Cyber 1AC

China Cyber
1ac
Plan
The United States federal government should substantially
increase its diplomatic engagement with the Peoples Republic
of China on negotiations about cyber transparency and
attribution of offensive cyber operations.
Contention One: Status quo cyber-diplomacy fails

Current US-Sino diplomatic efforts on cybernorms are
inadequate. Conflicts over attribution and implementation
delay and derail diplomatic negotiation
Segal 9/28/15 http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/09/28/attribution-proxies-and-u-s-china-cybersecurityagreement/ Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy
Program
In evaluating the cybersecurity agreement the United States and China announced
on Friday, we can ask ourselves three questions: did Beijing accept there should be
a norm against the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property to help individual
firms? Will the agreement lead to a decrease in cyberattacks on the United States?
And is the agreement a diplomatic step forward for the United States and China? We
will have to wait and see for more conclusive answers, but for now I think they are:
looks likely; very uncertain; and yes, but will have to be built on. Outside
analysts, myself included, have long argued that China does not distinguish
between cyber espionage directed at military and political secrets and the cyberenabled theft of business plans and intellectual property. Both types of espionage,
in this view, were part of building comprehensive national power, and the role of
state-owned enterprises in the economy blurred the distinction between public and
private gain. The United States has for years tried to create a norm against
economic theft for competitive advantage, but made little progress, especially in
the light of the Snowden disclosures about NSA operations. Last year, former NSA
Director Michael Hayden described the problem with the U.S. argument as: Look,
you spy, we spy, but you steal the wrong stuff. [My colleague David Fidler analyzes
the joint statement and its impact on norm development here.] As Jack Goldsmith
notes, the Chinese government has said it opposes online theft several times
before, but it is important that the opposition to online theft is coming from Xi
Jinping himself and not lower level officials or a foreign ministry spokesperson.
Beijing now appears to have accept there is good stuff and bad stuff to steal.
Moving forward, as many have noted, the central issue will be implementation
and the question of attribution in particular . President Obama said, the
question now is, are words followed by action. As the United States has become
increasingly confident in its ability to identify attackers, the Chinese have been
equally vociferous that attribution remains difficult, if not impossible. Claims that
Beijing was behind the hacking of the Office of Personnel Management and the data
theft of over 20 million federal employees were met with a response from a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman that its irresponsible and unscientific to make
conjectural, trumped-up allegations without deep investigation. The agreement
could quickly bog down over what arguments of what evidence China will accept
and what the United States is willing to provide. In response to a reporters
question, President Xi Jinping warned that the two sides should not politicize the
issue, which is often a claim levied by China when it is criticizing U.S. attribution.
The other big issue is will the agreement increase, or reinforce, Beijings reliance on
proxies to conduct cyber espionage. As a recent investigation in the Wall Street

Journal shows, there is overlap between PLA and freelance hacking groups. During
their press conference, President Obama said that President Xi told him, with 1.3
billion people, he cant guarantee the behavior of every single person on Chinese
soil. But what portion of hacking is government controlled is already murky and
now there are reasons to muddy the waters even further. It is important that the
two sides have committed to further identify and promote appropriate norms of
behavior in cyberspace, to create a senior experts group to discuss international
security in cyberspace, and are establishing a high-level joint dialogue on
cybercrime. But implementation remains to be seen , and what, or who, is
missing from the statement is notable. The high-level joint dialogue involves the
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Justice, and the
State Internet and Information Office on the Chinese side, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security, U.S. Attorney General, representatives of the intelligence
community, and FBI on the U.S. side. Maybe they will make up the experts senior
group, but the joint fact sheet has no mention of the DoD, State Department, and,
most important, the PLA as being involved in cyber discussions. Expectations before
the summit for any progress on the cyber issue were low, so the agreement is a
significant outcome, even if question remains. As Herb Lin puts it, progress has
been made towards a better cybersecurity relationship between China and the
United States, and more doors are open today than they were last week.
Despite signals toward cyber rules of the road, the US hasnt

actualized the process redoubled efforts key to solve
Meyer Summer 15
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Meyer_Summer%202015.pdf Paul Meyer is
currently an Adjunct Professor of International Studies and Fellow in International Security at Simon Fraser
University and a Senior Fellow at The Simons Foundation, Vancouver, Canada. From 1975 to 2010 he was a career
diplomat in Canadas Foreign Service with a professional focus on international security policy. He served as
Canadas Ambassador to the UN and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from 2003 2007.
Tense U.S. Chinese Cyber Security Relations Even the most casual observer of the
Western media should note the growing attention paid to cyber attacks and the
losses of information that both public and private entities have suffered. These
losses now regularly involve millions of compromised accounts, ranging from
personal data of the customers of major corporations to that of U.S. government
employees. In particular, China has been accused of state - sponsored cyber
espionage directed at U.S. government and business interests. After years of
discreetly avoiding naming China as the culprit in these cyber attacks, the U.S.
government has decided starting in 2013 to identify Beijing as the principal
perpetrator and to publicly call upon it to desist. The U.S. Department of Defense
has been especially vocal in accusing China in these cyber intrusions, linking them
to the compromise of several U.S. weapon systems including the F - 35 and F - 18
fighter jets and the PAC3 missile. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has
referred to cyber threats as terribly dangerous and has called for talks with China
and others to establish international norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace.
8 Indeed, the issue of cyber espionage has figured prominently in U.S.China
bilateral relations and has found its way onto the agenda of the highest levels of
discussion, such as the summit between Presidents Obama and Xi in June of 2013. It
would appear, though, that the political attention to the problem has not yielded
sufficient results . In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice took the
unprecedented step of indicting five serving officers of the Peoples Liberation Army
for engaging in cyber espionage against U.S. corporations. Chinese officials have
angrily denied these charges and have even suggested that the United States
fabricated the evidence against the PLA officers. 9 Beijing has also responded to
the U.S. charges by suspending its involvement in a bilateral cyber working group
that had only been recently established. 10 These publicized actions represent a
significant escalation over the previous reliance on behind - the - scenes diplomatic
protests, and demonstrate the difficulty of sustaining a substantive cyber - security
dialogue between the two powers. It is noteworthy that even as the U.S. military
moves to significantly enhance its cyber - security capacities, the Defense
Department is still advocating a cooperative approach to address some potential
cyber conflict. The Cyber Strategy specifically seeks to strengthen the U.S. cyber
dialogue with China in order to enhance strategic stability. It also offers to do the
same with Russia [i]f and when U.S.Russia military relations resume. 11 This
approach looks to diplomatic rather than military initiatives and would
ultimately seek to agree on rules of the road to govern state behavior in
cyberspace. Whether global cyber security will be characterized by
adversarial or cooperative approaches may depend on the near - term
success or failure of efforts by cyber powers to develop these norms of
responsible state behavior.
The Quest for Norms of Responsible State Behavior
The idea of agreeing upon such norms is not a novel international concept .
States have long worked out common standards to cover their interaction, including
how to manage conflicts. These agreements have applied to the traditional domains
of land, sea, and air, and have evolved to accommodate changes in technology and
the introduction of new armaments. However, cyberspace constitutes a unique
domain that raises special concerns and considerations for states and their national
security establishments
The United States was the first country to recognize officially the
interrelationship between national and global cyber security and to set out its vision
for how the international community should proceed. In May 2011, the Obama
administration issued its International Strategy for Cyber Space . This path breaking policy statement acknowledged the immense dependency of society on
the operation of networked technologies and the increasing threats to the secure
use of these technologies. The policy noted, Cyber security threats can even
endanger international peace and security more broadly, as traditional forms of
conflict are extended into cyberspace. To counter this tendency for some states to
exert traditional power in cyberspace, the policy called for a new international
consensus on norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The statement

promised early and energetic action in this regard: We will engage the international
community in frank and urgent dialogue, to build consensus around principles of
responsible behavior in cyberspace... 12 The policy directions set out in the
International Strategy are progressive and infused with a cooperative security spirit.
But having expressed the goal and stressed the urgency of the requirement, the
Obama administration has found it difficult to translate its policy vision into a
diplomatic process to achieve it. Although more than four years have passed
since its International Strategy, The United States has yet to endorse any
multilateral process to develop and agree on norms for state behavior, and has
struggled to establish or maintain even bilateral dialogues on the issue with key
states
Contention Two: US-China War
Diplomatic failures pushing us to the brink of full-scale USChinese cyberwar

Glitch News 15 http://www.glitch.news/2015-09-30-cyber-relationship-between-u-s-china-said-to-be-atbreaking-point.html - CITES Calum Jeffray, research fellow of national security and resilience at the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI),
And it is this response begets response cycle that some analysts fear the most.
While establishing deterrence is important, they say, finding the right balance
without escalating attacks to a point where one nation decides a more robust
response including a military response is needed, is key. Calum Jeffray, research
fellow of national security and resilience at the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI), told V3 that there has always been a cool relationship between China and
the United States when it comes to the web. U.S. and Chinese interests are often
fundamentally opposed when it comes to issues of Internet governance. The U.S.
approach favors openness and freedom of information, whereas China favors more
state control over information in cyber space, he told V3. However, I think its
important to note that, thus far, China and the U.S. have restricted their activities to
espionage, particularly economic espionage, rather than other forms of more hostile
attack, he added. Added V3: As this cyber arms race heats up security experts
and researchers are now worried a breaking point could fast be approaching
as the two nations show no signs of backing down.
Cyber-negotation failures create multiple unique scenarios for

US-Chinese war through accidents and misattribution
Gompert and Libicki Aug/Sept 14 David C. Gompert is Distinguished Professor at the
Center for Cyber Security Studies of the US Naval Academy, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation and Chairman of
the Board of Global Integrated Services, US. He has also served as US Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence and in numerous senior positions in government and private enterprise. Martin Libicki is Distinguished
Professor at the Center for Cyber Security Studies of the US Naval Academy and Senior Management Scientist at
the RAND Corporation Survival | vol. 56 no. 4 | AugustSeptember 2014 | pp. 722
Sino-American crises and war How do these general observations bear on SinoAmerican crises and war? To begin with, the Chinese know that computer networks
are critical to US capabilities and strategy in the Western Pacific, and that targeting
them could have decisive effects on a conflict. Indeed, Beijing may think that it
must impair US systems if it is to have some chance of averting military defeat.
Accordingly, America can expect China to initiate cyber warfare at the outset of an
armed conflict, or as an immediate precursor to it. Although this could also include
attacks on non-military networks important to Americas economy and society, it is
more likely that the Chinese would concentrate their most effective cyber
capabilities on systems that enable US forces to deploy to, and operate in, the
Western Pacific. By the same token, China will grow more vulnerable to cyber
warfare as it comes to rely on computer networks for A2/AD, and extends the range
of its sensors, weapons and communications far beyond China for its kill chain.
Indeed, AirSea Battle makes no bones about conducting cyber warfare against
Chinese kill-chain networks in the event of a conflict. Taking into account the
vulnerabilities and strategies of both sides, it seems likely that cyber warfare would
begin no later than at the outset of armed hostilities, and may in fact precede
them by hours or days enough time for the attacker to know whether its attack
had worked, but not so long as to give the defender time to restore targeted
systems. Both America and China now treat cyber operations as an integral aspect
of warfare. Military C4ISR networks are currently thought to be well protected:
Chinas because they are mostly based on dedicated landlines within the country
proper, and Americas because of partitioned and restricted access. It is unclear
whether such networks will be immune to cyber warfare for long. And even if C4ISR
networks remain relatively secure, those used to prepare, deploy and support forces
will not be. The latter are inviting targets for both sides. Cyber attacks aimed at
disrupting military operations involve a danger of escalation to general (or
strategic) cyber warfare, perhaps targeting criti - cal national, governmental and
commercial infrastructure, and certainly the Internet. Given the inherent
vulnerabilities of these civilian networks, both the US and China face a sharp
dilemma: how to conduct cyber warfare against enemy C4ISR in the event of a
conflict without crossing into civil - ian domains and thereby sparking an openended, perhaps uncontrollable, cyber war. This challenge demands tight political
control by both states. 14 Thus far, the risks of escalation in cyber warfare have not
tempered the Chinese and American militaries interest in how to employ it to their
advantage during a wider conflict.
In a crisis over Taiwan, the possibility that a US defence of the island will be
deterred by severely degrading American forces, either with cyber warfare or an
all-out strike, would encourage China to attack early on and robustly. In either case,
given the deleterious effects on its military forces and operations, the US could
assume that a Chinese cyber attack was a precur - sor to a conventional strike.
Moreover, intensified Chinese cyber espionage, likely in a crisis, could be
misinterpreted as a cyber attack in preparation for an armed attack. Because the
effects of cyber warfare are short-lived, the assumption could be that an armed
attack was not far behind. The US might react by resorting immediately to
armed conflict in response to virtually any Chinese cyber operation that could be
interpreted, accurately or not, as a prelude to war. Alternatively, the US could limit
its response to major cyber attacks aimed at degrading the Chinese kill chain. This
could convince Beijing that war was imminent, thus precipitat - ing Chinese
conventional strikes on US forces (which, of course, may have been planned
anyway). Such a scenario is all the more likely if important decision-makers were
unaware of the Chinese cyber-warfare operations that the US was reacting to. A
mirror image of this scenario may occur if it is the US rather than China that
initiates cyber warfare, either instead of, or in preparation for, an armed attack, or
as stepped-up cyber espionage. 15 Indeed, one cannot rule out the possibility that
third-party cyber-espionage operations may be mistaken for those of the US,
carried out in preparation for cyber war. China might interpret any such act as a
strong indicator that the Americans were preparing to attack its kill chain. Given the
drawbacks of waiting, this could trigger a Chinese strike. Indeed, both the US
and China could assume that cyber attacks would lead, and lead quickly, to
conventional warfare, making it all the more likely.
Cyberscalation from Asian flashpoints is a UNIQUELY probably

scenario only stepping up diplomacy solves
In light of the growing reliance of military forces and operations on com - puter
networks, Chinas A2/AD strategy gives the US military a strong incentive to initiate
cyber warfare, and the AirSea Battle concept gives the Chinese an equally strong
incentive to do so. If each side is poised to strike early on, if not pre-emptively, for
fear that waiting will endanger its forces, there could be an inclination to start with
cyber operations. Thus, cyber warfare could be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
comparatively low- risk way to degrade the enemys ability to maintain, and
confidence in, its systems, and hence the capabilities such systems provide. The
threshold for cyber warfare could be low; the temptation high . Chinese and
US military strategies that favour a first strike, the low threshold for initiating cyber
warfare, and the link between cyber warfare and conventional conflict all have the
potential to increase the risk of war in ways that neither the US nor China would
rationally desire. If crises are inherently unstable, the probability of war becomes
a function of the probability of crises between the two states. Given the several
flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific, crises are not improbable. The advent of cyber
warfare did not create these conditions, but it presents a major new challenge that
must be managed wisely. At a minimum, these conditions make it imperative for
political leaders to be thoroughly familiar with military plans and their implications,
including those for cyber warfare. They also put a premium on establishing effective
crisis-management communication channels, including at the highest polit - ical
levels. Finally, the US and China should conduct direct talks, perhaps augmented by
crisis games, on why and how military reliance on cyber warfare could make war
more likely. In both the US and China, debate and analysis of cyber warfare are
plagued by a curious and risky failure to connect the tactical military advantages
of cyber attacks with the strategic hazards, from crisis instability to escalation. Just
as both states fail to see the connection between their respective strategies, so
too do Chinese and American cyber-warfare enthusiasts and sceptics fail to see the
dilemmas and dangers, and to discuss them in a common language
Most likely internal link to Asian war

Raska 3/10/15 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/revealed-the-battleground-chinas-next-war-12387
Michael Raska is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
East Asias strategic assessments and debates currently focus on five key issues:
the pace, character, and direction of Chinas military modernization ; the
struggle for dominance by the regions two major powers (China and Japan); the
future of the Korean Peninsula; intra-regional competition in territorial disputes in
the East China Sea and South China Sea; and perhaps most importantly, the
contours of long-term regional strategic competition and rivalry between China and
the United States. In every major security issue facing East Asia, however, there is a
major Chinese footprint, both direct and indirect.
Traditionally, Chinas primary strategic interests, influence, and military

modernization initiatives have aimed at prevailing in any future conflict over the
status of Taiwan. While Taiwan scenarios remain the baseline for the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) defense planning, Chinas military is gradually developing
asymmetric warfare strategies and technologies designed to constrain U.S. freedom
of action in East Asia. Notwithstanding Chinas development of fifth-generation air
platforms, standoff precision weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, early warning,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to naval assets, the key
emphasis in PLA strategy is the applicability of computer network operations.
Indeed, the next main conflict involving China will likely start in
cyberspace.
**Risk of MISCALCULATION and INADVERTENT ESCALATION

outweighs DETERRENCE
Lindsay 15 Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto Munk School.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cy
ber_threat.html
INFLATED THREATS AND GROWING MISTRUST
Policymakers in the United States often portray China as posing a serious
cybersecurity threat. In 2013 U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that
Chinese cyber intrusions not only endanger national security but also threaten U.S.
firms with the loss of competitive advantage. One U.S. member of Congress has
asserted that China has "laced the U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs." Chinese
critics, meanwhile, denounce Western allegations of Chinese espionage and decry
National Security Agency (NSA) activities revealed by Edward Snowden. The
People's Daily newspaper has described the United States as "a thief crying 'stop
thief.'" Chinese commentators increasingly call for the exclusion of U.S. internet
firms from the Chinese market, citing concerns about collusion with the NSA, and
argue that the institutions of internet governance give the United States an unfair
advantage.
The rhetorical spiral of mistrust in the Sino-American relationship threatens to
undermine the mutual benefits of the information revolution. Fears about the
paralysis of the United States' digital infrastructure or the hemorrhage of its
competitive advantage are exaggerated. Chinese cyber operators face
underappreciated organizational challenges, including information overload and
bureaucratic compartmentalization, which hinder the weaponization of cyberspace
or absorption of stolen intellectual property. More important, both the United States
and China have strong incentives to moderate the intensity of their cyber
exploitation to preserve profitable interconnections and avoid costly punishment.
The policy backlash against U.S. firms and liberal internet governance by China and
others is ultimately more worrisome for U.S. competitiveness than espionage;
ironically, it is also counterproductive for Chinese growth.
The United States is unlikely to experience either a so-called digital Pearl Harbor
through cyber warfare or death by a thousand cuts through industrial espionage.
There is, however, some danger of crisis miscalculation when states field
cyberweapons. The secrecy of cyberweapons' capabilities and the uncertainties
about their effects and collateral damage are as likely to confuse friendly militaries
as they are to muddy signals to an adversary. Unsuccessful preemptive
cyberattacks could reveal hostile intent and thereby encourage retaliation with
more traditional (and reliable) weapons. Conversely, preemptive escalation spurred
by fears of cyberattack could encourage the target to use its cyberweapons before
it loses the opportunity to do so. Bilateral dialogue is essential for reducing
the risks of misperception between the United States and China in the event of a
crisis.
Goes nuclear most probable escalation scenario

Tan 15 (January, Andrew Tan, Associate Professor PhD (Sydney), M Phil (Cambridge), B Soc Science (Hons)
(NUS), BA (NUS) School of Social Sciences, Security and Conflict in East Asia, Google Books, pgs. 3-4)
high tensions in East Asia, the highest since the end of the Second World War have led to
fears of open conflict involving the states in the region as well as extra-regional
powers, in particular the USA. By early 2013 tensions between North Korea on the one
hand, and South Korea, the USA and Japan , on the other, had deteriorated to their worst
level since the end of the Korean War in 1953, sparking feats of an accidental war due
to North Koreas brinkmanship and political miscalculation (ICC 2013a). Tensions
between the People's Republic of China and Japan were also at their highest since
the end of the Second World War, due to their dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku lslands (Hughes 2013).
More seriously, China, the USA and North Korea possess nuclear weapons , and Japan
has always been regarded as a threshold nuclear power , as it possesses
plutonium stocks generated through its power industry, ballistic missile capability
The
and the technology to rapidly transform itself into a significant nuclear weapons
power should it choose to do so (Rublee 24110: (12-(>3). South Korea could also be forced
to develop its own nuclear weapons if the threat from a hostile aggressive and
unpredictable North Korea continues to grow as it develops its nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons capabilities, and uses them to coerce South Korea (New York Times 2013). The impact of any
regional conflict in East Asia will be significant and global . Any conflict in this
region would involve not only states in the region and US allies from further afield,
but also quickly escalate into a nuclear conflict, given the superiority that the
USA enjoys in terms of conventional warfare capabilities over North Korea, and to a
diminishing degree, China, thus forcing them to resort to non-conventional means,
such as nuclear weapons, in any major conflict . Indeed, the US strategy of Air-Sea Battle, which
involves attacking Chinas surveillance, intelligence and command systems, are likely to be interpreted by China as
attempts to disarm its nuclear strike capability and could thus lead to a quick and unwanted escalation into a
the centre of the global economy no longer

resides in Europe or North America but in Asia, in particular, East Asia . Indeed, three of
the key actors in the region, namely the USA, China Japan, are also the three largest
economies in the world, with South Korea ranked 15th in global terms, according to the World Bank. Any
conflict in East Asia will therefore have a profound, global economic
impact. Furthermore, the fact that any conflict could escalate into a major war,
including nuclear war , means that conflict in East Asia will have global
implications as well as uncertain consequences for the international
system .
nuclear conflict (Schreer 2013). Moreover, today
Contention Three: Global Road Rules

Global risks from cyberanarchy increasing each delay of a
negotiating framework makes it worse
Brake 15 Benjamin Brake, International Affairs Fellow Benjamin Brake is an international affairs fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations and a foreign affairs analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S.
Department of State. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the Department of State or the U.S. Government http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/strategic-risks-ambiguitycyberspace/p36541
As major powers increasingly rely on digital networks for critical services, the
number of plausible network attacks, accidents, or failures that could trigger or
exacerbate an international crisis will increase. The likelihood and severity of such a
destabilizing event will also grow as long as norms of appropriate behavior in
cyberspace are underdeveloped, timely and convincing attribution of attacks
remains difficult, and the number of cyber-capable actors increases. Preparing for or
responding to such a crisis is complicated by ambiguity in cyberspace, primarily
regarding responsibility and intent. Ambiguity about who is responsible for a
cyberattack exacerbates the risk that countries amid a geopolitical crisis will
misattribute an attack, unduly retaliate or expand a crisis, or be unable to attribute
an attack at all, thereby preventing or delaying a response and weakening their
deterrence and credibility. Ambiguity of what is intended complicates a countrys
ability to distinguish between espionage operations and activity conducted in
preparation for a cyberattack. The United States has strategic interests in
preventing and mitigating these risks, given its commitment to global security and
overwhelming dependence on networked systems for national security missions,
commerce, health care, and critical infrastructure. The longer it takes to
implement preventive and mitigating steps, the greater the likelihood of
unnecessary military conflict in and outside of the cyber domain.
Cyber anarchy sparks US-Russian nuclear conflict

Futter 16 War Games redux? Cyberthreats, USRussian strategic stability, and new challenges for nuclear
security and arms control Andrew Futter European Security Vol. 25, Iss. 2, 2016 r Andrew Futter is a Senior
Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester.
In the 1983 Hollywood blockbuster War Games, a teenage hacker sitting in his
bedroom in Seattle, WA, broke into a Pentagon supercomputer, managed to initiate
a nuclear attack plan, and almost started the Third World War between the USA and
the Soviet Union. Such a scenario may have seemed somewhat far-fetched to
viewers at the time, and a work of science fiction rather than scientific reality;
indeed, most people didn't own a personal computer in the early 1980s, let alone
have access to the Internet.1 But some 30 years later, with the ubiquitous spread of
computers, hi-tech systems and software, digital networks, and general
interconnectedness, the possibility that hackers be they state or non-state actors
might break into, interfere with, or sabotage nuclear command and control (C2)
facilities; spoof or compromise early warning systems or components of the
nuclear firing chain; or in a worst-case scenario even cause a nuclear explosion or

launch has become disconcertingly real. As the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear
Risk Reduction (2015) has mused:
Questions abound: could unauthorized actors state or non-state spoof early
warning networks into reporting attack indications that precipitate overreactions?
Could such hackers breach the firewalls, the air gaps, and transmit launch orders to
launch crews or even to the weapons themselves? What if an insider colluded with
them to provide access and passwords to the launch circuitry? Might they acquire
critical codes by hacking? (p. 29)
Given the current downturn in eastwest strategic relations, and the significant
amount of nuclear weapons still deployed by the USA and Russia a surprisingly
large number of which remain on high alert and ready to be fired at very short
notice2 the potential for accidents, miscalculation, or unauthorised
nuclear use appears to be growing . Worryingly however, in this increasingly
unstable strategic context, the focus of US and Russian officials seems likely to be
more on making sure that nuclear forces cannot be compromised or undermined
through hacking or other strategic developments (a focus on credibility ), rather
than taking various measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use
most notably perhaps through de-alerting, securing, and potentially reducing their
nuclear forces (a focus on security and safety). Or, more succinctly, the perceived
requirement to fire nuclear weapons seems likely to supersede the desire to keep
them safe and secure for the foreseeable future (Blair 2010). Consequently, it
seems that cyber will become a significant impediment for bilateral arms control
and the nuclear reductions agenda, and that the nightmare scenario depicted
in War Games over three decades ago is gradually becoming a feasible political
reality that must be recognised, understood, and addressed.
Extinction
Barrett et al. 13 (6/28, Anthony, PhD, Engineering and Public Policy from
Carnegie Mellon University, Director of Research, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute,
Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, Seth Baum, PhD,
Geography, Pennsylvania State University, Executive Director, GCRI, Research
Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, former Visiting Scholar
position at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia
University, and Kelly Hostetler, Research Assistant, GCRI, Analyzing and Reducing
the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,
Science and Global Security 21(2): 106-133, pre-print, available online)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are
by far the largest of any nations , could have globally catastrophic effects such as
severely reducing food production for years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization
worldwide and even the extinction of humanity .2 Nuclear war between the United
States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or

unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or
unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over
nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or
explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to
attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation
mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3
(Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of
risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4 )
nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional

attack through development of deterrence capabilities , though numerous measures were also
taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of
deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant
capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a
Over the years,
subsequent counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the
other sides forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides development of capabilities to detect a
first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack.5
Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations
between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was
significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war
between the United States and Russia has continued to present a
substantial risk.7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they
have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8
False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of
events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty
terrorist
groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia
that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as
exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb ,10 especially if such an event occurs during a
crisis between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are
possible.12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use
them against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to
circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their
security.14
computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second,
It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is
significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions ,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being
a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly
deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of
ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia,
making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks.16
Independent of escalation, cyberwar could be worse than

nuclear war
McAfee 15 John McAfee is one of the most influential commentators on cybersecurity anywhere in the
world. His new venture Future Tense Central focuses on security and personal privacy-related products
The United States government, like much of the Western developed world
governments, has lost touch with the technology upon which the power, as well as
the threats to national security within our government, rests. That technology is the
science of cyber engineering, and the cyber-security aspects of this science have
been developed into the weapons that will be used as the main offensive means of
destruction in the upcoming new age of warfare. We are on the edge of a
precipice and my government is clueless - largely illiterate in the most important
science to have ever existed. The next major war will not be fought with guns, ships
and missiles. It will a cyber war with far more devastation than could possibly be
achieved by our combined nuclear arsenals. Or if conventional weapons are
used, they are likely to be our own turned against ourselves. A scant two months
ago, hackers demonstrated their ability, from halfway around the world, to hack into
a Jeep automobile, take control of the steering, brakes and acceleration, and run the
car into a ditch, while the driver tried desperately to regain control. The same
intelligence concepts that created the architecture of the Jeep control system
pervades every aspect of our military hardware. To expect our defence department
to have some magic that the Chrysler Corporation does not have, especially in the
light of the recent OPM hack in which tens of millions if critical personnel files were
easily stolen by the Chinese and Russians, is absurd. We are on the edge of a
precipice and my government is clueless largely illiterate in the most important
science to have ever existed. This same illiteracy does not exist in Russia, India,
China, Japan and a host of more perceptive countries than my own. To the contrary,
it is difficult to reach any level of political power in most of these countries if you
never programmed a computer. To these countries, the concept of a government
official who was not highly competent in the cyber sciences would be the equivalent
to us of having a president who could not read or write. This must drastically
change, and we must also see cyber attacks from foreign governments for what
they are acts of war and respond accordingly.
Contention Four: Multistakeholder model

Failure of the US to proactively engage cyber-diplomacy cedes
the initiative to a Sino-Russian movement for authoritarian
control
Meyer Summer 15
Needing a Western Response Whatever the diplomatic strategy Beijing and

Moscow ultimately pursue, it is evident that Western states are reacting warily to
the proposed Code. Therefore in the near term, any push for early adoption of the
draft Code of Conduct is likely to result in a new EastWest divide. The desire to
avoid such a divisive outcome explains in large part the restraint its SinoRussian
sponsors have shown. At the same time, the West (in particular its leading nation
the United States), having called for the development of a global consensus on
norms for responsible state behavior, can hardly object when states respond by
suggesting a set of norms of their own. Indeed, from the cool reception that some
Western capitals have shown the RussianChinese proposal, one can discern an
irritation that Beijing and Moscow have effectively stolen the initiative from leading
Western powers in presenting a draft set of global norms to the international
community . Instead of simply being miffed over having lost the diplomatic
monopoly on norms for responsible state conduct in cyberspace, it would be
prudent for Western states to come up with their own version of what these global
norms should include. In the competition for intellectual leadership on global norms
for cyber security, it is not enough to simply critique Chinas and Russias
offerings.
Some signs indicate that the United States is starting to articulate what appropriate
norms and practical measures include. Officials in the State Departments Office for
Cyber Issues began in 2014 to call for cooperative measures that would preserve
stability in cyberspace and remove incentives for attack. These measures would
build on practices of state self - restraint and seek to provide critical civilian
information infrastructure with a protective status from cyber attack, akin to that
which crucial civilian infrastructure currently enjoys under international
humanitarian law. There is express interest in pursuing agreement on confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of escalation due to
misunderstanding or miscalculation regarding a cyber incident of national security
concern... 29 These are promising initial ideas, but need to be formalized and
presented more systematically if they are to represent a coherent set of norms
and measures that would constitute an alternative to the SinoRussian proposed

Code of Conduct.
US diplomatic vacuum is filled by Chinese and Russian

rejection of the multistakeholder model
Fontaine 14 Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He
served as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at CNAS from 2009-2012 and previously as foreign policy advisor to
Senator John McCain for more than five years. He has also worked at the State Department, the National Security
Council and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_BringingLibertyOnline_Fontaine.pdf
The United States has aimed to promote the free flow of online information through
diplomatic action as well. State Department diplomats pres - sure repressive
regimes to loosen their Internet restrictions, free imprisoned bloggers and ensure
that citizens can express themselves online with - out fear of punishment. U.S.
government officials have engaged in significant dialogue with U.S. and
multinational technology companies about their involvement in aiding Internet
repression and in establishing transparency standards. American diplomats have
also pressed for Internet freedom in the proliferating international fora that have
taken up the issue. In 2012, for instance, the United States won approval of a U.N.
Human Rights Council resolution affirming that freedom of expression and other
rights that people have offline must also be protected online. 13 Trade agreements
have provided yet another vehicle for the U.S. Internet freedom agenda with, for
example, hortatory language in the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement calling for the
free flow of online information. 14 The U.S. government has backed up its words
with resources. Since 2009, the State Department and other government agencies
have spent more than $125 million on Internet freedom programming. POLICY BRIEF
SEPTEMBER 2014 3 CNAS.ORG A key element of U.S. action has been aimed at
preventing fundamental changes to the multistake - holder model of Internet
governance, which brings together individuals, governments, civil society
organizations, private firms and others for trans - parent and consensus-based
decisionmaking. 15 One such challenge arose at the December 2012 World
Conference on International Telecommunications, when 89 countries a majority of
ITU members in attendance supported an attempt by Russia, China, Iran and
others to give governments greater control over the Internet. 16 Despite opposition
from the United States and others, the session ended with 89 countries signing the
revised treaty; 55 other countries did not. As a sign of what may come in future
international treaty negotiations, such num - bers did not favor the multistakeholder
model, and this was so even before the Snowden revelations emerged to complicate
U.S. efforts
US diplomatic failures drive Russia and China to cooperate

against the US model of Internet governance
Beyer 6/21 (Jessica, Ph.D in political science from University of Washington,
China-Russia Cybersecurity Cooperation: Working Towards Cyber-Sovereignty
published online 6/21/2016 at https://jsis.washington.edu/news/china-russiacybersecurity-cooperation-working-towards-cyber-sovereignty/)/\MB/\
Much like Russia

and Chinas combined effort to oppose a US-dominated world order, the insistence
on cyber-sovereignty is a shared strategic interest that contrasts with the US
advocacy for cyber freedom. The Chinese idea of cyber-sovereignty was first mentioned in 2010 in a white
Nevertheless, cyber-espionage is not the core of Sino-Russian cybersecurity cooperation.
paper called The Internet in China and was reinforced by Chinese President Xi at the 6th BRICS summit in 2014. It
was further emphasized at the Wuzhen World Internet Conference in December 2015. China argues that Internet
sovereignty should mean that the Internet is a reflection of physical space and, hence, also a states sovereign
territory. Thus, according to China, the Internet should not be subjected to foreign interference, and each country
should have the right to control its domestic cyberspace. In other words, any Internet regulation, such as state
In order to create this norm of cyber-sovereignty,

China is working fervently to establish regulatory institutions and mechanisms to
strengthen cyber-governance. Moreover, in support of the idea of cyber-sovereignty, China is
looking for international partners that share the same ideology . For instance, the Cyber
Security Association of China (CSAC), newly created in March 2016, not only connects the government,
private sector, and researchers to centralize the state power over cyberspace , but also
is an institution which for the first time can engage in international cyber diplomacy at more
senior levels. The intention of engaging in international cyber-diplomacy is
exemplified by CSACs participation in the cybersecurity forum in Moscow in June .
Meanwhile, Russias concern with US control over the Internet and its own Internet
governance has increased since the implementation of Western sanctions against Russia in 2014. In 2014,
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov made a statement that indicated that Russia may take measures to
prevent foreign interference in its Internet. His statement coincides with Chinas
idea of Internet sovereignty. With the consensus in Internet sovereignty, the
language of protecting Internet sovereignty in cyberspace was added to the SinoRussian cybersecurity pact as the new aspect of cooperation . Deepening Cybersecurity
control over Internet content, is justified.
Cooperation: The Information and Communication Technologies Development and Security Forum The first RussiaChina Information and Communication Technologies Development and Security Forum held in Moscow in April 2016
illustrates the deepening of Sino-Russian cyber-sovereignty cooperation. The April meeting was attended by 50
Chinese information technology experts and government officials from the CSAC, including Lu Wei, the senior
executive official in charge of Chinese cybersecurity and Internet policy, and Fang Binxing, the architect of Chinas
Great Fire Wall. The main focus of this Sino-Russian cybersecurity forum was implementing Internet regulation and
protecting cyber-sovereignty. In February prior to the meeting, the Russian Ministry of Communication was
preparing a bill on state control of the Internet traffic in Russia, with proposals to improve the infrastructure for
monitoring DNS and IP addresses, to control foreign communication channels and traffic exchange points, and to
oblige operators to use only the exchange points registered with the state. Following the announcement of the draft
of this bill in March, the Safe Internet League, which is the largest state backed Russian organization focusing on
combatting dangerous online content, published an article revealing Chinas successes in building infrastructure to
block malicious traffic and in solving IPv4 address exhaustion, which seemed to foreshadow the forum in April. At
Russian attendees echoed the concerns brought forward by Chinese

delegates about US reluctance to share its sovereignty over todays Internet, and
aggressive media propaganda, meaning the incoming information from the West. Nationwide
pre-filtering was also proposed to protect Russian digital sovereignty along with the
spoken need for more Internet regulation to improve the quality of online content.
As the forum was concluded, there appeared to be a call to stand against the
efforts of some nations to usurp Internet ownership . Therefore, instead of augmenting
the trust or preventing cyber-espionage between the two countries, the SinoRussian cybersecurity cooperation a strategic move to challenge US dominance
over the Internet. Conclusions Undoubtedly, bilateral ties between China and Russia have been strengthened
the meeting, the
in recent years, yet this partnership will hardly become an alliance. Rather, the Sino-Russian cooperation is a
The closeness of China and Russias cybersecurity relationship is

not dependent on their ties with each other, but is defined in relation to the US . Just as
marriage of convenience.
China and Russia advocate for multipolarity to challenge the perceived USs unipolar world view and values, their
cooperation in cyberspace demonstrates the same focus on the US. There is a concern about the US support for
Internet freedom as a foreign policy priority, accompanied by the FBI and Pentagons insistence on the loyalty of the
The fear for and the opposition to

US dominance over the Internet brings China and Russia together. Their combined
efforts and increased cooperation to filter the incoming foreign information illustrate
their determination to reshape international politics and cybersecurity norms .
global, but US-based, technology companies to American interests.
This determines the larger struggle between a

