%)

111.2
(2.8%)

111.1
(-0.1%)

Consumer price index

 

93.4
(8.8%)

101.9
(9.1%)

Real GDP per person

+.DW
VSULFH

120540
(3.1%)

122778
(1.9%)


5
-47681

Real wage growth (%)

217

8.6

4.7
4.0
10.8
4.8
9.7
4.3
4.9
4.5
790

Private consumption expenditure

Government consumption
Gross domestic fixed capital formation
Export of goods
Export of services
Import of goods
Import of services
Real GDP

Real GDP (HK$ billion)

829

6.2
2.4
12.7
6.1
-0.1
7.2
4.0
5.0



785

-7.4
0.8
-7.6
-4.3
-1.8
-7.2
2.7
-5.3
809

0.7
3.3
-17.5
3.7
5.7
0.1
-3.1
3.0
894

5.5
2.1
9.8
17.1
14.1
18.1
2.1
10.5

  

209

Q1
8.7
3.7
5.7
20.7
15.8
22.9
-0.9
14.1

218

6RXUFH: Census and Statistics Department, 2001. http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/index.html

Notes :
(#) Figures are subject to revisions later on as more data become available.



213

Q2
5.1
2.7
5.4
17.7
18.2
18.8
3.3
10.7
235

Q3
5.6
2.5
14.8
17.7
14.0
18.4
3.4
10.8



236

Q4
2.6
-0.6
13.1
13.3
9.5
13.4
2.7
7.0
214

Q1
3.0
3.9
11.5
4.2
6.2
5.3
3.9
2.2
215

Q2
3.6
4.1
1.3
-1.9
6.3
-0.7
1.0
0.8



Table 1.*URVV'RPHVWLF3URGXFWDQGLWVPDLQH[SHQGLWXUHFRPSRQHQWVDWFRQVWDQWSULFH
\HDURQ\HDUUDWHRIFKDQJH(percentage))

234

Q3
1.3
6.2
3.7
-4.0
1.5
-3.4
-2.0
-0.3

Table 2.'LVWULEXWLRQRI*'3E\VHFWRU
(FRQRPLFDFWLYLW\
Agriculture and fishing
Industry
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas and water
Construction
Services
Wholesale, retail and import /
export trades,
Transport, storage and
communication
Financing, insurance, real
estate and business services
Community, social and
personal services
Ownership of premises
Adjustment for financial
intermediation services
indirectly measured




0.8


0.5


0.3


0.1


0.1

31.7
0.2
23.7

6.6

29.9
0.1
22.1
2.6
5.0

25.3
0.0
17.6
2.3
5.4

14.1
0.0
5.8
3.0
5.3

14.1
0.0
5.8
3.0
5.3

67.5

69.6

74.5

84.4

85.8

21.4

22.8

25.2

26.7

26.3

7.4

8.1

9.5

9.8

10.1

23.0

16.0

20.2

25.1

23.5

12.1
8.9

16.7
10.5

14.5
10.6

17.6
13.1

21.2
12.9

-5.4

-4.6

-5.5

-7.9

-8.2

6RXUFH: Census and Statistics Department, 2001. http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/index.html

Note: (#) provisional estimates.

Table 3.'LVWULEXWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQWE\VHFWRUSHUFHQWDJH

Year Manufacturing Construction Commerce

Transport &
Finance & Services
Communication Business
81
39.2
8.8
20.8
7.0
5.0
17.3
86
35.0
7.7
23.0
8.3
6.2
17.6
87
34.2
8.0
23.4
8.5
6.4
17.3
88
32.0
8.5
24.3
9.0
6.8
17.6
89
29.7
8.4
24.9
9.6
7.4
18.2
90
27.7
8.3
25.9
9.9
7.7
18.9
91
26.1
8.2
26.7
10.0
8.3
19.3
92
23.9
8.5
27.4
10.7
8.4
19.6
93
21.5
8.0
28.5
11.2
9.5
20.0
94
18.8
7.9
28.6
11.4
11.5
20.2
95
17.5
8.1
28.9
11.4
11.6
21.5
96
15
9.4
29.8
10.9
12.1
21.6
97
13.4
9.8
30.3
10.9
13.1
21.5
98
11.8
9.5
30.5
11.2
13.7
22.3
99
11.5
9.4
30.1
11.1
13.9
23.1
2000
10.2
9.5
30.7
11.2
14.1
23.6
Source: Quarterly Report on General Household Survey, various years.
Note: Year-end figures.

219

Others
1.9
2.3
2.3
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.5
1.1
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.8

Total
(000s)
2407.0
2625.4
2688.5
2740.7
2748.6
2741.0
2793.8
2787.2
2865.0
2968.5
3012.7
3063.2
3253.4
3232.5
3342.7
3254.9

Table 4.*URZWKRIUHDOZDJHVWR
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Craftsmen and Operatives

0.0
1.7
-2.1
-3.6
1.9
1.4
-0.8
3.9
1.7
Non-production workers to
supervisory level
0.4
2.6
1.5
-1.3
0.9
1.7
0
1.8
3.8
Middle-management and
professionals
3.5
4.6
4.1
3.8
3.3
3.5
2.9
4.4
8.6
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Annual Digest of Statistics, Monthly Digest of Statistics various
issues.
Note: 1. Wages for craftsmen and operatives, and other non-production workers are September figures. Figures
for managerial employees refer to Real Salary Index (B) in June of the year.

Table 5. /HJDOLPPLJUDWLRQWR+RQJ.RQJ

6WDWXV
Legal entrants for residence from China
With employment visas


45 986


61 179


50 287


56 039


54 625

persons with special skills admitted under

normal immigration policy
2 967
6 550
6 521

2 177
7 650
4 557

4 026
8 545
3 990

2 932
7 702
4 286

2 533
7 294
4 694
















PRC nationals who have resided overseas for

more than 2 years (or 1 year after Nov 2000)

298

198

219

174

126

PRC nationals admitted under the pilot scheme

for entry of 1000 PRC professionals@

304

166

84

---

5 751

4 103

4 425

1 949

31

Workers admitted under the General Labour

9 853
1 215
3 031
Importation Schemes and Supplementary
Labour Scheme
Grand Total
32 244
20 066
24 320

:LWKUHVLGHQFHYLVDV



6RXUFH: Unpublished information supplied by the Immigration Department.
Note: @ The scheme was closed in August, 1998.
# The scheme was closed in March, 1999.
The General Schemes ended after a review in 1995.
The overseas residential requirement for overseas PRC nationals coming for employment.

2 164

830

19 210


15 508


- Technical professionals
- Administrators, managers and other
professionals
- Others
6XE7RWDO
*

*
Construction workers for the New Airport
Scheme and related projects#
*

220

Table 6.1XPEHURI)'+VLQ+RQJ.RQJ\HDUHQGILJXUHV

<HDU

3HUVRQV

*URZWK
5DWH

1990
70 300
1991
84 600
20.3
1992
101 200
19.6
1993
120 600
19.2
1994
141 400
17.2
1995
157 000
11.0
1996
164 300
4.6
1997
171 000
4.1
1998
180 600
5.6
1999
193 700
7.3
2000
216 790
11.9
6RXUFH 1990-97, $SSOH'DLO\, September 11, 1998, citing Immigration Department figures. 1998 and 1999 figures
are supplied by the Immigration Department. 2000 figure is from the Commissioner for Labour, 5HSRUW RI WKH
&RPPLVVLRQHUIRU/DERXU.

Table 7.1DWLRQDORULJLQRI)'+VLQ+RQJ.RQJWRWDOLQEUDFNHWV

Country
Philippines

1991
1995
1999
2000
75 667
131 176
143 206
151 485
(91.1%)
(85.1%)
(75.3%)
(71.1%)
Indonesia
1 822
16 357
41 397
55 174
(2.2%)
(10.6%)
(21.7%)
(25.9%)
Thailand
5 597
6 708
5 755
6 451
(6.7%)
(4.3%)
(3.0%)
(3.0%)
Total
83 086
154 241
190 358
213 110
6RXUFH Unpublished information supplied by the Immigration Department.

Table 8.1XPEHURI)'+FDVHVKDQGOHGE\WKH/DERXU'HSDUWPHQW


<HDU
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

1RRI)'+UHODWHG
FODLPV
1 972
2 552
2 280
2 188
2 461

6RXUFHUnpublished information supplied by the Labour Department.

221

7RWDOQR
RIFODLPV
20 404
30 204
31 890
28 620
31 152

Table 9.3RSXODWLRQE\QDWLRQDOLW\DQG




1DWLRQDOLW\
1R

1R

1R

Chinese
5 191 545
94.0
5 623 467
90.4
6 261 864
93.3
GRPLFLOHGLQ+RQJ.RQJ
Chinese
48 029
0.9
64 717
1.0
76 898
1.1
GRPLFLOHGLQ+RQJ.RQJ
1.2
175 395
2.8
25 418
0.4
British
68 502
1.2
120 730
1.9
143 662
2.1
Filipino
64 658
0.3
32 515
0.5
11 862
0.2
Canadian
15 135
U.S.A.
18 383
0.3
28 946
0.5
14 379
0.2
0.3
20 955
0.3
28 642
0.4
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi &
14 329
Sri Lankan
Japanese
10 850
0.2
19 010
0.3
14 715
0.2
Thai
11 787
0.2
15 993
0.3
14 791
0.2
1.3
93 771
1.5
49 150
0.7
Others
71 158
Total
5 522 281
6 217 556
6 708 389
6RXUFH Census and Statistics Department 2001D: 34. Figures refer to the first nationalities reported by
respondents in the census/by-census. Some people claimed a second nationality but data on second nationalities
are not included in this table.

Figure 16HDVRQDOO\DGMXVWHGTXDUWHUO\XQHPSOR\PHQWDQGXQGHUHPSOR\PHQWUDWH
$SULO2FWREHU
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0

4/
1
8/ 997
19 6
12 97 /19
/1 - 1 97
9 0/
3/ 97 199
19 - 2 7
/
7/ 98 199
19 - 5 8
11 98 /19
/1 9
9 9/ 8
2/ 98 199
19 - 1 8
/
6/ 99 - 199
1
10 99 4/1 9
/1 9 - 99
99 8 9
/
1/ 9 - 199
20 12 9
/
0
5/ 0 199
20 - 3 9
9/ 00 /20
20 0
00 7/ 0
- 1 200
1/ 0
20
4/
00
2
8/ 00
20 1
01 6
- 1 /20
0/ 01
20
01
#

0.0

6RXUFH Census and Statistics Department 2001,

http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/labour/ghs/labour1_index.html

222

Unemployment
rate
Underemployment rate

Figure 2. 2IILFLDO+RQJ.RQJJRYHUQPHQWHVWLPDWHVRQHPLJUDWLRQ
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000

19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00


6RXUFH: Hong Kong Government Information Centre. March 1999. Topical Information: Emigration.
http://www.info.gov.hk/info/emigrat.htm. Information Services Department, 2001. +RQJ .RQJ %DFNJURXQG
,QIRUPDWLRQhttp://www.info.gov.hk/hkbi/enghkbi/13/13-4a.htm.

223

Figure 3. 7KHSROLF\PDNLQJIUDPHZRUNRQLPPLJUDWLRQDQGLPSRUWHGZRUNHUV

Chief
Executive

Executive
Executive
Council
Council

Chief Secretary
For
for
Administration

Judiciary

Secretary for
for Education
Secretary
Education
and Manpower
And
Manpower
Education and
Education
and
Manpower Bureau
Manpower
Bureau

Labour
Labour
Advisory Board

Legislative
Council

Secretary for Security

Security Bureau

Labour
Department

Immigration
Department

224

)25(,*1:25.(56,1&+,1(6(7$,3(,
E\
-RVHSK6/HH
National Central University, Taipei

(FRQRP\DQGWKHODERXUPDUNHW
Over the past fifty years, the social, political and economic environments in Chinese Taipei
have undergone substantial changes, particularly since 1987, as Chinese Taipei has changed from a
less developed into a mature economy. A shift took place in its industrial structure, away from the
predominance of labour-intensive industries and towards more capital and skills-intensive industries
that now dominate the economy. This was accompanied by a shift away from goods-producing
industries towards the service sector. For example, in 1987, 46.7% of Chinese Taipeis GDP was
generated by the industry sector and 48% by the service sector, but by the year of 2000, these set of
figures changed to 33.4% and 65.5% (see Table 1). For manufacturing industries the share of GDP
generated by this sector dropped even faster, from 389% to 26.4% (Table 1).
The change in Chinese Taipeis economic structure is also clearly reflected in its export
structure. Between 1989 and 1999, the share of total exports accounted for by labour-intensive
products dropped from 43% to 34%, whilst the share of exported products requiring highly skilled
labour rose from 24% to 40% (CEPD 2000). This switch to greater capital- and technology-intensive
products meant that whilst the demand for highly skilled workers increased, there was also a
corresponding decline in the demand for low-skilled workers.
As the economic structures change, so do the structures of employment; over the past
decade, employment opportunities have shifted noticeably away from manufacturing industries and
towards service industries. In 1987, the share of total employment accounted for by Chinese Taipei's
manufacturing industries was 43%, but by 2001, it had dropped to 27%, whilst the share of
employment in the service sector had risen from 42% to 56.8% during the same period (Table 4).
The level of education of the available workforce has also improved significantly throughout
the past forty years. Between 1987 and 2000 particularly, the proportion of the workforce with only
primary education dropped from 60% to 42%, and the proportion of high-school graduates rose from
27% to 34%, whilst college graduates increased from 14% to 24%. However, the rising demand for a
better-educated workforce has also led to a decline in labour force participation rates, particularly
amongst teenagers and young adults, since more of them are now enrolled in school. Thus, between
1987 and 2000, the labour force participation rates for the 15 to 19 age group declined from 32% to
15%, whilst in the 20 to 24 cohort, it fell from 69% to 59% (DGBAS, 2002).
Clearly, the rapid rise in income and educational attainment has brought about an increase in
the supply of highly educated workers and a reduction in the availability of low-skilled workers,
resulting in an acute shortage of low-skilled workers. This shortage caused a serious delay in the
construction of infrastructure projects, and the inability of employers in the labour-intensive industries

225

to fulfil their international orders, with the result that in some cases, customers have turned to
neighbouring countries in order to ensure their orders are met.
In the early 1990s, in an effort to resolve the growing shortage of low-skilled labour, the
government began to authorize the importation of foreign workers into Chinese Taipei actually,
foreign workers had started entering Chinese Taipei, working there illegally, from the late 1980s; prior
to the enactment of the Employment Service Act in 1992, there was already an estimated 40 000 lowskilled foreign workers. By the late-1990s, most of the labour-intensive firms had completed the
process of restructuring, either by relocating their labour-intensive facilities abroad, or by upgrading
their facilities towards the production of high-tech, or high-value added products. This resulted in the
release of a large number of workers to be taken up by other sectors, which not only alleviated the
labour shortage problem, but also caused an increase in structural unemployment; by 2000, the overall
unemployment rate had risen to more than 3%, a record high for the previous fifteen-year period.
The solution to the labour shortage problem thus brings about a paradoxical amelioration, as
it entails a simultaneous rise in the unemployment rate, all the more so that as the unemployment rate
rose alarmingly from less than 2% in 1995, to over 5% in 2001, there was a correspondingly rapid rise
in the importation of foreign workers, from 250 573 in 1995 to 326 515 in 2000.
The DPP government has proved unable to take concerted action. The recession that has
followed saw the unemployment rise drastically. Interestingly, the number of foreign workers has also
risen. Of all the questions raised by this paradox, the most interesting ones are: What role did foreign
workers play in the past?, and Was it not to relieve the labour shortage problem in Chinese Taipei?.
If this is the case, then why has the level of importation of foreign workers continued to rise when the
labour shortage problem had already been significantly reduced? More importantly, what role did
these foreign workers play when Chinese Taipeis economic structure was undergoing its
transformation from a labour-intensive, low-skilled economy, to a highly skilled, capital-intensive
economy? And what will be the role of foreign workers as Chinese Taipei moves forward towards a
high-tech, knowledge-based economy? Will their services no longer be required in Chinese Taipei?
These are the questions investigated in this paper. Another emerging problem is the shortage of highly
skill and professional workers.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Following this Introduction, a second section
examines the basic principles of Chinese Taipeis foreign labour policies for low-skilled workers. The
following section undertakes an analysis of the changes in the role of foreign labour; the fourth section
is a discussion of the challenges to the governments mechanism for allocating foreign workers to
designated industries and occupations. After a discussion of the current public policy towards the
importation of white-collar and professional workers, the last section before the conclusion comments
on the number of illegal workers in Chinese Taipei.
/RZVNLOOHGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
7KHEDVLFSULQFLSOHVLQLPSRUWLQJORZVNLOOHGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
The fundamental reason for the importation of low-skilled foreign workers into Chinese
Taipei was to alleviate the labour shortage in the construction, labour-intensive industries, and 3D jobs
(dirty, dangerous, and difficult) shunned by nationals. Based on this rationale, the government
formulated its foreign labour policy, and in 1992, enacted the Employment Service Act. This law

226

officially established the principles and procedures for the importation of foreign workers into Chinese
Taipei, as follows (see Table 5).
Foreign workers are imported only to supplement nationals and not to replace them. Based
on this principle, the government has set quotas that restrict their importation to designated industries
and occupations. Employers wishing to import foreign workers must clearly show that a labour
shortage exists in their industries or occupations, and that the shortage has hindered their operations,
their expansion, or the upgrading of their production facilities. In most cases, to ensure that the
employment of foreign workers does not replace native workers, the law limits their employment to a
maximum of 30% of the firms total workforce. It also prohibits the employment of foreign workers in
administrative and management units, since there is no indication of any labour shortage in these
occupations. Small firms, LH, those with less than 10 employees, are also prohibited from importing
foreign workers on the grounds that they have minimal impact on the economy, and also because of
the difficulties in administering these programmes.
Foreign workers are imported only on a temporary basis; they cannot become permanent
immigrants. Under this principle, they are allowed to stay in Chinese Taipei for only two years; if their
continued presence is necessary, they may obtain an extension up to a maximum of three years.
Foreign workers cannot be imported if the upgrading of Chinese Taipeis industrial structure
is delayed as a consequence.
The importation of foreign workers should be under the condition of minimum social costs,
which means that family reunion and marriages with nationals are not allowed. Any female worker
who is found to have become pregnant is immediately deported, and those found guilty of committing
a crime, even a relatively minor offence such as shoplifting, are also deported immediately.
As one can see clearly from the above discussion, the purpose of importing foreign workers,
as set by the government, was strictly to relieve the labour shortage in the construction and labourintensive industries in the manufacturing sector. It was always the governments intention that after a
certain period of time, once the labour-intensive industries had completed their adjustment, the
demand for foreign workers in Chinese Taipei could be reduced substantially, or even eliminated.
7KHSUHUROHRIORZVNLOOHGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
During the late 1980s, many of the governments infrastructure construction projects were
unable to actually start because of a severe labour shortage. Private employers in construction and
labour-intensive industries had also experienced great difficulties in obtaining low-skilled labour. As
Table 5 shows, the government permitted the importation of foreign workers only into these two
sectors. Table 6 also demonstrates that foreign workers were indeed found only in these fields (e.g., in
1992, two-thirds in construction and one third in manufacturing). Between 1992 and 1993, the
government decided to import more foreign workers into the manufacturing industries due to the
persistent labour shortage (see Table 6), and by 1995, more than three-quarters (76.62%) of all foreign
workers were working in that field, whilst the share in construction had dropped to less than a quarter
(23.38%) (see Table 7).
Within the manufacturing sector, the largest share of foreign workers was found in labourintensive industries, such as textile, plastic and metal products, wood and bamboo, electrical and
electronic manufacturing. However, by 1995, many of these industries had completed their
adjustments, either by relocating their labour-intensive facilities abroad, adopting automated
227

production facilities at home, or by upgrading themselves into more skills-intensive and greater valueadded products. Thus, in 1995, the share of foreign workers in these labour-intensive industries started
to decline (see Table 6).
In short, during the early 1990s, the government allocated foreign workers to areas where
employers were experiencing the most serious labour shortages. The magnitude of the labour shortage
was considerably reduced. For example, the vacancy rate in the manufacturing industries, which
accounted for 7.32% in 1992 and 9.83% in 1993, had fallen to just 3.82% by 1999. In construction, the
vacancy rate also dropped from 7.29% in 1992 to 3.21% in 1999, whilst the unemployment rate
amongst low-skilled workers had risen to 3.3%, or 43% of the total unemployed (&RPPHUFLDO7LPHV,
August 15, 2000, p. 2).
7KHSRVWUROHRIORZVNLOOHGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
3URPRWLRQRIKLJKWHFKDQGUDSLGO\H[SDQGLQJH[SRUWLQGXVWULHV
After 1995, the major function for the foreign workers in Chinese Taipei gradually shifted
from alleviating the labour shortages in the labour-intensive industries, to contributing to these hightech and rapidly expanding industries. Therefore, it is no surprise to see that in 1997, the proportion of
foreign workers in the electrical and electronics industries (which have been transformed from labourintensive to high-tech industries) bypassed the textile industry to become the largest employer of
foreign workers. By 2000, 16.24% of all foreign workers were employed in the former sector, whilst
the latter accounted for only 10.08%. The number of foreign workers in the machinery industries also
rose quickly. In 1995, there were only 3 876 foreign workers in these industries, but by 2000, the
number had risen to 7 830 or 2.4% of all foreign workers.
The electrical and electronics, metal products and basic metal products industries have now
become the major employers of foreign workers, and also the major exporters of Chinese Taipeiesemade products. In 2000, the electronics and machinery industries together employed 18.84% of all
foreign workers (one-third of all foreign workers in the manufacturing sector), exporting 61.7% of
Chinese Taipeis total exports (,QGXVWU\ RI )UHH &KLQD, June 2000). This rapid development of the
high-tech industries occurred just in time to save the country from the 1997 Asian financial crisis;
although Chinese Taipeis exports to Southeast Asian countries dropped during this period, the crisis
was offset by the increase in the export of high-tech goods to the US and other industrialized
countries.
Additional evidence of the changing role of foreign workers from the relief of labour
shortages in the labour-intensive industries to the promotion of high-tech and export-oriented
industries lies in the reduced share of foreign workers in most of the labour-intensive industries and
the rising proportion of foreign workers in the capital and skills-intensive industries. Table 7 reveals
that since 1995, the share of foreign workers in apparel, leather, lumber and bamboo, and plastics have
all been declining, with the textile and rubber industries being two notable exceptions. At the same
time, however, the shares of foreign labour in capital- and skills-intensive industries such as
machinery and electronics and electrical industries have all been increasing. In fact, the shares of
foreign workers in the machinery industries rose from 2.5% in 1997, to 3.67% in 1999, and in the
electronics and electrical industries, from 4.0% in 1995, to 7.6% in 1999 (see Table 7).
Further evidence of the changing role of foreign workers is provided by the change in the
number by category of admission. As Table 8 shows, since 1995, the number of foreign workers
228

admitted to the so-called labour shortage industries such as the 68 industries in manufacturing, and
the 73 industries and the 6 ceramics industries in the manufacturing industries, has declined
significantly, whilst in investment projects it rose from 29 325 persons in 1995, to 65 916 in 2000, or
from 11.7% to 20.19% of all foreign workers admitted to Chinese Taipei (see Table 8). In short, the
government has intentionally used the tool of foreign worker allocation to increase the supply of
labour to capital- and skills-intensive industries, and in the case of major exporting industries, to speed
up the upgrading of Chinese Taipei's industrial structure.
,QFUHDVLQJIHPDOHODERXUIRUFHSDUWLFLSDWLRQUDWHV
While the government has a clear policy towards the importation of low-skilled workers, it
does not have a formal policy on the importation of white-collar and professional foreign workers.
During the 1960s and 1970s large number of Chinese Taipeiese students went to the US, Canada and
other industrialized countries for advanced studies. When they completed their studies abroad they
usually remained in these countries due to the higher salary and better working conditions existing
there. However, in the 1980s, when Chinese Taipei entered a more industrialised stage, this brain drain
started to decrease, partly thanks to the governments efforts. In short, the government found that the
so called brain drain turned out to be a reservoir of highly trained manpower.
In an effort to encourage female participation, and thus to increase the labour supply, the
government has recently improved the availability of foreign household maids and helpers for private
homes and medical institutions. For example, in 1995, only 16 472 foreign workers were imported
under these occupations, but by 2000, this number had risen to 79 766 ( a rise from 6.57% in 1995, to
25.97% in 2000) (see Table 8).
However, not all of these helpers work in institutions or in households; some of them are
assigned by their employers to work in family restaurants or family-owned factories, because many
small-sized businesses suffer greatly from labour shortages and are not allowed to import foreign
workers. These employers therefore take advantage of the fact that they have elderly family members
to apply for helpers as a means of solving part of their factory labour shortage problems. Although
the number of helpers imported has increased tremendously in recent years, the labour force
participation rates of women has not, partly because hiring a household maid or helper is expensive,
affordable only by higher middle-class families. Thus, the importation of foreign household helpers
might well end up helping the housewives of well-to-do families to increase their leisure time, rather
than increasing their availability to the labour market. This policy requires further investigation.
)URPORZFRVWODERXUWRPDQDJHPHQWIOH[LELOLWLHV
One of the advantages of using foreign workers in the past was low cost. In 1993, foreign
workers in the manufacturing industries earned in average 88.22% of a nationals earnings, whilst in
the construction industries they earned even less (75.5%) (see Table 9). However, as these gaps are
narrowing over time, these advantages are rapidly disappearing.
By 1999, in the manufacturing industries, a foreigner was earning as much as 95.3% as a
national, whilst in construction, in 1998, the relationship was 89.6%, and in 1999, it went down to
76.9% (see Table 9). One may argue that average earnings are not a very accurate indicator in
comparing the costs of hiring native and foreign workers because they include overtime pay, and
clearly, foreign workers put in much more overtime work than native workers. Thus one should
compare regular wages, not total earnings, and the figures provided in the bottom panel of Table 9
229

clearly show that the disparity in regular wages is larger than that of total earnings. In 1993, foreign
workers earned, on average, 80.7% of native workers regular wages (58.8% in construction), but by
1999, these regular wage gaps had narrowed to 87.4%, and 65%, respectively, with the long-term
trend also moving towards a narrowing gap. When other expenses, such as employment stabilization
fees, travelling expenses, dormitory, food, clothing and other administration fees are added to the total
earnings, the advantages of hiring foreign workers begins to disappear. Therefore, low labour costs are
no longer such an advantage in hiring foreign workers. (This is precisely why recently, employers
have been urging the government to exclude foreign workers from the coverage of minimum wage law
since foreign workers in Hong Kong (China) and Singapore are not protected by any minimum wage
and employers in these countries enjoy a low-cost foreign workforce).
Experience in the past showed that, by employing foreign workers, employers could increase
production, and thus, profit. According to surveys conducted by the Council of Labour Affairs, in
1994 and 1995, between 40% and 50% of firms found that their production levels rose as a result of
employing foreign workers, with an increase in production of about 18%. In terms of profit, 31% of
the firms using foreign workers in 1994, and 23% in 1995, found higher profit levels from the
employment of foreign workers (CLA 1994, 1995). However, there is no available data to show the
changes in this benefit over time.
Another assumption connected to foreign employment is the improvement of the native
workers work effort: as foreign workers take on the hard, dirty, and difficult jobs, native workers
would be able to switch to more meaningful work, thus increasing their morale and work effort.
However, we do not find any evidence to confirm this assertion, because it was supported by only
22.59% of the firms using foreign workers in 1994, and 21.14% in 1995. In the majority of the cases,
the work effort of native workers was unaffected by the employment of foreign workers (CLA 1994;
1995).
Nationals are becoming more and more reluctant to work overtime, or to work night shifts,
whilst foreign workers are eager and willing to take on this type of work. As the figures in Table 10
show, on average, foreign workers put in two to three times more overtime hours than native workers
in the manufacturing industries, and up to seven times more than workers in the construction industry.
As Chinese Taipei becomes more internationalised and globalised, management flexibility becomes
increasingly important to employers, and by accepting overtime and night work, foreign workers
clearly play an important role in providing employers with the management flexibility they need, both
in terms of numbers of workers, and hours worked.
As shown in Table 10, foreign workers willingness to work overtime has not declined over
time, and in fact, their role in providing management flexibility has become more and more important,
because as income levels continue to rise, native workers become even less willing to put in overtime
work. Furthermore, the new government has recently announced a reduction in the standard working
week to 84 hours for every two weeks, starting from January 2001. Thus, employers are becoming
even more dependent on foreign workers.
In short, the role of foreign workers in providing low-cost labour and higher profit levels has
been declining, while their part in providing greater management flexibility is increasingly important.
5XQDZD\ZRUNHUVDFKDOOHQJHWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWVV\VWHP
The quota system is one of the most useful tools for the government in allocating foreign
workers to designated industries and occupations. Employers wishing to hire foreign workers must
230

send their application to the government for approval. However, to make this system work, not only
must employers who hire foreign workers receive prior government approval, but the foreign worker
involved must also stay with the same employer until his contract expires and he returns home.
Although this system worked well in the early 1990s, it has recently come under increasing criticism
and challenge as a result of some workers, on completion of their two-year term, wishing to stay
longer in Chinese Taipei. The only practical way to stay is to run away from their current employers
and to work illegally for alternative employers.
One of the reasons for wishing to stay longer is that in most cases, foreign workers are
recruited via job brokers (in 67.11% of the cases) (CLA 1999, p. 18). The fee the job brokers charge,
paid by the workers themselves, amounts to USD 2 241 in average for each job placement; the actual
amount depends on the job and the workers country of origin. According to a CLA study, Thai
workers pay the highest referral fees, on average USD 2 512 with the Philippines ranking second at
USD 1 835, and Indonesia third with USD 1 580. Malaysians pay the lowest referral fees, at
USD 1 027 (CLA 1999, p. 19). Foreign workers are willing to pay these high referral fees because
they are protected by the minimum wage law, so they are sure of receiving the highest wages in the
region; by contrast, foreign workers in Hong Kong (China) or Singapore, for example, have no
minimum wage protection.
By running away to work for other employers and earn more money without having to pay
the referral fees, foreigners can better achieve their original goal of making a certain amount of money
before returning home. However, these runaway workers cause great problems for both employers and
the government. Employers who have runaway foreign workers are not allowed to import other
workers to fill the vacancies left behind; they must first find the runaway workers and ensure they
depart for their home countries before they are allowed to reapply for other foreign workers. Illegal
runaway workers also undermine the governments system of allocating foreign workers to the
targeted industries and occupations, making it impossible to keep track of the number and conditions
of foreign workers in Chinese Taipei. Three to four years ago, as 30% of the firms employing foreign
workers had this problem (CLA, 2000), the government tried to use a bonus system, both to reward
policemen who caught these illegal workers, and to help restore the creditability of the allocation
system (Lee, 1998). However, this policy failed because the discovery of an illegal worker is clearly
not a one-man job, which makes it difficult to decide who should be paid the bonus.
In 1998, the government introduced an alternative policy which required employers to sign
contracts with their foreign workers giving the employers the right to deduct up to 30% of their
monthly earnings for deposit into individual savings accounts. Foreign workers were not allowed to
withdraw any money from these accounts until they had completed their employment contracts and
were ready to go back to their home countries. By 1999, 83.26% of employers in the manufacturing
industries and 70.3% in the construction industries had set up such special accounts (CLA, 2000, p. 8),
with employers deducting, on average, 18.15% of their workers monthly pay (around NT$ 2 995, or
USD 96.6). This programme, by and large, is proving effective: the proportion of firms with runaway
workers has already dropped from 30.1% in 1995-96, to 14.74% in 1998-99. However, it has also
given rise to other problems, such as the fact that some employers refuse to return the deducted money
to foreign workers once they have completed their contracts and are ready to go home (8QLWHG'DLO\,
21 October 1998, p. 6).
One of the principles of importing foreign workers is minimum social cost. Have foreign
workers raised the social costs for Chinese Taipei ? The answer is no, because they cause neither
health nor crime problems. They are required to pass a health screening test at home before entry and
another health test upon entry. In 1991, only 1.93% failed their health screening tests. These failure
rates dropped to 1.36% in 1994 and 1.2% in 1996, and raised somewhat to 1.71% in recent years. A
231

more serious issue is the higher percentage of foreign workers who pass their first test upon entry but
fail their second health test after working in Chinese Taipei for a period of time. For example, in 1997,
the failure rate for second tests was 1.88%, and in 1999, 1.82%. These figures could mean either that
these workers have put in too many hours or that their working conditions are so poor that their health
is deteriorating. The government needs to watch these developments closely (/DERXU 0DQDJHPHQW
5HODWLRQV0RQWKO\, No. 226, p. 10).
The crime rates for foreign workers are low. For example in 1998 the official policy record
showed that only 233 foreign workers were caught in serious crime and were deported (/DERXU
0DQDJHPHQW 5HODWLRQV 0RQWKO\, No. 226., p.10). Foreign workers have thus adjusted quite well in
Chinese Taipei, partly because many of them have a similar cultural background. Besides, the Council
of Labour Affairs has set up more than 15 centres all over the county to provide them with counselling
services.
3ROLF\RQLPSRUWLQJIRUHLJQZKLWHFROODUDQGSURIHVVLRQDOZRUNHUV
Whilst the government does have a coherent policy on the importation of low-skilled foreign
workers, it does not have any formal policy on the importation of white-collar and professional
workers. This is partly because, in the past, Chinese Taipei had no shortage of highly skilled
technicians and professionals. However, a distinct shortage of labour supply developed in certain
crafts and professions in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly because a very high proportion of Chinese
Taipeiese students who had gone abroad to study decided not to return home. They remained in the
host countries because of the attraction of higher pay and better working conditions. During that
period, a considerable number of these highly educated Chinese Taipeiese professionals took up
employment in the US, Canada and some other industrialized countries, creating the so-called brain
drain phenomenon.
During the 1980s, as the structure of the Chinese Taipeiese economy began to shift towards
more skills- and knowledge-intensive industries, the demand for highly skilled workers and
professionals increased rapidly. In order to raise the supply of such workers, the government began to
source actively these skilled professionals from amongst Chinese Taipeiese graduates who had
remained overseas, with some degree of success. From the mid-1980s onwards, as a direct result of the
governments active intervention, there was a significant increase in the number of students returning
to Chinese Taipei on completion of their overseas studies. For example, while only 937 students
returned to Chinese Taipei in 1980, by 1994, 6 510 students had decided to come back (Table 11).
The reported number of returning students has declined somewhat since the mid-1990s. This
is partly because the government cancelled subsidized airfares for students returning home, and thus,
some of these returnees who had come home at their own expense did not bother to report their return
to the government; hence, they were not included in the governments published list. However,
another reason is that pay levels at home are now much more attractive and employment opportunities
are plentiful. Thus, the current young generation does not feel the need to go abroad for advanced
studies or to find employment in the industrialized countries.
In short, up until very recently, there was a considerable number of highly trained Chinese
Taipeiese professionals employed in western industrialized countries, particularly the US and Canada;
Chinese Taipei could count on these people as an important potential source of supply of highly
skilled labour. However, with the rapid shift in the economy in recent years (towards skills- and
knowledge-intensive industries) and the drop in the number of students studying abroad (due to

232

improvements in Chinese Taipeis living standards and rising salaries) the shortage and therefore,
the demand for such workers has increased considerably.
In response to this shortage, the government recently implemented a number of programmes
aimed at attracting both Chinese Taipeiese and Mainland Chinese professionals, who had been trained
aboard, to come to Chinese Taipei. The government also revised the Employment Service Act,
relaxing some of the entry restrictions on highly skilled foreign workers. In February 2000, the
Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that it would provide subsidies to employers in the private
sector to assist them to recruit foreign professionals. The programme reads as follows:
For foreign professionals with a Ph.D. and 8 years of work experience, an MA degree and 12
years experience, or a BA degree and 14 years experience, the government will subsidize up to onehalf of the professionals salary, to a maximum limit of NT$ 80 000 per month.
For a Ph.D. holder with less than 8 years experience, an MA with 12 years experience, or a
BA with 14 years experience, the government will subsidize up to one-half of his salary, with a
maximum limit during the first year of NT$ 65 000 per month, followed by 70% of the first years
subsidy during the second year, and 40% during the third year.
For a PhD holder with 2 to 4 years working experience, an MA with 4 to 6 years experience,
or a BA with 6 to 8 years experience, the government will subsidize up to one half of his salary, with a
maximum limit of NT$ 50 000 per month for the first year, 70% of the first years subsidy during
second year, and 40% during the third year.
The question of whether such programmes will prove effective in attracting foreign
professionals has yet to be answered, and there are also limits on the total amount of subsidies that an
individual company may receive, LH., a company may submit only one application per year, and the
total amount subsidized may not exceed NT$ 1.5 million during the first year. There are also
stipulations on the specific skills of the foreign white-collar workers and professionals that should be
attracted to Chinese Taipei. According to Article 42 of the Employment Service Act 1994, only the
following types of foreign workers may be imported:
1.

Professional and technical workers;

2.

Managers of foreign-owned or overseas Chinese-owned firms;

3.

Teachers of public and private colleges and universities and language school teachers;

4.

Short-term language teachers;

5.

Sportsmen and sports coaches;

6.

Religious practitioners or artistic performers; and

7.

Other types of persons capable of making an important contribution to the development

of Chinese Taipei.

Considering the above list, it comes as no surprise to see that foreign workers are
concentrated in professional and managerial positions, religious functions, and language teaching.
As shown in Table 12, the number of foreign professional workers entering Chinese Taipei
increased throughout the 1990s, from only 17 824 foreign male professionals and 12 464 foreign
female professionals to 183 171 male and 205 018 female professionals at the turn of the century.
Most of them are to be found in the northern part of Chinese Taipei, LH., Taipei city and Taipei and
233

Taoyun counties, although there is also a notable proportion in the cities of Taichung and Kaoshiung.
Very few foreign professionals work outside of these areas, since this is where most of the big
industries are located.
According to occupation, most of these professionals are, in ascending order, teachers,
religious practitioners (technically these should not be referred to as foreign professionals because
they do not work for an employer), businessmen, and engineers. Their countries of origin are: Japan
(19.1%), the US (15.6%) and Canada (4.6%), while a further 4 to 6% comprise of Asian foreign
professionals, such as Koreans, Malaysians, Indonesians and Filipinos. As Table 13 reveals, amongst
US nationals, most of these professionals are found in teaching, including college and language
teaching. The occupational distribution of Japanese professionals is somewhat different; they are
heavily concentrated in business, engineering and language teaching. Most of the Indian professionals
are found in business, whilst Filipinos and Malaysians are concentrated in the field of engineering.
,OOHJDOZRUNHUV
As Chinese Taipei becomes more and more liberalized and globalised, entry and illegal stay
are becoming easier for foreigners. As Table 13 shows, there are three types of foreign alien, mere
overstayers, overstayers who work illegally, and illegal entrants who also work illegally. As we see
from figures in table 13, the number of working overstayers in on the rise. It is important to know that
these figure do not include the large number of illegal workers from Mainland China, as they are
Chinese too and thus almost impossible to catch and deport. In short, the figures in Table 13
underestimate by far the true number of illegal foreign aliens in Chinese Taipei. 
6XPPDU\DQGFRQFOXVLRQV
During the past ten years, the structures of Chinese Taipeis economy and of its labour force
have changed rapidly. It is clear that foreign workers were originally imported to alleviate the labour
shortage in the construction and labour-intensive industries. As labour shortage became less serious,
the government redirected foreign workers into the high-tech and rapidly expanding industries, so that
foreign workers are clearly being used to increase the supply of labour to the targeted industries and to
speed up the transformation of Chinese Taipeis economic structure.
In order to increase female labour force participation rates, and hence, the supply of female
labour, the government increased the importation of household maids and helpers. This was designed
to enable women to be released from taking care of young children and elderly parents or disabled
family members (tasks traditionally performed by women in Chinese Taipei).
The high referral fee and the short duration of employment contracts (2 to 3 years) has
resulted in increasing numbers of runaway foreign workers in Chinese Taipei at one time, which
almost destroyed the governments foreign worker allocation system. This problem has, however,
been resolved satisfactorily by requiring employers to set up individual savings accounts for their
foreign workers, retaining a portion of their income on individual accounts that workers are not
allowed to access until they are ready to return home.
The rising unemployment rate amongst native workers in recent years has caused the unions
and social groups to call on the government to reduce the number of foreign workers. However, such
policies were could not achieve this purpose, nor create jobs for native unemployed workers. The new
government needs to recognize that the role of foreign workers in alleviating labour shortages in the
234

construction and labour-intensive industries have been, by and large, accomplished, and that the new
role of foreign workers is to promote the development of high-tech and rapidly expanding industries.
However, whilst many people may think that jobs in the high-tech industries are clean and highly paid,
such a perception is wrong. Many of these jobs involve long working hours and hard labour, which is
why Chinese Taipei nationals are unwilling to occupy them. Therefore, the provision of foreign labour
for these industries can help speed up their expansion and thus, create better jobs for native workers.
The experiences of West Germany and Switzerland immediately after WWII showed that by
importing foreign workers, these countries enjoyed a high rate of growth, whilst the policies of the UK
and others, which restricted the importation of foreign workers, succeeded only in limiting their
economic growth.
As for illegal foreign workers, one can expect their number will continue to increase, since
Chinese Taipei is becoming more and more liberalized. However, if the new government is unable to
take action soon, the logical consequences of the long period of recession and high unemployment will
probably contribute to their decrease.

235

5()(5(1&(6

CEPD (2001), 6WDWLVWLFDO 'DWD %RRN, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive
Yuan, Peoples Republic of China.
CHENG, M.C. (1995), An Evaluation of Foreign Labour Policy, M.A. dissertation, National
Chengchi University, Chinese Taipei.
CHUNG, C. (1998), 7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI 6PDOO DQG 0HGLXP %XVLQHVVHV LQ &KLQHVH 7DLSHL
Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.
COUNCIL OF LABOUR AFFAIRS CLA (2000), 6XUYH\RI0DQDJHPHQWDQG8WLOL]DWLRQRI)RUHLJQ

:RUNHUVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL, Council of Labour Affairs, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.
COUNCIL OF LABOUR AFFAIRS CLA (1995), 6XUYH\RI0DQDJHPHQWDQG8WLOL]DWLRQRI)RUHLJQ

:RUNHUVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL, Council of Labour Affairs, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.
COUNCIL OF LABOUR AFFAIRS CLA (1994), 6XUYH\RI0DQDJHPHQWRI8WLOL]DWLRQRI)RUHLJQ

:RUNHUVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL, Council of Labour Affairs, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.
CORNELIUS, W.A. and KUWAHARA, Y. (1998), Changing Ways of Utilizing Foreign Labor in
the U.S. and Japanese Economies, Mimeo.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF BUDGET, ACCOUNTING, AND STATISTICS DGBAS (2000),
0RQWKO\%XOOHWLQRI0DQSRZHU6WDWLVWLFV, Executive Yuan, May.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF BUDGET, ACCOUNTING, AND STATISTICS DGBAS
(1998D), 5HSRUW RQ WKH :RUN ([SHULHQFHV LQ &KLQHVH 7DLSHL , Directorate-General of
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Peoples Republic of China.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF BUDGET, ACCOUNTING, AND STATISTICS DGBAS
(1998E), <HDUERRN RI 0DQSRZHU 6XUYH\ 6WDWLVWLFV RI &KLQHVH 7DLSHL $UHD , DirectorateGeneral of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Peoples Republic of China.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR AFFAIRS DLA (1996), 6XUYH\RI:RUNHUV$WWLWXGHRQ:RUNDQG

(PSOR\PHQW5HODWLRQVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL3URYLQFH, Department of Labour Affairs, Chinese
Taipei Provincial Government, Peoples Republic of China.
HUANG, H.L. (1996), The Formation and Development of Trade Unions Outside of the Legal
System, 0DQDJHPHQW0DQDJHPHQW5HODWLRQV, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 19-30.
KINDELBERGER, C. (1965), (FRQRPLF *URZWK DQG WKH 6XSSO\ RI /DERU, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.

236

LEE, J.S. (1992), Capital and Labor Mobility in Chinese Taipei, in G. Ranis (ed.), &KLQHVH7DLSHL

)URP'HYHORSLQJ WR0DWXUH(FRQRP\, Westview Press, New York, pp. 305-356.
LEE, J.S. and WU, H.L. (1992), Unskilled Foreign Workers in Chinese Taipei, Causes and
Consequences, $VLD&OXE3DSHUV, Tokyo, Vol. 2, pp. 107-122.
LEE, J.S. (1996), Recruiting and Managing Foreign Workers in Chinese Taipei, $VLDQDQG3DFLILF

0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO, Vol. 5, No. 2-3, pp. 281-299.
LEE, J.S. (1998), The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Foreign Workers in Chinese Taipei,
$VLDQDQG3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO, Vol. 7., Nos. 2-3, pp. 145-169.
LEE, J.S. (2000), Labour Policy for Knowledge-based Economy, in Charles Kao and Joseph S. Lee
(eds.), (FRQRPLF 3ROLF\ LQ .QRZOHGJH%DVHG (FRQRP\ Commonwealth Publishing
Company, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.
MARTIN, P. (1996), Labor Contractors: A Conceptual Overview, $VLDQ DQG 3DFLILF 0LJUDWLRQ

-RXUQDO, Vol. 5, Nos. 2-3. pp. 201-218.

237

12.7
7.8
8.2
5.4
7.6
7.5
7.0
7.1
6.4
6.1
6.7
4.6
5.4
5.9

Population
Increase Economic
rate
growth rate
No.(1 000
% Change
of average
(%)1
persons)
from
earnings in
previous
manuf.
year

19 673
1.1
9.8
19 907
1.2
10.8
20 107
1.0
14.4
20 353
1.2
13.3
20 557
1.0
11.0
20 752
1.0
10.3
20 944
0.9
7.0
21 126
0.9
6.7
21 304
0.8
5.7
21 471
0.8
4.2
21 683
1.0
4.6
21 871
0.9
2.8
22 034
0.7
3.4
22 216
0.8
2.9
1. Real Growth rate of GDP.
6RXUFH: Industry of Free China, Dec. 2001.
















Year

103 641
126 233
152 565
164 076
183 736
217 004
228 578
248 337
269 125
283 599
293 289
269 176
290 544
313 908

5 298
6 379
7 626
8 111
8 982
10 502
10 964
11 806
12 686
13 260
13 592
12 360
13 235
14 188

238

69.8
72.8
75.6
75.4
81.0
84.5
87.8
93.6
98.0
100.0
107.4
110.3
118.8
127.5

10.6
4.3
3.8
-0.2
7.4
4.4
3.9
6.6
4.7
2.0
7.4
2.6
7.7
7.4

GNP
Per capita Industrial production
(current
GNP
% Change
prices,
(current
General
from
US $ mln)
prices,
index
previous yr
USD )
1996=100
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

5.3
5.0
4.9
4.2
3.8
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.2
2.6
2.5
2.6
2.1

46.7
44.8
42.3
41.2
41.1
40.1
39.4
37.7
36.4
35.7
35.3
34.6
33.2
33.4

38.9
37.2
34.6
33.3
33.3
31.8
30.6
29.0
27.9
27.9
27.8
27.4
26.6
26.4

48.0
50.1
52.8
54.6
55.1
56.3
57.0
58.8
60.2
61.1
62.1
63.0
64.3
65.5

Structure of industry ( as % of GDP)

Total
Agric. Ind. Manuf Services

Table 10DMRULQGLFDWRUVRI&KLQHVH7DLSHLHFRQRP\
Consumer Prices
General
%
index
Change
1996=100
from
Previous
yr
73.3
0.5
74.2
1.3
77.5
4.4
80.7
4.1
83.6
3.6
87.3
4.5
89.9
2.9
93.6
4.1
97.0
3.7
100.0
3.1
100.9
0.9
102.6
1.7
102.8
0.2
104.1
1.3

Table 2.1DWLRQDOHFRQRPLFWUHQGV
GNP
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Amount
(NT$)
6 028 074
6 557 125
7 110 891
7 767 087
8 396 516
8 986 694
9 375 841
9 803 348

Real GNP

Annual Rate of
Change (%)
10.41
8.78
8.45
9.23
8.10
7.03
4.33
4.56

Amount
(NT$)
6 470 609
6 899 735
7 332 453
7 767 087
8 257 972
8 611 598
9 112 981
9 692 766

Annual Rate of
Change (%)
6.59
6.63
6.27
5.93
6.32
4.28
5.82
6.36

Per capita
GNP at Current
GNP
Prices
(USD Mn.)
Amount (USD )
228 578
248 337
269 125
283 599
293 289
269 176
290 544
313 908

10 964
11 806
12 686
13 260
13 592
12 360
13 235
14 188

6RXUFH: 0RQWKO\%XOOHWLQRI6WDWLVWLFV, Nov. 2001.

Table 3./DERXUPDUNHWLQGLFDWRUV
/DERXUIRUFHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
UDWH
Year
Total

Male

Female

(PSOR\HG
% of civilian
% of labour
population
force
(15 yrs plus)
57.78
98.33
57.99
98.73
57.55
98.77
57.04
98.64
56.69
97.86
57.65
97.29
58.26
97.55
57.76
97.09
58.76
97.34
59.73
98.03
59.19
98.31
59.18
98.43
58.25
98.33
58.22
98.49
58.44
98.49
57.97
98.55
58.04
98.44
57.66
98.21
56.92
97.40
56.74
97.28
56.48
97.31
56.24
97.08
55.95
97.01


58.76
77.96
39.13

58.73
77.95
39.23

58.26
77.11
39.25

57.82
76.68
38.76

57.93
76.47
39.30

59.26
76.36
42.12

59.72
76.11
43.30

59.49
75.47
43.46

60.37
75.15
45.51

60.93
75.24
46.54

60.21
74.83
45.56

60.12
74.84
45.35

59.24
73.96
44.50

59.11
73.80
44.39

59.34
73.78
44.83

58.82
72.67
44.89

58.96
72.44
45.40

58.71
72.03
45.34

58.44
71.13
45.76

58.33
71.09
45.64

58.04
70.58
45.60

57.93
69.93
46.03

57.68
69.42
46.02
1RY

57.18
68.45
46.01
54.64
95.56
6RXUFH: 0RQWKO\%XOOHWLQRI0DQSRZHU6WDWLVWLFVChinese Taipei Area, Nov. 2001.