MULTISTAKEHOLDER model and the SOVEREIGN model of
internet governance
Simon 14 Joel Simon is the executive director of the Committee to Protect
Journalists. His book, Controlling the News, will be published by Columbia University
Press in 2014. http://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-surveillance-pressfreedom.php
In its typically fulminating style, the English language edition of China's People's
Daily proclaimed in an August 2012 editorial that the U.S. must cede control of the
Internet. "The Internet has become one of the most important resources in the
world in just a few decades, but the governance mechanism for such an important
international resource is still dominated by a private sector organization and a
single country," the newspaper noted. China is not alone in this view. A coalition of
Internet-restricting nations--including Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and countries
throughout Africa and the Middle East--have formed an international coalition calling
for the United Nations to take over Internet governance. The Chinese argument that
the Internet structure serves U.S. hegemonic interests was long viewed by the
international community as cynical and hypocritical, said Dan Gilmor, an author
and expert on Internet issues, given the fact that U. S. policy has supported and
promoted freedom of expression online while China has built a massive and
sophisticated system of Internet control. But the ever-growing revelations about the
scope of digital spying carried out by the National Security Agency raise doubts
about the U.S. commitment . The documents leaked by former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden show that some of the U.S. spying programs operated with
technical support of technology companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The NSA took
advantage of the fact that nearly all online communications passes through U.S.based servers and switches to vacuum up a huge portion of global communication.
It specifically targeted governments, including allies like Brazil, whose president,
Dilma Rousseff, has taken grave offense at the invasion of her personal
correspondence. By using its technological advantage and indirect control over the
Internet to carry out a global surveillance operation of unprecedented scale, Gilmor
told CPJ, "The U.S. has abused its position, handing repressive regimes a lot of
ammunition to be clamping down even more." China has long argued that the
United Nations-administered International Telecommunication Union (ITU) should
assume the authority for setting technical standards that currently resides with
ICANN, a quasi-private entity based in Los Angeles that operates under license from
the U.S. Commerce Department. The Peoples Daily editorial was intended to set the
stage for the latest meeting of the ITU, which took place in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, in December 2012. At that meeting, a coalition of African and Middle
Eastern countries introduced a treaty to bring Internet governance under ITU
control. The U.S. and European nations worked feverishly against the proposal, and
in the end more than 50 countries, including all eligible members of the EU, refused
to sign. But subsequently the U.S./EU coalition has been deeply strained by the
Snowden revelations. Europeans, who place a much higher value on privacy, were
outraged to learn that their personal data might have been accessed by the NSA.
European leaders reacted with fury at the scope of the surveillance, with German
officials calling the spying "reminiscent of the Cold War" and the French Foreign
Ministry summoning the U.S. ambassador to offer a formal rebuke. "The credibility
of the United States as a global champion for freedom of expression and human
rights is undoubtedly damaged by the NSA revelations," Marietje Schaake, a
member of the European Parliament and leader on Internet freedom issues, told CPJ.
The decentralized nature of the Internet, which makes censorship or control much
harder, is a great strength for journalists and others committed to the free flow of
information and ideas. But if you believe, as China does, that national sovereignty
trumps the individual right to freedom of expression, then the Internet's current
structure not only undermines state authority but also imposes U.S. standards of
freedom of expression on the entire world. This was the argument that played out at
the U.N. General Assembly in September 2012 in the aftermath of the Innocence of
Muslims video. After President Obama called censorship obsolete and described
freedom of expression as a universal ideal, then-Egyptian President Mohamed
Morsi pushed back, declaring that Egypt does not respect freedom of expression
that targets a specific religion or a specific culture. His views were echoed by
other leaders. The embrace by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of the right
to connect during a landmark speech at the Newseum in January 2010 was initially
hailed by online freedom advocates as a positive step. But in the aftermath of the
NSA scandal, it looks less enlightened. Many governments are skeptical of U.S.
support for online freedom and believe that the U.S. commitment to free expression
and association online is really about using the Internet to execute regime change
and install client governments favorable to U.S. interests. Iran under its last
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, announced plans to build a separate halal
Internet closed off from the World Wide Web. In March 2012, Russian Duma member
Aleksey Mitrofanov, head of the Parliamentary Committee on Information Policy,
announced legislation to curtail online speech. An era of absolutely free Internet in
Russia has ended, he declared. Since then, courts have shut down critical
websites--one Internet news site was stripped of its license for posting videos
containing foul language--and the countrys leading blogger, Aleksei Navalny, was
convicted of trumped-up bribery charges. Using powerful computers and technical
acumen, the NSA has cracked encryption codes, making it possible for the U.S.
government to gain access to nearly anything that moves online, according to a
report by ProPublica. This has given the U.S. a tremendous strategic advantage,
since it is widely believed to be the only country in the world with this capability.
While the scope of online spying is still unfolding, the U.S. has hacked into the
internal communication of at least one media outlet, according to a report in Der
Spiegel. Citing leaked Snowden documents, the German magazine reported that the
U.S. accessed Al-Jazeeras internal communications in 2006. Both Germany and
Brazil have indicated they will assert greater control over their domestic Internet.
Deutsche Telekom, which is partially government-owned, is seeking an alliance with
other German Internet providers to shield the German network from foreign
snooping. The Brazilian Congress, meanwhile, is considering legislation that would
require Internet companies operating in the country to store their data on domestic
servers, a proposal opposed by international communications and technology
companies, which say such a system would be prohibitively expensive. Brazil is also
advocating a new U.N. treaty to safeguard privacy. Speaking at the U.N General
Assembly in September 2013, President Rousseff said Brazil would present
proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the
governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection of data
that travels through it. Eduardo Bertoni, who directs a global freedom of expression
center at the University of Palermo in Buenos Aires, Argentina, called on Brazil to
take concrete actions in support of Rousseffs words including disavowing the ITU
treaty, which Brazil signed. Internationalizing Internet governance is, of course, not
inherently a bad thing. In fact, proponents of the current "multi-stakeholder model"
of Internet governance are also calling for a reduced U.S. role. At an October 2013
conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, the leaders of the organizations that coordinate
the Internet's technical structure called for the "globalization" of ICANN functions.
The signatories included the head of ICANN, Fadi Chehad. Rebecca MacKinnon,
author of a book about online free expression called Consent of the Networked and
a CPJ board member, pointed out that the multi-stakeholder model, in which
constituencies including governments, companies, and civil society groups share
responsibility for Internet governance, is flawed but "better than going to the U.N ."
She added: "The role that the United States has been trying to preserve as a
protector of freedom of openness--not too many people take it seriously any more. If
we want to preserve the multi-stakeholder model, then U.S. power needs to be
reduced." Schaake of the European Parliament agreed. "The negative impact of the
exposure of the NSA activities is not limited to the United States' foreign policy
objectives but could also harm the global open Internet, including the multistakeholder model as governments seek to take further control," she said. "We must
ensure human rights and democratic principles are defended online . It is very
worrying that the United States has undermined its own credibility to
push these efforts." There is a risk in the current environment that an open
debate will simply provide an enhanced platform for Internet-restricting countries
like China to push for U.N. control. Success, while unlikely, would be a
catastrophic event, according to MacKinnon, and would mean the end of the
Internet as a shared global resource. "Around the world, countries are increasingly
restricting the Internet and seeking to bring it under state control," Gilmor noted. He
said he hoped the Snowden revelations "don't accelerate the trend, but I fear that
they might."
Abandoning the multistakeholder model wrecks global growth,

causes mass poverty, crushes trade
McDowell 2/21/12
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702047924045772290740231
95322?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle
%2FSB10001424052970204792404577229074023195322.html Mr. McDowell is a
commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission.
Since the Net's inception, engineers, academics, user groups and others have
convened in bottom-up nongovernmental organizations to keep it operating and
thriving through what is known as a "multi-stakeholder" governance model. This
consensus-driven private-sector approach has been the key to the Net's
phenomenal success. In 1995, shortly after it was privatized, only 16 million
people used the Internet world-wide. By 2011, more than two billion were online
and that number is growing by as much as half a million every day. This explosive
growth is the direct result of governments generally keeping their hands off the
Internet sphere. Net access, especially through mobile devices, is improving the
human condition more quicklyand more fundamentally than any other
technology in history. Nowhere is this more true than in the developing world,
where unfettered Internet technologies are expanding economies and
raising living standards. Enlarge Image Corbis Farmers who live far from markets
are now able to find buyers for their crops through their Internet-connected mobile
devices without assuming the risks and expenses of traveling with their goods.
Worried parents are able to go online to locate medicine for their sick children. And
proponents of political freedom are better able to share information and organize
support to break down the walls of tyranny. The Internet has also been a net job
creator. A recent McKinsey study found that for every job disrupted by Internet
connectivity, 2.6 new jobs are created. It is no coincidence that these wonderful
developments blossomed as the Internet migrated further away from government
control. Today, however, Russia, China and their allies within the 193 member states
of the ITU want to renegotiate the 1988 treaty to expand its reach into previously
unregulated areas. Reading even a partial list of proposals that could be codified
into international law next December at a conference in Dubai is chilling: Subject
cyber security and data privacy to international control; Allow foreign phone
companies to charge fees for "international" Internet traffic, perhaps even on a "perclick" basis for certain Web destinations, with the goal of generating revenue for
state-owned phone companies and government treasuries; Impose unprecedented
economic regulations such as mandates for rates, terms and conditions for currently
unregulated traffic-swapping agreements known as "peering." Establish for the
first time ITU dominion over important functions of multi-stakeholder Internet
governance entities such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, the nonprofit entity that coordinates the .com and .org Web addresses of
the world; Subsume under intergovernmental control many functions of the
Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Society and other multi-stakeholder
groups that establish the engineering and technical standards that allow the
Internet to work; Regulate international mobile roaming rates and practices. Many
countries in the developing world, including India and Brazil, are particularly
intrigued by these ideas. Even though Internet-based technologies are improving
billions of lives everywhere, some governments feel excluded and want more
control. And let's face it, strong-arm regimes are threatened by popular outcries
for political freedom that are empowered by unfettered Internet connectivity. They
have formed impressive coalitions, and their efforts have progressed significantly.
Merely saying "no" to any changes to the current structure of Internet governance is
likely to be a losing proposition. A more successful strategy would be for proponents
of Internet freedom and prosperity within every nation to encourage a dialogue
among all interested parties, including governments and the ITU, to broaden the
multi-stakeholder umbrella with the goal of reaching consensus to address
reasonable concerns. As part of this conversation, we should underscore the
tremendous benefits that the Internet has yielded for the developing world through
the multi-stakeholder model. Upending this model with a new regulatory treaty
is likely to partition the Internet as some countries would inevitably choose to
opt out. A balkanized Internet would be devastating to global free trade
and national sovereignty. It would impair Internet growth most severely in the
developing world but also globally as technologists are forced to seek bureaucratic
permission to innovate and invest. This would also undermine the proliferation of
new cross-border technologies, such as cloud computing. A top-down, centralized,
international regulatory overlay is antithetical to the architecture of the Net, which
is a global network of networks without borders. No government, let alone an
intergovernmental body, can make engineering and economic decisions in lightningfast Internet time. Productivity, rising living standards and the spread of
freedom everywhere, but especially in the developing world , would grind to
a halt as engineering and business decisions become politically paralyzed within a
global regulatory body. Any attempts to expand intergovernmental powers
over the Internet no matter how incremental or seemingly innocuous should
be turned back. Modernization and reform can be constructive, but not if the end
result is a new global bureaucracy that departs from the multi-stakeholder model.
Enlightened nations should draw a line in the sand against new regulations while
welcoming reform that could include a nonregulatory role for the ITU. Pro-regulation
forces are, thus far, much more energized and organized than those who favor the
multi-stakeholder approach. Regulation proponents only need to secure a simple
majority of the 193 member states to codify their radical and counterproductive
agenda. Unlike the U.N. Security Council, no country can wield a veto in ITU
proceedings. With this in mind, some estimate that approximately 90 countries
could be supporting intergovernmental Net regulationa mere seven short of a
majority. While precious time ticks away, the U.S. has not named a leader for the
treaty negotiation. We must awake from our slumber and engage before it is too
late. Not only do these developments have the potential to affect the daily lives of
all Americans, they also threaten freedom and prosperity across the globe .
Extinction
Burrows and Harris - 2009 (Counselor in the National Intelligence Council, Member at the National
Intelligence Council - Mathew J. Burrows, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed Worldan unclassified report by the
NIC published every four years that projects trends over a 15-year period, has served in the Central Intelligence
Agency since 1986, holds a Ph.D. in European History from Cambridge University, and Jennifer Harris, Member of
the Long Range Analysis Unit at the National Intelligence Council, holds an M.Phil. in International Relations from
Oxford University and a J.D. from Yale University, 2009 (Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial
Crisis, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 32, Issue 2, April, Available Online at
http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf, Accessed 08-22-2011, p. 35-37)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the
future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces.
With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample [end page 35]
opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity.
Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe
that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from
that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic
societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of
multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no
reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the
twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater
conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile
economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying
those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will
remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and
youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place
some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups
in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups
inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training
procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent
collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,
particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an
economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced
drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East .
Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a
nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security
arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent
relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would
emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity
conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an
unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those
states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear
rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dualcapable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving
reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of
strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight
times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption
rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. [end page 36] Types of
conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could
reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neomercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to
take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this
could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to
energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability
and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have
important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a
rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias
development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these
countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be
military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions,
rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for
multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming
scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water
resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a
more dog-eat-dog world .
Contention Five: Rules of the Road solve Cyberwar

!!!Increasing official diplomatic engagement key leads to
small successes that snowball
Maller 13 (Dr. Tara, Research Fellow National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation,
Associate Director for Strategic Communications for the Franklin Project at the Aspen Institute, fellow
with the Truman National Security Project and the Millennial Action Network, B.A. in government from
Dartmouth College and M.A. in international relations from the University of Chicago, 8/21/13,
Enhancing the Cyber Diplomacy Arsenala draft paper for China Institute of International Studies,
http://images.china.cn/gyw/5th%20China-US%20Young%20Leaders%20Dialogue/Tara.pdf)
Breaking down the cyber issues: Given that the areas of agreement and
disagreement in the cyber realm span across different types of activities, it makes
sense to try to work on these areas separately and establish frameworks, norms and
international law treating these areas separately. In other words, breaking down the
cyber issue into dimensions mentioned earlier (cyber-terrorism, cybercrime,
economic espionage, cyberwar) and dealing with these as separate issues might
make it easier to make progress faster on areas of agreement. Start with small
victories : Related to the point above, start with areas of cyber that the US and
Chinese agree on and then address some of the more difficult areas of
disagreement. Sometimes small mutual victories can work to help in fostering
cooperation in later negotiations. Moving Forward on Cyberdiplomacy Both the US
and China ought to embrace a strong push for cyberdiplomacy and work together to
create a comprehensive international framework or treaty. A parallel effort should
include the ongoing diplomatic meetings that have started and continued highlevel meetings on this issue. While ideally an official agreement or framework will
be put in place over time, the US and China ought to work on confidence-building
measures and communicating redlines. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue
meetings and the new Cyber Working Group, which first met on July 8 will be key to
these efforts. In July, both sides agreed to talk more about the norms governing
cyber activities and Defense Secretary Hagel emphasized the importance of USChinese cooperation.16 - Ramp up on cyber diplomats: The US should devote
more resources to the diplomatic side of the cyber equation, namely at the State
Department. The ChinaUS Strategic Security Dialogue, States Cyber Coordinator
and the newly announced Chinese cyber affairs office are all positive steps in the
right direction. Both President Obama and Secretary Kerry ought to be having
frequent meetings with Chinese leadership on cyber issues and other areas of
importance to US-Sino relations. In his Foreign Policy piece Maurer suggests Let's
start by growing our cyber diplomatic effort by at least a factor of five. 16.
-Increase high-level cyber summits : Diplomatic summits and high-level
meetings between leaders, like the recent meeting between both countries
leaders at the Sunnylands Estate in California are critical and should be continued.
Personal relationships are important. Larger summits, conferences and exchanges,
such as this conference, are important for promoting a shared vision and for
understanding the zones of disagreement.
Intensified negotiation of rules of the road and attribution

necessary and sufficient to avert cyberwar
Segal and Lan 16 (Adam and Tang, both are Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellows for China Studies
and Directors of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Reducing and
Managing US-China Conflict in Cyberspace, The National Bureau of Asian Research,
http://www.nbr.org/publications/ specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)--RF
Although the summit statement on cyber-enabled intellectual property the t was an

important first step, cyberespionage will continue to be an irritant in the U.S.-China
relationship. Neither side agreed to reduce spying for political and military
purposes; cyberespionage is too important to the national interests of both. The
ideological battle over an open and free Internet will not end. Sovereignty in
cyberspace will also continue to divide the two sides, as will the application of the
law of armed conflict in cyberspace and the role of governments in the multistakeholder model of Internet governance. Beijing and Washington want to prevent
escalatory cyber operationsattacks that one side sees as legitimate surveillance
but the other views as prepping the battlefield. Much like discussions about
incidents at sea or in the air are meant to regularize interactions and prevent
miscalculations, the senior experts group should work to clarify intentions in
cyberspace. Formal discussions on acceptable norms of behavior and possible
thresholds for use of force, as well as greater transparency on doctrine, can reduce
the chance of misperception and thus diminish the likelihood that a conflict in
cyberspace will become kinetic. Attribution remains a point of contention, with
Beijing calling the United States claim that China was behind the attacks on the
Office of Personnel Management irresponsible and unscientific. 68 A shared
understanding of what types of evidence can be used to attribute an attack and
how that information is presented would be an important first step to defining
norms of behavior. The 2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts report also calls on
states to substantiate public accusations of state-sponsored cyberactivity and notes
that the indication that an ICT activity was launched or otherwise originates from a
States territory...may be insufficient in itself to attribute the activity to that state.
69 If this norm is truly accepted, it will mean that the United States, and other
countries, will have to provide more public evidence of who is behind an attack. At
the June 2015 Strategic and Economic Dialogue, State Councilor Yang Jiechi called
for China to work with the United States to develop an international code of
conduct for cyber information sharing. 70 While the Chinese side did not offer any
specifics, Washington and Beijing could establish a joint forensics team, made up of
experts from the government, private sector, and academia, to investigate an
attack on a third party and identify types of information to be shared. Conclusion
Trust is currently a rare commodity in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship, and it is
especially difficult to sustain in cyberspace. Much of what happens in this domain
occurs in the shadows, out of the public sight. States do not take credit for
cyberattacks, and there has been a widespread reluctance to talk publicly of the
development of cyberweapons and offensive doctrines. In many cases, states
outsource cyber operations to patriotic hackers, criminals, and other proxies. The
2015 agreement on cybersecurity was a significant symbolic step forward for China
and the United States, but trust will be built and sustained through
implementation. Both countries will test whether the high-level dialogue
mechanism will successfully assist in cooperation and better incident response.
While it is good that Washington and Beijing have agreed to further the discussion
on the norms of cyberspace, the dialogue must be formalized, routinized, and
insulated from political point scoring. Without practical progress, cybersecurity
could quickly rise to the top of the bilateral agenda and threaten to undermine the
U.S.-China relationship again.
Us-China cooperation on Internet norms spills over globally,

continued cooperation key
et despite the gaps in their positions, and the hyperbolic rhetoric that o t e n shows
up in the media in both countries about cyberwar, policymakers in Zhongnanhai and
the White House appear committed to not letting cyber issues derail the
relationship. The September 2015 summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi
Jinping produced breakthrough agreements on several important cybersecurity
measures. Both sides pledged that neither countrys government will conduct or
knowingly support cyber-enabled the t of intellectual property, including trade
secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. 1 Washington and
Beijing also agreed to identify and endorse norms of behavior in cyberspace and
establish two high-level working groups and a hotline between the two sides.
However, as President Obama acknowledged following the summit in September,
Our work is not yet done. I believe we can expand our cooperation in this area. 2
The U.S.-China cyber agreement could be a model for future international
discussions. China and the United Kingdom, for example, reached a similar
agreement, and in November 2015 China, Brazil, Russia, the United States, and
other members of the Group of Twenty (G-20) accepted the norm against
conducting or supporting the cyber-enabled the t of intellectual property.
Inherency
Inherency Ext: At 15 Cyber Agreement Solves

Current agreement is failing because too vague
Gady 15 (Franz-Stefan, Associate Editor with the Diplomat and Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute where
he edits the policy innovation blog, Can the US and China Cooperate on the First (and Last) Line of Cyber
Defense? The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/can-the-us-and-china-cooperate-on-the-first-and-last-lineof-cyber-defense/)
Earlier this month, I noted that the recent agreement between China and the United
States to cooperate on a number of cyberspace-related policy issues, including an
understanding on intellectual property theft, would, in all likelihood, not lead to a
reduction of the number of cyberattacks ostensibly launched from Chinese territory.
A new report issued by the U.S.-based cybersecurity company CrowdStrike appears
to confirm my previous analysis, since it outlines that attacks by Chinese stateaffiliated hackers (a rather vague term) on U.S. technology and pharmaceutical
companies have continued unabated from the time the agreement was announced
until now.
This is not surprising. After all, the agreement did not specifically prohibit all
cyberattacks and the collection of information via cyberespionage, but rather called
for an end to the passing on of information extracted from U.S.-private sector
networks to Chinese companies in order for them to gain a competitive advantage.
It may be too premature to argue that the agreement has failed.
For now, the September 2015 China-U.S. cyber agreement remains the most useful
framework for bilateral cooperation on cyber-related policy issues after the June
2013 Sunnylands summit pledges to deepen cybersecurity cooperation were
abandoned with the U.S. indictment of five Chinese military hackers in May 2014.
To avoid past mistakes, the rather vague September agreement needs to be
followed up as soon as possible by bilateral meetings to more clearly define specific
venues of cooperation between China and the United States.
Squo negotiations, but not enough to solve the risk

Harold Libicki and Cevolles 16 Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and
Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica,
California. Scott Warren Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia
Pacific Policy, a political scientist at the RAND CorporationAstrid Stuth Cevallos,
Project Associate at the RAND Corporation.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/RAN
D_RR1335.pdf Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace
While the bilateral Cyber Working Group appears to have been abandoned as an
approach, discussions on cyberspace issues did occur at the bilateral Strategic and
Economic Dialogue in summer 2015, and an initial agreement to move forward on
the issue took center stage on the outcomes list of the Xi-Obama summit held in
Washington in Sep - tember 2015. Still, substantial questions persist about the two
nations relationship in cyberspace . In the absence of a set of fully fleshed-out

norms and procedures to modulate troublesome activity and set rules for
cyberspace, the issue will continue to represent a substantial risk to the
bilateral relationship, regional peace and stability, and global order
Agreements a good step but cant solve

Narod 15 (Andrew J. Narod has a PhD at Washington College of Law, US-China cyber deal big on promises,
short on action, 9/29/15, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4a51bb42-ba20-4c73-b38c-c10d405fd0d5)
In the aftermath of recent cyberattacks attributed to Chinas government and

citizens, many observers prepared for a rather uncomfortable state visit by Chinese
President Xi Jinping last week. Then, as President Xi began his visit, the White House
announced on September 25 what appeared to be a significant victory for corporate
data security in America. We have agreed that neither the U.S. or [sic] the Chinese
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information for
commercial advantage. In addition, well work together and with other nations to
promote international rules of the road for appropriate conduct in cyberspace,
President Obama stated at a news conference following the announcement. Despite
the favorable optics for the countries two presidents, the question remains whether
corporate data is truly more secure as a result of this agreement between the
United States and China. It appears that the agreement is a first step but only a
ceremonial first step in effect in the ongoing efforts to secure business data from
corporate espionage. The agreement struck with China was, in part, predicated
upon the White Houses threat of sanctions in light of recent attacks.
Notwithstanding the agreement, President Obama made clear that he is largely
unsure of the level of cooperation to be expected from his counterpart in China.
The question now is are words followed by actions? President Obama said. We
will be watching carefully to make an assessment as to whether progress has been
made in this area. Even President Xi, himself, questioned in these negotiations
whether he could prevent individual actors within China from launching corporate
espionage attacks. President Xi indicated to me that with 1.3 billion people he cant
guarantee the behavior of every single person on Chinese soil. I understand that,
President Obama said. What I can guarantee, though, and what I am hoping that
President Xi will show me is that we are not sponsoring these activities and that
we take it seriously and will cooperate to enforce the law. The net effect of this
agreement seems to be most squarely focused on critical infrastructure, including
power grids, banking systems, mobile phone networks and hospitals. Surely,
protection of such infrastructure is necessary. Yet the true economic advantage to
be gained in cyberattacks is now primarily in the area of trade secrets theft and
business data theft and this area was sparsely addressed between the countries in
any meaningful way. Essentially, China has agreed to avoid taking down the United
States infrastructure which was unlikely to happen in the first place as a
headline-grabbing concession without any true impact. Of course, this concession
regarding infrastructure almost completely overlooks non-infrastructure corporate
data security. The problem for U.S. business is how to gauge the impact of this highlevel agreement in terms of real improvements in security, given that the
agreement is only for future cooperation between the U.S. and China. In light of
President Obamas own expressed uncertainty over Chinas follow-through, the deal
seems less like the Soviet era trust and verify, and something more akin to hope
and wait-and-see. At a practical level, it seems difficult to trust that an agreement
with broad goals, but not much detail, will be effective in the near term. Some might
ask, in the words of Joe Namath, If you arent going all the way, why go at all? The
limitations of the new U.S.-China agreement are readily apparent. U.S. businesses
must remain as vigilant as ever to combat the threat of corporate espionage. No
high-level agreement between presidents will guarantee that individual actors
intend to stop their efforts to profit from data theft. When conducting a
cybersecurity cost-benefit analysis, it appears that little consideration if any
should be given to the U.S.-China cybersecurity agreement. But, it is a start, and
perhaps future negotiations will provide a stronger framework and greater
enforcement to deter criminal acts of corporate espionage.
Currrent negotiation progress is painfully slow

Chin 6/5/16 http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/06/15/inside-the-slow-workings-of-the-u-s-chinacybersecurity-agreement/ Politics reporter for @WSJ in Beijing. Once worked as a sous chef on a man-made island in
San Francisco.
Getting the worlds two largest powers to work together on a subject as touchy as
cybersecurity was always bound to be difficult. How difficult? Nine months after
Barack Obama and Xi Jinping announced a surprise series of cyber agreements at
the Rose Garden press conference, it appears China and the U.S. are still figuring
out how to talk about it. Speaking to reporters at a high-level U.S.-China dialogue on
cybercrime held in Beijing this week, Department of Homeland Security
Undersecretary Suzanne Spaulding said the two sides were busy setting up lines of
communication to share information on cyber threats. Progress has evidently not
been swift. We are very pleased to have temporary email addresses, Ms.
Spaulding said, adding that efforts were underway to establish permanent email
addresses. The comments didnt escape the notice of analysts, some of whom were
left wondering what cyber authorities in Beijing and Washington did to talk with
each other before the temporary email addresses came into being: The Department
of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, the agencies representing the U.S.
in the dialogue, didnt immediately respond to written requests for an answer to
that question sent Wednesday during the day in China. Considerable doubt
hovers over the U.S.-China rapprochement on cyber security, which aims to
transform an issue that once bitterly divided the two countries into an area of
cooperation. Security researchers disagree over whether China has made good on
its key promise to stop state-sponsored hacking of U.S. companies for commercial
gain. And while the threat of sanctions may keep China coming to meetings, some
researchers and U.S. officials say, its not clear that Beijing is willing to do much
more than talk. The Chinese side at least made a show of taking the meeting
seriously on Tuesday. Meng Jianzhu, the countrys security czar, and Guo Shengkun,
its minister of public security, both attended the dialogue even after their U.S.
counterparts, Department of Homeland Security chief Jeh Johnson and Attorney
General Loretta Lynch, cancelled to contend with the mass shooting in Orlando, Fla.
We do this to demonstrate the sincerity of the Chinese side to engage in dialogue
with the U.S. Mr. Meng told reporters, saying Beijing wanted both to help burnish
Mr. Obamas legacy and establish a framework for cooperating with his successor.
We know that the current administration has six months left in office. We must
work until the very end. Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang denied suggestions
that little had been accomplished during the gathering, saying at a regular press
briefing on Wednesday that it was a substantial meeting. According to statement
released Wednesday by the Department of Justice, the two sides agreed to
implement plans to set up a cyber hotline developed at an inaugural dialogue in
Washington in November. They also agreed to conduct seminars on network
security and the misuse of technology to commit acts of terrorism. The two
countries are holding a separate series of dialogues to hash out differences over
what laws and rules should apply in cyberspace. China believes the internet should
be divided up and governed according to national borders an idea most Western
governments say would kill the free flow of information and stifle innovation. Adam
Segal, an expert on cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Tang Lan,
an information researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary China Relations,
warned in a recent essay (pdf) that building on Mr. Xis agreement with Mr. Obama
would not be easy. Trust is currently a rare commodity in the Sino-U.S. bilateral
relationship, and it is especially difficult to sustain in cyberspace, they wrote,
adding that trust could only be built if the agreement is actually implemented.
Cyberagreement insufficient even if its a good step

Starks 4/1/16 http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-cybersecurity/2016/04/still-room-for-improvingus-china-cyber-relations-how-the-fbi-deals-with-teen-hackers-the-ftc-tackles-ransomware-213534#ixzz4CobFJPnh
STILL NOT BESTIES Despite last years agreement between the U.S. and China
to forbid cyber theft of intellectual property, President Barack Obama pointed out
Thursday during Chinese President Xi Jinpings visit that theres not complete
harmony. Now, as has been true in the past, we will have a candid exchange about
areas where we have significant differences issues like human rights, cyber and
maritime issues, Obama said in a joint appearance. For his part, Xi said the two
presidents would explore possibilities of deepening cooperation in cybersecurity,
among other areas. Mayer Brown JSMs Xiaoyan Zhang told MC theres still room for
improvement between the two countries, to say the least. Since last years cyber
agreement, the alleged cyberattacks between the United States and China have not
lessened in fact, it might be more accurate to say they have increased, said
Zhang, who is counsel of the Intellectual Property and Technology, Media and
Telecoms group and is based in Hong Kong and Shanghai. The lack of a binding
treaty makes last years deal little more than a high-level agreement to general
principles, she said. But she expects the two sides to work toward putting flesh on
bone, even if the two presidents didnt get there Thursday: I think there will be a
little more definite and specific agreements coming out.
Cyberagreement leaves military on the table

Greene 9/25/15 [Tim, Trusted Third Party, U.S.-China agreement on cyber espionage is a first step at
best, Network World, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2986401/security/u-s-china-agreement-on-cyberespionage-is-a-first-step-at-best.html]
The agreement sets up high-level talks twice a year to deal with complaints the U.S.
and China have about whether the other is responding quickly and thoroughly to
claims by the other side about malicious cyber activity.
Presidents Obama and Xi agree that the U.S. and China wont steal corporate
secrets from each other, but the wording is
so
full of loopholes
that CISOs shouldnt take
too much comfort in the pact for quite a while
The agreement sets up high-level talks twice a year to deal with complaints the U.S.
and China have about whether the other is responding quickly and thoroughly to
claims by the other side about malicious cyber activity.
[N]either countrys government will conduct
or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade
secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.
It also takes a run at corporate spying in particular:
The word knowingly injects a factor of deniability. So one side might actually
support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, but if they claim not to know
about it, and nobody can prove they do, theyre OK. And if they do it and their intent is not to
provide competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors, theyre also OK, according
a strict, lawyerly reading of this wording provided by the White House. That leaves this type of activity for the
purpose of, say, military advantage, on the table.
Agreement backfires
15 deal makes it worse unless we do the plan
Austin 15 (Greg, PhD in International Relations author of Cyber Policy in China and Professional Fellow at
the EastWest Institute, Why the China-US Cyber Agreement May Prove Destructive, The Diplomat
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/why-the-china-us-cyber-agreement-may-prove-destructive/)
In late September 2015, the Presidents of China and the United States reached a
number of agreements on cyber security, cyber espionage and cyber crime. They
provide for a new high-level contact group as well as assurances to investigate and
resolve complaints from each other. The agreements are important diplomatic
breakthroughs, but they are relatively piecemeal when seen against the bigger
picture. They may ultimately prove to be destructive if not followed up quickly by
a more comprehensive agreement.
From the United States side, the agreements were intended to constrain China from
using government-collected commercial intelligence for the benefit of its civil sector
firms. This narrow focus on just one aspect of the bilateral cyber problem appears to
reflect a belief in the United States that it can be addressed without Washington
having to give up anything. This is further evidenced by its repeated demands
unaccompanied by any concessions, even rhetorical ones. The U.S. decision to stake
so much on eliminating cyber espionage, without considering other major
challenges, may be misguided for at least three reasons.
First, the United States overestimates the negative impact of Chinas cyber
espionage on U.S. competitiveness. Take for example the case of Westinghouse, the
giant U.S. corporation named as a victim in the indictments brought against five
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) personnel in May 2014 for commercial espionage.
Westinghouse was almost certainly the victim of cyber espionage and its trade
secrets were undoubtedly handed to a Chinese competitor.
But within two months of the indictment, Westinghouse raised its estimates of likely
new contracts in China to US$20 billion. Its competitiveness does not appear to
have been impacted negatively in the short to medium term. And Westinghouse
was already in a long term technology transfer relationship with China that had
seen it hand over some 75,000 technical documents as well as engaging in joint
nuclear construction projects in China.
Second, the U.S. position rests on its assertion that there is a workable and
enforceable distinction between the national security purposes of economic cyber
espionage (which Washington defends and conducts) and the commercial purposes
of cyber espionage (which Washington says it opposes). In effect, the United States
is implying very clearly that the espionage against Westinghouse had no national
security implications at all. Such a claim is not sustainable. There may be few
companies in the United States where the blurring between military and civil
purposes is more profound. Westinghouse is a major supplier of military nuclear
reactors to the U.S. Navy. For this reason, Westinghouse and the nuclear technology
sector appear therefore to have been poor choices for action by the United States
as part of a diplomatic strategy to counter Chinas cyber espionage for being
commercial in character.
Cyberagreement only economic INCREASE risk of national

security hacks
Philipp 9/29/15 [Joshua, Writer for Epoch Times, Us-China Cyberpact: A Deal Built on Distrust, The
Epoch Times, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1777875-a-deal-built-on-distrust/]
The cybersecurity deal between the United States and China is a deal without trust.
With the United States threatening sanctions and declaring that its patience for
Chinese cyberattacks had reached an end, the leader of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), Xi Jinping, agreed to end cyberattacks that have been stealing trillions
in value annually from the U.S. economy.
The agreement is being viewed with a sort of pessimistic hope in the cybersecurity
community.
My opinion is, Ill believe it when I see it, said Darren Hayes, director of
cybersecurity and an assistant professor at Pace University, in a phone interview.
While some experts believe the threat of sanctions against Chinese companies is
too large for the CCP not to comply, the CCP has a track record of saying one thing
and doing another.
The cyberagreement will establish a system for high-level dialogue between the
United States and the CCP. On the U.S. side, this will include U.S. secretary of
homeland security and the U.S. attorney general.
The CCP will assign an official at the ministerial level. Other departments, including
the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and Chinese offices with similar
roles, will take part.
According to a White House fact sheet, this biannual dialogue will be used as a
mechanism to review the timeliness and quality of responses if an incident takes
place. In other words, if the United States detects a cyberattack being used to steal
from a business, they will alert the CCP, and participants in the dialogue will review
whether the CCP did anything about it.
Despite the oversight, on the surface the agreement appears to be toothless. Yet,
deep down this may not be the case.
The context of the agreement is whats important, according to Dmitri Alperovitch,
co-founder and CTO of CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity technology company.
The CCP realized, he said in a phone interview, if they didnt concede on these
points that sanctions would have been put on Chinese companies.
While it doesnt appear sanctions are mentioned directly in the agreement, the
United States is reserving them as an option if the CCPs use of cyberattacks for
theft continue.
Obama hinted at this during the joint press conference with Xi. He said, We will be
watching carefully to make an assessment as to whether progress has been made in
this area.
If the CCP doesnt comply, Obama said, sanctions and other retaliatory options are
still on the table. He said, I did indicate to President Xi that we will apply those and
whatever other tools we have in our toolkit to go after cybercriminals, either
retrospectively or prospectively.
One of the main problems the CCP faces is that its systems for economic theft are
massive, and deeply entwined with its programs for economic growth.
Epoch Times recently exposed this system in an investigative report. The CCPs
economic theft is directed by legislation, and carried out by large-scale networks of
military and private hackers. Stolen information is reverse engineered by a network
of hundreds of technology transfer centers under government and academic
offices. The system is also supported by more than 3,200 military front companies
operating in the United States.
Were talking about tens of thousands of people involved in doing this for the
Chinese government, and to say this is going to stop today or tomorrow is absurd,
said Hayes.
According to Alperovitch, however, the CCP may not need to dismantle this system.
He believes the program could solve the problem of economic theft in the United
States, but said Chinese hackers will still have plenty of targets to choose from.
Alperovitch said the CCP is unlikely to dismantle its network of military hackers.
Instead, Theyre just going to give them new tasks.
Its not going to cut down on all espionage, he said, noting that we will likely see
an increase in cyberattacks that fall under conventional espionageand there will
likely be an increase of Chinese cyberattacks against other countries.
The issue rests in two key elements of the agreement. First off, the agreement is
currently only between the United States and Chinaand the CCPs operations to
steal intellectual property could simply turn their sights on businesses outside the
United States.
Second, the agreement doesnt cover cyberattacks that fall under the definition of
old-fashioned espionage.
The line is it has to be for commercial benefit, Alperovitch said.
This means that cyberattacks stealing U.S. military blueprints, personal data on
federal employees, and cyberattacks monitoring U.S. officials and other persons of
interest will not only not end, but may even increase.
NU Ext disad link now

The link is non-unique more talks coming
Gady 6/16/16 (Franz-Stefan, Associate Editor with the Diplomat and Senior Fellow at the EastWest
Institute where he edits the policy innovation blog, China-US Talks on Cybercrime: What Are the Outcomes? The
Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/china-us-talks-on-cybercrime-what-are-the-outcomes/)
On June 15, China and the United States held their second round of bilateral talks on
cybercrime and other cyber-related topics in Beijing. Originally intended to be a
ministerial meeting, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch and U.S. Homeland
Security Secretary Jeh Johnson had to withdraw their participation to focus on the
ongoing Orlando shooting investigation. As a result the meeting was being cochaired by Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary Suzanne Spaulding.
Next to agreeing to hold the next round of high-level talks in the second half of 2016
in Washington D.C., the bilateral dialogue yielded a number of other outcomes.
First, both sides agreed to hold another tabletop exercise (the first was held in April
2016) on cybercrime and network protection before the next meeting in Washington
D.C. Second, participants agreed to the scope, objective and procedures necessary
for the implementation of the so-called U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues
Hotline Mechanism Work Plan and are planning to test the hotline mechanism
before September 2016.
Cyberwar Advantage
Global Cyberwar risk increasing
Multiple scenarios for escalatory cyberwar ambiguity key

Cyberattacks are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of

impact, including their capacity for physical destruction. China, Iran, North Korea,
and Russia have demonstrated an ability to conduct destabilizing cyber activity.
Such actionswhether for destructive purposes, intelligence collection, or economic
espionageare designed to evade network defenses and can involve various means
of deception to thwart attribution. Recent incidents have shown that U.S.
adversaries can no longer assume they will be able to conceal their identities in
cyberspace, but cybersecurity experts still lack agreed-upon standards for
attribution; evidence for a credible and convincing attribution can take a long
time to compile; and malicious actors continue to develop new means of obscuring
responsibility. Moreover, unlike many cyber operations designed to exfiltrate large
amounts of data, destructive cyberattacks can be made to operate with limited
communication between the malware and controller, offering fewer forensic details
to establish responsibility. Even when an attacker can be identified, public
attribution will remain as much a political challenge as a technical one, given that
competing allegations of responsibility will likely follow any public accusation.
Without corroborating signals or human intelligencewhich, if it exists, officials may
be reluctant or slow to disclosecomputer forensic data may be incomplete or too
ambiguous to convince a skeptical public. Should a major cyberattack occur over
the next twelve to eighteen months, or even beyond that period if sufficient
preventive and mitigating steps are not taken, public pressure to respond could
outpace the time needed to credibly attribute responsibility and, if desired, build an
effective coalition to support a response. Over the same time period, ambiguity
regarding the intent of cyber operations will also remain a challenge, leaving
policymakers uncertain about whether malware discovered on a sensitive system is
designed for espionage or as a beachhead for a future attack.
The United States could face several plausible crises over the next twelve to
eighteen months that would be complicated by the risks of ambiguity in
cyberspace. These include destructive insider threats, remote cyber operations that
threaten trust in financial institutions, and cyberattacks by foreign nations or
nonstate groups against critical infrastructure systems that cause widespread panic
and loss of life, or similar attacks against a U.S. ally. National Security Agency (NSA)
Director Admiral Michael Rogers warned in late 2014 that he expects U.S. critical
infrastructureassets essential to the function of a society and economy, such as
water supply systems, electric grids, and transportation systemsto be attacked,
noting that multiple foreign nations and groups already possess the ability to shut
down a U.S. power grid and several others are investing in the capability. Attacks
like the publicly unattributed January 2015 cyberattack that severely damaged a
German steel mill suggest the ability to bring about physical destruction through
cyber means may be proliferating quickly. Of particular concern would be the
proliferation of these capabilities among terrorist groups, which currently possess
limited technical skills but destructive intent. As the number of cyber-capable
adversaries grows, so too does the number of critical targets, especially as
industrial control systems move to web-based interfaces and more common
operating systems and networking protocols.
The implications of any crisis will depend on the current geopolitical context; the
type of networks that fail; and the extent of economic damage, physical destruction,
or human costs that result directly from network failure or its cascading effects on
public health, communication and financial networks, and the economy. A
successful cyberattack against one or more critical infrastructure systems could
endanger thousands of lives, halt essential services, and cripple the U.S. economy
for years. Two plausible factors that could exacerbate such a crisis are intentional
and inadvertent ambiguity.
High risk of cyberwar now undeveloped rules of the road

intensify risk
Segal 6/28/16 (Adam Segal is the Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy
Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, Cyber Attacks Blurring Borders
Between War and Peace, http://www.brinknews.com/cyber-attacks-blurring-bordersbetween-war-and-peace/)
With the public campaign proving ineffective, the U.S. raised the stakes
significantly, threatening sanctions on individuals or entities that benefited from
cybertheft before the September 2015 meeting between President Xi Jinping and
President Barack Obama. The summit was important to Xi and his efforts to portray
himself as a strong leader to the Chinese public; Beijing did not want the cyber
issue to derail the summit, so he made concessions. Standing side by side in the
White House Rose Garden, the two presidents announced an agreement in which
neither countrys government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled
theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or
commercial sectors. China and the UK reached a similar agreement a month later,
and in November 2015, China, Brazil, Russia, the U.S. and other members of the
Group of Twenty accepted the norm against conducting or supporting the cyberenabled theft of intellectual property. The problem for states, and for international
stability, is that espionage precedes and enables a disruptive or destructive attack.
Chinese hackers have reportedly broken into industrial control systems, and Admiral
Mike Rogers, head of U.S. Cyber Command and the director of the National Security
Agency, told a congressional panel that China and one or two other countries
would be capable of mounting a cyberattack that could shut down the power grid or
other critical infrastructure. What might seem to be legitimate spying to a Chinese
or Russian hacker might to U.S. policymakers look like prepping the battlefield,
that is, looking for weaknesses that an attacker can later exploit in the event that a
conflict breaks out. If the espionage is discovered during a time of high tension, the
defender may assume that an attack is being immediately prepared and feel
pressure to respond quickly. A cyberattack could lead to physical war. This is a
growing threat. Militaries that do not want to be caught flat-footed are rushing to
develop powerful cyber weapons without any agreement on how and when they
might be used or any deep understanding of the consequences they might unleash.
Cyberspace is uncharted waters, as President Obama said after his June 2013
summit with Chinas President Xi: You dont have the kinds of protocols that have
governed military issues, for example, and arms issues, where nations have a lot of
experience in trying to negotiate whats acceptable and whats not. The U.S. has
been trying, with its friends and allies, to develop some rules of the road. In 2015, a
group of government experts at the UN, which included representatives from China,
U.S., Russia and other countries, published a report arguing for a number of
peacetime norms, including that states should not conduct activity that intentionally
damages critical infrastructure or interferes with another countrys cyber
emergency responders.
Cyberwars ambiguity raises escalation risks