239

8QHPSOR\PHQWUDWH
Total

Male

Female

1.67
1.27
1.23
1.36
2.14
2.71
2.45
2.91
2.66
1.97
1.69
1.57
1.67
1.51
1.51
1.45
1.56
1.79
2.60
2.70
2.69
2.92
2.99

1.57
1.15
1.10
1.21
2.08
2.68
2.44
2.90
2.75
1.96
1.70
1.57
1.68
1.50
1.47
1.36
1.51
1.79
2.72
2.94
2.93
3.23
3.36

1.86
1.53
1.47
1.65
2.25
2.76
2.46
2.92
2.53
1.97
1.68
1.56
1.64
1.53
1.57
1.59
1.65
1.80
2.42
2.37
2.33
2.46
2.44

4.44

4.99

3.62

3 324

719

1 577

205
214
223
233
240
260
284
313
321

346

10

19
18
15
14
13
12
11
11
11
2 549

2 483
2 485
2 449
2 422
2 570
2 611
2 603
2 655
2 683

Manufacturing

36

36
36
36
35
35
35
35
36
36

Electricity, gas
& water

729

879
967
1 003
928
885
865
843
832
821

Construction

,QGXVWU\

2 139

1 806
1 875
1 919
1 976
1 995
2 047
2 130
2 163
2 197

342

411

240

619

1 628

1 039

1 718

705

411

277
290
311
334
351
385
406
412
416

3 236

Prod. related
workers, plant
and machine
operators and
labourers
3 382
3 486
3 473
3 362
3 416
3 426
3 373
3 413
3 415

498

463
473
469
472
465
477
476
481
487

Finance,
Wholesale, retail Transport, storage
insurance &
& restaurant
& communication
real estate

2FFXSDWLRQ

5 313

4 323
4 457
4 586
4 751
4 795
4 945
5 116
5 218
5 284

Total

Service

Legislators,
Agricultural,
Technicians and
Service workers and
government
animal
Professionals
associate
Clerks
shop and market
administrators,
husbandry,
Public
professionals
sales workers
forestry and
administration business executives &
managers
fishing workers
313
441
485
1 231
806
1 405
995
317
436
479
1 296
839
1 438
965
317
436
500
1 338
877
1 479
942
324
429
542
1 376
922
1 530
906
323
420
560
1 426
938
1 550
865
315
425
578
1 498
955
1 597
810
318
414
601
1 571
995
1 667
764
315
412
610
1 591
1 027
1 712
726
309
413
613
1 634
1 028
1 747
701

Mining &
quarrying

Social, personal
& related
community
services
1 259
1 288
1 347
1 412
1 421
1 461
1 502
1 534
1 554

Business
services

3 417
3 506
3 503
3 399
3 503
3 523
3 492
3 534
3 551

Total

1 005
976
954
918
878
822
776
740
714

Agriculture,
forestry &
fishing

6RXUFH : 0RQWKO\%XOOHWLQRI6WDWLVWLFV, November 2001.










6HS


<HDU










6HSW


Year

Industry

(Unit: 1000 persons)

Table 4.(PSOR\HGSHUVRQVE\LQGXVWU\DQGRFFXSDWLRQ

20 August 1992

17 August 1992

8 May 1992

12 October 1991

(IIHFWLYHGDWH

Helpers

241

Public or private mental institutions

No limitation

1. Unit : family
7 999 (increased to 8 000
2. Advertise on local newspapers for three days
on 12 January 1993)
3. Household maid is old enough and with training license
4. Both spouses work and have children under 12 years
old, or live with their parents (70 yrs+),
elderly person (70 yrs+) with no relatives, elderly
person (70 yrs+) living with
relatives

Household maids

15 000

No limitation

7DUJHW1R

Identify legal foreign workers

Household maids
Government major construction projects
Crewmen
Mental institutions employees
Nurses
High linkage industries or important export industries
Duration of stay: up to 2 years.
Employers pay stabilisation fee.

5HTXLUHPHQWV

Employment Service Act

First round (6 industries)

1. Construction
2. Textiles
3. Basic metal industries
4. Fabricated metal
5. Machinery & equipment
6. Electrical & electronic machinery
& repairing

0DMRUSROLFLHV

(Unit: persons)

Table 5.6WDWXVRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL

Third round (73 industries): apart

from the 68 industries, also includes
Shipment
Chemical products
Umbrella industry
Food processing industry
Chemicals

242

6RXUFH Monthly Labour Statistics, January 2001 Council of Labour Affairs, Executive Yuan, Chinese Taipei, P. R. O .C.

Fourth round: Chinaware, etc., 6

No quota on the number of foreign workers
industries
17 August 1993 Fifth round (73 industries): New
1. New plants: 30% of the workforce
plants or extended equipments firms 2. Government major construction projects
14 September Sixth round: Export Processing
1994
Zones, Science-Based Industrial
Park, and 38 industries
8 October 1994 Major investment-manufacturing
Major investment refers to investment for more than NT$ 200 million
School, institutions, construction of
Investment more than NT$ 150 million
hospitals
Construction for Major investment
projects
1 May 1995
7 industries

23 May 1993

12 January
1993

1. Size of establishment at least 10 employees.

2. The share of foreign workers has to be 30% or less of total employees.
3. With request foreign workers file at industry association
4. Foreign workers not allowed to engage in administration or management
5. Advertise in local newspapers for three days
1. Those who imported more than 50 foreign workers in the first round are not
allowed to reapply for the second round
2. Firms with high layoff rates are not allowed to reapply

26 September
1992

Second round (68 industries):

important export industries
high linkage industries
3D industries

1. Ships of more than 20 tons

2. Foreign crewmens share less than 1/3 of the regular workforce
3. Advertise in local newspapers for three days

20 August 1992 Crewmen

7DEOH(FRQWLQXHG)

4 825

No limitation

1.5 000
2.10 000

No limitation

No limitation

9 000

32 000

No limitation

35.07
0.56
8.54
1.24
0.31
1.88
0.88
0.10
0.06
4.27
3.33
6.88
2.44
2.92
1.46
0.03
0.17
64.93
----

452
51

30
2 184

1 704
3 520
1 247

1 492
748
14
86

33 217
---

---

17 938
287
4 369
635
158
961


No.



--

--

---

0.16
23.38

269
38 570
---

2.80
0.32

12.87

0.78
0.95
2.84
7.01
4.87
9.31
8.95
2.35

76.62
2.04
14.21
2.02
1.60
1.23
0.14
2.17

4 616
536

21 230

1 289
1 572
4 678
11 566
8 042
15 363
14 758
3 876

126 403
3 366
23 435
3 331
2 639
2 024
226
3 587

No.



1 265


35 245

48 786

6 844
624
237

35 825

1 401
2 170
4 463
11 211
9 688
14 885
18 994
4 195

160 401
4 402
32 956
3 577
2 663
2 233
209
3 824

No.

0.51


14.34

19.86

2.79
0.25
0.10

14.58

0.57
0.88
1.82
4.56
3.94
6.06
7.73
1.71

65.28
1.79
13.41
1.46
1.08
0.91
0.09
1.56



1 100


44 683

41 673

6 928
831
2 134

41 907

168 150
4 368
32 920
3 754
2 571
1 983
251
3 731
121
1 538
2 007
4 955
11 344
8 581
14 587
18 747
4 892

No.

0.43


17.48

16.30

2.71
0.33
0.83

16.40

65.78
1.71
12.88
1.47
1.01
0.78
0.10
1.46
0.05
0.60
0.79
1.94
4.44
3.36
5.71
7.33
1.91



999


61 723

51 894

6 881
704
4 550

42 105

164 256
4 305
33 113
3 023
2 189
1 724
211
3 490
205
1 497
1 722
4 763
10 582
7 460
12 128
17 304
6 300

No.

0.36


22.13

18.61

2.47
0.25
1.63

15.10

58.90
1.54
11.87
1.08
0.78
0.62
0.08
1.25
0.07
0.54
0.62
1.71
3.79
2.68
4.35
6.20
2.26



1 185


106 331

37 001

7 678
986
7 203

53 029

181 998
4 683
32 916
3 214
1 948
1 659
305
3 855
226
1 986
1 729
4 805
11 511
6 972
11 228
18 234
7 830

No.

3URGXFWLYLW\6WDWLVWLFV'*%$69DULRXV\HDUV

243

6RXUFHV6XUYH\RI8WLOL]DWLRQDQG$GPLQLVWUDWLRQRI)RUHLJQ:RUNHUVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL&RXQFLORI/DERXU$IIDLUVYDULRXV\HDUV0RQWKO\5HSRUWRI6DODU\DQG

1. Manufacturing
Food
Textiles
Apparel
Leather and fur products
Wood and bamboo products
Furniture and fixtures
Pulp and paper
Printing
Chemicals
Chemical products
Rubber products
Plastic products
Non-metallic minerals
Basic metal products
Metal products
Machinery and equipment
Electrical & Electronic
machinery
Transportation
Precision instruments
Miscellaneous
Others
2. Construction
3. Household maids and helpers
in medical institutions
4. Crewmen
7RWDO

Industry Sector

(Unit: persons, %)

Table 6.'LVWULEXWLRQRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVE\LQGXVWU\

0.36


32.57

11.33

2.35
0.30
2.21

16.24

55.74
1.43
10.08
0.98
0.61
0.50
0.09
1.18
0.07
0.61
0.53
1.47
3.53
2.14
3.44
5.58
2.40

Table 7.6KDUHRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVE\LQGXVWU\
(Unit: %)






Manufacturing
4.48
6.00
6.70
7.00
6.80
Food
4.84
5.50
3.79
3.94
3.92
Textiles
7.72
13.20
21.33
21.38
21.47
Apparel
1.95
4.30
3.47
3.73
3.14
Leather
7.28
7.10
7.60
7.42
6.10
Lumber
1.70
5.10
7.42
6.95
6.07
Furniture
0.00
1.02
0.43
0.52
0.43
Paper
0.88
5.00
6.10
5.90
5.36
Printing
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.35
Chemical
0.10
2.90
2.14
2.31
1.99
Chemical products
0.06
2.00
3.50
3.24
2.61
Rubber products
4.27
10.00
10.37
11.51
11.30
Plastic products
0.00
4.60
6.31
6.42
5.86
Non-metallic minerals
3.33
10.80
10.36
9.63
8.64
Basic-metal products
6.88
6.60
13.65
13.42
11.39
Metal products
2.44
7.50
7.30
7.03
6.42
Machinery and equipment
2.92
5.90
2.50
2.86
3.67
Electrical & electronic machinery
1.46
4.00
6.71
7.65
7.60
Transportation equipment
0.03
5.10
4.78
4.83
4.92
Precision instruments
0.17
3.20
1.90
2.42
2.17
Miscellaneous
0.00
3.10
0.30
2.80
6.03
6RXUFHV Yearbook of Labour Statistics, August 2001, Council of Labour Affairs; 0RQWKO\ 5HSRUW RI 6DODU\ DQG
3URGXFWLYLW\6WDWLVWLFV, DGBAS, various years.

244

Table 8.'LVWULEXWLRQRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVE\DGPLVVLRQFDWHJRULHV
(Unit: persons, %)

No.
%

-XO\
No.
%

-XO\
No.
%

46 968

18.74

45 863

18.46

39 008 15.26

48 253

17.30

35 513

11.56

5 221

2.08

5 861

2.36

5 691 2.23

4 323

1.55

860

0.28

16 472

6.57

20 980

8.45

32 816 12.84

52 213

18.72

79 766

25.97

15 072
1 541
19 243

6.01
0.61
7.68

14 237
1 265
14 227

5.73
0.51
5.73

11 833 4.63
1 100 0.43
16 285 6.37

9 495
999
15 178

3.40
0.36
5.44

7 370
1 084
10 245

2.40
0.35
3.34

73 industries in
manufacturing
Ceramics 6 industries
New plants, or expanding
production facilities
Export processing zones and
science-based industrial
park
3D Jobs
Major investment projects: in
manufacturing

26 351

10.52

23 241

9.36

12 565 4.92

3 034

1.09

512

0.17

24 467
35 263

9.76
14.07

23 446
39 233

9.44
15.79

15 775 6.17
32 586 12.75

5 334
18 451

1.91
6.62

584
2 859

0.19
0.93

4 312

1.72

4 010

1.61

4 283 1.68

1 015

0.36

930

0.30

20 202
29 325

8.06
11.70

4 900
30 551

1.97
12.30

2 215 0.87
44 063 17.24

571
54 269

0.20
19.46

109
70 620

0.04
22.99

Major investment projects: in

construction

1 650

0.66

1 505

0.61

1 493 0.58

2 642

0.95

2 813

0.92

7 industries in manufacturing
industries
Replacement workers in
manufacturing who have
completed their employment
term

4 488

1.79

4 407

1.77

2 716 1.06

432

0.15

68

0.02

12 102

4.87

33 177 12.98

62 663

22.47

93 842

30.55

$GPLVVLRQFDWHJRULHV
Major government
construction projects
6 industries and 15
occupations
Helpers in private home or in
institutions
Household maids
Crewmen
68 industries in
manufacturing

-XO\
No.
%

-XQH
No.
%


     
 

7RWDO
Sources: Survey of Utilization and Administration of Foreign Workers in Chinese Taipei, Council of Labour Affairs,
Various years; Monthly Report of Salary and Productivity Statistics, DGBAS, Various years.

245


% of
FW
NW
wages


18 186
89.27
18 305
70.14


% of
FW
NW
wages


19 529
90.70
19 533
75.00


% of
FW
NW
wages


20 102
94.20
19 954
81.70


% of
FW
NW
wages


20 963
96.90
20 662
80.80


% of
FW
NW
wages


21 006
96.00
21 909
89.60


% of
FW
NW
wages


21 006
95.0
20 645
76.9

246

7RWDO
Manufacturing
Construction
Regular wage
7RWDO 
 
 
 
 
 
 

14 079
80.70
14 587
82.10
15 410
83.30
15 562
83.80
16 167
86.90
16 406
84.60
16 542
87.4
Manufacturing
Construction
14 268
58.80
15 291
61.90
15 736
63.90
15 415
66.50
15 710
65.00
16 149
69.00
16 395
65.0
1RWHV
1. FW refers to foreign workers; NW refers to native workers.
2. Native workers wages are for those with less than 2 years experience working in the same company; they are not the wages of those who work side by side with
foreign workers.
6RXUFH: 6XUYH\RI8WLOLVDWLRQDQG$GPLQLVWUDWLRQRI)RUHLJQ:RUNHUVLQ&KLQHVH7DLSHL, Council of Labour Affairs, January 2000.


% of
FW
NW
wage.


17 525
88.22
19 565
75.50

Table 9.,QFRPHJDSVEHWZHHQIRUHLJQZRUNHUVDQGQDWLRQDOV
(Unit: persons, %)

Table 10.$YHUDJHZRUNLQJKRXUVIRUIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
















Manufacturing

Hr
Rt.
239.2 1.13

Hr
Rt.
241.9 1.13

Hr
Rt.
Hr
Rt.
Hr
Rt.
Hr
246.6 1.14 243.1 1.15 244.8 1.18 239.77

Rt. Hr
Rt.
1.19 241.02 1.16

Construction

242.2 1.22

239.4 1.17

245.0 1.21

248.8 1.23

257.3 1.29

263.20

1.36 261.43 1.36

5HJXODUZRUNLQJKRXUV
Manufacturing

201.1 1.02

209.4 1.05

209.9 1.04

208.2 1.06

204.1 1.06

204.22

1.08 203.44 1.07

Construction

201.7 1.05

209.2 1.07

210.2 1.08

206.4 1.06

208.3 1.10

209.06

1.13 218.55 1.18

2YHUWLPHZRUNLQJ+RXUV
Manufacturing

38.2

2.67

32.5

2.16

36.71 2.55

34.92 2.33

40.66 2.61

35.55

2.47 37.58

2.26

Construction

40.5

7.63

30.3

3.49

34.76 4.46

42.32 4.76

49.05 5.27

54.14

7.32 42.88

4.82

Notes:1. Hr = working hours.

2. Rt = Average working hours for foreign workers.
Source: Survey of Utilization and Management of Foreign Workers in Chinese Taipei, Council of Labour Affairs, January 2000.

247

,1'21(6,$
E\
7DUD%DNWL6RHSURER
Demographic Institute, University of Indonesia

,QWURGXFWLRQ
Since 2000 Indonesia has seen positive growth following the economic crisis of 1997. Prior
estimation shows that Indonesia reached 3.5% of real GDP growth in 2001.1 However, this positive
economic growth was accompanied by high inflation that was estimated to be as much as 7.7% for the
period January to July 2001.2 This was mainly caused by the rise in oil and gas prices in the first
quarter of 2001 in order for the government to be able to reduce the subsidy.
'RPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGWKHODERXUPDUNHW
Economic growth in 2001 was reached by several government policies. The government
brought about tight fiscal policy by lowering the budget deficit from 54 trillion rupiahs to around
34 trillion rupiahs.3 To generate revenue, the government also extensively increased tax revenues on
other taxable objects. To create employment, the government has driven investment through domestic
investment and foreign direct investment. Because of the crisis also faced by financial and banking
institutions the Indonesian economy could not rely upon domestic investment. Moreover, during 2001,
foreign direct investment decreased by 50% compared to the previous year.4 This might have been
caused by unstable political and security conditions.
One other tool of driving higher economic growth used by the government is by driving the
export. Compared to the previous year, Indonesia has experienced a 10% decrease in the value of
exports in 20015 while Indonesian export prices were lower because of the low exchange rate around
10.000 rupiahs per US dollar during 2001.6 This has not however been successful in driving higher
demand on exports. This situation has meant that the Indonesian economy must depend upon its
domestic consumption.7 However, the increase in consumption in 2001 consists of higher demands on
basic needs. It means lower demand on goods other than basic goods. This situation mainly brought
1

Preliminary estimation from the Coordination Minister of Economy and Industry, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti in
.RPSDV, January 2002.

As cited from Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) statement in .RPSDV, August 2001.



.RQWDQ, 13th edition, December 2001. Data from Bank of Indonesia (www.bi.go.id) shows that the growth of CPI
until November 2001 is 11%.



,ELG



,ELG



Based on Bank of Indonesia data (www.bi.go.id).



/RFFLW., .RQWDQ.






251

lower demand on the products of the manufacturing industry and it has induced lower demand for
labour in that sector.8
The effect on labour demand has resulted in a reduction in employment. In the middle of
20019 the number of unemployed reached around 40 million. This situation has persisted since the
beginning of the economic crisis in 1997. Unemployment rates were higher in 1998-2000, at between
5-6% per year, compared to rates before the crisis as can be seen in Table 2.2. However, the
Indonesian economy can survive because of the presence of informal sectors. Around 1.7 million
informal industries can exist in this crisis.10 Furthermore, we can see from Table 2.2 that there is an
increase in the percentage of employment in the agricultural sector (from 41% in 1997 to 45% in
2000) and a decrease in the percentage of employment in manufacturing industry (from 19% to 17% in
2000). It indicates a shift in the labour market after 1997, which may have been the result of those who
were laid-off in the manufacturing industry finding employment in the agricultural sector.
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
Economic conditions in Indonesia have affected the labour market since the crisis. As
previously shown, there is an indication of a shift in employment trends, from the formal to the
informal sectors as well as from manufacturing to the agricultural sector. However, the unemployed
were not able to be fully absorbed into the domestic labour market during the crisis due to decline in
investment. This condition has led to emigration to many countries. The number of Indonesian
workers working abroad reached 1.6 million from 1995 to 2000 (stock).11 Sixty percent of whom are
working in the informal sectors, and 40% in the formal sector. The number of Indonesian workers sent
abroad yearly (flow) since 1997 and their ratio of male/female, can be seen in Table 3.1.
We can see from this table that the country attracting the highest number of Indonesians
every year in search of work is Malaysia, followed by Singapore. East Asian countries are also
becoming increasingly attractive as is illustrated by the flow of Indonesian workers to Hong Kong and
Taiwan which has increased to around 50% since 1999 compared to previous years. The major
receiving country remains Saudi Arabia, with the highest number of Indonesia workers from year to
year. However, the percentage of female workers entering into the foreign labour market tends to
increase from year to year.
The benefit of sending Indonesian workers abroad can be seen from the remittances sent
back to Indonesia which can be calculated in foreign exchange credited to the Indonesian economy.
The amount of remittances has reached 5 billion US dollars in the past five years. On average, the
remittances of Indonesian workers represents a tenth of the revenue for their region. The amount of
remittances sent can be seen in Table 3.2.


,ELG



.RPSDV, August 2001. This number is overstated as it includes all the number of layoffs. The number of
unemployed persons in Table 2.2 around 5 to 6 million persons are based on surveys that the respondents were
asked whether they searched for jobs or not as indicator in counting the number of unemployment. The layoffs do
not necessarily search for jobs.






/RFFLW, .RQWDQ.



As cited from Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, 3HQHPSDWDQ 7., NH /XDU 1HJHUL 0DVDODK GDQ
3HPHFDKDQ8SD\D3HPEHQDKDQ6HMDN-XQL [The Placement of Indonesian Workers Abroad: Problems and
Solutions], Jakarta: March 2000.



,ELG






252

At micro level, family and relatives can use remittances to improve their social and
economic conditions. Most of the remittances were used by workers families and relatives to build
houses and sometimes represented the main source of funding in their households. Furthermore, most
migrants return to Indonesia with greater skills levels gained from their relevant field of work, which
can be used to increase the marginal productivity of those returning
However, there is a negative side to sending Indonesians working abroad. By 2000, around
700 Indonesian workers had sought protection from Indonesian consulates abroad. Between 19952000, according to NGO records, around 100 of those working abroad had experienced deception,
violence, sexual abuse and even death. Some Indonesians that intended to work abroad were deceived
by employment agencies before their departure. This could be due to inadequate placement services
provided by Indonesian government and working agencies. Moreover, it is well known that workers
sent from Indonesia are have low quality in terms of human capital, most being employed as
housekeepers.
If we compare Indonesian and foreign workers, we may conclude that most foreign workers
have a higher educational attainment. In Table 3.3 we can see that most foreign workers are in
professional occupations. These foreign workers mostly originate from Asian countries, mainly from
Japan and The Republic of Korea (see Table 3.4). This may indicate that the inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) from those countries were followed by the inflow of their workers. The Ministry of
Manpower and Transmigration has been successful in collecting 100 US dollars per worker as a nontaxed government revenue.
Since the year 2000, we can see in Table 3.4 that the number of foreign workers entering the
country has declined from around 20.000 workers in 1999 to around 15.000 workers between 2000
and 2001. This may be explained by poor economic conditions that allows for little employment of
foreigners as well as Indonesians. Another possible explanation is that since the implementation of a
policy on regional autonomy, local authorities have been reluctant to divulge the number of working
permits issued.19 However, if we observe the number of visas issued in Table 3.5, we find that the
number of temporary and permanent residents visas has declined sharply since 1999 and as is widely
known, Indonesia has faced rioting in several regions brought about by the unstable economic and
political situation. This may lead to lower number of foreigners entering Indonesia, as they fear of
their safety.
As we may trace the number of migrant flows from this data issued by the Directorate of
Immigration, the number of Indonesians exited from and returned to Indonesia cannot explain the


Ministry of Manpower, 6WXGL.HELMDNDQ3HUOXDVDQ.HVHPSDWDQ.HUMD%DJL7HQDJD.HUMD,QGRQHVLD3XUQD7XJDV

[Policy Study of Employment Creation for Returned Indonesian Workers], Jakarta: March 1998, pp. 70.



Demographic Institute, Migrasi Internasional Tenaga Kerja dari Indonesia: Sebelum Pemberangkatan, Selama di
Luar Negeri, dan Setelah Kembali [International Labour Migration from Indonesia: Pre Departure, While
Working Overseas, and Upon Return], unpublished paper.





2SFLW, Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (March 2000).

16

/RFFLW, Demographic Institute.

17

Around 50% of the workers in 1998-1999 were working in social services sector, which is referred to
housekeepers. (Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, 1999).

18

.RPSDV, Senin, 12 November 2001.

19

This condition was explained by the authority in Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration. The similar situation
also occurred regarding Indonesian workers sent abroad.





253

number of emigrants. There are no details of the reasons for leaving Indonesia and the duration spent
abroad. We can only recognise the relatively stable numbers of Indonesians both leaving and
returning.
When observing the issue of international migration, consideration should be given to the
number of illegal migrants entering and exiting Indonesia. However, there is no specific yearly data
stating the number of illegal migrants. The Malaysian government deported 1,700 illegal immigrants
who came from Indonesia on December 2001.20 Furthermore, they have stated that there were around
450 000 illegal immigrants who came from Indonesia and that they have been deporting 10 000 every
month since the year of 2002.21 This indicates that many Indonesians are living abroad illegally,
especially in neighbouring countries.
Since 2001 the Indonesian Police Department has dealt with 1,996 illegal immigrants. As
many as 1,594 were managed by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), and
the rest (402) were deported by local immigration services. In East Java, 294 refugees stayed in
several locations such as Surabaya (132), Situbondo (55), Gresik (41), South Surabaya (35), and
Madura (31), until November 2001. As many as 75 were handled by the International Organisation
for Immigration (IOM). There were 55 illegal immigrants who came to Situbondo from Afganishtan
and who were handled by the IOM. On November 22, 63 illegal immigrants from Pakistan, Iraq, Iran,
and several Middle East countries came to East Java.
The most recent issue concerning illegal immigrants is the presence of refugees from
Afghanistan, since the Talibans have been in rule.24 Many Afghanis escaped via Pakistan and intended
to enter Australia. This usually meant transiting Malaysia, as this country has free short visit visas for
citizens of Middle Eastern countries. Later they came to Batam by boat through the Indonesian sea and
some were seized by the local immigration service. In April of 2001 around 50 immigrants from
Afghanistan came to Jakarta, were arrested and then deported to Malaysia.
There are many parts of Indonesian where illegal immigrants can easily enter. Based on
UNHCR data, around 1,559 immigrants from the Middle East have stayed in many locations. Most
illegal immigrants in Indonesia from middle eastern countries are looking for asylum protection and
the Indonesian government cannot easily deport these people as they are protected by international
convention. This situation has been a burden on the Indonesian government, although the provision of
their basic needs are supported by the IOM (International Organisation of Migrants).
(FRQRPLFRXWORRNDQGSROLFLHVUHJDUGLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
The Indonesian economy is predicted to recover by the year of 2002. This will be driven by a
recovery of world economy this year which is predicted to benefit the Indonesian economy after the
second quarter. This will be brought about by the policy of the USA and Japan governments, of
cutting interest rates 2% and 0.5% per annum respectively, in order to drive domestic consumption.25
20

.RPSDV, December 4, 2001.

21

.RPSDV, January 26, 2002.

22

.RPSDV, November 6, 2001.

23

.RPSDV, November 24, 2001

24

.RPSDV, January 21, 2002.

25

/RFFLW, .RQWDQ

254

Consequently, this policy will lead to higher demand for Indonesian exports and will drive the inflow
of capital into Indonesia. It is expected that more of FDI will also enter Indonesia. Helped by
government policy to increase domestic consumption and to reform taxation and tariffs, it is predicted
that Indonesian economic growth will reach around 4% this year.
This economic growth is expected to open up employment for Indonesians and this Job
Creation policy focuses on driving domestic, as well as foreign direct investment. Driving labour
export is also of government interest as unemployed Indonesians finding jobs abroad then send money
back to Indonesia. Both alternatives of creating employment for Indonesians will lead to a higher
number of inflow and outflow of international migrants in the future. Furthermore, legislation that will
drive international migration will accompany this economic policy.
For example, there will be better bargaining position of Indonesian workers in face of their
potential employers in the receiving countries. A new on-line computerised system has been
arranged between several inter-related institutions (working agencies, banks, ministry of manpower,
and immigration services) which will raise the recruitment fee for Indonesian workers from around
600 to 700 USD.26 This system requires that working agencies make a deposit of as much as 200 US
dollars per worker. Employment agencies will still have an obligation to pay USD 11 per worker for
protection. This regulation will lead to better guaranteed working conditions for Indonesian workers.
In addition, the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, in co-ordination with several
ministries and institutions have made new programs for the placement of Indonesian workers. These
focus on the quality of workers, professional attitude of the management amongst agencies, protection
for workers and co-ordination in areas of monitoring, controlling, and action.27 In spite of the
attractiveness of higher wages received by Indonesian workers abroad, this condition will tend to lead
to higher number of workers outflow.
For foreign workers, the regulation for including foreign workers PT. Jamsostek will apply a
social security program that previously repealed the government corporation that deals with social
security management. This will benefit foreign workers for they will have security and will also
benefit Indonesian workers, as there will be a greater flow of funds for the social security program.
Furthermore, it will be of benefit to the Indonesian economy since many consumers abroad have
refused to buy Indonesian products as their governments required that there were guarantees of a
social security program for the workers who produce these products. Better social security will tend to
increase the number of foreign workers into Indonesia in the future.
For immigrants as a whole, the authority that is responsible for policymaking is the Ministry
of Justice, under the Directorate General of Immigration. There are recent issues on immigration that
are being considered by the Directorate General of Immigration and the Ministry of Justice these are
the global issues, such as the presence of networks of organised international terrorists, economic
aspects, gender issues and human rights. In considering the economic aspect, the procedure of
acquiring permanent residents permits needs to be revised in order to stimulate direct foreign
investment in Indonesia.28 Concerning gender and human rights issues - these represent the possibility
of Indonesian citizenship status for foreign husbands of Indonesian wives and the possibility of dual
citizenship in a limited period for Indonesians living abroad.

26

.RPSDV, November 25, 2001.

27

2SFLW, Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (March 2000).

28

/RFFLW.RPSDV, January 26, 2002.

255

There are several legal aspects that will be revised such as the revision of short-term visit
visas and the revision of complicated procedures in granting visas to the elderly. The Directorate of
Immigration has also planned additional consulates and immigration offices abroad and throughout
Indonesia in order to extend and improve immigration services for Indonesians.
However, implementation of regional autonomy can reduce the ability of monitoring and
controlling the increase in the number of international migrants. As experienced by the Ministry of
Manpower and Transmigration, there has been a reluctancy on the part of each local authority to report
information on workers since the year of 2000. Consequently, the recorded numbers of outflow and
inflow will be understated in spite of the tendency of higher international migration flows, driven by
these migration-related policies. Furthermore, there is large number of illegal migrants that are
unrecorded.
It is planned to provide places to handle illegal immigrants in co-ordination with local
authorities in Lumping, NTT, NTB, and East Java, where they can be effectively managed and sent to
IOM/UNHCR or deported back to their home country.29.

29

/RFFLW, .RPSDV, November 24, 2001.

256

5()(5(1&(6

CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 6WDWLVWLFDO<HDU%RRNRI,QGRQHVLD 1995-2000.

DEMOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE, Migrasi Internasional Tenaga Kerja dari Indonesia: Sebelum
Pemberangkatan, Selama di Luar Negeri, dan Setelah Kembali, [International Labour
Migration from Indonesia: Pre Departure, While Working Overseas, and Upon Return],
Unpublished paper.
MINISTRY OF MANPOWER (1998), 6WXGL.HELMDNDQ3HUOXDVDQ.HVHPSDWDQ.HUMD%DJL7HQDJD
.HUMD,QGRQHVLD3XUQD7XJDV [Policy Study of Employment Creation for Returned Indonesian
Workers], Jakarta: March 1998.
MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND TRANSMIGRATION (2000), 3HQHPSDWDQ7.,NH/XDU1HJHUL
0DVDODKGDQ3HPHFDKDQ8SD\D3HPEHQDKDQ6HMDN-XQL [The Placement of Indonesian
Workers Abroad: Problems and Solutions], Jakarta: March 2000.

257

Table 2.1. 0DLQHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUVLQ,QGRQHVLD





Real GDP Growth
7.98
4.70
-13.13
0.85
Real GNP Growth
8.08
4.10
-16.61
2.58
Real per capita GDP (US$)
883.6
475.8
236.3
266.9
Real per capita GDP growth (%)
6.31
3.29
-14.30
0.07
Domestic demand growth (%)*
7.36
6.77
-2.14
-12.70
-as proportion to GDP (%)
121.40
109.98
70.68
53.13
Export growth (%)*
7.56
7.80
11.18
-31.61
-as proportion of GDP (%)
25.82
27.86
52.97
35.19
Current balance (million US$)
-7,801
-5,001
4,097
5,781
-as proportion of GDP (%)
3.49
3.70
3.44
3.70
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital
Formation (million US$)
66,157.2
38,212.1
30,285.8
33,848.2
-as proportion of GDP
29.60
28.31
25.43
21.65
Consumer Price Index (1990=100)
185.9
198.3
168.3
202.6
Inflation Rate (%) (1996=100)
6.47
11.05
77.63
2.01
Exchange Rate
(year average of US$/Rp)
2,383
4,650
8,025
7,100
$SSURYHG)RUHLJQ'LUHFW,QYHVWPHQWE\VHFWRUPLOOLRQ86
Agriculture
1,521.6
463.7
998.2
491.2
Mining and quarrying
1,696.8
1.6
0.3
14.1
Manufacturing
16,075.0
23,017.3
8,388.2
6,929.2
Electricity, gas, and water supply
3,808.5
1,839.9
1,795.4
2,310.0
Construction
296.8
306.8
197.8
153.4
Trade, restaurants, and hotels
1,761.7
472.0
672.9
507.7
Transport,storage,and communication 694.6
5,900.0
79.0
102.7
Finance,insurance,estates,and
business services
3,000.2
1,397.6
1,270.9
179.4
Electrical, trading, and other services 1,076.2
433.6
160.4
202.9
7RWDO
29,931.4
33,832.5
13,563.1
10,890.6
$SSURYHG'RPHVWLF,QYHVWPHQWE\VHFWRUELOOLRQUXSLDKV
Agriculture
16,071.4
14,807.7
5,315.1
2,408.3
Mining and quarrying
460.1
126.3
116.3
174.0
Manufacturing
59,217.7
79,334.3
44,908.0
46,745.5
Electricity,gas,and water supply
3,485.5
11,151.2
138.4
117.9
Construction
1,550.0
877.0
1,992.0
395.1
Trade, restaurants, and hotels
5,151.2
2,632.8
1,231.8
1,670.9
Transport,storage,and communication 3,065.0
4,649.4
3,260.5
225.3
Finance, insurance, estates, and
business services
9,425.7
4,300.5
1,547.5
995.5
Electrical, trading, and other services 2,288.6
1,993.7
2,239.7
817.5
7RWDO
100,715.2 119,872.9 60,749.3
53,550.0
*Note: Calculatedasapercentagechangecomparedtopreviousyear.
6RXUFH: CentralBureauofStatistics,StatisticalYearbookofIndonesia,variousyears.

258


4.77
4.38
205.1
3.16
10.76
50.61
16.06
38.55
1,897
1.40
32,939.7
24.32
210.3
9.35
9,530
152.2
2.2
5,179.6
0.4
87.8
222.0
138.1
104.6
200.1
6,087.0
3,559.4
34.1
11,516.8
100.0
449.1
170.8
629.5
292.6
744.2
17,496.5

Table 2.2. 3RSXODWLRQDQGODERXU

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Population (million)
198.32
201.35
204.39
206.52
Labour force (million)
90.11
91.32
92.73
94.85
Employment (million)
85.70
87.05
87.67
88.82
Unemployment (million)
4.41
4.28
5.06
6.03
Unemployment rate (%)
4.89
4.68
5.46
6.36
Employment by industry
Agriculture (% of total)
44.01
41.18
44.96
43.21
Industry(%of total)
18.09
19.01
16.29
17.84
Services(% of total)
37.89
39.81
38.76
38.95
30
*Note: Based on 2000 PopulationCensus.
6RXUFH: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, various years.

*203.46
95.65
89.84
5.81
6.08
45.28
17.43
37.29

Table 3.1.1XPEHUDQGVH[UDWLRV 65RI,QGRQHVLDQZRUNHUVVHQWDEURDG





7RWDO

65


7RWDO

65


7RWDO

65

 
7RWDO

65

$6,$3$&,),&
$XVWUDOLD
42 0,00
55 0,00
72 0,00
0 0,00
%UXQHL'DUXVVDODP
2.567 72,09
5.349 76,74
6.477 74,99
4.370 74,65
+RQJ.RQJ
4.747 98,76 15.969 99,54 12.762 99,67 21.709 99,97
-DSDQ
3.454 0,82
3.256 1,14
3.388 1,03
3.411 1,52
7KH5HSRI.RUHD
8.708 17,35
7.230 18,65 11.078 16,25
6.689 17,37
0DOD\VLD
107.625 51,09 108.775 63,70 169.177 52,64 191.700 44,36
3KLOLSSLQHV
2 0,00
14 0,00
49 0,00
1 0,00
3HRSOH5HSRI&KLQD
46 0,00
267 0,00
315 0,32
36 0,00
6LQJDSRUH
34.424 85,92 39.656 89,64 34.829 90,80 25.707 89,41
7DLZDQ
9.582 29,96 15.509 58,26 29.372 80,18 50.508 89,33
7KDLODQG
36 2,08
51 0,49
41 0,00
13 7,69
9LHWQDP
1 0,00
7 0,00
0 0,00
6 0,00
2WKHUV
92 0,27
208 0,00
208 0,00
36 2,78
7RWDO
171.325 55,75 196.344 68,89 267.768 61,11 304.186 58,95
$0(5,&$6
86$
1.031 0,15
2.191 0,06
3.300 0,45
1.302 0,08
2WKHUV
131 0,00
303 0,00
219 0,00
207 0,00
7RWDO
1.162 0,13
2.493 0,05
3.519 0,43
1.509 0,07
(8523(
7RWDO
653 2,45
1.114 1,68
1.696 3,36
359 10,58
0,''/(($67 $)5,&$
$UDE(PLUDWHV
8.986 98,40 15.061 97,95 17.584 97,80
9.558 98,09
6DXGL$UDELD
123.258 92,91 151.288 91,99 131.157 88,97 114.067 90,58
2WKHUV
391 73,19
1.225 53,62
5.895 88,18
5.540 94,08
7RWDO
132.635 93,23 167.574 92,24 154.636 89,94 129.165 91,28
727$/
305.774 71,68 367.526 78,87 427.619 70,81 435.219 68,30
*Note: The sex ratio is calculated as the percentage of female workers.
6RXUFH8QSXEOLVKHGGDWDIURP0LQLVWU\RI0DQSRZHUDQG7UDQVPLJUDWLRQSURFHVVHGGDWD

30

 
7RWDO

65

0
5.773
23.929
1.543
3.391
110.490
0
0
34.295
38.119
6
0
9
217.555

0,00
72,60
99,99
0,45
17,02
59,94
0,00
0,00
90,09
93,66
0,00
0,00
0,00
74,25

138
90
228

2,17
0,00
1,32

29 17,24
11.027
103.235
6.918
121.180
338.992

97,57
90,49
97,02
91,51
80,36

The number of Indonesian population in the year 2000 is based on preliminary result of 2000 Population Census
(www.bps.go.id). It has lower number because the number of population in previous years are from CBS
population projection based on 1995 Intercensal Population Survey.

259

Table 3.2.5HPLWWDQFHVVHQWE\,QGRQHVLDQZRUNHUV
LQPLOOLRQ86

  

ASIA PASIFIC
Australia
n.a
0.6
Brunei Darussalam
n.a
31.9
Hongkong
n.a
94.5
Japan
n.a
31.8
The Rep. Of Korea
n.a
44.5
Malaysia
n.a
298.7
Philippines
n.a
0.1
People Rep. of China
n.a
2.2
Singapore
n.a
133.3
Taiwan
n.a
97.1
Thailand
n.a
0.4
Vietnam
n.a
0.0
Others
n.a
1.8
Total
1,987.5
737.1
AMERICA
USA
n.a
20.3
Others
n.a
2.2
Total
80.8
22.5
EUROPE
Total
35.0
10.6
MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA
Arab Emirates
n.a
22.4
Saudi Arabia
n.a
492.4
Others
n.a
10.5
Total
1,541.1
525.3
Grand Total
3,644.4 1,295.4
*Note: The values of remittances are calculated in fiscal year period.
Source: Unpublished data from Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.

31





0.4
17.7
157.4
34.3
51.2
325.2
0.3
1.9
85.7
208.2
0.3
0.0
1.3
883.9

n.a
n.a
10.5
n.a
n.a
7.8
n.a
n.a
2.5
266.9
n.a
n.a
n.a
287.7

20.9
2.1
23.0

0.1
n.a
0.1

9.8

0.1

18.2
356.8
21.0
396.0
1,295.4

3.3
29.8
1.0
34.2
322.1

The value of remittances in 2001 were calculated based on number of Indonesian workers sent abroad up to
October, 2001, which is around 135.000 workers

260

Table 3.3.3HUFHQWDJHRIZRUNSHUPLWVLVVXHGIRUIRUHLJQ
ZRUNHUVE\VHFWRUDQGW\SHRIRFFXSDWLRQ



      
%\6HFWRU
Agriculture
7.92
6.96
7.57
8.29
3.87
Mining & quarrying
19.89 27.92 26.81 19.45 17.44
Manufacturing
12.19 10.81 11.30 13.86 20.86
Electricity, gas, and water supply
2.16
2.06
0.89
0.66
0.48
Construction
18.11 16.05 13.11 10.56
8.32
Trade
15.63 16.15 18.21 21.87 20.78
Transportation
3.30
2.87
2.45
3.12
3.46
Finance and Insurance
3.13
3.21
3.52
3.57
3.63
Other Services
17.67 13.97 16.14 18.63 21.14
%\7\SHRI2FFXSDWLRQ
Manager
10.81 10.98 16.75 24.97 42.72
Professional
59.38 73.00 74.92 69.68 53.13
Supervisor
19.65 13.00
6.11
3.59
2.95
Technician/Operator
1.87
0.74
0.34
0.17
0.14
Others
8.29
2.28
1.88
1.58
1.05
*Note: Since year 2000 the number of working permits issued is understated.
Source: Unpublished data from Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.

Table 3.4.1XPEHURIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVLQIORZWR,QGRQHVLD
E\FRXQWULHVRIRULJLQ

      
$VLD3DFLILF





Australia
2,261 2,509 2,376 1,463 1,590
Hongkong
93
79
69
76
70
Japan
3,337 3,358 2,764 2,082 2,705
The Rep. Of Korea
1,737 1,727 1,728 1,449 1,499
People Republic of China
645
666
549
595
816
Malaysia
772 1,009
723
574
651
Philippines
1,425 1,216
920
633
659
Singapore
616
552
478
302
391
Taiwan
785 1,010 1,104
794
724
Thailand
1,214
378
314
133
206
Others
1,550 1,761 1,679 1,325 1,552
7RWDO
14,435 14,265 12,704 9,426 10,863
$PHULFD
USA
2,686 3,084 2,649 1,563 1,620
Others
842 1,152 1,116
713
611
7RWDO
3,528 4,236 3,765 2,276 2,231
(XURSH
7RWDO
4,234 5,278 4,483 2,855 3,404
$IULFD
7RWDO
51
88
78
42
59
2WKHUV
2,620
492
277
264
279
*UDQG7RWDO
24,868 24,359 21,307 14,863 16,836
6RXUFH: Unpublished data from Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.

261

Table 3.5.1XPEHURIIRUHLJQHUVDUULYLQJLQDQGGHSDUWLQJIURP,QGRQHVLD
E\YLVDW\SHV




6KRUW9LVLW

Arriving
Departing
7HPSRUDU\5HVLGHQW Arriving
Departing
3HUPDQHQW5HVLGHQW Arriving
Departing







3,841,516 3,617,661 3,925,862 2,812,115

797,592
2,468,577 3,277,658 3,581,068 2,263,330 3,397,162
264,896
295,799
222,471
128,096
122,090
344,174
276,394
220,309
118,264
102,494
31,487
179,854
79,618
122,139
44,397
37,655
171,320
91,825
113,134
55,031

6RXUFH: Unpublished data from Directorate of Immigration

Table 3.6.1XPEHURI,QGRQHVLDQVH[LWLQJIURPDQG
UHWXUQLQJWR,QGRQHVLD












5HWXUQLQJ
2,747,996 2,018,715 1,390,525
'HSDUWLQJ
2,047,996 1,894,796 1,509,159




6RXUFHUnpublished data from Directorate of Immigration.

262






2,023,639
2,102,896


1,576,958
1,669,551

&+$1*(6,1/$%2850$5.(7$1',17(51$7,21$/0,*5$7,21
81'(55$3,'(&2120,&$'-8670(17,1-$3$1
E\
<DVXVKL,JXFKL
Kwansei Gakuin University
,QWURGXFWLRQ(FRQRPLFDGMXVWPHQWLQ(DVW$VLD
Since the last quarter of 2000, the IT sector in East Asia, which helped bring about the recovery
from the 1997 financial crisis and encouraged international migration, now seems to be undergoing a
recession, worsened by the effects of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against the United States.
Asian economies that had benefited from the boom of the IT-related industries, especially Korea, Taiwan
(China), Singapore and Malaysia, were faced with sharp downward trends.
In the course of this severe economic adjustment within the East Asian region, the sustained high
growth of the Chinese economy is outstanding. The inflow of foreign direct investment into China has
been relatively maintained with the growing expectation of the opening-up of the Chinese economy after
the entry of China into the WTO in November, 2001. The intra-regional competition of industrial location
has intensified, especially between ASEAN and China.
In contrast to such development in China, the Japanese economy is facing pressures for rapid
adjustment, not only in the financial sector, but also in the manufacturing sector. The de-localisation of
manufacturing factories from Japan to neighbouring countries, especially to China, accelerated
extraordinarily in 2001, which increased the risks of the deflationary spiral, as domestic prices
continuously fell, domestic production declined, employment diminished and income decreased. The
unemployment rate soared to 5.5% in November, 2001.
Under such circumstances, the phenomena of international migration is increasing within East
Asia. Intra-regional as well as inter-regional movement of the highly skilled is gaining importance, while
the level of unskilled migrants fluctuate according to each countrys economic situation.
This paper explores the recent economic and labour market adjustments in East Asia as well as
their effects on international migration, together with globalisation and its effects in East Asia constitute
the other important topic of this paper.
5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHHFRQRP\DQGODERXUPDUNHW
5HFHVVLRQDQGTXLFNHFRQRPLFDGMXVWPHQWLQ(DVW$VLD
The export of IT-related goods and services, which had cushioned the decline in intra-regional
trade after the East-Asia financial crises, has been affected by the US economic slowdown.
According to estimates published by the Asian Development Bank and taking into account the
effects of terrorist attacks in the US, the growth of East Asian developing economies will experience a

263

substantial decline. In 2001, the growth in South-east Asia was expected to be 2.4% (formerly estimated
as 4%), especially in crisis-affected countries such as Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand,
where it may show a slight decline from 2.8% to 2.6%, whilst in China, growth will remain unchanged at
7.3% . In 2002, the growth in Southeast Asia will recover to as high as 3.3% (formerly estimated as 4.8%).
In crisis-affected countries it may reach 3.4 % (formerly estimated as 5.1%) and in China, may decrease
from 7.5% to 7.0% (ADB, 2001).
The prolonged low growth of East Asian economies may partly be attributed to the sluggish
growth of the Japanese economy, as Japan still represents as much as 60% of the GDP in East Asia.
Irrespective of the worsening economic outlook, economic adjustment within East Asia has accelerated
thanks to the growing foreign direct investment in 2000 and 2001. Especially noteworthy has been the
inflow of American and European capital into East Asia for the purpose of M&A under the devaluation of
Asian currencies.
In addition, Japanese direct investment has accelerated in the last two years, not only in
strengthening production sites in Asia, but also to reorganise the production network and undertake M&A
in East Asia (JETRO, 2001).
The enormous inflow of foreign direct investment is based on the assumption that more trade
liberalisation measures will take effect in the East Asian region in the near future. In ASEAN, the tariffs
of trade for manufactured goods within the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement should be lowered to under
5% for the seven ASEAN Member countries by the end of 2002 (ASEAN Centre, 2000; Iguchi, 2001b).
The joining of China as well as Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) has also been acknowledged by the General
Assembly of the Word Trade Organisation in Dubai on 12 November, 2001. This may lead, not only to the
opening of the Chinese Market with its great potential, but also to problems in an effort to compete with
Chinese products worldwide (JETRO, 2001).
Admittedly, China has structural issues with state-owned enterprise, public finances and banking
systems, but it has been less affected by the Asian monetary crisis. In carrying out such difficult reforms,
the Chinese government has adopted an expansive fiscal policy to prevent the economic growth from
increasing together with strategies to attract inward foreign investment in accordance with the joining in
the WTO.
Recently, several consultations have been undergone among East Asian countries to establish
bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements in the future. The most recent agreement was that between
Japan and Singapore signed in October, 2001 on Trade and Investment.
In 2000 in the area of labour market development, the recovery of economic growth mainly
through the expansion of the IT-related industry has improved the employment situation in some
countries, except in the Philippines (ADB, 2001). This phenomenon has contributed to a rapid growth in
international migration within East Asia, especially in Korea and Malaysia (ADB, 2001; Iguchi, 2001a).
The downturn of economic activity, following the decline in export and production in late 2000
has negative effects on employment in this region. International migration in East Asia will be affected by
such movements in future.

264

*URZLQJULVNVRIGHIODWLRQDQGKLJKXQHPSOR\PHQWLQ-DSDQ
At the beginning of 2000, the Japanese economic growth turned from negative to positive thanks
to the measures taken to stabilise financial institutions and the enormous stimulus package of Emergency
economic measures followed by an increase in export and production in IT-related sectors.
This increase in IT-related production led to an improvement in corporate profits as well as
investment and consequently, to a rise in wages. After an eleven months decrease in employment, growth
turned positive in October, 2000, which contributed to a maintained improvement of the average
household income.
However, employment growth eventually halted in May, 2001 and the reduction of employment
in comparison with the previous year gradually expanded. It is worth mentioning that irrespective of the
shrinking of regular employment, irregular employment (especially part-time and dispatch workers), has
tended to rise. The ratio of part-time employment of less than 35 hours per week reached 22.9% in
October, 2001.
Unfortunately, since the second half of 2000, the recovery of the Japanese economy has been
gradually losing momentum, because of a slow down in IT-related export growth. At the same time, stock
prices (Nikkei Average) began to fall from 17 000 Yen in June 2000 to 13 600 Yen in December 2000. It
continued to drop to under 11 000 Yen in March 2001, and even less at the beginning of December, 2001,
although continuity of the Nikkei Average is not guaranteed.
The Mori Cabinet, which succeeded the Obuchi Cabinet after the sudden death of Mr. Keizo
Obuchi in May, 2000, was faced with limitations in fiscal policy, as the accumulated government debt
approached 130% of GDP.
In addition, non-performing loans remained steady, while a decline in stock prices and real estate
prices resulted in a freeze on credit and growing risks of insolvency among companies.
The Mori Cabinet established an Emergency Economic Package in April, 2001, with the
following objectives.
Firstly, an acceleration of the non-performing loans, which amounted to 20 trillion Yen at the
end of March, 2001. This measure aims at writing out non-performing loans or bad debts which will
inevitably workforce, which would increase unemployment.
Secondly, the holding of stock by banks should be stopped, so that the banking system would be
unaffected by the fluctuation of stock prices. However, with the downward trend in stock prices, most
banks have already experienced losses in capital and will therefore have to curb credit creation in order to
come in line with BIS standards.
The Mori Cabinet has also emphasised the importance of information and communication
technologies. The E-Japan Strategy decided upon in March, 2001 has indicated a new move towards
public investment to create a better IT infrastructure, as well as human capital, which also implies
accepting 30 000 foreign IT workers by the year 2005.
While the government has reduced its budget and issuance of government bonds to finance the
deficit of revenues, the monetary policy of the Bank of Japan has been under severe criticisms and
political pressures.

265

The Bank of Japan already stopped its policy of zero interest rate as of August, 2000. As the
policy to lower the official rate of interest has limitations, it has been argued that quantitative easing
should be promoted in the course of a more rapid disposal of non-performing loans in banks.
In February 2000, facing the approaching risks of deflation, the Bank of Japan introduced a
complementary lending facility, similar to the German Lombard-type lending facility, to provide
liquidity into the market.
In addition, in March 2001, the Bank of Japan adopted drastic measures to provide liquidity to
the market, targeting not the overnight call rate, but the outstanding balance of the current account at the
bank. The Bank is able to purchase long-term government bonds until the negative consumer price index
remains at zero for over a year.
In line with the growing fear of deflation, criticism of the reliability and personality of Prime
Minister Mori has so intensified public opinion that he was almost forced to resign after the anticipated
election of the president of the Liberal Democratic Party in May, 2001.
As a result of the election, Mr. Junichro Koizumi was elected president of the LDP thanks to the
strong support of local LDP members and against mainstreams of Diet Members. Mr. Koizumi was then
elected Prime Minister as a result of the continued coalition between the LDP, the Komei Party and the
Conservative Party.
In the meantime, the Japanese economy has suffered a period of negative growth in the second
and third quarters of 2001 as the result of a contraction of public spending, declining private investment,
stagnating private consumption as well as declining exports, especially in IT-related industries. Stock
prices dropped further to under 10 000 Yen in August, 2001, with some rebound to around 11 000 Yen in
November, 2001.
The fall in the employment and labour market has become increasingly serious, with the decline
in IT-related export and production, especially since April, 2001.
In October, 2001, total employment decreased by 1.03 million in comparison to the previous
year. Particularly remarkable was the employment drop in manufacturing (minus 830 000), wholesale,
retail and restaurant (minus 370 000) and construction (minus 280 000), while employment kept growing
in the service sector (by 650 000). There are signs that this decline in some sectors may further intensify.
Firstly, in the banking sector, four main banking groups announced restructuring programs,
because stock prices have been declining and more cost reductions have become inevitable, and should
last until 2005/2006. Additional redundancy among these four groups is estimated to amount to of 23 000
employees. In relation to the banking sector, if the disposal of bad loans is rapidly promoted, it is also
expected that large construction and resale companies will undergo severe restructuring and result in more
redundancies.
Secondly, in the field of electronics, even leading enterprises such as Matsushita Electric and
Fujitsu have announced that they will reduce the number of employees. IT-related companies may engage
into more restructuring and retrenchment.
In contrast, the production of automobiles by Japanese companies, especially Toyota and Honda,
achieved high profits and employment was maintained in this sector until at least November, 2001.

266

Thirdly, the relocation of factories from Japan to China has been accelerating extremely rapidly
in 2001. This phenomenon reflects tougher price competition and a decline in domestic prices on the one
hand, whilst on the other hand, this has been enabled by flexible production, as well as an improvement in
the quality control on production sites in China.
Fourthly, the rising import penetration rate in many manufacturing and agricultural sectors is
negatively affecting production and employment. Under the deflation, the positive adjustment of industry
and employment has become more and more difficult in the short term.
In March, 2001, the government of Japan resorted to a safety measure on emergency import
restrictions based on the WTO agreement for the first time. These measures relate to four agricultural
products. Korea and China immediately took retaliatory measures and trade friction persists.
In the meantime, the unemployment rate had already reached 4.8% in December, 2000 and has
risen to 5.1% (seasonally adjusted, 3.50 million people unemployed) in November, 2001, its worst record
since 1953. While the unemployment rate of male workers has risen to 5.8%, the unemployment rate
among females has gone down to 4.9%.
In October, 2001, among the unemployed, 1.14 million left on grounds stated by their
employers, while 1.22 million left because of their own reasons; 0.88 million were unable to find work
upon entry into the labour market.
The recent rising trend in unemployment may be explained by structural phenomena rather than
by a demand deficiency. According to the UV analysis, structural unemployment has been continuously
rising, from 2.9% in 1997 to 3.7% in 2000, although there has been an improvement in the unemployment
rate as a result of a decline in the demand-deficient unemployment rate from 1.4% in 1999 to 1% in 2000
(MHLW, 2001a, Figure 12). The expanding mismatch may be attributable to the structural gaps between
demand and supply by age, wage, working conditions and occupation. The existence of a mismatch
constitutes an important background of the growing employment among foreign workers during the
recession.
7UHQGVDQGSURVSHFWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQLQ-DSDQ
0RYHPHQWRIIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOV
,QIORZDQGRXWIORZRIIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOVWR-DSDQ
The number of foreign nationals who entered Japan in 2000, excluding those who entered Japan
with re-entry permits, amounted to 4 256 403, a continuous increase (+7.5% or 296 782 persons) after the
1998 decline, mainly due to augmentation of the number of temporary visitors (3 910 732, +233 000),
especially for the purpose of business (1 218 102, +99 518 persons). This may reflect the recovery of the
Japanese or the East Asian economy for two consecutive years.
By country of origin, 58.3% (57.7% in 1999) of new entrants come from Asia. The largest share
being that of the Republic of Korea (951 884), Chinese Taipei (882 394), followed by the US (661 564),
the Philippines (104 324), the United Kingdom (169 053), Mainland China (190 380) and Hong Kong
(UK) (188 692). If we compare new entrants between 1999 and 2000, the increase from China (+33 873),
Brazil (+20 302), the Philippines (+19 557) was considerable. At the same time, the number of entrants
from North America, Europe and Oceania continues to increase (Table 6).
267

By status of residence, Temporary Visitors occupy 91.9% (+6.3% in comparison with the
previous year) of the number of new entrants. New entrants with working status (excluding the status of
residence of Diplomat, Official and the ones described in Table 6) amounted to 128 682 (+6%). The
increase was the greatest in the category of Entertainer (103 264, +25.4%) (Table 6).
As for refugee recognition in 2000, the number of applications for refugee status increased
rapidly from 133 in 1998 to 262 in 1999, and slightly decreased to 213 in 2000. Only 16 asylum seekers
were acknowledged as refugees in 1998, 16 in 1999 and 22 in 2000. From January to August, 2001,
159 applications were filed and only seven were granted.
The number of foreign nationals who left Japan in 2000 excluding those who have re-entry
permits was 3 861 248 (+8.8 %).

:ith the terrorist attack in the USA on 11 September, the inflow of foreign nationals into Japan
dropped by more than 20% because of the threat of suicidal hijackings. Irrespective of the tightening of
security control, the number of passengers of international aircraft over Japan over 40% in October 2001
and does not recover until now.
)RUHLJQSRSXODWLRQLQ-DSDQ
At the end of 2000, the number of registered foreign nationals (those who stay more than
90 days) amounted to 1 686 444, substantially more than the previous year (+130 330, +8.4%). The share
of registered foreign nationals of the total population reached an all-time record (1.33% of the estimated
total population, LH 126 919 288 people on 1 October, 2000).
The registered number of foreign nationals are Korean (635 269 or -1 279%, LH -0.2% from
1999), followed by China (including Taiwan, 333 575 or +39 374, +13.3%), Brazil (254 384 or +30 095,
+13.1%), the Philippines (144 871, +29 186 , +25.2%) etc.
To sum up the total of nationals, 1 244 629, or 73.8%, come from Asia and 312 921, or 18.6%,
from South America.
According to status of residence, permanent residents (including special permanent residents as
stipulated in the Special Law for nationals (and their descendants) who lost Japanese nationality as a
consequence of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952) total 657 605 (+21 890, +3.4%, share 40.9%).
The number of special permanent residents is still in decline, while the number of other permanent
residents increases.
Those who hold a status of residence for working purposes amounted to 154 748 (+29 022 or
+23.1%). The number of workers with a residence permit increased in 2000, except for journalists and
Medical service workers. The most significant increase took place in the number of entertainers
(53 847, +21 550, +66.7%) especially from the Philippines, which had once shown a decline in 1996
because of a tightening of control and regulation.
1DWXUDOLVDWLRQDQGPL[HGPDUULDJHV
Although it is increasing, the number of naturalisations amounted to only 15 812, LHless than
the previous year (- 308, -1.9%), mainly of Koreans (9 842, 62.2%) or Chinese (33.2%), most of whom
had permanent resident status (GOJ, 2001a).

268

The number of mixed marriages increased (36 263, +4 368, +13.7%) in 2000, accounting for
4.5% of all marriages in Japan. Of this figure, 28 326 of spouses were female and 7 937 were male (GOJ,
2001a).
Japanese nationality is based on a principle of MXVVDQJXLV. A baby born either from a Japanese
mother or with a Japanese father is entitled to receive Japanese nationality, even when the baby is born
outside Japan, while a baby born in Japan cannot be Japanese if none of his parents is Japanese.
25 610 were born from Japanese women in 2000, a 7.9 % (+1 876) increase in comparison with
1995. Among them, 13 396 (0.2%, +27 since 1994) had Japanese fathers (GOJ, 2000a).
,OOHJDOLQIOX[RUODQGLQJRYHUVWD\DQGLOOHJDOZRUN
In Japan, the number of foreign nationals who overstay has been estimated twice a year from
1992. However, in the year 2000, the estimates were published only once by the Ministry of Justice.
This estimation is made by computing those who are staying over their entitled period through
matching embarkation card and disembarkation card.
On January 1, 2001, the number of overstayers was estimated at 232 121, a 7.7% decrease in
comparison with the previous year (251 697 on January 1, 2000 ). But on July 1, 2001, after a continuous
decrease of over seven years, it increased to 235 509 (the largest number of overstayers was recorded on
May 1, 1993 (298 646).
By gender, men account for 53.4% (125 751) and women for 46.6% (109 758) (each of them
increased by 1.6% or 1.4% respectively from January to July, 2001).
By nationality, Koreans (56 554, +0.9%) occupy the biggest share, followed by Chinese (32 112,
+3.7%), Filipinos (31 600, -0.2%), Thais (19 193, -1.6%), Malaysians (9 986, +3.5%) Taiwanese (8 864,
+2.1%), Peruvians (8 465, -0.4%), Indonesians (5 957, +12.1%) and Myanmarians (4 364, -2.4%), to
quote only the biggest shares. Therefore, the increase in overstayers between January and July, 2001 was
attributable mainly to people coming from China, Indonesia and Malaysia.
A new factor underlying this phenomenon is the liberalisation of sightseeing abroad for Chinese
nationals by the government of China. As the number of Chinese touring Japan is increasing, so are the
risks to see Chinese nationals disappearing during their tour and overstaying.
Fleeing trainees from several countries also contribute to the increase in overstayers, while
several measures have been taken to reduce them. A total of 385 trainees disappeared (+175 persons) in
2000, mostly Vietnamese (52.5%) and Indonesians (6.5%) (NPA, 2001, pp. 14-15).
The declining tendency of foreigners who overstayed in Japan might also be explained by
several factors. First, increasing number of overstayers whose status is recognised by the Special
Permission of Stay of the Minister of Justice in the course of deportation procedure from humanitarian
reasons for the past four years. Second, the indictment of foreigners who had been overstaying on the
basis of new article in the Immigration Control and Refugees Recognition Act enforced on 18 February,
2000, amounted to 296 cases and 218 persons. (NPA, 2001, p. 14) Naturally, the general background of
this tendency may be the worsening economic and labour market situation in Japan.
Anyway, the slight increase in estimates of overstayers on 1 July, 2001 does not necessarily
mean a change of the tendency that the overstayers are decreasing.
269

In the meantime, the total number of foreign nationals who are found violating the immigration
laws and regulations amounted to 51 459 (- 3 708, -6.7% ) in 2000. Among them, 44 190 (-2 063, -4.5%)
were illegal workers. Among them, 77.9% is occupied by overstayers (GOJ, 2001).
The total illegal influx was very high in 2000 (9 186, -151, -1.6%). Illegal influx by air reached
the highest record (6 828, +8.7%), whereas by ship, it decreased slightly (2 358, -22.8%). The former is
partially attributable to the tightening of measures against Snake Heads, both from the side of Japan and
China, while the latter is the result of more and more sophisticated smuggling with forged passports and
documents, including human smuggling during their stay in transit areas at airports in Japan (NPA, 2001,
pp. 13-14).
As for the home countries of illegal workers, Korea (11 336, 25.7%), China (8 132, 16.4%), the
Philippines (7420, 14.2%), and Thailand (3 902, 8.8%) are the main source countries.
According to the National Police Agency, those who were indicted because of violation of
employment laws and regulations including employment sanctions in the case of violation of
Immigration Control and Refugees Recognition Act amounted to 342 (373 persons) in 2000, a decrease
by 162 cases and 219 persons (NPA, 2001).
Indictment of illegal intermediaries totalled 17 persons. 1 033 foreign were involved in workers
in such violations (-595 persons in comparison with the previous year).
The drastic decline in indictments due of the violation of employment laws does not necessarily
mean that the threat for illegal working as well as trafficking is diminishing. There are also growing
concerns that the power of the police in indicting crimes in general might be weakening.
As for general crimes, 30 971 cases (-10.0%) and 12 721 persons (-5.4%) were indicted among
foreigners. The number of foreigners who committed evil crimes (murder, raid, robbery and arson)
decreased slightly (318 persons, -29 in comparison with the previous year).
A total 1 051 cases (+12 cases, +1.2%) and 720 persons (-34, - 4.5%) were reported for drug
abuse (NPA 2001, p. 11). By country of origin, Iran (175 persons), the Philippines (115) and Brazil (111)
are the main nationalities according to the National Police Agency (NPA, 2001, pp. 9-10).
As for prostitution, 280 cases were recorded (+37 cases, +15.2%, 172 persons, LH-12, - 6.5%),
mainly among Thais (55 persons), Columbians (41), Taiwanese (29), Koreans (22) and Chinese
people (16). according to the National Police Agency (NPA 2001, p12).
It should be stressed that the declining number of indictments does not reflect a decrease in
crimes committed by foreigners, but might mean that the safety conditions was faulty during the longlasting recession.
(PSOR\PHQWRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
%DVLFIUDPHZRUNDYDLODEOHWRIRUHLJQZRUNHUV (see Iguchi, 2001a)
The framework aimed at legal foreign workers is stipulated in the Economic Plan and
Employment Counter Measures Plan on the one hand, and in the Immigration Control and Refugees
Recognition Act on the other hand. The former prescribes basic policy of their admission while the latter
prescribes concrete criteria and measures.
270

The current plans, adopted by the Cabinet in July and August, 1999, are called Ideal Socioeconomy and Policies for Economic Rebirth and the 9th Employment Counter Measures Plan.
The Immigration Control and Refugees Recognition Act determines two categories of
foreigners. The Act describes categories of foreigners who are permitted to enter Japan by way of the
Positive list. The Japanese Act does not have any Labour market testing or Numerical quotas. This
may be a merit as well as a drawback of the Japanese immigration control system (Iguchi, 1997). It should
be borne in mind that the government's basic policy is applied only to the Annex table 1 of the Act. For
example, the second and third generation of ex-emigrants from Japan are not regulated by this policy. That
is to say, the Japanese-Brazilians who are Japanese descendants of the third generation are eligible to the
"Long-term stayer" status, as prescribed in the Annex Table 2. Therefore, according to the authors view,
Japanese-Brazilians are able to work in unskilled jobs in Japan without contradicting the basic principle.
&XUUHQWVLWXDWLRQRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfares estimate, the total number of foreign
workers in Japan amounted to 710 000 in 2000, the highest figure that Japan has ever experienced. One
must remember that this estimate includes undocumented foreign workers but not foreigners with
permanent resident status. According to the Ministry, Japan should welcome as many as possible
foreigners in possession of technology and knowledge, while the acceptance of unskilled foreign workers
should be carefully examined.
The changes in the number of foreign workers should be examined according to several
categories; we will devote a section later to the highly skilled.
Firstly, according to the Alien Registration Statistics, 155 000 had residence status for work
purposes (these figures correspond to the ones indicated in the previous chapter). This number has
increased by 23.1 %, especially due to the rapidly growing number of entertainers (+21 550, +66.7%,
mainly from the Philippines). At the same time, every category except for Journalists and Medical
services workers increased. This change partly reflects the growing influx of highly skilled professionals
analysed later.
Secondly, the number of foreign workers of Japanese descend (1LNNHLMLQ, namely, second and
third generation as well as their spouses) amounted to 233 000 in 2000 (a 5.8% increase after a slight
decrease in 1999), which includes not only Latin Americans (mainly Brazilians) but also Asians and other
descendants of ex-emigrants. The number of 1LNNHLMLQ had been growing irrespective of long economic
stagnation until 1998. It decreased in 1999 for the first time since 1990, reflecting the severe restructuring
in the production process, which has been intensified in 1998 and 1999. However, it has also been
observed in several areas in Japan that the 1LNNHLMLQ tended to settle, with a growing number of children
born in Japan.
According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the internal mobility of the 1LNNHLMQ
may have risen, due to job losses caused by the recession. Because they are concentrated in several cities
in Japan, their problems such as a lack in language education, health insurance and networking among
public authorities are intensifying (Hamamatsu, 2001).
Thirdly, 59 000 students and pre-college students work part-time, accounting for 56.3%
(+21 432). This number is generally influenced by the total number of students and pre-college students as
well as by their labour participation rate. The recent movement can be explained mainly by the growing
number of foreign students (78 812 students, the highest record, mainly because of an increase in short-

271

term students. By nationality, the number of students from China (+27.5%) and Korea (+24.3%) increased
remarkably (Ministry of Education and Technology, 2001). These students and pre-college students are
able to apply for a permit of non-designated activities at the local immigration office.
Fourth, the number of foreign workers with designated activities has been increasing,
reflecting mainly the growing popularity of Technical Intern Traineeship Program (TITP).
However, there have been scandals related to the TITP in the Logistics case in 1999 (see the
2000 Japan Report), and the KSDs case (profit-seeking by the KSD Foundation concerning the
deregulation of the TITP) in 2000 has damaged the images of the TITP.
To overcome these difficulties, several kinds of measures have been taken by the JITCO to
improve the functioning of the system (JITCO, 2001).
)RUHLJQZRUNHUVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHSRUWLQJV\VWHP
The Reporting System of Employment of Foreigners, established in 1993, gives us indicative
information on recent developments in the employment of foreign workers. It should be borne in mind that
the figure does not stand for the total number of foreign workers, but for the ones whose establishments
have some connections with the Public Employment Service Offices. The growth of the number does not
necessarily mean an increase in the amount of foreign workers; it reflects an improvement in the cooperation undertaken by enterprises, as the submission of the report is not compulsory.
According to the results of the June, 2001 report, the total number of foreign workers amounted
to 221 807 (+7.1% more than in 2000), among which 130 440 had a contract with an employer (+8.3%)
and 91 367 (+5.5%) were employed by subcontracting or dispatching companies. Direct contracts
augmented in sectors like real estate (+77.5%), fishing (+26.7%), banking and insurance (22.9%),
wholesale, retail and restaurants (+21.9%, LH 9.3%), manufacturing (+11.0%, LH 61.5 %), and it
decreased in electricity, gas and water companies (-12.8%) and in services (-3.3%, still 21.1 % of the
total).
By size of businesses, foreign workers directly employed increased in establishments with 1 to
499 and 1000 or more employees, while they decreased in establishments with 500 to 999 employed.
According to gender, the share is respectively 60.1% and 39.9% for men and women, but the
female proportion is rising gradually (also, as the service sector is underrepresented in this report, female
foreign workers may in fact amount to a much larger number).
According to region or country of origin, Latin America (44.9%) and East Asia (both North East
and South East Asia: 42.3%) are the major sources. The increase is noticeable especially from North East
Asia (China and Korea, +20.5%), and South East Asia (ASEAN, +17.4%) while Latin America (Brazil,
Peru) increased slightly (+1.2%; in the case of foreign workers of Japanese descent, -0.2%).
Those who are able to work within a limited period of time amount to 29 254 (22.4%), while
75 394 workers (+57.8%) do not have a limited stay. It is remarkable that students and pre-college
students increased drastically (+35.0%), as did the number of technical intern trainees (+30.9%). Among
foreign workers from Latin American countries, those of Japanese descent represented 87.5%.
According to occupation, 61.5% (80 166) were manufacturing and production workers, 18.4%
(24 044) were specialists, engineers and managers, while salesmen, cooks, waiter or waitresses and

272

hostesses accounted for 7.7% (10 060). Construction/civil engineering workers and business and clerical
employees decreased while the number of other workers increased.
The ratio of regular employees among the directly employed workers was 32.2 percent (-0.8%,
in comparison with the previous year). This ratio is the lowest in establishments with 300 or more
employees.
It is important to point out that the ratio of foreign workers employed by subcontracting and
dispatching companies to those solely under employment contract continues to rise. This ratio declined to
41.2% (-0.6%), after it had been steadily rising until 2000. According to sectors, manufacturing occupies
92.2% and services, 3.2%. According to the size of the establishment, those with 100 to 299 employees
occupy the biggest share of (33.3%). The decline of the ratio of foreign workers employed by
subcontracting and dispatching companies is principally due to a drop in the number of such workers in
establishments with 100 to 299 employees (-4.0%), although foreign workers under subcontract or
dispatching contract are increasing in the other sectors. It should also be noted that the dispatching of
production or construction workers is still prohibited, even under the deregulation of the Worker
Dispatching Undertaking Law adopted in December 1999.
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(PLJUDWLRQRI-DSDQHVHQDWLRQDOV
In 2000, the number of Japanese who departed overseas had increased continuously to
17 818 590 (+1 461 018, 8.9% more than in 1998). The departure of Japanese nationals is more than three
times more important than foreign departures
Although 28.5% of the Japanese go the United States, Asian countries as a whole occupy 47.6%
of all Japanese emigration destination countries. The main ones other than the United States are Korea
(13.4%), China (8.2%) and Thailand (5%).
According to purpose of going abroad, sightseeing and others amounts to 14 583 476 (81.8%),
followed by short-term business travel 2 599 173 (14.5%). Study or training abroad represents
193 779 people (1.1%), emigration for permanent settlement, 130 251 people (0.7%) and transfer to
overseas affiliates or branches, 55 119 people (0.3%).
Most of the movement of Japanese nationals has been explained by such factors as the foreign
exchange rate, GDP SHUFDSLWDand direct investment to foreign countries. In the year 2000, the strength of
the Yen may also have strongly encouraged Japanese nationals to travel abroad.
-DSDQHVHQDWLRQDOVUHVLGLQJLQIRUHLJQFRXQWULHV
The number of Japanese nationals residing abroad for three months or longer and who reported
to Japanese embassies and consulates has increased remarkably since 1987, reaching 812 712 (+2.0%) in
2000, among which 526 685 long-term stayers (+2.2%; share: 64.8%) and 285 027 permanent residents
(+1.6%: share 35.2%). The development of long-term stayers mainly reflects the movement of intracorporate transferees and their families as well as of students and researchers.
A total amount of 163 108 Japanese nationals reside in the rest of Asia, (2.5% more than in
1999), among which 156 539 are long-term stayers (+2.6%), while 332 042 (+2.4%) reside in North
273

America (among which 201 942 are long-term stayers), and 142 202 (+1.8%) in Western Europe, among
which 113 728 are long-term stayers (+0.3%).
As to the numbers in big Asian cities, 22 074 (23 295 in 1999) Japanese nationals are living as
long-term stayers in Singapore, 22 399 (22 872 in 1999) in Hong Kong, 16 345 (16 252 in 1999) in
Bangkok, 8 358 (6 311 in 1999) in Shanghai, 7 734 (7 274 in 1999) in Jakarta, 8 297 (7 581 in 1999) in
Taipei, 5 475 (5 529 in 1999) in Kuala Lumpur, and 4 805 (4 735 in 1999) in Beijing.
In Asia, among long-term stayers, the number of workers dispatched to affiliated companies,
sometimes joined by their family members, dropped in 1999. However, this number started to increase
again remarkably in 2000, while the number of researchers, students and their families continued to
increase (MOFA 2001).
)RUHLJQGLUHFWLQYHVWPHQW)',HPSOR\PHQWDQGWUDLQHHVKLSSURJUDPV
&KDQJHVRI)',LQ$VLD
The FDI inflow to Asia in 2000 recorded a 44% increase in comparison with 1999, reflecting an
unexpected rise in the inflow into HK China, while the inflow of FDI into China remained at a similar
level than in 1999. The unexpected change in the HK China figures was caused by the transaction related
to China Mobile. Therefore, a substantial part of FDI into HK China has been channelled to Mainland
China. In addition, Korea also enjoyed a high level of FDI inflows until the middle of 2001.
However, the inflow of FDI into South East Asian countries remained below the crisis level in
2000. Its share in the total FDI into Asia shrank from over 30% in 1995 to approximately 10% in 2000
(UNCTAD, 2001, pp. 24-25, Annex Table B-1).
In the meantime, FDI by trans-national corporations (TNC) from Singapore, HK China and Taiwan China
had been active in North East Asia from 1999 to 2000, while the FDI from Japan increased again in 2000
after the decline in 1999, with a rise in the production of IT related industries as well as a growing M&A
in South East Asia (JETRO 2001). Chinese and Indian companies have begun to invest abroad especially
in IT-related sectors in 2000.
The trends of high FDI flows from outside Asia until 2000 is attributable to an enormous
increase in M&A, which has been intensified since the financial crisis, as American and European
companies had been trying to buy local companies after the devaluation of Asian currencies.
In addition, the growing FDI is reflecting the establishment of R&D centres in East Asia,
especially in China, by several American, European and Japanese TNCs. Such movement continues to
promote changes in the structure of trade in East Asia, increasing technology-intensive export.
&KDQJHVLQHPSOR\PHQWLQ-DSDQHVHDIILOLDWHGFRPSDQLHV
The employment in Japanese affiliated companies has been well maintained during the monetary
crisis and begun to increase in almost every country within East Asia (except in Taipei) in 2000. It was
particularly remarkable in China and Hong Kong China. This trend may continue in China as over
100 Japanese large manufacturers will reportedly relocate their production from Japan to China (1LNNHL
1HZV, 9 November, 2001). Such affiliated production facilities are not always intensive-intensive but

274

technology-intensive. The important background of such relocation may be the contraction of the Japanese
market as well as the decline in consumer prices in 2001.
0RYHPHQWRIWUDLQHHVDQG7HFKQLFDO,QWHUQ7UDLQHHVKLS3URJUDP
The number of foreign trainees who entered and stayed in Japan had been increasing until 1998.
After the decline in 1999, it rebounded sharply in 2000. About 90% of the trainees come from Asia,
especially from China and Indonesia.
About 13 000 of foreign trainees are accepted by semi-governmental organisations like JICA,
AOTS, OVTA, OISKA and ILO, while 40 000 join private organisations, some of which are supported by
the JITCO ( Japan International Traineeship Co-operation Organisation).
In Table 14, Company alone refers to companies in Japan that have affiliated companies in
foreign countries. Therefore, the movement of Company alone trainees are related to foreign direct
investment. Nowadays, more than half of the trainees seem to be recruited not through the channels of
multinational corporations, but by organisations.
Among foreign trainees, those who passed the official skill test are able to change their status of
residence from Trainee to Designated activities so as to develop their skills as Technical Intern
Trainees under an employment contract. Their length of stay should normally not exceed two years, but it
can be extended to three years. The JITCO is responsible for the management of the Technical Intern
Traineeship Program. More and more trainees are changing their status of residence from Trainee to
Designated activities. They mostly come from China, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.
Unfortunately, there have been abuses in the Technical Intern Traineeship Program and political
scandals related to so-called KSD foundation, which had been engaged in the recruitment and acceptance
of TITP applicants. The measures taken by the JITCO to improve management and restore a good
functioning of the system will be discussed later.
0RYHPHQWRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG+6LQ-DSDQ
&RPSDULVRQRI+6EHWZHHQ-DSDQDQG86
Recent discussions on the movement of the highly skilled have not succeeded in taking into
consideration the whole variety of issues. Some people debated mostly the movement of specialists, (IT
workers or key personnel). Recently, the discussion in international organisations focused on the
movement of professionals, service providers, and students.
In this context, the author of this paper proposed a framework in which a variety of the highly
skilled (HS) can be compared internationally (Iguchi 2002). According to this, HS are divided into Core
HS, Additional channels to HS and Permanent HS. Using this classification, we can compare the
movement of HS in Japan and in the US.
Here, intra-corporate transferees refers to those with a status of residence called
Investor/Business manager and Intra-corporate transfer in Japan, while it refers to L-1 and E visa
holders in the US. Researchers comprises those with researcher and professor statuses of residence
in Japan while it refers to O-1 visa holders in the US. Professionals applies to those with the legal
/accounting service and medical service statuses, while it means Professional workers: NAFTA in the
275

US. Specialists includes engineers, Specialists in the Humanities and international services and
instructors in Japan while it refers to H1-b visa holders in US.
HS immigrants accepted under employment-based or points-based system is a category that
exists only in the US. HS temporary workers applying for stable residence status cannot be
distinguished either in US or in Japan. The data of resident or visa status is already included in other data.
Other activities include temporary visitors, excluding business travellers, trainees without OJT (the data
on trainees accepted by government agencies are used as a proxy in Japan) and other activities.
From such a comparison, we may say that1) the Core HS is much bigger in the US than in
Japan, mainly because of a large number of intra-corporate transferees (and inward direct investment) and
specialists (usually with a bachelors degree); 2) in both countries, Core HS has almost the same size as
students; 3) Professionals are mobile, insofar as specification of professionals and accreditations has
been made (especially under the framework of regional economic integration like NAFTA) in both
countries; 4) The movement of researchers is not always clear in both countries, because some of them are
counted as short-term travellers and some may be counted as specialists in both countries; 5) The activities
of business travellers are not easy to grasp and the movement of people who supply services on a contract
basis cannot be specified; 6) the additional channel, namely the inflow of both students and business
travellers, is much bigger in the US than in Japan; 7) the share of employment-based immigration is not
very large in the US but it may work together with the Core HS; 8) the ratio of HS in the wider sense
(namely A+B+C) in the total of entries into the host country (namely A+B+C+D) is 29.8% in Japan and
49.9% in the US, which is not only due to larger acceptance of intra-corporate transferees and specialists,
but also the huge size of additional channels (students and business travellers) in the US.
0RYHPHQWRI&RUH+6
In Japan, the size of the Core HS has been limited by the low level of inward foreign direct
investment. It is interesting to examine whether the inflow of FDI into Japan is contributing to the inflow
of intra-corporate transferees.
As discussed before, the inward FDI into Japan has been expanding rapidly in recent years. This
trend can be identified by the growing inward FDI in non-manufacturing sectors such as
telecommunications, finance and insurance as well as trade. The imbalance of outward and inward FDI
has been rapidly corrected by this movement.
When we look at the countries of origin, the inflow of FDI is attributable to European
enterprises, especially French businesses in 1999. However, the inflow of intra-corporate transferees were
not great in 1999 and 2000. When we observe the stock figures, the number of business managers and
intra-corporate transferees are gradually increasing, probably because the limits for the duration of their
stay have been extended made renewable by the deregulation of the Justice Ministers Ordinance.
According to home country and region of intra-company transferees and business managers,
over 40 % of them come from Asia and nearly half of the investors and business managers from North
America.

Concerning researchers and professors, they are so mobile that their movement does not seem to
be well reflected in immigration statistics. The ratio of foreign professors and foreign researchers may be
underestimated. 

276

According to the country and region of foreign researchers in Japan, it is interesting to note that
China, India, Korea, Russia and the US are the major sending countries, and that 57% of such flows can
be regarded as intra-regional movement within Asia. 

In the case of professors coming to Japan, China, US, Korea, Russia are major sending countries
again, while intra-regional movement accounts for 41%, substantially less than for researchers. 
As we discussed earlier in the comparison between Japan and the US, the admission of
professionals is very limited in number, as we are only talking about lawyers, accountants and medical
doctors. Only American and British lawyers and accountants came to Japan in 2000. However, it should
be noted that legal services can be provided within a business traveller status. Such short-term movement
is not visible as such in immigration statistics.

The Specialists category is also very difficult to define. Table 26 shows the movement of
foreign specialists with Technology and Humanities and International Service residence statuses The
major sending countries are the US, China, the UK, Canada and Australia. Intra-regional mobility
occupies one third of the movement of specialists. 

According to economic sector, many of the specialists are working in so-called IT sectors and
education. About 60% of foreigners with status of residence Engineer are particularly concentrated in
electronics, machinery and communication. About two thirds of foreigners with status of residence
Humanity and International Services are concentrated in education. 

Concerning remuneration for employment of foreign specialists, many foreigners with status of
residence Humanity and international services get monthly salary from 20 000 Yen to 299 999 Yen,
while the monthly salary for those with Technology are more diversified.
$GGLWLRQDOFKDQQHOVIRU+6
The data on the movement of persons as business travellers is not homogeneous and their
activities remain unclear. The number of people providing services on a contract basis is not
distinguishable and not legally acknowledged by the Immigration laws and regulations in Japan.
With all limitations, we can easily see where they come from. About one half of the movement
of business travellers into Japan is intra-regional. The major sending countries or regions in Asia are
Taiwan China, Mainland China, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong China. However, the US is the greatest
sending country with over 260 000 business people, which is almost equivalent to the number of those
coming from European countries.

Another important element of Additional Channels is foreign students. Their movement in and
around Japan has not been analysed very often. When we look at the foreign student statistics in Japan, the
share of postgraduates is as high as 32%, which is much higher than the ratio of postgraduates in the total
number of students in Japan (3.3% in 1995, according to UESCO).
Since 1981, foreign students having completed their studies in Japan are able to change their
status of residence from Student to other statuses that enable them to work. The ratio of those who
changed their status in the total of foreign students has risen from 4 to 5% since 1997. This ratio seems to
be very low. However, it should be carefully examined, as more than two thirds of foreign students are
staying in Japan for a short time without achieving any academic degrees (Ministry of Education and
Technology, 2001, pp. 2-3). 

277


The activities of students who acquired working status after graduation in Japan are very
diversified. A lot of them are interpreters and many of them are engaged in very specific jobs often with
higher academic degrees than Japanese students. Most do not follow the same career path as Japanese
students. However, their remuneration is not particularly high in comparison with other foreign specialists,
as about two thirds of them are employed by companies with less than 300 employees. This may also
contribute to the reactivation of small and medium companies. However, due to the difficult labour market
situation in 2000, the level of salaries for those students got worse.
5HJLRQDOLQLWLDWLYHVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHPRYHPHQWRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG
0XOWLODWHUDOLQLWLDWLYHVLQ$3(&
In APEC, where negotiation for trade liberalisation has been promoted after the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round in 1994, there have been several initiatives concerning the movement of the highly
skilled within the APEC region.
Firstly, APEC decided to encourage the participating countries to introduce an $3(&%XVLQHVV
&DUG, which enables business travellers from APEC member countries to simplify their entry.
Secondly, APEC led a study on the mutual recognition of professional services, which is also the
agenda for the WTO after the negotiation on trade-in services in the Uruguay Round. Since 2000, seven
countries participated in preparatory work for the mutual recognition of $3(&(QJLQHHUV.
Thirdly, APEC initiated some co-operation for the development of human resources by
facilitating the admission of foreign students from the APEC region and to allow them to work after
completing their studies in the host country.
These three initiatives, although they are meaningful, have not yet been always successful, partly
because they are only voluntarily proposed by certain countries and not legally binding participating
countries (Iguchi, 2001b, pp. 9-10).
0XOWLODWHUDO,QLWLDWLYHVLQWKH$6($1E\-DSDQ
Since the Asian monetary crisis, the economic and political situation has changed. New bilateral
and multi-lateral initiatives have been proposed by the Japanese government, which are supported by
several neighbouring countries.
Firstly, Japan promotes bilateral negotiation on the establishment of bilateral free-trade
agreements. Having experienced the strong negative impact of the crisis, East Asian countries including
Japan have begun to think about institutional economic integration in East Asia to guarantee gains from
regional trade and investment. In November, 2001, Japan and Singapore signed an agreement on
Investment and Trade. The negotiation with Korea is also underway. These (draft) agreements consist in
measures concerning foreign direct investment, including the liberalisation of trade-in services (which
implies measures concerning the movement of natural persons).
Secondly, in the field of industrial and human resources development policies, Japan and eight
ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and
Cambodia) have started a co-operation to establish Centres of Excellence for human resources
development. In this project, Japan provides funding for activities and each ASEAN country selects their
278

strategic institutions for human resources development. These institutions should hold seminars for the
participating countries with the financial assistance from Japan (through AOTS) to develop their
curriculum for human resources development, which should form the basis of common qualification
standards of this region. The aim of this project is to establish common qualification standards, including
those related to information and communication (Iguchi, 2001b, pp. 10-11).
7RZDUGVDELODWHUDOFRRSHUDWLRQRQ,7E\-DSDQ
Thirdly, Japan is trying to strengthen co-operation in the field of information and communication
technologies (ICT) in Asia. In November 2000, a Conference on IT Strategy was convened and the
Fundamental IT Strategy was decided in Japan.
According to this Strategy, together with basic philosophy and targets, the most advanced IT
environment should be created in Japan within five years. Policies will have four focuses: 1) establishing
infrastructure for hyper networking and strengthening competition policy, 2) establishing environment for
E-commerce, 3) implementing an Electronic Government and 4) strengthening human resources
development. Especially in the field of human resources development, MA and Doctorate-level IT relateddegrees should be encouraged, and  KLJKO\ VNLOOHG IRUHLJQ ZRUNHUV VKRXOG EH DWWUDFWHG LQWR WKH
FRXQWU\ XQWLO  to secure a pool of IT-engineers and researchers The Fundamental Strategy was
reflected in the E-Japan Strategy decided by the Cabinet in April, 2001. In the meantime, the Law on
Fundamental Policy for IT was enacted in December, 2000.
To implement this, an international standardisation of IT qualifications should also be promoted
and the landing criteria of IT engineers should be re-examined. The first step to such measures is the
recognition of Indian accreditation on information technology will be discussed in detail later.
1HZGHYHORSPHQWVUHODWHGWRPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHV
In 2001, the discussion on the future of migration policies developed further and measures were
implemented to facilitate acceptance of IT specialists from India, while illegal immigration and its
countermeasures continues to be one of the most sensitive migration issues. The improvement of the
foreign traineeship program should remain an important task. The integration issues of foreign workers
and their families are also growing in importance in cities where foreign inhabitants are concentrated
under a severe economic recession.
'LVFXVVLRQVRQQHZPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHV
The government announced the Ideal Society and Policies for Economic Rebirth and the 9th
Basic Plan for Employment Measures in August, 1999. Therefore, basic principles applicable until 2010
have already been set up, led by a will to admit foreigners with technical and professional competences
and to study carefully the applications filed by unskilled workers.
Even after the Cabinets decision on the Economic Plan and the 9th Employment Measures Plan,
the debate continues on the admission of permanent immigrants and the enlargement of the scope of these
admissions. At an initial stage, Mr. T. Sakaiya, former State Minister of Economic Planning Agency, had
taken initiatives. Today, Mr. H. Okuda, the President of the Japanese Federation of Employers
Association (1LNNHLUHQ) continues to organise active discussions on this issue. The present debate is
characterised by concerns about the declining birth rate and the long-lasting recession of the economy in
addition to some bottlenecks in specific sectors (Iguchi, 2001b, pp. 40-44).
279

$FNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI,76SHFLDOLVWVIURP,QGLDDQG6LQJDSRUH
In line with the E-Japan strategy mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) promoted the mutual recognition of IT qualification standards, especially with India.
In India, the accreditation system of ICT qualification is called DOEACC (Department of
Electronics, Accreditation of Computer Courses). Level A of the DOEACC corresponds to an advanced
diploma, level B with a Master of Computer Application, level C should be higher than level O and level
O corresponds to a diploma. According to METI, level C is equivalent to the Examination of Fundamental
Information technology in Japan (Iguchi, 2001b, pp. 11-12).
The Ministry of Justice informed local immigration offices that Indian IT-engineers with level A
or B satisfied the conditions for acquiring the Engineer residence status as stipulated in the Ministers
Ordinance. In addition, the Ministry recognised not only the Japanese accreditations on IT but also that of
Singapore (CITPM) as exceptions to the Ministers Ordinance in December, 2001.
&RPEDWLQJLOOHJDOPLJUDWLRQDQGRYHUVWD\
Illegal influx of foreigners remain high in number, as does the number of overstayers.
First, concerning illegal migration, the techniques of forged passports and documents are
becoming more and more sophisticated. Therefore, the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice is
devoting more officials and enhancing their skills to detect forgeries.
Secondly, getting information on stowaways is more and more important to prevent illegal
immigration. Actually, the departures of boats used for stowaways are coming from certain ports in China,
South Korea and Russia. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice should strengthen the exchange of information
and the co-operation with the National Police Agency, the Japan Coastal Guard as well as the Ministry of
Finance. They should inspect boats jointly.
Thirdly, although the number of overstayers might be declining, many factors lead to an increase
in overstayers. Therefore, the criminal sanctions against overstay based on the Immigration Control and
Refugees Recognition Act should also be implemented effectively.
,PSURYLQJPDQDJHPHQWRIWHFKQLFDOLQWHUQWUDLQHHVKLS
As there have been several scandals related to the Technical Intern Traineeship Programs, as in
the case of Logistics, the JITCO (Japan International Training Co-operation Organisation) has been
encouraging employers to hire foreign trainees and Technical Intern Trainees to implement proper
management with new guidelines and to distribute notice on training or employment conditions.
The JITCO also made recommendations directly to 76 accepting bodies and enterprises to
improve their management, so as to improve the selection of trainees, the payment of training fees as well
as the number of trainees accepted in the fiscal year 2000 (JITCO, 2001, pp. 43-44) .
Trainees and Technical Intern Trainees from Vietnam who flee away during their stay in Japan
have become a serious problem. The JITCO and the Ministry of Manpower in Vietnam made an
agreement to improve the management concerning trainees and Technical Intern Trainees. The
performance of the agreement will be reviewed twice a year.

280

6WUHQJWKHQLQJRIHPSOR\PHQWSROLF\IRUIRUHLJQHUV
In 2001, the number of job-seekers, especially foreigners of Japanese descent, who visited the
Corner for Employment of Foreign Workers (in 81 Public Employment Service offices) increased
drastically, partly because of a rise in dismissals and in the non-extension of contracts, especially in
subcontracting companies. In such a labour market situation, employment policy measures for foreign
workers, such as employment services for foreigners within the network of the Public Employment
Service as well as Guidance to employers based on the Guidelines concerning Employment and Working
Conditions of Foreign Workers should be strengthened.
In addition, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is trying to implement employment
assistance measures for foreign students who wish to get a job after graduating. The seminar on proper
channels for the employment of foreigners will be held in China. The International Migration and Labour
Market in Asia Workshop should also play an important role in monitoring and consulting on the recent
situation of international migration as well as migration policies in East Asia.
/RFDOLQLWLDWLYHVWRZDUGVWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQHUV
On October 19, 2001, the municipal governors from 13 cities (Hamamatsu, Iwata, Kosei,
Toyohashi, Toyota, Yokkaichi, Suzuka, Oogaki, Kani, Minokamo, Ota, Oizumi, and Iida) with a high
percentage of foreigners got gathered in Hamamatsu City for the fourth time to discuss the problems and
tasks of the municipalities related to foreigners. They made a statement and proposals to the central
government, prefectural governments and related organisations.
It is in these 13 cities that foreign workers and their families are concentrating: the city with the
highest percentage of foreigners (excluding permanent residents) is Oizumi (14.7%), followed by
Minokamo (6.8%), Kosei (5.6%), and Ota (5%). The main nationalities of foreigners are Brazilians,
Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, Peruvians and Thais.
These cities are co-operating with each other to exchange information on the policies and
activities concerning foreign citizens in order to solve the problems actively. The meeting also aims at
making proposals and co-operative actions towards the central government, prefectural governments and
related bodies, since many problems cannot be solved without improving or changing the legal system.
The meeting made proposals on the education of foreign citizens (especially on strengthening
the teaching of Japanese language to foreign children), social security (especially the improvement of the
health insurance coverage and the insolvency for high medical expenses) and the harmonisation of
registration systems for Japanese and foreign citizens (Conference on Municipalities with a High Number
of Foreign Population, 2001).
6XPPDU\DQGFRQFOXVLRQ
Important findings and the conclusion of this paper are as follows:
1.

The East Asian economy, which experienced rapid recovery thanks to the expansion of the
IT sector and showed recovery in employment and growing international migration should
now go through an IT recession, worsened by the terrorist attack on the US in September,
2001. The movement of highly skilled workers is of growing importance for the future
growth of Asia, while international migration in general is negatively affected by the
recession.
281

2.

The Japanese economy is exposed to strong downward risks and experienced negative
growth for three consecutive quarters until the end of 2001. It has reached a critical situation
of enormous deflation. While the fiscal policy is reaching its limitations as the government
debt accumulates, the quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan is under political pressure.
With the continuous downfall of the prices, income and employment is also declining and
consumption and investment fall; exports do not increase irrespective of the devaluation of
Yen.

3.

Employment losses reached over one million in October, 2001, with an all-time record
employment rate of 5.5% in November, 2001.
Furthermore, there are signs that employment deteriorated in 2002: Reforms in the banking
sector may lead to further redundancies and the electronic industry is also damaged by the
collapse of the IT boom. The relocation of manufacturing production sites from Japan to
China is accelerating, and the rising import penetration rate is causing a production downfall.
Irrespective of this poor labour market situation, foreign workers may flow in because of the
existence of mismatches and the need for highly-skilled workers.

4.

The data of the year 2000 on immigration and foreign workers show a substantial increase in
foreign workers and population (estimated at 700 000). The pressure of illegal immigration
into Japan is still very high, while the legal migration of the highly skilled renewed its
record. The number of trainees and Technical Intern Trainees also showed a substantial
increase.

5.

However, the data on employment of foreign workers in the first half of 2001 indicates a
worsening environment in the labour market. With such a background, the problems of
integration intensified in several cities with a high rate of foreign inhabitants. The local
initiatives to renew migration policy is becoming more and more active.

6.

This report undertook a comprehensive analysis of the movement of the highly skilled. With
the classification of Core HS, Additional channels and Permanent HS, the situation of
the highly skilled in Asian countries could be compared.
x

In the Japan-US comparison, Core HS is much bigger in the US than Japan, mainly
because the acceptance of intra-corporate transferees and specialists is much larger. To
accept more professionals, mutual recognition of accreditations is necessary. The large
number of students and business travellers in the US is another reason why the ratio of the
highly skilled is much higher. In addition, the adjustment of status from temporary to
permanent plays an important role.

According to the analysis of the highly skilled migration in Japan, irrespective of the
growing inward direct investment from Europe, the growth of intra-corporate transferees is
attributable to the close relationship of Japan with Asia as well as to the lifting of the upper
limits of the duration of stay. Intra-regional migration plays an important role in the
migration of students and researchers, while intra-regional movement of specialist is
underdeveloped. With all the possibility to change status of residence from students to
worker, the rate of students returning to home countries after finishing study is high. To take
initiatives on the regional basis to promote intra-regional migration of the highly skilled,
strong political will is lacking. However, the situation is rapidly changing, as political
discussion on regional integration is becoming more and more active in East Asia.

282

7.

In Japan, discussions on new migration policies continue, even though the government
already decided its policy orientation until 2010. In the meantime, the acknowledgement of
IT accreditation in India and Singapore has been undertaken. The combat against illegal
influx and overstay continues to be of great importance. The improvement of the
management of traineeship programs is going further. The strengthening of employment and
integration policies are gathering more and more attention, especially on a local basis.

8.

In conclusion, intra-regional co-operation within East Asia on migration policies is of

growing importance, especially under the present economic and political situation. The cooperation is necessary not only because irregular migration should be curbed and human
smuggling extinguished, but because Asia should prepare the conditions for its future
development. The intra-regional migration of the highly skilled is one of the most important
elements for the region to implement a dynamic, competitive, mutually beneficial and open
economic integration. Harmonising migration policies between countries may enhance such
potential. However, the task of revitalising the Asian economy cannot be achieved solely by
migration policies. The co-ordination between migration policies and human resources
development, science and technology, industrial as well as labour market and social policies
should be strengthened.

283

5()(5(1&(6

ADB (2001), 5HJLRQDO(FRQRPLF5HSRUW, Manila.

CONFERENCE OF MUNICIPALITIES WITH HIGH NUMBER OF FOREIGN POPULATION (2001),
Cohabitation and Co-operation between Municipalities in the Global Era: Hamamatsu International
Symposium,Hamamtsu.
GOVERNMENT of JAPAN GOA (by Fukuhara and Ishigaki) (2001),6RSHPL-DSDQ5HSRUW,
Tokyo.
IGUCHI, Y. (1997), ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQDQG/DERXU0DUNHW Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo.
IGUCHI, Y. (2001a), The East Asian Recovery and International Migration in Japan, paper submitted to
the International Workshop on International Migration and Labour Market in Asia, Japan Institute
of Labour, Tokyo, 1-2 February.
IGUCHI, Y. (2001b), International Migration of the Highly Skilled and Migration Policy Initiatives
from Japan and Asia, paper submitted to the Seminar on International Mobility of Highly Skilled
workers from Statistical Analysis to Formulation of Policies organised by the OECD
(DSTI/DEELSA), Paris, 11-12 June.
IGUCHI, Y. (2002), The Movement of the Highly Skilled in Asia, Present Situation and Future Tasks,
paper submitted to the International Workshop on International Migration and Labour Market in
Asia, Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo, 4-5 February.
IMF (2000), :RUOG(FRQRPLF2XWORRN New York.
JETRO (2001), :KLWH3DSHURQ)RUHLJQ'LUHFW,QYHVWPHQW.
JITCO (2001), :KLWH3DSHURQ-,7&2.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (2001a), 2QWKH,VVXDQFHRI&HUWLILFDWHRI(OLJLELOLW\IRU)RUHLJQHUVWRJHW
HPSOR\PHQWZLWKWKHVWDWXVRIUHVLGHQFH+XPDQLWLHVDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHDQG(QJLQHHU,
Tokyo.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (2001b), 2QWKH,VVXDQFHRI&HUWLILFDWHRI(OLJLELOLW\IRU)RUHLJQHUVWRJHW
HPSOR\PHQWZLWKWKHVWDWXVRIUHVLGHQFH+XPDQLWLHVDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHDQG(QJLQHHU,
Tokyo.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE MHLW (2001a), 7KH$QDO\VLVRI/DERXU
(FRQRP\, Japan Institute of Labour.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE MHLW (2001b), 5HVXOWRI5HSRUWLQJ6\VWHPRQ
(PSOR\PHQWRI)RUHLJQ:RUNHUV Tokyo.