Due to the difficulty of determining whether certain activity is intended for

espionage or preparation for an attack, cyber operations run the risk of triggering
unintended escalation. Espionage malware that could be reprogrammed to gain
control of networks, such as BlackEnergy, which has been discovered on critical
infrastructure networks, may be viewed by victims as one update away from
becoming an attack tool capable of crippling energy supplies, water-distribution and
-filtration systems, or financial transactions. Security scans of networks intensified
amid heightened geopolitical tensions could reveal such malware and prompt fears
of an imminent attack, even if the malware was implanted for espionage
purposes long before the crisis began. The difficulty of predicting a cyber
operations effects and the interdependency of networked systems increase the
risks that an operation will inadvertently spill over onto sensitive systems or cause
unintended effects.
One example of ambiguity and the risk of misperception is the 2010 discovery on
Nasdaq servers of malware similar to a cyber tool reportedly developed by Russias
Federal Security Service. Initial assessments maintained that the malware was
capable of wiping out the entire stock exchange. Only later was it shown to be less
destructive, according to media accounts. Such ambiguities during periods of
heightened geopolitical tensions pose significant escalatory risks. Information
security experts have raised similar concerns about other Russia-linked activity and
questioned whether aspects of the activity are intended to insert offensive
capabilities into critical infrastructure systems for future use.
Ambiguity also arises in the case of wormsself-replicating malware that seeks

out other computers to infect. Worms can spread so pervasively that their origin and
intent can be difficult to infer from known victims. One worm, Conficker, spread to
millions of computers and disrupted military communications in several European
countries. Its creator and purpose remain unknown.
Warning Indicators
Indicators of activity with the potential to create or exacerbate an international

political crisis include leadership statements of an intent to conduct or permit
computer network operations against foreign networks; evidence of that intent,
including research and development, budgetary allocations, or organizational
changes, such as the creation of offensive cyber forces; the express or tacit
acceptance of parastatal hackers; and a demonstrated capability to conduct
computer network operations, including cyber-espionage and cyber operations
against domestic targets.
Tactical warning indicators resemble traditional conflicts, such as changes in the

alert status of military units and an increase in crisis-related rhetoric. Indicators
unique to cyber operations include increased efforts to probe foreign networks and
an uptick of activity in online hacker forums discussing foreign targets and tools,
techniques, and procedures appropriate for operations against them.
Implications for U.S. Interests
First, cyberattacks will eventually be part of every nations military strategy. The
United States depends on information communications technologies for critical
military and civilian services far more than its strategic rivals or potential
adversaries. U.S. officials have noted an increase in computer network operations
targeting state, local, and privately operated critical infrastructure, some of which
have the potential to cause considerable harm to operations, assets, and personnel.
Second, ambiguity in cyberspace elevates the risk that a significant cyber event
amid a geopolitical crisis will be misattributed or misperceived, prompting a
disproportionate response or unnecessary expansion of the conflict. Such an
escalation would impair the United States prominent role and interest in global
security and its commitment to international law.
Third, U.S. officials ability to respond swiftly and effectively to cyberattacks is

complicated by the difficulty of timely public attribution and ambiguity over
what type of cyberattack would trigger a right to self-defense or security
commitments to strategic partners. A failure to confidently attribute an attack or
determine whether such activity constituted an attack could limit U.S. response
options. Such confusion, uncertainty, and delay could weaken deterrence and the
credibility of U.S. assurances, trigger a misperception of U.S. commitment, and
undermine a U.S.-led coalition.
Cyberwar increasing will escalate to full war

Hanson 10/20/15 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/10/20/Waging-war-in-peacetime-Cyberattacks-and-international-norms.aspx Fergus Hanson is a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was
Director of the annual Lowy Poll until September 2012. Fergus Hanson has a Masters in International Law from the
University of Sydney. His published thesis focused on regional stability in the Pacific. He worked for the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) from 2004 to 2007. From 2005 to 2007 he served at the Australian Embassy in
The Hague where he was responsible for Australias relations with five international legal organisations and
domestic political issues. Prior to joining DFAT he was a fellow at Cambridge Universitys Lauterpacht Research
Centre for International Law. Fergus has also studied at Uppsala and Fribourg universities.
James Clapper characterised cyber attacks as a 'growing reality' and noted: 'foreign
actors are reconnoitring and developing access to US critical infrastructure systems,
which might be quickly exploited for disruption if an adversary's intent became
hostile'. Key threat actors named were Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, the
latter two noted for having 'possibly more disruptive intent'.
Cyber attacks should now be expected during times of war. Of far more concern
though is the emerging norm in favour of conducting cyber attacks during
peacetime. In 2012, the UK's then-Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Nick
Harvey, even made the case to the Shangri-La Dialogue that cyber attacks were
'quite a civilised option.'
Practice would suggest several states agree. In 2012, it was revealed the US had
been targeting Iran's nuclear program with cyber attacks. It was the first time a
cyber attack had turned hot, doing physical real-world damage. In retaliation, Iran
launched a major attack in August 2012 on the world's largest energy company,
Saudi Aramco.
North Korea has also been active, attacking South Korean banks and broadcasters in
March 2013. In November 2014, it struck again, targeting Sony's spoof movie, The
Interview, about the assassination of the North Korean leader. The attackers used
the threat of terrorism to persuade theatre chains in the US to pull out of screening
the film. As President Obama said at the time: 'We cannot have a society in which
some dictator someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States.
Because if somebody is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie,
imagine what they start doing when they see a documentary that they don't like, or
news reports that they don't like.'
These attacks didn't lead to any deaths, but that seems unlikely to last. Major
attacks on critical infrastructure could easily result in casualties, making
escalation to traditional military options more likely. Cyber attacks may have
appeared to be a soft, civilised option when not everyone had them, but with over
100 states now having military and intelligence cyber warfare units and cyber
capabilities increasing, their more benign nature is unlikely to last or to escape the
pitfalls of miscalculation and escalation.
China Cyberwar Risk increasing

Hostile cyber action increasing spilling over now
Dickson 9/21/15 [Ben, Software Engineer and Freelance Writer, Is The U.S. And Chinas Cyberwar
Reaching A Dentente Or A Flashpoint?Crunch Network, https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/21/is-the-u-s-and-chinascyberwar-reaching-a-detente-or-a-flashpoint/]
The U.S. has traditionally responded to cyber-attacks through preventative and defensive measure s. But
recent escalation in attacks, and the more daring breaches into the security sector,
have forced the U.S. government to revise is national cyber-security strategy and
possibly take more aggressive measures, which can escalate tensions and spill
over to other domains.
In May 2014, the U.S. attorney general charged five Chinese military officials
with hacking and data-theft charges. This was the first time the U.S. formally
accused officials of another country of involvement in cyber-crimes.
Moreover, the Obama administration has been preparing a raft of sanctions against
companies and individuals in China guilty of cyber-espionage attacks against U.S.
targets. The state department has been pushing for the sanctions to come into
effect after Xis visit to Washington, while law enforcement officials argue against
waiting because of the serious nature of cyber-attacks.
The cyberwar between China and the U.S. has also dealt collateral damage. There
were cases in which U.S. citizens of Chinese descent were arrested on espionage
and technology theft charges, but were later released as the charges were
dropped and the suspicions proven unfounded.
China will launch economic cyber campaign

Paganini 16 (Pierluigi, Chief Information Security Officer at Bit4Id, member of the ENISA (European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security) Security Analyst and Freelance Writer, 6.23.16,
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/48661/intelligence/chinas-attacks-us-drops.html)
The theories for the decline are almost as endless as malware variants but perhaps the most likely scenario is
less about Presidents Xis domestic policies and more about his geopolitical ambitions. In recent
years, China has expanded its economic reach globally with a strong focus on South and
Central Asia; more specifically, Chinas One Belt, One Road initiative.The goal behind the initiative is to provide trade routes from
as far west as Iran and east to Indonesia. These trade routes that include land and sea transit routes for energy and goods pass
through some of the worlds least stable countries. Pakistan and Afghanistan are two good examples, political instability and
terrorism are significant risks to Chinas goals. Terrorist groups such as the Taliban are heavily entrenched in some of these areas.
There are also tribal disputes and other Islamic militants to consider. For this, it is likely that China has shifted its attention from
targeting Kazakhstan, India, and Vietnam

may represent far more important sources of information to execute Xis long-term
ambitions at this moment than the next US military weapon system. If this is true, it may signal
Beijings desire to take on the US economically rather than militarily. Chinas
espionage program has often been seen using the least amount of force to
compromise its target often exploiting the weakest vulnerabilities first, such as
Windows XP, or other unpatched systems, then escalating up. It is likely that the infrastructures in
what it feels comfortable knowing, the US, to what it doesnt.Cyber
developing countries such as Afghanistan and others along the One Belt, One Road trade routes have
weak infrastructures that require little skills to penetrate . It would only make sense that China
would use its most sophisticated hacks and hackers for high value targets
in the US, shifting a majority of its less experienced hackers on unhardened
systems that are easily compromised.
Cyber increases war risk (structural/IR theory)

Cyberwar increases first strike because of vulnerability
Schneider 15 Jacquelyn Schneider is a PhD student in Political Science at George Washington University.
Cyber - Enabled Warfare and Deterrence : The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox of U.S. Doctrine and Technologies
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=0141170640981270950651010270780130690570200660180530530811001010941261150751260040931000
5706201102703001807000600510800408101305103501108702912110010609812009409612206100103108911
8003117079070086017027020085122114025087019024122076066007008074108072002&EXT=pdf
However, the U . S . ' increasing reliance or even dependence o n cyber

technologies to enhance networked combat makes the U . S . not only more capable
and credible , but also more vulnerable. As the U . S . continues to invest in cyber dependent technologies and strategies like unmanned aerial platforms, precision
weapons, and network - reliant joint planning, it develops operations, force
structures, and doctrine to conduct strikes fur ther away from the battlefield and
with greater effectiveness. It also means, however, that the U . S . will not be able to
execute its planned operations if cyber key terrain , like links to satellite
communication relays , intelligence infrastruc ture, or GPS networks are successfully
attacked by cross - domain weaponry. This dynamic of enhanced lethality and
vulnerability make cyber enabled warfare a credible deterrent and a
dangerous d ependency . Because of this paradox of capability and
vulnerability, states may perceive a first mover advantage to strike before their
network capabilities are degraded by both kinetic and cyber attack across domains,
thus increasing the danger of conflict escalation in crises.
Cyberwar as bad as nuclear

Absent rules of the road, Cyber escalates to war with China as
bad as nuclear
Vinik 12/9/15 [Danny, Americas Secret Arsenal, Politico,
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-cyber-offensestrategy-000331]
To this day it remains one of the most sophisticated and mysterious offensive
operations ever launched: Stuxnet, the computer virus specifically engineered to
attack Iran's nuclear reactors. Discovered in 2010 and now widely believed to be a
collaboration between the U.S. and Israel, its existence raised an urgent question:
Just what is the U.S. government doing to attack its opponents in the cyber-realm?
Stuxnet's origins have never been officially acknowledged, and the extent of
American meddling in malware is still unknown. But for the past few years theres
been something new developing within the U.S. military that has taken "cyber" from
a theoretical idea to a deliberateif secretivepart of U.S. policy. The first ripple
came in January 2013, when the Washington Post reported that the Pentagon was
significantly expanding its cybersecurity forces across all the service branches. By
that October, the U.S. Army had launched two teams of technical experts dedicated
purely to the cyber realm. Just a year later, the number was up to 10.
The growth has been snowballing. Last year, the secretary of the Army created a
new branch for cyberthe first new Army branch since Special Forces was created
in 1987. By October of this year, there were 32 teams, coordinated out of a new
joint force headquarters for cyber opened last year in Fort Gordon, Georgia. By next
summer, the Army expects to have 41.
What's going on? The growth points to one of the most cutting-edge, but also
obscure, realms of American military activity: its cyber strategy, and especially its
strategy for cyber offense. The United States already has, most observers believe,
the most powerful cyberattack capabilities in the world. Much less clear is just what
its capacities actually areand when the Department of Defense believes it should
use them.
In conventional war, weapons and strategies are fairly well-understood; the
international community has developed rules of the road for armed conflict. Even
tactics wrapped in secrecy, such as covert military raids, are governed by some
standards about when and how we use them.
Thats not the case with cyber. Its widely acknowledged that offensive cyberattacks
will be a necessary component of any future military campaign, and the weapons
are being developed now. In April, the DOD released a 32-page document that laid
out specific strategic goals for U.S. cyber offense for the first time. But critics say
that document still leaves many questions unanswered about how, when and where
the government will use these capabilities.
What is legitimate retaliation for an act of war? said Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.), the
ranking member of the House Intelligence subcommittee on NSA and Cybersecurity.
How do you think about things like proportionality, which is a key term in the rules
of war? How do you think about that in the cyber realm? In place of those norms
and definitions you've just got a series of endless question marks. That's a
dangerous world because uncertainty in this world equals risk.
Many of those decisions will likely fall to the next president and his or her advisers,
whose approach to this new virtual battlefield will help determine whether this
moment of restraint leads to long-lasting cyber peace, or sends us on a far riskier
path.
An all-out cyber assault can potentially do damage that can be exceeded only by
nuclear warfare, said Scott Borg, the director of the U.S. Cyber Consequences
Unit, a nonprofit research institute that focuses on cyberattacks. Its huge.
WHEN I SET out to examine the U.S.s offensive cyber capabilities, the first question
I asked experts was what type of cyber weapons the U.S. possesses, expecting a
range of answers. With kinetic weapons, Americans are well aware of the power of
our military arsenal and have some sense of the consequences of our traditional
and nuclear capacities. I expected to learn something similar from cyber experts.
Thats not what happened. In fact, cyber weapons exist in a realm not unlike the
early days of the nuclear program, shrouded in secrecy, with plenty of curiosity but
very little public information. In part this secrecy is integral to the whole concept: a
cyberattack is useful insofar as the enemy is unaware of it. The more the
government reveals about whats in its arsenal, the more our adversaries can do to
protect themselves.
"If you know much about it, [cyber is] very easy to defend against," said Michael
Daniel, a special assistant to the president and cybersecurity coordinator at the
National Security Council. "Therefore, thats why we keep a lot of those capabilities
very closely guarded."
One thing everyone I spoke to agreed on: The U.S. has the most powerful cyber
arsenal in the world. Brandon Valeriano, a lecturer at the University of Glasgow who
focuses on cyber conflict, used the example of the North Korean Internet
interruption in December 2014, when the nations fledgling Internet went out for a
few hours, just a few days after the White House blamed the Sony hack on
Pyongyang. If America wanted to take down North Koreas Internet, he said, it
wouldnt be two to three hours. It would be devastating.
A cyber weapon, called a capability in the field, is a piece of malicious code that
exploits a flaw in an enemys software; the point is to manipulate, disrupt or destroy
computers, information systems, networks or physical infrastructure controlled by
computer systems. An attacker could use a cyber weapon to take down another
countrys financial systems or electrical systems.
Anything that has a computer anywhere on earth can be stopped or taken over,
said Jason Healey, the head of the Atlantic Councils Cyber Statecraft Initiative and
former director for cyber infrastructure protection in the George W. Bush White
House from 2003 to 2005.
The most powerful cyber capabilities, called zero-days, exploit software
vulnerabilities unknown even to the author of the software itselffor example, a
security hole in the Windows operating system that even Microsoft doesnt know is
there. Theyre called zero-days because once discovered, the author has zero days
to fix thempeople can immediately use them to cause damage.
As weapons, cyber capabilities differ in a few key ways from traditional weapons like
missiles and bombs. First, they cause damage thats less overt but more widespread
than a physical attacka cyber weapon could cripple a local economy by attacking
a countrys financial or communication systems. Second, an attack can occur
almost instantaneously against any target in the world. The Internet makes physical
distance between enemies all but irrelevant, making it both easier for enemies to
launch cyberattacks and harder for the government to monitor for them. Third, the
use of a cyber capability is often a one-time deal: If the government has a piece of
malicious software and uses it to exploit a flaw in an enemys code, it could render
future uses of that capability ineffective, since the adversary could just patch it. It
could also compromise intelligence-collection activities that use the same exploit.
Furthermore, the line between a military attack and an espionage operation is far
blurrier in the cyber realm. A cyberattack generally doesnt involve the movement
of physical objects and does not put the attackers soldiers at risk. All of the
potential red flags that would pop up and get congressional attention don't, said
Peter Singer, a renowned cyber expert and author of Cybersecurity and Cyberwar:
What Everyone Needs To Know. The same exploit might be used by intelligence
agencies to spy on an enemy, or as an offensive weapon to mount a sudden attack.
That blurriness can be used to cloak responsibility, many observers think. For
example, analysts have pointed out that if Stuxnet were indeed a U.S. operationas
is widely believed by nowthe administration could avoid taking public
responsibility for it by classifying it as an intelligence operation, rather than military.
Stuxnet is attributed by the media to have been a U.S. intelligence community
operation that would have been conducted under intelligence authorities versus
cyber command authorities, said Robert Knake, a fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations who was the director for cybersecurity policy at the National Security
Council from 2011 to 2015. So from that perspective, we really dont know that
much about what DOD engaged in offensive cyberwar would look like.
Whoever conducted it, it announced something new was happening. Stuxnet was a
game changer, said Healey. The Internet became a much more dangerous place
after that, because almost literally everybody started to say the gloves are off now.
WHILE THE OBAMA administration has slowly begun disclosing more information
about the U.S.s offensive cyber policy, a lot of experts would like to see a broader,
public discussion about how the U.S. intends to use its capabilities.
Those 41 Army teams that will be in place by the end of 2016 are part of a bigger
DOD effort to expand and organize the militarys cyber efforts. In 2013, the
department revealed that it was creating 133 mission teams to conduct offensive
and defensive cyber operations, with 27 of those building up capacity to attack an
enemy abroad. The operations are run out of U.S. Cyber Command in Fort Meade,
Maryland, which was set up in 2010 by Gen. Keith Alexander, who at the time was
wearing dual hats as both head of the command and director of the National
Security Agency.
The DODs new cyber strategy lays out strategic goals and objectives for the
department but provides few details about how the military is supposed to act in
practice. If directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD must be
able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and
contingency plans, it says. A few lines later: For example, the United States
military might use cyber operations to terminate an ongoing conflict on U.S. terms,
or to disrupt an adversarys military systems to prevent the use of force against U.S.
interests.
When it comes to specifics, the most dedicated cyber watchers say its not the
governments official documents that contain the most details: its the documents
leaked by Edward Snowden. Though now a few years out of date, they include
detailed information about how the U.S. government was building up an arsenal of
cyber capabilitiesand, at times, using them. In 2013, the Washington Post
reported from the Snowden disclosures that the U.S. government carried out 231
offensive cyber operations in 2011, none of which came near a Stuxnet-level attack.
Snowden also released Presidential Policy Directive-20, a top-secret document that
laid out the administrations cyber principles. But much like the DODs cyber
strategy, PPD-20 doesnt answer many questions, instead offering general
guidelines for the U.S.s offensive cyber goals.
This lack of specificity has frustrated some expertsMost of it is vague and blank,
Borg said about the DODs cyber strategybut the problem may be less that the
administration isnt releasing that information and more that those decisions
havent been made at all. Other experts who share Borgs frustrations with the
governments offensive cyberstrategy nevertheless defended the DODs document,
saying it was not meant to lay down specific rules for the militarys use of offensive
cyber weapons. Instead, it was the first step in the process intended to lead to more
specific rules of engagement.
I spoke to Alexander, now retired from the military and running the Maryland-based
consulting shop IronNet Cybersecurity, about the administrations offensive strategy
and how the government was trying to build up its cyber capacity. He said that
cyber offense emerged as a priority after he set up Cyber Command. Rather than
just defend its own networks, he said, it became clear that the military would need
to defend the country more broadly, and that would require offensive as well as
defensive cyber capabilities. If we are under attack, you cant just try to catch
every arrow, he said. You have to take care of the person shooting the arrows at
you.
The second part, he continued, is what do you do and how do you create a force
that can do that. The force has clearly started to take shape: The DOD is working
on forming the 133 cyber mission teams overall and four new joint force
headquarters for cyber, including the Army one in Georgia. The Army cyber branch
alone now has 1,000 people. But the specific rules of engagement, he said, are still
to come.
I think the policy that goes along with the employment of cyber is still in its early
stakes, Alexander said. So having the rules of engagement, the policy out there
when to actyoure more into an early stage than you are people really having a
concrete set of decision points.
In one sense, specifying rules of engagement is even more important for cyber
weapons than for kinetic ones, he said, because attacks occur so rapidly in the
cyber realm. Alexander used the example of a missile flying at a city in the U.S.
while the North American Aerospace Defense Command was unable to get in touch
with key decision makersthe secretary of Defense and presidentabout whether
to shoot it down. Under that scenario, U.S. rules of engagement dictate that NORAD
can shoot it down.
Now, if someone is attacking our infrastructure and theyre doing it at network
speed, Cyber Command should probably defend the nation, he said. But, he added,
We havent gotten, in my opinion, to that point yet. But I think theyre getting
close. The reason is people dont understand how bad cyber can be.
"We are still, as are all governments, thinking through how do you actually employ
these capabilities in a way that make sense and how do you fit them into your
larger strategic context," said Daniel, who leads the White House's development of
its cyber strategy. "You don't just carry out a cyber operation for the sake of carrying
out a cyber operation."
WHILE THE DEBATE over U.S. offensive cyber strategy may be happening quietly in
the federal government, its playing out quite publicly among outside experts. In
early November, Himes and four other lawmakers sent a letter to Secretary of State
John Kerry and National Security Adviser Susan Rice proposing a cyber convention
like the Geneva Convention, to lay out rules of the road for cyber.
Now is the time for the international community to seriously respond again with a
binding set of international rules for cyberwarfare: an E-Neva Convention, they
wrote.
One key concern they have is what actually constitutes an act of war in the digital
realm, versus a smaller crime or nuisance. What is cyber war? Rep. Lynn
Westmoreland (R-Ga.), the chair of the House Intelligence subcommittee on NSA
and Cybersecurity who also signed the letter, said in an interview. What is it?
What if Iran melted down one server at Florida Power and Light? They do $5,000
worth of damage. That sounds to me like a crime, Himes said. But what if they
melt down a whole bunch of servers, a network goes down and a bunch of people
die? That feels to me like an act of war. He added: But these lines arent drawn.
Because they're not drawn, is our response to have the FBI investigate and file a
diplomatic dmarche? Or is our response to do a cyber reprisal? Or is our response
to do a kinetic reprisal? We don't know. I think that's a real problem.
Another key question in the cyber realm is if any specific infrastructure is off limits,
the way hospitals are supposed to be off-limits in kinetic war. Is an electrical grid a
valid target? Knocking out the Internet or the power can cause immense damage to
civilians, particularly in advanced countries like the United States whose economies
depend heavily on the Internet.
Forging consensus on these questions is hard but not impossible. Already, the
international community is coalescing around an agreement that states cannot
conduct cyber espionage for commercial purposes. Whether countries such as China
will actually abide by that is unclear, but countries have at least agreed on that
norm in principle.
Even among cyber experts, crafting a cohesive rules of engagement is proving to be
a challenge. I dont know if you could come up with a set policy, Westmoreland
said. I think it would have to be some type of living document that would allow it to
change when technology changes.
Daniel said that coming out with a specific case-by-case framework was not
possible. "The idea that we are going to be able to spell out in detail exactly how we
would respond to any particular incident or activity, I think doesnt fully account for
how we are going to have to act in the real world," he said.
When I asked Himes how the U.S. government should craft a cyber strategy if it
cant prepare for every possible scenario, he responded: The laws of war, if you
will, arent about describing every possible scenario. They are about articulating
principles.
This top-level guidance needs to come not from cyber experts but from
elected leadersand, observers say, so far that direction has not been
forthcoming.
Part of the problem is that there are so many senior people in the government,
especially coming out of the political world, that just dont understand enough about
the technology, Borg said. They really are remarkably uninformed.
You can see this in New Jersey Gov. Chris Christies comments about cyber in the
last Republican debate. If the Chinese commit cyberwarfare against us, they are
going to see cyberwarfare like they have never seen before, he said. Saber-rattling
against the Chinese is nothing new for a U.S. presidential election, but its hard to
imagine Christie making a similar claim about conventional war.
In one sense, thats because its hard to imagine Christie ever being confronted with
that scenario. No one is foreseeing an imminent kinetic attack from China. But
thats precisely what makes cyber so difficult: What exactly would qualify as
cyberwarfare? And what type of Chinese cyber attack would result in cyberwarfare
like [China has] never seen before?
It seems superfluous to mention, perhaps, but cyberwar with China is war with
China. And a war that starts out in the cyber realm can quickly migrate to
other realms.
I consider the current state of affairs to be extremely volatile and unstable because
one could escalate a cyberwar pretty quickly, said Sami Saydjari, the founder of
the Cyber Defense Agency consulting firm, who has been working on cyber issues
for more than three decades. You can imagine a scenario where a country
instigates a cyberwarfare-like event but does it in such a way to blame another
country, which causes an escalation between those countries, which accidentally
causes a kinetic escalation, which accidentally reaches the nuclear level. This is not
an implausible scenario.
Not implausible, but perhaps not likely either. At the moment, cyber experts say, the
world is at a tenuous moment of cyber peace. For all the constant theft and hacking,
nobody is waging overt attacks on infrastructure and assets. But they also say this
relative stability masks the underlying threats in the cyber world.
I would say were in a cold war, not a peace, Alexander said. If you paint a
picture of the world above, people are shaking hands. And then below the water,
theyre kicking like crazy. I think in cyber theres so much going on in cyber that its
invisible to most people.
If a major cyber incident occurred in the U.S.one that actually hurt or even killed
Americansthe public would quickly want some answers, and likely a plan for
defense and retaliation. In the absence of more specific rules of engagement, its
clear to many experts whats going to happen at this point: Were going to
improvise.
If there were a cyber incident in the United States, wed do it from scratch, said
Martin Libicki, a senior scientist and cyberwarfare expert at the RAND Corporation.
I don't care what's been written. That's just the nature of the beast.
Cyberwar cuases mass civilian causalties

Shackleford 09 Scott, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Law;
Stanford Law School; Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Center for Applied Cyber security Research,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396375, Berkley Journal of International Law (BJIL), Vol. 25,
No. 3, 2009
Although the U.S. has not embraced a per se rule banning the use of nuclear weapons, it acknowledges that the law
of armed conflict, including the rules of proportionality, necessity, moderation, discrimination, civilian immunity,
of the effects of nuclear weapons can

be similar to a worst-case cyber-attack on a state. An all-out attack could disable or
destroy all critical infrastructures, leave the victim nation completely helpless and
terrorize its population. Cyber-attacks on the scale of those against Estonia, like nuclear warfare, do not
neutrality, and humanity, governs such use.162 As noted, some
discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, nor do they pass the test of proportionality. If the use of
nuclear weapons is subject to the rules of IHL listed above, as the U.S. maintains, so too should cyber-attacks. Even
though the ICJ did not declare all nuclear weapons illegal, the logic of its hold- 157. FOREIGN & INTL LAW COMM. OF
THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS ASSN (NYCLA), ON THE UNLAWFULNESS OF THE USE AND THREAT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (2000) [hereinafter NYCLA, UNLAWFULNESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS],
http://www.nuclearweaponslaw.com/JournalsReport/NYCLA_Report.pdf.] -ing that methods and means of warfare
which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited164 is just as applicable to cyber war as
Cyber attackers could have a larger role in non-combatant casualties

than would a nuclear aggressor state launching a mass assault, since cyber-attacks
by their nature may be targeted to specific systems whereas nuclear weapons
cannot be similarly focused due to collateral damage from even the smallest
devices. Even the lowest yield weapons result in substantial collateral damage. 165 Yet
it is to nuclear war.
the ICJ has refused to rule such low-yield nuclear weapons illegal, or even explicitly consider IW.166 As this decision
there is little to no customary international law on the use of cyberattacks beyond the basic principle in the Nicaragua Case that every sovereign
[s]tate [has a right] to conduct its affairs without outside interference . . . [this] is
part and parcel of customary international law.167 As a result, it is yet impossible
as a matter of customary international law to argue that IW is illegal, especially
given that state practice routinely shows otherwise
indicates, as of yet
Cyberwar with China = Pre-emption in Western

Pacific
Cyberwar uniquely exacerbates conflict instability in the
Western Pacific six warrants
Crisis instability in the Western Pacific The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has
embraced the idea that the best, if not only, way to avoid defeat is to be able to
strike US forces before they can attack Chinese forces or China itself. While not
seeking war, the Chinese especially dread a prolonged one, in which the full weight
of Americas global military power would surely prevail. Beijing is therefore crafting
plans and fielding anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to swiftly take out
US carriers, air bases, and command, control, communi - cations, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks. Chinas
commitment to A2/AD capabilities and plans should not be underestimated, as
Beijing regards US forces as being extremely threat - ening to national security. The
growing vulnerability of American forces to Chinese A2/AD capa - bilities in the
Western Pacific is a serious problem for the US. It would be exceedingly difficult and
expensive to reverse this trend by protecting US forces with ballistic-missile-defence
(BMD) and anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) capabilities, which are not particularly
effective against a large and sophisticated force, such as Chinas. The US Navy and
Air Force know this, and are responding with preparations to counter Chinas A2/AD
capa - bilities under the heading AirSea Battle. 2 The concept seeks to develop
networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and
defeat adversary forces across the air, land, sea, space and cyber domains. 3 This
is to be accomplished with both conventional and cyberwarfare attacks on Chinas
A2/AD kill chain of sensors, networks, launch - ers, weapons, and command and
control centres. Obviously, maximising AirSea Battles effectiveness requires
attacking Chinas kill chain before it can be used against US forces. Knowing this,
the Chinese have a greater incentive to attack US forces before they lose their
ability to do so. Significantly, most of the Chinese kill chain air and naval bases,
missile launchers, air-defence systems and C4ISR centres is located inside China.
This implies that, under AirSea Battle, US forces would strike targets in the Chinese
homeland at the outset of hostilities. As the Chinese see it, AirSea Battle is aimed
at rendering China defenceless against follow-on US attacks, reinforcing their sense
of threat and predisposition to strike before being struck. 4 There is no reason to
think that China will simply accept the disadvan- tages that AirSea Battle would
impose on it. Chinese commentators are already calling for Beijing to intensify its
efforts to develop cyber-warfare and anti-satellite capabilities in order to counter
AirSea Battle, which depends critically on the computer networks and satellites
that connect American C4ISR, platforms and weapons. 5 Like its A2/AD weapons,
Chinas cyberwarfare and anti-satellite capabilities are most effective if used first.
Such considerations give the US additional incentives to strike before its forces lose
their networks and satellites. In such a textbook case of crisis instability, each
side knows that the other is thinking in the same way, and so has all the more
incentive to act pre- emptively if war appears imminent, probable or even quite
possible. China would be strongly motivated to attack US strike forces before it lost
the kill chain that enabled it to do so, and the US would want to attack the kill chain
before it enabled China to strike US forces. In effect, fear of war is trumped by fear
of losing. Although there is some comfort in the expectation that political leaders on
both sides would tamp down tensions and not order a preemptive attack, it does
not take much imagination to see the ways in which circuit breakers could fail in the
heat of a crisis. There are several sources of friction in East Asia that could cause a
Sino-American show - down: Chinas enforcement of its air-defence identification
zone or harassment of Japanese vessels in the disputed East China Sea could lead
to a US show of force; the US Navy could oppose a Chinese attempt to seize
disputed islands in the South China Sea; instability in North Korea could spur
Chinese and US intervention to place Pyongyangs nuclear weapons under control;
China might contest the presence of US ships or aircraft suspected of spying off its
coast; or Taiwan could declare independence. In any such situation, even if
politicians were cautious, military advis - ers and commanders would prepare their
forces for war, as good officers do. Worse, it is unclear how much civilian control can
be exercised over the PLA. Once under tight Party control, it now has a corner on
Chinese mili - tary expertise, a voice in war-and-peace decisions, and a propensity
to take chances to show that China can no longer be pushed around. 6 If, in a crisis,
the PLA advised Chinas political leaders that US forces were preparing for war and
the states only chance to avoid defeat was to strike early on, would Beijing say no?
If, at the same moment, American mil - itary commanders advised the president
that the PLA was gearing up and might strike first unless US forces acted, would
Washington risk the loss of US carriers, air bases, personnel and credibility by
waiting? Anticipating such US decision-making, would Beijing be even more inclined
to attack before being attacked? Such logic makes it less likely that political leaders
would have the time or presence of mind to defuse a Sino-American con - frontation
before it turned violent. Enter cyber warfare China and the US have improving
defensive and offensive cyber-warfare capabilities. Both have recognised that an
armed conflict with the other would include cyber warfare. Indeed, they have
implied that cyber warfare increasingly features in their war-fighting prospects and
plans. Could the advent of cyber warfare therefore aggravate the underlying crisis
instability caused by current Chinese and US military capabilities and strategies?
One canonical Sino-American cyber-attack scenario starts with a confron - tation in
which the Chinese plan military action to achieve their objectives (such as to seize
Taiwan, should it declare independence) but fear that the arrival of US forces in
strength could prevent the PLA from succeeding. 7 Since time is precious, it would
be to Chinas advantage to delay the arrival of US forces until it has gained a
defensible position. A feasible Chinese strategy would be to disrupt the US logistics
and deployment system. The key to doing so would be to penetrate the unclassified
networks on which the system runs. These networks are connected to the Internet,
largely to permit coor - dination with private supply and transportation firms.
Although the US Department of Defense has made significant efforts to secure
them, it is dif - ficult to guarantee the security of even the best-protected Internetconnected systems because of the relative ease with which they can be accessed.
Thus, it is plausible that a cyber attack on the logistics and deployment system
could impede the mobilisation of US forces by either crashing the relevant portion of
the network or by adding false information to it (which would ultimately mean that
no information on the network could be trusted). Furthermore, because the best
time to disrupt the trans-Pacific movement of US forces would be before they
started to move, there would be a premium on car - rying out a cyber attack early
in the crisis. Given the stakes and objectives, it stands to reason that such an attack
would be ambitious and substantial. As a general rule, the main target of a cyber
attack would be the enemys military capability; more specifically, the ability of its
forces to attack. Essentially, a cyber attack would aim to disrupt the networks on
which the enemys forces rely in order to operate. Given the purpose, one can
assume that this would be a robust attack, as opposed to a probe, a signal of
resolve or a reminder of the defenders vulnerability. A successful cyber attack is
capable of forcing information networks to run badly, fail, or issue bad information
or instructions, thus degrading C4ISR, weapons performance, logistics or other
mission-critical functions. Because degrading such military functions is most
advantageous at the beginning of a conflict, it follows that cyber attacks for this
purpose would come early, perhaps at the moment of, or as a prelude to, physical
attack. If the attacker has the right combination of skill and luck, a cyber attack
could degrade the opponents C4ISR, weapons, logistics and other capabilities, to
the point of making it incapable of, and hence deterred from, attempting
conventional military operations at least until it has restored its systems, by which
time the circumstances that would have prompted their use could be altogether
different. In a situation in which countries believe that they cannot afford to strike
second, cyber-warfare options augment conventional first-strike capabili - ties with
the means to paralyse the enemys forces at the outset, by either retarding their
flow into the theatre of war or impairing their operation and facilitating their defeat
once they arrive there. At the same time, cyberwarfare capabilities are not just
one more first-strike weapon: they have peculiar characteristics that lend a certain
twisted mischief to their combination with conventional warfare. However, one
classic feature of instability does not apply to cyber warfare. Whereas conventional
military forces may be so vulnerable to attack by the enemy that there is a strong
incentive to use them or lose them, such a consideration is not currently relevant
to cyber-warfare capabilities. In the jargon of strategic theory, they are not good
counterforce weapons, in that cyber attacks cannot significantly reduce the
enemys ability to launch similar strikes in response. For this reason, cyber warfare
on its own does not cause crisis instability. To do so, it must be coupled with kinetic
capabilities. The way in which cyber warfare works could exacerbate underlying
crisis instability for several reasons. Firstly, the effects of a cyber attack tend to
be short-lived. 8 Once the victim realises that one of its networks has been
penetrated, affected systems can be purged, restored, secured or worked around in
just hours or days. 9 Because the interval between a cyber attack and the
defenders recovery can be short, fully exploiting any advantage gained requires
that it be followed promptly by a conventional strike, even in circumstances that
would otherwise favour observation and defensive preparations. This puts pressure
on conventional forces to move out or lose out after a successful prefatory cyber
attack. Knowing this, the side that suffers a cyber attack could decide that it is
imprudent to wait and see whether a strike by the enemys conventional forces will
follow, and may instead act pre-emptively. Secondly, cyber attacks are difficult to
duplicate once used the first time, for they involve guile, not force. An attacks
discovery informs defenders that they neglected to secure their networks
adequately. Because most cyber attacks exploit some piece of vulnerable computer
code, they can reveal the source of weakness, allowing the code to be patched or
routed around, and the problem solved. The difficulty of duplicating cyber attacks
supports the logic of early use and prompt exploitation in order to maximise their
effect. Put differently, if a cyber attack causes the defender to improve its defences,
it is best carried out early, by surprise, and with the intent of maximum effect
before defences are improved. Thirdly, the effects of a cyber attack may be difficult
for both the attacker and the defender to assess. The attacker will know what was
supposed to go wrong, but not necessarily whether it actually did so (particularly if
the defender isolates the attacked network in order to diagnose and repair it). The
defender may know what seems to have gone wrong, but not necessar - ily what
was supposed to go wrong, nor, hence, where to look for evidence of corruption or
subtle failure. The ambiguity of results may, again, weaken the effectiveness of
cyber warfare. In the context of a crisis in which both sides have reason to fear that
the other might strike first, such ambiguity is more likely to be interpreted darkly by
the side suffering the attack. This means that any detected cyber operation
could lead to conventional war , regardless of whether the attacker intended it
to do so. Fourthly, and related to the previous consideration, a network pen etration carried out for the purposes of cyber espionage may be hard to
distinguish from one carried out to degrade a network in preparation for a
conventional armed attack. 10 Although penetrating some networks (such as that
of an integrated air-defence system) is likely to indicate prepara - tions for war,
penetrating others (such as those of C4ISR or supply systems) might be no more
than spying. The difficulty of distinguishing the opening stage of a cyber attack,
such as network penetration, from cyber espionage may cause defenders to
interpret cyber espionage as a precursor to war, rightly or wrongly, and to react
accordingly. The side that has been attacked may be disinclined to give its
adversary the benefit of the doubt, particu - larly during a crisis. Fifthly, a failed
cyber attack may go unnoticed by the target. It could be stopped by the networks
firewall and look no different than thousands of other failed penetration attempts.
Or it may succeed in penetrating the firewall and infecting the host, but give
commands that do not have effects interesting enough to be noticed. The likelihood
that such failure will go unnoticed by the target reduces one risk of cyber attacks,
and thus poten - tially lowers the cost of carrying them out. By contrast, most failed
kinetic strikes are more easily detected, meaning that the aggressor risks trying,
failing and being retaliated against anyway. Finally, cyber attacks are easier than
conventional attacks to conduct without the knowledge and direction of a states
top political authorities. Coupled with the fact that cyber attackers may be
institutionally closer to the intelligence community (as both focus on accessing
networks) than to the armed forces, the potential for unauthorised cyber attacks
cannot be ignored. 11 The possibility that cyber attackers may act beyond the
leader - ships control raises the odds that a conflict may be triggered without
the knowledge of political authorities. Given the stakes in a crisis, would the
targeted state be willing to bet that a cyber attack was unauthorised? Or would it
presume that the attack was a prelude to conventional war, and be inclined to strike
first?
Cyberwar Impact 2cd Line

Their impact defense doesnt assume full blown cyberwar
Singer and Cole 7/9/15 http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/the-reality-of-cyberwar119915 P.W. Singer is strategist at the New America Foundation. August Cole is director of the Art of Future Warfare
project at The Atlantic Council.
Warthe real kind of warnot the way we use the term to describe everything from
anti-drug to anti-Yuletide decoration campaigns, involves two key elements, mass
violence and high-level politics. That is what distinguishes it from all the other
wonderful human enterprises that range from crime to spying to even terrorism.
Indeed, for all the talk of cyber terrorism and cyber Pearl Harbor, terms used
over a half-million times according to Google, not a single person has been directly
hurt or killed by a cyber attack, ever. ( Cows, meanwhile, killed 22 people in the U.S.
last year.)
That we have not seen the digital face of true conflict yet, however, does mean that
cyber war will not take place as recent academic works have claimed. The reason
we have seen no cyber war in the past is that we havent seen actors with actual
cyber capabilities go to war with each other. But as the great strategic thinker
Bachman Turner would advise, You aint seen nothing yet.
Threat is actually high and miscalculation risks enormous

Kagan 5/6/15 Frederick Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project at US think tank, the American
Enterprise Institute, and wrote the report which Robert Lee described as "dangerous".
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32534923
"[The] criticism misrepresents our report. We don't anywhere say there were
thousands of attacks on industrial control systems. We identify 65 attacks on an
industrial control system. We have used the term in accord with standard industry
definitions that include collection of information, and not just damaging systems.
"I'm trying not to overhype the cyber-threat. But the reality is that a very skilled and
determined attacker who spends a lot of time preparing for an attack can do an
enormous amount of damage to our critical infrastructure, and cause a lot of people
to die and cause a lot of economic damage and make it very difficult to recover.
"Could we have a massive 'Pearl Harbor' cyber-attack that did a huge amount of
damage, and was a surprise? Yes, absolutely.
"The scenarios that keep me up at night are scenarios of miscalculation. There's

always this probing around perceived red lines. What do we think we can get away
with? In the context of a world that has become incredibly violent, the risk of
miscalculation is high."
Taiwan Scenario
Cyberwar against Taiwan by 2030
Killalea 16 (Debra, Senior journalist at news.com, South China Sea conflict: China cyber war that is the
real story, 24.6.16 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11662456&ref=rss)
"By 2030 China will be more than capable of launching a militarily disabling cyberattack on Taiwan." Such capability, without even needing an actual attack, would shift the balance
of power enabling China to keep a firm grip on the Taiwan Strait. The US on the other hand
would not be keen to see Taiwan fall under greater Chinese sway, since a unified
Chinese nation would have even more influence across the region. "For China the biggest
problem in terms of global and security affairs isn't the South China Sea, it's the reunification with Taiwan." Military giants such as
the US rely on its satellites for major communication, GPS and a range of other things. "The aim of a
cyber-enabled war would be to prevent these communication channels working," Prof Austin said. He said like in any modern war,
the key would be for a country such as China, controlling the communication channels.
"The concern for our government is how our defence forces will respond to what the
US and China are doing," he said.
K2 US-China Relations
Failure to develop rules of the road poisions US-China coop
across the board
Harold et al 16 (Scott Warren Harold - Ph.D., M.A. in political science, Columbia University; B.A. in
international relations, Michigan State University, Martin C. Libicki - Ph.D. in economics, University of California,
Berkeley; M.A. in city and regional planning, University of California, Berkeley; S.B. in mathematics, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Astrid Stuth Cevallos - M.PHIL in international relations, Oxford University; A.B. in East Asian
studies, Princeton University, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, 4/29/16,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/RAND_RR1335.pdf)
This report was motivated by a desire to better understand U.S.-China relations over
the critical issue of cybersecurity. Three basic policy options exist for the United
States in dealing with China over this issue: to focus primarily on improving U.S.
cyber defenses, to attempt to convince China to change its behavior via diplomacy
and/or negotiations over norms and behavior, or to compel China to change its
cyber practices through coercion.30 Bolstering U.S. defenses is one key policy
option, as scholars and policy analysts have noted.31 This has been going on for a
number of years and should certainly be continued. However, such an approach
does not seek to address the source of the attacks; indeed, bolstering defenses is
recommended, regardless of the source of the cyber threat. To manage the cyber
issue within a bilateral relationship, the United States and China must find a way to
reach a modus vivendi (i.e., a negotiated agreement) on such issues. On the basis
of such considerations, we decided to explore options that went beyond simply
improving U.S. cyber defenses. Similarly, we did not systematically investigate the
option of coercing China to the negotiating table. To be sure, the United States could
seek to escalate its own imposition of costs for China through a set of responses
that might include a mix of public shaming and threats,32 indictments against
individual Chinese hackers,33 sanctions against Chinese firms,34 or even a
campaign of debilitating cyberattacks, all of which accept greater risk and thereby
hopes to persuade the PRC to see negotiations as a way to lessen the pain and
reduce the prospect of a further deterioration of relations.35 An approach based on
coercion was certainly not the Obama administrations first choice, but having seen
lower-cost, lower-risk initiatives fail to bring China to the negotiating table, the
United States appears to have concluded over the course of 20142015 that it
needed to increase the pressure on China to see results. As President Obama said of
the cyber issue with China during his speech to NSA employees on September 11,
2015: We can choose to make this an area of competitionwhich I guarantee you
well win if we have toor, alternatively, we can come to an agreement in which we
say, this isnt helping anybody; lets instead try to have some basic rules of the road
in terms of how we operate.36 Still, such an approach carries the risk of escalating
conflict even into the physical world or severely damaging U.S. efforts to elicit
Chinese cooperation on other fronts, such as addressing climate change, preventing
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, stabilizing the global
economy, or countering violent extremism. It is unclear whether China would
believe that such actions were being taken simply for the purpose of coercing them
to negotiations or whether they would instead view the actions simply as an
escalation of what some in China are prepared to see as an already ongoing (if
unacknowledged) cold war or Silent Contest, as one recent PLA National Defense
University video terms the relationship between China and the United States.37
Some forms of cyberattack (e.g., against Chinas so-called Great Firewall) could just
as easily be interpreted as an effort to assault the countrys sovereignty or even
undermine the CPCs rule and engage in regime change.38 Finally, on a more
practical level, we did not believe that we could find much data to evaluate the
merits of such an approach; Chinese writings do not shed much light on the issue,
and Chinese interlocutors would presumably not be eager to provide much in the
way of useful data that could contribute to assessing such a course of action. While
we were aware of this option and considered it at some length, our research did not
systematically explore such an approach.
Biggest internal link

Harold et. al 16 (Scott Warren, Martin C. Libicki, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, all three are political
scientists working for the RAND Corporation, an American nonprofit global policy think tank originally
formed by Douglas Aircraft Company to offer research and analysis to the United States Armed Forces,
Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, RAND Corporation,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/ RAND_RR1335.pdf)--RF
The U.S.-China disagreement over each others actions in cyberspace is asymmetric

in terms of issues of concern and prioritization. The United States would like China
to stop its intrusions into the networks of commercial companies; the Chinese just
want the issue to go away. Reflecting this difference in priorities, one interviewee we
spoke with, an expert on the U.S.-China relationship, observed that, while
cyberspace was within the top five issues of concern in the United States, 56
Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace it probably did not even rank among
Chinas top ten issues. Another noted that he had never seen an issue rise to the
top of the U.S.-China bilateral policy discussion agenda as rapidly as cyberspace
has, something that a third observer commented appeared to have caught the
Chinese leadership somewhat by surprise. A fourth interlocutor commented that,
although both sides were conscious of the fragility of key infrastructures, such
concerns were expressed far more frequently and vociferously in the United States.
Chinese interlocutors recognize that the cyber issue is an irritant in relations
between the two countries and that it erodes strategic trust (as the Chinese put it).
A reduction in strategic trust, in turn, may complicate the resolution of other issues
(e.g., trade, environment, geostrategic matters). It may also increase the odds of
future conflict, either accidental or intentional. Thus, even if one believes that little
in cyberspace makes much difference compared with controversies in the physical
world (e.g., South China Sea), resolving issues in that medium could have a knockon effect outside it and vice versa. As noted, the United States has at least three
cyberspace-related issues with China: its EMCE, its potential threat to the U.S.
critical infrastructure, and the mutual risk of strategic misunderstanding. They
would seem to call for negotiations, mutual assurance, and mutual understanding,
respectively. We start with our assessment of the negotiation climate and proceed
to the possible areas for negotiation.
Cyber relations spill over to affect all interactions between the

US and China
Lieberthal and Singer 12 (Kenneth and Peter W., Both are political scientists with expertise in
Chinese politics, working for The Brookings Institution, an American think tank based on Think Tank Row in
Washington, D.C. One of Washington's oldest think tanks, Cybersecurity and US-China Relations, Brookings
Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/2/23-cybersecurity-china-us-singerlieberthal/0223_cybersecurity_china_us_lieberthal_singer_pdf_english.pdf)--RF
Indeed, two scholars at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences released a report
whose tone effectively captured the perceived level of tension and confusion this
issue has generated in such a short period: Of late, an Internet tornado has swept
across the world ... massively impacting and shocking the globe. Behind all this lies
the shadow of America. Faced with this warm-up for an Internet war, every nation
and military cant be passive but is making preparations to fight the Internet war.
In sum, distrust of each others actions in the cyber realm is growing between the
U.S. and China, and such distrust easily spills over into broader assessments of the
other countrys long term intentions. It is heightened by the link between the cyber
domain and key values like individual privacy on the U.S. side and concerns with
internal stability on the Chinese side. Even more, the potentially poisoning effect of
cybersecurity on the relationship is occurring at a time when there is genuine
uncertainty about the degree and speed of changes in the global balance of power.
The disagreements feed into the anxieties on all sides as to whether America and
China will have a basically cooperative or antagonistic relationship over the coming
several decades. 25 In traditional relations between two powers, the intersection of
capability, vulnerability, and intention directs whether the states look at each other
as partners or threats. Thus, the stakes in this fundamental issue could hardly be
higher. Policymakers and publics on both sides must face the fact that, at this point,
developments in the cyber realm are contributing to tensions rather than enhancing
confidence in each sides ability to find ways to cooperate with the other to handle
the major issues we collectively face in a changing world.
China-US agreements spill over to restore global strategic

trust and bolster multilateral efforts in cyberspace
By no means would all cybersecurity issues be solved if Washington and Beijing

could reach agreement on how to move forward. These issues are of importance in
capitals that range from Moscow to Canberra. Indeed, one of the key challenges is
that the cyber realm is both global and especially democratic; states, organizations,
corporations, and even individuals can have a major, global impact. [Examples
ranging from an individuals significance like Julian Assange of Wikileaks to the
outsized influence that tiny Estonia plays in cybersecurity policy discussions bear
this out.] But the United States and China are the two most significant national
players in this sphere. Moreover, these two leading states represent very different
views on the proper use and future of the Internet. We therefore feel that thinking
through these issues in a U.S.-China context can provide a useful way to develop
approaches that should then be discussed more broadly, with the goal of ultimately
establishing global norms and implementing mechanisms to bring greater order and
security to those parts of the cyber realm where this is feasible. More importantly,
the spillover effect of cybersecurity on the broader U.S.-China relationship is also
perhaps more critical than for any other bilateral relationship. This is both because
of the enormous importance of U.S.-China relations in the emerging world order
and, in turn, the growing role of cyber issues in eroding strategic trust and poisoning
public and elite attitudes. If this trend can be reversed through improved
engagement by the U.S. and China on cybersecurity, the outcome would be a
triple win. It would bolster U.S.-China bilateral relations, serve as a crucial building
block for multilateral efforts in the cyber arena, and also aid in broader US-Chinese
engagement on other issues of importance, like global finance and the environment,
where the two nations must learn to work better together
Bilateral cooperation is key to prevent conflict and ensure

global stability
There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as that

between the U.S. and China. No other two nations play such dominant roles in
critical global issues from peace and security to finance, trade, and the
environment. How these two powers manage their relationship will likely be a key
determinant of not only their own political and economic futures, but also wider
global stability and prosperity. In the web of relationships that have built up
between the U.S. and China, no issue has emerged of such importance, and
generated such friction in so short a time span, as cybersecurity. Just a generation
ago, cyberspace effectively did not exist beyond the nascent links among a
limited number of university labs computer networks. Today, the centrality of
cyberspace to our entire global pattern of life is almost impossible to fathom. There
are some 4 billion people behind the roughly 50 billion devices that connect to the
Internet. They send more than 90 trillion emails a year, and conduct more than two
trillion transactions. 1 Domains that range from commerce to communication to the
critical infrastructure that powers and protects our modern day civilization all
depend on the safe and secure operation of this globalized network of networks.
And yet, concerns over this domain have rapidly moved to the forefront of U.S.China relations. While both senior policymakers and general publics are struggling
to understand the cyber realms basic dynamics and implications, the issue of
cybersecurity is looming ever larger in U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting
threat perceptions on both sides. Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the
cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that
have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (such as trade, human rights, crossStrait relations, and regional territorial disputes
Successful negotiations spills over to US-Chinese relations

more generally
Schuster and Stern 15 (Justin Schuster MBA, Entrepreneurship and
Technology Marketing at UC Berkeley, Eric Stern political science at Yale University,
Diplomatic Discourse, 5/1/15, https://books.google.com/books?
id=qaLGCQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=o
nepage&q&f=false)
We very much stand for human rights, and we call on all countries, including China,
to respect and promote universal human rightsand even human rights enshrined
in China's own constitution. We do have differences. But we're also very much
interested in pursuing a cooperative and comprehensive relationship with China
through those areas of common interest. We are very clear-eyed about the
challenges that we face. We need to find ways to cooperate not only on the
economic and strategic issues, such as stopping the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in North Korea and Iran. I think the world is really looking to see the United
States and China working together. The big issues that the world facesespecially
those in the area of climate change and cybersecurity cannot be solved by the
U.S. alone, nor can they be solved by China alone. We have made it clear that
cybersecurity and preventing hacking and cyber-attacks is a major issue for us and
must be addressed. The Chinese must investigate what is happening and put an
end to it, especially state-sponsored cyber intrusions. We really need to develop
rules of the road, international norms to what is expected from governments around
the world.
Improves relations cybersecurity spills over

Highlight the many advantages of diplomacy beyond just attaining political

outcomes: Diplomacy can yield a number of advantages beyond immediate
attainment of desired outcomes Diplomatic negotiations can work to transform the
nature of relationships between parties, build trust and lead to personal
relationships between leaders in both states. There can be spillover effects into
other areas and on other issues beyond cybersecurity. Emphasize that diplomatic
progress in one area, such as cybersecurity, can impact positive outcomes in other
realms of foreign policy for both countries: Diplomacy can serve as a way to link a
broad set of issues together and negotiate differences across these issues areas.
Working to resolve differences in cybersecurity can also assist US-China relations
and help with progress in other areas that serve both states' interests.
At china wont first strike in cyberspace

China can detach its internet falsely perceives first strike
advantage
Snelder 5/14/15 Julian Snelder has resided in Asia for almost a quarter-century. He has lived in India
and China and has also worked extensively in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. He worked for eight years at McKinsey &
Company, and then eight years at Morgan Stanley where he ran the high-technology investment banking unit. Since
2005 he has been a partner in a global investments fund. He has two bachelors degrees, one in engineering from
the University of Canterbury and the other in economics from Trinity College, Cambridge.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/explained-why-chinas-cyberwar-strategy-extremely-dangerous-12888
Beijing wants to have its own independent internet ecosystem for reasons of
national security and, well, because it can. Its economy is large enough, its
population is dynamic and innovative, and its financial system is sufficiently
insulated to create a vibrant, self-contained internet. Today China's best companies
are reaching across its borders for growth, but for now the most distinctive feature
of the Chinese web is its separateness.
One American defense analyst, John Costello, has suggested explictly that Chinese
domestic commerce could largely survive in an autarkic condition. That worries
such people, who believe this isolation might tempt China to act aggressively in
cyberspace, with little to fear in a worst-case scenario.
What would such a scenario look like?
It has long been supposed that Chinese authorities have a kill-switch to seal off
their internet, indeed they have done exactly this inside restive provinces to
suppress information flows. Knowing that cyber-war is offense dominant, China
could theoretically launch a huge, crippling cyber-attack while pulling up its
electronic drawbridge. Objectively speaking, most advanced nation states could do
this, at least to some extent. Chinese hawks may well worry about the U.S. pulling
the same stunt.
That mutual vulnerability is what's so scary.
China Hack kills econ

Chinese hacking of US kills our economy
Lee 14 * Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; J.D., Stanford Law School;
L.L.M., Harvard Law School. Part of this Article was presented in the Internet Law Seminar at the University of
Vienna on June 17, 2014. I am grateful to seminar participants for their feedback and to Rachel Jui-Ching Lee for her
great research assistance Summer, 2014 UMKC Law Review 82 UMKC L. Rev. 951 LENGTH: 8978 words ARTICLE:
THE RED STORM IN UNCHARTED WATERS: CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
In recent years, cyber attacks emanating from China have also troubled Western
companies suffering from significant economic losses due to online intellectual
property theft. n15 According to reports, some American intelligence officials
suspect that the hacking and the stealing of American intellectual property has
become constitutive of an important strategy by which China hopes [*953] to
maintain its high economic growth rate. n16 In short, China's cyber capability
appears to pose a serious threat to the American economy. Because Chinese
hackers have posed a serious threat to both the public and private sectors in the
United States, the U.S. government has prioritized this issue in dialogues with
China. n17
Trade War Addon module

Cyber mistrust spills over to trading relationship
Segal 15 http://nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/US-China_brief_Segal_Sept2015.pdf Adam Segal is the Maurice R.
Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program at the Council
on Foreign Relations.
The cybersecurity issue has also spilled over into trade relations . In part
motivated by disclosures of U.S. cyberespionage against Chinese targets made by
the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden and in part a
reflection of a long- held techno-nationalism, Chinese policymakers have introduced
a number of regulations designed to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for
critical technologies. New banking regulations, for example, and the draft
antiterrorism and national security regulations in China require companies to share
source code and build backdoors into encrypted products in an effort to make
technology secure and controllable. Although the bank regulations were
suspended in April, protectionism remains tightly linked to cybersecurity
concerns.
Rules of the road improve trade

Allen 13 (Nick Allen, Daily Telegraph's Washington Editor previously the US West
Coast Editor, Xi-Obama summit: US calls for 'rules of the road' over cyber-hacking,
6/8/13, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10107636/XiObama-summit-US-calls-for-rules-of-the-road-over-cyber-hacking.html)
In their first meeting since Mr Xi assumed power in March, Mr Obama struck a
positive tone welcoming the peaceful rise of China and suggesting the two nations
would forge a new model of cooperation. But he said it was critical to reach a
permanent understanding on the uncharted waters of cyber security to
accommodate deep concerns over intellectual property theft, fraud and sabotage of
the national infrastructure through hacking. While acknowledging that attacks often
came from non-state actors, Mr Obama called for an international economic
order where nations are playing by the same rules, where trade is free and fair, and
where the US and China work together to address issues like cyber security and
protection of intellectual property. Inevitably, there are areas of tension between
our two countries, but what Ive learned over the last four years is both the Chinese
people and the American people want a strong, cooperative relationship. Mr Xi said
he was willing to work with Mr Obama and that he wanted to clear up US
misgivings. He added: China is a victim of cyber attacks. I would hope that
earnest measures can be taken to resolve this matter. Earlier this week Chinas top
internet security official said he has mountains of data pointing to US hacking
aimed at China. Mr Obama's decision to broach the cyber espionage issue came as
his own administration was embroiled in a controversy over a massive internet and
telephone surveillance programme. The White House rejected charges that the row
weakened Mr Obama's hand with the Chinese, saying they were "different issues."
Speaking before the summit Jon Huntsman, the former US Ambassador to China,
said engaging with a new Chinese leader would allow the US to "recalibrate our
priorities." He said: "Where cyber (security) was never a top two or three issue on
the dialogue list, now it effects both economic and national security considerations
it likely will be bumped into the top rung of issues. "This is a most unprecedented
time in the sense that we have a lot of blue sky in the relationship in which to make
some gains."
[INSERT TRADE WAR IMPACT FROM STARTER PACK]
Cyberwar -> US China Trade War

Cyberwar sparks trade war with China
Muir 14 (Lawrence, Adjunct Professor of Law at Washington & Lee University of Law and former Assistant
Attorney General of Virginia where he prosecuted crimes in the Computer Crime section and published two law
reviews on cybercrime and international affairs, Combatting Cyber-Attacks Through National Interest Diplomacy: A
Trilateral Treaty with Teeth, Washington and Lee Law Review Online
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=wlulr-online)
26% of Chinas GDP comes from exports,66 and [e]xport

growth has been a major component supporting Chinas rapid economic
expansion.67 The United States is Chinas largest trading partner, receiving 17% of
Chinese exports.68 Thus, the Chinese economy would be particularly sensitive to a
trade war with the United States, and that is precisely what is developing. The
cyber-attacks have contributed to the circumstances that are pushing the
two countries towards the brink of a trade war. 69 In early June 2014, the U.S.
Department of Commerce imposed significant duties on Chinese solar products, such as
solar panels.70 SolarWorld AGs American subsidiaries were victims of the Chinese
hacking that led to the Wang Dong indictment. The other victim companies in that indictment
were Pittsburgh-based companies with connections to the steel industry. The PLA hacked into U.S. Steel
to gain inside information about the trade dispute involving steel pipes and tubes.71
Since the start of 2013, U.S. steelmakers have filed seven trade complaints against
China, the most since tariffs were imposed in 2001. 72 For its part, China does not think
that the United States is blameless. In retaliation for the indictment, China accused Cisco
Systems of spying on behalf of the United States , bann[ed] the use of Microsofts Windows 8
The World Bank reports that
operating system, and accused Apple, Google, and Facebook [of] cooperat[ing] in a secret U.S. program to
The destructive consequences of a trade war would be felt by

companies on both sides, as Cisco earned 15% of its revenue in a nine-month
period from Asia, including China, while Chinese competitors have eroded its
business.74 This means that Chinas accusation of Cisco spying may have less to do
with accuracy and more to do with weakening an American competitor to bolster
Chinese companies
monitor China.73
U: AT China attacks decreasing

China isnt scaling back cyberattacks
Hill 6/21/16 http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/china-still-major-cyber-threat/ Michael Hill Michael
Hill Deputy Editor , Infosecurity Magazine
Over the last year China-based threat actors have lessened their activity against US
organizations, according to new findings from cybersecurity specialists FireEye.
FireEyes observations are based on 262 intrusions that occurred in 26 countries

including the US, UK, Canada, and Japan including insights into 72 China-based
threat actors. The firm says the shifts in operations are reflective of ongoing military
reforms, widespread exposure of Chinese cyber operations, and actions taken by
the US government.
However, despite this decline, FireEye predicts that China will almost certainly
remain an aggressive cyber espionage actor going forward. Since mid-2015 they
have observed at least 13 China-based threat groups target a range of industries in
the US, Europe, and Japan.
Thats despite the agreement between President Obama and Chinese President Xi
Jinping that neither government would conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled
theft of intellectual property, set out back in September 2015.
China-based groups have been particularly synonymous for targeting governments

and firms around Asia for the past decade, commonly keen on regional security
issues in the South China Sea and political movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
"China remains a serious cyber threat to the US and countries around the world,
Nick Rossman, senior strategic threat intelligence manager at FireEye, told
Infosecurity.
China is likely in the process of a multi-year maturation of their cyber program with
better organization, communication and execution. We anticipate an evolution in
their organization, tools and tactics. As we discuss in the report, some China-based
groups are improving their capabilities. In addition, as we cover in the report, 13 of
these groups have conducted network compromises in the US, Japan, and Europe
since mid-2015, demonstrating that China-based groups remain active, he added.
At cant stop cyberwar

Stopping large scale cyberwar easier than low level
Lindsay 9/28/15 Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto ournal of Cybersecurity , 0(0),
2015, 115 doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyv003 Research Article Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the
feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack
Cyber attackers rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and obfuscate their

identity, which makes many pessimistic about cyber deterrence. The attribution
problem appears to make retaliatory punishment, contrasted with defensive denia
l, particularly ineffective. Yet observable deterrence failures against targets of lower
value tell us little about the ability to d eter attacks against higher value targets,
where defenders may be more willing and able to pay the costs of attribution and
punishme nt. Counterintuitively, costs of attribution and response may
decline with s cale . Reliance on deception is a double-edged sword that provides
some advantages to the attacker but unde rmines offensive coercion and creates
risks for ambitious intruders. Many of the properties of cybersecurity assumed to be
determined by technology, such as the advantage of offense over defense, the
difficulty of attribution, and the inefficacy of deterrence, are in fact consequences
of po litical factors like the value of the target and the scale-dependent costs of
exploitation and retaliation. Assumptions about attribution can be incor porated into
traditional international relations concepts of uncertainty an d credibility, even as
attribution involves uncertainty about the identity of the opponent, not just interests
and capabilities. This article uses a formal model to explain why there are many
low-value anonymous at tacks but few high-value ones, showing how different
assumptions about the scaling of exploitation and retaliation costs lead to different
degrees of cover- age and effectiveness for deterrence by denial an d punishment.
Deterrence works where it is needed most, yet it usually fails everywhere else
Global Spillover Internals
Spillover
Building rules of the road spills over to broader cyber
confidence building measures
Fidler 2/12/16 David P. Fidler is the James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law at the Indiana University
Maurer School of Law and an adjunct senior fellow for cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest
book is The Snowden Reader (Indiana University Press, 2015).
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17907/the-challenge-of-china-s-bid-for-cyber-suzerainty
The changed balance of cyber power means that U.S. strategy requires digital
dtente with China to mitigate the likelihood that both countries moves toward
cyber deterrence produce conflict. Sino-American tensions concerning non-cyber
issues, such as economic or maritime disputes, might produce spillover in the
cyber realm that the two nations must manage. Given Chinas increased openness
about its cyber warfare thinking, digital dtente could build common ground on,
for example, the law of armed conflict and military cyber operations and, as
happened with economic cyber espionage, produce some understanding where
disagreement previously prevailed. In other contexts, China and the United States
will compete, meaning U.S. cyber strategy must revitalize cyber defenses, repair
strained cyber relations with allies, remain steadfast on multi-stakeholder Internet
governance, and restore the promise of a cyberspace now on the cusp of another
wave of potentially transformative innovations.
US-Chinese cooperation spills over globally

Stokes and Hachigian 12 (Jacob Stokes has a MA of security studies at
Georgetown University and Nina Hachigian has a political science degree from Yale
University, US-China Relations in an Election Year,
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2012/03/pdf/us_china_relations.pdf)
Cybersecurity is being addressed across agencies, not just in the Defense
Department. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in a speech in January 2010:
We have taken steps as a government, and as a Department, to find diplomatic
solutions to strengthen global cybersecurity. Over a half-dozen different Bureaus
have joined together to work on this issue, and two years ago we created an office
to coordinate foreign policy in cyberspace. We have worked to address this
challenge at the UN and other multilateral forums and put cybersecurity on the
worlds agenda.105 To be sure, the process of finding solutions to the problems of
cybersecurity both military and industrialhas only just begun. The Chinese
government is believed to have been behind a number of recent major cyber
breakins, including multiple hacks of Google Inc., EMC Corp.s RSA unitwhich
makes the numerical tokens used by millions of corporate employees to access their
network Lockheed Martin Corp., and the Pentagons Joint Strike Fighter
program.106 Such breaches have negative implications for the broader U.S.-China
relationship. As Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution
point out, distrust of each others actions in the cyber realm is growing between
the United States and China, and such distrust easily spills over into broader
assessments of the other countrys long term intentions.107 To make progress on
resolving these threats, global norms or rules of the road for cyberbehavior, both
state sanctioned and otherwise, need to be established. Going forward, while global
agreements about acceptable web behavior are preferable, the United States could
first create a web of bilateral agreements that, taken together, can form the
backbone of global norms.108 In addition, U.S.-China dialogue on the issue has the
potential for progress and should focus on conveying red lines and exploring
common problems, such as attack attribution.109 Domestically, legislation pending
in Congress would facilitate information sharing between the public and private
sectors, although privacy concerns should be fully addressed.110 Finally, Chinese
capacity should not be assumed. As Adam Segal of the Council on Foreign Relations
notes, despite outside perceptions of the coherence and efficacy of Chinese
cyberstrategy, Chinese analysts are feeling increasingly vulnerable in cyberspace.
Segal explains that Chinas analysts believe, The work ahead [for China] is both
defensive and offensive, technical and strategic.111
Spills over globally and to US-China relations generally

Chen and Lim 16 (Gang and Wen Xin, Gang Chen is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute,
National University of Singapore. Wen Xin Lim is Research Associate at IPP Review, Xi Jinpings Economic
Agreement with Barack Obama, IPP Review, http://ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/35.html)--RF
For the cybersecurity issue to be resolved, the two countries would need to be more
accommodative about disagreements and differences. Without establishing a
mutual understanding or agreement on this issue, it is unlikely that cybersecurity
issue could be solved at the international level. At the strategic level, China and the
United States are still wary of each other and fully geared to avoid any potential
threats from the internet realm. Retaliation or tit-for-tat could lead to instability or
even an open warfare. As cybersecurity is a brand new issue and challenge, joint
endeavors are needed between governments, media, enterprises and other
stakeholders. China and the United States as the two pivotal countries in the
internet sphere could collaborate to explore important common interests and room
for cooperation. On the positive side, this could possibly create a new bright spot in
bilateral cooperation. For example, Chinese internet security company, Qihu 360,
has helped fix five new bugs in the Windows software package recently. To date,
Qihu has received 86 public commendations from Microsoft for its contributions to
the security of Microsoft products. In March 2015, China's largest e-commerce
platform Alibaba's first overseas data center in Silicon Valley began its trial
operations to help provide cloud services to overseas clients, especially those in
North America. Through the data center, American companies enjoy easy access to
cloud services from China and vice versa.31 While the US-China agreement in
September 2015 is a welcome first step towards a resolution to cybersecurity
threats, it also brings to light the greater issue facing the two countries that the
international cyberspace is an ungoverned space. The two countries will have to
continue to work on an overarching cyber doctrine and define the limits of

acceptable behavior in cyberspace.
US-China coop on cybersecurity key to establishing global

norms
De Jong-Chen 16 (Jing, Jing de Jong-Chen has over 20 years of professional experience in the high tech
industry, and is a senior director and domain expert on global cybersecurity policy and strategy at Microsoft
Corporation, US-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Needs to Move More Rapidly, Wilson Center report on
Cybersecurity, https://www.scribd.com/doc/310936704/U-S-China-Cybersecurity-Cooperation-Needs-to-Move-MoreRapidly)--RF
On top of those issues, cybersecurity is so challenging because of the diverse

perspectives from which nations view underlying questions of Internet governance
and sovereignty. China, for example, believes that governments should have
absolute control over the Internet and its use within their borders. Conversely, the
United States sees the Internet as a global network without borders, which enables
the free flow of information and provides for unrestricted cross-border commerce
and communication. Yet there are two unassailable facts that transcend these
political and philosophical differences, offering a foundation for shared progress: 1)
the Internet is an economic engine that is now an integral component of the global
economy, and 2) it is in every nations best interest to keep the Internet working
efficiently, without unnecessary restrictions that would hamper global economic
growth. Whats needed is a set of cybersecurity policies and international norms
that enable all countries to protect their citizens and critical infrastructure from
cyberattacks, defend against economic and military espionage, and safeguard their
national security. That said, we should be wary of laws that grant government
powers that could isolate users, violate privacy, increase the cost of delivering
information and services, restrict innovation, disrupt global trade, or prevent
sustained economic growth. As two of the worlds most influential nations, China
and the United States share responsibility for leading the effort to establish such
policies and normswork that began in earnest when the two countries agreed in
2015 to neither conduct nor condone the cyber theft of intellectual property or
business secrets, and to abide by what President Xi called norms of behavior in
cyberspace. President Obama, who called the agreement a work in progress, said
that China and the United States can now work with other world powers to develop
a clear and enforceable architecture to govern behavior.
Us-Chinese cooperation on cybernorms spils over to global

internet regulation
Govern 9/28/15 http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=946099113093064104067079112020016090015022028045089092075001079
099000101109106125127011017012000106100015113097067020121091064010
050012092072086122067096019083008038034055090100124073091119029108
069024088078120015082111066123083117086005107010078114&EXT=pdf
Professor Govern began his legal career as an Army Judge Advocate, serving 20
years at every echelon during peacetime and war in worldwide assignments

involving every legal discipline. In addition to currently teaching at Ave Maria School
of Law he has also served as an Assistant Professor of Law at the US Military
Academy and teaches at California University of Pennsylvania and John Jay College
On the national and foreign policy front, individual freedom of expression and
privacy considerations must be balanced against national sovereignty and security
concerns in the enforcement of the Convention on Cybercrime , just as they should
be for any future Cyber Weapons Convention or cyber security agreements that
China, the US, or any other nations conclude. From a technical perspective, the
prospect of increased cyber oversight, regulation and protection appears
increasingly challenging but more imperative than any prior time in history, yet as
the Brookings Institute has aptly observed [PDF], improved engagement
between China and the US on cyber security will likely have a positive
impact in establishing global cyber security norms and implementing
mechanisms , as well as other shared concerns, like global fi nance and the
environment. For the above reasons and more, any cyber security agreement
concluded will be indispensable to prescribing limits, if not proscribing, cyber
warfare, and will have dramatic signi fi cance to national and homeland security
and foreign affairs of each nation.
US-China demilitarization key to global cyber demilitarization

Meyer Summer 15
Snowdens revelation of this policy for offensive cyber operations, alongside the
rapid increase in military cyber capabilities, has likely overshadowed the limited
earlier appeal to forge a global consensus. As has often been the case in the past,
other states are likely to take their lead from U .S. policy and action in
determining what posture they should adopt in this new realm of international
security. It may represent wishful thinking on my part to hope that this unintended
transparency measure by the United States would lead states (and civil society) to
stare into the abyss and question whether they really want cyberspace to serve as
just another domain of international conflict? If not, what might be done to preclude,
or at least mitigate, its weaponization? Any preventive action must be taken in
cooperation with other leading cyber powers, notably China .
US-Russia Impact Ext
US-Russia Scenario
Uncontrolled cyber war threats = US-Russia nuclear war

Some 30 years since the release of the Hollywood blockbuster War Games, the
possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities,
compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of a nuclear
weapon has become disturbingly real. While this challenge will impact all
nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the USA and Russia given
their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces . The fact that eastwest
relations have deteriorated to a nadir perhaps not seen since the 1980s, strategic
instability has increased particularly in the wake of the Ukraine and now Syria
crises and that the nuclear arms reductions agenda appears to have reached a
standstill makes this challenge particularly pressing. In this discouraging milieu, new
cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already strained USRussia strategic
balance particularly the perceived safety and security of nuclear forces and at
the same time creating new vulnerabilities and problems that might be exploited by
a third party. Taken together, these dynamics add another major complication for
current arms control agreements and possible future nuclear cuts, and also seem
likely to increase the possibility of accidents, miscalculation, and potential
unauthorised nuclear use, especially given the large number of nuclear weapons
that remain on hair-trigger alert.
US-Russia second line
Multiple intersecting scenarios causing highest risk of USRussian nuclear war over cyber
hese tensions have been compounded and exacerbated in recent months in the
wake of the ongoing war in Ukraine, and now increasingly by events in Syria as well.
Perhaps the most notable development has been an amplification of bellicose
(nuclear) rhetoric, hostile posturing and threats, and sabre rattling from both
parties, in some ways reminiscent of the 1980s (see Ewing 2015a, Shapiro 2015).
Indeed, in March 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed that he had
considered putting Russian nuclear forces on alert in the wake of the Ukraine crisis
(Withnall, 2015), and in response the Obama administration allegedly considered
redeploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to Europe (Blakeley and Coghlan 2015).
The result has been a notable descent towards greater nuclear instability and
distrust, the suspension of bilateral cooperation on nuclear security issues (see
Bender 2015), and the recognition that any new arms control measures or further
nuclear reductions are unlikely any time soon. In fact, the USA and Russia currently
appear more interested in modernising their nuclear forces rather than cutting them
back (Wolfsthal et al. 2014, Mecklin, 2015), although both continue to implement
the arms control measures agreed under the New START treaty (Rose 2015). At least
that is for the time being.
This downturn in relations is happening at the same time as developments in cyber
are creating various new vulnerabilities and problems to be addressed for both the
safe and secure management of nuclear forces, and for the USRussia strategic
balance more generally (see Futter 2015b). Indeed, and while cyber remains a
contested and somewhat nebulous concept, and perhaps too often a universal
catch-all prefix for anything bad that involves a computer (Yadron and ValentioDevries 2015), it is clear that the cyber challenge to all facets of the US and Russian
nuclear security enterprise and associated infrastructure is real and growing. In
2012, for example, Thomas D'Agostino, former US Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security (20072012) and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, warned that US nuclear weapons and associated systems are under
constant attack from a full spectrum of hackers (Koebler 2012), and more
recently former head of US Strategic Command (20042007) General James
Cartwright noted that The sophistication of the cyber threat has increased
exponentiallyIt is reasonable to believe that the threat has extended itself into
nuclear command and control systems (quoted in Burns 2015). The nature of this
challenge is multifaceted and varied and ranges across a broad spectrum from
simple hacking and nuisance, through accessing and stealing information, right up
to attacks designed to cause physical damage (see Futter 2015a). As such, and
given the diverse nature of nuclear weapons management, in this case the cyber
challenge is perhaps best thought of as all measures designed to attack,
compromise, destroy, disrupt, or exploit activities involving computers, networks,
software, and hardware/infrastructure, as well as the people who engage with
them.4 New cyberthreats therefore impact right across and within the US and
Russian nuclear relationship, and include attacks on nuclear command and control
systems, communications links, weapons, and delivery systems; attacks on
computers, hardware, and software used to manage and operate nuclear forces;
and attempts to provide false or misleading information to these systems and to
decision-makers.5
The cyberthreat to US and Russian nuclear forces and stability is not homogenous,
but rather is twofold and nuanced, with each possibility representing different
challenges and signifying different implications and problems. The first is the
prospect that outsiders, third parties, or terrorist groups might seek to cause a
nuclear explosion, launch, or try to precipitate or exacerbate a crisis between
nuclear-armed states (potentially through a so-called false-flag operation6 ).
These can be thought of as enabling cyberattacks. The second is the possibility that
the USA and Russia or other states might carry out cyberattacks against each
other's nuclear systems in order to compromise communications, prevent weapons
working as required, or disrupt and undermine the opponent's nuclear C2. These
can be thought of as cyberattacks intended to disable or incapacitate nuclear
systems. Taken together, these new cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already
strained USRussia strategic balance particularly the perceived surety of nuclear
forces and at the same time creating new vulnerabilities and security problems
that might be exploited by a third party. Accordingly, they add another major
complication for both current arms control agreements and the possibility of future
nuclear cuts, and also seem likely to increase the chance of accidents,
miscalculation, and potentially unauthorised use, especially given the large number
of nuclear weapons that remain on high alert. As Cimbala and McDermot (2015)
point out, the result is that neither nuclear deterrence nor cyber war will be able to
live in distinct policy universes for the near or distant future (p. 103).
In this way, and even though cyber may not be the main cause of current US
Russian strategic instability or for that matter supersede nuclear weapons as the
ultimate symbol or guarantor of national security it is poised to further aggravate
current tensions and add to the increasingly risky and delicate management of
eastwest nuclear relations. The net result, as a recent report by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative argues, is that The risk of nuclear weapons use in the Euro-Atlantic
region is on the rise and it is higher than it has ever been since the end
of the Cold War (Berls & Ratz 2015, p. 1).
High alert makes nuclear launch from hacking uniquely likely