284

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRES MOF (2001), Result of the Study on Japanese Nationals
Overseas. Tokyo.
NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY NPA (2001),The Present Situation of Crimes by Foreigners in 2000,
Tokyo.
OECD (2001a), 7UHQGVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ, Paris
OECD (2001b), ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RELOLW\RIWKH+LJKO\6NLOOHGParis
UNCTAD(2001),:RUOG,QYHVWPHQW5HSRUW New York.

285

$11(;
'(6&5,37,212)7+('$7$,17$%/(

-DSDQ
The number of foreign workers (stock) is an estimate that includes overstayers, but does not include
permanent residents. The number of national workers abroad (stock) relates only to Asia. Together with
the other regions, it amounts to 292 000 in 1999.
.RUHD
The number of foreign workers (stock) is an estimate including overstayers and trainees. The inflow of
foreign workers dates from 1992 and the national workers, from December, 1990.
&KLQD
The number of departing nationals for the purpose of work relates to the labour export scheme, excluding
departing nationals using private placement services.
+RQJ.RQJ&KLQD
The amount of Labour force dates from 1998. The number of foreign workers (stock) only indicates house
maids. The number of national workers relates to commuters from Hong Kong China to Mainland China
in 1990.
7DLZDQ&KLQD
The amount of labour force dates of 1998.
6LQJDSRUH
The amount of labour force dates from 1998. The number of foreign workers (stock) is the sum of un-and
semiskilled workers (450 000) and professional and technical workers (80 000).
0DOD\VLD
The number of foreign workers (stock) is an estimate of illegal workers. The number of national workers
(stock) is an estimate of those commuting to Singapore.

286

7KDLODQG
The number of foreign workers (stock) is an estimate of illegal workers. The number of national workers
(stock) is an estimate of those working abroad.
,QGRQHVLD
The number of entering foreigners for work purposes relates to 1994-1995.
7KH3KLOLSSLQHV
The number of foreigners legally working is 6000 workers in 1999 and 5000 in 1998.

287

Table 1.8QHPSOR\PHQWLQ(DVW$VLD





-DSDQ




.RUHD




&KLQD




+RQJ.RQJ&KLQD




7DLZDQ&KLQD




6LQJDSRUH




0DOD\VLD




7KDLODQG




,QGRQHVLD




7KH3KLOLSSLQHV




6RXUFH$VLDQ'HYHORSPHQW%DQNUHYLVHGZLWKQDWLRQDOGDWDLQVRPHFRXQWULHV

Table 2.,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQLQ(DVW$VLDLQWKRXVDQGV




/DERXU
)RUFH

6WRFN
)RUHLJQHUV
1DWLRQDOV
ZRUNLQJ
ZRUNLQJ
LQVLGH
RXWVLGH
-DSDQ


 


.RUHD

1D
>@


&KLQD 0DLQODQG 




+.
>@



1D
7DLZDQ
>@


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7KDLODQG




1D
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1D 1D
1D
3KLOLSSLQHV



1D
1D
6RXUFH%\WKHDXWKRULQUHOLDQFHXSRQQDWLRQDOGDWDDQGHVWLPDWHV
1RWHVVWDQGVIRU>@VWDQGVIRUD\HDURWKHUWKDQRU
7KHGHWDLOHGGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHGDWDLVJLYHQLQWKHDQQH[
,QIORZRI
)RUHLJQHUV

)ORZ
2XWIORZRI
1DWLRQDOV

288

Table 3.0DLQHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUVLQ-DSDQ

5HDO*'3JURZWK
,Q444
*'3DFWXDOILJXUH
,QELOOLRQ<HQ




























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<HQWR86











&XUUHQW$FFRXQW
PLOOLRQ<HQ
,Q*'3
,QZDUG)',)<
LQPLOOLRQ86
2XWZDUG)',)<
LQPLOOLRQ86
&3,

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R































0RQH\6XSSO\




6RXUFH(FRQRPLF3ODQQLQJ$JHQF\%DQNRI-DSDQ


Table 4.0DLQODERXUPDUNHWLQGLFDWRUVLQ-DSDQ





3RSXODWLRQ  \HDUV 



ROGDQGRYHU
/DERXU)RUFH





(PSOR\PHQW





(PSOR\HHV





)RUHLJQ:RUNHUV





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LQHPSOR\HHV
8QHPSOR\HG





8QHPSUDWLR




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:DJHV




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289









































Table 5.,PPLJUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQHUVE\FRXQWU\RUDUHDH[FOXGLQJUHHQWU\

1996
897 467
695 238
528 841

Korea
Taiwan China
USA
Hong Kong
25 209
China
China
134 140
U. K.
124 609
Philippines
60 203
Canada
74 711
Thailand
56 505
Brazil
60 187
Others
752 916
Total
3 410 026
6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

1997
917 475
796,788
562 148

1998
640 968
814 956
605 719

1999
835 297
901 874
634 216

2000
951 884
882 394
661 564

28 208

50 677

39 613

46 797

149 831
147 710
74 345
82 860
53 778
66 636
929 900
3 809 679

152 046
162 132
75 161
95 105
40 174
40 972
789 903
3 667 813

156 507
161 392
84 767
94 739
48 384
38 275
964 557
3 959 621

190 380
169 053
104 324
106 501
56 011
58 577
1 075 715
4 256 403

Table 6,QIORZRIIRUHLJQHUVE\VWDWXVRIUHVLGHQFH
Status of Residence
Diplomat
Official
* Professor

1996
8 843
10 107
1 309

1997
8 758
9 624
1 463

1998
8 313
8 164
1 429

1999
8 305
9 824
1 513

2000
9 408
11 767
1 914

Artist
Religious activity
Journalist
Investor/ Manager
Legal/accountant service
Medical Service
Researcher
Instructor
Engineer
Specialist in the Humanities
Intra-corporate transferee

91
1 236
198
1 079
7
2
1 080
2 874
4 426
6 144
2 831

136
1 214
192
1 064
6
2
1 251
3 068
5 128
6 709
3 354

136
1 231
145
1 212
7
2
1 229
3 318
5 699
7 150
3 351

159
1 229
180
974
4
4
1 147
3 203
3 670
6 510
3 765

167
1 199
231
863
3
1
1 036
3 323
3 396
7 039
3 876

Entertainer
Skilled labour
Subtotal
Cultural activities
Temporary visitor
College student
Pre-college student
Trainee
Dependent
Designated activities
Spouse/child of Japanese
Spouse/child of perm. resident
Long-term resident
Total
6RXUFH0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH

53 952
3 336
78 538
3 391
3 184 642
11 717
9 436
45 536
15 199
3 222
25 869
213
12 773
3 401 026

67 475
2 833
93 895
4 092
3 534 869
12 408
11 755
49 594
16 138
3 295
31 606
292
33 353
3 809 679

73 778
3 024
101.891
3 733
3 402 358
13 478
14 540
49 797
16 134
2 979
24 572
352
21 501
3 667 813

82 305
3 375
108 038
3 693
3 677 732
14 446
19 426
47 985
16 695
2 934
26 737
341
23 465
3 959 621

103 264
3 876
129 868
3 396
3 910 624
19 503
22 404
54 049
17 617
4 364
33 167
389
40 033
4 256 403

290

Table 7.(VWLPDWHGQXPEHURIRYHUVWD\HUV
July 1997
Total
281 157
Korea
52 854
Philippines
42 627
China
38 957
Thailand
38 191
Malaysia
10 296
Peru
12 027
Taiwan China 9 403
Iran
10 153
Myanmar
5 957
Bangladesh
5 861
Pakistan
4 766
Others
50 016

July 1998

July 1999

Jan. 2000

Jan. 2001

July 2001

276 641
59 160
42 646
35 558
35 138
10 143
11 052
9 364
8 121
5 650
5 278
4 490
50 941

268 421
63 818
39 235
36 077
26 546
9 763
10 263
9 429
6 524
5 304
4 625
3 931
47 970

251 697
60 693
36 379
32 896
23 503
9 701
9 158
9 243
5 824
4 983
4 263
3 414
46 690

232 121
56 023
31 666
30 975
19 500
9 651
8 502
8 849
4 335
4 473
52 832

235 509
56 554
31 600
32 112
19 193
9 986
8 465
8 864
4 010
4 326
54 404

6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

Note: Figures for Bangladesh and Pakistan in January 2001 and July 2001 are included in Others.
Table 8.,OOHJDOLQIOX[ODQGLQJRYHUVWD\DQGZRUNLQJ

Total
Illegal influx
Illegal landing
Undesignated
Activities
Overstay
Violation of law
Illegal working

1996
54 271

1997
49 566

1998
48 493

1999
55 167

2000
51 469

4 827
811
279

7 117
776
430

7 472
719
310

9 337
831
335

9 186
748
473

48 211
143
47 785

41 113
130
41 604

39 835
157
40 535

44 403
261
46 258

40 756
296
44 190

6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

Table 9.,OOHJDOLQIOX[WR-DSDQ

Total
By air
By ship

1996
4 827
3 757
1 070

6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

1997
7 117
4 382
2 735

1998
7 472
4 916
2 556

291

1999
9 337
6 281
3 056

2000
9 186
6 828
2 358

Table 10.1XPEHUVRIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVLQ-DSDQHVWLPDWHV



6WDWXVRI5HVLGHQFH











3URIHVVRU





 





$UWLVW





 





5HOLJLRXV$FWLYLW\





 





-RXUQDOLVW





 





,QYHVWRU0DQDJHU





 





/HJDODFFRXQWDQW6HUYLFH







 



0HGLFDOVHUYLFH











5HVHDUFKHU











,QVWUXFWRU











(QJLQHHU









6SHFLDOLVWLQ+XPDQLWLHV















,QWUDFRUSRUDWHWUDQVIHUHH 





(QWHUWDLQHU









6NLOOHG/DERXU











6XEWRWDO









'HVLJQDWHGDFWLYLWLHV











3DUWWLPHZRUNRIVWXGHQWV











:RUNHURI-DSDQHVH














GHVFHQGDQW

2YHUVWD\HU





















 



670 000

710.000

*UDQGWRWDO



6RXUFH: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Note: * stands for status of residence for the purpose of working.
** stands for illegal foreign workers.

292



Table 11.(PSOR\PHQWRIIRUHLJQHUVDFFRUGLQJWRUHSRUWLQJV\VWHP
1996

1997

Total
Establish15 757
17 859
ment
Foreign
154 783
185 214
workers
%
100
100
Direct employment
Establish14 053
15 702
ment
Foreign
103 044
113 961
workers
%
66.6
61.5
Subcontracting, Dispatching contract
Establishm 2 918
3 529
ent
Foreign
51 739
71 253
workers
%

33.4

38.5

1998

1999

2000

2001

19 204

19 483

19 794

20 745

189 814

191 472

207 093

221 121

100

100

100

16 948

17 362

17 571

18 484

114 753

115 038

120 484

130 440

60.5

60.1

58.2

100

58.8

3 729

3 677

3 854

3 954

75 061

76 434

86 609

90 631

39.5

39.9

41.8

41.2

6RXUFH: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Note: Figures on June 1.

Table 12.'HSDUWXUHRI-DSDQHVHDQGIRUHLJQHUV

Total
Japanese
Foreigners

1996
20 850 188
16 694 769
4 155 419

6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

1997
21 370 382
16 802 750
4 567 632

1998
20 275 877
15 806 218
4 469 657

293

1999
21 203 898
16 357 572
4 846 326

2000
22 965 316
17 818 590
5 146 726

Table 13. (PSOR\HHVLQ-DSDQHVHDIILOLDWHGFRPSDQLHV

Oct. 1996

Oct. 1997

Oct. 1998

Oct. 1999

Oct. 2000

Asia Total

1 763 667

1 922 608

1 880 492

1 962 572

2 064 795

Korea
China
Mainland
Hong Kong
China
Taiwan China
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia
Singapore
Philippines
Vietnam

137 920
366 187

84 575
459 003

79 963
466 979

79 365
530 705

79 974
566 728

120 264

142 507

139 010

136 526

144 259

130 957
224 510
332 324
193 415
93 338
98 924
10 533

127 603
240 712
355 480
211 245
90 483
112 250
16 921

121 550
219 254
337 540
221 339
79 450
121 113
19 747

115 435
212 630
337 034
230 299
76 634
134 913
24 687

107 912
226 431
344 918
253 474
78 315
147 083
34 009

6RXUFH7R\RNHL]DL6KLQSR6KD.

Table 14.$FFHSWDQFHRIIRUHLJQWUDLQHHV

Total
Asia
Korea
China
Taiwan (Ch)
Philippine
Thailand
Malaysia
Vietnam
Indonesia
India
Sri Lanka
Europe
Africa
North Am.
Latin Am
Oceania

1996
45 536
40 201
2 701
17 904
737
4 446
3 298
1 675
1 313
5 098
631
501
1 078
1 578
662
1 605
370

6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

1997
49 594
44 384
1 596
21 340
499
4 380
3 534
1 575
2 009
6 701
567
478
1 001
1 502
638
1 648
356

1998
49 797
44 460
553
22 372
499
3 658
4 625
1 645
2 136
5 972
637
392
980
1 587
758
1 590
372

1999
47 985
42 456
696
22 041
299
3 694
2 998
1 358
2 108
5 926
697
476
902
1 764
757
1 167
346

294

2000
54 049
49 142
592
27 839
335
3 727
2 974
1 285
2 757
6 231
649
479
854
1 573
622
1 399
374

%
100
91.0
1.1
51.5
0.6
6.9
5.5
2.4
5.1
11.5
1.2
0.9
1.6
2.9
1.2
2.6
0.7

Table 15.)RUHLJQ7UDLQHHVDFFRUGLQJWRW\SHVRIDFFHSWLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV
$FFHSWLQJ2UJDQLVDWLRQV
7RWDO
*RYHUQPHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQV
3ULYDWHLQVWLWXWLRQV
ZLWK6XSSRUWIURP-,7&2
 &RPSDQ\DORQH
$VVRFLDWLRQRI60(
E\ 5HFRPPHQGHG
-,7 &RPSDQ\DORQH
&2 1*2V132V
2WKHUERGLHV
3ULYDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVZLWK
RXWVXSSRUWIURP-,7&2







































































6RXUFH: JITCO (2001).

Table 16.1XPEHURIIRUHLJQWUDLQHHVDOORZHGWREHFRPHWHFKQLFDOLQWHUQWUDLQHHV

China
Indonesia
Vietnam
Philippines
Thailand
Others
Total

6RXUFH: JITCO.

Total
32 087
13 044
3 924
1 310
241
167
50 733

1993
82
31
16
10
21
0
160

1994
1 156
579
14
82
15
15
1 861

1995
1 496
632
31
101
28
8
2 296

1996
2 128
965
272
203
38
18
3 624

295

1997
3 677
1 970
407
228
25
32
6 339

1998
7 690
4 136
945
221
45
29
13 066

1999
7 225
2 504
1 067
307
37
50
11 032

2000
8 633
2 227
1 165
78
32
60
11 032

Table 17,QIORZRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG+6DQGQRQ+6LQ-DSDQDQG86

7\SH

&ODVVLILFDWLRQ

7RWDO

$&RUH+6

-DSDQ

,QWUDFRUSRUDWH











3URIHVVLRQDO
6SHFLDOLVW

13 758 (64.0)

%$GGLWLRQDO

%XVLQHVVWUDYHOOHUVLQFOXGLQJ

&KDQQHOV

VHUYLFHSURYLGHUV

302 326 (53.8)

24 104 371



6WXGHQW


DFFHSWHG

HPSOR\PHQWEDVHG

&3HUPDQHQW



5HVHDUFKHU

LPPLJUDQWV





WUDQVIHUHH

+6

86



RU



XQGHU

SRLQWVEDVHG

1RQH

77 517 (1998)





V\VWHP 

+6

+6 WHPSRUDU\ ZRUNHUV DSSO\LQJ IRU

VWDEOHUHVLGHQFHVWDWXV

'2XWVLGH

1RQ+6ZRUNHUVLQ7RWDO

6FRSHRI+6



0HGLFDOUHODWHG
6SHFLDOLVWV 




(QWHUWDLQHUV
2WKHUZRUNHUV









7UDLQHHV ZLWK2-7





'HSHQGDQWVRIZRUNHUVVWXGHQWV





2WKHUDFWLYLWLHV



/RQJWHUPUHVLGHQWV

$%&$%&'









1RQH

3HUPDQHQWUHVLGHQWV

1RQH









6RXUFH: By the author, based on Japanese and US immigration statistics.

Table 18.*URZLQJDFFHSWDQFHRI)',VLQFHWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIV







,QZDUG)',7RWDO
0DQXIDFWXULQJ
1RQPDQXIDFWXULQJ
)LQDQFH,QVXUDQFH
7UDGH&RPPHUFH
7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ

 





























































2XWZDUG)',7RWDO







,QZDUGRXWZDUG









Ministry of Finance and JETRO.








Note: The figures in 2000 are estimates.

296






5DWLR

6RXUFH:



Table 19.,QZDUGGLUHFWLQYHVWPHQWLQWR-DSDQDQGLQWUDFRUSRUDWHWUDQVIHUHHV

Inward FDI Total

N. America
Europe
Asia
Japan
Corp. transfer
(A)+(B)(inflow)
(A) Investor,
Manager
(B) Intracorp.
Transferees
Corp. transfer
(A)+(B) (stock)
(A)Investor,
Manager
(B)Intracorp.
Transferees

1997

1998

1999

5 527
1 239
2 508
605
667
4418

10 469
6 323
2 361
161
1 351
4743

21 510
3 741
12 675
985
1 448
4 739

35 000*
12 328
1 726*
288*
18 378
4739

1212

974

863

3531

3 765

3 876

11427

11 711

12 762

14 349

5 055

5 112

5 440

5 694

8657

1064
3354

6372

6599

2000 (estimate)

7322

2001

6RXUFH: Ministry of Finance, JETRO and calculation by the author.

Note: * stands for estimates on annual basis. / Japan means investment by foreign affiliated company in Japan (i.e.
re-investment).
Table 20.+RPHFRXQWU\UHJLRQRILQWUDFRPSDQ\WUDQVIHUHHVLQ-DSDQ


$VLD

(XURSH

1RUWK

2FHDQLD

2WKHUV

7RWDO





$PHULFD
1XPEHU
5DWLR












86

$XVWUDOLD

.RUHD

8.

6HQGLQJ

&KLQD

)UDQFH

FRXQWU\

,QGLD
7DLZDQ&KLQD





0DMRU







*HUPDQ\




6RXUFH: Made by the author in reliance upon Ministry of Justice.



Table 21.+RPHFRXQWU\UHJLRQRIIRUHLJQHUVZLWK,QYHVWRUDQGEXVLQHVVPDQDJHU
LQ-DSDQ


$VLD

(XURSH

1RUWK

2FHDQLD

2WKHUV

7RWDO

$PHULFD
1XPEHU
5DWLR




0DMRU

.RUHD

6HQGLQJ

&KLQD

FRXQWU\

7DLZDQ&KLQD

,QGLD



8.













86$

$XVWUDOLD

)UDQFH
*HUPDQ\

6RXUFH: Made by the author in reliance upon Ministry of Justice.

297





Table 22.(VWLPDWHGUDWLRRIIRUHLJQSURIHVVRUVDQUHVHDUFKHUVLQ-DSDQ


5HVHDUFKHUV

3URIHVVRUV

1XPEHU

LQ 
WRWDO
)RUHLJQHU 
(VWLPDWHG5DWLR





3RVWJUDGXDWH
VWXGHQWV








6RXUFH: Calculated by the author in reliance upon UNESCO(2000), and Immigration Statistics of


Ministry of Justice.

Table 23. +RPHFRXQWU\UHJLRQRIIRUHLJQUHVHDUFKHUVLQ-DSDQ

$VLD

(XURSH

1RUWK

2FHDQLD

2WKHUV

7RWDO





$PHULFD
1XPEHU
5DWLR
0DMRU



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5XVVLD

86

$XVWUDOLD

6HQGLQJ

,QGLD

*HUPDQ\

FRXQWU\

.RUHD

+XQJDU\

%DQJODGHVK


6RXUFH: Made by the author in reliance upon Immigration Statistics.




In the case of professors coming to Japan, China, US, Korea, Russia are major sending countries
again, while intra-regional movement accounts for 41%, substantially less than for researchers.
Table 24.+RPHFRXQWU\UHJLRQRIIRUHLJQSURIHVVRUVLQ-DSDQ


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Table 25.+RPHFRXQWU\UHJLRQRIIRUHLJQSURIHVVLRQDOVLQ-DSDQ

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6RXUFH: Made by the author in reliance upon Immigration Statistics.

Note: Professionals refers to foreigners who enter Japan with a status of residence called Legal and accounting
service.

298

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Note: Statistics on Certificate of eligibility.

Table 27.6HFWRUVRIHPSOR\PHQWIRUVSHFLDOLVWV0DQXIDFWXULQJ


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6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice. Note: Statistics on Certificate of eligibility in 2000.



Table 29.0RQWKO\VDODU\IRUVSHFLDOLVWZRUNLQJLQ-DSDQ
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Note: Statistics on Certificate of eligibility in 2000.

299

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6RXUFH: Ministry of Technology and Education (2001).

Table 32.1XPEHUDQGFKDQJHRIVWDWXVRIIRUHLJQVWXGHQWVLQ-DSDQ


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300

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B.25($
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.LO6DQJ<RR
Korea Labour Institute

,QWURGXFWLRQ
Prior to the financial crisis in November 1997, Korea had achieved its economic peak over
the preceding three decades. Between 1965 and 1996, the SHUFDSLWD income in Korea increased by a
hundred times, from USD 105 to USD 11 380. The financial crisis drastically changed its economy
and labour market. The real GDP growth rate sharply decreased in 1998, as did the SHUFDSLWD income,
mainly due to devaluation of the Korean Won and the negative growth rate. The unemployment rate
went up from 2.6% in 1997 to 6.8% in 1998 and 6.3% in 1999. This unexpected shock also affected
the demand for foreign labour. The number of migrant workers including industrial trainees decreased
from 245 399 in 1997 to 166 648 in 1998 and 188 316 in 1999. In 1999 and 2000, the economy
quickly recovered, recording a GDP growth rate of 10.9% in 1999 and 8.8% and an unemployment
rate down to 4.1% in 2000. This quick recovery boosted the demand for labour, including migrant
workers, whose number increased to 254 178 in 2000 and 330 194 in November, 2001 (the figures
include industrial trainees).
These changes compelled the government to develop more effective measures to regulate
and manage migrant workers. In 2000, the government and the ruling party of Korea tried to introduce
a new system to regulate immigration of unskilled migrant workers with the purpose of providing
employment permits to the qualified employers who wanted to hire them. This attempt failed, mainly
because of the strong opposition of employers in 2000. On December 20, 2001, the government
announced the revision of the industrial training system for unskilled foreign workers, turning the
two years training plus one years employment system into a one years training plus two years
employment policy in February, 2002.
'RPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGWKHODERXUPDUNHW
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHGRPHVWLFHFRQRP\
Most experts agree that after the very high economic growth until the late 1980s, 1989 was
the turning point of a mid-growth period in which structural adjustment occurred. During this
transition, the Korean economy experienced higher inflation, widening trade deficit and faster growth
of the service sector as shown in Table 1, and entered the period of so-called labour shortage.
However, the financial crisis in late 1997 hit the Korean economy unfavourably. The GDP
growth rate fell to -6.7% in 1998, and SHUFDSLWD GNI decreased from USD 10 307 in 1997 to USD
6 723 in 1998, mainly due to the devaluation of the Korean Won and the negative economic growth

303

rate. Many companies, including five banks and big steel and car manufacturers, went bankrupt, which
resulted in a very high unemployment rate. At that time, the major challenge was to overcome the
economic crisis as fast as possible. Reform policies for the recovery were directed at the financial and
industrial sectors as well as at the public and labour sectors. With nation-wide pain-sharing schemes,
the economy recovered very quickly in mid-1998. In 1999 and 2000, it recorded a high growth rate
(10.9% and 8.8% respectively) and a very stable inflation rate measured by the consumer price index
(see Table 1).
However, the economy has suffered from the late-2000 worldwide recession; its GDP
growth rate sharply decreased from 12.6% in the first quarter of 2000 to 9.7% in the second quarter,
9.2% in the third quarter and 4.6% in the fourth quarter. In 2001, it fell down again to 3.7% in the first
quarter and 2.7% in the second quarter. Since the fourth quarter of 2001, an economic recovery seems
to be on the way. The government is expecting a 4% growth rate in 2002.
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHODERXUPDUNHW
2YHUYLHZRIHPSOR\PHQWDQGXQHPSOR\PHQW
As shown in Table 2, the population growth rate has decreased from 1.57% in 1980 to 0.89%
in 2000, which resulted in a drastic change of its populations structure. The proportion of the 0-14 age
group decreased from 34% in 1980 to 21.6% in 2000, while that of the 15-64 cohort increased from
62.2% in 1980 to 71.2% in 2000 and that of age 65 or over increased from 3.8% in 1980 to 7.1% in
2000. These changes and a generally higher education level resulted in a labour shortage in low-skilled
workers.
The unemployment rate stayed under 3% from 1990 to 1997, as shown in Table 3. Analysts
argued that it was too far below the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU). For
the 1990-1997 period, the growth rate of nominal wages averaged approximately 13% as shown in
Figure 1. Wage increases (the wages doubled from 1987 to 1997) far outran productivity increases,
which hurt the competitiveness of Korean goods, especially abroad, and discouraged a large number of
companies from investing.
The financial crisis at the end of 1997, followed by structural reforms and macro-economic
stabilization programmes, constricted the economic activities of the labour force on a large scale. In
1998, the number of employed people decreased by 1.1 million, and the official unemployment rate
reached 6.8%, with the number of the unemployed exceeding 1.4 million as shown in Table 3.
Unemployment affected mostly the construction, trade and manufacturing sectors. By occupation,
most were from non-professional jobs such as machine operators, assemblers and manual labourers. In
terms of wage adjustments, the growth rate of the nominal wage decreased from 7.0% in 1997 to 2.5% in 1998, while real wages were reduced by -9.3% in 1998.
As a result of the painful efforts of economic restructuring after the financial crisis, the
Korean economy quickly recovered from its deep recession. Although the unemployment rate
remained as high as 6.3% in 1999 mainly due to the lagging effects of business cycles on the labour
market, it started to decrease significantly in 2000. The unemployment rate as of the second quarter of
2001 was 3.5%, with 791 000 people unemployed. However, we can hardly say that the financial crisis
is over on the labour market. While unemployment rates are falling, it is unlikely that they will return
to the 2% level recorded before the crisis. Also, the overall labour force participation rate in 2000 is
only of 60.7%, which is far below the 1997 figure. The relatively low employment/population ratio
304

and the number of the employed suggest that there is still a large number of discouraged workers who
slow down their job search because of the economic downturn.
&KDQJHVLQHPSOR\PHQWVWUXFWXUH
Due to the successful industrialization, the share of agriculture, hunting and forestry
decreased dramatically since the early 1960s. Currently, only 11.2%s of the overall employment is
engaged in the primary industries. The employment share of the manufacturing sector also decreased
after a recorded 27.1% in 1990. On the contrary, service industries such as wholesale, retail, hotels &
restaurants and real estate employ workers at increasing rates.
In terms of occupation, employment retrenchment affected machine operators, assemblers
and manual workers, reflecting the decreasing employment shares of manufacturing industries. In
addition, a reduction in the proportion of clerks mainly due to office automation can be observed in
Table 5. The proportion of managers and (associate) professionals increased from 15.4% in 1994 to
18.8% in 2000. During the same period, the proportion of service and sales persons also went up from
21.6% to 23.9%.
Compared with OECD countries, the Korean labour market has two distinctive
characteristics. Firstly, a large proportion are employed in non-regular jobs, of short duration and
usually low stability. In 2000, 52.4% of the employees are either temporary or daily workers. The
incidence of non-regular work is particularly high among women, older workers and the lowereducated, while younger and higher-educated male workers occupy most regular jobs. The proportion
of non-regular workers follows a U-pattern during the 1990s, which is to say that the share of nonregular workers initially decreased and then increased, going up from 1 933 000 in the fourth quarter
of 1997 to 1 961 000 in the same quarter of 1998. The statistical figures of non-regular workers are
somehow misleading because a large number of temporary/daily workers have worked for more than
one year. In the Labour Force Survey, any worker who didnt receive severance payment, medical
insurance or other benefits was regarded as non-regular even if his/her tenure is more than one year.
This practice exaggerates the real scope of the non-regular work. Taking these workers into account
would bring the share of non-regular workers to an estimated 26 to 30%. Secondly, self-employment
is among the highest of OECD countries, stable at 27 to 29% during 1990s. Unpaid family workers
make up for about 10% of overall employment, as shown in Table 6.
&KDQJHVLQXQHPSOR\PHQWVWUXFWXUH
Among the unemployed, there are twice as many male workers as female workers (see
Table 7) because unemployed women are more likely to withdraw from the labour market after losing
their jobs, while men, still traditionally the breadwinners in households, actively search for new
opportunities. Figure 2 shows differences in unemployment rates between men and women during the
1990s. Before the financial crisis, the gap was relatively small, but it widened from 0.5 percentage
points in 1997 to 2.0 percentage points in 1998.
Patterns of unemployment rates differ considerably by age. Labour force participation rates
of the youth are considerably low by international standards, which can be ascribed to the fact that
more than 80% of high school graduates go to tertiary school and that most students wholly
concentrate on their studies and do not have part-time jobs. However, like in European countries, the
unemployment rate of the youth are relatively high, as shown in Figure 3. This structural phenomenon
may reflect a long job search process on the part of college graduates, whose parents support basic
305

needs. Skill mismatches between curricula and labour market demand may also induce serious schoolto-work transition problems for many young entrants, especially female entrants who studied liberal
arts in college. Compared with other age groups, the unemployment rate of the 60-and-over cohort has
always been low, maybe due to the fact that older workers are more likely to withdraw from the labour
market after losing their jobs.
One of the most important and least visible consequences of a deep recession is long-term
unemployment (LH, over one year). Figure 4 illustrates how its rate has changed over time. From 1995
to the second quarter of 2001, it showed relatively little changes. Traditionally, it has been higher for
men than for women and is positively correlated with education, which still prevailed after the
financial crisis. Long-term unemployment appears to be much less of an issue in Korea than in other
OECD countries.
Figure 5 illustrates the composition of unemployed workers by employment type of their
previous job. During the reference period, more than 60% of the unemployed were either temporary or
daily workers. This fact indicates the vulnerability of non-regular workers. After the financial crisis,
the income inequalities measured by the Gini index worsened (see Figure 6), mainly due to a higher
incidence of the unemployment of low-income earners and an increasing proportion of temporary and
daily workers.
/DERXUVKRUWDJH
Since the late 1980s, labour shortage for low-skilled workers has been one of the big issues
in Korea. As seen in Table 8, the average labour shortage rapidly increased from 1.8% in 1985 to 4.3%
in 1990. It was especially high for the low-skilled production workers in small firms. The following
paragraphs try to determine its causes.
On the employers side, labour shortage was due to overheated demand. The accelerated
economic growth over the 1986/88 period was the main reason for labour shortage in the
manufacturing sector. The average economic growth rate over those years reached 11.5% and
stabilised around 8/9% until 1996. On the supply side, the effects of entry on the market of the babyboomers (born between the late 1950s and the early 1960s) ended. This change in the population
structure implies that the labour shortage problem is not cyclical but structural.
The labour shortage, severe among blue-collar workers, small and medium-size firms and
unskilled and semi-skilled workers, forced the government to change its policy towards migrant
workers. Together with the overall tightening of the market, an important sectoral shift in employment
took place from manufacturing to services and construction. From 1989 to 1991, employment in
manufacturing increased at an average rate of only 1.9% while it increased in construction and
services (14.7% and 5.7% in average respectively) due to the two-million housing unit construction
project undertaken in 1989, a project that resulted in a transfer of workers from the manufacturing to
the construction industries.
The labour shortage problem of low-skilled workers has been solved through the use of
migrant workers. As shown in Figure 7, the labour shortage of production workers decreased when the
number of migrant workers went up.

306

'HYHORSPHQWRIDNQRZOHGJHEDVHGLQGXVWU\DQGVKRUWDJHRIKLJKO\VNLOOHGZRUNHUV
With the development of knowledge-based industries (KBI), the demand for highly skilled
workers is rapidly increasing in Korea. The Korea Labour Institute (2000) estimated the size of
employment in KBI according to the following definition: KBI industries have an R & D expenditure
greater than or equal to one third of their total revenue, a proportion of professional and technical
workers greater than or equal to 20% of the total number of their employees, the same proportion of
university or college graduate workers, and a minimum of 10% of science and technology-related
professional and technical workers. Table 9 shows the trend in employment in KBI, which increased
from 3 643 thousands in 1993 to 4 514 thousands in 1997, which corresponds to a 5.9% annual growth
rate. Due to the financial crisis in November 1997, the employment in KBI decreased to 4 449
thousands in 1998, but it began to recover to 4 493 thousands in 1999. It now accounts for one fourth
of total employment in the manufacturing 21.5% (968 000) of total KBI and service 78.5%
(3 524 thousands) sectors.
As shown in the Korean Labour Institute forecast (Tables 10 and 11), even though the
general employment growth rate is likely to decrease by 0.45% in the secondary sector, it will go up to
2.15% in the IT and high technologies manufacturing industries. In the service sector it was expected
to reach 2.4%, among which 2.6% in knowledge-based services.
The Korea Labour Institute surveyed 2 192 firms employing 10 employees or more in 2000
in order to get information about their employment plans for the years 2000-2005. According to Figure
8, the employment growth rate during 2000-2005 period will be much higher in knowledge-based
industries than in other industries, as will be the rate of highly skilled workers according to Figure 9.
Figure 10 forecasts a 5.2% employment growth rate in the IT field (in particular software industries),
which will be 2.5 times higher than the average rate in all industries.
The survey also announces severe labour shortage of IT and highly skilled workers
(according to 44.7% of the responding businesses). Forty-three thousands more workers were needed
in IT in 2000 and the additional labour shortage in IT industry up to the year 2005 is estimated at
142 000. In order to solve this problem, the government has increased the number of IT students in the
departments of universities and colleges (with a total supply of 200 000 per year). As there seems to
be a considerable skill mismatch in IT, it is not only the number of workers that urgently needs to be
increased, but also their skill level. In order to encourage foreign IT workers to come to Korea, the
government recently deregulated their immigration status.
7UHQGVDQGSROLFLHVLQPLJUDWLRQ
In 1998 and 1999, the government offered subsidies to employers who replaced migrant
workers by domestic workers, but very few employers applied to this programme. It seems that lower
wages keep away domestic workers even though they are unemployed. As a result, there was no
important change in immigration policies in 1998/99.
As the Korean economy began to recover, the number of migrant workers increased again in
1999. As of November 2001, there were 330 000 migrant workers (including trainees and
undocumented workers) which accounts for 1.5% of total employment and 2.4% of total employees.
Among the foreign workers in Korea, only 27 000 workers (8.2% of the total migrant labour force)
have received a work permit. Language teachers represent one third of them. It is to be expected that
the influx of migrant professionals will increase very fast as the government deregulated the
immigration policy on IT workers in 2000. The government also deregulated most of the foreign
307

investment policies immediately after the financial crisis, in an effort to attract into Korea more
professionals related to the foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.
Table 12 shows that the illegal immigration has recently increased very fast. As of
November, 2001, the number of undocumented migrant workers totalled about 251 000 (75.9% of all
migrant workers), of which about 51% came from China and another half were Chinese with a Korean
ascendance.
As of November 2001, there are 52 000 industrial trainees (15.9% of the total number of
migrant workers), who are employed in the medium-and small-size manufacturing firms as industrial
trainees, and in the big companies as overseas investment related trainees. The number of trainees had
also increased until 1997. After then it had once decreased in 1998 due to economic crisis, and
increased since 1999.
3ROLFLHVIRUXQVNLOOHGPLJUDQWZRUNHUV
The industrial training programme:
The Korean Immigration and Emigration Law does not allow unskilled foreign workers to
enter Korea for employment purposes, except in the case of industrial trainees. The only way to enter
Korea for the purpose of employment is to get a visa as an industrial trainee.
The globalisation of production of major Korean firms brought about a need to train foreign
workers from overseas branches in their Korean factories, who would go back to work in their
overseas branches. In November 1991, the government permitted this kind of training for one year.
This was the beginning of the industrial and technical training programme.
Introduced in November, 1993, this programme allows medium and small-size companies in
the manufacturing sector without factories abroad to employ foreigners as trainees. The Korean
Immigration and Emigration Law does not allow unskilled foreigners to enter Korea as employees. In
1996, the programme was broadened to include the fishing and construction sectors (in which trainees
are to return to their home countries after a maximum of three years).
The quota of industrial trainees was established at 20 000 in November, 1993, and it
gradually increased to 30 000 in September 1994, 50 000 in May 1995, 70 000 in February 1996, and
80 000 in July 1996. Industrial trainee visas are now allocated to 14 Asian countries. Minimum wage
is guaranteed to them and they are covered by the workers compensation and health insurance
systems. However, some labour rights such as the right to go on strike are not granted to them.
As the numbers of industrial trainees and undocumented workers keep augmenting, many
challenging issues have appeared. Firstly, an administrative one: A doubt grew as of the Korean
Federation of Small Business (KFSB)'s capacity to administer the fast increasing number of trainees,
LH to offer job orientation and industrial safety orientation upon entry. The second issue was that
many trainees either overstayed their visas or were found to move to other factories without
permission. This issue raised the need for a stronger scheme of regulation of the unskilled workers
immigration. As of November 2001, out of 114 327 migrant workers who had enter Korea as trainees,
61 869 people (54.1%) fled from the designated establishment.

308

:RUNSHUPLWDIWHUWUDLQLQJ
Even though industrial trainees are not treated as employees, the purpose of introducing the industrial
training system was to solve the shortage of unskilled workers. Therefore, they have to be protected as
workers (see Yoo and Lee, 2001; Lim and Seol, 2000, etc.). Many employers have asked the
government to expand the quota of industrial trainees, so much so that on April 1, 2000, the authorities
allowed industrial trainees to work as employees after two years of training. This is called work
permit after training. As of November 2001, 7 480 trainees have received a work permit-aftertraining and are allowed to work as documented workers.
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQRIWKHWUDLQLQJV\VWHP
The policies for foreign unskilled workers and the quota of foreign industrial trainees are
decided by the Committee for Foreign Workers Policy, which is chaired by the Prime Minister and
composed of related ministers. The administration of the training system, such as the selection of the
countries of origin and the quotas allocated to each country, is carried out by the Office for Small
Business of the government. The foreigners trainee system for manufacturing firms without foreign
affiliation is managed by the Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) with the aim of helping the
small manufacturing sector by supplying unskilled labour.
Companies have to deposit KW 300 000 per trainee to the KFSB, a deposit that has to be
given up if the trainee flees. Recruiting agencies also have to deposit USD 100 per trainee, which are
held by the KFSB while the trainee stays in Korea. However, quite a few foreign trainees leave their
companies, searching for higher wages.
5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHWUDLQLQJV\VWHP
On December 20, 2001, the Korean government announced a revision of the industrial
training system for unskilled foreign workers. Firstly, the period of employment after the training has
changed from two years training plus one years employment to one years training plus two
years employment in February 2002 which means that the total number of legal migrant workers
and trainees could increase even if the quota of trainees remains unchanged. Thus, the industrial
training system has taken its first step towards an employment permit system.
Secondly, in order to minimize the communication issues trainees may run into, only those
who passed a Korean language test are to enter the selection process.
Thirdly, in order to develop a more transparent selection process, trainees are randomly
chosen by computer among the pool of candidates. Until 2001, agents were selecting the trainees by
sending country. From 2002, however, their role is only advisory.
Fourthly, employers who abuse trainees or migrant workers see their quota of trainees and
migrant workers restricted or suppressed.
Fifthly, in an effort to encourage employment after training, the combination of a written test
and a letter of recommendation from a future employer has been replaced by an oral examination.
Lastly, the government is about to implement various measures to control and punish
undocumented migrant workers as well as their employers and brokers. The number of undocumented
309

migrant workers who escaped from training establishments will be taken into account in the quota of
trainees for each sending country.
$WWHPSWVDWLQWURGXFLQJDQHPSOR\PHQWSHUPLWV\VWHP
Since the mid-1990s, there have been attempts at introducing an official employment system
for migrant workers. In 2000, the government and the ruling party of Korea proposed a plan to turn the
current training system into an employment permit system, which they hoped would bring about a
better regulation of undocumented work.
However, because of a strong resistence on the part of employers, the plan has not been
implemented. As the number of undocumented foreign workers is rapidly increasing, it is very urgent
for Korea to reform the industrial training programme for foreign unskilled workers. According to a
survey done by the author, the proportion of employers who support the employment permit system
was only 39.6% among those employing industrial trainees. The share reaches 63.8% for those who do
not employ trainees and 63.6% for those who employ undocumented migrant workers (Yoo and Lee,
2001). Thus, most employers are in favour of the employment permit system, except for employers
currently employing industrial trainees.
3HQDOWLHVRQLOOHJDOPLJUDQWZRUNHUV
Any foreigner who stays in Korea after his/her visa expires is subject to a fine of up to KW 1
million. The Korean immigration authorities determine the fines according to the length of the
overstaying. Illegal foreign workers also have to pay for their return trip to their home countries.
Korean employers who hire illegal foreign workers are also subject to penalties. In October,
1996, the government toughened these sanctions in order to reduce the growing number of illegal
foreign workers. They can be imprisoned for up to three years (one year before October, 1996) or be
given a fine of up to KW 10 million (KW 5 million before October, 1996). They also have to pay the
cost of the return trip of their foreign employees if they cannot afford it.
From January to March, 1998, the government has offered an amnesty programme to those
who reported to the authorities; they were allowed to leave the country without paying fines. About
53 000 undocumented foreign workers left Korea under this programme so that their number
decreased from 148 048 in 1997 to 102 489 in 1998. Many foreign trainees lost their jobs. From
January to November 1997, 589 companies gave up 2 024 trainees, while 4 050 foreign trainees in
1 226 companies left their training companies from December 1997 to March 1998 (Park, 1998).
3ROLFLHVIRUVNLOOHGPLJUDQWZRUNHUV
The globalisation of the economy brought about an increasing demand for foreign
professionals who could transfer their knowledge, skills and technologies to the Korean people.
Furthermore, the free mobility of highly skilled workers provides a basis for the promotion of foreign
investments. The government revised the Immigration and Emigration Law in 2000 to make things
easier for foreign professionals and technicians wishing to work in Korea, who are now allowed to
stay for an almost unlimited period of time. Procedures were simplified so as to issue the visas
quickly. This open door policy to the professionals will be strengthened in the near future, as onestep service will be provided and the acquisition of nationality will be eased.
310

Until March 31, 2000, registered migrant workers were all professional and technical
workers such as professors, researchers and entertainers. The visa status of documented foreign
workers are divided into eight categories: professors (E-1), language teaching (E-2), research (E-3),
technology instruction (E-4), professional jobs (E-5), entertainment (E-6), specific activities (E-7), and
employment after training (E-8).
&RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
The government has tried to find more transparent methods to select migrant workers
abroad. For this purpose, cooperation between sending and receiving countries and bilateral
agreements are essential.
The recovery of the economy after the financial crisis and the sharp increase in
undocumented immigration have brought about the issue of immigration again. In order to reduce
illegal immigration of workers and develop an efficient employment and management system for
migrant workers, Korea has tried to introduce the employment permit system, upon which, however, it
has been difficult to get a national consensus to this day. Nevertheless, more and more people are
agreeing that there is no other way to solve this issue. The changes in the industrial training system in
December 2001 are the starting point of an in-depth reform of migration policies in Korea.

311

5()(5(1&(6

KANG, S.D. (1996),Globalisation of the Labour Market: Foreign Labour Issues in Korea, Korea
Labour Institute, September 6.
KOREA LABOUR INSTITUTE (1998), ./,/DERXU6WDWLVWLFV.
KOREA LABOUR INSTITUTE (2000), The Demand and Supply of Labour in the Knowledge-based
Industries.
LIM, H. and SEOL, D. (2000), Designing Employment Permit System for Korea, Ministry of Labour.
MINISTRY OF LABOUR (each year), Employment Forecasting Survey.
PARK, Y.B. (1998),Financial Crisis and Foreign Workers in Korea, unpublished paper, July.
UH, S. (1998), Immigration and Labour Market Issues in Korea, Workshop on International
Migration and Labour Markets in Asia, 29 and 30 January, Japan Institute of Labour.
YOO, K.S. (1998), Financial Crisis and foreign Workers in Korea, Korea Labour Institute.
YOO, K.S. and LEE, K.Y. (2001), Employment Practice of Migrant Workers and Policy Options for
Korea, Korea Labour Institute.

312

Table 1.6XPPDU\VWDWLVWLFVRIWKH.RUHDQHFRQRP\

<HDU

*'3JURZWK
5DWH

,QIODWLRQ



7UDGHVXUSOXV
3HUFDSLWD*1,
86'LQ
86GROODU
ELOOLRQ


1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

10.5
7.1
6.1
5.7
9.0
8.6
9.2
9.7
5.4
6.2
5.5
4.8
8.3
6.2
8.9
4.5
6.8
4.9
5.0
4.5
-6.7
7.5
10.9
0.8
8.8
2.3
6RXUFH: Department of Finance and Economy.

4 268
5 185
5 886
6 810
7 183
7 811
8 998
10,823
11 380
10,307
6 723
8 551
9.628


6HUYLFHVHFWRU
(PSOR\PHQW



14.2
5.1
-2.2
-8.3
-3.9
1.0
-3.8
-8.5
-23.0
-8.2
40.4
24.5
11.0

50.9
52.3
54.4
56.4
58.5
61.0
62.5
63.4
65.8
67.6
68.0
68.6
69.0

Table 2.3RSXODWLRQVWUXFWXUHRI.RUHD


0LG\HDUHVWLPDWHG
SRSXODWLRQWKRXVDQGV
7RWDO
0DOH
)HPDOH

1980
38 124
19 236
1985
40,806
20,576
1986
41 214
20,772
1987
41 622
20,960
1988
42 031
21 155
1989
42 449
21 357
1990
42 869
21 568
1991
43 296
21 784
1992
43 748
22 014
1993
44 195
22 243
1994
44 642
22 472
1995
45 093
22 705
1996p
45 545
22 939
1997p
45 991
23 170
1998p
46 430
23 396
1999p
46 858
23 671
2000P
47.275
23 831
6RXUFH: National Statistical Office.

3RSXODWLRQVWUXFWXUH


18 888
20,230
20,442
20,662
20,876
21 092
21 301
21 512
21 734
21 952
22 169
22 388
22 606
22 821
23 033
23 241
23 443

34.0
30.2
29.2
28.2
27.3
26.5
25.6
25.3
24.7
24.3
23.9
23.4
22.9
22.4
22.0
21.8
21.6

313


62.2
65.6
66.4
67.3
68.0
68.6
69.3
69.5
70.0
70.2
70.4
70.7
71.1
71.3
71.4
71.4
71.2

3RS*URZWK
5DWH


3.8
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.7
4.8
5.1
5.2
5.4
5.5
5.7
5.9
6.1
6.3
6.6
6.8
7.1

1.57
0.99
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.04
1.02
1.01
1.01
1.00
0.98
0.95
0.92
0.89

Table 3.0DMRUHPSOR\PHQWLQGLFDWRUVDJHGDQGRYHU



(FRQRPLF$FWLYLW\
8QHPSOR\PHQW
/DERXU
Economically
8QHPSOR\PHQW
)RUFH
(PSOR\HG 8QHPSOR\HG
Active
5DWH
WKRXVDQGV
WKRXVDQGV
3DUWLFLSDWLR
Population

(thousands
Q5DWH

1995
20,853
61.9
1996
21 243
62.0
1997
21 662
62.2
1998
21 456
60.7
1999
21 634
60.5
2000
21 950
60.7
2001 1/4
21 432
58.9
2/4
22 468
61.7

22 426
61.4
6RXUFH: Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Office.

20,432
20,817
21 106
19 994
20,281
21 061
20,403
21 677
21 694

420
426
556
1 420
1 353
889
1 029
791
732

2.0
2.0
2.6
6.8
6.3
4.1
4.8
3.5
3.3

Table 4.,QGXVWU\FRPSRVLWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQW


$

0 0

0

1980
34.0
22.5
21.6
43.5
1985
24.9
24.4
23.4
50.6
1990
17.9
27.6
27.2
54.5
1995
11.7
22.6
22.5
65.7
1997
11.3
21.4
21.2
67.3
1998
12.4
19.6
19.5
68.0
1999
11.6
19.9
19.8
68.6
2000
10.9
20.2
20.2
68.9
2001. 2/4
11.2
19.5
19.4
67.0
A: Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry.
M & M: Mining and Manufacturing.
M: Manufacturing.
S: Service Secto.r
C: Construction.
W: Wholesale, Retail, Repair, Hotels and Restaurants.
E: Electricity, Transport, Storage and Financial Service.
R: Real Estate and Other Services.
6RXUFH: Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Office.

&

6HUYLFH
:

6.2
6.1
7.4
9.5
9.5
8.9
7.3
7.5
7.5

19.2
22.6
21.8
27.1
27.5
27.9
28.2
28.2
26.2

(
7.3
8.7
10.7
9.3
9.5
10.0
9.8
9.8
9.5

5
10.9
13.3
14.6
19.8
20.9
22.3
23.3
23.4
23.8

Table 5.2FFXSDWLRQDOFRPSRVLWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQW

/HJLVODWRUV
0DQDJHUV 
$VVRFLDWH
3URIHVVLRQDOV

&OHUNV

6HUYLFH 
6DOHV

1994
15.4
12.2
21.6
1995
16.3
12.3
21.9
1996
17.0
12.3
22.5
1997
17.5
12.2
23.1
1998
18.7
12.1
23.7
1999
19.0
10.9
23.8
2000
18.8
11.2
23.9
2001. 2/4
18.6
11.8
26.1
6RXUFH: Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Office.