While all nuclear-armed states must be conscious of the new challenges presented
to their nuclear forces and infrastructure by the various news tools, techniques, and
dynamics associated with cyber, the threat appears to be particularly acute for the
USA and Russia. This is partly because these two states account for over 90% of the
total global nuclear weapons stockpile,7 but primarily because a considerable
number of these weapons approximately 1800 are kept on hair-trigger alert and
primed for launch within minutes of receiving the order (Global Zero Commission
2015, p. 1). The majority of these weapons are heavily armed ICBMs deployed in
silos far away from central command and control facilities, that are tightly coupled
with warning networks and sensors, and can be fired towards their targets at very
short notice. In fact, according to Blair (2014), the Russian high command needs
only seconds to fire rockets out of their silos as far away as Siberia.
While a posture of maintaining nuclear forces at such high levels of alert is seen by
many as an anachronistic legacy of the Cold War, it has however endured, and has
been sustained primarily by what Kristensen and McKinzie (2012) refer to as a
circular (though flawed) logic, whereby US nuclear forces are maintained on alert
because Russian nuclear forces are on alert, and vice versa (p. viii). Nevertheless,
and particularly given the current state of USRussian strategic relations, this
potentially very dangerous posture is unlikely to be reversed any time soon. The
result, as the Global Zero Commission (2015) points out, is that:
vulnerability to cyber attackis the new wild card . Having many far flung
missiles controlled electronically through an aging and flawed command and control
network and ready for launch upon receipt of a short stream of computer signals is
a nuclear (surety) risk of the first order. (p. 8)
In fact, as Blair (2010) has pointed out, it is at least possible that terrorist groups or
other unauthorised actors could have taken advantage of the loss of control over 50
Minuteman missiles at FE Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming during October 2010
and facilitated a nuclear launch. Moreover, given the number of nuclear accidents
and nuclear near misses that are only now coming to light (see Lewis et al. 2014), it
should be assumed that there have been many other times when hackers could
have interfered with nuclear systems in the recent past. This is particularly the case
for other nuclear-armed states, and not just the USA. As Schlosser (2013a) notes,
I have no doubt that America's nuclear weapons are among the safest, most
advanced, most secure against unauthorized use that have ever been builtother
countries with less hard-earned experience in the field may not be so fortunate. (p.
481)
Worryingly, according to General Robert Kehler, former head of US Strategic
Command (20112013), it remains unknown whether Russia or China could prevent
hackers from launching their nuclear missiles (quoted in Schlosser 2013b).
The nightmare scenario is that a terrorist group, a so-called lone-wolf hacker, or
even potentially a nation state, might somehow either directly or indirectly hack
into or interfere with US or Russian nuclear C2 systems and potentially cause
nuclear weapons to be launched or to detonate (see Blair 2010). There are a variety
of ways that such actors might seek to do this; attacks could be carried out directly
by acquiring (possibly through cyberespionage) and sending false launch codes to
the weapons, sabotaging the weapons and causing them to blow up or malfunction,
or they might seek to precipitate a nuclear crisis indirectly by interfering with or
spoofing early warning or other C2 systems into thinking an attack was underway
(a so-called false positive). With the USA and Russia deploying forces ready to be
used within minutes and perhaps even seconds of receiving the order, the
possibility that weapons might be used by accident (such as a belief that an attack
was underway due to spoofed early warning or false launch commands), by
miscalculation (due to compromised communications links or through unintended
escalation), or by people without proper authorisation (such as a terrorist group,
lone-wolf hacker, or rogue commander) appears to be growing. As Gady (2015)
explains:
First, sophisticated attackers from cyberspace could spoof U.S. or Russian early
warning networks into reporting that nuclear missiles have been launched, which
would demand immediate retaliatory strikes according to both nations' nuclear
warfare doctrines. Second, online hackers could manipulate communication systems
into issuing unauthorized launch orders to missile crews. Third, and last, attackers
could directly hack into missile command and control systems launching the
weapon(a highly unlikely scenario).
That said, as Fritz (2009) notes,
A sophisticated all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber
terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need
for compromising command and control centres directly.
Either way, the result is that it is becoming progressively important to secure
nuclear forces and associated computer systems and infrastructure against
cyberattack, guard against nefarious outside influence and hacking, and perhaps
most crucially, increase the time it takes and the conditions that must be met
before nuclear weapons can be launched. While this threat is particularly acute for
US and Russian forces deployed at a status of high alert and that cannot be called
back (such as ICBMs), it will increasingly impact all nuclear forces as well as those
held by other nuclear-armed states particularly during crises and periods of
heightened tension. In fact, it is believed that other nuclear-armed states are also
dispersing their forces and raising alert levels, increasing exponentially the
pressures on C2 systems, and therefore magnifying the risk and potential
implications of a possible cyberattack (Blair 2014).
Unique window of vulnerability to cyber-based launched in

both US and Russia
Unfortunately decisions about nuclear weapons are not made in a political vacuum,
and while new cyberthreats undoubtedly increase the risks associated with highly
alerted US and Russian nuclear weapons, and exacerbate the challenges of nuclear
security more broadly, they are also compounding and complicating USRussian
strategic stability. Essentially, while the threat that a third party or terrorist group
might seek to cause the launch or explosion of US or Russian nuclear weapons
appears to dominate the current debate, cyber capabilities could also be used by
the USA and Russia against each other in order to hinder, disable, or prevent each
other's nuclear forces from operating as they should. This clearly has implications
for the credibly and surety of nuclear forces on both sides, and accordingly, for the
strategic nuclear balance and mutual (assured) deterrence too. The result,
especially given the current climate of political distrust, is that neither party is likely
to take any moves such as de-alerting or reducing nuclear forces that might
potentially make them more vulnerable or susceptible to cyberattacks, or attacks
that include a cyber-component, aimed at compromising their vital nuclear
command and control systems. As Austin (2012) notes, Strategic nuclear
stability may be at risk because of uncertainty about innovations in cyber
attack capability . This is particularly the case when uncertainties about cyber
are added to other destabilising strategic dynamics.
While terrorists or other actors might wish to cause a nuclear launch or explosion, it
is also possible that the USA and Russia might seek to use cyber capabilities against
each other likely in conjunction with other forces, or as a potential precursor to
other kinetic forms of attack in order to undermine or weaken the opponent's
nuclear capability. This might be achieved by interfering with early warning systems
such as Israel is alleged to have done against Syria in 2007 (see Fulgham 2013);
preventing, blocking, or jamming communications and go-codes; hacking into
weapons and delivery systems themselves (possibly in advance, and through the
imposition of certain logic bombs and backdoors 11); and generally by placing
doubt in an adversary's mind that their nuclear systems may not work as intended
when needed. The worst-case scenario, as Libicki (2012) explains, is that
Conceivably, one state could hack into the nuclear command and control system of
another, render its weapons unusable, and use the temporary monopoly of power to
coerce its target. (p. 128)
While neither the USA nor Russia are likely to feel sufficiently confident that their
cyberattacks have fully disabled the other's command and control systems to the
point at which they can act with impunity (Libicki 2012, p. xvii), or for that matter
be willing to carry out such a potentially catastrophic move in anything but the most
extreme circumstances, the perception that systems could be compromised or
undermined is raising the perceived level of risk. This pressure is likely to become
particularly acute during any future crisis, and especially one that escalates rapidly,
where both the USA and Russia will want to be sure of the credibility of their nuclear
deterrent capabilities, and particularly the ability to carry out retaliatory nuclear
strikes in the face of possible cyber interference (Danzig 2014, p. 26).
Both parties are increasingly cognisant of these new potential vulnerabilities to the
surety of their nuclear forces, but the threat of cyber interference or disablement is
perhaps most acute in Russia. Moscow has become deeply aware of the risk that its
nuclear command and control systems could be compromised or disrupted by US
hackers, and sees this as an increasingly serious challenge at the strategic level
(Gady 2015). This concern has been magnified by the reported success of the
Stuxnet cyberattacks against the Iranian nuclear programme (see Zetter 2014) and
rumours of similar operations conducted against North Korea (Rodriguez 2015). But
it is not just the threat of cyber on its own that is the problem, but rather how cyber
might be used alongside and in conjunction with other emerging US technological
capabilities notably BMDs and advanced conventional strike systems. Such
concerns are compounded by the fact that Russian command and control
infrastructure, and particularly its early warning systems, are deteriorating (Osborn
2015).12 Overhauling and upgrading Russia's nuclear C2 and deploying a new fleet
of early warning satellites are also considered essential short-term priorities to help
eliminate and guard against nuclear false alarms (Sputnik News 2015). Purported
US plans to target enemy air defence networks and warning sensors with
cyberattacks early on in any future conflict are not helping to assuage this concern
(Ewing 2015b). A worst-case scenario therefore is that Russian nuclear weapons,
C2, and associated infrastructure could be penetrated by US hackers, various
systems and weapons might not work or work as expected, other assets might be
targeted by conventional precision strike forces, and missile defence systems could
potentially nullify the retaliatory capability of those weapons that remain usable.
While this might seem a highly unlikely future scenario at the time of writing, the
result is nevertheless that the perceived requirement to deploy varied and
sophisticated nuclear forces a significant proportion of which are ready to be fired
at short notice appears to be increasing rather than decreasing in Moscow. 13
Unfortunately, this desire to retain a credible nuclear force structure, and therefore
an ostensibly manageable strategic balance vis--vis the USA and NATO, is
compounding the vulnerability of Russian nuclear systems to cyber-intrusion and
attack by others.
AT Dealerting CP
Dealerting cant work

It is of course highly unlikely that either the USA or Russia has plans or perhaps
more importantly, the desire to fully undermine the other's nuclear command and
control systems as a precursor to some type of disarming first strike, but the
perception that nuclear forces and associated systems could be vulnerable or
compromised is persuasive. Or as Hayes (2015) puts it, The risks of cyber
disablement entering into our nuclear forces are real. While the growing possibility
of cyber disablement should not be overstated (notions of a cyber-Pearl Harbor
(Panetta 2012) or cyber 911 (Charles 2013) have done little to help understand
the nature of the challenge), cyberthreats are nevertheless an increasingly
important component of the contemporary USRussia strategic context. This is
particularly the case when they are combined with other emerging militarytechnical developments and programmes . The net result , especially given the
current downturn in USRussian strategic relations, and the way cyber is
exacerbating the impact of other problematic strategic dynamics, is that is seems
highly unlikely that either the USA or Russia will make the requisite moves to dealert nuclear forces that the new cyber challenges appear to necessitate, or for
that matter to (re)embrace the deep nuclear cuts agenda any time soon.
AT Hardening CP
Hardening vs cyber attack wont solve
Given the new challenges presented by cyber to both US and Russian nuclear forces
and to USRussia strategic stability, it is important to consider what might be done
to help mitigate and guard against these threats, and thereby help minimise the
risks of unintentional launches, miscalculation, and accidents, and perhaps create
the conditions for greater stability, de-alerting, and further nuclear cuts. While there
is unlikely to be a panacea or magic bullet that will reduce the risk of cyberattacks
on US and Russian nuclear forces to zero be they designed to launch nuclear
weapons or compromise the systems that support them there are a number of
options that might be considered and pursued in order to address these different
types of threats and vulnerabilities. None, of these however, will be easy.
The most obvious and immediate priority for both the USA and Russia is working
(potentially together) to harden and better protect nuclear systems against possible
cyberattack, intrusion, or cyber-induced accidents. In fact, in October 2013 it was
announced that Russian nuclear command and control networks would be protected
against cyber incursion and attacks by special units of the Strategic Missile Forces
(Russia Today 2014). Other measures will include better network defences and
firewalls, more sophisticated cryptographic codes, upgraded and better protected
communications systems (including cables), extra redundancy, and better training
and screening for the practitioners that operate these systems (see Ullman 2015).
However, and while comprehensive reviews are underway to assess the
vulnerabilities of current US and Russian nuclear systems to cyberattacks, it may
well be that US and Russian C2 infrastructure becomes more vulnerable to cyber as
it is modernised and old analogue systems are replaced with increasingly hi-tech
digital platforms. As a result, and while nuclear weapons and command and control
infrastructure are likely to be the best protected of all computer systems, and air
gapped14 from the wider Internet this does not mean they are invulnerable or will
continue to be secure in the future, particularly as systems are modernised or
become more complex (Fritz 2009). Or as Peggy Morse, ICBM systems director at
Boeing, put it, while its old it's very secure (quoted in Reed 2012).
AT US-Russian diplomacy CPs

Diplomacy cant solve arms control stalled
A third, more comprehensive option would be to include cyber alongside other

dynamics, such as sub-strategic nuclear forces, BMD, and (advanced) conventional
weapons in a holistic USRussian strategic stability dialogue. While this would
unquestionably be the most comprehensive and difficult option, the sustainability of
current bilateral arms control accords and certainly any further nuclear reductions
talks between the USA and Russia will have to at least address if not formally
include discussion and probably some type of agreement about the emerging
challenges beyond nuclear weapons. While this would appear to be a logical and
perhaps only credible way forward, there are unfortunately considerable political
and strategic barriers to achieving this, particularly in the USA, where any future
arms control agreement that includes limits on other US systems is unlikely to fare
well not only in the Senate, but also in Russia.15 Essentially, it is very difficult to see
any further progress on arms control between the USA and Russia, and therefore
the possibility of including other nuclear-armed states in these discussions, if the
whole gamut of technological and military dynamics effecting USRussian relations
and strategic stability are not addressed holistically. 16
Ultimately, given the problems inherent in combating the new challenges
associated with cyber, it may be that for the time being we have to accept that the
drive for significant nuclear cuts in the short to medium term will need to be
temporarily shelved and attention instead be focused on regaining a sense of US
Russian strategic stability, confidence building , and shoring up current arms
control agreements (see Acton 2012, p. 50). This is likely to mean including cyber,
alongside other emerging techno-military dynamics, in USRussian strategic
dialogue and as part of any future formal bilateral agreements. As the Deep Cuts
Commission (2015) points out:
While continuing to implement New START, the United States and Russia should
resume a comprehensive dialogue across the whole spectrum of strategic stability
issuesconcentrating on how to achieve further cuts in the New START limits in
strategic offensive forces and addressing the issues of how missile defense and
conventional arms impact nuclear arms reductions. (p. 7)
Diplomatic options cant solve perm best

The continued development of offensive cyber capabilities by different actors across

the globe is creating a range of new challenges and problems for the safe, secure,
and reliable management of US and Russian nuclear forces, and for the USRussian
strategic relationship more broadly. In particular, they increase the risk that hackers
might somehow gain access to nuclear C2 systems and either indirectly spoof
them into believing an attack was underway, or in a worse case scenario directly
facilitate the detonation or launch of a nuclear weapon. While the most logical
response to this challenge would appear to be de-alerting and reducing US and
Russian nuclear forces, enhancing nuclear security measures, as well as working
hard to maintain strategic stability, so as to minimise the risk of terrorists or nonstate actors breaking into C2 systems and precipitating a launch, this is unlikely to
happen any time soon. Essentially this is because in the current toxic geopolitical
environment, neither the USA nor Russia are likely to feel inclined to take any
measures to move away from the retention of a sophisticated suit of nuclear
capabilities, including forces kept on high alert and able to launch on warning. This
is particularly acute for Russia, especially when US cyber capabilities are combined
with concerns about the deployment of BMDs, new conventional precision strike
technologies, and the increasing problems within the Russian nuclear command and
control infrastructure. In this way, cyber is not the main cause of current eastwest
instability, but rather another factor exacerbating nuclear insecurity and strategic
instability and making it more difficult to rebuild trust and confidence.
Multistakeholder Model
Crowdout Links
Cyber cooperation with China is key to finding solutions that include China in the
United States model of internet governance a mutual agreement is the only
remaining obstacle
Chuanying 16 (Lu, research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International
Studies, focus on cybersecurity and cyberspace governance, Chinas Emerging
Cyberspace Strategy published online 5/24/16
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/chinas-emerging-cyberspace-strategy/)/\MB/\
China has been the center of attention on cyber issues and one of the very few countries yet to publish a report on
its cyberspace strategy. People outside China who are eager to understand its cyber strategy are only disappointed
by the lack of viable channels to find information they want. Such an information deficit has given rise to
misunderstandings and misperceptions about what China would do and where it is heading in the cyber world.
Things, however, are changing. China has recently started to articulate its cyberspace strategy, evidenced by
President Xi Jinpings statements at the 2015 World Internet Conference, Chinas much-touted cyber summit at a
tourist resort close to Shanghai and Hangzhou, the headquarters of the cyber giant Alibaba, and the National
Meeting on Cyber Security and Information Technology in April 2016. On those two occasions, Xi outlined Chinas
nascent cyberspace strategy, and addressed some of the concerns of the outside world. Such an emerging strategy,
however, needs to be scrutinized in light of Chinas unique political discourse, if one wants to pick up the cues and
the international
dimensions of Chinas cyber strategy, which include four principles on reforming the
existing international internet governance system: respect for cyber sovereignty, peace and security,
grasp the trends beneath it. At the World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, Xi focused on
openness and cooperation, and good order. A community of common destiny, Xis new vision on the diplomatic
front, is now part and parcel of Chinas cyber strategy. Under the four principles, five action proposals were made
concerning the digital gap, cultural diversity in cyberspace, digital economy, cyber security, and Internet
governance. This 4+5 formula shed light on the core elements of Chinas international cyberspace strategy. On
April 19, 2016, the president turned to the domestic aspect of this strategy , which has six
underpinnings: embracing the Internet, the Internet as a channel for the expression of public opinions,
breakthroughs in core Internet technologies, security and development, as well as engagement of the private sector
and IT professionals. It is worth noting that
Xi reaffirmed the importance of cyber
sovereignty . He said, We should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own
path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies, and participate in
international cyberspace governance on an equal footing. There are always outside
worries that Chinas claims for cyber sovereignty may split the Internet asunder. These concerns, however, are
unwarranted. China is not a leader in cyberspace. Nor does it have any intention to reinvent the wheel and replace
China only wants to participate in

international Internet governance on an equal footing together with all
other countries in the world . Such a position is not limited to the Internet, but
finds its origin in many of Chinas policies and practices in the real world . For instance,
the existing architecture of Internet governance.
China has been all along committed to a non-alliance policy and undertakes not to interfere in other countries
Many other countries also find Chinas position acceptable, as massive

cyber surveillance and penetration has undermined their security and social
stability. They therefore stand behind the legality of cyber sovereignty . Though Xis
talk on April 19 was intended for a domestic audience, he responded to outside concerns as well. He didnt lay
emphasis on an independent and controllable Internet, but called for open
development. He clearly took off the table the widely presumed Chinese attempt to divide the Internet. Chinas
sovereignty.
Internet sector, he promised, is open to foreign companies. And Chinese Internet businesses are encouraged to go
global. R&D- enabled innovation, Xi said, should be enhanced to tackle foreign blockades and embargos. (The
United States and the EU have maintained high-tech export controls against China.)
As a major player in
cyberspace, China has put the Internet on its priority list of development . It is therefore
very careful in formulating a cyber strategy. Hence, many avoidable tensions and conflicts with other countries
occurred, particularly in cyber security. The Snowden revelations have added to Chinas distrust in American
Internet companies. There has been a growing call in the country for indigenous IT products. Authorities have also
stepped up regulation of foreign businesses. Historically, China has grounded its policies in domestic realities and
As Chinas interactions with the United

States have grown in the past few years, it has paid more attention to the impact of
its domestic policies on the world. A case in point is the emerging cyberspace strategy.
Overall, the strategy is balanced, open, and pragmatic. It would prevent many
unnecessary conflicts in the cyber world and facilitate cooperation and competition
between China and the United States. In China, contrary to some foreign media reports, it is widely
failed to foresee and assess their international ramifications.
believed that there will be no harsh rules against foreign enterprises, based on the No. 317 circular issued by the
China Banking Regulatory Commission and the draft of Chinas anti-terrorism law, the final version of which actually
scrapped most of the cyber security-related provisions. This will, undoubtedly, reduce the uncertainties for foreign
This strategy also provides an opportunity for China and the

United States to build up trust and undo the damage on their relations caused by the indictment of five
Chinese military officers for economic cyber espionage and the threat of economic sanctions. Both sides
should refrain from seeing each other as adversaries or major threats in cyberspace .
Apart from their working group on cyber crimes, the two countries could well explore possibilities
for a comprehensive cooperation mechanism to regulate behaviors in cyberspace
and share malicious information . Private sectors in both countries should be aware of the importance of
companies operating in China.
stable bilateral cyber relations for Chinese and U.S. interests. Such relations should by no means be hijacked by a
handful of interest groups. Only in this way can China and the United States ensure healthy interactions in
cyberspace.
Us-China spills over to bring Russia into the fold

Harris 16 (Eimi, International Relations and Economics at the University of
Toronto, Comparing Cyber-Relations: Russia, China, and the U.S. published online
5/25/2016 at http://mackenzieinstitute.com/comparing-cyber-relations-russia-chinaand-the-u-s/)/\MB/\
the U.S.-China Cyber Agreement is voluntary cyber-restraint for
the protection of economic activity. However, the agreement does not go much further beyond that.
What we see explicitly in
Cyber diplomacy was limited to the clauses on State cybersecurity cooperation and norm development (neither of
This contrasts with the focus of the RussianChinese cyber relationship. Evident from the program agenda of the Safe Internet Forum, the explicit
elements of Russia and Chinas cyber cooperation focuses more on cyber culture,
with panels addressing the security and governance of internet communication
structures, general data security, and social issues appearing on the web (like religious extremism).
China and Russia, are facing many of the same social problems online as the
Western world is . However, the difference is that Russia and China have more openly used censorship and
the countries established any tangible obligations).
other surveillance to manage what their citizens can access on the web. These practices are likely to continue,
especially where both Russian and Chinese delegates at the Safe Internet Forum expressed a need to utilize its
state sovereignty and regulate information for its citizens. But is Chinas cyber cooperation with Russia principally in
both relationships agree to cooperate in

cybersecurity when necessary, but the U.S.-Chinese Cyber Agreement serves more
explicitly for economic protection while the Chinese-Russian cooperation delves
more into social cyber issues. With many analysts finding that China has so far complied with
the economic initiative in the U.S.-Chinese Cyber Agreement, there may not
contradiction with the U.S.-Chinese Cyber Agreement? No
necessarily be a clash in economic and social goals between the two cyber
relationships .
cemented cyber norms via bilateral agreements are key to

solve internet freedom and increase trade
Aronson 14 Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper Series
Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University Can Trade
Policy Set Information Free? IIEP-WP-2014-9 Susan Ariel Aaronson George
Washington University
http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/2014WP/AaronsonIIEPWP20149.pdf
Although the US argues that the system governing the Internet is global and diverse ,
US actors and norms

play an outsize role on the information superhighway . US companies such as Facebook, Google,
Yahoo, and Twitter dominate much of the web. Moreover, Internet governance reflects the influential
role of US earl y web actors who wanted an ad hoc, multistakeholder, bottom up and selfregulatory approach to internet governance . However, because US (and to a lesser extent
European) companies have such huge market presence on the web, policymakers in other
governments may distrust US motives. Policymakers and citizens in other countries
may perceive US policymakers as acting in the interest of US companies and not in
the general public interest. Meanwhile, many other major trading nations with global
clout and strong Internet presence have put forward different ideas about the role of
the state online. The Chinese 6 and Russian governments 7 argue that governments must safeguard and
control the Internet. For example, the Russian government now plans to use deep packet inspection to monitor the
The Chinese and Russian

governments have become increasingly vocal about re thinking Internet governance
and have proposed greater international control over the Internet . 9 At the same time,
Russian Internet, which could breach citizens privacy and free speech rights. 8
many developing countries are just beginning to set the ground rule s for the Internet in their countries. 10
Policymakers in some developing countries such as India or middle income nations such as Brazil believe that
governments should do more to control the Internet. 11 Officials in these countries make the case that greater
governmental control will help them provide public goods 7 online such as education and healthcare, and to foster
innovation and economic growth throughout their country. 12 In recent years officials have developed several sets
of principles to guide government action on the Internet. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, OECD, a forum and think tank on global issues, has spearheaded many of these efforts and called for
a holistic approach to Internet governance at the national and international level. 13 The US and the EU have
Some 34 nations have

also agreed to principles to encourage free expression online . 14 However, these
principles are neither universal nor binding . Hence, government officials have sought other
worked internationally to develop principles t o ensure an open and stable Internet.
venues to address cross-border Internet issue s. Trade agreements and policies have become an import ant source
policymakers recognize that when we

travel the information superhighway, we are often trading . And Internet usage can
dramatically expand trade. 15 Secondly, officials from the three trade giants understand that the
Internet is not only a tool of empowerment for the worlds people, but a major
source of wealth for US and European business. Moreover, some 65-70 percent of the world s population is
of rules governing cross- border information flows. First,
not yet online, so it is not surprising that these governments see a huge potential for growth in e-commerce. 16 US
and European policymakers want to both protect their firms competitiveness and increase market share. Finally,
while some domestic laws can have global reach, domestic

laws on copyright, piracy, and Internet security do not have global legitimacy and
force. Hence, they recognize they must find common ground on internationally
these officials understand that
accepted rules governing cross-border data flows . 17 They can achieve

these internationally accepted rules within bilateral , regional, or broader multilateral
trade agreements . 18 Trade agreements regulate how entities may trade and how nations may use
protectionist tools. These agreements initially covered only border measures such as tariffs and quotas. Since the
1970s, however, policymakers have gradually expanded trade agreements to include 8 domestic regulations such
as health and safety regulations, competition policies, and procurement rules. So when countries block services or
censor information on the Internet, policymakers from other countries may argue that these states are erecting
One
hundred fifty-eight (158) countries rely on an international organization, the WTO, to establish
the rule of law on international trade. The WTO is a set of rules delineating how firms
can trade and how policymakers can protect producers and consumers from
injurious imports. But it is much more; it also serves as a forum for trade negotiations
and settles trade disputes through a binding system . In the internet arena, the WTO acts
to promote market access, to preserve open telecommunication networks , and to
harmonize telecommunications policies that can affect international trade . 19 Although
barriers to Internet related trade. (A trade barrier is a law, regulation, policy or practice that impedes trade.)
the WTO does not explicitly regulate Inter net services per se, it regulates trade in the goods and services that
comprise e-commerce. 20 Some 74 members of the WTO have agreed to implement the Information Technology
Agreement. The signatories have eliminated tariffs on many of the products that make the Internet possible such as
semiconductors; set top boxes, digital printers, and computers. 21 Since 1998, the members of the WTO have
members have also disagreed on how the WTO

should affect national internet policies. The WTOs dispute settlement body has already settled two
agreed not to place tariffs on data flows. But
trade disputes related to Internet issues (Internet gambling and Chinas state trading rights on audiovisual products
member states have not found common ground on how to

reduce new trade barriers to information flows. 23 In 2011, several nations nixed a US and the EU
and services). 22 Alas, the
proposal that members agree not to block Internet service providers or impede the free flow of information online.
members of the WTO have made little progress on adding new

regulatory issues such as privacy and cyber security that challenge Internet
policymakers.
24 Moreover, the
Sino-Russian crowdout Link

US inaction results in Sino-Russian diplomatic advantage in
internet governance
Meyer Summer 15
The Sino Russian Code of Conduct Initiative Although the U.S. endorsement of the
idea of a set of global norms to govern interstate behavior in cyberspace
constituted an important diplomatic step, it was China and Russia that proved first
off the mark in presenting a proposal for a package of global norms to govern state
behavior. In an official document circulated at the September 2011 UN General
Assembly session, the delegations of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan submitted an International Code of Conduct for Information Security . In
the covering note explaining the proposal, the delegations stated that the rapid
development of information and telecommunication technologies could potentially
be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining
international stability and security. It went on to say that the proposed
international code of conduct had been elaborated in the form of a potential General
Assembly resolution and called for deliberations within the UN framework on this
text with the aim of achieving the earliest possible consensus on international
norms and rules guiding the behavior of states in the information space. 13 By this
initiative, China and Russia had adroitly taken advantage of the policy opening
provided by the Obama administrations International Strategy just a few months
earlier. Diplomacy, like nature, abhors a vacuum . The SinoRussian initiative
effectively claimed the diplomatic high ground with a proposed set of norms for
responsible state behavior in cyberspaceor information space, as the Chinese
and Russians prefer to term it. That difference in terminology is noteworthy because
it reflects a deeper ideological difference in how these governments perceive the
issue of cyber security. Western countries tend to consider it as a matter of
maintaining an open and secure Internet without constraint on content. China and
Russia, in contrast, consider content as a key element of the information space they
wish to safeguard. Although the proposed text did not explicitly address these
differences in terminology, they would certainly emerge in any consideration of the
proposal. The co - sponsors of this initiative were clever, however, in the form they
chose for their set of norms. They presented it as a politically binding code of
conduct rather than a legally binding agreement, even though traditionally both
China and Russia have advocated legal instruments over political arrangements.
This approach reflected the increased aversion U.S. administrations have shown
toward entering into international agreements that require Senate ratification, as
opposed to politically binding arrangements undertaken by the executive branch
alone, such as codes of conduct. Beyond the particular case of the United States,
the relative ease of state engagement and the general rapidity to conclude political
arrangements have tended to favor them over legal instruments such as treaties in
international security affairs (for example, the draft international code of conduct on
outer space activities originally presented in 2008 by the European Union). 14 China
and Russia have tailored a proposal that they knew would represent an easier
diplomatic sell to other states than if they had put forward a draft international
treaty.
The Devil is in the Details

If the form of the proposed code was skillfully designed to appeal to other countries,
the content of the code was more problematic and likely to spark controversy. After
a rather anodyne preamble, the SinoRussian Code states its purpose is to identify
the rights and responsibilities of States in information space, echoing the norms of
responsible state behavior language set out in the Obama Strategy. The core of the
code was contained in a set of eleven actions to which states were to voluntarily
subscribe. While some of these measures were rather innocuouswith references to
bolstering regional cooperation and assisting developing countries to close the
digital divideother actions were decidedly problematic. Three of these actions
were especially significant, both for their potential impact on state behavior and for
highlighting the challenge in bringing the international community to a common
understanding of key norms. The first such action reads: Not to use information
and communication technologies, including networks, to carry out hostile activities
or acts of aggression, pose threats to international peace and security, or proliferate
information weapons or related technologies. 15 The second was couched as a
cooperative measure: To cooperate in combating criminal and terrorist activities
that use information and communications technologies, including networks, and in
curbing the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism or
extremism, or that undermines other countries political, economic and social
stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment. 16 The third major
action was [t]o reaffirm all the rights and responsibilities of states to protect, in
accordance with relevant laws and regulations, their information space and critical
information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage.
It is evident that several of the terms used in these provisions are ambiguous and
could be open to widely differing interpretation. Take for example the phrase
hostile activity in the first measure; hostility is in the eye of the beholder and
could include hosting a server which supports the website of an opposition group.
Or consider the prohibition on proliferation of information weapons or related
technologiesbeyond the fact that information weapons as a category has yet to
be defined, what constitutes proliferation of these items is also obscure. Would
offering online subscriptions to a publication that criticizes state actions qualify as a
proliferation of information weapons? Since one could view a cyber attack mounted
from someones laptop as constituting an information weapon, would the ban on
proliferation of related technologies extend to marketing these basic computer

items? Establishing mutually acceptable definitions of the very equipment or
capabilities the code would aim to preclude represents a major hurdle for any future
negotiators. Similarly, the appeal to cooperate in combating criminal and terrorist
activities calls for suppressing information that incites secessionism or
undermines another countrys economic and social stability, as well as their
spiritual and cultural environment. 18 It is clear that authorities could interpret
almost anything as falling under these categories, and adopting such a measure
would provide an authoritarian regime with wide scope for censorship and
repression. Even the superficially benign affirmation of the right of states to protect
their information space could prove highly problematic in practice. What one state
might view as a disturbance or even sabotage of their information space,
another state might simply consider a case of exercising the right to freedom of
expression. These examples of inherently problematic features of the text are not to
suggest that the problems of a code of conduct for cyberspace are insurmountable
or that they render the pursuit of some common ground rules as futile. They do,
however, indicate the difficulty in arriving at provisions that would have comparable
implications for conduct among states with differing political systems and
ideological worldviews. Moscow and Beijing appear aware that their original
proposal might have provoked skepticism (and diplomatic opposition). In January
2015, a revised version of the Code of Conduct was circulated at the UN, one that
reflected input received from a series of consultations with other states. In the
covering letter, the sponsors declared that their aim was to push forward the
international debate on information security, and help forge an early consensus on
this issue. 19 The revised text largely reflects the contents (and concerns) of the
original, although there has been a major change on the international security
dimension. The ambitious measures to prohibit information weapons and their
proliferation have been deleted in favor of a far more general exhortation not to
carry out activities which run counter to the task of maintaining international peace
and security. 20
US must proactively advance diplomacy on cybernorms to

prevent Sino-Russian fillin
Meyer Summer 15
eeding a Western Response Whatever the diplomatic strategy Beijing and

Moscow ultimately pursue, it is evident that Western states are reacting warily to
the proposed Code. Therefore in the near term, any push for early adoption of the
draft Code of Conduct is likely to result in a new EastWest divide. The desire to
avoid such a divisive outcome explains in large part the restraint its SinoRussian
sponsors have shown. At the same time, the West (in particular its leading nation
the United States), having called for the development of a global consensus on
norms for responsible state behavior, can hardly object when states respond by
suggesting a set of norms of their own. Indeed, from the cool reception that some
Western capitals have shown the RussianChinese proposal, one can discern an
irritation that Beijing and Moscow have effectively stolen the initiative from leading
Western powers in presenting a draft set of global norms to the international
community . Instead of simply being miffed over having lost the diplomatic
monopoly on norms for responsible state conduct in cyberspace, it would be
prudent for Western states to come up with their own version of what these global
norms should include. In the competition for intellectual leadership on global norms
for cyber security, it is not enough to simply critique Chinas and Russias
offerings.
Some signs indicate that the United States is starting to articulate what appropriate
norms and practical measures include. Officials in the State Departments Office for
Cyber Issues began in 2014 to call for cooperative measures that would preserve
stability in cyberspace and remove incentives for attack. These measures would
build on practices of state self - restraint and seek to provide critical civilian
information infrastructure with a protective status from cyber attack, akin to that
which crucial civilian infrastructure currently enjoys under international
humanitarian law. There is express interest in pursuing agreement on confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of escalation due to
misunderstanding or miscalculation regarding a cyber incident of national security
concern... 29 These are promising initial ideas, but need to be formalized and
presented more systematically if they are to represent a coherent set of norms
and measures that would constitute an alternative to the SinoRussian proposed
Code of Conduct.
Chinese diplomacy fill-in undermines multistakeholder model

Fidler 2/12/16 David P. Fidler is the James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law at the Indiana University
Maurer School of Law and an adjunct senior fellow for cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest
book is The Snowden Reader (Indiana University Press, 2015).
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17907/the-challenge-of-china-s-bid-for-cyber-suzerainty
In addition to developing its cyber capabilities, China has also influenced cyber
norms. China is the leading proponent of Internet sovereignty, which subjects
cyberspace to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention. This norm
supports Chinas emphasis on defensive strategies to counter military threats from
more powerful states, its efforts to identify foreign-source Internet communications
that could affect domestic stability, and its demands that foreign tech companies
comply with Chinese laws. China has pushed for governments and
intergovernmental organizations to oversee Internet governance. It has supported
bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements; proposed codes of conduct; and
stressed sovereignty and non-intervention in United Nations negotiations on

information security. And although China has denied engaging in cyber spying,
espionage has not traditionally been considered a violation of international law.
Through these activities, China has confronted the U.S.-backed Internet
freedom norm, the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance, and
Western perspectives on how international law applies to cyberspace.
Chinas strategies, capabilities and proposed norms demonstrate that it thinks

comprehensively about the cyber realm and has altered cyberspaces trajectory to
reflect Chinese ideas and power. This impact has produced alarm about the cyber
threat China poses to Western countries. In response, analysts have pointed out
that China focuses on using cyber weapons within armed conflicts rather than to
start wars; that Chinese military and intelligence cyber capabilities lag behind those
of the United States; and that Chinas vulnerabilities are significant because its
cyber defenses remain a work in progress. Further, the United States has not ceded
the normative field to China and has advanced cyber norms reflecting Western
preferences .
Even so, Chinas approach has gained sufficient traction for it to exhibit greater
confidence in cyber geopolitics, as recent developments demonstrate. The latest
Chinese military strategy acknowledged Chinas offensive cyber capabilities and
emphasized cybers importance to its military power. China has also created a
Strategic Support Force (SSF) that centralizes its cyber defense, intelligence and
offensive activities, and integrates them with efforts in the space domain.
Independent E-Commerce Link

Failure of US-China rules on cyber crushes global GDP
Healey 16 (Jason, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs,
Global Implications of the United States China Cyber Relationship, Cybersecurity: Emerging Issues, Trends,
Technologies and Threats in 2015 and Beyond, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/RSIS_Cybersecurity_EITTT2015.pdf)--RF
These flashpoints may have graver and more far-reaching implications than
anticipated by traditional international relations and national security studies.
According to a classic piece of national security scholarship by Professor Robert
Jervis of Columbia University, a security dilemma is doubly dangerous if the
offense is dominant over defense and it is hard to distinguish offense from defense.
Of course, this exactly describes the cyber domain. But the situation in cyberspace
is even more dangerous. In cyberspace, it is not just hard to distinguish offense
from defense, but also to distinguish from espionage and intelligence preparation of
the battlespace. There are very low barriers to entry for many nations and even
non-states, and many adversaries freely use offense and espionage because of the
difficulties of attribution. Together, this might mean that cyber conflict might be the
most escalatory kind of warfare that mankind has ever experienced. Flashpoints like
those discussed above may have far more potential to spiral out of control than is
realized in Beijing or Washington DC. In addition, the stakes for the United States
and China - and all nations depending on the Internet for increased innovation and
productivity - are higher than expected. According to a recent study for the Atlantic
Council, a drastic increase in cyber conflict and crime, such as from an escalating
U.S.-China fight, could lead to perhaps $90 trillion less in global GDP through 2030.
Even an increase of cyber sovereignty, of strong Internet borders such as Chinas,
could lead to $30 trillion less in global GDP. In these futures, security issues would
take over all conversations at forums such as ASEAN, crowding out discussions of
deeper and more productive issues such as trade or improved Internet resilience.
This would affect everyone on the Internet, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, not
just the United States and China. There are areas of overlap where both nations can
cooperate. The recent Obama-Xi agreement is a promising sign, especially if both
sides hold to it over the next five years. North Korea also, oddly, might help. After
the country hacked Sony in late 2014, it appears the United States and China were
both riled and had similar interest to rein in the country. With so much on the line,
Asia-Pacific nations have much to lose if the United States and China cannot come
to terms over cyberspace and much to gain if all nations, together, can compromise
for a more peaceful and prosperous Internet.
Only US-China coop can retain the Internets value as a free

space of commerce

Finding some common ground and developing cooperative projects are necessary
first steps to reducing tensions in cyberspace. Both sides increasingly depend on
digital infrastructure for economic and national security and share a number of
concerns. Globally, cyberattacks are growing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and
severity of impact. Cybercrime continues to riseMcAfee estimates that it cost the
global economy more than $400 billion in 2014and terrorists groups appear to be
seeking the ability to launch destructive cyberattacks. 4 The proliferation of
cyberattack capabilities to nonstate actors that are not easily deterred puts critical
infrastructure in both China and the United States at risk. There are also strong
economic incentives for greater cooperation. The Chinese and U.S. information and
communications technology (ICT) markets are tightly linked, and both economies
rely on the security, integrity, and availability of global supply chains. While
avoiding greater mistrust and preventing virtual events from escalating into
physical conflicts are essential, Beijing and Washington should not stop there. They
should also work together to identify positive goals. The growth of the Internet has
brought immense economic, political, social, and cultural benefits to both sides.
Strategic cooperation in cyberspace could result in further gains for China, the
United States, and the rest of the world.
Rules of the road crucial to expanding economic benefits of the

interwebs
Golodner 15 (Adam Golodner, University of Colorado School of Law JD, Colorado College BA, Navigating
the Digital Age, 10/14/15, http://www.kayescholer.com/docs/20151014-navigating-the-digitalage/_res/id=File1/Golodner_International%20Inflection%20Point_chapter%20in%20Navigating%20the%20Digital
%20Age.pdf)
Although some policy makers have begun to talk about cyber norms, there has not
been sustained multi-lateral head-of-state to head-of-state work to set rules of the
road. However, it has to begin. The issues are big enough and complex and
significant enough that we have to set the right path now. We can build rules that
the majority of the family of nations can agree to and then bring the outliers along.
Most commentators are of the view that a formal treaty is premature, if it ever
makes sense. This sounds right to me. However, the time is right to up-lever the
conversation to the head of state level and convene the heads of state of some core
countries (such as U.S., U.K., Germany, France, Sweden, Estonia, India, Brazil, Japan,
Korea, Australia, Canada) to start to build out offensive, defensive, law enforcement,
and commercial rules of acceptable behavior. Of course, other countries, such as
China, could join in short order if it turns out they are in fast agreement, but the
work of building out the core should move ahead without waiting for everyone to be
on board. An additional benefit of doing this is that it reduces the impulse of
countries to complain about the activities of other countries when the activity at
issue is one that all countries find to be acceptable, and in the converse, gives
weight to complaints about activities outside of the acceptable. Why should

companies care? Why should they be integral to these discussions? First, companies
own the enterprise networks and databases in which cyber activity takes place
domestic companies and global companies. Companies own the software, hardware,
the information, and the upstream and downstream relationships where this contest
takes place. Think of the Internetevery little bit of it is owned by somebody, and
the vast majority is owned by public companies globally. Although cyber is the fifth
fighting domain (along with land, sea, air, and space), it is the only one owned
essentially by private companies. Second, information technology and
communications services and products are created and sold by the private sector. If
a government acts on those services or products, it acts on services and products
with a private sector brand. The same brand used by other companies. Third, the
future of the global interoperable, open, secure, network is at stake. Will companies
be able to continue to drive innovative business models, or will they be stifled by
the rules and activities of governments, hacktivists, and criminals playing in their
playing field? Here are some rules of the road that should be in play. What cyber
activity is an act of war? What cyber activity is acceptable espionage? What is cyber
vandalism, and what is the appropriate response? What activity by a nation-state is
acceptable on a bank, stock exchange, energy, transportation, electric, or life
sciences company? What if its a non-nation-state activity? What action is
acceptable to proactively stop a planned cyber activity? What principles should
animate the decision to use a cyber tool of war on a target connected to the
Internet? Is it OK to deliver cyber means through private networks or technologies?
What is an acceptable response to another countrys cyber or kinetic act? What are
the principles for disclosing or stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities or interdicting a
supply chain? How can we make global assurance methodologies such as the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (Common Criteria)
for products even more useful? Should there be requirements for governments to
share cyberthreat information with other countries and companies to improve
security? What tools in the toolbox are acceptable to curb behaviorprosecution,
sanctions, trade, covert action? Is it OK for national security services to steal
intellectual property of companies? Is it OK for intelligence services to give it to
competitors? What collection of information of or about individual citizens of
another country is acceptable or unacceptable? What is the standard? What
collection on other governments and their leaders is acceptable? Most of these
questions have some grounding in existing principles and laws, but the cyber facts
have to be understood and applied to start to enunciate these rules of the road.
Although work has certainly begun on cyber norms, the time is right for taking the
work to the next level. Furthermore, because the playing field is made up of private
networks and elements of technology services and products, the outcomes should
by definition be of interest to companies, CEOs, and boards of directors. Good rules
of the road should help build trust in networks and technology globally. So,
companies should engage in helping set the global rules of the road today. It affects
their future.
Rules failure kills internets positive effects

Murdock 5/12/16 (Jason Murdock, journalist for IBTimes UK reporting on
technology and cybersecurity, From hacking to cyber espionage: US and China
discuss security in the digital age, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hacking-cyberespionage-us-china-discuss-security-digital-age-1559787)
Officials from the US and Chinese governments have met for the first since an
agreement was established last year in an attempt to curb the rising threat of cyber
espionage and hacking between the two nations. The fresh working group, dubbed
the Senior Experts Group on International Norms and Related Issues, is now
expected to meet at least twice a year, according to the US State Department.
While details of the exact discussions remain scant, officials told Reuters topics
included the "international norms of state behaviour and other crucial issues for
international security in cyberspace." Cybersecurity and espionage have long been
a problem between the two rival nations at least one that simmers under the
surface of diplomacy. Both countries boast sophisticated intelligence agencies and
hacking techniques. The US is renowned for its surveillance operations under the
aegis of the NSA while, on Chinese shores, PLA-affiliated hackers have long been
sanctioned by the government to single out foreign targets from whom to steal
intellectual property for economic gain. The fresh rounds of discussions was led on
the US side by Christopher Painter, coordinator for cyber issues at the State
Department. Officials from the Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defence (DoD) were also present.
Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation was led by Wang Qun, director-general of arms
control at the nation's foreign ministry alongside officials from the public security
ministries as well as the Cyberspace Administration of China. Writing on The
Huffington Post following the meeting, Chinese official Qun said it was in the 'shared
interests' of both superpowers to cooperate on cybersecurity issues. He wrote:
"While it is true that the US and China may sometimes be at odds with each other
on some of the cyber issues, it shouldn't affect the cooperation between them. To
fling accusations at each other is not a solution. Only through cooperation, can the
US and China forge a unified and prosperous cyberspace. Otherwise, the cyberspace
will divide and wither." He continued: "The digital economy is taking up an
increasingly large share of GDP in both the US and China, two of the world's key
players in cyberspace. In the meantime, the two countries have evolved towards a
community of shared interests with each having a stake in the other." The initial
negotiations took place during a state visit to the US by Chinese President Xi Jinping
from 22 September to 28 September last year. The discussions, which many viewed
with open criticism, came only months after US officials revealed details about a
massive cyberattack at the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) which
resulted in the loss of 21.5 million federal records. Despite denials, the hack was
suspected to have originated from China-affiliated cybercriminals. As a result, the
move forced US President Barack Obama to adopt a harsher stance when it came to
rhetoric around cybersecurity. "We've made very clear to the Chinese that there are
certain practices that they're engaging in that we know are emanating from China
and are not acceptable," he said at the time. "And we can choose to make this an
area of competition, which I guarantee we'll win if we have to, or alternatively we
can come to an agreement where we say this isn't helping anyway, let's try to have
some basic rules of the road in terms of how we operate." In the resulting talks,
according to the White House, the two presidents agreed that "neither country's
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the
intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors".
Internal Link: US cred k2 open internet

US key driver of GLOBAL internet freedom
Roff 2/25/14 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2014/02/25/willobama-abandon-internet-freedom Peter Roff is a contributing editor at U.S. News &
World Report. Formerly a senior political writer for United Press International, he's
now affiliated with several public policy organizations including Let Freedom Ring,
and Frontiers of Freedom. His writing has appeared in National Review, Fox News'
opinion section, The Daily Caller, Politico and elsewhere.
Freedom built the Internet. Up to now it has been the position of the United States
government to defend that idea. The U.S. actively pressures other countries who
guard news and information more jealously, who exercise a greater degree of
control over news and information content than we do here to play by our rules
which include free and open access and freedom of content . Giving up control
of the Internet to any international body would make that a much tougher row to
hoe. Its perfectly well and good for senior U.S. officials like Secretary of State John
Kerry to meet with bloggers from China about the promotion of Internet freedom.
But if the president and Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker are at the same time
working out a scheme to give the Chinese government which is not exactly a
worldwide symbol of free thought and free association -- a commanding voice in
how the Internet is managed, then whats the point? The situation is more complex
than former President Jimmy Carters long-ago give-away of the Panama Canal. The
idea that We built it, we paid for it, its ours, as Ronald Reagan famously said
years ago, is the starting point of the discussion -- not the closing argument. The
idea behind the Internet is freedom, and no country can guarantee that freedom as
well or as enduringly as the United States. Policymakers in Washington need to
put a stop to the globalization of its management now, before its too late.
US key to internet freedom signal

Fontaine and Rogers 11 Richard Fontaine is a Senior Fellow at the Center for
a New American Security. Will Rogers is a Research Associate at the Center for a
New American Security
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_InternetFreedom_FontaineR
ogers_0.pdf
At the same time, the United States should counter the view that Internet freedom
is merely an American project cooked up in Washington, rather than a notion rooted
in universal human rights. The United States promotes Internet freedom more
actively than any other country, and is one of the only countries that actively funds
circumvention technologies. It leads in promoting international norms and has made
a greater effort than most to incorporate Internet freedom into its broader foreign
policy.
US image of global internet key to stopping transition to ITU

control
Simon 14 Joel Simon is the executive director of the Committee to Protect
Journalists. His book, Controlling the News, will be published by Columbia University
Press in 2014. http://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-surveillance-pressfreedom.php
In its typically fulminating style, the English language edition of China's People's
Daily proclaimed in an August 2012 editorial that the U.S. must cede control of the
Internet. "The Internet has become one of the most important resources in the
world in just a few decades, but the governance mechanism for such an important
international resource is still dominated by a private sector organization and a
single country," the newspaper noted. China is not alone in this view. A coalition of
Internet-restricting nations--including Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and countries
throughout Africa and the Middle East--have formed an international coalition calling
for the United Nations to take over Internet governance. The Chinese argument that
the Internet structure serves U.S. hegemonic interests was long viewed by the
international community as cynical and hypocritical, said Dan Gilmor, an author
and expert on Internet issues, given the fact that U. S. policy has supported and
promoted freedom of expression online while China has built a massive and
sophisticated system of Internet control. But the ever-growing revelations about the
scope of digital spying carried out by the National Security Agency raise doubts
about the U.S. commitment . The documents leaked by former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden show that some of the U.S. spying programs operated with
technical support of technology companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The NSA took
advantage of the fact that nearly all online communications passes through U.S.based servers and switches to vacuum up a huge portion of global communication.
It specifically targeted governments, including allies like Brazil, whose president,
Dilma Rousseff, has taken grave offense at the invasion of her personal
correspondence. By using its technological advantage and indirect control over the
Internet to carry out a global surveillance operation of unprecedented scale, Gilmor
told CPJ, "The U.S. has abused its position, handing repressive regimes a lot of
ammunition to be clamping down even more." China has long argued that the
United Nations-administered International Telecommunication Union (ITU) should
assume the authority for setting technical standards that currently resides with
ICANN, a quasi-private entity based in Los Angeles that operates under license from
the U.S. Commerce Department. The Peoples Daily editorial was intended to set the
stage for the latest meeting of the ITU, which took place in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, in December 2012. At that meeting, a coalition of African and Middle
Eastern countries introduced a treaty to bring Internet governance under ITU
control. The U.S. and European nations worked feverishly against the proposal, and
in the end more than 50 countries, including all eligible members of the EU, refused
to sign. But subsequently the U.S./EU coalition has been deeply strained by the
Snowden revelations. Europeans, who place a much higher value on privacy, were
outraged to learn that their personal data might have been accessed by the NSA.
European leaders reacted with fury at the scope of the surveillance, with German
officials calling the spying "reminiscent of the Cold War" and the French Foreign
Ministry summoning the U.S. ambassador to offer a formal rebuke. "The credibility
of the United States as a global champion for freedom of expression and human
rights is undoubtedly damaged by the NSA revelations," Marietje Schaake, a
member of the European Parliament and leader on Internet freedom issues, told CPJ.
The decentralized nature of the Internet, which makes censorship or control much
harder, is a great strength for journalists and others committed to the free flow of
information and ideas. But if you believe, as China does, that national sovereignty
trumps the individual right to freedom of expression, then the Internet's current
structure not only undermines state authority but also imposes U.S. standards of
freedom of expression on the entire world. This was the argument that played out at
the U.N. General Assembly in September 2012 in the aftermath of the Innocence of
Muslims video. After President Obama called censorship obsolete and described
freedom of expression as a universal ideal, then-Egyptian President Mohamed
Morsi pushed back, declaring that Egypt does not respect freedom of expression
that targets a specific religion or a specific culture. His views were echoed by
other leaders. The embrace by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of the right
to connect during a landmark speech at the Newseum in January 2010 was initially
hailed by online freedom advocates as a positive step. But in the aftermath of the
NSA scandal, it looks less enlightened. Many governments are skeptical of U.S.
support for online freedom and believe that the U.S. commitment to free expression
and association online is really about using the Internet to execute regime change
and install client governments favorable to U.S. interests. Iran under its last
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, announced plans to build a separate halal
Internet closed off from the World Wide Web. In March 2012, Russian Duma member
Aleksey Mitrofanov, head of the Parliamentary Committee on Information Policy,
announced legislation to curtail online speech. An era of absolutely free Internet in
Russia has ended, he declared. Since then, courts have shut down critical
websites--one Internet news site was stripped of its license for posting videos
containing foul language--and the countrys leading blogger, Aleksei Navalny, was
convicted of trumped-up bribery charges. Using powerful computers and technical
acumen, the NSA has cracked encryption codes, making it possible for the U.S.
government to gain access to nearly anything that moves online, according to a
report by ProPublica. This has given the U.S. a tremendous strategic advantage,
since it is widely believed to be the only country in the world with this capability.
While the scope of online spying is still unfolding, the U.S. has hacked into the
internal communication of at least one media outlet, according to a report in Der
Spiegel. Citing leaked Snowden documents, the German magazine reported that the
U.S. accessed Al-Jazeeras internal communications in 2006. Both Germany and
Brazil have indicated they will assert greater control over their domestic Internet.
Deutsche Telekom, which is partially government-owned, is seeking an alliance with
other German Internet providers to shield the German network from foreign
snooping. The Brazilian Congress, meanwhile, is considering legislation that would
require Internet companies operating in the country to store their data on domestic
servers, a proposal opposed by international communications and technology

companies, which say such a system would be prohibitively expensive. Brazil is also
advocating a new U.N. treaty to safeguard privacy. Speaking at the U.N General
Assembly in September 2013, President Rousseff said Brazil would present
proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the
governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection of data
that travels through it. Eduardo Bertoni, who directs a global freedom of expression
center at the University of Palermo in Buenos Aires, Argentina, called on Brazil to
take concrete actions in support of Rousseffs words including disavowing the ITU
treaty, which Brazil signed. Internationalizing Internet governance is, of course, not
inherently a bad thing. In fact, proponents of the current "multi-stakeholder model"
of Internet governance are also calling for a reduced U.S. role. At an October 2013
conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, the leaders of the organizations that coordinate
the Internet's technical structure called for the "globalization" of ICANN functions.
The signatories included the head of ICANN, Fadi Chehad. Rebecca MacKinnon,
author of a book about online free expression called Consent of the Networked and
a CPJ board member, pointed out that the multi-stakeholder model, in which
constituencies including governments, companies, and civil society groups share
responsibility for Internet governance, is flawed but "better than going to the U.N ."
She added: "The role that the United States has been trying to preserve as a
protector of freedom of openness--not too many people take it seriously any more. If
we want to preserve the multi-stakeholder model, then U.S. power needs to be
reduced." Schaake of the European Parliament agreed. "The negative impact of the
exposure of the NSA activities is not limited to the United States' foreign policy
objectives but could also harm the global open Internet, including the multistakeholder model as governments seek to take further control," she said. "We must
ensure human rights and democratic principles are defended online . It is very
worrying that the United States has undermined its own credibility to
push these efforts." There is a risk in the current environment that an open
debate will simply provide an enhanced platform for Internet-restricting countries
like China to push for U.N. control. Success, while unlikely, would be a
catastrophic event, according to MacKinnon, and would mean the end of the
Internet as a shared global resource. "Around the world, countries are increasingly
restricting the Internet and seeking to bring it under state control," Gilmor noted. He
said he hoped the Snowden revelations "don't accelerate the trend, but I fear that
they might."
Now Key
Crucial crossroads for internet freedom
Kelly 10/8/13 Sanja Kelly is the project director for Freedom on the Net at
Freedom House. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/10/08/how-internetfreedom-continues-to-slide/
The next few years will be critical for the future of the internet , particularly
as more countries look to pass national legislation to regulate the internet use. For
that reason, supporters of internet freedom whether they be civic activists,
technology companies, or the international community must act swiftly to
ensure that laws and practices under consideration are coined with regards to our
rights to privacy, free expression and assembly. Otherwise, the internet that our
grandchildren inherit might be significantly more restrictive than the network
we enjoy today.
Now key to internet freedom

Meldre 14 Patrik Maldre is a specialist in the security policy and arms control
division of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having lived half of his life in
Estonia and the other half in the United States, Patrik received a double-bachelor in
philosophy and political science at the University of Illinois and completed his M.A.
studies in international relations with a specialisation in peace and security at the
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals. (Estonia, the Freedom Online Coalition
and the future of internet governance, Estonian World, April 25, 2014,
http://estonianworld.com/security/estonia-freedom-online-coalition-future-internetgovernance/)
It is undeniable that the advent and rapid proliferation of the internet has
significantly impacted the social, economic and, perhaps most importantly, the
political dimensions of global relations. Not only has it brought about an astounding
rate of innovation and technological development, it has also enabled an
unprecedented level of connectivity between the worlds citizens. However, over the
course of the last two decades, the international discourse surrounding the internet
has become increasingly politicised and, more recently, securitised. It is very likely
that the next few years will be crucial for determining whether the internet of the
future will be characterised by the openness and interoperability that have been its
hallmarks thus far, or whether it will disintegrate into tens or hundreds of smaller ,
less porous, less connected, less free, more controlled and filtered networks.
Now key for internet expansion key driver of global economy

Meldre 14 Patrik Maldre is a specialist in the security policy and arms control
division of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having lived half of his life in
Estonia and the other half in the United States, Patrik received a double-bachelor in
philosophy and political science at the University of Illinois and completed his M.A.
studies in international relations with a specialisation in peace and security at the
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals. (Estonia, the Freedom Online Coalition
and the future of internet governance, Estonian World, April 25, 2014,
http://estonianworld.com/security/estonia-freedom-online-coalition-future-internetgovernance/)
The full benefits of the internet have yet to be realised in every part of the world.
Truthfully, the unpredictable and powerful process of digitisation is nowhere near
completion; only an estimated 40% of the world currently has access to the
internet. However, its full potential as a driver of economic, social and political
advancement can only be unleashed on a globally comprehensive scale if it remains
open and accessible. This does not mean that the timely and sensitive questions of
security and privacy that inevitably arise in this context can or will be ignored. In
fact, Estonia has shown that it is possible to make significant progress in
guaranteeing security and privacy without sacrificing fundamental freedoms online.
And on 28-29 April, Estonia, the rest of the FOC members, various like-minded
countries and a number of undecided nations around the world will come together
with executives, luminaries and activists to exhaustively discuss and debate the
intricacies of the questions of internet freedom and internet governance in Tallinn. It
remains to be seen whether the vision of a Free and Secure Internet for All will
become a reality within the next few years. Estonia, for its part, has demonstrated
its potential on the national level and will likely continue to pursue the goal of
sharing its experiences and spreading the potential of the internet to countries all
over the world.
Impact Module 1: Open Internet S Extinction

Open Internet solves Extinction
Genachowski 13 Julius Genachowski is chairman of the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission, First Amendment scholar Lee C. Bollinger is president
of Columbia University. Bollinger serves on the board of the Washington Post
Company, Foreign Policy, April 16, 2013, "The Plot to Block Internet Freedom",
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/plot_block_internet_freedom?
page=full
The Internet has created an extraordinary new democratic forum for people around
the world to express their opinions. It is revolutionizing global access to
information: Today, more than 1 billion people worldwide have access to the
Internet, and at current growth rates, 5 billion people -- about 70 percent of the
world's population -- will be connected in five years. But this growth trajectory is
not inevitable, and threats are mounting to the global spread of an open and
truly "worldwide" web. The expansion of the open Internet must be allowed to
continue: The mobile and social media revolutions are critical not only for
democratic institutions' ability to solve the collective problems of a shrinking
world, but also to a dynamic and innovative global economy that depends
on financial transparency and the free flow of information. The threats to
the open Internet were on stark display at last December's World Conference on
International Telecommunications in Dubai, where the United States fought
attempts by a number of countries -- including Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia -- to
give a U.N. organization, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), new
regulatory authority over the Internet. Ultimately, over the objection of the United
States and many others, 89 countries voted to approve a treaty that could
strengthen the power of governments to control online content and deter
broadband deployment. In Dubai, two deeply worrisome trends came to a
head. First, we see that the Arab Spring and similar events have awakened
nondemocratic governments to the danger that the Internet poses to their regimes.
In Dubai, they pushed for a treaty that would give the ITU's imprimatur to
governments' blocking or favoring of online content under the guise of preventing
spam and increasing network security. Authoritarian countries' real goal is to
legitimize content regulation, opening the door for governments to block any
content they do not like, such as political speech. Second, the basic commercial
model underlying the open Internet is also under threat. In particular, some
proposals, like the one made last year by major European network operators, would
change the ground rules for payments for transferring Internet content. One species
of these proposals is called "sender pays" or "sending party pays." Since the
beginning of the Internet, content creators -- individuals, news outlets, search
engines, social media sites -- have been able to make their content available to
Internet users without paying a fee to Internet service providers. A sender-pays rule
would change that, empowering governments to require Internet content creators to
pay a fee to connect with an end user in that country. Sender pays may look merely
like a commercial issue, a different way to divide the pie. And proponents of sender
pays and similar changes claim they would benefit Internet deployment and Internet
users. But the opposite is true: If a country imposed a payment requirement,
content creators would be less likely to serve that country. The loss of content would
make the Internet less attractive and would lessen demand for the deployment of
Internet infrastructure in that country. Repeat the process in a few more countries,
and the growth of global connectivity -- as well as its attendant benefits for
democracy -- would slow dramatically. So too would the benefits accruing
to the global economy . Without continuing improvements in transparency and
information sharing, the innovation that springs from new commercial ideas
and creative breakthroughs is sure to be severely inhibited. To their credit,
American Internet service providers have joined with the broader U.S. technology
industry, civil society, and others in opposing these changes. Together, we were
able to win the battle in Dubai over sender pays, but we have not yet won the
war. Issues affecting global Internet openness, broadband deployment, and free
speech will return in upcoming international forums , including an important
meeting in Geneva in May, the World Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum. The
massive investment in wired and wireless broadband infrastructure in the United
States demonstrates that preserving an open Internet is completely compatible with
broadband deployment. According to a recent UBS report, annual wireless capital
investment in the United States increased 40 percent from 2009 to 2012, while
investment in the rest of the world has barely inched upward. And according to the
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, more fiber-optic cable was laid
in the United States in 2011 and 2012 than in any year since 2000, and 15 percent
more than in Europe. All Internet users lose something when some countries
are cut off from the World Wide Web. Each person who is unable to connect to
the Internet diminishes our own access to information. We become less able to
understand the world and formulate policies to respond to our shrinking
planet. Conversely, we gain a richer understanding of global events as more
people connect around the world, and those societies nurturing nascent democracy
movements become more familiar with America's traditions of free speech and
pluralism. That's why we believe that the Internet should remain free of gatekeepers
and that no entity -- public or private -- should be able to pick and choose the
information web users can receive. That is a principle the United States adopted in
the Federal Communications Commission's 2010 Open Internet Order. And it's why
we are deeply concerned about arguments by some in the United States that
broadband providers should be able to block, edit, or favor Internet traffic that
travels over their networks, or adopt economic models similar to international
sender pays. We must preserve the Internet as the most open and robust
platform for the free exchange of information ever devised. Keeping the
Internet open is perhaps the most important free speech issue of our time.
Addresses all global and EXISTENTIAL threats

Eagleman 10 (David Eagleman is a neuroscientist at Baylor College of
Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the
Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate). Nov. 9, 2010,
Six ways the internet will save civilization,
http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no)
great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics.
Usually this results from: natural disasters, resource depletion, economic
meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption . But were luckier than our
predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a
rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the
internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly reduced the threat
of societal collapse . Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence One of our
more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic . Viral and bacterial epidemics
precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of
the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability
to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing
human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep
Many
supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density
If we are well prepared when an epidemic

arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail
due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The
internet will predict natural disasters We are witnessing the downfall of
slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of
up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV
below the tipping point required for an epidemic.
stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned
with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone
the internet carried news

about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could.
pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped:
In
this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave
kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the
internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount
If the Indian Ocean had the Pacifics networked tsunami-warning

system, South-East Asia would look quite different today . Discoveries are
retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant
rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have
Vesuvius.
fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And
Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way

in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe . By the time the idea reached
North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed .
The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately;
information that survives often does not spread.
information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in
their fortification against risk.
Tyranny is mitigated Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre

in the
in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines
USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenkos agricultural
despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation . Historically,
a more successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free
speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of
information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of
every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and
impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some governments to build firewalls,
Human capital is vastly increased

Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per
its clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance.
cent of the worlds population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the
education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational
opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a
The net opens the gates education to anyone with a

computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the worlds knowledge -- from the webs
of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MITs OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us
well when we confront existential threats weve never imagined before.
Energy expenditure is reduced Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy
budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues . This has
taken the form of deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel
depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease.
smaller pool of problem solvers.
Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from
Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to

purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving
the post to email.
around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are
energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal
The tangle of events that

triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not
address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of
the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation. The next time your coworker laments
and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow.
internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest
that the net may just be the technology that saves us.
Impact Module 2: Turkey

US internet freedom promotion key to reverse MUTLIPLE fronts
of Internet repression - TURKEY
[Turkey, Vietnam, Chinese, Iran, Zambia, Venezuela]
Fontaine 14 Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for a New American
Security (CNAS). He served as a Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at CNAS from
2009-2012 and previously as foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more
than five years. He has also worked at the State Department, the National Security
Council and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publicationspdf/CNAS_BringingLibertyOnline_Fontaine.pdf
A Snapshot of Internet Freedom Today The scrambled Internet freedom narrative

and its complicated consequences are discouraging , not least because the need
for an active online free - dom agenda has never been more pressing. It is today
estimated that roughly half of Internet users worldwide experience online
censorship in some form. 41 Freedom House observes a deterioration in global
Internet freedom over the three consecutive years it has issued reports; its 2013
volume notes that Internet freedom declined in more than half of the 60 countries it
assessed. Broad surveillance, new legislation controlling online content and the
arrest of Internet users are all on the increase; over the course of a single year,
some 24 countries passed new laws or regulations that threaten online freedom of
speech. 42 A glance at the past 12 months reveals a disturb - ing trend. In Turkey,
for example, after its high court overturned a ban on Twitter, the govern - ment
began demanding that the company quickly implement orders to block specific
users. Ankara also blocked YouTube after a surreptitious record - ing of the countrys
foreign minister surfaced, and it has dramatically increased its takedown requests
to both Twitter and Google. 43 Russia has begun directly censoring the Internet
with a growing blacklist of websites, and under a new law its government can block
websites that encourage people to participate in unauthorized protests. 44
Chinese social media censorship has become so pervasive that it constitutes,
according to one study, the largest selective suppression of human communication
in the history of the world. 45 China has also begun assisting foreign countries,
including Iran and Zambia, in their efforts to monitor and censor the Internet. 46
Vietnam has enacted a new law making it illegal to distribute digital content that
opposes the government. 47 Venezuela has blocked access to certain web - sites
and limited Internet access in parts of the country. 48 A robust, energetic
American Internet freedom agenda is most needed at the very moment
that that agenda has come under the greatest attack . Reenergizing the
Agenda Precisely because the Internet is today such a contested space, it
is vitally important that the United States be actively involved in

promoting online freedom . Americas Internet freedom efforts accord with
the countrys longstanding tradition of promoting human right s, including
freedoms of expression, association and assembly. And it represents a bet: that
access to an open Internet can foster elements of democracy in autocratic
states by empowering those who are pressing for liberal change at home .
While the outcome of that bet remains uncertain, there should be no doubt about
which side the United States has chosen. Reenergizing the Internet freedom
agenda begins with acknowledging that the United States must promote
that agenda even as it continues to engage in electronic surveillance aimed at
protecting national security.
Turkish internet crackdown tanks accession

Erdemir 14 http://www.aykanerdemir.net/basin-aciklamalarim/1102/ Assoc. Prof.
Aykan Erdemir Member of the Turkish Parliament (representing Bursa) Member of
Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee Republican People's Party
The European Court of Human Rights, in Ahmet Yldrm v Turkey case of 18
December 2012, ruled that the Law No.5651 is in violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Unfortunately, the AKP government ignored this court
decision and introduced further restrictions to Internet freedoms with the latest
legislative package. In 2010, Reporters without Borders added Turkey to the list of
countries under surveillance regarding Internet freedoms. Soon, Turkey might be
added to the list of the Internet enemies, where Turkey would be in the same
category with North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China. Internet restrictions
brought with the latest legislative package will create new obstacles to
Turkeys European Union accession process . Member of the European
Parliament, Marietje Schaake (ALDE/D66), drafted the Digital Freedom Strategy in
EU Foreign Policy which was accepted as a resolution by the European Parliament
on 11 December 2012. Schaake emphasized that Internet freedoms constitute an
integral part of the Copenhagen Criteria. Since 1993, the Copenhagen Criteria has
set out the minimum democratic standards for EU candidate countries. Due to the
development of the fundamental rights and freedoms in the world, the scope of the
Copenhagen Criteria has broadened over time. Turkey and other candidate
countries are today expected to fulfill the criteria in its current scope. In her
question for written answer of 1 June 2011 entitled Internet Freedom as a
Criterion for EU Accession , MEP Schaake asked the European Commission
whether freedom of the press and media, including Internet freedoms, will be
singled out as a specific political criterion or benchmark for EU accession? On 18
July 2011, in response to MEP Schaakes question, tefan Fle, the European
Commissioner for Enlargement, emphasized that the freedom of the media is
one of the fundamental rights and thus part of the Copenhagen accession
political criteria that Turkey must implement in order to progress on the
negotiations . In addition, Fle urged Turkey to amend its legal framework to

bring it in line with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
OSCE commitments on media freedom, as well as their implementation by the
courts. On 4 February 2014, after the Internet legislative package was passed in
the Turkish Parliament, MEP Schaake reminded once again that digital freedoms are
a prerequisite for EU membership. She urged the European Commission to remind
Turkey that the restrictions on the Internet, brought with the legislative package, are
in contradiction with the Copenhagen Criteria. It is clear that the restrictions in the
framework of the legislative package are an obstacle to the implementation of the
Copenhagen Criteria for Turkey. These restrictions are in contradiction with the
European Convention on Human Rights and will lead to new rulings against the
Turkey by the European Court of Human Rights. Today, I am applying to President
Abdullah Gl. Wide segments of the Turkish society are expecting President Gl to
veto this legislation. If the Internet bill is ratified, Turkeys EU membership process
will be irreversibly harmed.
Solves Cyprus
Nicola, 05 - Staff writer for United Press International, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars (Stefan, Cyprus backs Turkeys EU bid,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?
topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=132754)
The accession of Turkey into the European Union is essential to solve the
Cyprus problem, a senior Cypriot diplomat in Washington said Monday. "We are in favor
of Turkey joining the EU," said Euripides Evriviades, ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, at a luncheon
hosted by the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "The EU solves problems by embracing
them," he said, "it has managed to reunify the French and the Germans, and it will do
it for Cyprus...Turkey joining the Union is fundamental for peace and stability and
long-term prosperity in the region." A former British colony, Cyprus has been divided into the Republic
of Cyprus -- the Greek Cypriot south -- and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the Mediterranean island
in 1974. Although only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004, every
Cypriot carrying a passport has the status of a European citizen. EU laws, however, do not apply to the north, which
has so far been recognized by Turkey alone. Evriviades said he hopes the rejection of the EU constitution in France
and the Netherlands does not influence the timetable of the EU-accession talks with Ankara, which are scheduled to
start Oct. 3. EU foreign ministers also approved an agreement on Monday adapting its customs union with Turkey to
Once
Turkey signs the document, it will have met all the conditions to start the talks. In
those talks, Cyprus hopes it will not get overlooked, as the issue is one that EU leaders
have repeatedly stated they would like to be solved if Turkey wants to join the
Brussels-based club. But the strategic interest of the United States in Turkey, a country that borders Iran and Iraq,
the 10 new EU member states, including Cyprus, bringing accession talks with Ankara a big step closer.
might be disadvantageous to such a small country as Cyprus, the ambassador said. Evriviades criticized U.S.lawmakers for what he felt would be an unjust foreign policy towards Nicosia: The ambassador said that in a
Congress hearing earlier this year, it was said that "one politically risk-free option...for the United States to improve
its relations with Turkey, is for the U.S. basically to deliver Cyprus." "How do you think I feel as a Cypriot," Evriviades
asked, "if my own country is being used as an extension and a trump card for somebody else's foreign policy?" The
Cypriot issue, which has seen repeated sparks of violent outbreaks over the last four decades, is also on the tosolve list of the United Nations. A U.N.-endorsed reunification plan facilitated direct talks between the leaders of
both parties that culminated in a referendum last April. But while the Turkish north backed the plan, Greek Cypriotes
overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.
Nuclear war
Barber, 97 - Independent Staff Writer (1/23/97, Tony, Europe's coming war over
Cyprus: After 22 years of diplomatic stalemate, the world's most densely militarised
confrontation zone may be about to explode, writes Tony Barber,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/europes-coming-war-over-cyprus1284661.html)
Just as EU foreign ministers sit down over lunch in Brussels to thrash out what to do, word arrives that four Greek
Cypriots have been killed along the Green Line dividing government-held southern Cyprus from the Turkishoccupied north. The government, backed by Greece, retaliates by vowing to take delivery within a week of a batch
As a Russian-Greek naval convoy

carrying the warheads and launchers edges towards the eastern Mediterranean, the
Turkish armed forces swing into action. Troop reinforcements pour into northern
Cyprus. Planes raid the Greek-built missile base near Paphos in south-western Cyprus. The
Turkish navy prepares to blockade the island. Greece declares Turkey's actions a
cause for war and, angry at lukewarm EU support, invokes the secret defence clause of a
recently signed treaty with Russia. Fighting on Cyprus spreads to disputed Aegean
islands on Turkey's coastline. The United States warns Russia not to get involved. President
Alexander Lebed, with Chinese support, tells the US to mind its own business . All three
powers go on nuclear alert. Like Cuba, another island involved in a missile dispute 36 years before,
Cyprus has brought the world to nuclear confrontation.
of Russian S-300 anti- aircraft missiles ordered in January 1997.
Impact Module 3: Heg