314

$JULFXOWXUDO 
)LVKHU\:RUNHUV

0DFKLQH
2SHUDWRUV
$VVHPEOHUV 
0DQXDO/DERXUHUV

13.0
11.7
11.1
10.8
11.8
10.9
10.2
10.6

37.8
37.7
37.1
36.5
33.7
35.3
36.0
32.9

Table 6.&RPSRVLWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQWE\HPSOR\PHQWW\SH



:DJH:RUNHU




5HJXODU  7HPSRUDU\ 



'DLO\ 

1RQ:DJH:RUNHU
6HOI
8QSDLGIDPLO\
HPSOR\HG
ZRUNHU

1990
60.5
32.8
17.5
10.2
39.5
28.0
11.4
1992
61.0
34.8
16.9
9.3
39.0
28.5
10.5
1994
61.9
35.8
17.2
8.9
38.1
27.8
10.2
1996
62.8
35.6
18.5
8.7
37.2
27.9
9.3
1997
62.7
33.9
19.8
9.0
37.3
28.3
9.0
1998
61.0
32.3
20.0
8.7
39.0
28.9
10.1
1999
61.7
29.8
20.6
11.3
38.3
28.8
9.5
2000
62.4
29.7
21.4
11.3
37.6
28.5
9.1
2001. 2/4
62.2
30.3
21.4
10.5
37.8
28.8
9.0
Notes:
1. Regular Worker: Worker whose contract term is either one year or more, or does not have any specific term.
2. Temporary Worker: Worker whose contract term is shorter than one year but longer than or equal to one month.
3. Daily Worker: Worker whose contract term is less than one month.
6RXUFH: Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Office.

Table 7.&RPSRVLWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQWE\JHQGHUDJHDQGHGXFDWLRQ

7RWDO







Male
63.2
67.3
Female
36.8
32.7
15 19
7.6
5.9
20 29
48.7
36.0
30 39
20.5
24.6
Age
40 49
13.1
19.2
50 59
7.2
11.1
60 and over
2.7
3.2
Education
Middle school &
21.4
28.1
below
High school
55.2
52.4
Undergraduate
23.6
19.5
and over
6RXUFH: Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Office.
Gender

315










67.3
32.3
6.3
33.4
24.2
20.4
12.0
3.6

67.1
32.9
6.9
35.2
22.9
21.0
10.6
3.3

66.4
33.6
6.6
36.9
22.1
20.6
10.9
3.0

27.3

26.1

23.5

52.7
20.0

51.0
22.9

48.9
27.6

Table 8.7UHQGVLQODERXUVKRUWDJHUDWLR
















Average

4.3

3.6

3.7

2.4

0.6

1.0

1.2

By type of worker
- Clerical Worker
- Production Worker

1.3
6.9

1.8
6.0

1.8
5.8

1.2
3.5

0.4
1.0

0.6
1.6

0.7
2.0

By Skill Level of
Production Worker
- Highly Skilled
- Low Skilled

5.3
16.2

5.1
14.7

5.0
11.4

3.3
12.6

0.8
2.6

By Firm Size
- 10.29
- 30-99
- 100-299
- 300-499
- 500 or more

8.0
5.1
4.7
3.3
1.8

4.4
5.0
4.2
2.2
1.7

5.8
5.0
4.2
2.2
1.4

3.7
2.9
2.7
1.4
0.8

1.2
0.7
0.7
0.3
0.1

1.8
1.0
0.9
0.5
0.1

1.8
1.3
1.2
0.6
0.3

Note: Labour shortage by skill level is not published from 1999.

Source: Ministry of Labour, Employment Forecasting Survey, each year.

Table 9.7UHQGLQHPSOR\PHQWLQNQRZOHGJHEDVHGLQGXVWULHV
(thousands, %)








Total Employment in
Manufacturing and
Service Industry

16 426 (100.0)

18 693(100.0)

17 766 (100.0)

Employment in KBI
Manufacturing
Service

3 643 (22.2)
965 ( 5.9)
2 677 (16.3)

4 514 (24.2)
1 061 ( 5.7)
3 452 (18.5)

4 493 (25.3)
968 ( 5.5)
3 524 (19.9)

Note : Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of employment out of total employment in the manufacturing
and service sectors.
6RXUFH : Korea Labour Institute (2000).

316

Table 10.(PSOR\PHQWIRUHFDVWLQJLQPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXVWU\E\VNLOOOHYHO
(thousands, %)








IT & Highly
Skilled

1 516
(36.0)
1 065
(25.3)
1 630
(38.7)
4 213
(100)

1 728
(39.4)
1 079
(24.6)
1 579
(36.0)
4 388
(100)

1 877
(42.6)
1 027
(23.3)
1 502
(34.1)
4 406
(100)

Semi-Skilled
Low-Skilled
Total

$QQXDO*URZWK
5DWH
2.15
-0.37
-0.81
0.45

6RXUFH : Korea Labour Institute(2000).

Table 11.(PSOR\PHQWIRUHFDVWLQVHUYLFHLQGXVWU\E\VNLOOOHYHO
(thousands, %)



Knowledge-based
Service

4 050
(26.4)
11 291
Other Service
(73.6)
15 341
Total
(100.0)
6RXUFH : Korea Labour Institute (2000).





4 637
(26.8)
12 667
(73.2)
17 304
(100.0)

5 235
(26.9)
14 226
(73.1)
19 461
(100.0)

$QQXDO
*URZWK5DWH
2.60
2.34
2.40

Table 12.0LJUDQWZRUNHUVLQ.RUHDE\YLVDVWDWXV
<HDU

7RWDO

/HJDOVWD\
VXEWRWDO

(PSOR\HG

7UDLQHHV

1992. 12
1993. 12
1994. 12
1995. 12
1996. 12
1997. 12
1998. 12
1999. 12
2000. 12
2001. 11

73 868
(100
0)
66 919
(100
0)
81,824
(100
0)
128 906
(100
0)
210 494
(100
0)
245 399
(100
0)
157 689
(100
0)
217 384
(100
0)
285 506
(100
0)
330 194
(100 0)

8 340
(11
3)
12 411
(18
5)
33 593
(41
0)
47 040
(36
5)
81,440
(38
7)
97 351
(39
7)
58 152
(36
9)
82 046
(37
7)
96 511
(33
8)
79 438
(24 1)

3 395
(4
6)
3 767
(5
6)
5 265
(6
4)
8 228
(6
13 4)
420
(6
15 4)
900
(6
5)
11,143
(7
12 1)
592
(5
19 8)
063
(6
26 7)
980
(8 2)

4 945
(6
7)
8 644
(12
9)
28 328
(34
6)
38 812
(30
1)
68 020
(32
3)
81,451
(33
2)
47 009
(29
8)
69 454
(31
9)
77 448
(27
1)
52 458
(15 9)

6RXUFH: Ministry of Justice.

317

,OOHJDOVWD\
65 528
(88
7)
54 508
(81
5)
48 231
(58
9)
81,866
(63
129 5)
054
(61
148 3)
048
(60
3)
99 537
(63
135 1)
338
(62
188 3)
995
(66
250 2)
756
(75 9)

Figure 1. *URZWKUDWHVRIQRPLQDODQGUHDOZDJH


Figure 2.8QHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVE\JHQGHU

318

Figure 3. 8QHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVE\DJH

Figure 4.,QFLGHQFHRIORQJWHUPXQHPSOR\PHQW

319

Figure 5.&RPSRVLWLRQRIXQHPSOR\PHQWE\HPSOR\PHQWW\SHRISUHYLRXVMRE

Figure 6.7UHQGVLQ*LQL,QGH[

320

Figure 7. /DERXUVKRUWDJHRISURGXFWLRQZRUNHUVDQGXQVNLOOHGPLJUDQWZRUNHUV

321

Figure 8.(PSOR\PHQWJURZWKUDWHE\LQGXVWU\

(in %)
6RXUFH : Korea Labour Institute (2000).

Figure 9.(PSOR\PHQWJURZWKUDWHE\RFFXSDWLRQ

LQ

6RXUFH : Korea Labour Institute (2000).

322

Figure 10.$QQXDOHPSOR\PHQWJURZWKUDWHLQ,7DQGUHODWHGLQGXVWU\

(in %)

13.5

15.0

10.0
5.2

4.7

5.0

4.1

3.2

4.9

0.0
IT

IT Service

IT Machinery

S/W

Industry(Total)

IT related
Industry


6RXUFH : Korea Labour Institute (2000).

323

Total

(&2120,&6/2:'2:1$1',76,03$&721&52661$7,21$/
0,*5$7,21$1'32/,&<21$/,(1(03/2<0(17,10$/$<6,$
E\
$]L]DK.DVVLP
University of Malaya
,QWURGXFWLRQ
Malaysia entered the first year of the second millennium with cautious optimism. Although
the economy has fully recovered from the 1997 financial crisis and has grown steadily for seven
subsequent quarters, the government was apprehensive of prevailing economic slowdown among its
major trading partners and the possible impacts this may have on the economy. Tabling the 2001
budget in Parliament in October 2000, the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Finance,
predicted a single digit GDP growth of 7% for 2001 compared to 7.5 % for the previous year
(Economic Report 2000/01, p. 7). The worse than expected performance of the global economy and
subsequent external events, in particular, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States,
made this target impossible to achieve. The GDP charted negative growth by the end of the third
quarter of 2001.
In this paper the author outlines some of the major features of the Malaysian domestic
economy for 2001 and the impact of the economic slowdown on employment, cross-national workers
and on the countrys policy on the hiring of foreign nationals.
'RPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGODERXUPDUNHW
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHGRPHVWLFHFRQRP\
The sluggish industrial economy, especially of Malaysias major trading partners the
United States, Japan, the European Union and Singapore had an adverse effect on Malaysian
economy. The depressed external demand, especially for electronic goods, which account for half of
Malaysias exports, not only led to a sharp decline in manufacturing output, it also caused slower
growth in other sectors. However, the decline in manufacturing is offset by better performance in
agriculture, construction and services.
To reduce the adverse impact of the fall in external demand, the government introduced
fiscal and monetary stimuli to boost internal demand, both in the private and public sectors. In March
2001, the government announced a pre-emptive package of RM3 billion to increase public expenditure
and again in September, another RM4.3 billion. This is to be disbursed for the purposes of, among
others, infra-structural development, construction of low-cost and medium-cost housing, building of
schools, community colleges, four universities and small rural projects [1HZ6WUDLWVWLPHV (Business),
10 November 2001]. This accounts for the rise in performance of the construction/real estate sector.
In addition to public investment, steps were taken to increase disposable incomes and
encourage public consumption by both tax and non-tax measures (Economic Report 2001/02, pp. 1718). The former includes higher tax rebates which are designed to benefit 1.25 million tax payers, thus
placing RM 434 million into the hands of tax payers. The latter includes a reduction in Employees
325

Provident Fund contribution from 11 to 9% of the employees basic pay, removal of tax on credit
cards, and for civil servants the introduction of a number of extra perks. To encourage the sale of
automobiles, civil servants are allowed to apply for car loans every five years instead of seven years.
Similarly, to stimulate the sale of properties, their housing loan eligibility is increased, and they are
given exemption of tax duty in sale and purchase of properties, loans and transfer agreements,
exemption of processing fee for purchase of completed properties by the end of 2001. In addition, the
government also gave additional critical allowance for doctors, nurses, headmasters and school
principals; incentive and meal allowances for personnel of armed forces and the police; and half a
month bonus to be paid before the end of 2001, which released another RM 700 million to civil
servants.
While public expenditure and consumption may have helped boost the economy, private
sector investment and consumption remain weak. As a result the economy continues to slide as
evidenced by the GDP growth, which fell to 3% at the end of the first quarter, far below the forecast
figure of 7%. At the end of the second quarter, it went down further to 0.5% (%DQN1HJDUD4XDUWHUO\
%XOOHWLQ, 2001, p. 77). By the end of the third quarter, growth was negative. The economic slowdown
has repercussions on employment.
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQGRPHVWLFHPSOR\PHQW
Employment remains largely in the private sector, which accounts for about 90% of jobs in
the country for the last two years. It is in this sector that job expansion is expected to take place.
However, in view of the economic slowdown, employment increase was minimal, LH around 1.5%
until 2001 (see Table 2). Such expansion exhibits three major features. Firstly, employment in the
agricultural, forestry and fishing sector continues to decline, a persistent trend since 1997. Secondly,
growth in manufacturing fell drastically from 9.2% in 2000 to 0.6% in 2001. Thirdly, the real estate
sector charted the highest growth rate at 3.6% due mainly to the fiscal measures alluded to earlier.
Contribution of the various economic sectors to employment, as shown in Table 2.1 follows
a somewhat similar pattern as in 2000. Manufacturing continues to be the major contributor to
employment, accounting for 27.4%; followed by wholesale, retail trade, hotel and restaurants (17.4%);
agriculture, forestry and fishing (14.8%); and government services (10.6%). Mining remains the
lowest contributor with 0.4%.
8QHPSOR\PHQWDQGUHWUHQFKPHQW
The rate of unemployment rose by 0.8% to 3.9% in 2001. The increase causes some concern;
however, it is not considered a serious problem yet and Malaysia claims to be in a state of full
employment. The increase in unemployment is believed to be largely a function of two types of
mismatch. Firstly, jobs are not located where pools of labour are, and secondly, available jobs are not
those required by job seekers, thereby giving credence to the accusation made by some employers
government bureaucrats and politicians that Malaysians are too choosy about their jobs.
As shown in Table 2.2D, there has in fact been a slight increase (0.9%) in job vacancies
between July 2000 and July 2001. However, the number of active registrants declined by 6.3%.1 Over
60% of job vacancies in 2001 are in the state of Sarawak in East Malaysia, where the population is
small and where the relatively low level of industrial and infra-structural development makes the state
less attractive to job seekers. Other states with substantial job vacancies are in the Peninsula, LH in
1

Not everyone who is unemployed is registered at the Manpower Department. The tables mentioned
must be used only as an indication of the state of unemployment in Malaysia.

326

Selangor (5.9%), Johor (5.8%), Pulau Pinang (3.7%), and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur
(3.1%). These states are more developed and industrialised and Kuala Lumpur is the centre for
administration and commerce.2
A comparison between Table 2.2D and Table 2.2E reveals a change in the number of active
registrants and new vacancies between July and October 2001 and this change reflects the negative
GDP growth by the end of the third quarter. The number of active registrants increased while that of
new job vacancies plummeted from 70 394 in July 2001 to 13 081, a decline of over 81% in three
months. Compared to October 2000, the number of registrants increased by 2.7% and new jobs fell by
15.8%.
Table 2.3 provides an indication of job shortage and job mismatch in the country. In October
2001, there were 13 031 job vacancies as opposed to 35 042 registered job seekers. Around 74.6%
(9 770) of vacancies were in the production and related category, but the number of registered job
seekers with interest in such employment was only 7 916, thus creating a labour deficit of over 1 954.
The most sought after jobs were and still are in the clerical category over 16 230 registrants vie for
677 vacancies. Other jobs with high demand are in the professional/technical and
administrative/management categories. The least popular jobs are still in the agricultural sector.
Economic slowdown, especially in the manufacturing sector, has led to a number of
retrenchment due to closures, restructuring, re-location to other countries or to other states in
Malaysia, reduction in production, sale of companies and to the shift from manual to automation. In
July 2001, a total of 32 339 workers were retrenched and by the following December, the number rose
to 36 404, an increase of around 28% from the previous year. Over 87% of the retrenched were
Malaysians and more than 54% were women. Retrenchment was highest in the manufacturing sector
(75.5%). followed by wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurants (6.6%). The worst affected were the
unskilled and semi-skilled category (44.3%), and the least in sales (1.9%) and agriculture (2.1%)
(/DSRUDQ5LQJNDV, KSM, 11 December 2001).
:DJHLQFUHDVH
Due to the poor performance of the economy and rising retrenchment, wage pressure is
subdued. However, wage increase in the private sector was affected through 200 collective wage
agreements which benefited a total of 57 047 workers. Average wage increase was 6.3%, 1.7% less
than 2000. The highest increase took place in the services and transportation, storage and
communication sectors, and the lowest in mining and quarrying. In the utilities sector (electricity, gas
and water) wages remained stagnant (see Table 2.4). The increase, especially in export oriented
manufacturing, is causing concern as it may lead to high production costs which, in turn, will make
Malaysian products less competitive on the world market.
As this wage increase involves only 6.6% of the Malaysian workforce, it does not reflect the
actual situation of wage movement in the country. Public service employees, who comprise 10.6 % of
the workforce, did not enjoy any pay-rise in 2001 and had to be content with an annual bonus of half a
month pay, which was 50% below what they received in 2000.

The administrative center for Malaysia has been shifted in stages from Kuala Lumpur to Putra Jaya
since 2000.

327

0LJUDWLRQ
According to the latest Malaysian population census carried out in 2000, the foreign
population in Malaysia was over 1.38 million, accounting for around 5.9% of the total population of
over 23.27 million (see Table 3). It is unclear if the census includes illegal immigrants in the country;
if not, the number of immigrants must be much higher.
As shown in Table 3, the foreign population is unevenly distributed across the country with
more than half of the alien population residing in the East Malaysian states of Sarawak, Sabah and the
Federal Territory of Labuan. The two latter states have a combined total of over 620 000 foreigners.
Foreigners account for over 23.6% of Sabahs population and 21.6% of Labuans. In 2001, the number
of foreigners in the country may have increased.
The 2000 census also reveals that a substantial portion (over 23%) of the foreign population
is not in the economically active age group. Over 20% are below 14 years of age and 3% above the
Malaysian mandatory retirement age of 55 years. Thus only around 1.07 million are in the
economically active age group and of these, only about 80% are registered as legal workers in 2001.
The rest, around 200 000 are either unemployed or working illegally.
)RUHLJQZRUNHUVDQGHPSOR\PHQW
Foreign workers are allowed to work at the top level of the occupational hierarchy where
local expertise is not available and at the very bottom, in jobs shunned by Malaysians. The former, the
expatriates SHJDZDL GDJDQJ) and the latter, the semi-skilled/unskilled category SHNHUMD DVLQJ are
subjected to two different sets of rules and regulations and administered by separate bodies. It is
difficult to determine the exact number of these workers in any particular year as the number of
workers fluctuates daily due to new intake and termination of contracts.
7KHVHPLVNLOOHGDQGXQVNLOOHGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
Figure 3.1, which refers to those in the semi-skilled and unskilled category, offers estimates
which have been collected from various official sources, such as the Ministry of Human Resource, the
Department of Immigration, the Ministry of Home Affairs and FOMEMA (the medical body entrusted
with the medical examination of foreign workers). It must be emphasised at the outset that very often
figures given by different sources or by the same source at different times, are not in conformity with
each other.
Based on the estimate in Table 3.1, in July 2001, there were over 807 000 legally employed
semi/unskilled alien workers in Malaysia. The number seems to have declined by 45% between 1997
and 2000 due largely to measures taken by the government to reduce foreign workers in the wake of
the financial crisis. However, by July 2001, their number appears to be on the rise again in spite of the
sluggish economic growth.
In the Peninsula, over 89% of the 691 032 foreign population are legally employed; in Sabah
and the Federal Territory of Labuan, the percentage of working population is very low, LH over
15.7%, thus raising question about the status of the rest of the population. In the state of Sarawak, the
situation is even more puzzling. The number of foreign workers, LH 88 120, far exceeds the total
number of foreigners (62 738) in the country as shown in the 2000 population census.
Table 3.2 shows the nationalities and job sectors of the foreign workers in 2001. The
Indonesian presence remains predominant; they form over 73.6% of the total legal foreign work force.
328

In spite of the ban on the recruitment of Bangladeshis except for exceptional cases (NHVWHUWHQWX
NKDV) imposed in the later half of the nineties, their number is still relatively high (17.5%). The
involvement of other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries is minimal, the
largest being the Philippines with 1.9%. The others category covers a range of countries such as
Myanmar, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and India.
Foreign nationals are engaged in several job sectors as designated by the government
manufacturing (especially in export-oriented factories), plantations, domestic and other services and
construction. Manufacturing is the largest user (30%) of foreign workers followed by plantations
(25.5%) and domestic services (20.4%). The term plantation is a misnomer as it also often includes
aqua-culture and animal husbandry. Except for domestic services, job types in each sector are varied
and so is the level of remuneration.
([SDWULDWHV
The number of expatriates is estimated at around 31 949 in November 2001, a decline of
over 20% (2000: 40 221). Expatriate workers can be recruited from any country, except Israel and
Montenegro; hence, expatriates in Malaysia come from about 107 countries. But the majority (around
70%), as shown in Table 3.3, are from Asian countries, in particular Japan and India. The prominence
of the Japanese is due mainly to their relatively large investment in the country and that of the Indians
to their expertise in the information and communication technologies (ICT). The latter is preferred to
other ICT experts as they do not demand what many calls excessive pay by Malaysian standards.
The number of expatriates from developed western nations is relatively small due to the large pay
differentials for management, administrative and technical expertise between these countries and
Malaysia as well as the low value of the Malaysian ringgit.
In terms of job sectors, most of the expatriates are in manufacturing (46.1%) followed by
services (36.4%) and construction (5.4%). In manufacturing, they are generally top management
officers in multi-national companies owned by their nationals or highly-skilled technicians with
competency in maintenance and repair of production equipment. In the service sector, they are
engaged in a variety of jobs, from bankers and consultants to highly qualified medical and nursing
experts. Expatriates, especially those who work for Malaysian organisations, are expected to affect
technology transfer to local workers by training their understudy so that on their departure Malaysians
can replace them. This, however, is seldom done.
(PLJUDQWVDQGHPSOR\PHQWSDWWHUQV
As evidenced by studies of migration experts in other countries, such as Hugo (2001), Iguchi
(2001), Mani (1995), Tsay (1995), and Sazaki (1990), to name just a few, thousands of Malaysians
reside and work overseas. Various newspaper reports also provide information on them. For example,
a national daily reveals that about 40 000 Malaysians are employed in neighbouring Singapore in
2001, engaged mainly in manufacturing, construction, ship-building and domestic services (%HULWD
+DULDQ, 26 July 2001). A large number are commuters travelling to and from the Republic everyday.
Some have now been retrenched. Another report in a local daily shows that around 2 500 Malaysians
are working in Papua New Guinea (7KH%RUQHR3RVW, 28 June 2001). In spite of the large number of its
citizens abroad, Malaysia neither keeps records on emigrants nor monitors their employment activities.
Most Malaysians working overseas went initially either as students or tourists. In the latter case, they
overstayed and work illegally in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. The former are most likely to work,
after their graduation, in skilled and professional jobs.

329

The Malaysian government is fully aware of the large presence of its nationals overseas and
is keen to lure some to return, in particular those with expertise very much needed in Malaysia. To
achieve this, the Ministry of Human Resources initiated a special programme in 1999, referred to in
short as the Expatriate Programme, offering a number of incentives for those who return, which
include tax exemption on personal effects (such as two luxury cars) brought in, permanent resident
status for foreign wives and children within six months of their return, etc. Until December 2001, there
were only 393 applications and of these only 127 were approved.3 Most of the applicants, with
expertise and experience in finance, ICT, medicine and others, are from the United States of America,
United Kingdom, Australia, Hongkong and Canada. These applications are subjected to close scrutiny
to avoid possible abuse. There is no equivalent programme to woo back the unskilled and semi-skilled
workers abroad.
,OOHJDOLPPLJUDWLRQ
The terms illegal immigrants, as officially defined in Malaysia, as alluded to by the author
in an earlier paper (Kassim, 2001E), refer to over-stayers, contract defaulters, pass abusers,
undocumented workers and their non-working retainers (children, etc.). Their number is difficult to
determine. The only way to evaluate it is to examine official records of their arrest, apprehension and
detention. Table 4 shows that over 2.25 million illegal aliens have been identified and apprehended
under the various programmes and operations carried out by the relevant authorities between 1992 and
2001. These figures represent only a fraction of their total number, as it is generally believed that not
all illegal aliens are apprehended and that for every one apprehended there may be one or two who got
away.
As indicated in Table 4, since 1992, many programmes have been devised to identify and
apprehend illegal immigrants which include the establishment of Ops Nyah I and Ops Nyah II,
voluntary repatriation scheme, regularisation exercises; and, since year 2000, keeping tabs on runaway contract workers and those with expiry work permits. Of these, the most important are Ops Nyah
I and Ops Nyah II. Both are on-going operations, the former to stop illegal incursion at the sea and
land borders and the latter to root out illegals already in the country. The activities of these
programmes seem to be inversely related with the state of the economy; in lean times their activities
are accentuated and more illegals are apprehended and sent back. Conversely, when the economy is
doing well, only Ops Nyah I and Ops Nyah II are in operation. Since 1997, the number of arrests made
under the Ops Nyah exercises has increased. Between January and November 2001, around
87 461 illegals were nabbed under Ops Nyah II, an increase of over 11% from the previous year.
Heightened activities under Ops Nyah II partly account for the low number of arrests at the border
under Ops Nyah I, LH around 9 103, which is lower than the previous year. Foreigners may be
reluctant to enter illegally if they know their chances of being arrested on Malaysian soil are high.
It must be stressed, however, that the activities under Ops Nyah I and Ops Nyah II are
constrained by a number of factors. Of these, the most important are the limited space at the
13 immigration detention camps in the country and bureaucratic delays caused by official
representatives of the respective countries of origin in processing and identifying the detainees before
they could be given travel papers for deportation.
In terms of job distribution, illegally recruited and undocumented foreign workers are
engaged in similar jobs as the legally recruited workers. However, they are more likely to be employed
in jobs that are performed in areas not easily accessible by enforcement officers, such as in large
3

Interview with Puan Rohani Abdullah, Ministry of Human Resources, Putra Jaya, on 3 January 2002.

330

estates in remote areas, in construction or domestic services, or as cooks in restaurants. Illegally

recruited and undocumented foreign workers are preferred by some unscrupulous employers because
they are captive workers and are cheaper to hire than legal ones. Some illegal and undocumented
foreign workers are also self-employed, especially in petty trading.
5HPLWWDQFHVWRKRPHFRXQWULHV
For 2001, no official estimates on remittances by foreign workers in Malaysia to their
homeland are available. The only mention of such remittances in official documents accessible to the
author is inthe Economic Report 2001-2002 which makes a very general reference to the subject. The
report states, [] while the transfers account deficit continue to widen as a result of higher
remittance by foreign workers (p. 32). In earlier years, official estimates put the amount at
RM 4.1 billion in 1994, RM 6 billion in 1997, and RM 3.2 billion in 1998. No estimates are available
for the subsequent years and in view of the above statement, one can only assume the amount is
higher than RM 3.2 billion. As these estimates are based on transactions made through official
channels, they represent only a fraction of the transfers actually made. It is widely known that foreign
workers, especially from Indonesia, have their informal mode of sending money home to serve
families who have no access to banking facilities in the home country.
Malaysia also receive remittances from its workers abroad. In the state of Johor, for example,
the Chief Minister of the state is reported to have said that Malaysians from Johor working in
Singapore bring in about RM 336 million a year (%HULWD+DULDQ, 26 July 2001). No official estimates
on remittances from other countries are available, probably because the amount concern would be very
low. 
6RFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQHUV
As alluded to in my earlier papers (Kassim, 2000 and 2001E), Malaysia views the
employment of foreign workers as a temporary measure and as such has no specific plans to integrate
these workers with the local population. However, their integration, LH their rights at the workplace
and access to social amenities and interactions with the locals will be discussed here.
x

7KH XQVNLOOHGVHPLVNLOOHG FDWHJRU\. In theory, this category of workers, subject to

contract signed between them and their respective employers, are to enjoy the same
wages and benefits as local workers. But as explained in the earlier papers (Kassim, 2000
and 2001b) the implementation of such rights leaves much to be desired due to a number
factors, chief of which is poor enforcement. However, they are not allowed to participate
in unions and their employers are no longer required to make contributions to the
Employees Provident Fund (EPF)4 for them, a scheme which is mandatory for local
workers. Common complaints by foreign workers lodged at the Manpower Department
include sub-standard housing, inadequate medical facilities, non-payment of wages,
denial of paid leave and right to overtime pay, and excessive working hours; and, in the
case of domestic helpers, physical and mental abuse and confinement.

Outside the workplace there are no restrictions on the movement of foreigners but they are
expected to observe local laws and refrain from any form of legal infraction. A nominal fee is imposed
on them for use of social services, such as medical services at government clinics and hospitals and
schooling for their children.
4

In early 1998, it was made compulsory for employers to make a monthly EPF contribution of RM 5
per foreign worker employed. This was abolished in 2001.

331

([SDWULDWHV: As for expatriates, the terms and conditions of their service are usually very
favourable and, in some cases, higher than what is offered to local workers. These
workers are usually well taken care of by their employers with respect to emoluments,
medical facilities, leave, housing, etc. and are least likely to use local social amenities. In
short, they are not seen as a possible burden to the government. Perhaps the only
criticism some locals have about them is the involvement by some in property
speculation, especially housing in urban centres which imposes stiff competition for
relatively low paid Malaysians.

3ROLF\FKDQJHVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGLPPLJUDQWZRUNHUV
In view of the current economic slowdown, minor adjustments have been made with regards
to the policy on the hiring of foreign workers in 2001. The maximum period for a foreign employee in
the unskilled and semi-skilled category to work in Malaysia has been reduced further from five years
to three years, a move which may have been designed to discourage foreigners to work in the country.
The new ruling received strong criticisms from employers and trade union leaders for two reasons.
Firstly, in view of the high cost of recruitment, a short working period will cause substantial losses to
both employers and employees. Secondly, it makes skill acquisition among foreign workers
impossible and this may affect the quality of production (1HZ6XQGD\7LPHV, 18 November 2001). The
expatriates, on the other hand, have had their minimum work duration increased from two to three
years.
Due to a series of misdemeanours and felonies by foreign workers, especially Indonesians, in
2001, there are talks of some amendments to the policy on foreign workers, at least in respect of
source countries. These incidents include the break-out at the Semenyih camp, riots and attempted
arson at the Macap Umbu camp in Melaka on 16 October 2001 and at the Pekan Nenas camp in Johor
on 4 December 2001, where fighting among inmates in one of the blocks led to fights against the
guards and burning of the premises. And very recently, in mid January 2002, about 450 Indonesian
workers at the Hualon Textile factory in Nilai, Negeri Sembilan clashed with the police during a urine
testing exercise to identify drug addicts among the factory workers (1HZ 6WUDLWV 7LPHV, 23 January
2002). The clash not only impeded police work but also destroyed three police vehicles and other
properties; it is viewed with much rage and anger by the local population and authorities alike. As a
result, the Malaysian Prime Minister is seriously considering reducing intake of workers from
Indonesia and sourcing workers from other countries.
7UHQGVLQRYHUVHDVHPSOR\PHQWSODFHPHQWVHUYLFHV
The mode by which foreign workers enter the Malaysian workforce takes various forms
depending on the types of job sectors involved. Expatriates working for multi-national corporations,
be they manufacturing concerns, banks or foreign financial agencies, for example, are usually sent to
the country by their head office. Others are recruited by local organisations in need of their services
and this is usually done through advertisements; their recruitment seldom require the services of
placement agencies.
It is the semi-skilled and unskilled workers who often require the services of placement
agencies. There are 591 active private employment agencies in the country but only 200 are licensed to
recruit foreign workers, LH domestic workers only. The recruitment of other types of workers is done
by the prospective employers with the help of placement agents in the source countries.
Not all prospective employers of domestic helpers use the services of employment agencies.
Many of those recruiting maids from Indonesia do so through their informal networks of friends and
332

relatives by using calling visa which proves to be less costly (HJ., a fee of around RM 1 500 for a
maid from Sumatra compared to RM 3 500 through employment agencies) and faster. The use of
informal networks has led to the proliferation of informal employment agents, LH those who are not
registered with the Labour Department. The activities of these illegal agencies have adversely
affected the businesses of registered agencies and this has led to complaints by the latter.
Many problems relating to employment of foreign maids are attributed to placement
agencies. In many cases, they do not adhere strictly to the official ruling on recruitment. For example,
medical examinations in the sending countries are not properly done. As a result, many of the maids
are found to be suffering from some kind of disease once they are in Malaysia and have to be sent
back, thus causing considerable losses to the employers and the maid themselves. Many placement
agencies also do not have training facilities for maids and often deliver untrained and inexperienced
workers. Worse, many of the agencies are partly responsible for abetting abuse of work passes by
delivering domestic helpers to prospective employers who require workers for other purposes such as
launderette operators, hair-dressers, helpers in retail shops, cooks in restaurants, helpers at fish stalls,
etc. Such abuse is rampant in the urban areas due partly to the relatively high cost of levy for workers
in the general service sector, LH RM 1 200 per annum compared to RM 360 for domestic helpers. The
mismatch between jobs offered and jobs sought and the exploitation that accompanies such
malpractice contribute to the high number of run-away maids.
7UHQGVLQMREFUHDWLRQSROLFLHV
The major challenge for Malaysian economic planners now is to overcome the mismatch
between labour and job location and between job types and the requirements of job seekers. Many
seem to believe that the answer to this is to go for a knowledge-based economy or the K-economy,
as it is widely known. Since the mid-nineties several measures have been taken to achieve this
objective and the first step was to establish the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in a designated area
in Selangor, near the new administrative capital Putra Jaya. Following this, attempts were made to
woo foreign companies to come and by 2001, about 563 companies had registered with the MSC of
which 40 are world class companies (Economic Report 2001/02, p. 19). The hope is for these
companies to set up operations in Malaysia and to create high technology jobs, especially those that
are related to the information and communication technologies (ICT). This is reminiscent of the
seventies when Free Trade Zones were established in some sections of the country and multi-national
corporations were invited to come to set up manufacturing operations. Only this time, jobs expected to
be created are of the high technology category. Until 2001, about 14 438 jobs have been generated at
the MSC, of which over 82% are knowledge-workers.
The shift to K-economy means phasing out labour intensive industries, and this is perceived
as one way of reducing dependency on foreign workers. In line with this objective, measures have
been taken by many quarters to increase the number of educated and skilled workers. These include
the expansion of higher education, which saw 4 more universities and 400 community colleges being
built in 2001 (1HZ 6WUDLWV 7LPHV, 7 December 2001). A computer literacy campaign is actively
pursued and the government amended the EPF (Employees Provident Fund) Act, so that contributors
can borrow from the Fund to enable more accessibility to computers by students and workers and to
achieve the one family one computer target. To complement this the Ministry of Human Resources
has taken steps to expand its facilities for industrial training schemes, offering long-term programmes
for students to acquire skills in a host of technology-related courses which include, among others,
information technology, industrial automation, electronic engineering, computer engineering, etc. It
also caters for short courses for students or for upgrading of workers skills and for re-training of
retrenched workers under the Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF). The main objective is to
produce well-trained high technology workers.
333

/DWHVWUHVHDUFKVWDWLVWLFVRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
There are a number of small-scale researches carried out by students and by the academic
staffs of local universities, especially at Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Universiti Malaya, Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia and Universiti Sains Malaysia. These are funded by the universities concerned or
by government funding such as the IRPA (Identified Research Priority Areas) at the Ministry of
Environment, Science and Technology. Such studies are anchored in various disciplines history,
geography, anthropology, sociology, economics, international relations and medicine. Much of the
results of these studies remains unpublished.
In addition, two studies are carried out by the authorities, LH the Federal Special Task Force
in Sabah and by the Ministry of Human Resource. The former conducted a statewide survey on the
socio-economic status of immigrants in Sabah in mid-2001. The results of the study are yet to be
released. The latter, carried out in Johor, focuses on workers retrenched from Singapore. The results of
this study have not been made public either.
,QWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
At the governmental level, apart from government to government MOUs with source
countries to recruit labour, international co-operation on international migration is focused largely on
border-control to stop the flow of illegal immigration into Malaysia from Thailand in the north of the
Peninsula, from Indonesia into the Peninsula and from the Philippines and Indonesia into the two
Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak.
The continuous illegal in-flow of Filipinos from the southern islands of the Philippines into
Sabah seems to have created unease in the relations between the two countries. In early 2001, the
Philippines announced that it would not welcome Filipinos repatriated from Sabah, unless they had
been verified and issued travel papers by the Philippine official representative in Malaysia. This
caused enormous problems for both the illegals and the Sabah authorities as such verification is
difficult to obtain without a Philippine Consulate in Sabah. The political turmoil in the Southern
Philippines in November 2001 is believed to have increased illegal in-flow into Sabah, as evidenced
by the capture of Nur Misuari, the ex-Governor of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region and his
followers. Close co-operation between Kuala Lumpur and Manila has helped to alleviate some of the
attendant and ensuing problems.
3ROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
0LQLVWULHVLQYROYHGLQSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVHV
Decisions on any policy matters involve the Malaysian Cabinet, which is headed by the
Prime Minister. In the case of policy on foreign workers (unskilled/semi-skilled category), before any
proposal is being brought to the Cabinet, it must first be discussed by a special committee called the
-DZDWDQ .XDVD 7HNQLNDO 3HQJDPELODQ 3HNHUMD $VLQJ, (Technical Committee for the Recruitment of
Foreign Workers), which is based in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Ministries and agencies involved
include:
Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of Primary Industries
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Human Resources

334

Ministry of Trade and Industry

Department of Immigration
Department of Manpower
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB)
As for the policy on expatriate workers, ministries and agencies involved in policy proposals are:
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Malaysian Industrial and Development Authority (MIDA)
Construction Industry Development Board (CIBD)
Bank Negara Malaysia
Public Service Department
Multimedia Development Corporation Sdn. Berhad.
Department of Immigration
&RRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQDJHQFLHV
For the semi-skilled and unskilled workers the Technical Committee for the Recruitment of
Foreign Workers brings together representatives from the various ministries and related departments
mentioned above. In the case of expatriate workers each Ministry or relevant agency (such as Bank
Negara) decides on the types and number of skilled foreign workers required. Application by
prospective expatriate workers who do not come under the jurisdiction of any of the agencies
mentioned above, will be deliberated by the Expatriate Committee, comprising representatives from
these agencies (see Table 5).
2XWOLQHRISROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
Public opinions and pressure, especially from within, play an important role in shaping
policy on immigrants and foreign workers in Malaysia. Sometimes the pressure, through criticisms
from the public or opposition parties, is so strong that a regulation or ruling proposed by the
government has to be dropped or amended. Two cases will help to illustrate this point.
Firstly, the ban on the importation of Bangladeshi workers in 1997: the ruling was
introduced after strong public condemnation of Bangladeshi male workers following a bloody clash in
mid-1996 between them and local youths in Johor Baru, the capital of the southern Malaysian state of
Johor, where a large number of Bangladeshis are employed in the manufacturing sector. The clash, it
was alleged, was caused by antagonisms harboured by local youths against Bangladeshi men whom
they accused of dating and having liaisons with local women. For days the national and local dailies
and electronic media carried reports of the clash as well as opinions and debates regarding the issue.
This, in turn, triggered other such incidents elsewhere in the Peninsula. Bangla bashing became the
order of the day and the foreigners were blamed for these incidents.
Secondly, the proposal by the government to make it mandatory for employers to contribute
to the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) for foreign workers in late 1997: While the proposal was
335

lauded by trade unions, it was strongly opposed by employers unions such as the Federation of
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM), the Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) and Malaysian
Agricultural Producers Association (MAPA), who claimed that it would increase production costs.
The government had to amend its proposal to accommodate these objections. It concurred with
employers suggestion that their contribution for each employee be reduced to a token of RM 5.00 a
month and not 11% of the employees basic pay. This contribution was scrapped in 2001.
Amendments made to the 1959/63 Immigration Act, such as the introduction of section 55A,
55B and 55C, made effective in 1998, were induced by public concerns about the increase in the
number of illegal aliens and the negative impacts they have on the local economy, security and
politics. Such concerns were debated and aired via various channels such as in the print and electronic
media, at political party meetings, in public and academic forums and conferences, in Parliament by
the peoples representatives, and in the Malaysian Senate. It took a number of years for the
amendments to be made.
.H\HOHPHQWVDIIHFWLQJSROLF\PDNLQJ
As proposed by Weiner (1995), immigration policy is no longer simply a domestic issue,
mainly of up-holding sovereignty. It can also be influenced by external forces and by the presence of
the immigrants themselves. This is very true in the case of Malaysia where immigration policy is
shaped by the state of the economy, security considerations and diplomatic relations. These may
include the following:
x

Demand for workers by employers which may rise and fall depending on the state of the
economy;

The rate of unemployment among locals;

The size of illegal aliens in the country and the rate of illegal infiltration by foreigners;

Legal infraction by immigrants which includes their involvement in serious criminal

activities, illegal purchase of Malay Reserve land and illegal construction of houses and
squatting on state land;

Socio-cultural infractions by immigrants such as having liaisons with local women or

men and abandonment of spouses and children on their return to the home country;

Pressure from interest groups such as employers association, trade unions, women and
human rights groups from within and outside the country.

2XWORRNIRUHFRQRPLFDQGPLJUDWLRQSROLF\
There is a strong belief among decision makers in the government that the Malaysian
economy has strong fundamentals and that it can weather the negative impacts of economic slowdown
among its major trading partners with fiscal and financial measures designed to boost internal demand.
Based on this optimism, the GDP is expected to improve from negative growth to around 4.5% in
2002. Such growth means the need for foreign labour will be sustained.
The economic slowdown in year 2001 appears to have no negative impact on the use of
foreign nationals. In fact, the number of foreign workers underwent a slight increase although
unemployment rose by 0.8%. The use of foreign nationals is expected to persist unless and until local
336

workers cease to be choosy about jobs, up-grade their skills and are willing to travel where jobs are. It
is uncertain if the move to K-economy will reduce the number of foreign workers, let alone remove
them altogether, as no matter how advanced an economy is technologically, there are always jobs
which cannot be taken over by machines or automation.
However, despite the fact that foreign workers will be in the country for a long time yet,
Malaysia is expected to continue to view foreign labour employment as a temporary measure. By
doing so, it can get rid of excess alien labour when the economy is weak and recruit more when the
economy strengthens, while at the same time absolving itself of their reproduction costs as well as of
their maintenance when they are incapacitated or no longer economically active. Malaysia will merely
adjust its policy from time to time to accommodate changing socio-economic situations and pressure
from interest groups within and outside the country.

337

5()(5(1&(6

KASSIM, A. (2001D), Recent Trends in Migration Movements and Policies in Malaysia, in
,QWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQLQ$VLD7UHQGVDQGSROLFLHV, Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development(OECD), Paris, pp. 261-284.
KASSIM, A. (2001E), Integration of Foreign Workers and Illegal Employment in Malaysia, in
,QWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQLQ$VLD7UHQGVDQGSROLFLHV, Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development(OECD), Paris, pp. 113-135.
KASSIM, A. (2001F), Trends in Economic Development and International Migration in Malaysia,
Paper presented at the Workshop on Labour Migration and Labour Market in Asia 1-2
February, Tokyo, Japan.
KASSIM, A. (1994), Malaysian Illegal Workers in Japan: Some Preliminary Findings, in ,QGRQHVLD
&LUFOH, No. 63, June, Oxford University Press, pp. 156-173.
HUGO, G. (2001), Foreign Workers Integration in Australia and Undocumented Immigration in
Asia, in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO PLJUDWLRQ LQ $VLD 7UHQGV DQG SROLFLHV, Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development(OECD), Paris, pp. 63-97.
IGUCHI, Y. (2001), Recent Changes in the Japanese Labour Market and International Migration, in
,QWHUQDWLRQDO PLJUDWLRQ LQ $VLD 7UHQGV DQG SROLFLHV, Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development(OECD), Paris, pp. 231-248.
LAPORAN RINGKAS TREND DAN KEDUDUKAN PASARAN BURUH (2001), Bahagian
Perancangan & Penyelidikan Dasar, 11 December, Ministry of Human Resources, Putra Jaya,
Malaysia.
MANI, A. (1995), Migration in Brunei Darussalam, in J.H. Ong, K.W. Chan & S. B. Chew (eds.),
&URVVLQJERUGHUV7UDQVPLJUDWLRQLQ$VLD3DFLILF, Prentice Hall, Singapore, pp. 441-463.
SAZAKI, S. (1990), Clandestine labour in Japan: Sources, Magnitude and Implication, Paper
presented at the Expert Group Meeting on cross-national migration in Asia, UNCRD,
Nagoya, 5-8 November.
TSAY, H.C (1995), Foreigners in Taiwan, in J.H. Ong, K.W. Chan & S. B. Chew (eds.), &URVVLQJ

ERUGHUV7UDQVPLJUDWLRQLQ$VLD3DFLILF, Prentice Hall, Singapore, pp. 464-471.
STALKER, P. (2000), :RUNHUVZLWKRXWIURQWLHUV, Lynne Ryner, Colorado.
WEINER M. (1995), 7KH JOREDO PLJUDWLRQ FULVLV &KDOOHQJHV WR VWDWH DQG WR KXPDQ ULJKWV Harper
Collins College Publisher.

338

2)),&,$/5(32576

$QQXDO5HSRUW Manpower Department, Ministry of Human Resources, Putra Jaya, Malaysia.

%DQN1HJDUD0DOD\VLD4XDUWHUO\%XOOHWLQ , (Second Quarter), Vol. 16, No. 2.
(FRQRPLF5HSRUW Vol. 30, October 2001, Ministry of Finance Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.
(FRQRPLF5HSRUW Vol. 29, October 2000, Ministry of Finance Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.
1(:63$3(56
%HULWD+DULDQ, 26 July 2001, 40 000 pekerja Malaysia tidak terjejas.
1HZ6WUDLWV7LPHV, 23 January, 2002, So sorry, says Indonesia
1HZ 6WUDLWV 7LPHV, 7 December 2001, Domestic-led boost to economy - PM: Strong
FundamentalsProvide Base for New Strategies.
1HZ6WUDLWV7LPHV, 10 November 2001, On Road to Positive Growth.
1HZ6XQGD\7LPHV, 18 November 2001, The Long and Short of Alien Workers Woes.
7KH%RUQHR3RVW, 28 June 2001, 2 500 Malaysians in Papua New Guinea Safe.

339

$&.12:/('*(0(176

I owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who helped me with the necessary data and information
to write this paper. May I take this opportunity to extend my sincere thanks, especially to the
following:
YG.BHG. Datuk Seri Aseh Che Mat, Chief Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia;
En Mansor Embong, Secretary, Division for Immigration and National Registration , Ministry of
Home Affairs, Malaysia;
Pn. Rohani Abdullah , Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Human Resources;
En Adzmi Mohd Sani, Director, Labour Market Services Division, Manpower Department, Ministry
of Human Resources;
Chief Inspector Abdul Razak Majid, Ops Nyah Secretariat, Malaysian Police Headquarters, Bukit
Aman, Kuala Lumpur;
Haji Abdullah Sani Bin Sulaiman , Director of Immigration Sabah.
They went out of their way to assist me and I am touched by their generosity. 7HULPDNDVLK.

340

Table 1.3ULQFLSDOHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUV


(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)
(e)

(f)
(g)
(h)


GDP growth (%, 1987 prices)
Domestic Demand (% growth)
Exports:
Value (RM million)
% of GDP
GNP growth (current prices) (%)
Current Account Balance:
Value (RM million)
% of GNP
Total investment
Domestic investment (RM million)
Foreign Investment:
Value (RM million)
No. of approved projects

(i)
(j)
(k)

Producer Price Index (PPI)

Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Exchange rate (US1)

(l)

Per capita GNP (at current prices (RM))

Percentage Growth

(m)

Increase in real wages (%)

Notes:
6RXUFH







5.8
1.0

8.3
19.5

2.0
7.1

321 181

373 307

333 789

3.8

5.9

2.5

47 902
17.1%
N.A.
N.A.

31 959
10.2
N.A
N.A

25 070
7.9
N.A
68 3302

12 274
421

19 848.5
523

13 430.9
337

-3.3
2.8
3.80

131.8
120.7
3.80

134.2
122.3
3.80

12 305
1.4

13 441
9.0

13 333
-0.6

-1.7

12.9

4.5

1. Between January and July.

2. Private investment of RM 18 183 million + Public investment of RM 50 147 million.
N.A. = Not available.
Economic Report 2000/01 & 2001/02, various pages.




341


Table 2.1.(PSOR\PHQWE\VHFWRU

 







 

16.3
0.5
26.5
9.4
0.8
16.7
4.9
5.1
10.2
9.7

15.8
0.5
27.2
9.2
0.8
16.6
4.8
5.1
10.0
9.9

15.2
0.4
27.6
8.1
0.8
17.1
5.5
5.0
10.6
9.7

14.8
0.4
27.4
8.2
0.8
17.4
5.7
5.1
10.6
9.6

3ULPDU\6HFWRU



6HFRQGDU\6HFWRU



7HUWLDU\6HFWRU



7RWDO







7RWDO1XPEHU







Note:
* Estimate.
6RXUFH
Economic Reports 1998/99, 1999/2000, 2000/01 & 2001/02.

















Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing

Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity, Gas & Water
Wholesale & Retail Trade, Hotels & Restaurants
Finance, Insurance, Real Estates & Business Services
Transport, Storage & Communications
Government Services
Other Services

Table 2.2D0DOD\VLDFRPSDULVRQRIDFWLYHUHJLVWUDQWVDQGQHZ
YDFDQFLHVE\VWDWH-XO\-XO\

$FWLYH5HJLVWUDQWV 
July
July
Change
2000
2001
(%)

6WDWH
Johor
Kedah
Kelantan
Melaka
Negeri Sembilan
Pahang
Perak
Perlis
Pulau Pinang
Sabah
Sarawak
Selangor
Terengganu
Federal Territory (KL)
7RWDO
Note:
6RXUFH

2 683
2 998
1 493
508
1 740
3 000
1 898
710
1 322
4 466
3 111
2 169
2 912
7 370

1HZ9DFDQFLHV
July
July
2000
2001

Change
(%)

3 548
1 985
1 393
1 382
2 007
1 686
2 734
696
1 492
3 844
3 123
2 545
2 677
4 960

32.2
-33.8
-6.7
172.0
15.3
-43.8
44.0
-1.9
12.9
-13.9
0.4
17.3
-8.1
-32.7

5 110
1 565
2 496
554
1 803
1 752
1 955
131
5 423
1 989
37 287
4 915
2 749
2 040

4 098
1 006
1 887
1 064
1 030
1 665
1 644
243
2 639
1 330
45 787
4 140
1 664
2 197

-19.8
-35.7
-24.4
92.0
-42.8
-4.9
-15.9
85.5
-51.3
-33.1
22.8
-15.7
-39.5
7.7



* Cumulative figures.
Economic Report 2001/02, p. 136.