Shift to ITU from ICANN crushes US primacy , leads to
DISASTROUS multipolar transition and cyberterror disaster
Ginn 12 SCLs Managing Director, Jane Ginn, is the curator of this News/Blog.
JaneGinnHeadShotMs. Ginn has over 25 years of professional experience in
information assurance, engineering consulting, international business, training and
education. She also served for eight years on a national-level committee on
international trade policy, reporting to five different Secretaries of the US
Department of Commerce. She is a former Fellow of the Institute for Resource
Management. And she served as a member of the Faculty of the University of
Phoenixs graduate and undergraduate business programs from 2003 to 2012. Her
educational credentials include: Master of Science in Information Assurance (MSIA),
2013 Master of Environmental Science and Regional Planning (MRP), 1988
Certificate in Applied Information Technology (AIT), 2001 Bachelor of Arts in
Geography (Environmental Studies), 1981
http://www.sedonacyberlink.com/2012/11/incubator-of-catastrophe/
Incubator of Catastrophe The current leaderless geopolitical and environmental
state of the world is the theme of Ian Bremmers new book Every Nation for Itself:
Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World (2012). Bremmer starts by defining the G-7
college of nations which, after the 2008 global financial crisis morphed into the G20. Although much ado was made about the potential of the G-20, Bremmers key
point is that the reduced standing of the U.S. in the global policy arena
leaves an unfilled leadership gap in trade and security policy that the G20 is not yet able to fill . The G-20, comprised of the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Japan, China, Indonesia, South
Korea, India, Australia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the EU was an
accommodation to the new global balance of power that has emerged in the early
21st Century. But as a tool for global leadership it is too unwieldy with too many
diverse ideological frameworks that also have competing policy and commercial
interests. This leaves us adrift in the ocean of social and political change like what
we have witnessed over the past four years; what he characterizes as the G-Zero
world. In the book Bremmer carefully outlines who the winners and losers may be as
we move forward into the future in such areas as nuclear weapons policy, climate
change, regional and global trade and cybersecurity. He also outlines who the
various national players may be as pivot states, rouges with friends, adapters,
protectors, and cheaters. He also illustrates how important both the U.S. and China
are as the two largest economies that are intricately intertwined economically, but
diametrically opposed philosophically. He presents a series of scenarios of possible
futures calling upon recent political events that may or may not develop to support
how each scenario plays out. All in all, it is a fascinating and enjoyable excursion
into the world of what if. Going in the reader should have a good grasp of
geography and current events to fully appreciate the nuances he delivers as he
jumps back and forth in time and space. For my purpose in this essay, the jumping
off point is how his model of the G-Zero leaderless world, could play itself out in
cyberspace as we approach the upcoming International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) vote to be held in December, 2012 in Dubai. The Future of the Internet This
event which I wrote about in a previous article on the challenge to the authority of
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is likely to be
one of the most important events of 2012, and yet it is barely reported on in the
mainstream press. The ICANN, a multi-stakeholder, multinational non-profit
organization originally established by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
administers the top-level domain authority and the root servers for the Internet.
Since the global expansion of the Internet has far exceeded the wildest imaginations
of the original purveyors and many countries now depend on the efficient
communications benefits it offers, a battle for the management of the Internet
backbones root authority is now underway. Russia, China and Brazil are reported to
be three countries pushing for transferring this authority from the ICANN to the ITU,
an agency of the United Nations (UN). The vote on this matter will be held in less
than a month. The Great Distorter Leading spokespersons on both sides of the
debate have made strong arguments. On the one hand, the ITU is an international
body and is, therefore, not subject to the political agenda of one powerful nation
(i.e., the U.S.). And, they contend, since the Internet is now a global public good it
makes sense that governance should be in the hands of a multinational body.
Besides, the world of the Internet is being overwhelmed by the traffic of
cybercriminals and hacktivists that are using this public resource for nefarious
purposes. More control by national governments is in order to maintain the resource
for beneficial commerce, trade, and governance, so they argue. On the other hand,
others argue, the ICANN is a multi-stakeholder body and, therefore allows private
sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to sit at the table as equals with
state actors. It, therefore, reflects the new reality of the modern world whereby
unrepresented but important constituencies can have a voice. Further, they argue
that bureaucratic actions by slow-moving, politically-sensitized nation states cannot
possibly keep up with the pace of technological change necessary to make good
decisions about Internet governance. And, the potential for corruption, the great
distorter, will artificially dictate winners and losers through market distortions that
have nothing to do with the original intent of the Internet (i.e., as a tool for the
freedom of expression). It is feared that the machinations of political horse-trading
will be expressed more fully in the context of ITU governance and the efficiencies
gained in market advances and technological innovations will be stalled. More
importantly to civil liberties advocates the use of the Internet as a tool for
oppression and control is seen as a dangerous shift for the future of
[hu]mankind . Anonymity and Cybercrime The arguments of those that advocate
for a more civil, less criminal, cyberspace have not gone unnoticed by those in
power within the U.S. Bills before the U.S. Congress to reduce our own
vulnerabilities to activities of state-sponsored or private action cyber-terrorism are
stalled due to political infighting. The Obama Administration in seeking to forestall a
tragic cyber Pearl Harbor as Secretary of Defense Panetta characterized it has
issued a secret directive and has floated a draft Executive Order (EO) to protect the
U.S.s critical infrastructure. Critics of the draft EO, especially those supporting
voluntary private action by companies deemed to be subject to the definition of

critical infrastructure fear that the U.S. government is going too far in mandating
incident reporting and data collection activities. Other critics, especially those who
are concerned about the loss of anonymity online and the prospect of an Orwellian
Big Brother are concerned that the civil liberties of ordinary citizens will be
infringed upon. Some seem to be more concerned about the U.S. national agenda
and the actions of the Executive Branch than the 800 pound international Gorilla
staring them in the face with the prospect of a loss of top-level domain name
authority and root server governance to the ITU. The up-tick in cybercrime and the
advanced persistent threats that U.S. corporations and citizens are facing minuteby-minute and day-by-day in cyberspace present the greatest test of the G-Zero
concept that Bremmer proposes (Verizon RISK Team, 2012). The U.S.s global
leadership in establishing the ICANN structure as a multi-stakeholder entity is a
prime example of leading from behind as Bremmer documents in his book. The
question now becomes how to slow the progress of cyber-criminal activity without
stalling the progress of technological innovation and/or infringing on civil rights and
liberties. Although tough for the 18 industry sectors detailed in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) increased information sharing as proposed in
the EO is the first step in a unified and coordinated approach to dealing with
organized cyber criminal activity and the cyber espionage efforts of state actors. Im
willing to place my bets on solutions that emerge from a healthy mixture of private,
public and NGO action in ICANN and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
rather than the bureaucracy of the ITU. In my view, ITU governance of the Internet
backbone would be an incubator of catastrophe and would speed the world
toward the G-Zero scenario that Bremmer outlines.
[Insert Additional Heg Impacts]
Sino-Russia Alliance Bad threat

Sino_russian internet alliance multiplies risk to the US and
escalation dangers
Garrido 8/29/15 Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Masters degree in the International Security
and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA.
http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=953:a-perfect-cyber-storm-russia-and-chinateaming-together&Itemid=488
United States intelligence agencies have listed cyber-attacks as the top threat to
American national security, ahead of terrorism. These threats are increasing in
sophistication, scale, frequency, and severity of impact.
Also, the range of actors, attack methods, targeted systems, and victims are
expanding. In February 2015, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence in
the United States, announced that the estimation of the Russian cyber threat had
been elevated, pushing Russia to the number one spot on the list of countries which
pose the greatest danger to the United States.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has faced political, military, and
economic challenges which it worried could mean that its national interests could be
ignored by other powers. In order to protect their interests defensively, and free up
their offensive capabilities for deployment elsewhere, Russia and China signed an
agreement in April 2015 vowing not to attack each other, while also agreeing to
share intelligence and software and cooperate in law enforcement and
investigations. This is a direct challenge to the United States because not only are
Russia and China working together to get ahead in the energy race but this
agreement meant they were now trying to combine their capacities in the digital
world.
China and Russia, by far, have the most sophisticated cyber capabilities in the
world. The offensive cyber capabilities of each individual country was a threat
already to the United States but if they now work together in earnest the United
States could be facing an unprecedented cyber danger. According to senior military
officials, Russias Ministry of Defense is establishing its own cyber command that
will be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities such as propaganda
operations and inserting malware into enemy command and control systems. A
specialized branch for computer network operations is also being established by
Russias armed forces. Computer security studies claim that unspecified Russian
cyber actors are developing ways to access industrial control systems remotely.
Industrial control systems manage critical infrastructures such as electrical power
grids, urban mass-transit systems, air-traffic control, and oil and gas distribution
networks. These unspecified Russian actors have successfully compromised the
product supply chains of three ICS vendors so that customers download exploitative
malware directly from the vendors websites along with routine software updates.
Russia was one of the first nations to move assertively into the cyber sphere. In
1998, long before most nations even began thinking about cyber-security, the
Kremlin-backed Directorate K, a government agency, began operations to monitor
and defend against hackers and spammers. However, in recent years Directorate K
has taken on a more offensive role in the digital sphere. Russia has been cyberprobing the United States for many years. In 1999, it was discovered that the
Moonlight Maze virus had been stealing information from the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, NASA, and military contractors for two years.
In early 2015, Russian hackers were able to access an unclassified server belonging
to the United States Department of State. Through this they were able to penetrate
sensitive areas of the White House computer system and access information such
as the real-time non-public details of President Barack Obamas schedule. The FBI,
Secret Service, and other United States intelligence agencies were all involved in
investigating the breach and said that it was the most sophisticated attack ever
launched against an American governmental system. The breach was pinpointed to
hackers working for the Russian government based on tell-tale codes and other
markers, even though the intrusion was routed through computers all around the
globe. The attack was believed to have begun with a phishing email launched using
a State Department email account that the hackers had previously stolen.
China has also recently increased the amount of time, manpower, resources and
money spent on cyber espionage. Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) includes a
special bureau within its intelligence community specifically managed for cyber
espionage. The PLA, according to recent intelligence reports, is not only capable of
advanced surveillance and collection but also possesses malware that could take
down foreign electricity and water grids. However, it seems that China so far has
only been motivated to commit financial and economic espionage, rather than any
outright physical infrastructure attacks. Nevertheless, the United States has been
getting compromised by China for many years. It is estimated that in the last few
years, Chinese hackers have attempted attacks on 2,000 companies, universities,
and government agencies in the United States. In 2003, China launched Titan Rain
against United States military and government agencies. Titan Rain targeted US
defense networks in an attempt to obtain confidential national security information.
While no information was reported as stolen, it was considered to be one of the
largest attacks in cyber espionage history. Titan Rain is particularly unnerving
because the attack was meant to be completed in as little as 20 minutes and was
able to target high-profile agencies such as NASA, the US Army Information Systems
Engineering Command, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Naval Ocean
Systems Center, and the US Army Space and Strategic Defense Installation
simultaneously in one day.
These cyber threats from Russia and China were always a major concern for the
United States because they undermined American economic competitiveness and at
least tried to compromise national security interests. As of now, a cyber
armageddon may not be a high risk but low to moderate-level attacks over time
could pose serious financial and security risks to the United States. Especially if this
supposed cyber alliance ever truly takes root and begins to create new innovative
cyber strategies for attacks. In the United States alone, the value of the
information that is compromised due to international hacking is somewhere
between 25 billion to 100 billion dollars annually. With Russias tactics of using
cyber-attacks to block any and all communications from within a nation-state and
Chinas habit of economic and financial cyber-attacks, the two countries combining
could be a perfect storm of political and economic havoc that may not yet have the
United States proper attention and deterrence capacity.
Solvency: Rules/ Negotiation
K2 prevent cyberwar: Ext

Continued cooperation key to prevent escalatory cyberwar
A t e r a year of ups and down in the Sino-U.S. cybersecurity relationship, the

agreement signed by the two presidents may provide a mechanism to mediate
conflict in the future. Failure to build on the agreement, however, could
generate greater mistrust that spills over into other aspects of the relationship.
U.S. and Peoples Republic of China (PRC) forces, for example, are in close contact in
the South China Sea, and cyberattacks could quickly escalate a stand-off and,
through misperception or miscalculation, lead to military conflict. Defense planners
in both countries appear to assume that offense dominates in cyberspace, and so
there are strong incentives to strike first, further heightening the risk that a crisis
could quickly escalate . A cyberattack that causes damage or destruction could
create domestic demand for immediate action that both leaderships would have a
hard time ignoring.
Rule Framework Key

!!Negotiation of compliance framework crucial to
implementation of cyber rules
Mussington 11/18/15
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/ITSD/2015/D-5648.ashx Current Institute
for Defense Analyses, Information Technology and Systems Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, The Cyber Loop
Previous Juno Risk Solutions, Institute for Defense Analyses, Executive Office of the President (EOP), the White
House Education Harvard University
In September 2015 the United States and the Peoples Republic of China reached an
agreement designed to advance progress toward norms of acceptable cyber
behavior. Condemnin g the cyber theft of commercial intellectual property ( IP )
both as a matter of national policy or when undertaken indirectly through proxies
the two c ountries seemed poised to at last make progress on a difficult issue. Public
comments by informed officials in the United States seemed to suggest that the
threat of sanctions and a perceptibly hardening of the U . S . position (especially
after the Office of Personnel Management ( OPM ) cyber intrusions) were causal in
the emergence of agreement condemning commercial cyber theft. More recent ly,
revelations on the continuation of targeted attacks against U . S . and Western firms
by groups ostensibly opera ting from locations in China has highlighted the lack of
clear compliance metrics or a framework for defining new rules of the road. A
bilateral understanding that limits some cyber activities was achieved, but what
is the character of an agreement i n which neither side seeks to verify its tenets? Is
the agreement meaningful because it reveals that neither side is ready to initiate a
fundamental conflict because the perceived losses from deteriorating relations are
too high? And what about definitions ? Is operational data in a critical infrastructure,
for example, protected by such an agreement, or is such information a legitimate
object for foreign intelligence? What are the threshold cases? And where are the
bright lines differentiating what is in from what is out? Background: Agreeing
to Disagree? President Obamas September comments on the unacceptability of
Chinas cyber behavior garnered attention. Seeing a U . S . position evolving toward
one of confrontation, perhaps Chinas leaders chose a p osition balancing denials of
culpability with limited cooperation in the name of norms to which it was already
committed under World Trade Organization rules and ordinary commercial practice.
That some of Chinas own State - Owned - Enterprises ( SOE ) could fall victim to
commercial IP theft and predation was seen as an emerging incentive that would
shape its national policies. Lastly, Chinas President Xi may, it was thought, simply
have concluded that China no longer needed practices that may have be en key to
its technological and industrial rise risking accusations with the potential to sully
his countrys international reputation. Or perhaps a combination of these factors
helped foster a change in official views (and actions). The pronounced ambig uity
may persist for an extended period, leaving little possibility for anything more than
tactical handling of particular cyber disputes. Situational awareness requirements
for even such limited agreements may accumulate, however, suggesting that as
incre asingly complex cyber behavior is seen as threatening economic, political ,
and , conceivably , military interests, a compliance framework of some kind

may be a requirement to preserve strategic stability. Diplomatic
interchange is clearly the primary and mos t developed channel for this purpose.
Arms control or technical risk management activities and protocols will likely
have an essential role. But what might a compliance framework in the cyber aspects
of commercial IP theft be able to achieve? Complianc e and Detection in the U . S .
China Cyber Agreement If an aversion to costly impacts on economic and political
conditions from disruptive cyber activities is a shared concern, a compliance
framework that detects and documents defection from even limited agre ements
may still have value. Clarity needs to be achieved, however, on the potential for
such an agreement and on its limited temporal and issue - linkage boundaries. A
compliance framework that detects and documents defection behaviors may:
Clarify the n ature, magnitude and objectives justifying threat actor behavior;
Assist in prioritizin g vulnerabilities for mitigation; Aid in identifying the
composition of and magnitude of accumulated losses suffered by IP rights holders,
perhaps providing a basis for redress of claims in an appropriate forum or
jurisdiction. Two key detection challenges would characterize any such framework:
Detecting changes in cyber threat actor behavior following an agreement ;
Detecting changes in cyber actor attack platforms that suggest alteration in
preparation and operation of any covert infrastructure for such activity . What are
some benefits of an explicit compliance framework ? Initially it was thought
that such a framework might exist, but be largely implicit avoiding p ubli c
discussions of sensitive areas (and concrete cases) that might serve to exacerbate ,
rather than lessen , the intensity of cyber controversy . There is little reason to think
that such an implicit agreed framework has been reached, however. And any such
arr angement would need to have at least some real - world instantiation in order to
track policy progress. A concrete compliance framework would be a significant
diplomatic and political breakthrough indicating that both sides had considered
the costs of continuing the status quo selecting instead an alternate course with
agreed facts, definitions, and dispute discussion (if not resolution) procedures.
Further, such a bilateral framework might partially insulate the relationship from
temporary hiccups caused by the discovery of ongoing activities (legacy) that had
yet to be reined in consistent with the new rules of the game. CERT 1 - to - CERT type contacts would further deepen the linkage between bilateral agreements to
refrain from proscribed actions in c yber and operational exchanges on data that
support non - contro versial investigations of cyber - crime. Lastly, such a
framework could provi de a mechanism for discussion of IP rights holder injury and
remediation options. In this way the compliance framework would provide added
support to law enforc ement cooperation on cyber - crime already established, as
well as aligning well with norms emerging from the U nited Nations Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) process.
Rule-based framework for attribution key to averting cyber

conflict
Bradshaw Raymond and Shull 15 Bradshaw, Samantha, Mark Raymond, and Aaron Shull.
"Rule Making for State Conduct in the Attribution of Cyber Attacks." Mutual Security in the Asia-Pacific: Rules for
Australia, Canada and South Korea (2015): 153-71. Samantha Bradshaw is an expert on the high politics of Internet
governance and cybersecurity technology. She joined CIGI as a research associate in October 2013 in the Global
Security & Politics Program. She contributes to CIGIs work on Internet governance, and is a key member of a small
team facilitating the Global Commission on Internet Governance. Samantha holds a joint Honours B.A. in political
science and legal studies from the University of Waterloo, and an M.A. in global governance from the Balsillie School
of International Affairs.
Problems in attributing the cyber attacks related to the anniversary of the Korean
War expose a deeper, and more nuanced problem. The challenge is that attributing
cyber intrusions back to a government sponsor is not simply a factual or technical
challenge. Rather, it is a multifaceted problem that has technical, legal and political
dimensions, all of which must be satisfied for the attribution of a cyber attack to a
particular state to be appropriate. The additional complexity here, as with most
things cyber, is that the rules governing conduct in each of these categories are still
evolving. However, the complexity of the task should not mask its importance. The
increasing importance of the Internet to daily life can be expected over time to
amplify the stakes involved in large-scale, persistent disruptions of access. Further,
technology already allows the creation of kinetic effects by means of malicious
code; such capabilities are highly likely to become more widely available in the
foreseeable future. Accordingly, there is real potential for escalation from cyber
attacks to more traditional forms of violent conflict. New rules, norms and
institutional structures are needed that can ameliorate the possibility of
misattribution and the attendant consequences that would flow from it, and that can
act as circuit-breakers inhibiting escalatory spirals even where attribution is
properly made.
Clarification solves cyberescalation

-Create cyber milestones: The US and China should work to develop cyber
milestones. This could take the form of symbolic goals or a timeline for certain small
steps to be accomplished. Look historically to how norms developed around
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and determine if shared norms could
create pillars for a new cyber weapons convention or cybercrime convention.
-Define which current laws are applicable to cyber realm and define areas where
international cooperation may be required to create new frameworks: In the Chris
Painter interview mentioned earlier, he notes that the UN Group of Government
Experts (which includes both the US and China), are issuing a final report that notes
that existing international law included in frameworks like the UN Charter and the
Law of Armed Conflict apply to the cyberspace domain. However, while existing
frameworks may be applicable in some areas, there is definitely a need for
additional new frameworks to govern cyberspace. -Establish a cyber hotline: The US
and China should establish a cyber hotline like the one that was recently
established between the US and Russia in June.18 This type of communication
channel is valuable particularly in the event of any sort of cyber crisis between
states.
-Joint study on impact of attacks: In a 2012 paper by Greg Austen and Franz StefanGady and published by the East West Institute, the authors propose that a joint
study be carried out by the United States and China. The study would examine the
interdependence of their respective critical information infrastructure in terms of
likely economic effects of criminal attacks with strategic impacts.19 Joint studies
looking at the impact of various types of cyber attacks are useful in highlighting the
shared consequences and also help foster greater communication, cooperation and
transparency between the US and China. - Make red lines clear : Both the US and
China need to make red lines clear by clearly articulating its responses if certain
lines are crossed and the types of penalties being considered in response to certain
types of attacks with regard to non-state actors and states.
Solves accidental escalation

Spade 12 (Jayson M., US army colonel, received Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
(AFCEA) writing award, Information as Power: Chinas Cyber Power And Americas National Security, US Army War
College, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-072.pdf)
Through Cold War confrontation and negotiation, the United States and Soviet Union
worked out guidelines for mutual nuclear deterrence. The United States and China
must establish a similar appreciation for each others positions a code of conduct
for cyberspace. The two states need to establish an understanding of how far the
other will tolerate network intrusions, what might constitute an act of cyber warfare,
and how each might react if cyber redlines are crossed. For 20 years, individuals
and organizations within the PLA has published articles on what they could do with
cyber power. They may be signaling both capabilities and intent, assuming that
similar American articles are a response. To date, the U.S. government has
complained but not responded legally, militarily, or economically to Chinas cyber
intrusions. This leaves the Chinese to assume that America will tolerate CNE or that
the United States is unwilling or unable to respond. The danger in this ambiguity is
that China or America might suffer a serious cyber attack and blame it on the other,
prompting a retaliation and subsequent escalation. Opening a constructive dialogue
now might avoid a cyber version of the Cuban Missile or Berlin Crisis in the future.
Bi-lateral discussions with China must accompany one of President Obamas other
goals, developing internationally accepted norms for behavior in cyberspace. This is
a systemic challenge, as the GAO notes: In general, differences between the laws
of nations, sovereignty and privacy issues, varying degrees of national technical
capacity, and differing interpretation of laws will impede efforts to establish
common, international standards for prohibiting, investigating, and punishing
cybercrime. For 10 years, the United Nations has tried and failed to enact an
international treaty on cyber crime. The latest attempt, April 2010, broke down over
normative differences on national sovereignty and human rights. Russia and China
wanted tighter government Internet controls, which Western states saw as
censorship. The United States and Europe wanted greater authorities for
investigation and law enforcement, whereas Russia and China do not want foreign
investigators within their jurisdictions.
AT fails 2cd line

EVEN IF the agreement doesnt take, normbuilding and
transparency mitigate escalation risk
Creemers 6/7/16 (Roger, June 7, 2016, Research Officer with background in Chinese Studies and IR at
Programme for Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of Oxford; China, U.S. Talk Norms in Cyberspace
What Do They Mean? http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-u-s-talk-norms-in-cyberspace-what-dothey-mean/)
This is where the development of norms is important. (Re-) writing international law is a time-consuming process,
often proceeding at glacial pace. The rapid evolution of cyberspace therefore requires a more flexible approach.
Norms, or generally accepted modes of behaviour, can develop much more readily,
and form the precursor of more stable legal rules to follow. They provide some
measures of consistency and predictability, even if there is no formal enforcement
mechanism. Moreover, traditional international law largely deals with traditional sorts
of state-to-state conflict. It has little to say about the sort of minor, but continuous
skirmishes, that seem to characterize events in cyberspace.
Another reason why norms are important is that states historically have not seen fit to develop legal norms in too
much detail. The poster-child example of this is intelligence-gathering. And it is here that much of the chagrin
Accusing China of wholesale, state-supported

intellectual property theft through cyber espionage, the United States is seeking to
establish a norm where it is only legitimate for states to conduct intelligence operations against the
traditional sort of targets for state-to-state espionage. China, on the other hand, has denounced
the American stance on cyber operations as a ploy to maintain its hegemonic
status.
between the United States and China has emerged.
What is it, then, that these talks are supposed to bring, apart from more talks in six months time? Some would say
it is most important to build trust. For the moment, however, that seems unlikely: there simply is too
wide a disparity in perceptions and expectations for trust to be a realistic objective in the short term. A better
option, and equally important for avoiding conflict, is transparency . Hopefully, better
information about counterparts capabilities and intention reduces uncertainty and
risk hedging, and thereby also reduces the risk of conflict .
Norm establishment sufficient even if imperfect

Lewis 16 (James Andrew, director and senior fellow of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Expanding International Norms After the US-China Cybertheft
Agreement, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17653/expanding-internationalnorms-after-the-u-s-china-cybertheft-agreement)--RF
For the past five years, the focus of international negotiations on cybersecurity has
been the creation of norms, or an expectation among governments on how each
one will behave. To set a baseline for responsible state behavior, governments have
tried extending current international commitments and international law into
cyberspace, while discussing where new norms are needed. But when it comes to
espionage, by design, international law does not apply: There are no commitments
not to spy, as countries dont want formal constraints on their intelligence agencies.
While there are implicit norms that guide spying, they are few in number, flexible
and opaque. This lack of norms and international laws governing espionage is a
problem for cybersecurity, where spying is out of control. But that started to change
last fall, when the first explicit norm on espionage emerged from the September
summit between U.S. President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Xi
Jinping. The two reached an agreement on cybertheft, pledging that neither
countrys government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of
intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or
commercial sectors. The United Kingdom and Germany quickly reached similar
agreements with China. The U.S.-China deal was also endorsed by the G-20, which
added language on respecting online privacy, in a rebuke to American as well as
Chinese spying. Why Xi agreed to this cybersecurity norm is unclear, but its impact
was significant. Since 2010, the U.S. has repeatedly told China that persistent
economic espionage by Chinese entities would be cause for disrupting bilateral
relations, but the Chinese simply denied all accusations against them and countered
with their own about American spying. This changed at the summit, in part because
of the massive hack last year of the Office of Personnel Management, which
Washington pinned on China. The security clearance records of over 17 million
federal employees were exposed in the data breach, one of a series of six related
hacks that acquired massive amounts of crucial intelligence data on the United
States. The Chinese knew U.S. officials were furious and considering a punitive
response. China did not want U.S. sanctions to undermine Xis trip, which included
meetings with many American business and technology leaders and was in good
measure a long-distance photo-op meant for Chinese domestic consumption. The
agreement is voluntary, and one criticism of voluntary norms is that they are not
binding. But voluntary agreements still have an impact and can sometimes evolve
into binding norms. The commitment not to sell chemical and biological weapons
technologies started out as a voluntary agreement among 15 nations, known as the
Australia Group, and eventually led to the Chemical Weapons Convention. When the
U.S. signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which recognized the Soviet Blocs border
in exchange for a commitment to human rights, critics ridiculed it for being naive. In
fact, the agreement weakened the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world and its own
citizens. Chinas new commitment on cybertheft and economic espionage wont
weaken the Chinese state, but it will put Beijing in an increasingly intolerable
position internationally if Chinese cybertheft continues. Skepticism about the
agreement also ignores the absence of compelling alternatives to norms. Heated
rhetoric and glowering are ineffective. Defenses are inadequate against major state
opponents. Deterrence doesnt work. And yet, the United States is not going to go
to war over hacking. Meanwhile, a binding treaty on cybersecurity faces major
problems in verification and in the definition of terms. That leaves international
norms as the best way to build stability, since they help persuade countries to
change their behavior in cyberspace through broad, multilateral agreements. U.S.
actions will determine how well China observes its commitments. If China does not
follow the agreement and the U.S. does nothing, the commitment will erode. If the
U.S. responds to unacceptable behavior with action, such as sanctions, it will define
for China the limits of what is acceptable. This is not a business contract, where
agreement means the deal is done and will be enforced by some court if necessary.
This is an agreement between great powers that play by their own rules. So far,
however, the U.S. seems to have successfully implemented a strategy of prioritizing
international norms as the basis for an international agreement on cybersecurity.
The earliest recommendation to use this approach appeared in a 2009 report by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, which drew upon the experience of
the Missile Technology Control Regime, an informal, voluntary agreement
established in 1987 to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles and,
eventually, certain types of drones.
Informal agreements on cyberspace rules of the road deter

conflict and prevent miscalculation EVEN IF doesnt scale up
Coming to such agreements on red lines of behavior is surprisingly possible even in

the most contentious realms. For example, much of the pernicious state-sponsored
activity in the cyber realm today is related in some way to espionage. But even at
the height of the Cold War, the CIA and KGB were able to come to an informal set of
agreements to avoid certain types of behavior. Neither side liked the other stealing
secrets from it, but the two agencies were able to communicate a set of activities
and targets that were to be avoided by both in order to keep their competition in
the espionage realm from escalating into something more serious. 75 In short, no
one should expect all disagreements to be easily resolved or the two sides to give
up their core interests or values, nor that certain codes of conduct wont change as
situations evolve. Rather, the goal is to communicate ones interests and values
effectively. Many believe that this will actually be in each partys own interest, as it
will aid their respective deterrence strategies. As General James Cartwright (ret.),
former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one of the key figures in the
development of U.S. cybersecurity strategy, notes, You cant have something thats
a secret be a deterrent. Because if you dont know its there, it doesnt scare you.
76 Most importantly, it will clarify to each side the paths of behavior that will be
viewed as egregious and provoke serious tension and responses that neither side
wishes to see happen. That is, even if no formal agreement is possible, there is
great value in having serious discussion to start the process of communicating each
sides red lines, what they would view as unacceptable behavior in the cyber
realm that could lead rapidly to a crisis. This discussion is important in that it will
inform the policymakers that there are legitimate concerns on each side and
potentially provide some clarity on prospective escalation paths that can then be
avoided. There is also a critical potential side benefit of such a discussion about red
lines and escalation paths. It can also promote healthy attention to the issue within
each government. It will allow leaders to better understand not just what the other
side is thinking but also what their own agencies and related non-state entities
might be doing and the potential consequences. This is something that most senior
policymakers on both sides are not sufficiently focused on at present
At China says no
China will say yes their evidence relies on scholars not actual
officials
http://www.nbr.org/publications/ specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)RF
Contrary to the negative language mostly used by Chinese scholars, senior officials
usually take a more rational and calm position. For example, in keynote remarks at
the eighth U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum, Lu Wei, the head of the Cyberspace
Administration of China, compared the countries to two people in the same boat
who can combat a storm only by paddling together. As President Xi has highlighted,
steady and constructive cooperation in cyberspace will be beneficial to the whole
bilateral relationship. Obviously, there is a structural difference of cyber awareness
between China and the United States. The two countries are at different stages of
technological development. All China does today is what the United States has
already accomplished. China tends to learn and absorb U.S. best practices and
lessons and has followed the U.S. model, which one might perhaps call a latestarting advantage. The United States, for its part, keeps a close eye on the
measures China takes to improve its defense capabilities in the cyber domain and
views these as a challenge. The root cause is absence of strategic trust between
both sides. Undoubtedly, a cybersecurity agreement that includes a practical
cooperative mechanism would be a crucial step in building trust in the two
countries future relationship in the cyber domain.
China says yes

Stern 14 (Sarah Stern, Barnard College and Columbia Universitys Graduate
School of Journalism, State Secretary Markus Ederer Calls Rules of the Road
Essential to Cybersecurity, 12/4/14, http://www2.ewi.info/idea/state-secretarymarkus-ederer-calls-%E2%80%9Crules-road%E2%80%9D-essential-cybersecurity)
Dr. Markus Ederer, state secretary of the Federal Foreign Office, opened the second
day of the EastWest Institutes Global Cyberspace Cooperation Summit V, held at
the German Foreign Office Conference Center in Berlin. Ederer stressed that Rules
of the Road for cybersecurity must be developed and implemented so that the
greatest number of opportunities can flourish, trust can be built and challenges can
be met. Likening the necessity of the Rules of the Road to traffic rules, Ederer
pointed to the agreement of countries to drive on either the right or left side of the
road. If only a tiny portion of the population disobeys this, a great deal of harm can
be inflicted, and this is compounded exponentially on the Internet. He added, In
order for us to live in a truly global village, we must agree on laws and regulations
that keep all of us safe and protect all of our critical infrastructures. Ederer asked
that all participants work toward this goal, keeping in mind the delicate and difficult
balance between freedom and security. Following Ederers remarks, global cyber
experts from both the private and public sector participated in several key plenary
sessions. EWIs Senior Vice President Bruce McConnell chaired the first panel,
Overview of International Cyberspace Cooperation. Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Coordinator for Cyber Affairs Fu Cong stressed Chinas commitment to
international cooperation in cyberspace. China is committed to working together
for cyberspace security. Fu stressed that some global cooperation already exists in
the areas of Emergency Response and Law Enforcement, and that there are great
opportunities for further cooperation in the areas of norm setting, cyber terrorism
and capacity building. Undersecretary, Legal Adviser, Cyber Security, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Estonia Marina Kaljurand emphasized the fact that, Cybercrime
laws are useless if they are not internationally enforced. The panel recognized
Estonia as a leader in spreading cybersecurity awareness.
Xi says yes
Davis and Sanger 15 (Julie Hirschfeld Davis - bachelors degree in Ethics,
Politics & Economics from Yale University, David E. Sanger International Relations
from Harvard University, Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on
Cybertheft, New York Times, 9/25/2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-white-house.html?_r=0)
With Mr. Xi standing beside him at a Rose Garden news conference, Mr. Obama said
the two had reached a common understanding that neither the United States nor
China should engage in state-sponsored cyberintrusions to poach intellectual
property, and that they would together seek international rules of the road for
appropriate conduct in cyberspace. But Mr. Obama said that he had told the
Chinese president during two hours of meetings at the White House that the
escalating cycle of cyberattacks against American targets has to stop, warning Mr.
Xi that the United States would go after and punish perpetrators of those offenses
through traditional law enforcement tools and, potentially, with sanctions. The
question now is, Are words followed by actions? Mr. Obama said of Chinas
commitments on cyberthreats. And we will be watching carefully to make an
assessment as to whether progress has been made in this area. It was the third set
of meetings between Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi in the last three years, and it came at a
potential pivot point in United States-China relations, with the Obama
administration determined to find areas where it can cooperate with Beijing but
increasingly wary of its behavior. Besides their meeting at the White House, the two
presidents spent more than two and a half hours together Thursday night at a
private dinner at Blair House, across from the White House. At their news
conference, both Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi made an effort to demonstrate that they had
made progress on curbing cyberattacks, even as they skirted direct references to
some of the most contentious issues, including the United States claim that China
was behind the theft of security dossiers on roughly 22 million Americans from the
Office of Personnel Management. Confrontation and friction are not the right
choice, Mr. Xi said. Confrontation will lead to losses on both sides. The pledge on
cybersecurity a hard-fought and not entirely expected bit of progress that was
still under negotiation until the final hours before the two presidents met came as
Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi sought to spotlight their cooperation on the world stage. They
hailed progress on climate change, with Mr. Xi announcing a new commitment to
start a national cap-and-trade system in 2017 to curb greenhouse gas emissions,
and both countries outlining ambitious goals for reaching a global climate pact at a
December summit meeting in Paris, including winning commitments from every
country to reduce emissions. They also celebrated their cooperation on the nuclear
accord with Iran and said they were both committed to pressing ahead against the
North Korean nuclear problem, which has defied solution for more than 20 years.
But there was ample evidence, even as Mr. Obama welcomed Mr. Xi with a 21-gun
salute and a state dinner on Friday night, that the two nations remain deeply at
odds on key issues. Speaking in the Rose Garden, they clashed over Chinas
reclamation of islands in the South China Sea, which Mr. Xi defiantly defended,
suggesting that Chinas buildup on artificial islands in the strategic waterway would
move ahead and flatly denying that it was militarizing any territory. Mr. Obama said
he told Mr. Xi that he had significant concerns over the activities, which makes it
harder for countries in the region to resolve disagreements peacefully. While the
United States has no territorial claim in the waters, he added, we just want to make
sure that the rules of the road are upheld. The Chinese president stuck to his guns,
bluntly asserting, We have the right to uphold our own territorial sovereignty and
lawful and legitimate maritime rights and interests. Mr. Xi said Chinas construction
activities do not target or impact any country, and China does not intend to pursue
militarization. The exchange underscored the degree to which Mr. Xi has in many
ways confounded Mr. Obamas hopes and expectations. As the most powerful
leader in China in decades, Mr. Xi presented an opportunity for greater
collaboration, said Bonnie S. Glaser, senior adviser on Asia at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Instead, he turned out to be an ultranationalist,
bent on achieving the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation even if it meant
damaging ties with the U.S. as well as Chinas neighbors. In another point of
friction, Mr. Obama said he had deep concerns over human rights in China,
describing what sounded like a lecture he had given to Mr. Xi about the issue. I
expressed in candid terms our strong views that preventing journalists, lawyers,
NGOs and civil society groups from operating freely, or closing churches or denying
ethnic minorities equal treatment, are all problematic in our view, and actually
prevent China and its people from realizing its full potential, Mr. Obama said, using
an acronym for nongovernmental organizations, which face strict restrictions under
proposed legislation in China. The stern message elicited only a generic response
from Mr. Xi, who said democracy and human rights were the common procedure of
mankind, but then added, We must recognize that countries have different
historical processes and realities, that we need to respect people of all countries in
the right to choose their own development independently. Even the agreement on
cybersecurity left room for differences. The United States and China said they would
cooperate with requests to investigate cybercrimes and, according to a White House
fact sheet, mitigate malicious cyberactivity emanating from their territory. But
while Mr. Obama said they had agreed on the principle that governments dont
engage in cyberespionage for commercial gain against companies, Mr. Xi said
nothing of computer-enabled spying, speaking only of cybercrime, a narrower

formulation.
Solvency: Attribution Rules
Attribution good: Middle path

Attribution rules best for steering between over and under
attribution its the middle path
Rule Making for State Conduct in the Attribution of Cyber Attacks Given that both
attribution and non-attribution of cyber attacks create significant international
security risks, what is the appropriate policy response when cyber attacks occur?
We argue that thoughtful international efforts at rulemaking to govern state conduct
in the attribution of cyber attacks have the potential to steer a middle course,
mitigating the risks associated with both widespread non-attribution and with hasty
attribution. Such rules must govern when and how states publicly attribute cyber
attacks and the consequences of attribution. Furthermore, these rules need to
accomplish two parallel tasks: minimizing the need for attribution; but also
enhancing capacity to respond when necessary. While the ex-ante specification of
such rules is impossible due to the unpredictable nature of international
negotiations, it is possible to sketch out some general design features of promising
rule sets.
Attribution Good: independent

Attribution key to preventing cyber attack INDEPENDENT of
diplomacy
We have focused thus far on the dangers inherent both in the employment of cyber
attacks (and conduct that may be mistaken for a cyber attack, such as some
cybercrime and cyber espionage activities) and in the hasty attribution of cyber
attacks. Less obviously, there is also a significant danger in widespread failure to
attribute cyber attacks when technical and legal criteria have been satisfied. If
cyber attacks are not criticized and no efforts are made to hold bad actors
accountable, the establishment of permissive norms (and even permissive
customary international law) is likely. Given the escalatory potential of cyber
attacks, the prevalence of permissive norms could pose a significant international
security risk. This risk entails, at maximum, the employment of cyber attacks to
create kinetic damage and widespread disruption to critical infrastructure, as well as
the potential escalation to more traditional interstate military conflict. While such
outcomes are unlikely, they carry high costs. More modestly, permissive norms
could lead to higher incidence of increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks resulting
in degradation of Internet services and a loss of trust in the Internet as a means of
commerce, communication and delivery of government services. Even this more
optimistic scenario involves significant economic opportunity costs. The key point is
that, due to its ability to forestall the development of permissive norms, criticism of
socially undesirable behaviour is important in itself, (at least partially)
independent of the ability to effectively enforce international rules (see
Johnston 2001).
At attribution bad
Attribution inevitable, even if its not data-driven just a
question of whether its escalatory or not
This political dimension of attribution engages calculations of interest both by state

and (increasingly) non-state actors, as well as less understood dynamics of choice
driven by emotion and by justice motives (see Welch 1993; Raymond and Welch
2013). As a result of these considerations, it is possible that attacks which can be
reliably attributed from technical and legal perspectives will not be publicly
(politically) attributed (i.e. dogs that dont bark). It is also possible that political
pressures may lead to the public attribution of cyber attacks even when relevant
technical and legal criteria are not clearly satisfied (i.e. potentially false
positives ). Both of these outcomes can create problematic impacts on
international security. The primary risk associated with false positives is the
creation of escalatory spirals. Accusations, in particular when not
accompanied by convincing technical data and when not made according to
proper legal procedure, can damage diplomatic relations. The offense-dominant
nature of the cyber domain (at least given the current state of technology) suggests
strong potential for escalation in the event of a cyber attack; the perceived
necessity of immediate reprisal also creates pressures militating toward hasty
attribution (Nye 2011). If the attribution is accompanied by self-help measures, the
risk of tit-for-tat escalation and the emergence of a crisis atmosphere are
increased. In crises, domestic audience costs have a critical effect on the
willingness of parties to back down (Fearon 1994). Ironically, the Internets
expansion of low-cost communication and its increasing integration with critical
infrastructure and other essential aspects of everyday life may act to increase the
size of the domestic audience and the stakes of significant cyber attack disruptions
in the eyes of that audience, thus ratcheting up the audience costs associated with
conceding in a dispute concerning a publicly attributed cyber attack and making
such crises especially prone to escalatory spirals. Societies with a high degree of
Internet penetration may be most prone to escalate in the aftermath of a publicly
attributed cyber attack. As global rates of Internet penetration increase, there is
thus also a greater risk of conflict spirals.
AT CP
Only track 1/formal solves

Only full agreement solves, squo inadequate
Harold Libicki and Cevolles 16 Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the
Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. Scott Warren Harold is associate director of
the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, a political scientist at the RAND CorporationAstrid Stuth Cevallos, Project
Associate at the RAND Corporation.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/RAND_RR1335.pdf Getting to Yes
with China in Cyberspace
We have concluded that, despite the apparent September 2015 agreement

between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese Presi - dent Xi Jinping, the two
sides are likely to remain deeply divided over cyberspace unless they formally
negotiate a more wide-ranging and robust set of agreements detailing
terminology, metrics and standards of proof, and norms. At their core, China and the
United States have very different perspectives on the development of cyberspace
and on what each can ask each other. The two countries also have different
perspectives on the roles played by norms and the legitimacy of state actions used
to enforce such norms. This does not mean that agree - ment is impossible.
China may accede to U.S. wishes as a way to relieve pressure from the United
States, but it is unclear whether such agreements will survive beyond their shortterm utility in helping China avoid sanctions (one possible interpretation of what led
to the surpris - ing September 2015 cyber agreement). The path to a lasting
agreement would, in our opinion, require China to commit to and follow through on
changing their behavior in cyberspace. To say that these are difficult or even
unlikely does not imply that they are impossible. The follow - ing summary of our
work explains how we reached these conclusions.
Perm vs Trck 2
Perm do both
Engage in both public and private diplomacy: Concerns about reputation or

credibility can be ameliorated by starting talks in private. While public displays of
diplomacy, like the recent summit in California are critical, behind-the-scenes talks
allow diplomatic foundations to be put in place. The US and China should be
engaging in both forms of diplomacy on cybersecurity.
Ongoing Dialogue key