342

Table 2.2b0DOD\VLDFRPSDULVRQRIDFWLYHUHJLVWUDQWVDQGQHZ
YDFDQFLHVE\VWDWH2FW2FW

$FWLYH5HJLVWUDQWV
Oct 2000
Oct 2000 Change (%)
6WDWH:
Peninsula
Sabah
Sarawak

27 402
4 003
2 708

28 559
3 454
3 029

4.2
-13.7
11.9

Oct 2000

1HZ9DFDQFLHV
Oct 2000 Change (%)

4 832
380
10 133

3 748
168
9 170

-22.8
-55.8
-9.5

 0DOD\VLD






6RXUFH Adapted from Table 1, Ministry of Human Resource website http://www.jaring.my/ksm


Table 2.3.0DQSRZHUPLVPDWFKQHZUHJLVWUDQWVDQGMREYDFDQFLHVLQ2FWREHU


2FFXSDWLRQDO*URXS

$FWLYH
5HJLVWUDQWV
1XPEHU

Professional/Technical

7 385
(21.1)
2 505
(7.1)
16 230
(46.3)
366
(1.1)
541
(1.5)
99
(0.3)
7 916
(22.6)

Administrative/Management
Clerical & Related Jobs
Sales
Services
Agriculture
Production & Related
Jobs
7RWDO
6RXUFH

-RE9DFDQFLHV
1XPEHU

455
(3.4)
89
(0.6)
677
(5.1)
440
(3.4)
327
(2.5)
1 323
(10.1)
9770
(74.9)

0DQSRZHU
'HILFLW([FHVV
6930
2 416
15 553
-74
214
-1 224
-1 954




Adapted from Table 3 & Table 10, Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia
website http:// www.jaring.my/ksm

343

Table 2.4.$YHUDJHZDJHVLQFUHDVHLQWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU3HUFHQWDJH


Manufacturing
Commerce
Transport, Storage &
Communications
Services
Agriculture/Estate
Mining & Quarrying
Electricity, Gas & Water
Construction
Others

















9.0
11.0
15.0

28.0
12.0
12.0

11.0
13.0
10.0

15.0
N.A.
11.0

8.0
8.0
8.0

7.0
5.0
10.0

8.0
8.0

7.7
7.8

8.0

8.5

9.0
10.0
6.0

11.0
15.0
6.0
9.0
10.0
7.0

9.0
15.0
9.0.0
5.0
9.0

13.0
18.0
8.0
18.0
9.0

14.0
13.0
11.0
10.0
11.0

9.0
12.0
6.0
5.0
8.0
8.0

7.0
11.0
9.0
0.0
13.0
8.0

8.5
8.3
6.0
0.0
7.0
7.7













7RWDO
Note:
6RXUFHV

From January to July 2000 only.

Malaysia: Labour and Human Resources Statistics 1997, pp. 133-134.
Economic Report 1997/98, p. 167; Economic Report 1998/99, p. 153.
Economic Report 1999/2000, p. 131; Economic Report 2000/01, p. 127.



Table 3.'LVWULEXWLRQRIIRUHLJQSRSXODWLRQLQ0DOD\VLD

7RWDO
3RSXODWLRQ

3HQLQVXOD0DOD\VLD
Johor
Kedah
Kelantan
Melaka
Negeri Sembilan
Pahang
Perak
Perlis
Pulau Pinang
Selangor
Trengganu
)HGHUDO7HUULWRU\.XDOD/XPSXU
6XE7RWDO

1RQ&LWL]HQV1R 1RQ&LWL]HQV
RIVWDWH3RS
RI7RWDO
)RUHLJQ3RS

2 740 625
150 530 (5.5)
10.9
1 649 756
25 605 (1.6)
1.8
1 313 014
20 795 (1.6)
1.5
635 791
22 944 (3.6)
1.7
859 924
31 859 (3.7)
2.3
1 288 376
54 800 (4.3)
3.9
2 051 236
38 345 (1.9)
2.8
204 450
3 155 (1.5)
0.2
1 313 449
48 382 (3.7)
3.5
4 188 876
186 382 (4.5)
13.5
898 825
15 838 (1.8)
1.1
1 379 310
92 373 (6.7)
6.7
18 523 632
691032

2
603
485
614
824
(23.6)
44.4
6DEDK
2 071 506
62 738 (3.0)
4.5
6DUDZDN
76 067
16 150 (21.2)
1.2
)HGHUDO7HUULWRU\/DEXDQ



0DOD\VLD
6RXUFH Population & Housing census 2000:Population Distribution and Basic Demographic
Characteristics. Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, July 2001: various pages.

344

Table 3.1.$SSUR[LPDWHQXPEHURIUHJLVWHUHGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
LQ0DOD\VLD

<HDU

3HQLQVXOD

6DEDK 

6DUDZDN

0DOD\VLD

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001 (July)

414 336
515 983
576 441
586 796
1 190 437
789 684
680 846
632 720
618 946

100 000
100 000
120 719
121 144
226 565
283 968
162 269
75 232
99 281

18 387
26 074
29 529
37 299
54 643
54 000
75 202
91 733
88 120

532 723
642 057
726 689
745 239
1 471 645
1 127 652+
818 677
799 685
807 984@

Note:

6RXUFHV:

* The 1993 & 1994 figures for Sabah are the authors estimates. Figures for
those years are not available; + The Economic Report 1999/2000 (p.132)
gave a lower figure for 1998 LH 1 033 497. The author is unable to explain
the discrepancy between the two figures: @ Figures given by the Ministry of
Home Affairs Malaysia. The Economic Report for 2001/02 mentioned a
higher figure, LH 810 695 (p. 134). The author is also unable to explain this
discrepancy.
Ministry of Human Resource Annual Report 1997, Labour Department
Sarawak; Sabah Monthly Statistics; Unpublished data from the Bahagian
Sistem Maklumat & Rekod; Immigration Department Headquarters, Kuala
Lumpur; Fomema Sdn. Bhd., 1999; Economic Report 1999/2000 &
2001/02; Ministry of Internal Affairs as per letter from the Ministry to the
author, dated 8 January 2002; Laporan Tahunan Kementerian Sumber
Manusia 2000, pp. 40 & 63.

345

Table 3.2. )RUHLJQZRUNHUVLQ0DOD\VLD-XO\

1DWLRQDOLWLHV

3HUFHQWDJH

Indonesians
Bangladeshis
Filipinos
Thais
Pakistanis
Others
7RWDO
7RWDO1XPEHU
-RE6HFWRUV

73.64
17.54
1.90
0.80
0.40
5.8


3HUFHQWDJH

Manufacturing
30.08
Plantations
25.59
Domestic Helpers
20.40
Construction
8.57
Services
7.32
7RWDO

7RWDO1XPEHU

6RXUFH : Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia. Unpublished
Data made available to the author by En. Mansor Bin Embong,
Division Secretary, Division for Immigration & National
Registration. 

346

Table 3.3.([SDWULDWHVLQ0DOD\VLDE\FRXQWU\RIRULJLQDQG
MREFDWHJRU\

&RXQWU\RI2ULJLQ
Japan
India
Singapore
Peoples Republic of China
UK citizens
Taiwan
Philippines
Indonesia
Australia
United States of America
Korea
Pakistan
Germany
Thailand
Others
7RWDO
7RWDO1XPEHU

3HUFHQWDJH
17.2
17.2
9.3
7.4
5.8
4.0
3.9
3.3
3.3
3.2
3.0
2.2
2.0
2.0
2.0



-RE6HFWRUV

3HUFHQWDJH

Manufacturing
46.12
Services
36.45
Commerce
5.44
Construction
4.96
Petroleum
2.96
Education
2.52
Transport
0.70
Sports
0.56
Agriculture
0.27
Mining
0.03
7RWDO

7RWDO1XPEHU

6RXUFH : Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysia. Unpublished
Data made available to the author by En. Mansor Bin
Embong, Division Secretary, Division for Immigration &
National Registration. 

347

Table 4.$SSUR[LPDWHQXPEHURILOOHJDOVDSSUHKHQGHGDQGLGHQWLILHGLQ3HQLQVXODU0DOD\VLD 6DEDK



<HDU 2SV
2SV
1\DK, 1\DK,,
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
7RWDO

14 211
41 584
11 082
43 189
7 828
32 835
10 919
25 873
8 547
35 521
14 670
42 574
11 721
42 889
10 575
77 943
9 103
87 461
 

5HJXODULVDWLRQ 9ROXQWDU\
([SLU\ 5XQDZD\ 7RWDO


5HSDWULDWLRQ  RI:RUN &DVHV

3HUPLWV
483 784
483 784
55 795
54 271
40 663
554 941
591 733
413 812
457 880
187 486
244 730
54 610
18 714
72 528
179 760
96 564



 

Note: 1. A regularisation process was carried out in the Peninsula between January and June, 1992,
and December 1996. The data were made available to the author by the Chief Secretary, Ministry of
Home Affairs, as per letter to the author, dated 04/06/97. Prior to this there was another
regularisation among illegal Indonesian plantation workers, but the number of regularised illegals is
not included here. In Sabah, regularisation exercise was carried out between March and October
1997. Sarawak carried out similar exercise between January and March 1998, but the results are
not available.

2. Voluntary repatriation of illegal immigrants was carried out between 1 October and 15 November,
1998. Figures were provided by the Immigration Department Headquarters, Pusat Bandar
Damansara, Kuala Lumpur.

6RXUFH Compiled from unpublished data from the Urusetia Ops Nyah, Malaysian Police Headquarters, Bukit Aman, Kuala
Lumpur; Ministry of Home Affairs, Immigration Department Headquarters, Pusat Bandar Damansara, Kuala Lumpur &
Federal Task Force, Sabah.


Table 5.$JHQFLHVLQYROYHGLQDSSURYLQJDSSOLFDWLRQV
IRUH[SDWULDWHZRUNHUV

$SSURYLQJ$JHQFLHV

&RPSDQ\$FWLYLWLHV

MIDA
Ministry of Education
CIDB
Bank Negara
Ministry of Trade & Industry

Manufacturing industries
Private colleges and schools
Construction and engineering work
Banking and financial institutions
Representative office, regional office,
international procurement centre
Domestic wholesale, retail & trading

Ministry of Domestic Trade and

Consumer Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Multimedia Development Corp. Sdn. Bhd.

Operational headquarters
Multimedia & IT for Multimedia Super
Corridor
Ministry of Health
Private hospitals
Public Service Department
Government hospitals, government
institutions of higher learning
Expatriate Committee
Activities other than listed above
6RXUFH Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia 2000 (unpublished report).

348

5(&(1775(1'6,10,*5$7,21029(0(176$1'32/,&,(6
7+(029(0(172)),/,3,12352)(66,21$/6$1'0$1$*(56
E\
6WHOOD3*R
De La Salle University

,QWURGXFWLRQ
Despite the heightened economic uncertainty brought about by the continuing local and
international peace and order problems confronting the country and the global community, the
Philippine economy showed its resiliency by posting a positive growth in 2001. Beating market
forecasts, the GNP grew by 3.7% and the GDP rose by 3.4%. The services sector was the main
contributor to the GNPs expansion due to the improved performance of trade and government
services. It accounted for 1.9% of the GNP gain. As in previous years, the remittances of the overseas
Filipino workers bolstered the economy by contributing 0.5% to the 3.7% GNP growth.
Exports, however, suffered a major setback. It declined by 3.7% after a strong performance
of 17.7% in 2000. Consequently, it impeded GNP growth by 1.4%.
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) still flowed into the country although at a slower pace.
Approved FDIs in the first three quarters of 2001 amounted to only 46.5 billion pesos or 31% lower
than the previous years level of 67.7 billion pesos.
Despite the countrys political turmoil and the effects of the global economic slowdown on
the local economy, the countrys employed situation fared better than the previous year. Employment
increased primarily due to the strong recovery in the agricultural sector that benefited from the good
weather that prevailed in most parts of the country. It was also aided by the expansion in the trade
sector that absorbed most of the displaced workers from industries affected by the global economic
downturn. Employment grew by 6.2% in 2001, a reversal from the 1% decline in employment in 2000.
Although the growth in employment was broad based, much of the gain resulted from the
expansion of part-time work mostly in agriculture and the trade sectors. The weakness in the market
was also mirrored in the sluggish growth in wage and salary employment.
Unemployment, however, remained unchanged from the previous year at 11.2% despite the
increase in employment. This was due to the increase in the labour force participation rate. The
number of establishments which closed or retrenched its workers also increased by 19% for the first
10 months of 2001 compared to the same period in 2001.

349

5HFHQWWUHQGVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
,QWHUQDWLRQDOODERXUPLJUDWLRQ
The Department of Labor and Employment estimates that today there are about 7 million
Filipinos working or living abroad. Every day, about 2,300 workers are deployed overseas. The
deployment of overseas Filipino workers to various parts of the world has increased by 3% in 2001
from a low growth of 0.6% in 2000. The number of land-based workers and seafarers who went
abroad to work in 2001 grew at the same rate of 2.9% compared to their minimal increase the year
before.
The deployment to Asia continued to decline at about the same rate as in 2000, with the
largest decline in the number of overseas Filipino workers going to Korea and Hong Kong. The
outflow of workers to Japan continued to increase although at a decelerated rate compared to the
previous year. On the other hand, the number of workers going to Singapore increased at a faster rate
than in 2000. Moreover, the increased demand for nurses in England has resulted in a surge in the
deployment of workers to that country in 2001 compared to 2000.
It is interesting to note is that over the last three years, the number of Filipino workers who
have left the country to work in Asia has almost equaled the total number of workers who have gone
to Middle East. Between 1999-2001, the average share of the worker outflow to Asia and the Middle
East was the same at 45% each. Over the last three years, close to 90% of the Filipino workers can be
found employment in Asia and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia remains most important destination of
the migrant workers followed by Hong Kong.
From 1994 to 2001, more Filipinos have actually found jobs overseas compared to those that
were added to the number of employed persons in the local market every year. In 1999 and 2000, more
than 800,000 workers were deployed abroad while local employment shrank. On the assumption that
these workers would not be able to create their own employment had they not worked abroad, the
unemployment rate would have worsened and would have remained in double digit figures over the
years. The overseas Filipino workers constitute about 2.5% of the labour force.
5HPLWWDQFHV

Although the remittances of migrant workers in the first three quarters of 2001 saw a decline
(-5.7%), it was not as severe as the drop in the amount in 2000 (-11.0%). As in previous years the
remittances of workers continue to bolster the Philippine economy. They contributed 0.5% to the 3.7%
growth in GNP for 2001. Based on the 1997 Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES), at least
6% of Filipino families receive income from abroad.
3ROLF\ VKLIW LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODERXU PLJUDWLRQ IURP PDQDJLQJ WKH IORZ WR SURPRWLQJ ODERXU
PLJUDWLRQ
In its policy framework contained in new The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
(2001-2004) released under the Arroyo administration in November 2001, government now explicitly
recognizes overseas employment as a OHJLWLPDWH RSWLRQ IRU WKH FRXQWU\V ZRUN IRUFH $V VXFK
JRYHUQPHQWVKDOOIXOO\UHVSHFWODERUPRELOLW\LQFOXGLQJWKHSUHIHUHQFHIRURYHUVHDVHPSOR\PHQW

350

While government provides for the protection and welfare needs of those who choose to work
abroad as well as their eventual reintegration upon return, government will now actively explore and
develop EHWWHU HPSOR\PHQW RSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG PRGHV RI HQJDJHPHQW LQ RYHUVHDV ODERU PDUNHWV 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKUHJLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQWVDQGDJUHHPHQWVThus, from managing the
flow, government now seeks to actively promote international labor migration especially of higher
skilled, knowledge based workers, as a growth strategy.
Four major employment-promoting strategies for both the local and overseas market will be
vigorously pursued: employment generation, employment preservation, employment enhancement,
and employment facilitation.
To generate overseas employment, it will secure and enhance the countrys competitive edge
in software development and e-services by VHL]LQJ  RYHUVHDV PDUNHW RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ GHYHORSLQJ
VWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLSVIRUPDMRU,&7GHYHORSPHQWLQLWLDWLYHV
To preserve overseas employment, it will continue forging multilateral and bilateral labor
agreements and arrangements.
To enhance employment so that workers will be able to compete in the global economy,
access to education and training programs in priority areas such as the overseas labor market will be
improved to ensure the continuous availability of human resources. It will be complemented with
welfare programs and mechanisms to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to fair
and equitable recruitment and employment practices under a deregulated condition.
Employment facilitation will also be adopted as a strategy to improve access to employment
opportunities and alternatives both locally and overseas; to provide a level playing field for contractual
negotiations; and to provide accurate and up-to-date labor market information to improve matching of
jobs to workers.
This shift in policy, however, will require:
x

the strengthening of the overseas employment industry and its accompanying structures
in order to better protect the rights and welfare of workers;

the reorientation of the educational system and other training institutions to meet the
domestic and global demand for professionals and highly skilled workers, especially
knowledge-based workers; and a more aggressive marketing of the Filipino as a globally
competitive worker and the Philippines as a rich human resource center.

+LJKO\VNLOOHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQWKHPRYHPHQWRI)LOLSLQRV
Globalisation and increasing trade liberalization has led to the wider circulation, not only of
goods and capital, but of labour as well. Today, the Philippines is the largest labour exporting country
in the Asian region and is an active participant in the global circulation of labour. Millions of its
internationally shared human resources are scattered in more than 130 countries around the globe and
the highly skilled Filipino professionals and managers are important components of this mobile pool
of workers.
Compared to the temporary labour migration of the semi-skilled and the unskilled, the
international movement of the highly skilled is of considerable economic and cultural significance.
351

The highly skilled workers are not only important agents of economic change, they are also bearers of
new cultural values (Castles, 1996).
,GHQWLI\LQJWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHG
The term highly skilled appears liberally in the literature. However, very often, it is used
without an operational definition presumably, on the assumption on the authors part, that it is
understood in the same manner by all. The term implies that the individual has more years of formal
education, generally at least a baccalaureate degree, and/or training, in terms of on-the-job training,
than the rest of the work force.
Various terms are used in the literature to refer to this pool of highly educated, highly trained
individuals. Ong, Cheng, and Evans (1992) use the term KLJKO\ HGXFDWHG to refer exclusively to
scientific, technical and professional workers with at least a college degree. Castles (1995), on the
other hand, uses the term KLJKO\ TXDOLILHG to cover a wider group of professionals, executives,
technicians and other highly skilled personnel. Just what other highly skilled personnel includes is
again subject to interpretation. Used in the context of brain drain, WDOHQW is yet another word found in
the migration literature (Atal and DallOglio, 1987) The talented, according to the authors refer to the
so-called brains of society. They are distinguished from the rest on the basis of four criteria where
they rate highly on each:
x

/HYHORIVNLOO: Skilled, Semi-skilled, Unskilled

3UHVHQW VWDWXV: Trained with experience, Trained (qualified) but without experience,
Under training (student), Untrained

)LHOG RI VSHFLDOL]DWLRQ: Professional technical (e.g. engineering, medicine, agriculture,

management), Sciences (Physical, Natural, Social), Humanities, Technician, Artist,
Artisan-craftsmen

3URIHVVLRQDOHVWHHPRUUHFRJQLWLRQ: Outstanding, ordinary, substandard

Based on the above criteria, the talented would presumably include only individuals with at
least a bachelors degree in the Professional, technical and scientific fields and who have had some
work experience. Given their field of specialization, these individuals would be more highly skilled,
and their professions generally more highly regarded than the rest by society.
A special category of highly skilled migrants is the LQWHUQDWLRQDO VHUYLFH SURYLGHU or the
VSHFLILHGHPSOR\PHQW ZRUNHU defined by the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) as someone who:
x

has been sent by his or her employer to a foreign country in order to undertake a specific
assignment or duty for a restricted and defined period of time;

engages in work that requires professional, commercial, technical and other highly
specialized skill; or

who, upon the request of his or her foreign employer, engages in work whose nature is
transitory or brief for a restricted and defined period of time

International service providers, therefore, are employed in consulting services, training

activities, or supervisory functions and exclude low-skilled overseas contract workers engaged in
production, output-oriented activity (Garnier, 1996). They include:
352

LQWUDFRPSDQ\WUDQVIHUHHV executives and personnel sent by their companies to work in

overseas branches or joint ventures;

LQGLYLGXDO VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV DQG VSHFLDOLVWV RQ VSHFLILF DVVLJQPHQWV self-employed

service providers architects, artists, engineers, lawyers, athletes, and news
correspondents who are based in the exporting country or in a third country and enter
into a contractual relationship with an exporting firm to carry out a specific assignment
in the importing country; also intra-company transferees on short-term cross-border
assignment such as consulting, training, and repair/maintenance tasks for the parent
companys subsidiary in the destination country, or for any firm of that company under
an international service contract;

VKRUW WHUP RU EXVLQHVV YLVLWRUV individuals who enter a country for a short period of
time, from a few days to a few months, while maintaining their residence and salary
payments in the country of origin; they can only be engaged in certain specific activities,
such as participation in business meetings, trade fairs, promotional activities and
preparation of feasibility studies;

GLSORPDWLF DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHUVRQQHO staff of diplomatic or military

missions/embassies, humanitarian/development aid workers, clergy, and international
civil servants

Intra-company transferees, diplomatic and international personnel are what Appleyard

(1989) refer to as SURIHVVLRQDOWUDQVLHQWV
For the purposes of this paper, highly skilled workers refer to all professional, technical and
related workers as defined in the 1977 Philippine Standard Occupational Classification. They also
include administrative, executive, and managerial workers.
7KHPRYHPHQWRIWKHKLJKO\VNLOOHGLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVDQRYHUYLHZ
The international movement of highly skilled Filipino professionals can be classified into
two types: SHUPDQHQWPLJUDWLRQRUHPLJUDWLRQ, often referred to as the brain drain, and WHPSRUDU\RU
FLUFXODUPLJUDWLRQ, also referred to as contract labour migration.
The 1960s saw the first massive outflow of Filipino professional and technical workers,
mostly medical personnel, who moved to the United States as immigrants. Permanent migration
became distinguished from temporary migration at this time when two distinct waves of Filipinos left
the country either are emigrants or as contract workers. Emigration in the sixties was selective of the
highly skilled medical professionals to the United States while contract labour migration was highly
selective of the skilled production workers, craftsmen and unskilled laborers to other countries in the
Asian region. These contract workers were hired by the American military and by independent
contractors for war reconstruction work in Guam, Okinawa, and Wake Island. Others landed
contractual jobs in logging companies operated by Filipino and American companies in Borneo,
Indonesia and Malaysia.
The passage of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965 saw the emigration of increasing numbers
of Filipino professionals to the United States. From 2,517 professionals admitted in 1967, the number
progressively increased each year. In 1970, 8,811 Filipino professionals entered the United States,
comprising 39% of all Asian immigrants that year and 19.1% of all immigrants (Gupta, 1973) (see
353

Table 1) The largest group of professionals that entered the United States between 1967-1970 were
medical doctors followed by nurses. Increases in the number of professionals admitted yearly into the
United States between 1967 and 1970 were most marked for engineers, nurses, and teachers.
When its immigration policies eased in the late 1960s, Canada provided an alternative
destination for Filipinos. Employment opportunities were opened for professionals, mainly nurses,
doctors, science technicians and engineers who sought permanent residency there. Between 1965 and
1968, the Filipino professionals and managers who emigrated to Canada each year comprised more
than 50% of the flow (King, 1987). Since 1969, professionals made up less than half of the total
number of Filipino immigrants each year to that country. The proportion has progressively decreased,
The seventies saw the unprecedented out-migration of Filipino contract workers for overseas
employment, particularly to the Middle East. Since then, the volume of Filipinos leaving the country
as temporary overseas contract workers has decidedly been more than the volume of people leaving
the country as permanent emigrants. The proportion of emigrants in the total migration outflow has
drastically decreased from 31% in the period 1975-1979 to 9% in 1990-1995. On the other hand, the
proportion of overseas workers increased from 69% to 91% for the same period.
If one looks at the data for selected years over the 20-year period between 1975 and 1995,
one will observe that the pattern in the outflow of professionals and managers among the emigrants
and the overseas workers has been the same (Table 2). For both groups of out-migrants, the proportion
of professionals who left the country declined between 1975 and 1985. The proportion began to
increase once again, albeit minimally, between 1985 and 1992 and fell again in 1995.
It must be noted, however, that data regarding permanent migration based on the number of
registered Filipino emigrants, do not reflect the exact magnitude of permanent migration among
Filipinos. These data do not capture those who leave the country as contract workers or students and
who change their visa status once in the country of destination.
Among emigrants, the United States remains the primary destination of Filipino
professionals and managers, followed by Canada and Australia. Between 1972 and 1985, U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics reveal that Filipino professionals, mostly nurses and
doctors, were the second largest Asian group, who entered the United States (Ong et al., 1992). The
Indians were the largest group. Among the land-based Filipino contract workers, on the other hand, a
majority of the professionals are working in Saudi Arabia.
What types of highly skilled workers are in demand in the overseas labor market? Data from
1992-1996 show that a majority of the highly skilled Filipinos were female performing artists,
particularly choreographers and dancers (56.5%) (Table 3). In the five-year period between 19921996, a total 187,290 performing artists left the Philippines to work abroad. This category of
professionals, however, is a catchall for all types of entertainers working mostly in Japan, from the
professional singers and dancers to the commercial sex workers. Consequently, the professional skills
of many of these workers have been questioned.
Thus, if we focus our attention on the professionals with technical specialization, male
engineers and female medical workers (particularly nurses) stand out as the largest group of newly
hired Filipino professionals deployed abroad. Most of the engineers work in Saudi Arabia while the
nurses can be found in both Saudi Arabia and the United States. Computer programmers and
accountants have also found employment in Saudi Arabia and the United States.

354

Garnier (1996) estimates that in 1994 there were 60,000 highly skilled Filipinos providing
short term services abroad and 40,000 intra-company company transferees. In addition there were
100,000 long-term skilled emigrants abroad that year.
)DFWRUVIDFLOLWDWLQJWKHRXWIORZRIKLJKO\VNLOOHG)LOLSLQRVDEURDG
The migration of the highly skilled, highly educated has generated a lot of debate both in the
sending countries and in the receiving countries through the years. In the 1960s, the debate centered
around the issue of brain drain, the process by which the best and the brightest in the less developed
countries were siphoned out systematically by more developed countries through permanent
migration. Although permanent migration continued, the brain drain debate subsided in the 1970s.
Today, the fluidity of migration generated by greater circular mobility rather than permanent migration
has focused the discussion on the fears in advanced economies of the potential ill effects caused by
return migration or reverse brain drain (Ong et al., 1992).
Several studies have identified the factors that promote the out-migration of highly skilled manpower
from the Philippines within the push-and-pull framework, positing conditions at the country of origin
which push the highly skilled out and conditions in the country of destination that attract or pull the
highly skilled. These factors can be further classified into the individual or micro-level factors (e.g.
social psychological factors such as motivations and perceptions; demographic characteristics) and the
structural or macro-level factors (e.g. disparities in economic development between countries;
migration policies in sending and receiving countries).
At the micro-level, social psychological factors and demographic factors have been identified as
facilitating the out-migration or brain drain of Filipino professionals in the sixties (Joyce and Hunt,
1982; Jayme, 1971; Cortes, 1975; Abad, 1974).
Anchorage to the Philippines and valuation of the comparative opportunities between the
Philippines and the host country were the social psychological factors identified by Cortes (1975) and
Jayme (1971) that differentiated the highly skilled migrants from the returnees. Anchorage referred to
the strength and the quality of the social, psychological and other ties which bind the individual to the
Philippines. Migrants tended to have low anchorage in the Philippines and perceived greater
opportunities in the United States than in the Philippines.
Moreover, the study of Jayme (1971) found that attitudes toward the Philippines were more
relevant in the migration decision than the attitudes towards, or nature of experience in, the United
States. This suggests that the push factors were more fundamental in the decision to migrate than the
pull factors. Consequently, the responsibility of keeping highly skilled manpower rests on the country
of origin. Her study also revealed that openness to the culture of the host country was another
important determinant of migration among the highly skilled.
Other studies reinforce the findings on the importance of the perception of comparative
opportunities on the decision of the highly skilled to migrate permanently (Joyce and Hunt, 1982;
Abad, 1974). Perceptions of better financial and professional/ career opportunities were cited as the
important factors in the decision to remain in the United States.
Certain demographic factors also predisposed the highly skilled Filipinos to emigrate.
Younger persons, those who were single when they left the Philippines, females rather than males,
those with degrees from abroad, especially in the natural sciences and engineering were some of the
correlates of migration identified by Cortes (1975).
355

At the macro-level, the disparities in the economic development between countries of origin
and destination are important determinants in migration (Stahl and Appleyard, 1992). The poor
economic conditions of the Philippines, particularly its poor labour absorptive capacity and low
domestic wages, have been identified as important push factors not only among highly skilled
migrants but also among the less skilled.
In the 1980s, the ranks of the unemployed swelled in the Philippines (Abella, 1993). Even
more alarming was the extent of human resource under-utilization in the country as indicated by the
underemployment rate and the increase in the number of the college-educated unemployed in the
eighties (Table 4). In 1986, at the height of the economic crisis in the Philippines, 277,000 college
graduates were unemployed together with 284,000 who had some college education. Bye 1993, the
number of college graduates without jobs had increased to 351,000.
Added to the unemployment problem were the low domestic wages and salaries (Abella,
1993). Overseas employment was therefore a more attractive alternative. In a study by Tan (1993), she
found out that the monetary gains from overseas employment, in terms of wages, were highest among
the professionals. Her estimates of the 1990 average annual wage rate of Filipino professionals abroad
was 138,733 pesos or almost 4 times the average annual rate of 35,664 pesos in the domestic market.
The decision of the individual to migrate is constrained by the migration laws and policies of
the both the country of origin and the country of destination. However, receiving countries set the
migration streams in motion by determining what type of workers and how many will be allowed into
its borders and what rights workers are entitled to. Be that as it may, whether or not the state
intervenes in either the sending or receiving countries, large-scale migration will occur if there are
strong emigration pressures in the country of origin and a concomitant demand and the perception of
better opportunities in the country of destination.
Since international migration is premised on the willingness of the receiving countries to
open their borders to foreigners, the migration laws and policies of these countries become more
important determinants of out-migration than those of the sending countries. These laws and policies
set the pattern and the pace of migration. In the case of the emigration of the highly skilled Filipino
professionals, the immigration patterns since the early 1900s have shifted in tandem with the changes
in U.S. immigration laws. Similarly, the temporary labour migration patterns from the Philippines
have been influenced by the immigration laws and policies of the host countries.
In addition to migration policies and laws in the receiving countries, political unrest resulting
in war or civil strife, as in the 1990 Gulf crisis, also affect international migration patterns.
The outflow of highly skilled manpower is the result, therefore of an interplay among the
macro-level factors, on one hand, such as the economic and the political and the micro-level factors,
such as demographic characteristics of migrants, social psychological factors such as anchorage in the
home country, motivations and perceptions of comparative opportunities in the receiving country.
0LJUDWLRQRIKLJKO\VNLOOHG)LOLSLQRVZKRJDLQVDQGZKRORVHV"

The receiving country clearly gains from the entry of highly skilled and highly educated
professionals by increasing its human capital, enhancing its ability to use existing technology, and
even to train its next generation of highly educated labour (Ong et al., 1992). Through permanent
emigration, the Philippines has transferred much human capital to the United States in the 1960s and
early 1970s in the form of medical doctors, nurses and other professionals. Since then, the brain drain
356

of Filipino talent has drastically diminished as a result of more restrictive immigration laws in the
United States.
However, the outflow of human capital has continued unabatedly over the last years via the
temporary labour migration of overseas Filipino workers with fairly high levels of education. The
1999 Survey of Overseas Filipino Workers conducted by the National Statistics Office revealed that
more than half of these workers are college educated (54.7%), with about a third of them (31.8%)
having completed a college degree or higher. Unfortunately, the skills profile of these workers
indicates a mismatch between their level of education and their overseas jobs. Despite this, the
absolute number of Filipino workers who have found temporary employment abroad as professionals
(even with the exclusion of the performing artists) and managers has been formidable.
The Filipino professional and his/her family also gain from overseas employment: the
professional through higher earnings and advanced training, the family through the remittances sent
home. In 1990, the wages of the overseas Filipino professionals were about 4 times the domestic
wages in 1990 while their average annual remittances were the highest among the land-based workers
in 1991 (Tan, 1993).
The benefit to the Philippines also comes in the form of foreign exchange remittances and
the creation jobs that require no local capital investment. In the case of the latter, migration also acts a
safety valve that eases possible social unrest due to the unemployment and underemployment not just
of its highly educated manpower but its excess labour in general.
Loss can also be assessed at the three levels of the individual migrant, the family, and the
country as a whole. At the individual level, loss is largely psychological and is the result of separation
from family and alienation from ones culture. However, for the Filipino professional, particularly the
female migrant worker, who accepts an overseas job as a domestic helper, de-skilling is another form
of loss. The erosion of professional training through disuse is another. At the family level, loss
manifests itself in the absence of a husband and father, a wife and mother or both and the negative
repercussions of that absence on family relationships.
At the national level, it can be argued that the outflow of highly skilled Filipinos, especially
through permanent emigration, in a general sense constitutes a loss because the country can no longer
benefit from its investment on their education and training. It becomes even a greater loss when it
results in definite setbacks for the country as skill shortages occur and there is a dearth not only in the
quantity but most especially the quality of the countrys scientific and technological practitioners.
There has been no clear empirical evidence that the outflow of Filipino professionals has had
a profound negative effect on the country and its economy. Engineers, nurses, medical doctors,
scientists, finance specialists and even teachers have worked abroad in their professional capacities.
However, Tan (1993) argues that the cost to economy appears minimal since there is a large pool of
unemployed labour to replace those who have gone abroad.
In fact, schools and training institutes have been established that cater mainly to the foreign
market (Tan, 1993). The medical schools increased in number from 10 in 1975 to 19 in 1980 and to 27
in 1985. Nursing schools, on the other hand, grew from 73 in 1975 to 130 in 1980.
It is also argued that the outflow of professionals, in particular, and overseas workers, in
general, cannot really be counted as a loss because their migration is only temporary. However, the
return of human capital does not appear to be substantial.

357

One of the difficulties in monitoring the labour migration flows today is that government has
not developed a system for determining exactly how many of the overseas Filipino workers have
returned permanently or if not permanently, for what duration before they move on to the next
overseas job. As such there is no way of assessing just how much homeward transmission of human
capital is taking place.
Generally, overseas Filipino professionals work in more developed countries with more
state-of-the art technology. They are therefore more likely to experience a higher rate of on the job
training (OJT) than if they remained in the Philippines. However, there is no way of assessing with
certainty just how much the Philippines has benefited from the more advanced on the job training
acquired by Filipino professionals abroad, in the absence of data on return migration.

In an increasingly integrated and global economy, increasing the skills and capabilities of its
labour force and making them internationally competitive is crucial to economic success. In its
national agenda for sustainable development in the 21st century or Philippine Agenda 21, the
government places people at the core of its development initiatives. In the area of economic
development,
Economic progress will increasingly rely on the creative energies and ingenuity of the
Filipinos, hence, investments are channeled towards the improvement of human capital and the social
infrastructure.
Thus, it envisions that Filipino creativity, skills, initiative, diligence and other talents rather
than low wage rates will become the basis for attracting domestic and foreign investments.
With globalisation and increasing trade liberalization, the demand for a more skill-intensive
and technology-literate workforce to produce high quality goods competitive in the global market will
become increasingly greater for more developed economies with a scarcity of labour. The Philippines
must be able to seize the opportunity so that Filipino professionals and higher skilled workers can
participate more actively in the global market.
Consequently, there is a need for the Philippines to improve its human capital foundations in
the technical arena. This means upgrading the quality of its technical education, raising the quantity
and quality of its science and technology practitioners, and strengthening the on-the-job training of its
workers (Intal, 1997).
In a very recent study Cororaton (2001) states that the absence of competent research and
development manpower in the country places the Philippines in an extremely disadvantaged position
in catching up with the worlds cutting edge technology producers. Thus, he advocates for an urgent
reform in the science and technology education system so that the country can sustain a long-term
growth.
Tullaos study (2000) also indicates that the existing educational institutions in the
Philippines will not be adequate to improve the chances of the country to benefit optimally from trade
liberalization unless substantial institutional innovation is undertaken.
A new area for export opportunities that the Philippines can pursue in view of its abundant,
skilled and highly trainable workforce is the services industry. One sector in the services industry
considered a big opportunity for the country is the construction services sector (Trade Pulse New &
Measures, 1997). This sector offers employment opportunities for technical people and skilled
construction workers involved in professional consulting services. Generally, the activities include
358

advisory and review services, pre-investment or feasibility studies, design, construction supervision,
management and related services, as well as other technical services or special studies.
In a cumulative ranking of consultancy services undertaken by the Asian Development Bank,
the Philippines were ranked number 6. The United States was ranked first, followed by the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and International Organizations.
In 1994, the industry generated a total employment of about 6,000 consultants, including
engineers, architects, managers, specialists, and administrative personnel. The maximum salary for a
licensed senior architect with a 10-year experience in a specialized area is pegged at US$2,700 a
month, while the minimum salary is placed at US$2,200. Salaries for technical support, on the other
hand, range from US$1,080 to US$1,600. However, the industry is faced with the big problem of the
gradual loss of this pool of professional consultants. These consultants are pirated by foreign firms
who want to avoid the higher cost of engaging a local firm for their projects.
Another budding industry in the Philippines which Lamberte (1996) suggests is the
countrys key to sustained competitive advantage in the future is the computer software and services
industry. There are two types of labour in this industry: (1) those who remain in the Philippines and
produce software and provide computer services for domestic consumption or for export; and (2) those
who take up foreign assignments in overseas firms (Lamberte, 1996).
It was estimated that in 1986, there were 300 contract computer professionals deployed
overseas, 600 in 1987, and 800 in 1988 (Noyelle, 1990). Data from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) reveal that between 1992 and 1996, a total of 3,002 newly hired
computer programmers and related workers were sent overseas. This number does not include the
rehires which would further increase the total number of deployed computer programmers for that
period.
It would seem that the formal education of the country has likewise begun to respond to the
shifts in the occupational structure with the advancement in information technology (computer
hardware and software technologies and telecommunications). The number of information technology
and engineering and technology graduates increased significantly between 1989 and 1993 (Lamberte,
1996). It appears that the Philippine educational system has responded quantitatively to the new skill
requirements brought about by advances in information technology. However, it must respond
qualitatively as well by continuing to develop the content of its curricula and upgrading its training
systems so that the competitive edge and the comparative advantage of the Filipino are maintained.
As government strives to improve the global competitiveness of its workforce, it must
continue to go full steam ahead in the implementation of its comprehensive employment strategy
program. Investment generation and employment creation ought to remain important priorities so that
more domestic jobs with more competitive wages are generated. By doing so, the emigration pressures
will be eased and the massive outflow of Filipino workers abroad will be stemmed.

359

5()(5(1&(6

ABAD, R.E. (1974), Migration expectations of Filipino medical graduates: an overview, Unpublished
manuscript.
ABELLA, M.I. (1993), Labor mobility, trade, and structural change: The Philippine experience, $VLDQ
DQG3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO 2(3), pp. 249-268.
APPLEYARD, R.T. (1989), International migration and developing countries, in R.T. Appleyard
(ed.), 7KH,PSDFWRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQRQ'HYHORSLQJ&RXQWULHVParis: OECD.
ATAL, Y. and DALLOGLIO, L. (1987), Theorizing brain drain: a prefatorial, in Yogesh Atal and
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Bangkok: UNESCO Principal Office for Asia and the Pacific.
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7UDQVQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQLQ$VLDDQGWKH3DFLILF5HJLRQ3UREOHPVDQG3URVSHFWV Asian
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Philippines: Drawing policy lessons for the Philippines, Philippine Apec Study Center Network
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the Philippines to the U.S.A, Paper presented at the Conference on International Migration from
the Philippines, East-West Center, Honolulu, June2-6.
GARNIER, P. (1996), International trade in services: a growing trend among highly skilled migrants
with special reference to Asia, $VLDQDQG3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO 5(4), pp. 367-397.
GUPTA, M.L. (1973), Outflow of High-Level Manpower from the Philippines, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERXU
5HYLHZ, 107(2), pp. 168-169.
INTAL, P.S. Jr. (1997), Developing the technology for global market competition, 'HYHORSPHQW
5HVHDUFK1HZV 25(2), March-April 1997.
JAYME, J.B. (1971), Demographic and Socio-Psychological Determinants of Migration of Highly
Trained Filipinos to the United States, Ph. D. dissertation.
JOYCE, R. and HUNT, C. (1992), Philippine nurses and the brain drain,6RFLDO6FLHQFH0HGLFLQH 16,
pp. 1223-1233
KING, A.M. (1987), Philippines, in Yogesh Atal and Luca DallOglio (eds.), 0LJUDWLRQRI7DOHQW
&DXVHVDQG&RQVHTXHQFHVRI%UDLQ'UDLQBangkok: UNESCO Principal Office for Asia and
the Pacific.
360

LAMBERTE, M.B. (1996), Trade in services in the Philippines, in P. Jr. Intal et al., 7KH(PHUJLQJ
:RUOG7UDGLQJ(QYLURQPHQWDQG'HYHORSLQJ$VLD7KH&DVHRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV, Report
submitted to the Asian Development Bank.
NOYELLE, T. (1990), Computer software and computer services in five Asian countries, in Gibbs et
al. (eds.), 6HUYLFHVLQ$VLDDQGWKH3DFLILFSwitzerland: United Nations.
ONG, P.M., CHENG, L. and EVANS, L. (1992), Migration of highly educated Asians and global
dynamics, $VLDQDQG3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO 1(3-4), pp. 543-567.
PERNIA, E. (1976), The question of brain drain from the Philippines, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ5HYLHZ
10(1), pp. 63-72.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (1997), 3KLOLSSLQH$JHQGD$1DWLRQDO$JHQGDIRU
6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQWIRUWKHVW&HQWXU\
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (2001), 7KH0HGLXP7HUP3KLOLSSLQH'HYHORSPHQW3ODQ
.
STAHL, C.W. and APPLEYARD, R.T. (1992), International manpower flows in Asia: an overview.
$VLDQDQG3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO 1(3-4), pp. 417-471.
TAN, E.A. (1993), Labor emigration and the accumulation and transfer of human capital, $VLDQDQG
3DFLILF0LJUDWLRQ-RXUQDO 2(3), pp. 303-328.
TULLAO, T.S. Jr. (2000), An evaluation of the readiness of Filipino professionals to meet
international standards, Philippine Apec Study Center Network Discussion Paper No. 2000-01,
Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

361

Table 1.3URIHVVLRQDOWHFKQLFDODQGDOOLHGZRUNHUVDGPLWWHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIURP
WKH3KLOLSSLQHV
2&&83$7,21
Natural Scientist
Social Scientist
Physicians, Surgeons & Dentists
Nurses (including student nurses)
Other Medical and Related Fields
Engineers
Editors & Reporters
Lawyers & Judges
Professors & Instructors
Religious Workers
Social and Welfare Workers (Except
Group)
Teachers, Elementary, Secondary,
Not Elsewhere Classified
Other Professional, Technical & Kindred
Workers, Not Elsewhere Classified
TOTAL
Asian Total
World Total
Philippine Total as Percentage of Asian
Total
Philippine Total as Percentage of World
Total
Source: Gupta (1973), p. 172.

1967
85
133
612
445
240
346
11
29
57
29

1968
187
13
846
891
470
746
7
50
57
31

1969
333
24
983
796
632
1 068
14
71
68
41

1970
283
67
968
954
632
1 163
13
124
107
49

1971
360
46
1 158
1 564
640
1 055
19
108
73
58

17

32

24

38

35

342

816

1 348

2 285

1 076

95

167

404

411

456

2 517

4 844

7 130

8 811

8 629

12 382
46 652

13 036
48 753

16 683
40 427

22 568
46 151

27 046
48 850

20.33

37.16

42.74

39.04

31.9

6.04

9.94

17.64

19.09

17.66

362

Table 2.+LJKO\VNLOOHG)LOLSLQRHPLJUDQWVDQGRYHUVHDVZRUNHUV
(0,*5$176
PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL &
RELATED WORKERS
ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE &
MANAGERIAL WORKERS

1975

1980

1985

1987

1992

1995

28.5

17.3

8.6

8.7

11.1

9.5

1.7

1.0

0.7

0.7

0.8

1.1

PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL &

RELATED WORKERS
ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE &
MANAGERIAL WORKERS
ALL EMIGRANTS

4 124

7 886

3 869

4 899

7 184

5 351

245
14 492

469
45 500

309
45 269

420
56 350

533
64 712

604
56 259

29(56($6:25.(56

1975/a

1980/a

1985/a

1987b

1992/c

PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL &

RELATED WORKERS
Composers and Performing Artists
Medical, Dental, Veterinary & Related
Workers
ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE &
MANAGERIAL WORKERS

1995/c

53.5
15.4

15.5
7.99

22.5
5.4

27.6
8.9

27.7
19.2

20.5
10.9

nda

nda

nda

3.7

3.2

4.8

0.6

1.3

0.4

0.4

0.1

0.2

PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL &

RELATED WORKERS
6 685
24 361
75 959
ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE &
MANAGERIAL WORKERS
71
740
1202
ALL OVERSEAS WORKERS
12 501
57 394 337 754
a. Refers to all processed overseas Filipino workers.
b. Refers to all deployed overseas Filipino workers (new hires & rehires).
c. Refers to new hires only.
6RXUFHRIUDZGDWD: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

363

105 538

72 230

43 629

1 503
382 229

289
260 594

346
214 157

Table 3.6NLOOVGLVWULEXWLRQRIKLJKO\VNLOOHGRYHUVHDV)LOLSLQRZRUNHUV
6NLOO&DWHJRU\
0DOHV


)HPDOHV

7RWDO

$OO+LJKO\6NLOOHG:RUNHUV

100,0
(76 204)

100,0
(215 846)

100,0
(292 050)

$OO3URIHVVLRQDO7HFKQLFDO 5HODWHG:RUNHUV

98,3
(74 921)

99,9
(215 528)

99,5
(290 449)

(QJLQHHUVDQG5HODWHG7HFKQLFLDQV

57,3
(43 645)
44,6

0,3
(736)
0,1

15,2
(44 381)
11,8

11,7
(8 884)
5,9
2,4
2,2

16,4
(35 319)
12,6
6,4
4,1

15,1
(44 203)
10,8
5,3
3,6

&RPSXWHU3URJUDPPHUV 5HODWHG:RUNHUV

3,0
(2 272)

0,3
(730)

1,0
(3 002)

$FFRXQWDQWV

2,4
(1 844)

0,3
(733)

0,9
(2 577)

16,9
(12 862)
10.7
10.6

80,8
(174 428)
72.7
72.2

64,1
(187 290)
56.5
56.1

7.1
(5 414)
1.7
(1 283)

1.7
(3 582)
0.1
(318)

3.1
(8 996)
0.5
(1 601)

6DXGL$UDELD
0HGLFDO'HQWDO9HWHULQDU\ 5HODWHG:RUNHUV
1XUVHV
6DXGL$UDELD
8QLWHG6WDWHV

&RPSRVHUV 3HUIRUPLQJ$UWLVWV
&KRUHRJUDSKHUV 'DQFHUV
,Q-DSDQ
2WKHU3URIHVVLRQDO7HFKQLFDO 5HODWHG:RUNHUV
$GPLQLVWUDWLYH 0DQDJHULDO:RUNHUV
6RXUFH Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

364

Table 4.3KLOLSSLQHVODERXUIRUFH XQHPSOR\PHQWE\HGXFDWLRQDOOHYHO

Year

Labour Force

Open Unemployment
Persons
7KRXVDQGV
%
574
4.1

Educ. Unemployed
Undergrad.
Graduate

Under
Employed
%
21.0
21.3

7KRXVDQGV
1975
14 016
1976
15 118
1977
14 595
1978
16 022
1979
17 135
1980
16 855
1 364
8.1
158
99
34.5
1981
17 806
1 613
9.1
190
138
37.4
1982
17 984
1 714
9.5
208
155
36.4
1983
19 427
2 032
10.5
207
152
37.1
1984
19 936
2 104
10.6
254
263
36.4
1985
20 503
2 566
12.5
272
248
37.9
1986
21 369
2 513
11.8
284
277
35.6
1987
22 568
2 518
11.2
33.6
1988
23 449
2 244
9.6
32.7
1989
24 120
2 212
9.2
31.2
1990
24 244
2 377
8.4
31.4
1991
24 733
2 182
8.8
31.7
6RXUFH Abella (1993), Table 1
Data Sources: National Census and Statistics Office, Labour Force Integrated Survey of Households
1975-1985; National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1991; Damaso
(1991).

365

6,1*$325(
E\
0XL7HQJ<DS
Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore

,QWURGXFWLRQ
The year 2001 saw Singapore suffering its worst recession since the independence in 1965.
Preliminary estimates show that the GDP shrank by 2.2% during the year. While it had escaped the
Asian financial crisis relatively unscathed, Singapore is among the worst-hit Asian countries in the
current worldwide economic downturn. As of the third quarter, unemployment was expected to rise to
4.5% and retrenchment to 25 000 by year-end. More professionals and executives were retrenched
since the financial crisis. The government has increased its funding for training/re-training and
assistance to families in difficulty. As before, there is tripartite agreement that there should be severe
wage restraints (wage freeze or wage cuts) in order to save jobs. Government ministers, senior
government officials and management in certain major companies have taken the lead by taking bigger
wage cuts than other employees.
'RPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGODERXUPDUNHW
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHGRPHVWLFHFRQRP\
Preliminary estimates show that Singapores real GDP shrank by 2.2% in 2001, as compared
to a growth rate of 9.9% in 2000 (see Table 1). Negative growth was recorded in the last three quarters
of the year, rising from -0.4% in Q2 to -5.5% in Q3 and then to -7.0% in Q4. For the whole year, the
goods-producing sector is estimated to have declined by 9.3%, due to the continued decline in
worldwide demand for electronics. On the other hand, the services sector is estimated to have grown
marginally by 1.5%. Both sectors have slowed down substantially compared to 2000 when growth
rates of 10.1% and 8.9%, respectively, were recorded.
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHGRPHVWLFODERXUPDUNHW
Data on the labour market in 2001 are only available for the first three quarters of the year.
The data show that total employment fell while unemployment rose during the year. In tandem with
the economic downturn, but with a lagged effect, WRWDOHPSOR\PHQW in the third quarter fell by 12 452
after growing by 23 200 in Q1 and 3 300 in Q2 (see Table 2). The seasonally adjusted WRWDO
XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH rose from 2.4% and 2.6% in March and June to 3.8% in September 2001. The
XQHPSOR\PHQWUDWH DPRQJWKHUHVLGHQWZRUNIRUFH rose from 3.0% to 4.0% over the June-September
period. 5HWUHQFKPHQWV totalled 17 247 in the first three quarters of the year, up from 11 624 for the
whole of 2000. There were fewer jobs opening available in Q3, at 32 per 100 job seekers, compared to
61 in June and 76 in September, as new job seekers joined the labour market.
Compared to 1997 (LH before the Asian financial crisis), there is an increase in the
proportion of managers and executives among the locals retrenched in Q3, from 23% to 37%. On the

367

other hand, the proportion of unskilled production, cleaning and related workers declined from 57% to
46%. The unemployment rate in December 2001, estimated to be about 4.5%, is close to the level in
December 1998. The number retrenched in 2001 is expected to reach 25 000 below the 29 000 in
1998.
0LJUDWLRQ
1XPEHURIIRUHLJQZRUNHUVDQGWUHQGVLQWKHLUHPSOR\PHQW
With a small resident workforce of only 1.5 million, Singapore needs to import foreign
manpower at all levels to augment the local workforce and support economic growth. Employment
passes (EPs) are issued to degree holders, professionals and workers with requisite skills earning basic
monthly salaries of S$ 2 500 or more a month (up from S$ 2 000 since December 2001) while work
permits (WPs) are issued to foreigners with little or no qualifications earning no more than $2 500.
There has been an increase in the number of skilled foreign workers on EPs over the last ten years.
Singapore regards the admission of foreign talent as an important economic strategy as human capital
is a key competitive advantage in a knowledge economy. The profile of workers on WPs has also
improved over the years as a result of tighter policies restricting the admittance of low-skilled foreign
workers.
Data computed from the results of the 2000 census show the number of foreigners working
in Singapore to be about 612 000, constituting about 29% of the total workforce. The majority (56.6%)
had below secondary education, and three out of four were employed in the unskilled jobs as
production workers, machine operators and labourers or related workers (see tables below). Fewer
than one in five were professionals, managerial workers or associate professionals/technicians. The
proportion with university degrees was about 13%, with males outnumbering females 3:1. Women
foreign workers were more likely to have secondary and upper secondary qualifications.

The data on the foreign workforce shown above do not include foreigners who have been
granted permanent resident status or citizenship in Singapore. Employment pass holders and other
foreigners with special talent who can contribute to Singapore are eligible to apply for permanent
resident status for themselves, their spouses and minor children. Hui (2001)1 estimates that about
326 000 have been granted permanent resident status over the period 1980-1999. The results of the
2000 census show that the educational profile of new arrivals has risen over the years (see table
below).
1XPEHURIHPLJUDQWVDQGWUHQGVLQWKHLUHPSOR\PHQWLQIRUHLJQFRXQWULHV
There are an estimated 200 000 Singaporeans living overseas (7KH 6WUDLWV 7LPHV,
19 February 2001). Detailed information is, however, not available.
7UHQGVLQLOOHJDOLPPLJUDWLRQ
A total of 16 500 immigration offenders and overstayers were apprehended in 2000 (7KH
6WUDLWV7LPHV, 24 February 2001). This was a decline from the 23 000 apprehended in 1998 and 17 000
in 1999. The immigration offenders arrested were mainly from Bangladesh, China and India. In
response to an increase in human smuggling syndicates targeting lowly paid commercial drivers to
1

Hui Weng-tat (2001), Foreign Manpower and Development Strategy in Singapore, in 3URFHHGLQJV
RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO :RUNVKRS RQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0LJUDWLRQ DQG 6WUXFWXUDO &KDQJH LQ WKH $3(&
0HPEHU&RXQWULHV, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan.

368

sneak in illegal migrants, the government announced that it would start using mobile x-ray machines
to detect people hiding in cars and trucks. The number of traffickers arrested rose from 27 in 1999 to
40 in 2000 ($VLDQ0LJUDWLRQ1HZV 15 January 2001).
According to the Ministry of Manpower, 2 615 of the 18 500 foreign workers screened in
2001 were working illegally. About 40% of the workers caught were invalid work permits holders, i.e.
they were performing work not in accordance with the approved occupation or employer shown in
their work pass. Another 35% were holders of Social Visit Passes, and 25% were immigration
offenders, i.e. illegal immigrants and overstayers. Over the last five years, about 30%-35% of foreign
workers screened were working illegally.
In 2000, MOM implemented the four P strategies to enhance enforcement efforts on
foreign manpower management and employment:
x

3URPRWLRQ: Increase the awareness of employers on the foreign manpower employment

laws, regulations and employment conditions, through seminars and briefings to newly
registered companies and to new licensees of stalls, entertainment outlets, clubs and
other business activities.

3UHYHQWLRQ: Enhance the security of and control over foreign workers at work sites/work
places and promote self regulation within industries through security audit inspections,
provision of advisory services and assistance in the implementation of the measures.

3ROLFLQJ: Maintain the integrity of the foreign manpower work pass system and
employment regulations through the conduct of inspections/raids on all industry sectors,
and to take punitive action against errant employers.

3DUWQHUVKLS: Work in partnership with all enforcement and regulatory agencies to

conduct integrated enforcement activities to combat illegal employment in Singapore.

Under a special rehabilitation scheme, a small, selected group of immigration offenders are
allowed to work as cleaners at some food courts after serving their jail terms of between one and four
months. They are paid between $60 and $120 a day. The Industrial and Services Co-operative Society
(ISCOS), an ex-prisoners self-help body allows the workers who are put up in flats and lodging
houses, to use their pay for meals and accommodation. They can also save a part of the salary as
pocket money to take home (6WUDLWV7LPHV,QWHUDFWLYH1HZV, 10 November 2001).
7UHQGVLQVRFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQHUV
Singapore adopts a policy of equal treatment for local and foreign workers under its laws.
The Employment Act, the principal legislation stipulating the basic terms and conditions of
employment, apply equally to foreign and local workers. Foreign workers covered by the Act are
entitled to prompt payment of salaries, payment for overtime work and other statutory non-wage
related benefits like annual leave and sick leave. Foreign workers, like local workers, are also covered
under the Workmens Compensation Act, and are compensated in the same manner as local workers if
they are injured at work. Civil and criminal laws such as the Penal Code also equally protect all
foreign workers. The laws are rigorously enforced in Singapore, and the same equality applies when it
comes to offences committed by foreigners.

369

Foreign workers enjoy free access to all social facilities, including medical, transport and
recreational facilities. They are allowed to gather at public places for recreation, and have access to the
high standards of medical care enjoyed by Singaporeans at the same subsidised rates.
There is a special Foreign Workers Unit at the Ministry of Manpower set up to address the
grievances of foreign workers. Conciliation and advisory services are offered free of charge to the
foreign workers.
3ROLF\FKDQJHVDQGWUHQGVLQSROLF\GHEDWHUHJDUGLQJPLJUDQWVDQGWKHLUHPSOR\PHQW
The worsening economic situation in 2001 and the run-up to the general elections held on
3 November 2001 provided the occasion for the debate on foreign workers to rise to a new level. As
retrenchments and unemployment rose, Singaporeans increasingly questioned the appropriateness of
the governments foreign worker policy and the quality of talent recruited.2 The government
maintained that foreigners contributed to economic growth, citing a study by Ministry of Trade and
Industry (MTI)3 that showed that employment pass holders contributed 2.87 percentage points (nearly
37%) to GDP growth in the 1990s. The government maintained that Singapore should not adopt a
discriminatory policy against foreign workers in times of economic difficulty, and urged Singaporeans
to take advantage of the many training and re-training opportunities to upgrade themselves. This is
because the new jobs created would have to be filled by skilled workers (see section below on
employment creation policy).
In December 2001, the Ministry of Manpower raised the minimum salary criterion for
employment pass from S$ 2 000 to S$ 2 500. This is to ease the competition between fresh local
graduates and foreigners who are willing to accept lower wages than Singaporeans. In addition, the
educational criterion for low levy foreign workers (i.e. skilled work permit holders) has been raised to
ensure that a greater proportion has at least completed Secondary 4 or its equivalent or possessed
NTC-3 (practical) certificates.
7UHQGVLQMREFUHDWLRQSROLF\
Under pressures of rising domestic costs and global competition, Singapore is restructuring
its economy yet again, moving from capital-intensive to knowledge-intensive manufacturing and
services industries. The growth sectors identified under the Industry 21 economic blueprint for the
21st century are: electronics, chemicals, engineering, life sciences, education, healthcare, logistics,
communications and the media and headquarters operations. The Economic Development Board also
aims to promote the growth of a small number of local companies with world-class products and
services. The government expects to create 20 000-25 000 jobs annually, with the majority (two out of
three of 15 000 new jobs in the manufacturing sector and three out of four of the 5 000-10 000 created
in the exportable services sector) requiring knowledge and skilled workers. For example, in the area of
Life Sciences, in view of the sophisticated equipment and technology used, a highly skilled workforce,
with at least NTC-2 certificate at a minimum and many holding higher degrees, is needed. Demand for
higher-skilled, better-qualified workers and more specialised professionals is expected to increase in
all sectors.
2

See, for example, Cherian George, Why talents rally in the Valley, 7KH6XQGD\7LPHV, 29 December
2001; Ensure that foreign talents boosts Spores competitiveness, 7KH 6WUDLWV 7LPHV ,QWHUDFWLYH,
11 January 2002.

See Tan Kong Yam et al. (2001), Has Foreign Talent Contributed to Singapores Economic Growth?
An Empirical Assessment, Ministry of Trade and Industry Paper (www.mti.gov.sg).

370

On the other hand, about 40% of the Singapore workforce are unskilled (with less than
secondary education). The number of graduates of the relevant disciplines, particularly at the more
advanced levels, is small relative to the projected demand. Singapore does not have enough research
scientists and engineers and other knowledge workers, with a RSE (Research scientists and engineers)
ratio per 10 000 labour force at 66, compared to 98 for Japan, 94 for Finland and 74 for the US.4 For
this reason, a S$ 60 million Life Sciences Manpower Development Fund has been set up which
awards scholarships for postgraduate training at local and top overseas universities for various lifesciences disciplines such as bioinformatics, biomedical, engineering genetics, immunology, molecular
and cell biology. Singapore has also continued to recruit foreign talent in spite of rising
unemployment and concern among its population.
/DWHVWUHVHDUFKVWDWLVWLFVRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
Two recent studies, by Hui, Tan et al., have already been cited above.
As mentioned, Tan et al. concluded from their econometric study that employment pass
holders contributed significantly to Singapores economic growth in the 1990s. More than one third of
the 7.8% growth rate achieved during this period was attributed to EP holders, as compared to 14% by
the local workforce and 27% by capital.
Hui concludes that foreign manpower will continue to be needed to augment the local
workforce. However, he also cautions that The greater influx of foreign talent could also possibly
heighten emigration tendencies leading to outflow of locals and permanent loss of human capital
investments. The policy challenge, according to Hui, is to assuage public fears and resentment about
foreign talent competition and threat to job security and to enhance and highlight the positive benefits
of citizenship (p. 209). He also suggests that Singaporeans can be made more receptive towards the
influx of foreign talent if there are greater assurances about commitment of employers and the
government to retain and nurture local talent (LELG.).
,QWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
The Singapore Co-operation Programme (SCP) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
provides technical training to developing countries, either bilaterally or in co-operation with third
countries or multilateral organisations. In addition, the government also offers the Singapore
Scholarship to citizens of ASEAN countries for undergraduate study in Singapore. Scholarships are
also granted by non-governmental organisations such as the Singapore International Foundation (SIF),
the Association of Nanyang University Graduates and the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
The SIF reveals that it has awarded 92 scholarships since 1999 (7KH6WUDLWV7LPHV, 14 January 2002).
Autonomous and independent schools have also recruited students from overseas. It is hoped that such
exercises would expose Singapore students to other cultures, spur Singaporean students to excel and
also that some of these foreigners would remain to contribute to the Singapore workforce.

See Koh Ai Tee (2001) in 3HUVSHFWLYHV, edited by Yap Mui Teng, Singapore: Times Academic
Press for the Institute of Policy Studies.

371

3ROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
0LQLVWULHV DQG DJHQFLHV WKDW SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH SROLF\PDNLQJ SURFHVV RQ LPPLJUDQWV DQG IRUHLJQ
ZRUNHUVDQGWKHUROHRIHDFK
The Ministry of Manpower is the main ministry responsible for regulating the entry of
foreigners for purpose of employment, while the Ministry of Home Affairs/Singapore Immigration
and Registration is responsible for immigration policy for foreigners in or entering Singapore for
social visits and non-work-related purposes.
&RRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQPLQLVWULHVDQGDJHQFLHVDQGWKHUROHRIRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWV
The Ministry of Home Affairs/Singapore Immigration and Registration and the Ministry of
Manpower often consult each other to ensure that policies are effective and not contradictory. When
needed, views of employers unions and trade unions are consulted in the spirit of tripartism and
consensus-building.
3ROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
Manpower policies and strategies are formulated based on information and forecasts on
industry trends and needs, obtained through the MOMs manpower planning efforts and projections as
well as feedback from and consultation with government economic agencies and industries. Regular
industry and company visits are also conducted by MOM to better understand the working
environment and manpower needs of various industry sectors. Depending on the subject matter of the
policy, these stakeholders may come from the public or private sector or the community. For foreign
manpower, the stakeholders include:
i)

Government economic agencies overseeing various economic sectors or involved in

economic policy making, HJ the Economic Development Board, the Trade Development
Board, Singapore Tourism Board, Ministry of Trade and Industry;

ii) Enforcement agencies such as the Singapore Immigration and Registration, and the
police;
iii) Other government agencies which have more direct dealings with foreign manpower
issues, HJ the Ministry of the Environment;
iv) Employers associations, individual employers and foreign workers;
v)

Grassroots organisations and members of the public (through the governments Feedback
Unit or other feedback channels such as the media);

vi) Other groups such as non-governmental organisations and foreign embassies in

Singapore.
In relation to the example cited above, where the Ministry of Manpower raised the minimum
salary criterion for employment pass from S$ 2 000 to S$ 2 500 and the educational criterion for lowlevy work permit holders, this was to raise the profile of the Singapore workforce and serve the
growing need of industries for more skilled workers and to help Singapore compete for global
investment. These policies are constantly reviewed, in close consultation with government economic
agencies and industries, to ensure that they remain relevant and effective in meeting the changing
372

economic needs. Such reviews cover the full range of economic sectors, including manufacturing,
service, process and construction.
The timeframe for individual policies to go through from initial discussion to
implementation can vary widely depending on the complexity of issues, consultation process and
implementation details and the urgency involved. Routine policy reviews can be completed in a few
weeks. Issues which are complex and which involve many stakeholders take longer. Complex issues
are generally handled by inter-ministry or multi-agency task forces. For example, the Construction 21
multi-agency study on manpower policies in the construction sector took one year to arrive at its
recommendations.
.H\HOHPHQWVDIIHFWLQJSROLF\PDNLQJRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
The key factors affecting policy making on foreign workers include:
i)

employment trends and surveys conducted by statistics departments;

ii)

enforcement statistics;

iii) wages and other labour force surveys;

iv)

feedback by stakeholders such as employers unions and members of the public.

2XWORRNIRUHFRQRPLFDQGPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHVDQGWKHLUOLNHO\LPSDFW
According to the Ministry of Trade and Industrys Third Quarter 2001 report, the adverse
external economic environment (slowdown in the US, Japanese and EU economies, and downturn in
semiconductor industry, aggravated by September 11 attacks) has affected Singapore significantly.
Growth prospects are expected to remain poor until the external demand improves. Business
sentiments have been aggravated by increased economic uncertainties. The preliminary growth
estimate for 2001 is better than initially expected. However, the government continues to urge caution
even as private sector economists have predicted that the worst is over for the Singapore economy, and
some academic economists are even predicting a 7% growth rate. Official projection of the 2002
growth rate remains at -2% to +2%.
The gloomy economic outlook has definitely impacted the outlook for the labour market.
However, job opportunities are still available in niche areas/occupations as 14 000 jobs are still
waiting to be filled (as at Q3 2001). Job opportunities at the higher end for health professionals,
educators, research scientists and infocom manpower. At the semi to low skilled levels, there is
demand for nursing aides, healthcare assistants, sales associates, waiters, mobile vehicle drivers and
mechanics.

373

Table 1.*'3DWPDUNHWSULFHVDGYDQFHHVWLPDWHV 


Overall GDP
b
GPI
c
SPI

4
9.8
6.5
10.4

4
8.4
8.9
7.2

4
10.3
11.0
9.2

4
11.0
13.7
8.7


9.9
10.1
8.9

4
4.8
2.6
5.5

4
-0.4
-6.5
2.7

4
-5.5
-15.0
-0.4

4
-7.0
-16.2
-1.6


-2.2
-9.3
1.5

Notes:
a.
Figures measure percentage change over the corresponding period of previous year.
b.
Goods-Producing Industries.
c.
Services-Producing Industries.
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Advance GDP Estimates for Fourth Quarter 2001, 2 January 2002 (www.mti.gov.sg).

Table 2.0DQSRZHUVWDWLVWLFV

108 500
3.1

Employment creation
Unemployment rate (%)
(a)

Unemployed persons

4
23 200
2.0
(2.4)
43 100
(52 100)
3 248
0.76
3.8

65 400
(b)(c)

Number of retrenched workers

(a)(c)
Job Vacancy to job seeker ratio
Real growth in average monthly
(d)
earnings (%)

11 624
7.5

4
3 300
3.4
(2.6)
72 900
(54 900)
5 631
0.61
4.2

4
-12 500
3.0
(3.8)
65 000
(81 000)
8 368
0.32
3.9

Notes:
Figures in parentheses are seasonally-adjusted.
Figures for 2001 are as of March, June and September (preliminary).
Number in each quarter.
Figures are for private sector establishments with at least 25 employees.
Figures show growth over corresponding period of the previous year.
Source: Ministry of Manpower (www.mom.gov.sg).

Table 3D.)RUHLJQZRUNIRUFHDJHGDQGROGHUE\JHQGHUDQGKLJKHVWTXDOLILFDWLRQDWWDLQHG


Total
No qualifications
Primary
Lower secondary
Secondary
Upper secondary
Polytechnic
Other diploma
University

7RWDO
1R
612 234
131 244
105 025
110 317
123 447
31 681
4 309
25 044
81 167


100.0
21.4
17.2
18.0
20.2
5.2
0.7
4.1
13.3

6RXUFH: Census of Population 2000 Statistical Release.

0DOHV
1R
381 326
98 006
65 874
64 626
58 674
13 107
3 167
16 403
61 469

374


100.0
25.7
17.3
16.9
15.4
3.4
0.8
4.3
16.1

)HPDOHV
1R

230 907
100.0
33 237
14.4
39 152
17.0
45 691
19.8
64 773
28.1
18 575
8.0
1 141
0.5
8 641
3.7
19 697
8.5

Table 3E)RUHLJQZRUNIRUFHDJHGDQGROGHUE\RFFXSDWLRQ


Total
Senior officials and managers
Professionals
Associate professionals and technicians
Clerical workers
Sales and service workers
Agricultural and fishery workers
Production, craftsmen and related workers
Plant and machine operators and assemblers
Cleaners, labourers and related workers
Workers not elsewhere classified
6RXUFH: Census of Population 2000 Statistical Release.

1XPEHU
612 233
37 455
36 334
29 699
17 884
28 963
292
159 690
66 482
234 881
553

3HUFHQW
100.0
6.1
5.9
4.9
2.9
4.7
0.0
26.1
10.9
38.4
0.1

Table 4.)RUHLJQERUQUHVLGHQWSRSXODWLRQE\\HDURIDUULYDOLQ6LQJDSRUHDQGKLJKHVWTXDOLILFDWLRQ
D
DWWDLQHG 

No Qualifications
b
Primary
Secondary
c
Upper secondary
University
7RWDO


1XPEHU

4 088
4.9
18 248
21.9
19 107
22.9
21 013
25.2
20 864
25.0



a.


1XPEHU

3 897
3.3
12 989
11.0
18 957
16.0
31 029
26.2
51 387
43.5



Refers to citizens and permanent residents aged 15 and older who are not students. The figures are likely to include
foreign-born spouses of Singapore citizens.
b.
Includes lower secondary.
c.
Includes polytechnic and other diplomas.
6RXUFH: Census of Population 2000 Statistical Release Notes.

375

(&2120,&67$*1$7,217+(/$%2850$5.(7$1',17(51$7,21$/
0,*5$7,21,17+$,/$1'
E\
<RQJ\XWK&KDODPZRQJ
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI)
,QWURGXFWLRQ
Since the last meeting at the Japan Institute of Labour in early January, 2001, Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra has succeeded to Chuan Leekpai in February, 2001. After almost a year in office,
the new Prime Minister came to the conclusion that the countrys fundamental woes would take years
to overcome. He has to face internal and external problems, among which a growing uncertainty in
global markets originating from major world trading partners like the United States and Japan, and
stiffer competition in the region. What is more, the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New
York City and Washington D.C. has slowed down further reform, while making it even more crucial.
When Prime Minister Thaksin took office in early 2001, his image, according to
Ingsrisawang (2000E), was that of a white knight leading the new government. But his fate also came
with political uncertainty, as he had been charged by the National Counter Corruption Commission for
violating asset disclosure laws while serving as a deputy Prime Minister in the earlier government. A
verdict of guilty, which he managed to avoid, would have banned him for five years from political
office and removed him from the limelight.
Thaksin decided to implement a dual-track economic development policy in which foreign
investment (the driving engine of growth) and domestic growth would be promoted in parallel, by
giving the priority to grassroots enterprises, SMEs, and micro-credit. At the same time, privatisation
and generous tax incentives were implemented to encourage multinational companies to set up
regional headquarters in Thailand. This outward looking, along with inward looking, is an effort
to get Thailand back on a normal track of development.
7KH7KDLHFRQRP\
Because of the slowdown of the world economy, especially among Thai trading partners
such as the United States and Japan, the Thai economic growth rate was expected to reach only 1.5%
in 2001, down from 4.4% in 2000, as the inflation remains low at about 2% and current account
registers net surpluses of 4.1% of GDP. Private consumption and investment were expected to grow
by 3% and 5% respectively. The government spending remained at the same level as the preceding
year. Export reached USD 63.8 billion, decreasing by 6.1% since 2000. Import was slightly lower than
export at USD 62.5 billion, a 0.1% increase. The current account registers net surplus of
USD 4.7 billion, that is, 4.1% of the GDP (Table 1).
The National Economic and social development Board (NESDB) released the most recent
forecast of the Thai economy in December, 2001, which indicated that the economy is entering a
stagnation period as the growth rate of the GDP grew only by 1.5% in the third quarter of 2001, a
1.9% since the previous quarter. Seasonally adjusted, the growth rate of the GDP in the third quarter
was of only 0%; the NESDB also expected the GDP would grow only 0.8% in the final quarter of
377

2001. Apart from an external factor attributable to this slowdown such as the September 11 terrorist
attacks on the US, Thailands major export market,1 the state of things seems to have been worsened
by the absence of government measures.
The results of 2002 will depend on the new Prime Ministers will to turn threats into
opportunities. Internal and external threats include: 1) how to reach a sizeable public debt the
current one represents almost 65% of the GDP and to restructure and liquidate the Thai Asset
Management Corporation more efficiently; 2) how to improve export performance under this
worldwide slowdown; and 3) how to increase direct foreign investment (FDI) under fierce competition
from neighbouring countries such as Mainland China and Vietnam.
The positive factors that would support the growth include: 1) a fair amount of public
expenditure to stimulate the economy and 2) initiatives towards the local and community economies
(using village funds). Since cautiousness is necessary as regards the effects of its outward looking
policy, strong commitment of an inward looking policy may bear fruits in 2002, limiting the
devastating effects of the worldwide slowdown in 2002.
In short, the current governments goals were reoriented towards the development of the
countrys inner strengths to cope with the external shock. The economic policy aims at reviving
growth at the grassroots level, easing poverty and putting the country firmly on the road to sustainable
development.
7KH7KDLODERXUPDUNHW
After the 3% decrease in the growth rate in 2001, the government took the decision to open a
process of registration to all illegal migrants in all areas and occupations residing in Thailand since
August 28, 2000 or before. Hopefully, this idea will bring about a better management of illegal
migrant workers coming from neighbouring countries, but labour economists show scepticism and the
public opinion seems concerned as at least 1.3 million nationals (or about 3.78% of the labour force)
are unemployed.
The number of low-skilled unemployed workers reached almost one million, some of these
peoples job opportunities seem to have been taken away by foreign workers a major concern among
those who disagree with the governments decision to run a regularisation campaign.
The Labour Force Survey of the National Statistical office (NSO) released in November,
2001 indicates a 5% (LH 500 000 persons) increase in the workforce due to population growth. The
Third round survey of the NSO also showed that 890 000 people were unemployed in 2001 (1.42%),
compared with 810 000 (1.3%) in 2000. The amount of underemployment (less than 35 hours per
week) of round 1 to round 3 of the surveys in 2001 was much higher than 2000, mainly because of the
impact of the slowdown on exporting industries (producing at about 51-53% of their capacities) and of
lacking demand and ineffective stimulation packages introduced by the government.
In fact, the total unemployment rate has improved since the financial crisis, rising again after
a peak in 1998. However, the unemployment rate among highly skilled workers has been higher than
the total unemployment rate for at least four consecutive years, jumping from 1.4% in 1997 to over
5% in 2001. The causes for this phenomenon might be the following: 1) a slowdown of almost all
sectors, especially export. The financial and banking sectors, which have not fully recovered, intend to
lay off more and more people; and 2) the fact that the Civil Servant Commission has been practising a
1

Together, Japan and the United States accounted for 30% of Thailands total export.

378

downsizing policy for government and state enterprises employees for several years. These
organisations used to be the main working sector for the highly skilled.
Before the crisis, the growth of wage rates in all sectors had somewhat fluctuated and
declined but had remained positive in all sub-sectors. After the crisis, they turned negative in 1998
before becoming positive again in 1999 in all sectors except for agriculture, and turning negative again
in 2000 except for agriculture, when the prices of many commodities increased. The impact of the
crisis seem to depress wage rates in all sectors where the Thais hired illegal migrants, making equal
protection and migrants receiving the same protection and coverage as Thais very difficult (Table 2).
The current government has implemented several measures to tackle unemployment
problem, encouraging inter-Ministerial co-operation between the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Finance, and the
Government Financial Institutions. These measures are described in Appendix 2.
,QWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
(PLJUDWLRQ
The 1997 Asian financial crisis has affected career stability among Thai workers in various
sectors and occupations. It is poor career opportunities that have motivated the decision to seek job
opportunities and wealth abroad of most skilled workers (Chalamwong, 2001D). During 1999 and
2000, the number of total departures from Thailand was of respectively 10.37 and 10.35 million, of
which 77.8% departed to OECD countries and 25.9% to non-OECD countries. In 2000, the favoured
emigration destinations to OECD countries were Japan, the UK, the US, Korea and Germany whereas
China, Chinese Taipei, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong (China) were among the favoured
countries elsewhere (Table 4). The number of outgoing nationals increased from 1.65 million in 1999
to 1.9 million in 2000 (a growth of 15.3%). The outgoing Thais seeking employment abroad increased
both to OECD and non-OECD countries. The total number of departures to OECD countries increased
by 21.78%, compared to 13.71% elsewhere (Tables 5 and 6).
Out of 1.9 million outgoing Thais in 2000, 0.63 million were labourers, production and
service workers, 0.33 million were clerical, salesmen and commercial personnel, 0.19 million were
students and 0.1 million were housewives and unpaid family workers. It is interesting to note that
number of outgoing Thais in all ten occupations except for agricultural workers increased. According
to gender, more men departed in 1997 and 1998 but the trend was reversed in 1999 and 2000
(Table 6).
The overall number of Thai workers abroad as recorded by the Ministry of Labour and
Social Welfare (MOLSW) in 1999 and 2000 decreased by 4.6% compared with the 4.3% increase that
occurred in 1997 and 1998. The number of Thai workers going to Japan, Italy and Germany decreased
while Australia, the UK, the US and Korea saw their inflow from Thailand augment in 1999 and 2000.
Emigration to Chinese Taipei decreased from 115 000 to 107 000 as did emigration to Singapore
as a result of high unemployment rates in this destination country, while outflows increased to Hong
Kong (China) and Malaysia (Table 7). Table 8 examines the stock and growth of Thai workers
working overseas as located by the Thai Office of Labour Affairs. The statistics show an overall
declining trend, with a decrease in emigration to six countries in 2000; Hong Kong (China), Malaysia,
Chinese Taipei and Saudi Arabia remain popular destination countries.
According to the Bank of Thailand, in 2000, remittances sent through the banking system
reached THB 68 836 million (USD 1 530 million) , increasing by THB 55 278 million
379

(USD1 228 million), or by some 19% since 1999. These remittances, which are definitely helping the
current account balance of Thailand, accounted for about 2.4% of its total export value.
Emigration policies have not changed over the past two years. The MOLSW still encourages
workers of all skill and educational levels to seek employment overseas through private placement
agencies. The government has used the G2G to send workers abroad from time to time for the purpose
of keeping the placement fee of the private in check. For example, in 2000, only 528 workers were
sent directly by the Department of Employment. However, the government vowed to step up measures
to keep the placement fee at reasonable levels and to better look after the welfare and living conditions
of Thais working overseas. In 2000, 68 domestic and overseas recruitment agencies out of the
256 operating were suspected of wrong-doing and 3 had their licenses temporary withdrawn.
When the conflicts between Israel and the Palestine heated up in late 2001, the MOLSW
took measures to evacuate about 20 000 Thai workers from Israel for their own safety. Even though
the situation between the two sides has improved, the MOLSW is still monitoring their impacts on
Thai workers very carefully.
,PPLJUDWLRQ
For about five years, Thailand has been one of the countries with the highest number of
immigrants in Asia, including a large number of illegal migrant workers from neighbouring countries.
Tourism, border trade, skilled and low-skilled employment, commercial sex trade, transit to other
countries and business immigration or immigration for permanent residence are the main causes of
these inflows (Chalamwong 2001b). The total arrivals to Thailand reached 10.3 million in 2000
(+1.63%), among which 9.5 million were tourists, 70 203 were overseas Thais (-1.02% since the
previous year) and 800 000 were unknown arrivals (Table 9). Among the arrivals from OECD
countries (which increased by 84.6%), Japan accounted for 1.15 million (+2.97%), while the UK, the
US, Korea and Germany were among the subordinates. In comparison to Non-OECD countries, China,
Chinese Taipei, Malaysia and Singapore accounted for the largest number of arrivals. The growth rate
of arrivals in 2000 was 25.8% lower than in 1999 (Table 10).
Alien employment in Thailand can be classified into two major categories: legal and illegal
alien workers. According to Table 11, there were 102 612 legal workers in 2000, a decrease of only
0.15% since 1999 accounted for by the general drop in the number of permanent foreign workers
(-17.4%). The situation of illegal workers has increased slightly in 2000 due to the rising number of
businesses or households seeking to cut costs by hiring more low-skills-low-wage illegal workers from
neighbouring countries.
In 2000, the government (through the MOLSW) allowed the same number as 1999 of illegal
migrants to regularise their status. However, the number of actual registrations dropped slightly by
0.34%, resulting in an increase in the number of non-registered migrants (Table 12). The MOLSW
issued 4.32% more work permits than the previous year. Administrators and managers, service
workers, agricultural workers and craftsmen and transportation workers were among the occupations
that maintained higher demand while professionals and technicians, clerks and commercial workers
showed substantial lower demand (Table 12).
In spite of a total average growth of 4.32% during 1999/2000, alien workers from OECD
countries showed a negative growth (1.29%), except for Australia. By contrast, the number of alien
workers from non-OECD grew by 8.66%. China, the Philippines and unidentified countries
contributed to this rise, while Chinese Taipei and India decreased by 21.5 and 21.8% respectively
(Table 14).
380

,PPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHV
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpais government had granted work permits to illegal migrant
workers, mostly low-skilled, from neighbouring countries. According to the Cabinets resolution in
1998, workers of Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia could be given work permits to work in 54 provinces
in 47 occupations, and in 1999, this was extended to other provinces and occupations.
As a result of the measures taken in 1999, illegal immigrants have continuously been pushed
back, arrested and deported. The statistics released by the National Security Council (NSC) indicated
that 319 629 were arrested in 1999 and 444 636 in 2000. Employers and business owners who
continued to hire undocumented workers after the granting period expired can also be arrested and
prosecuted. More than 1 000 employers were arrested and sentenced in 2000.
There were proposals from the National Advisory Council for Labour Development and the
NSCs Sub-committee on Solving the Problem of Illegal Migrants to set up a permanent organisation
to manage illegal migrant workers. This organisation, called the Office of the Administrative
Commission on Irregular Workers (OAW) was finally approved by the Cabinet in mid-2001. It was
chaired by the Prime Minister or the appointed Deputy Prime Minister. The MOLSW was in charge of
the setting up of its administrative office. The committee, which consists of 29 representatives from
various organisations, aims at proposing policies, measures, master plans, at setting up the conditions
of negotiations, and at seeking co-operation and helps from other countries. It also establishes
networks that help manage foreign labour in Thailand and develops legislation and regulations.
However, this office has only started to operate in November, 2001 and his actions have not
progressed as one could have expected.
However, after the work permits given to illegals expired in August, 2001, Mr. Thaksins
new government came up with a new policy allowing all illegal migrant workers already residing and
working in Thailand to report to the Royal Immigration Police. They could apply for temporary work
permits from the MOLSW before the end of October, 2001. These alien workers were first granted
six-month work permits and were required to pass a physical examination before getting it extended
by six more months. The registered migrants who could not pass the physical check up would be
deported.
A number of 562 527 illegal workers were reported in 10 types of business occupations.
These include:
7\SH  $JULFXOWXUH Workers cultivating vegetable, fruit, sugarcane, palm oil, coffee, etc.
(18.33%).
Type 2: Mining industry (0.25%).
Type 3: Brick and porcelain-making factories (0.64%).
7\SH&RQVWUXFWLRQ,QGXVWU\ Construction workers (8.49%).
Type 5: Ag. Processing Industry. Rice-milling workers (1.1%).
7\SH/LYHVWRFN Hog and chicken breeders (5.28%).
7\SH)LVKHU\ Marine and Fresh water fisheries workers (17.7%).
7\SH7UDQVSRUW Manual workers in commodity transportation inside cargoes (2.27%).
7\SH'RPHVWLF:RUNHUV Housemaids or servants (14.41%) .
7\SH6SHFLDO%XVLQHVVHV Special businesses other than those 9 types.

 Having employers (26.86%).

2 Having no employers (4.68%).

381

Out of 562 527 registered migrants, 79.82% were Burmese, 10.38% from Laotian and 9.8%
Cambodian, a figure that the government seems to find satisfactory. But it is believed that at least
300 000 to 400 000 illegal workers did not register, especially those coming to work in Thailand
seasonally along the border provinces of the country.
The government is now facing the issues entailed by the coming expiration of the latest
regularisation process. Can the government keep the promise that there will be no more extension of
the current work permits after the one-year term expires? Will Thailand import foreign labourers to fill
up the shortage of low-skilled workers? What measures are to be taken regarding registered illegal
workers who refuse to return to their countries of origin after the expiration date? These are just a few
questions raised by the public opinion, questions that in my opinion, the new government-based
organisation cannot but address.
,QWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
It has been a long time since Thailand signed bilateral agreements with such neighbouring
countries as Malaysia, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. With Malaysia, Northern Malaysia in
particular, the leadership of regional military infantry and/or border provinces governors had signed
agreements to create a joint patrol on the border, especially at the time when communist movements
and separatist groups were very strong the four southern provinces. Today, as separatist groups have
disappeared, the joint border committee focuses more on economic issues, LH ways to cope with
illegal entry and employment. The agreement aimed at stopping the clandestine entry of Thais as well
as others coming from third countries such as Myanmar, Bangladeshi, Chinese and Southern China in
general.
There have been discussions under the multi-lateral agreement of IMT-GT of the regional
growth triangle to establish an international training centre in a southern province of Thailand with the
MOLSW. In the process, proposals were made to ease the restriction or labour movements across the
border.
Similar Joint Border Committees have been established in many major provinces of Thailand
such as Tak, Chiang Rai, Kanchanaburi and Ranong with Myanmar local authorities to discuss all
matters of conflict between citizens of the two countries including the military activities infrastructure
development, trade, and cross-border movements. So far, the government of Myanmar and the
Thaksins administration have formally discussed matters pertaining migrant workers to Thailand and
other important migration issues.
Trade and investment co-operation has also been established between Thailand and three
other northern neighbouring, namely Laos, Southern China and Myanmar. Discussions over migration
and employment matters have not been made public yet. Thanks to a close co-operation between the
Joint Border Committees of Laos and Cambodia, there has been no difficulties on any part to
exchange information and facilitate border-crossing.
6RFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQ
In spite of the 1995 registration process of illegal/undocumented migrants in 1995,2 these
registered workers are restricted to certain occupation and areas. They do not receive the same level of
2

Thailand did not grant an amnesty to illegal/undocumented migrants but rather used the existing
Article 12 of the Work of Aliens Act to issue work permits to those caught who were awaiting to be
repatriated.

382

freedom of movement as local workers (LH. they enjoy limited freedom outside their workplaces) but
they are supposed to receive the same rights and protections as local workers according to the labour
protection laws. They are also supposed to receive the same minimum wage rate and social security
benefits. In practice, they are quasi-employees, but their accessibility and protections are fairly limited.
In most cases, as they cannot read Thai, are unaware of such rights and afraid to complain to officers
and/or employers, they are exploited, either on their pay or in the number of hours they are compelled
to work. Recently, this picture has changed when more than 200 registered workers from Myanmar
protested at the provincial office in one of the coastal provinces, requesting better treatment from the
factory owner.
An effort was made by the government to limit illegal entries in 2002 and start encouraging
legal recruitment and employment in a very near future (LH this process could be called social
integration of the foreign workers from neighbouring countries).
Family reunion is currently prohibited for fear of social issues, but many undocumented
migrants have been in Thailand for almost a decade and some of them have brought in their spouses
and had children. For humanitarian purposes, they are provided with social services such as state
hospitals and public schools. The Cabinet resolutions of September, 1999 allow family reunion to
registered migrants, but should the spouse get pregnant, they are required to go back to their home
countries.
By contrast, expatiates (HJ foreign experts) can bring along their families and receive better
care than registered undocumented workers, such as public amenities and social services. The
government allows them to have their own schools or enter a public or a private school if they wish to
do so. In general, these expatiates are well paid by their employers and often receive welfare and/or
fringe benefits at much higher levels than the ones stated in the Thai Labour Protection Laws.
8SGDWHRQWKHSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVIRULOOHJDOPLJUDQWV
As mentioned in Chalamwong (2001c), many organisations, namely, the NSC, the MOLSW
and the NACLD provide the government with recommendations on the management of irregular
migration. The Department of Employment (DOE), which works the under MOLSWs supervision,
has a Committee Considering Aliens Work composed of 14 representatives (mostly ministries and
experts). This committee can issue temporary work permits to anyone including illegal migrants
awaiting deportation.
A Sub-committee on Solving the Problem of Illegal Migrants has been established by the
NSC; it is composed of representatives from the MOLSW, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), the
Royal Police, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Public Relations
Department (PRD), the Office of Economic and Social development Board (NESDB), the Ministry of
Defence, and various experts. Its main tasks are to give recommendations to the NSC to solve issues in
illegal migration through the network of the sub-committee. This is one of the most effective
organisation in dealing with this matter since it can submit proposals directly to the NSC, which is
chaired by the Prime Minister.
The National Advisory Council for Labour Development (NACLD) provides
recommendations on labour issues to the MOLSW and can give advice directly to the government.
The council, comprised of tripartite members and experts, has played major roles in the past five years.
Let us just give an example of the way these national committees have been operating since
2000: the DOE commissioned a report from the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University,
383

to evaluate the number of alien workers needed by enterprises by occupation and province, and tried to
use the results of this research to support a renewal of work permits in 2001.
The Sub-Committee chaired by Secretary-General of the NSC met several times to discuss
the possibility of organising new registration campaigns. At the same time, they gathered a working
group to draft a law that would create a new organisation to manage illegal migrant in the longer-run;
the draft was approved by the Sub-Committee and submitted to the NSC for approval and suggestions.
In addition, the NACLD set up a similar sub-committee to suggest appropriate policies.
Recommendations were sent to the Minister of MOLSW, which later sent it to the government via the
Sub-committee in Solving Problems of Illegal Migrants for consideration.
Finally, the sub-committee has considered the proposals of all agencies concerned and has
agreed in principle to create a more permanent organisation. After almost two years of preparation, the
draft was completed and submitted to the NSC and the Cabinet for approval. The National Office of
the Administrative Commission on Irregular Migration was established in November, 2001.
5HVHDUFKRQPLJUDWLRQDQGQHWZRUNLQJ
The following paragraphs are an update about a research project related to migration in
Thailand sponsored by the ILO-IOM (International Organisation for Migration) and entitled
Thailand: Improving Migration Policy Management with Special Focus on Irregular Labour
Migration. The main objective is to contribute to the promotion of long-term growth and employment
through the judicious management of foreign labour. The main output is an advisory report submitted
to the government. The research works were carried on by the TDRI, the Asian Research Centre for
Migration at Chulalongkorn University and the Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidon
University, in collaboration with Professor Philip Martin, ILOs consultant, and Doctor Phillip Guest
of the Population Council. This project was completed in February 2002.
In the part of the TDRI, exchanges and networking with the JIL for over five years has
continuously helped improve knowledge and experience about OECD countries and Asian
participating countries. The benefits of attending such annual seminars have been tremendous.

384

$33(1',;
&+5212/2*<2)0($685(6'($/,1*:,7+81'2&80(17(':25.(56

Since the first stage of the measures started (around 1989), the number of illegal immigrants
has been increasing continuously. Government agencies have tried to cope with the problem. The
measures for dealing with illegal foreign workers proposed during Anan Panyarachuns administration
and approved by the Cabinet on March 17th, 1992 intended to:
x

Warn Burmese citizens along the Thailand-Burma border that intruding Thailand is
illegal and that they would be prosecuted and punished according to the law. (Forces
have been used to withhold new immigrants.)

Let Burmese citizens along the border enter Thailand to buy commodities by establishing
the trading channels or border check-points, while controlling, arresting and punishing
those who intrude through these check-points.

Register and document intruders and allow them to stay in Thailand temporarily.

Allow illegal immigrants to work temporarily in Thailand on approval of the Ministry of

the Interior.

The Ministry of the Interior has issued regulations on May 2nd, 1995 concerning the working
status of illegal Burmese immigrants; they:
x

Allow Burmese to work in some areas especially in industrial sites along the border.

Limit the categories of aliens who can work in Thailand, for example, the Burmese who
immigrated after March 1st, 1976 and have already been registered and documented by
the Governing Department.

Although a number of regulations are used to control illegal immigrants, Burmese citizens
have continuously immigrated and scattered all over Thailand, moving into inner provinces in search
of higher wages. In addition, entrepreneurs and other organisations such as the Chamber of Commerce
or the Industrial Federation has requested from the government that they allow foreign workers from
neighbouring countries by claiming that Thailand suffered from a shortage of unskilled workers.
Bunhan Silapaachas administration issued policies and measures on June 25th, 1996 to set up a system
that:
x

Organises and systemises the regulations by controlling illegal immigrants so that the
government can manage and supervise them easily;

Let all agents, such as entrepreneurs, employers, labourers, government agencies and
people organisations take their share of responsibility.

385

Nevertheless, these measures have not been very efficient so far. The National Security
Office has proposed on February 17, 1998 not to register or grant further work permits to foreigners,
and to control registered foreigners, who would not be allowed to work in factories. The illegal
immigrants who did not receive a permit must be repatriated. If they cannot be sent back immediately,
temporary work permits can be granted while they wait for their repatriation.
On May 6th, 1998, the Cabinet has approved other measures dealing with alien workers,
without much success. In 1999, the government issued another set of measures similar to the previous
ones and that might be bearing fruits slowly but remains generally inefficient in practice. According to
the 1999 measure, illegal immigrants have continuously been pushed back, arrested and deported.
Employers, employees, government agents, and others involved in illegal immigration must also be
arrested and prosecuted. Businesses that cannot immediately find Thai workers and need to hire illegal
alien workers must request temporary work permits so that they can be systematically controlled.
/DWHVWPHDVXUHV
The Alien Labourers Administration Committee, which consists of 29 persons, is presided
by the Prime Minister or his representative, and has the Minister of labour serving as vice-president.
Its main tasks are to propose policies, measures and plans, to set up conditions in negotiations, and to
seek co-operation and help from other countries. It also establishes networks to better manage foreign
labour and develops legislation and regulations.
These policies aim at avoiding the replacement of Thai workers by a cheaper foreign labour
force. There are 10 types of businesses that foreign labourers are allowed to work according to the law
(see Table 13 for the list of businesses).
Unfortunately, the new measures seems to have adverse effects such as the expansion of
prostitution in concealed forms such as Thai massage and security guards.

386

$33(1',;
0($685(6352326('7262/9(81(03/2<0(17352%/(0681'(5
7+$.6,16$'0,1,675$7,21
0HDVXUHV
0HDVXUHVWRVORZGRZQOD\
RIIV
1.1 Thai businesses revita-lization
project
1.2 Offensive strategy
to deter lay-offs.
0HDVXUHVIRUVNLOOWUDLQLQJDQG
MREUHFUXLWPHQW
2.1 Job recruitment and career
support for workers returning from a
project abroad.
2.2 Training and inventing potential
development networks for labour
forces.
2.3 The career support project on
education (9+1 and 12 +1 years)
2.4 Career potential development
for the laid-offs project
2.5 A project on training and
developing workers who have
potential to run SME businesses
2.6 Project for increasing the
efficiency of village fund
management and urban community
fund management.
0HDVXUHVWRFUHDWHQHZ
HQWUHSUHQHXUV
3.1 Project for creating new
entrepreneurs
0HDVXUHWRKHOSWKHODLGRII
4.1 Extension of the benefits of the
Social Security Fund
4.2 The handicap career training
project
5. Loans and services to solve
unemployment
/RDQVIRUVHOIHPSOR\HG
ZRUNHUV

2UJDQLVDWLRQVLQ
FKDUJH

%XGJHW
0LOOLRQ%DKW

7DUJHWJURXS
1RRI:RUNHUV

MOI

260 000

2 000

MOLSW

214 000

1 400.7

MOLSW

18 000

46.3

MOLSW

135 280

1947.6

MOE

163 960

549.5

MOE

18 600

42.6

MOE

17 700

69.3

MOE/village fund offices

74 881

5 077.1

MOI

5 000 /#of jobs

created 1 500 /#of
businesses
invented

250

MOLSW

350 000

2 000

MOLSW

600 /# of jobs
created


7.6

Prospective and
current selfemployed

50 000 baht/person
(max. in case of
personal warranty.)
200 000 baht/person
(max. in case of
collateral.)


Srinakorn Bank

387

$SSHQGL[FRQWLQXHG
0HDVXUHV

2UJDQLVDWLRQVLQFKDUJH

/RDQVIRUZRUNHUVVHHNLQJ
HPSOR\PHQWDEURDG

Srinakorn Bank

*ROGHQODQGORDQV

Srinakorn Bank

7KH1DNRUQOXDQJ7KDL%DQN
SURMHFW

Nakornluang-Thai Bank

/RDQIRUMREFUHDWLRQ

The Government Saving

Bank

/RDQIRUSURVSHFWLYHZRUNHUV
DEURDG

The Government Saving

Bank

5.7 Loan for job creation

Krungthai Bank

5.8 Social Service for the

unemployed

Krungthai Bank

388

7DUJHWJURXS
%XGJHW
1RRI:RUNHUV
0LOOLRQ%DKW
For unemployed
80 000 baht/person
who wish to work
(max. in case of
abroad
personal warranty)
200 000 baht/person
(max. in case
collateral)
The retailer who
100 000 baht/person
wants to buy
(max. in case of
booths, shops, or
personal warranty.)
areas in shopping
250 000 baht/person
malls or markets
(max. in case of
collateral.)
The laid-offs and
50 000 baht/person
new graduates
(max. in case of
who cannot find
personal warranty.)
jobs.
100 000 baht/person
(max. for each project
in case of more than
3 person group loan.)
Unemployed or
50 000 baht/person
laid-off graduates
(max. in case of
personal warranty.)
100 000 baht/person
(max. in case of no
more than 6 person
group loan.)
The person who
Max. 150 000
intends to work
baht/person.
abroad through a
recruiting agency
registered with the
Job Recruiting
Department.
The laid-offs and
the workers who
return from
abroad f/ Nov.,
2001 to Dec.,
2002. and The
graduates who
has participated in
Loan-for
education project
and cannot find
Jobs or be laid-off
The laid-off and
Max. 100 000
the workers who
baht/person
return from
abroad from Nov.,
2001 to Dec.,
2002.
The graduates
who have
participated in
loan for education
project and cannot
find jobs or have
been laid-off.

5()(5(1&(6

CHALAMWONG, Y. (2001D), The Impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis on Thailand International
Migration to OECD countries, paper presented at the OECD, June.
CHALAMWONG, Y. (2001E),Recent Trends in Migration Flows and Policies in Thailand, 7'5,
4XDUWHUO\5HYLHZ, Vol. 16 (2), June.
CHALAMWONG, Y. (2001F),Recent Economic Development, Labour Market and International
Migration in Thailand, A Country Report, paper presented at the Workshop on International
Migration and Labour Market in Asia organised by the Japan Institute of Labour (JIL), 1-2
February, Tokyo, Japan.
INGSRISAWANG, C. (2000D), Recovery or False Dawn, %DQJNRN3RVW, 2000 Year-end Economic
Review.
INGSRISAWANG, C. (2000E), Long Night ahead for White Knight, %DQJNRN3RVW, 2000 Year-end
Economic Review.

389

7DEOH)RUHFDVWLQJRIWKH7KDLHFRQRP\


Exchange rates (Baht/US$)
Real growth rates of GDP (%)
Agriculture
Industry
Service
Inflation Rate (%)
Investment growth rate (%)
Exports
9DOXHELOOLRQ%DKW

9DOXHELOOLRQ86

Imports
9DOXHELOOLRQ%DKW

9DOXHELOOLRQ86

Balance of trade
9DOXHELOOLRQ%DKW
$VRI*'3
9DOXHELOOLRQ86
Tourism income
9DOXHELOOLRQ%DKW

9DOXHELOOLRQ86

Current account
9DOXHELOOLRQ%DKW
$VRI*'3
9DOXHELOOLRQ86
Per capita nominal GDP (baht)
Per capita nominal GDP (US$)
Nominal GDP (billion Baht)
Growth rates (%)


40.27
4.4
2.7
5.2
4.1
1.6
5.4


44.60
1.2
2.1
0.9
1.2
1.8
0.1


45.00
2.4
2.0
4.0
0.9
2.0
3.0


45.00
0.2
2.0
0.7
-0.8
0.7
1.5

2 733.3
27.1
68.13
19.9

2 792.1
2.2
62.79
-7.8

2 903.6
4.0
64.52
2.8

2 746.4
-1.6
61.03
-2.8

2 513.5
39.6
62.40
30.4

2 748.6
9.4
61.82
-0.9

2 885.5
5.0
64.12
3.7

2 791.3
1.6
62.03
0.3

219.9
4.5
5.62

43.5
0.9
0.97

18.1
0.3
0.40

-44.9
-0.9
-1.00

2.99.5
12.7
7.44
6.3

298.6
-0.3
6.70
-10.0

299.4
0.3
6.65
-0.6

285.7
-4.3
6.35
-5.2

367.1
7.5
9.37
78 525
1 950
4 900
6.2

183.9
3.7
4.15
80 246
1 799
5 049
3.0

154.2
2.9
3.43
82 853
1 841
5 255
4.1

81.6
1.6
1.81
80 106
1 780
5 081
0.6

1. Export increased around 2.8%, income from tourism remained the same as 2001.
2. Export decreased by 2.8% and income from tourism decreased by 4.3%.
6RXUFH: Thailand Development Research Institute, released September 25, 2001.

390

Table 2.$YHUDJHPRQWKO\ZDJHRIDQHPSOR\HHLQWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUDFFRUGLQJWRHGXFDWLRQOHYHO
URXQG
(GXFDWLRQDO/HYHO
Number (Baht)
Primary and Lower
Lower Secondary
Upper Secondary
Lower Vocational
Upper Vocational
Bachelor
Master and Higher
Total
Growth Rate (%)
Primary and Lower
Lower Secondary
Upper Secondary
Lower Vocational
Upper Vocational
Bachelor
Master and Higher
Total







3 761
4 969
5 446
7 479
8 637
15 095
34 240
4 922

4 019
4 917
6 115
8 282
9 566
16 125
96 077
5 502

3 938
4 964
5 953
7 681
9 474
15 584
37 930
5 571

6.86
-0.44
12.28
10.74
10.76
6.82
5.36
11.79

-2.03
0.34
-2.66
-7.26
-0.96
-3.36
5.14
1.25

3 460
6 575
7 520
7 694
14 805
32 359
4 669

8.70
-1.08
-17.17
-0.54
12.26
1.96
5.81
5.44







3 901
4 864
5 728
7 940
8 752
15 600
32 650
5 586

3 942
4 911
5 325
7 975
8 701
15 203
39 097
5 538

-0.93
-2.00
-3.76
3.37
-7.62
0.10
-13.92
0.26

1RWH: Highly educated workers mean those in possession of a bachelors degree or more.
6RXUFH: National Statistical Office, Labour Force Survey (round 3), 1997-2001.

1.06
0.96
-7.04
0.45
-0.58
-2.54
19.75
-0.85

Table 3.3RSXODWLRQE\ODERXUIRUFHVWDWXVZKROHNLQJGRP

1XPEHU
Population
Total Labour Force
Current Labour Force
Employment
Unemployment
Looking for Work
Not Looking but Available for Work
Seasonally Inactive
Not in Labour Force
Over 13 Years
Under 13 Years
6KDUH
Population
Total Labour Force
Current Labour Force
Employment
Unemployment
Looking for Work
Not Looking but Available for Work
Seasonally Inactive
Not in Labour Force
Over 13 Years
Under 13 Years



61 856 730
33 210 217
33 072 932
32 087 171
985 761
326 016
659 745
137 285
28 646 513
14 763 795
13 882 718

100.00
53.69
53.47
51.87
1.59
0.53
1.07
0.22
46.31
23.87
22.44


62 481 450
33 973 061
33 813 736
33 001 088
812 648
283 766
528 882
159 325
28 508 389
14 739 163
13 769 225

 
63 001 140
34 487 688
34 380 032
33 483 724
896 308
160 779
735 529
107 656
28 513 452
12 646 693
15 866 758


100.00
54.37
54.12
52.82
1.30
0.45
0.85
0.25
45.63
23.59
22.04

* Population not in labour force of over 15 years and under 15 years of age respectively.
6RXUFH: National Statistical Office, Report of the Labour Force Survey Round 3 (various years).

391

100.00
54.74
54.57
53.15
1.42
0.26
1.17
0.17
45.26
20.07
25.18

Table 4.'HSDUWXUHVIURP7KDLODQGE\QDWLRQDOLW\3HUVRQV



Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
US
OECD Countries
Bangladesh
China (Mainland)
Hong Kong
Taiwan
India
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Thai
Vietnam
Others
Non-OECD
Nations
Total



22 4881
39 906
38 806
74 037
6 992
52 667
36 982
214 221
343 057
15 428
7 895
1 298
15 184
108 782
986 261
418 183
1 678
4 028
84 535
40 372
31 316
7 112
27 368
32 876
93 333
91 313
12 124
344 490
347 338
2 166 397
20 404
636 338
197 922
432 481
158 213
88 865
26 479
867 745
52 052
13 404
36 622
77 413
385 917
1 707 187
21 858
1 838 561
6 561 461



251 984
23 251
21 398
91 471
6 795
45 884
28 257
184 323
289 284
14 977
6 862
2 014
19 371
123 034
881 160
193 703
2 101
5 182
133 836
15 552
20 285
11 712
13 261
14 188
132 326
107 088
15 796
415 620
402 252
1 990 065
7 774
527 412
204 241
464 844
160 921
53 393
20 668
595 258
33 601
13 060
17 175
75 818
450 895
2 597 442
14 681
1790852
7 028 035



30 771
40 415
46 150
101 734
9 427
76 743
45 050
252 428
382 946
12 945
6 963
1 773
24 653
111 877
1 163 516
348 370
1 884
5 770
112 869
49 907
50 029
11 741
24 681
29 471
135 774
93 754
16 560
524 857
531 913
2 578 391
22 381
947 440
269 996
543 876
197 895
111 488
39 635
798 820
50 896
14 778
37 543
85 067
468 295
1 743 907
34 986
2 426 682
7 793 685



280 741
41 468
46 480
106 697
9 435
72 881
50 820
242 330
355 929
12 529
7 762
1 808
31 624
114 316
1 162 293
434 362
1 742
7 783
121 658
57 168
55 181
10 210
16 756
32 978
151 577
94 812
18 211
545 643
501 044
4 586 238
25 950
764 626
240 894
645 792
222 862
107 876
41 002
593 323
50 018
15 163
47 744
96 855
455 158
1 923 436
44 565
493 850
5 769 114

8 727 858

9 018 100

10 372 076

10 355 352

6RXUFH: Immigration Bureau, Royal Thai Police, 2001

392

*URZWK


12.05
-6.97
-41.74
2.61
-44.86
0.72
23.55
4.88
-2.82
0.08
-12.88
-5.03
-23.59
12.81
-13.96
-4.00
-15.67
-7.06
-2.92
-3.21
-13.08
11.47
55.16
1.97
27.58
28.28
13.10
2.18
-10.66
-0.11
-53.68
24.68
25.21
-7.54
28.65
34.89
58.32
7.79
-61.48
14.55
-35.22
10.30
64.68
-13.04
-51.55
-32.11
-56.84
11.90
41.78
11.64
17.28
1.13
30.29
9.97
20.65
3.96
15.81
-5.80
-8.14
77.87
-61.90
15.95
-17.12
-19.30
3.19
-10.78
7.48
18.74
1.71
12.62
-39.92
-3.24
-21.95
3.45
-31.40
-25.73
-35.45
-1.73
-2.57
2.61
-53.10
27.17
-2.06
13.86
16.84
-2.81
52.15
10.29
-32.83
27.38
-2.59
-79.65
7.11
-25.98
3.33

-0.16

Table 5.2XWJRLQJ7KDLQDWLRQDOVE\FRXQWU\RIGHVWLQDWLRQ3HUVRQV



Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US
OECD
Nations
Bangladesh
China
(Mainland)
Hong Kong
Taiwan
India
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Vietnam
Others
Non-OECD
Nations
Total



62 571
5 322
1 136
4 025
5 954
4 378
21 393
39 272
14 339
87 235
26 760
13 260
12 975
681
904
3 381
17 891
36 616
65 362
423 455



53 174
4 920
551
4 812
5 224
3 434
20 450
34 594
11 741
86 831
21 344
13 751
9 275
349
964
3 476
13 739
32 287
53 935
374 851



34 065
2 151
236
1 668
3 878
1 918
10 323
26 215
5 641
67 529
27 505
8 961
3 975
309
583
2 712
9 912
21 661
33 727
262 969

1 199
105 820

1 828
91 492

273 448
107 825
15 167
20 899
54 469
383 985
20 685
2 294
2 012
12 575
268 560
16 458
114 825
1 400 221
1 823 676



50 568
3 375
305
2 302
5 107
3 129
15 589
32 411
10 062
76 776
35 605
8 503
5 303
370
637
3 709
15 824
26 482
43 178
339 235



58 597
4 615
313
1 244
6 023
3 888
17 557
41 088
10 786
88 900
61 465
13 135
5 094
668
701
4 627
16 231
31 171
47 026
413 129

2 076
69 919

2 032
120 819

2 739
135 517

13.57
-23.58

34.79
12.17

201 368
116 500
15 026
20 886
51 180
376 036
19 133
2 358
1 541
13 332
211 114
16 716
124 234
1 262 744

130 731
118 173
12 756
8 551
53 818
403 248
17 718
2 060
1 733
10 854
194 490
15 728
89 021
1 130 816

178 030
121 589
12 942
7 795
62 640
445 552
19 362
2 694
1 619
11 625
225 431
16 373
87 002
1 315 505

195 678
134 880
15 646
15 731
67 251
540 278
19 820
3 731
2 378
12 201
234 482
21 851
93 616
1 495 799

-35.08
1.44
-15.11
-59.06
5.15
7.24
-7.40
-12.64
12.46
-18.59
-7.87
-5.91
-28.34
-10.44

9.91
10.93
20.89
101.81
7.36
21.26
2.37
38.49
46.88
4.95
4.01
33.46
7.60
13.71

1 637 595

1 393 845

1 654 740

1 908 928

-14.88

15.36

6RXUFHStatistical Report, Tourism Authority of Thailand (various issues).

393

*URZWK


-35.94
15.88
-56.28
36.74
-57.17
2.62
-65.34
-45.96
-25.77
17.94
-44.15
24.26
-49.52
12.62
-24.22
26.77
-51.95
7.20
-22.23
15.79
28.87
72.63
-34.83
54.47
-57.14
-3.94
-11.46
80.54
-39.52
10.05
-21.98
24.75
-27.86
2.57
-32.91
17.71
-37.47
8.91
-29.85
21.78

Table 6.2XWJRLQJ7KDLQDWLRQDOVE\VH[DQGRFFXSDWLRQ3HUVRQV




Professionals
Administrative &
Managerial Personnel
Clerical, Salesman &
Commercial Personnel
Labourer/Production
and Service Workers
Agricultural Workers
Government and
Military Personnel
Housewife/Unpaid
Family Workers
Students and Children
Retired and
Unemployed
Other
Not Stated
Total
Male
Female


67 440
30 570


58 587
22 626


70 715
41 576


87 000
49 410

*URZWK


-13.13
23.03
-25.99
18.84

263 898

241 975

287 732

330 618

-8.31

14.90

493 095

421 385

482 866

638 261

-14.54

32.18

13 924
49 668

17 832
26 985

19 331
37 406

17289
49 572

28.07
-45.67

-10.56
32.52

74 461

66 382

77 684

104 967

-10.85

35.12

155 338
5 169

130 205
4 200

168 780
6 259

194 377
7 833

-16.18
-18.75

15.17
25.15

4 331
479 701
1 637 595
991 955
725 640

6 133
397 535
1 393 845
789 885
603 960

6 025
456 366
1 654 740
902 372
752 368

7 087
422 514
1 908 928
1 008 959
899 969

41.61
-17.13
-14.88
-20.37
-16.77

17.63
-7.42
15.36
11.81
19.62

1. Includes Hong Kong (China), Mainland China and Chinese Taipei.

6RXUFH: Statistical Report, Tourism Authority of Thailand (various issues).

Table 7.7KDLZRUNHUVDEURDGDVUHFRUGHGE\WKH02/6:)ORZV3HUVRQV




Australia
Denmark
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea
UK
USA
OECD
Nations
HongKong
Chinese
Taipei
Malaysia
Singapore
Vietnam
Other
Non-OECD
Nations
Total


43
85
305
111
10 118
994
103
764
12 523


23
189
130
10 099
1 455
82
699
12 677


85
655
671
10 790
1 234
143
1 496
15 074


83
426
298
5 278
1 871
127
1 274
9 177


97
289
199
4 767
3 086
240
1 340
10 018

*URZWK


269.57
16.87
246.56
-32.16
416.15
-33.22
6.84
-9.68
-15.19
64.94
74.39
88.98
114.02
5.18
18.91
9.16

4 301
96 097

3 960
100 916

4 709
106 828

4 339
115 096

5 030
107 572

18.91
5.86

15.93
-6.54

9 363
17 601
46 656
174 018

8 860
17 770
305
39 183
170 994

9 031
17 069
202
38 822
176 661

17 716
24 525
182
31 381
193 239

20 541
22 989
199
26 692
183 023

1.93
-3.94
-33.77
-0.92
3.31

15.95
-6.26
9.34
-14.94
-5.29

186 541

183 671

191 735

202 416

193 041

4.39

-4.63

1RWH: Number of Thai workers abroad includes workers sent by the Department of Employment, private agencies or employers,

and self-arranged employment.

6RXUFHV: National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare.

394

Table 8.7KDLVZRUNLQJRYHUVHDVLQFRXQWULHVDVORFDWHGE\WKH2IILFHRI/DERXU$IIDLUV
6WRFNV


Greece
Japan
OECD
Nations
Brunei
Hong Kong
Israel
Kuwait
Malaysia
Singapore
Saudi
Arabia
Chinese
Taipei
Non-OECD
Nations
Total



32 700
44 680
77 380



32 700
54 680
87 380



7 200
34 237
41 437



7 000
27 508
34 508

37 372
8 163
4 494
57 000
64 500
23 050

24 297
7 529
4 942
57 000
65 800
37 550

20 497
7 200
24 000
5 421
30 500
68 000
36 454

14 728
7 683
20 000
4 800
35 000
52 500
41 700

-34.99
-7.77
9.97
0.00
2.02
62.91

-28.15
6.71
-16.67
-11.46
14.75
-22.79
14.39

130 000

130 000

131 000

139 010

0.00

6.11

324 579

327 118

323 072

315 421

0.78

-2.37

401 959

414 498

364 509

349 929

3.12

-4.00

6RXUFH: Overseas Labour Affairs Division, MOLSW.

*URZWK


0.00
-2.78
22.38
-19.65
12.92
-16.72

Table 9.1HWDUULYDOVWRXULVWVDQGXQNQRZQDUULYDOVWR7KDLODQG3HUVRQV




Tourists
OECD
Non-OECD
Overseas Thai
Unknown
Arrivals
Net Arrivals


7 244 400
3 494 365
3 750 035
52 255
1 585 834
8 830 234


7 293 957
3 455 060
3 838 897
72 612
1 251 370
8 545 327


7 842 760
3 677 565
4 165 195
77 830
1 769 865
9 612 625


8 651 260
4 066 162
4 585 098
70 928
1 504 326
10 155 586


9 508 623
4 812 580
4 696 043
70 203
812 263
10 320 886

*URZWK


7.52
9.91
6.44
18.36
8.50
2.42
7.19
-1.02
41.43
-46.00
12.49

1.63

6RXUFH: Statistical Yearbook Thailand 1998 & 2000, National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister; Statistical Report,

Tourism Authority of Thailand (various issues); Immigration Bureau, The Royal Thai Police.

395

Table 10.1XPEHURIDUULYDOVE\QDWLRQDOLW\3HUVRQV



Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
US
OECD Nations
Bangladesh
China (Mainland)
Hong Kong
Chinese Taipei
India
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Thai
Vietnam
Others
Non-OECD
Nations
Total



217 769
38 144
38 852
72 800
6 623
51 359
35 844
209 428
329 780
14 115
7 357
1 317
14 819
103 876
955 735
411 572
1 579
3 844
83 044
39 374
30 859
6 657
25 959
32 554
89 861
87 438
11 754
337 387
341 121
2 097 818
19 543
620 809
187 669
421 205
151 796
86 492
27 224
886 762
58 348
12 763
36 005
75 335
376 797
1672 814
21 357
1 792 590
6 447 509



278 459
27 052
27 229
91 353
8 650
47 385
29 016
240 610
356 521
14 595
6 686
1 859
18 983
129 312
1 014 056
200 618
2 104
5 009
135 374
16 497
20 608
11 710
12 615
13 387
137 604
105 698
15 678
515 793
415 970
2 291 766
10 098
615 329
302 357
455 461
170 979
53 716
22 539
693 240
37 212
12 874
18 597
78 393
456 077
2 453 201
19 884
1 920 902
7 320 859



297 776
39 132
46 007
100 310
8 878
75 682
46 528
249 266
378 331
12 906
6 801
1 568
24 600
114 565
1 125 584
337 533
1 849
5 695
113 427
48 563
48 950
11 235
23 010
29 281
136 818
93 189
16 275
523 429
507 686
2 527 934
22 329
891 771
249636
540 719
193 271
113 851
41 651
826 334
54 936
14 908
39 689
82 227
456 665
1 693 282
34 215
2 372 168
7 627 652



288 916
43 995
48 235
107 787
8 285
75 913
54 176
244 542
369 046
12 631
7 791
1 974
32 694
118 803
1 159 015
434 958
1 848
7 907
124 207
57 375
57 649
10 198
16 826
33 489
167 950
97 424
19 003
554 978
505 507
4 663 122
25 837
746 444
253 980
654 337
222 892
108 140
44 195
579 864
55 162
16 289
49 175
96 843
457 848
1 811 197
44 836
490 725
5 657 764

8 545 327

9 612 625

10 155 586

10 320 886

6RXUFH: Immigration Bureau, Royal Thai Police.

396

*URZWK


27.87
-2.98
-29.08
12.43
-29.92
4.84
25.48
7.45
30.61
-6.68
-7.74
0.31
-19.05
16.44
14.89
-1.90
8.11
-2.45
3.40
-2.13
-9.12
14.56
41.15
25.89
28.10
32.90
24.49
3.70
6.10
2.97
-51.26
28.86
33.25
-0.05
30.31
38.84
63.01
9.50
-58.10
18.15
-33.22
17.77
75.91
-9.23
-51.40
-26.88
-58.88
14.37
53.13
22.75
20.88
4.54
33.38
16.76
52.88
6.03
21.94
-0.43
9.25
84.46
-48.33
15.71
-0.88
-16.30
61.11
1.74
8.13
21.01
12.64
15.33
-37.89
-5.02
-17.21
6.11
-21.82
-29.83
-36.22
0.41
0.87
9.26
-48.35
23.90
4.06
17.78
21.04
0.26
46.65
6.96
-6.90
31.04
7.16
-79.31
13.55
-25.83
12.49

1.63

Table 11.$OLHQZRUNHUVLQ7KDLODQGE\FDWHJRU\3HUVRQV




Legal Alien
Workers
Permanent
Article 7
(Temporary)
Article 10 (BOI)
Article 12
Illegal Migrant
Workers
1
Registered
Burmese
Laos
Cambodians
2
Non-registered
Total


316 174


164 313


116 657


102 767


102 612

*URZWK
 
-29.00
-0.15

121 521
44 998

15 291
42 162

21 853
48 288

19 361
49 976

15 988
52 229

42.91
14.53

-17.42
4.51

18 609
131 046
717 689

18 049
88 811
961 467

21 474
25 042
986 889

23 637
9 793
986 889

24 567
9 828
1 000 000

18.98
-71.80
2.64

3.93
0.36
1.30

293 652
256 492
11 594
25 566
424 037
1 033 863

293 652
256 492
11 594
25 566
667 815
1 125 780

90 403
78 904
1 231
10 268
896 486
1 103 546

99 996
89 336
1 164
9 496
886 893
1 089 656

99 656
97 024
1 011
7 921
900 344
1 102 612

-69.21
-69.24
-89.38
-59.84
34.24
-1.97

-0.34
8.61
-13.14
-16.59
1.51
1.18

1. Registered illegal migrant workers from Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia who received a two-year work permit in 1996 (held
constant in 1997) and one year extension in 1998, 1999 and 2000.
2. Estimated by the National Security Council and the MOLSW (various years). Number of workers under Article 12 changed in
to registered illegal migrant workers after 1997.
6RXUFH: Department of Employment, MOLSW (as a Sub-Committee on Solving Illegal Workers). Sakdina Sontisakyothin, Major
Factors Affecting Policy Changes on Illegal Migrant Workers in Thailand, Doctoral Dissertation, NIDA, Table 2.4.

Table 12.(PSOR\PHQWSHUPLWVLVVXHGWRIRUHLJQHUVQRQLPPLJUDQWYLVDDQGYLVDXQGHUODZVWRSURPRWH

LQYHVWPHQWE\RFFXSDWLRQ3HUVRQV



Professionals and
Technicians
Administrators and
Managers
Clerks
Commercial Workers
Service Workers
Agricultural Workers
Craftsmen and
Transportation Workers
Not Classified
Total


6 542


28 805


22 478


18 663

*URZWK


340.31
-16.97

24 046

30 354

24 704

25 433

26.23

2.95

1 700
10 718
74
1 203
13 299

688
1 560
1 470
39
5 517

894
1 193
1 576
149
1 629

685
861
1 665
1 280
2 251

-59.53
-85.45
1 886.49
-96.76
-58.52

-23.38
-27.83
5.65
759.06
38.18

6 000
63 582

1 318
69 751

20 990
73 613

25 958
76 796

-78.03
9.70

23.67
4.32

6RXUFH: Department of Employment, MOLSW.

397

Table 13. (PSOR\PHQWSHUPLWVLVVXHGWRIRUHLJQHUVQRQLPPLJUDQWYLVDDQGYLVDXQGHUODZVWRSURPRWH

LQYHVWPHQWE\QDWLRQDOLW\3HUVRQV


Australia
France
Germany
Japan
Korea
UK
US
OECD Nations
China (Mainland)
Taiwan
India
Philippines
Vietnam
Other
Non-OECD Nations
Total



2 480
2 340
10 224
7 903
7 128
30 075
5 964
1 106
6 237
2 117
1 291
16 792
33 507
63 582

6RXUFH: Department of Employment, MOLSW.



2 764
391
2 607
11 368
595
8 934
8 023
34 682
6 648
1 463
6 937
2 397
1 326
16 298
35 069
69 751



2 093
2 118
13 608
2 011
6 144
6 090
32 064
5 656
2 889
6 506
3 135
23 363
41 549
73 613

398



2 725
1 136
2 106
13 355
1 950
5 694
4 683
31 649
5 890
2 268
5 083
4 223
27 683
45 147
76 796

*URZWK


11.45
30.20
11.41
-0.57
11.19
-1.86
-3.03
13.05
-7.32
12.56
-23.10
15.32
-1.29
11.47
4.14
32.28
-21.50
11.22
-21.87
13.23
34.70
2.71
-2.94
18.49
4.66
8.66
9.70
4.32

,17(51$7,21$/0,*5$7,212)+,*+/<6.,//(':25.(56
,19,(71$0
E\
1JX\HQ;XDQ1JX\HQ
Economic Adviser, Vietnam
,QWURGXFWLRQ
To boost economic development and meet the target of a GDP growth rate of 8% in 2001,
the government has embarked on the track of reform, stimulated foreign investment, liberalised trade,
promoted workers export, and encouraged the development of private businesses. These measures
have led to an increase in the demand for highly skilled workers on internal as well as external
markets. The Bilateral Trade Agreement signed with America, the tariff reduction in the framework of
AFTA implementation, and new WTO negotiations have compelled enterprises to improve their
competitiveness, which relies greatly on the development of human resources.
The latest available data show that in 2001, out of a GDP growth rate of 6.8% (lower that the
expected target), agriculture accounted for 2.7%, industry for 10.4%, and services for 6.1%. CPI was
low as 0.8%; the unemployment rate in urban areas fell from 6.44% in 2000 to 6.13% in 2001. Export
grew by 4.5% and trade deficit amounted to USD 90 million, LH 0.46% of the GDP. A total of
458 FDI projects (amounting to USD 2 191 million) were registered. The establishment of FDI
enterprises attracted more highly skilled workers, both foreigners and Vietnamese.
'RPHVWLFHFRQRP\DQGODERXUPDUNHW
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHGRPHVWLFHFRQRP\
The reduction of the VND (Vietnam Dong) inflation and the growth of the GDP SHUFDSLWD
in USD have improved real wages. During the 1990s, the reform policy toward a market-oriented
economy has mobilised investment and sustained a high growth rate of 8% per year in average. The
GDP SHUFDSLWD increased from USD 97.8 in 1990 to USD 289 in 1995 and USD 405.6 in 2000. The
inflation has been lowered from 67% in 1990 down to 9.2% in 1998, and to 1% in 2001. The poverty
rate fell from 30% in 1990 to 10% in 2000.
The increase in the GDP growth rate, the expanding export and the reduction of trade deficit
during the last decade demonstrated that the domestic economy has improved, and consequently, the
qualification of workers has increased. The devaluation of the VND and a trade liberalisation policy
have promoted export. The VND has been devaluated by 130% in 10 years, from VND 6 500 per USD
in 1990 to VND 11 000 per USD in 1995 and VND 15 000 per USD in 2001. Export value has been
multiplied by seven, from USD 2 752 million in 1990 to USD 5 449 million in 1995 and USD 14 308
million in 2000. Import value raised too, from USD 1 314 million in 1990 to USD 8 155 million in
1995 and USD 15 200 million in 2000. The trade deficit, at 14.5% of the export value in 1990, was
brought down to 48.8% in 1995 and 6.2% in 2000.

399

Foreign investment and assistance have also increased. Since 1988, 3370 FDI investment
projects from 58 countries have brought in USD 40065 million. While in 1990, less than 10 foreign
international organisations and NGOs were working in Vietnam, by 2000, 15 main international
organisations (including ADB, IMF, WB, UNDP, FAO, UNIDO), 51 embassies, 30 consulates and
232 international NGOs were operating (Tables 1 and 2).
Increasing international assistance and investment to Vietnam has led to increase the number
of foreign skilled workers moving into the country. It is estimated that about 30 000 highly skilled
foreign workers work in Vietnam, including more than 15 000 in FDI projects (the other half work for
international institutions and NGOs).
Despite its progress in economic development, Vietnam is still facing challenges to integrate
the world economy because of its low productivity and efficiency in almost all its economic activities.
Firstly, the economy is still traditionally dominated by agriculture, with a low productivity.
The proportion of the rural population is high; it has hardly changed during the last ten years, from
79.5% in 1990 to 76% in 2000 (the general population growth being 1.7% per year in average, from
64.4 million in 1989 to 76.3 million in 1999). Nearly 70% of the workforce are small farmers. They
own 0.7 hectare of arable land per farming household in average, a this figure that is declining as the
population is growing. Cultivated land occupies 9 345 million hectares (28.4% of the countrys
territory) and the forest covers 11 575 million hectares (or 35.2%). The yield of main agricultural
products (rice 4.2 tons/ha, maize: 2.7 tons/ha, coffee, shrimps, livestock) is lower than that in other
Asian countries. In urban areas, the population has grown from 19.4% to 23.5%.
Secondly, although export is increasing, exported goods remain primary products.
Manufacturing products such as textile, garment and handicraft contributed to only 25% of the export
value in 1995, increasing to 35% in 2000. More than 60% of the export value comes from primary
goods (crude oil, rice, coffee, shrimps). The price fluctuation on the international market has had a
negative impact on the countrys economic growth and on its workers income.
Thirdly, the income gap is increasing. Agriculture employs 70% of the workers but it
accounted for only 30% of the GDP and 24% in 1990 and 2000 respectively. The growth rate of
agriculture (3-4%) is lower than that of industry (10-15%) and of the service sector (5-8%), which
accounts for low wages for rural labourers. The income gap SHUFDSLWD between rural and urban areas
has increased from 2.5 times (VND 359 700/VND 14 100 or USD 26/USD 10) in 1994 to 3.7 times
(VND 832 500/VND 225 000 or USD 57/USD 16) in 1999. Low incomes prevent the poor from
accessing higher education.
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQWKHGRPHVWLFODERXUPDUNHW
Every year, over 1 million people become part of the active population. Hence, the problem
of job creation is becoming increasingly serious. The total number of workers increased from
28.9 million in 1989 to 38.6 million in 2000, with a share of 70% in agriculture (Table 3). It is
estimated that every year 70% of the people reaching working age join the agricultural sector. Industry
and services have little capacity to create employment.
The labour force is relatively young, which accounts for a high ratio of working-age people
(58.6%) see Table 4). In 2002, this ratio is expected to increase due to the high ratio of school-age
population: the 5-9 and 10-14 age-groups both represent 12% each, which makes them the biggest
cohorts.
400

The high proportion of young workers (and young people in general) creates more
consumption (which stimulates economic development and job creation) and a higher capacity to learn
(which increases qualification, efficiency, and productivity). However, the generally low qualification
of workers creates high unemployment and keeps incomes low. The 1999 population census showed
that 92% of the working age population (13 years and older) have no qualifications (Table 5). The
number of workers with a post-graduate university degree is very low, at about 1 344 000 persons
(2.44%).
The unemployment rate is high in Vietnam. In 1996, 8 392 600 working-age persons were
unemployed (5.88% of the active population), among which 86.3% were in rural areas and 13.7% in
urban areas. According to gender, 49.8% of the unemployed were women.
According to sector, the General Statistic Office reported that in other sectors than
agriculture, the unemployment rate rose from 5.88% in 1996 to 6.01% in 1997, about 7% in 1999, and
7.26% in March 2000.
According to age, young people are the most affected by unemployment, especially the 1524 cohort (36% of total unemployment). Workers of the 35-44 age group had the next highest
unemployment rate (20%).
x

15-24 years old: 36%.

25-34 years old: 18.1%.

35-44 years old: 20%.

45-54 years old: 16%.

Over 55 years old: 9.9%.

In June, 1999, 42 000 people (43.2% of whom were women) working in State enterprises
(6.08% of the public sector employees) in 41/61 provinces could not be given any task. By industry,
unemployment affects construction (10%), manufacturing (10%), and transport (5%). In some
provinces, the unemployment rate is particularly high, reaching 20% in Yen Bai, 28.5% in Hai Duong,
25.5% in Thai Binh, and 23.3% in Ha Tay. In 2001, a State enterprise reform has led to the laying off
of 150 000 people (75 000 workers from 357 disbanded enterprises, and another 75 000 from
privatised SOEs).
There is no consolidated data on the number of unemployed in the private sector because of
a lack of unemployment registration in Vietnam. It is estimated that the unemployment rate is higher
there than in the State sector, and that most of its workers are part-time workers.
Underemployment is a serious problem, especially in rural areas. No unemployment figures
are available for these areas, because on the one hand, 95% of the rural workers have been allocated
land but only need a few working days to work on these small plots, and on the other hand, they are
unable to find regular paid work. On average, each rural worker works 262 working days per year. In
1996, working days occupied 72.1% of their working time, but it fell to 70.9% in 1998. From these
figures, we can conclude that about 30% of the rural workers are unemployed, since they spend only
70% of their working time at work. In 2000, estimates indicated that the unemployment rate in rural
area was 24.73%, and that it would probably reach 20,28% in 2010. The government thus targeted a

401

6.5% reduction of unemployment in urban areas and an increase in the working time utilisation in
rural areas from 70% to 80% (Table 6).
Most young workers in rural areas stay at home only at harvest time; out of season they
move to cities or other places to find jobs in industries, land preparation on large farms, and others
small businesses (vendors, house workers, newspapers sellers, etc.).
The income of skilled workers is much higher than that of low or unskilled workers.
Unskilled workers earn an average monthly income of VND 300 000-1 000 000 (USD 20-70), while
skilled workers earn VND 3 000 000 (USD 200) or more. Skilled workers in the state sector earn low
wages (VND 500 000-1 000 000 or USD 35-70 per person per month), sometimes less than unskilled
workers in private companies. Skilled workers in non-governmental institutions (international
organisations, FDI companies, private enterprises) earn USD 300 to USD 1500 per person per month.
Foreign workers of private companies earn higher salaries than theVietnamese. There is no official
information available, but it is estimated that they earn from USD 3000 to USD 12000.
High wages are subject to the income tax, according to the rates indicated in Table 7.
The high wages of skilled workers have stimulated young workers to attend the
131 Vietnamese universities and colleges that employ 27 100 teachers. The number of students
increased from 297 900 in 1995 to 734 900 in 1999. Graduates increased from 58 500 in 1995 to
113600 in 1999. However, many of them are unable to find good jobs after their graduation, due to
Linsufficient foreign language skills, LL low practical experience, and LLL poor understanding of
international regulations. In 2001, the government was to send 400 young graduate-level government
staff to study at post-graduate level abroad. But only 194 of them (48%) passed the examination. Most
of them had poor foreign-language skills.
Statistics show that there is a surplus of low-skilled workers and a shortage of highly skilled
workers. In 2000, 66 industrial parks needed to recruit 400 000 qualified workers. In Ho Chi Minh
City, 12 000 skilled workers are needed (mainly women, at 75-80%), 5-7% of which with a university
degree, 60% professionally trained, and 32-35% unskilled. The job service agency of the Binh Duong
province, which was trying to recruit 1000 workers in the first quarter of 2001, was only able to find
20 people. The situation in Hanoi is not better: one job service company received 40 application
forms, but only 3 were selected even though all applicants had certification of professional training. In
1999, job information service agencies introduced 33 000 workers to industrial parks but only
14 000 workers were recruited. The demand for skilled workers is high in some industries like
construction, architecture, oil refinery, and food processing. Qualified workers should have several
skills: capacities in foreign languages (spoken and written), computer skills, and professional skills.
Many workers have got professional technical training certification, but companies are still facing
shortages because of the low quality of their training and their lack of practical skills.
Unskilled labourers are plethoric in all industries. However, there is a surplus of some highly
educated workers in the fields of law, economics, social sciences and culture. It is estimated that every
year, 50% of graduating students spend over a year to find a job, often in areas unrelated to their
degree and low-paid.

402

0LJUDWLRQ
)RUHLJQZRUNHUV
In order to sustain a high economic growth and attract FDI, the government encourages
foreign workers to come by allowing Vietnamese from overseas to buy houses in the country,
abolishing the two-price system, easing the procedures of trans-national marriages, and simplifying
visa procedures for workers and their families.
The number of foreign workers in Vietnam is increasing, along with the improvement of the
FDI policy and the trade liberalisation. Most of them are highly skilled and work for international
institutions, NGOs, FDI and various internationally-fund projects. Foreign workers often occupy high
positions in institutions (directors, managers) or work as experts. It is estimated that from 1990 to
2000, their number increased from 3000 to 30 000 persons. Their inflow fluctuates according to L the
number of FDI projects, and LL the amount of ODA funds made available to Vietnam by their
countries.
Foreign workers mostly come from South-East Asia (China (including Hong Kong), Chinese
Taipei, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand) and the West (France, America).
The number of foreign skilled workers is expected to increase in the coming years after
Vietnam signs the Trade Agreement with America, starts negotiating with the WTO (to become a
member as soon as possible) and implements trade liberalisation in the framework of AFTA and
APEC.
(PLJUDWLRQ
In 1995, statistic data showed that 2 645 570 Vietnamese were living in 79 countries and
territories (9LHWQDPHVH $EURDG Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1997). The following countries
have more than 100 000 Vietnamese residents:
x

North America: America 950 000; Canada 150 000.

Europe: France 400 000; Germany 100 000; Russia 100 000.

Australia: 160 000.

Asia: China 300 000; Thailand 120 000; Cambodia 100 000.

The Vietnamese may be living abroad for the following reasons: L wars; LL natural
emigration in the past; LLL not returning after studying. It is estimated that 60% of overseas
Vietnamese left the country after the 1975-1977 war to settle in North America, France and Australia.
Between 1980 and 1990, 400 000 Vietnamese were sent to study and work in Western European
countries and 250 000 people stayed there after studying.
Since 1990, the number of emigrants has been going down. Every year, 1000 to 2000 people
leave Vietnam for family reunion and an ever-greater number of Vietnamese travel under the worker
export programme.

403

Three thousand Vietnamese are now working abroad. During the 1990s, Vietnam has exported
121 752 workers to work in 40 countries and territories:
x

1996: 12 660 persons.

1997: 18 470 persons.

1998: 12 240 persons.

1999: 21 810 persons.

2000: 31 500 persons.

2001: 37 000 persons.

Most workers abroad are low skilled and perform manual tasks in industries such as textile,
construction, electronic assembling, and mechanical maintenance. Less than 1% (2000-3000 persons)
of these Vietnamese expatriates are highly skilled. They are as engineers, agriculture experts and
physicians working in Africa under a government bilateral agreement on economic and cultural
collaboration. Some highly skilled workers have been recruited directly (usually through
advertisements for job vacancies published in newspapers) by foreign companies in Vietnam to work
in their branches abroad, mainly in electronics, IT and mechanics. There is no official statistical data
on this number, but it is estimated at 3 000 to 4 000. Some go abroad within the framework of
exchange programmes between universities or research institutes to give lectures and do research in
the fields of culture, language, mathematics, physics. Some students do not return to Vietnam after
graduating abroad.
7UHQGVLQLOOHJDOLPPLJUDWLRQ
The main problem of workers abroad is that some of them have broken work contracts and
work illegally for higher wages. Out of the Vietnamese working in South Korea and Japan,
5 500 persons (29%) and 1 500 persons (23%) respectively have broken work contracts. The
government has approved several measures to improve the situation, such as to ask local governments
to arrest and send back workers (and to provide them with airplane tickets to do so) and not to seize
their deposited money before they go abroad.
Foreign workers in Vietnam enjoy better working conditions that those of Vietnamese
workers (better payment and security) because they are offered contracts by foreign and international
institutions. Illegal immigration and visa-overstay is not a noticeable phenomenon in Vietnam.
7UHQGVLQUHPLWWDQFHV
Overseas Vietnamese workers earn wages of USD 400 per month per person in average, and
their remittances are about USD 1.25 billion per year. This figure may be as high as USD 2 billion if
one includes illegal ways of sending money. Many have earned experience and developed relations
abroad and have thus started their own businesses successfully thanks to their savings. In 2000 and
2001, the new Private Company Law has created a favourable environment for the establishment of
private enterprises. Thirty-two thousand private businesses have been set up in 2000-2001, based on a

404

total investment of USD 4 billion, which entailed the creation of 700 000 jobs, while only
10 000 private enterprises had been established from 1991 to 1999.
Foreigners working in Vietnam have contributed significantly the countrys economic
development, introducing new approaches to job organisation, business planning, work regulation and
high technologies. For example, not only foreign but also Vietnamese companies are now trying to get
ISOs certificates for their products, which enables them to increase their productivity and
competitiveness.
As the high qualification of foreigners in Vietnam demonstrates the quality of education in
their respective countries, the government, as well as a number of families, spends money to send
students abroad, especially to universities in Australia, Europe and North America. Every month,
several meetings or workshops are organised by Vietnamese education companies and universities
abroad to discuss studies abroad.
7UHQGVLQWKHVRFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQHUV
Vietnamese workers going abroad for a job are always expected by to inform Vietnam
Worker Export Companies about the benefits they will get, including wage and insurance. The
situation is better for highly skilled workers because: L they have more accurate working contracts;
LL their small number makes them easier to manage. However, the information available is poor
because the links between authorised worker management agencies in Vietnam and abroad are too
weak.
Foreigners recruited by foreign companies operating in Vietnam do receive benefits, but the
government, after providing them with a visa and entitling them to family reunion, also allows them to
rent houses, travel for free and enjoy the new one-price system.
3ROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVRQLPPLJUDQWVDQGIRUHLJQZRUNHUV
The following institutions take part in the policy-making process on immigrants and foreign workers:
x

Party Congress: every 5 years, the Leading Party holds its congress to propose the
coming years development strategy. The IXth Party Congress, which took place in April
2001, proposed to promote labour market operations, to protect the interest and benefits
of workers, and to increase the number of workers abroad.

The National Assembly: each year, the National Assembly holds two sessions at the
middle and the end of the year. Each session lasts from 30 to 40 days, discussing,
approving or amending Laws to implement the Partys strategy. Labour Law was
approved in 1994. The draft of Law to submit to National Assembly is usually prepared
by Ministry which is most responsibility for this law implementation.

The government: to implement Laws, the government issues decrees that provide
detailed guidelines on the implementation of the law, such as the Decree on workers
wages (No197/1994), the Decree on working time (195/1994), the Decree on export
workers (07/1995), the Decree No. 152/1999/ND-CP, 20 September 1999 on Vietnamese
workers and experts going abroad for contract jobs, or the Decision on visa provision.

405

Based on these Decrees, the appropriate ministries and local authorities will provide
workers with administrative services.
x

The Ministry of Labour, Invalid and Social Affairs (MOLISA) is responsible for the
guidelines on the application of government Decrees in daily operations. It also monitors
the companies that send workers abroad. It is the Overseas Worker Management Agency
of MOLISA that is in charge of this issue.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues passports and visas to workers and concludes
agreements on migration with other countries.

The Ministry of Security approves application forms sent by people who want to work.

The policy-making process follows two steps: the drafting and the implementation.
During process of drafting policy, the ministry requested by the government to draft the policy will:
x

Organise the working group, whose members are the representatives of concerned
ministries and research institutes an trade unions;

Appoint one organisation to prepare the draft policy;

Discuss the final draft and issue the policy.

The working group will:

x

Organise workshops with different participants: with group members only; with different
ministry departments; with concerned institutions, and with research institutions and
colleges;

Submit the draft policy to Ministers for review;

Submit a final draft to government (to the vice-prime minister, who is responsible for
labour issues).

On September 20, 1999, the government issued the Decree No. 152/1999/ND-CP on
Vietnamese workers and experts going abroad for contracted jobs. This policy-making process took
about 12 months from the first draft to final approval, as the following table illustrates:

406

August
1998

September
1998
November
1998
January
1999
April 1999

July 1999
August
1999
September
1999

Realising that the policy on workers export determined in the Decree 07/CP
issued on January 20, 1995 had not met the expected changes in the labour
market, the Ministry of Labour, Invalid and Social Affairs (MOLISA) proposed
to the Prime Minister a change in this policy.
With the agreement of the Prime Minister, the minister of LISA requested from
the Department for Management of Labour in Foreign Countries (DMLFC) a
draft policy. DMLFC set up a working group of 5 members.
After 2 months preparation, DMLFC issues a first draft and organised
workshops to discuss it. Feedback information was provided.
DMLFC submitted the first draft policy to Minister of LISA, who organised
workshops with MOLISA departments to revise the draft.
DMLFC submitted the revised draft to the Minister policy. A workshop was
organised with the representatives from concerned ministries and research
institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of Security, of Finance, Trade Unions,
Labour Research Institute). New revision by the DMLFC.
Final draft of policy was submitted to the Minister of LISA for approval.
The Minister of LISA revised it for the last time and submitted it to the Prime
Minister for approval
The Prime Minister revised it and issued the policy as a legal document on
export dated September 20, 1999. It replaces to the old one (January 1995).
After September 1999, based on this new policy, MOLISA manages the
operation.

During the process of policy making on immigrants and foreign workers, policy makers have to look
at different affecting factors such as:
x

Unemployment rate in the country;

GDP growth rate;

FDI and ODA in the country;

World experiences on foreign workers, especially the technology and skill brought in by
highly skilled foreign workers, and remittances that the country receives from workers
abroad;

Social security.

(FRQRPLFDQGPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHVDQGWKHLUOLNHO\LPSDFWV
To reduce the unemployment rate in the country and improve wages, Vietnam has planned to promote
FDI and increase export workers. The measures taken have the following objectives:
x

Increase export workers. Negotiate with other countries to open market for Vietnamese
workers;

Improve workers export management system in order to provide qualified workers;

407

Train workers with high qualifications;

Improve management capacity of worker export companies;

Target to export 100 000 workers in 2005;

Establish special funds to lend money to workers going abroad;

Provide budget to send 400 students per year to study abroad;

Encourage FDI.

408

Table 1,QFUHDVLQJQXPEHURI)',SURMHFWV-XQH

<HDU
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
7RWDO

3URMHFW1XPEHU
37
68
108
151
197
269
343
370
325
345
275
311
371
200
3370

5HJLVWHUHG&DSLWDO86'PLOOLRQ
371
582
839
1322
2165
2900
3765
6530
8497
4649
3897
1568
2012
968
40065


6RXUFH7UDGH-RXUQDOMinistry of Trade, Hanoi, December 2001.

409

Table 2.)',SURMHFWVLQ9LHWQDPE\FRXQWU\-XQH

1R
&RXQWU\
3URMHFW
5HJLVWHUHG&DSLWDO
(VWLPDWHG)RUHLJQ
7HUULWRU\
1XPEHU
86'PL OO L RQ
6NLOOHG:RUNHUV
1 Men Islands

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
Total

Guensey
Iraq
Liberia
Iugoslavia
Pakistan
Xlovakia
Quatar
Tuorvakia
Xrilanka
North Icelands
Cambodia
Cuba
Lichtenxten
Vanuatu
Bahama
Belarusia
Ixrael
Macao
Korea North
Poland
Laos
Sec
Austria
Hungary
Norw ay
Panama
Bermuda
Caymen
Denmark
Luxambur
India
Ucraina
Sw eeden
New Zealands
Chanmen
Belgium
Italia
Indonexia
Pilippine
Sw iss
Canada
Germany
Holands
The UK
Russia
Malayxia
Australia
China
Virgin UK
America
Thailand
France
Singapore
Japan
Korea S
Hong Kong
Taiw an

1773

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
6
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
9
10
11
11
14
16
18
27
32
38
39
42
44
66
92
98
105
106
120
135
158
252
296
309
319
605

57
544
270
24
5
46
312
63
4
223
15
199
226
54
4885
15
9
586
3225
3634
10
15
318
5
12
47
9
23
4
1131
1339
1578
36
2
3441
60
1171
40
673
2176
229
43
39
1092
1
377
625
25
151
24
31
3
1846
5886
2
73
171

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
10
10
10
15
15
15
15
15
20
20
30
35
35
35
35
40
40
40
40
45
45
50
55
55
70
80
90
135
160
190
195
210
220
330
460
490
525
530
600
675
790
1260
1480
1545
1595
3025



Note: Excluding non-operating projects. 

6RXUFH:7UDGH-RXUQDOMinistry of Trade, Hanoi, December 2001.

410





Table 3.:RUNHUVE\LQGXVWU\
1989

Total

1995

1997

Person

Person

Person

Person

1999

28971392

100

34590000

36994000

36375265

2000
%

Person

100

38643123

1. By Sector
State setor
Non-state sector

3421000 11,81

3053000

3267000

3370000

9,265

3414200

25550392 88,19

31537000

33727000

33005265

90,74

35228923

3265028 11,27

3434600

3502500

3976008

10,93

540167 1,864

995600

976500

908560

2,498

21354746 73,71

23521000

24813800

25199516

69,28

1649540 5,694

2394400

3190200

3195410

8,785

781000

856000

892902

2,455

2. By Industry
Manufacturing
Construction
Agriculture
Trading and Restourant
Transport

504136

Banking

1,74

88784 0,306

66743

0,183

State Management

278709 0,962

899240

2,472

Education

722333 2,493

918853

2,526

Health and Culture

277716 0,959

318033

0,874

973400

998800

22650814

6RXUFH: Vietnam Economy 2000, CIEM, March 2001; Annual Statistical Book and 1999 Population Census, General
Statistical Office, Hanoi, 2000.

Table 4.5DWLRRISRSXODWLRQE\DJH

$JH\HDUV

1XPEHU
SHUVRQV

5DWLRWRWRWDO


5DWLRE\JURXSWRWRWDO

0
From 1-4
From 5-9
10-14
15-17

1304
5966
9161
9132
5278

1.7
7.8
12.0
12.0
6.9

From 0 to 14 years old:

18-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64

2940
6765
6474
6001
5552
4509
3105
2137
1804
1767

3.9
8.9
8.5
7.9
7.3
5.9
4.1
2.8
2.4
2.3

65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
Over 85

1682
1209
834
419
290
76329

2.2
1.6
1.1
0.5
0.4
100.0

33.5%

)URPWR\HDUVROG



DQGROGHU

8.1%

7RWDO

6RXUFH: The 1999 Population and Housing Census, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi, May 2000.

411

Table 5.4XDOLILFDWLRQRIZRUNHUVIRUSHRSOHDJHGDQGROGHU

7RWDO
SHUVRQ

Total
of which
Technical workers with certificate
Middle Vocational Education
College
University
Master
Doctor
Non qualification

Person
54473
1240
1526
379
937
17
11
50363

0DOHV

)HPDOHV

%
Person
100% 26182

%
48,06

Person
28291

%
51,9

2,28
2,80
0,70
1,72
0,03
0,02
92,45

3,46
2,72
0,57
2,36
0,05
0,03
90,76

333
813
231
318
5
2
26600

1,18
2,87
0,82
1,12
0,02
0,01
94,02

907
713
148
619
12
9
23763

6RXUFH:3RSXODWLRQ&HQVXV, Vietnam General Statistical Office.

Table 6.5XUDOXQHPSOR\PHQWPLOOLRQSHUVRQV

Total Population of Vietnam (millions)

Rural population proportion
Working age persons in rural areas (millions)
Demand for labour in rural areas (millions)
In which: Agriculture (millions)
Non-agriculture (millions)
Unemployment rate in rural areas
Note: Underemployment: less than 8 hours per working day.
6RXUFH: 1KDQ'DQ newspaper, 24 December, 2000.


76.3
76.5%
33.89
21.0
14.0
7.0
25.29%


77.9
75.2%
34.34
21.4
13.9
7.5
24.73%


88.6
65%
36.40
23.5
11.0
12.5
20.28%

Table 7.,QFRPHWD[
For the Vietnamese
Monthly income (million
VND)
Under 3 VND
3 to 6
6 to 9
9 to 12
12 to 15
15

Income rate
(%)
0
10
20
30
40
50

For foreigners
Monthly income (VND million)
Under 6 (equivalent 400 USD)
6 to 8
8 to 20
20 to 50
50 to 80
80 to 120
120

6RXUFH: Ministry of Finance.

412

Income rate
(%)
0
5
10
20
30
40
50

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