Successful dialogue has to be ongoing, not just a one shot deal
http://www.nbr.org/publications/ specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)RF
Developing new norms and building trust will require regular discussions. A U.S.China cyber working group announced in April 2013 was suspended a t e r the
Department Justice indicted five alleged PLA hackers for cyberespionage in May
2014. The two sides should work to ensure that the new high-level experts group
does not become hostage to the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship. The
need for the group to meet is bound to be most pressing when tensions between
the two countries are highest. The cancelation of the meeting should not be used by
either side to send signals or express displeasure. Cyber discussions should also be
expanded at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and through military-to-military
contacts.
AT QPQ
No QPQ a confined cyberdiplomacy effort solves better
Our team hoped that Chinese respondents and interlocutors would present
suggestions for changes in U.S. behavior that might form a basis for a deal on
important issues, such as EMCE or cyber espionage against critical infrastructure,
but we found that there was little to no corresponding set of asks on the Chinese
side. This may stem from the relative lack of expertise on a technically complex
policy issue, combined with the understandable reluctance of respondents to speak
ahead of official policy on a sensitive issue. The few suggestions we heard were
either not as pressing to our interlocutors as U.S. con - cerns are to U.S. officials or
would be unacceptable because they would require U.S. officials to make promises
that contravened the U.S. Con - stitution (notably, the First Amendment). Thus, our
second conclu - sion is that any deal with China to restrain EMCE in exchange
for omething that the United States might be able and willing to offer in the cyber
domain is unlikely to be particularly wide ranging or robust unless it is linked to
broader cooperation and conflict avoidance in the overall relationship. We next
explored the possibility of achieving progress in cyber - security negotiations by
means of an agreement that would have both the United States and China refrain
from attacking each other. Here, we found more common ground; our respondents,
and Chinese writ - ings more broadly, generally reflect a willingness to agree to such
a proposition (although some of our respondents preferred a multilateral approach
over a bilateral agreement). Such an agreement would poten - tially represent a
valuable step forward in terms of mutual reassurance and could help consolidate
norms that would affirm, clarify, or at least supplement the applicability of the
international LOAC to cyberspace. Since China announced an agreement with Russia
in May 2015 to refrain from carrying out cyberattacks on each other, there may be
precedent to draw on in negotiations with China over such an issue. 2
At Disads
At deterrence DA
No softline link - Diplomatic engagement isnt a concession
General Recommendations for Overcoming Diplomatic Barriers In light of the

previous barriers discussed, there are a number of recommendations that may help
ameliorate barriers to diplomacy and help leaders opt for diplomatic engagement.
Emphasize that diplomacy does mean equal concessions, but it a process of
communication, learning and even expressing disapproval. Diplomacy is a
mechanism of communication between states. It does not need to convey an
attitude of acceptance or approval of another state's behavior. In fact, diplomacy
can be used to convey harsh messages of condemnation, criticism, and even
articulate threats to another state. Opponents of diplomacy often frame diplomatic
endeavors as signals of acceptance of the other side, so framing diplomatic
engagement as a way to apply positive and negative pressures can help overcome
this limited view of diplomacy.
Cybercapabilities from the US REVERSE deterrence by pushing

use or lose pressures
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What impact does cyber - enabled warfare have on cross - domain deterrence for
the U.S? Because cyber - enabled warfare creates immense capability for the U.S. to
conduct joint, adaptable, and de - centralized complex warfare, cyber technology
increases the conventional capabilities of the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. has
demonstrated the effectiveness of these tenets in the opening campaigns of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The cyber - enabled inf ormation dominance that the
U.S. displayed in these campaigns not only helped achieve conventional battlefield
success, but also cemented perceptions that information dominance enabled by
cyber capabilities would dramatically tip the scales of success in a ny future conflict.
As Cebrowski and Gartzka asserted after the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, information
technology could shape the perceptions of adversaries to deter aggression. This
certainly seems to have affected Chinese calculations of threat. Wr itings as early as
2001 argue that, t he concept of an information umbrella is an extension of the
concept of a nuclear weapons umbrella. This concept asserts that in the information
age, information superiority has a similar deterrent role . 59 Meanwhile , U.S.
willingness to use cyber - enabled warfare in combat, including precision targeting
in Yugoslavia, 60 provided credibility to the U.S. significant conventional threat. PLA
writings during their RMA of the early 2000s spoke of the power of U.S. cyber - en
abled tactics to limit adversary action and lock out future strategies. 61 As Maj Gen
Dai Qingmen writes, in terms of the concept of the success or failure of
informatized war, the goal is to control the enemy and preserve oneself. The
objective of controlling the enemy and preserving oneself was exemplified during
the war in Kosovo. Here, in 1999, the US military conducted large - scale air raids on
Yugoslavia and forced them to surrender under duress without penetrating deep
into Yugoslav territory . 62 Dai goes further and foreshadows the decision
advantage principle inherent in the Joint Operational Access Concept, arguing, in a
future war, a belligerent with information superiority is bound to give scope to its
own superiority and try to gain the i nitiative in operations by making full use of
various information fighting platforms . . . contention for information control in every
single - dimensional space will affect a war in terms of process and outcome. 63
This then creates a paradox in which the U nited States extreme capabilities with
cyber - enabled technologies and operations could deter, but also could incentive
another state to make a first - move because of the inherent dependency on cyber
to be effective. As we see with the Chinese RMA and the e volution of Chinese anti access/area denial doctrine , increasingly China realizes that key to success against
a much more capable United States is to strike the U.S. where it is most
dependent and before the U.S. can escalate to blinding strikes. 64 What Ch ina
has developed in the last fifteen years is a cross - domain set of resources and
tactics designed to mitigate the U.S. ability to conduct cyber - dependent
operations. Part of this is within cyberspace , for instance the exploitation of
U.S. networks and the exfiltration of data. 65 Part of this is within the
electromagnetic sphere, including the jamming of datalinks and satellite relays. 66
And, finally, part of this is the kinetic targeting of U.S. communication nodes with
cruise, ballistic, and anti - sate llite missiles. 67 Chinas ability to target the U.S.
Achilles Heel 68 has drawn concern within the United States, with warnings from the
U.S. government that Chinese capabilities might severely impede the ability to
implement effective operations. 69
EVEN IF deterrence, thats secondary to FIRST MOVER

advantage in a CRISIS
ID=0141170640981270950651010270780130690570200660180530530811001010941261150751260040931000
5706201102703001807000600510800408101305103501108702912110010609812009409612206100103108911
8003117079070086017027020085122114025087019024122076066007008074108072002
hat does this mean for cross domain deterrence? Fir st, it means that holding cyber
key terrain at danger may be an effective deterrent to stop a cyber - dependent
nation from launching an attack, but only if a state can credibly threaten that they
will launch that attack successfully and before the highly ca pable network dependent nation can launch a first dominant attack. And, because a state must
credibly threaten preemptive attack on cyber key terrain, this also makes the cyber
- dependent nation more sensitive to potential attacks and more likely to also s trike
pre - emptively. Effectively, cyber engenders a first mover advantage that may
undermine deterrence in a crisis situation. What does this mean for U.S. cyber
and conventional capabilities? It means that in most situations, and at most times,
the c yber - enabled force that the U.S. has constructed will provide a strong
deterrent against another nations. However, if the U.S. continues to risk its cyber
vulnerabilities in order to attain cyber - enabled capabilities, the U.S. may find itself
in a tenuous situation where it must either strike first or function without much of its
cyber key terrain.
Motives are for WAR AVOIDANCE Chinese rationality means

MISCALC is a bigger risk than AGGRESSION
Austin 15 (Greg Austin, PhD in international relations, Visiting Professor at the
Australian Defence Force Academy in the University of New South Wales, Chinas
Cyber Turn: Recognizing Change for the Better, 12/21/15,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/chinas-cyber-turn-recognizing-change-for-thebetter/)
On December 1-2, the two countries held the first ministerial on cyber policy as
foreshadowed by the September agreement and reached remarkable agreements,
including a plan for training 15 U.S. law enforcement personnel in China, to be
reciprocated later. Even more remarkably, China admitted in this meeting that a
hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (compromising data on more than
20 million people) did originate in China, though it also said that the hack was not
state-sponsored. Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude that 2015 saw far more
signs of a turn toward collaboration on cyberspace issues rather than away from it.
The challenge for us all is to recognize such change when we see it and call it out.
Moreover, recognition of Chinas changes in cyber policy on the collaborative side
have not been given the same prominence as signs of stepped up competition. The
net effect of this has been to leave undisturbed a dominating narrative that China is
close to being an enemy of the United States in cyberspace. There is no reason to
see Chinas persistence in pursuing both tracks as evidence of an unrevealed
master plan for aggression or beating the United States into second place on the
world stage. China is not an enemy of the United States, but does actively compete
with it in broad-based contest for international influence and prestige. There are
security tensions between the two countries that might lead to military
confrontation, but on all issues including the political status of Taiwan Strait,
maritime disputes, and cyberspace the longer term interests of both countries
dictate an unambiguous policy of war avoidance. If the war avoidance goal is intact
and dominating, that constitutes peace as best we know it and it needs to be called
out as peace.
Risk is from MISCALC over deterrence

Lindsay et al 4/12/15 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-china-america-clash-cyberspace12607?page=show Jon R. LindsayTai Ming CheungDerek Reveron Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist
with the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and assistant adjunct professor at the
UC San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies. Tai Ming Cheung is the director of the University
of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Derek S. Reveron is a professor of national security affairs
and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. They are the co-editors of the book China and
Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain (Oxford University Press, 2015). .
Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Cyber Bomb
Understanding cyber threats to and from China requires more attention to domestic
and international institutions and the incentives they create. Paradigms matter, and
the political economy of trade and industrial regulation might be as or more
important than deterrence or warfighting for analyzing cybersecurity.
Cyberspace is ultimately a human creation and its potential for abuse will be shaped
through a long and complex process of institutional bargaining in the context of
ongoing architectural redesign. Misunderstanding not only leads to
oversimplification in analysis but also to potential miscalculation in strategic
interaction.
While it might not be possible to completely eliminate cyberthreats through norms

or formal agreements, we should be able to avoid making them worse through
ignorance. Both the U.S. military and the Chinese PLA assume that cyberspace is a
highly offensive, asymmetric, and unstable domain of conflict, yet the history of
minor irritants and tolerable abuses experienced thus far suggest that restraint
and limited effectiveness is the norm.
Bad assumptions are dangerous in international relations , so both states

should work to dispel illusions about catastrophic cyber attacks. More
transparency will strengthen China-U.S. relations, former U.S. Secretary of
Defense Charles Hagel observed, adding: Greater openness about cyber reduces
the risk that misunderstanding and misperception could lead to miscalculation.
The worries over cybersecurity should not risk the mutual value both countries
derive from an open and innovative cyberspace.
US has huge edge attack risk is all misperception

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cy
ber_threat.html
THE U.S. ADVANTAGE
The secrecy regarding the cyber capabilities and activities of the United States and
China creates difficulty in estimating the relative balance of cyber power across the
Pacific. Nevertheless, the United States appears to be gaining an increasing
advantage. For every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious
Chinese vulnerabilities and growing Western strengths.
Much of the international cyber insecurity that China generates reflects internal
security concerns. China exploits foreign media and digital infrastructure to target
political dissidents and minority populations. The use of national censorship
architecture (the Great Firewall of China) to redirect inbound internet traffic to
attack sites such as GreatFire.org and GitHub in March 2015 is just the latest
example of this worrisome trend. Yet prioritizing political information control over
technical cyber defense also damages China's own cybersecurity. Lax law
enforcement and poor cyber defenses leave the country vulnerable to both
cybercriminals and foreign spies. The fragmented and notoriously competitive
nature of the Communist Party state further complicates coordination across
military, police, and regulatory entities.
There is strong evidence that China continues to engage in aggressive cyber

espionage campaigns against Western interests. Yet it struggles to convert even
legitimately obtained foreign data into competitive advantage , let alone make
sense of petabytes of stolen data. Absorption is especially challenging at the
most sophisticated end of the value chain (e.g., advanced fighter aircraft), which is
dominated by the United States. At the same time, the United States conducts its
own cyber espionage against China , as the Edward Snowden leaks dramatized,
which can indirectly aid U.S. firms (e.g., in government trade negotiations). China's
uneven industrial development, fragmented cyber defenses, erratic cyber
tradecraft, and the market dominance of U.S. technology firms provide considerable
advantages to the United States.
Despite high levels of Chinese political harassment and espionage, there is little
evidence of skill or subtlety in China's military cyber operations. Although
Chinese strategists describe cyberspace as a highly asymmetric and decisive
domain of warfare, China's military cyber capacity does not live up to its doctrinal
aspirations. A disruptive attack on physical infrastructure requires careful testing,
painstaking planning, and sophisticated intelligence. Even experienced U.S. cyber
operators struggle with these challenges. By contrast, the Chinese military is rigidly
hierarchical and has no wartime experience with complex information systems.
Further, China's pursuit of military "informatization" (i.e., emulation of the U.S.
network-centric style of operations) increases its dependence on vulnerable
networks and exposure to foreign cyberattack.
To be sure, China engages in aggressive cyber campaigns, especially against

nongovernmental organizations and firms less equipped to defend themselves than
government entities. These activities, however, do not constitute major military
threats against the United States, and they do nothing to defend China from the
considerable intelligence and military advantages of the United States.
Cyber cant deter

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8003117079070086017027020085122114025087019024122076066007008074108072002&EXT=pdf
How has the development of technologies, operations, and doctrine operating in

cyberspace influenced the way states think about deterrence? Most analyses of
cyber and deterrence have focused on the role of cyber technologies 1 as weapon
systems . 2 The general consensus from these types of analyses is that
cyberspace capabilities are not useful (or at least impactful) weapons when it
comes to deterrence. Because operations and capabilities within cyberspace are
secretive, 3 hard to attribute, 4 have few established norms of use, 5 and can often
be effectively used only once, 6 cyber weapons are dif ficult tools of deterrence.
Therefore, in these analyses the emergence of digital technologies and digitally
enhanced operations play no significant role in deterrence whether it be
deterrence at the strategic, operational, or tactical level .
AT Hardline DA/CP
Diplomatic engagement solves better than hardline
The United States and China both have legitimate concerns and grievances.
However, these issues can only be resolved by maintaining open lines of
communication and making a strong and concerted effort to cooperate on this very
difficult issue and work to institutionalize this cooperation both bilaterally and
multilaterally. My dissertation research focused on the value of diplomatic
engagement not cybersecurity but many of the overarching lessons regarding
the concrete value of diplomacy can be applied to the cyber realm. In fact, my
research looked specifically at diplomacy in the context of US sanctions across a
wide range of difficult issue areas. So, these were all cases with their own sets of
tensions as punitive policies were in place. In my research, I looked at more than
100 episodes in which the US imposed sanctions on other countries. When
controlling for other variables, simply increasing the economic costs imposed on the
target state did not lead to desired outcomes . Diplomacy was critical to progress
and diplomatic disengagement hindered efforts to attain desired
outcomes. For example, in the most extreme cases, when the US completely
disengaged with a country and closed its embassy in a targeted country, for
instance, the rate of failure in attaining desired outcomes rose to 73 percent from
42 percent. The Atlantic Councils expert on cybersecurity, Jason Healey, writes in a
recent article, The cyber age has barely begun. But already cyberspace is so
dangerous, and with so few norms, it has been called the new Wild West. Its future
is still a jump ball, however, and there is no way of knowing how sensitive that
future could be to the wrong decisions today. 15 Both the US and China need to
work to attain mutually agreed upon norms and rules governing the cyber realm. As
with the traditional realm of war without a set of international norms and structure
in place, misperception may become increasingly likely with unintended escalation
and negative outcomes for both sides. We can see the classic security dilemma at
work in the realm of cyber particularly since offensive and defensive measures can
at times be indistinguishable from one another. However, if the US and China dont
take strong diplomatic measures now to sort out disagreements and cooperate,
we risk cybersecurity conflict becoming more and more entrenched over time making it increasingly difficult to engage in diplomacy or engage one another to
resolve differences, establish norms and work together. In addition, we run the risk
of cyber attacks or cybersecurity disagreements polluting US-Sino relations in other
areas or, in a worst-case scenario, unintentionally catalyzing conflict.
AT Xi Bad Da
Turn anti-corruption efforts are key to Chinese stability they
appease the populace and are a source of party legitimacy
GPC 16 (Greater Pacific Capital, Investing institution specializing in the Chinese
and Indian markets, The Logic Underlying President Xis Anti-Corruption Campaign
published online 3/2/16 http://greaterpacificcapital.com/the-logic-underlyingpresident-xis-anti-corruption-campaign/)/\MB/\
China itself has seen two revolutions in the 20th Century . The need to avoid a further
one is a major motivation underlying the anti-corruption drive . At the end of its life-span the
imperial bureaucracy of the Qing Dynasty had become hopelessly ossified and highly corrupt, leading to a
breakdown of effective central government control, a situation that was mirrored during much of the Kuomingtangs
rule of China, who never fully consolidated control of the country and remained reliant on warlord allies of dubious
reliability. In the KMTs case, this lack of central control was exacerbated by the loss of popular support and
credibility the government suffered for its corruption. Both the calamity that befell the last communist country that
revolutions that befell rulers who allowed excess and corruption

to spin out of control in Chinas history provide the impetus for President Xi to embark on one
of the most far-reaching state led attempts to squash corruption, a pre-emptive strike before something
eschewed communism and the
worse happens to the model of Chinas modern ruling order, the Party. While President Xi is clearly pursuing
these ultimately are tied to the

maintenance of stability and the continued rule of the party . To this end, it also seems likely
multiple objectives with regards to his current campaign, all of
that the party is seeking to further a series of interconnected political, social and economic objectives with the
initiative, including: Maintaining Political Legitimacy. 30 years ago Deng Xiaoping shifted the Partys claim to
political legitimacy from one based on revolution and Marxist theory to one based on the delivery of economic
With the high growth phase clearly at an end, Chinas slowdown underway, the Party will
need to shift its legitimacy to more solid ground . One of the key policy areas that President Xis
growth.
government has focussed on is improving governance, from strengthening the rule of law (however foreigners may
The current anticorruption drive plays a key role in establishing the Partys commitment to sound
and just governance as the source of legitimacy to govern 1.3bn people . Re-Establishing
perceive its credibility) to putting an end to Chinas system of extra-judicial detention.
Trust and Credibility. Corruption has clearly tarnished the reputation of the Party and eroded public trust in the
government. The governments crack-down on corruption is a first step in re-establishing public credibility. In this
the campaign is walking a fine line: while it needs to show its commitment to
cracking down on corruption and share its successes, it also needs to manage
perceptions of the scale of corruption, lest a too successful campaign only serves to convince the
regard,
public that corruption is everywhere and the Party rotten to the core. This may partly explain why the government
is highly selective about releasing details of officials offenses and invariably seeks to portray the cases it does
disclose as outliers, backed up by details of officials private lives and their moral turpitude.
AT Kritiks
Framework
Exclusive ideological focus trades off with essential material and policy realities.
Deudney 13 (2013, Daniel, PhD in Political Science from Princeton, Associate Professor and Director of
Undergraduate Studies in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Mixed Ontology, Planetary Geopolitics, and
Republican Greenpeace, http://www.theory-talks.org/2013/11/theory-talk-60_9211.html)
Postmodern and constructivist theories have

significantly contributed to IR theorists by enhancing our appreciation of ideas,
language, and identities in politics. As a response to the limits and blindnesses of certain types of rationalist, structuralist, and
In many parts of both European and American IR and related areas,
functional theories, this renewed interest in the ideational is an important advance. Unfortunately, both postmodernism and constructivism have been
Postmodernism and constructivism have

also helped make theorists much more conscious of the implicitand often severely limiting
ontological assumptions that underlay, inform, and bound their investigations. This is also a major contribution to the study of world
marked by a strong tendency to go too far in their emphasis of the ideational.
politics in all its aspects.
Unfortunately, this turn to ontology has also had intellectually limiting effects by
going too far, in the search for a pure or nearly pure social ontology. With the growth in these two approaches,
there has indeed been a decided decline in theorizing about the material . But
elsewhere in the diverse world of theorizing about IR and the global, theorizing about the material
never came anything close to disappearing or being eclipsed . For anyone thinking
about the relationships between politics and nuclear weapons, space, and the
environment , theorizing about the material has remained at the center, and it would be
difficult to even conceive of how theorizing about the material could largely
disappear. The recent re-discovery of the material associated with various self-styled new materialists is a
welcome, if belated, re-discovery for postmodernists and constructivists. For most of the rest of us, the
material had never been largely dropped out.
A very visible example of the ways in which the decline in appropriate attention to the material, an excessive turn to the ideational, and the quest for a
nearly pure social ontology, can lead theorizing astray is the core argument in Alexander Wendts main book, Social Theory of International Politics, one of
the widely recognized landmarks of constructivist IR theory. The first part of the book advances a very carefully wrought and sophisticated argument for a
nearly pure ideational social ontology. The material is explicitly displaced into a residue or rump of unimportance. But then, to the readers surprise, the
material, in the form of common fate produced by nuclear weapons, and climate change, reappears and is deployed to play a really crucial role in
understanding contemporary change in world politics.
My solution is to employ a mixed ontology. By this I mean that I think several ontologically
incommensurate and very different realities are inescapable parts the human
world. These unlikes are inescapable parts of any argument, and must somehow
be combined . There are a vast number of ways in which they can be combined,
and on close examination, virtually all arguments in the social sciences are actually employing some
version of a mixed ontology , however implicitly and under-acknowledged .
But not all combinations are equally useful in addressing all questions. In my version of mixed ontologywhich I call practical naturalismhuman social
agency is understood to be occurring between two natures: on the one hand the largely fixed nature of humans, and on the other the changing nature
composed of the material world, a shifting amalgam of actual non-human material nature of geography and ecology, along with human artifacts and
infrastructures. Within this frame, I posit as rooted in human biological nature, a set of natural needs, most notably for security-from-violence and habitat
questions of functionality , by which I mean: which combinations of material

practices, political structures, ideas and identities are needed to achieve these ends in different material
services. Then I pose
contexts? Answering this question requires the formulation of various historical materialist propositions, which in turn entails the systematic formulation
of typologies and variation in both the practices, structures and ideas, and in material contexts. These arguments are not centered on explaining what has
Instead they are practical in the sense that they are attempting to
answer the question of what is to be done given the fixed ends and given
changing material contexts. I think this is what advocates of arms control and
or what will happen.
environmental sustainability are actually doing when they claim that one set of
material practices and their attendant political structures, identities and ideas must
be replaced with another if basic human needs are to going to continue to be
meet in the contemporary planetary material situation created by the globalization
of machine civilization on earth.
Since this set of arguments is framed within a mixed ontology, ideas and identities
are a vital part of the research agenda. Much of the energy of postmodern and many varieties of
critical theory have focused on deconstructing various identities and ideas. This
critical activity has produced and continues to produce many insights of theorizing about politics. But I think there is an untapped potential for theorists who are interested in ideas and identities, and who
want their work to make a positive contribution to practical problem-solving in
the contemporary planetary human situation in what might be termed a
constructive constructivism. This concerns a large practical theory agenda and an
urgent one at that, given the rapid increase in planetary problems revolving around the
task of figuring out which ideas and identities are appropriate for the planetary world, and in figuring out how they can be rapidly disseminated.
Xt: Epistemology First bad

Epistemology focus produces bad scholarship.
Lake 11 (David, PhD, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences, Distinguished Professor of
Political Science, Associate Dean of Social Sciences, and Director of the Yankelovich Center for Social Science
Research at the University of California, San Diego, Why isms Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects
as Impediments to Understanding and Progress, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 55, Issue 2, pages 465
480, June 2011)
Despite much confusion on this point, these two
epistemologies are not wedded to particular methods .16
Epistemology is not the same as methodology. The nomological approach can be used with well-designed historical case studies (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), even of the processtracing variety (see George and Bennett 2005). The narrative approach can use large numbers of observations and statistical analyses within particular events.17 Much attention has
been drawn recently to mixed methods approaches, which I applaud. Our objective should always be to use the best possible method for any theory. Passing ever harder tests using
different methods only adds confidence to our theories. But mixed methods do not by themselves address the epistemological differences. Methods and epistemology are separate
issues and should be treated as such.
The question of epistemology in international studies suffers from the same

pathologies for theories outlined earlier, and which I need not repeat here. We reify each approach, reward
extremism, fail to specify research designs completely, apply epistemologies selectively where
they are most likely to work, and then claim universality . Through these pathologies, we not only create academic
religions of different theories but also become committed to academic sects with
different epistemologies.
Like our theories, these epistemologies have become increasingly politicized and used as
criteria and even weapons in power struggles within the discipline. Gatekeepers increasingly use ones adherence to this or that epistemological religion
to determine who gets hired where, who gets access to resources, and who is accepted in various professional networks. We increasingly talk and interact
only with others of our same epistemological persuasion .
the choice of
epistemology by scholars appears to be largely subjective . We appear to be
drawn to one or the other approach by intuition : one form of explanation simply feels right. Some are satisfied only when an
Yet, although it may disappoint partisans, I can think of no objective reason to prefer one epistemology over another. Rather,
event is placed in its full historical perspective with all the conjunctures and counterfactuals accounted for. Others are satisfied only when events accord with an appropriately derived
hypothesis that has passed many demanding experimental tests. For myself, I read a lot in historyfar more than I read in political scienceand benefit from and enjoy these mostly
narrative accounts immensely. But at the same time, I am usually not persuaded by causal claims that lack well-specified theories and experimental tests. In turn, while most of my own
research has focused on the history of US foreign policy, the cases are treated within a nomological approach (see Lake 1988, 1999). One can move across the divide without finding the
causal claims on the other side especially satisfying.
I do not know whether these epistemological tastes are innate, genetically hard-wired,
or learned, the product of early socialization. Just as beauty is found for some in pure math and others in poetry, I suspect that scholars come predisposed to prefer one form
of explanation over the other. Although graduate school appears to shape ones views, suggesting socialization, there is also a lot of self-selection into graduate programs.18 Similarly,
academic departments are typically populated by scholars of diverse theoretical perspectives but tend to be more homogenous by epistemology, also suggesting socialization. Yet,
again, scholars typically want to be surrounded by colleagues whose work they respect and admire, and what they find persuasive, in turn, is partly a function of epistemology. Thus,
innate tastes can lead to intellectual clustering within departments and segregation between institutions.19
That there is a transatlantic divide in international studies along epistemological lines is undeniable, and is probably the strongest evidence for socialization ( Cohen 2007). Even here,
however, professional gatekeepers within different intellectual communitieswho themselves know intuitively that their preferred form of explanation is superiormay also shape the
Regardless of
origins, however, epistemological differences exist and massively affect how we
evaluate research in the field.
development of the discipline within their respective regions. The upshot is that we do not know much about the origins of epistemological preferences.
The nomothetic and narrative forms of explanation have coexisted for centuries, perhaps even millennia. One may appear to pull ahead at a particular moment, but the other always
seems to stage a comeback. Neither is likely to win nor lose decisively. What then is to be done? Faced with alternative forms of explanation, what should scholars do? The usual route,
as with theory, is to try to crush adherents of the other faith by seizing and occupying strategic positions within the disciplinary hierarchy. And we do see considerable disciplinary
positioning occurring today, at least in international studies. Many think of this as a war in which truth and justice will prevail only if their side wins. I suggest an alternative course that
embraces diversity at the level of the discipline, even if individual scholars continue to find one or the other approach more intuitively satisfying.
we ought to
do the following.
As a community,
First,
recognize the legitimacy of alternative forms of explanation and respect the approach used by colleagues. It
is the supreme act of intellectual hubris to assume that whichever form of explanation intuitively appeals to you is the inherently better form. If the choice of epistemology is even partly
subjective, then trying to win converts is a fools errand, at best a temporary achievement.
Second,
judge each approach on its own terms. We should focus on improving each approach as it understands its own success. Is the
narrative sufficient? Are there alternative currents in the historical record that need to be told as well? Are there important events that are inconsistent with the narrative or that are
distorted by the analyst to be made consistent with the narrative?20 Alternatively, is the theory logically derived? Do the hypotheses follow from the premises? Are the variables
operationalized appropriately? Is the research design sound?
accept that each approach is likely to apply more or less well to different
questions. At the moment, and most likely into the future, the narrative protocol can likely apply better to long-term changes in global norms, such as those against slavery
Third,
and in favor of human rights. Changes in fundamental conceptions of right and wrong, legitimate and illegitimate behavior, are rare and typically do not lend themselves to nomological
analysis. The processes unfold over a time scale in which it is difficult to hold features of the social environment constant. Disciplined narratives are likely to produce greater insights into
these phenomena. Conversely, when social interactions are repeated frequently or within well-structured and stable institutions, nomological analysis may offer parsimonious and
powerful explanations. We know a lot about the causes of wars and civil wars, given their frequency and observability. We also know a lot about economic policymaking within
The question is not which

epistemology is inherently superior, but when and where each approach offers
greater insights and understanding.
democratic institutions where the rules of the political game are well specified. Each approach has much to teach us.
Epistemology doesnt come first pragmatic action is essential

despite epistemological flaws
Branstetter 11 (John, Dept. of Poly Sci @ Washington St. U, Bridging the divide: Normatively anchored,
problem-driven research in political communication, French Politics, 9)
the lack of attention to the normative dimension of political

communication is an important issue for us to reflect on, I also hope to show that adopting
a pragmatic epistemological perspective not only makes engaging with the normative
dimension possible, it might also provide a means of bridging the gap between the French and American
Although I hope to show that
bodies of literature and styles of research. Gerstle s book is inspirational in the sense that it answers the
normative challenge by also transcending another divide that many students of French politics will be aware of; the
disconnect between French and American approaches to the study of politics more generally. Gerstle is normatively
anchored, but also problem driven, so to speak. It is this problem-driven focus that allows him to be open to
Rather than remaining hung up on

epistemological or methodological concerns , he constructs an effective dialogue between three
dealing with the normative issue in the first place.
bodies of literature (in this case political theory, and so-called American and French studies of political
communication) that are not normally integrated because of their epistemological differences and closed academic
This broad epistemic approach also facilitates dialogue with

policymakers by rejecting this closed model of evaluation . An example of this
communities.
broader conception can be found in Jacques Lagroye et als classic textbook, Sociologie politique (2006). They argue
that [t]he activities of political organizations, the State and public action, the forms of government and the
conditions of democracy are the object of research for anthropologists, jurists, theoreticians of power or
sociologists, and none has a monopoly on this domain of studies (Lagroye et al, 2006). Gerstle approach bears
some resemblance to the pragmatism of Friedrichs and Kratchtowil (2009). Friedrichs and Kratchtowil highlight the
importance of the collective acceptance by discursive communities as the most legitimate standard for the
Pragmatism should therefore neither be reduced

to the existing (or fabricated) consensus of a concrete group of scientists, nor to the
utility of results regardless of their presuppositions and meaning. An academic research project
evaluation of pragmatic research. They write:
should carry the day if, and only if, it fulfills the following two criteria: first, it should work as a reasonable res-
Academic
communities should not become so self-referential to behave as the sole judge of
their own discourse, without considering what other courts have ruled or what the jury says. (2009, p. 31)
ponse to the problem at hand; and second, it should be convincing to the relevant evaluators.
That is, for
scholars
of political communication to evaluate their own products without input from either theorists
risk
ignoring important findings, producing results of relevance to no one , or even
aiding antidemocratic tendencies in our societies . Gerstle adroitly avoids these pitfalls
or scholars studying the same phenomena from a different geographical or epistemological frame, they
by being pragmatic, or normatively anchored and problem driven.
Epistemological focus precludes real world change and artificially divides

theoretical inquiry depoliticizes critique
Houghton 08 (David Patrick, Associate Professor of I.R. Theory at the University
of Central Florida, Positivism vs Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a
Difference?, International Politics (2008), 45)
As long ago as 1981, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach effectively laid the influence of the dogmatic
behaviouralism of the 1960s to rest in their book The Elusive Quest, signaling the profound disillusionment of
mainstream IR with the idea that a cumulative science of IR would ever be possible (Ferguson and Mansbach,
1988). The popularity of the nave form of positivism, wed to a view of inexorable scientific progress and
supposedly practiced by wide-eyed scholars during the 1960s, has long been a thing of the past.
Postmodernists hence do the discipline a disservice when they continue

to attack the overly optimistic and dogmatic form of positivism as if it
still represented a dominant orthodoxy, which must somehow be
overthrown. Equally, supporters of the contemporary or neo- version of positivism perform a similar
disservice when they fail to articulate their epistemological assumptions clearly or at all. Indeed, the first error is
neo-positivists have
allowed postmodernists to fashion a series of straw men who burn rapidly at the
slightest touch. Articulating a full list of these assumptions lies beyond the scope of this article, but
greatly encouraged by the second, since by failing to state what they stand for,
contemporary neo-positivists are, I would suggest, committed to the following five assumptions, none of which
That explaining the social and political world

ought to be our central objective, (2) That subjective though our perceptions of
the world may be many features of the political world are at least potentially explainable. What
remains is a conviction that there are at least some empirical propositions, which can be
demonstrably shown to be true or false, some underlying regularities that clearly
give shape to IR (such as the proposition that democracies do not fight one another), (3) That careful use
are especially radical or hard to defend: (1)
of appropriate methodological techniques can establish what patterns exist in the political world, (4) That
positive and normative questions, though related, are ultimately separable, although both constitute valid and
interesting forms of enquiry. There is also a general conviction (5) that careful use of research design may help
researchers avoid logical pitfalls in their work. Doubtless, there are some who would not wish to use the term
positivism as an umbrella term for these five assumptions, in which case we probably require a new term to
cover them. But to the extent that there exists an orthodoxy in the field of IR today, this is surely it. Writing in
1989, Thomas Biersteker noted that the vast majority of scholarship in international relations (and the social
sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In
professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious
reflection on the philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, consideration of these core issues
is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of required concepts and methods courses,
as we socialize students into the profession (Biersteker, 1989). This observation while accurate at the time
Even some scholars who profess

regret at the philosophically self-regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory ,
nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to
epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instance
Wendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a
would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today.
discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually
practice IR. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do , and
our retreat into philosophical self-doubt, is ironic given the roots of the field in
very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is
not that IR scholars should ignore philosophical questions, or that such navel gazing is
always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of IR that ever existed. Rather,
I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of
thought have much more in common than they suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much
to the
extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to
epistemological questions, it has no real impact on what we do as scholars
when we look at the world out there. Rather than focusing on epistemology,
it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive claims made by
positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. My own
more in common than they would like to think with the positivists they seek to condemn. Consequently,
view, as the reader may have gathered already, is that the empirical claims of scholars like Der Derian and
Campbell will not often stand up to such harsh scrutiny given the inattention to careful evidence gathering
the point is that substantive theoretical and

empirical claims, rather than metatheoretical or epistemological ones, ought to
be what divides the international relations scene today.
betrayed by both, but this is a side issue here;
XT: Method First Bad

Any risk of a link thinking produces bad scholarship.
Lake 11 (David, PhD, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences, Distinguished Professor of
Political Science, Associate Dean of Social Sciences, and Director of the Yankelovich Center for Social Science
Research at the University of California, San Diego, Why isms Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects
as Impediments to Understanding and Progress, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 55, Issue 2, pages 465
480, June 2011)
since their assumptions are typically incomplete, research traditions cannot be

assessed directly
Nonetheless,
scholars often pit traditions against one another in head-to-head
competitions
In turn,
. As they are often underspecified and do not generate deductively valid hypotheses themselves, they cannot be tested on their own terms. Sometimes, since with different auxiliary
assumptions they may predict both a behavior and its opposite, they cannot be tested at all. One can probe the explanatory power of a theory, but usually not of a tradition.
.11 In these battles, since each tradition is incomplete and yields few logically deductive predictions, no empirical evidence can shed any meaningful light on the explanatory power of the
approach or, inversely, broad ranges of behavior may be equally consistent with its assumptions. Without determinate predictions, scholars play a game of heads I win, tails you lose in which their preferred approach is almost
always supported.
Fourth,
we narrow the permitted subject matter of our studies to those topics
periods, and observations that tend to confirm the particular strengths of our tradition. Realists, for instance, tend to focus mainly on security policies of great powers where their assumptions appear to fit slightly better, and then
find evidence for the power of realism. Liberals tend to focus on economic policy where their assumptions appear to fit slightly better, and then find evidence for the power of liberalism. Neoliberal institutionalists study institutions,
which not coincidentally tends to affirm the important role of institutions. Constructivists study changes in norms, and find their approach persuasive. English school scholars often focus on the socialization of polities within the
international system, and find evidence of the power of their approach and so on. This narrowing of empirical focus need not be a conscious strategy but can be a natural by-product of the search for confirming evidence. Having
spent years developing a theory, it is not unreasonable to apply it where it is most likely to fitat least as a first, initial test of plausibility. Journals and book publishers are also notoriously loath to publish null findings, a belief that
need not be true to have a major effect on the choice of research topics by scholars of different traditions.
By narrowing empirical focus

each tradition affirms itself by studying that
which it does best and ignoring subjects that do not conform
its
, however,
to expectations. This produces self-affirming sects that come to
believe in the power of their tradition based on a selective reading of the possible empirical evidence. It is here that research traditions move from the realm of objective social science to theology. Having adopted a tradition, we then
look only for evidence that affirms our prior belief in the rightness of that tradition. Practice becomes not an attempt to falsify theories through ever more demanding tests, but to support theories that were adopted prior to their
confrontation with evidence. In essence, we eschew social science theories that can, in principle, be falsified for beliefs that are largely impervious to evidence.
scholars within each research tradition

We claim that our particular tradition
general approach that can and should be treated as a universal
Fifth,
aspire for their approach to be the scientific paradigm. Rather than accept that our favored tradition is inevitably partial
and limited in scope and domain, we seek intellectual hegemony.
with its unique set of assumptions
is a
or near universal paradigm. I have always found the
phrases I am realist or As a neoliberal institutionalist, I think to be peculiar statements. The only logical construction is that the speaker is asserting that his or her particular tradition is superior to all other known traditions, a
claim that all questions can be answered by theories based on the assumptions of that tradition. Thus, by the third and fourth pathologies, we validate our often incomplete theories through favorable and selective evidence but, by
the fifth, we then assert they are universal and superior toor at least worthy of respect by adherents ofother equally self-validated traditions.
There are, perhaps, strong reasons of self-identification to seek intellectual hegemony. As scholars, much of our self-worth is entwined with our ideas. To vanquish the alternatives, if even in our own minds, validates our contributions
and ourselves. There are also strong professional incentives to win the contest for intellectual hegemony. To establish ones tradition as the tradition promises to put the original adherents at the top of the field. Even if individual
scholars are not so narrowly instrumental, intellectual combat is like an arms race. Each tradition perceives the failure to compete for hegemony as ceding ground to opponents, and thus, each tradition believes it must compete in
expectation that others will compete for dominance. To admit the partial nature of ones theory is to risk being subsumed as a special case within someone elses traditiona lower status. Thus, everyone aspires to hegemony if only
to prevent others from conquering the field. But like arms races, this intellectual competition leaves everyone worse off than if they could simply cooperate, which in this case means admitting the partial nature and limited empirical
evidence for every theory now known in the field.
These five pathologies

divert professional debate from the substance of
world politics to first principles
we do
not seek to assess which approach helps us understand world politics best
We focus instead on the inherent superiority of this or that set of
assumptions
combine to
. Having created academic sects based on incommensurate assumptions and supported by selective evidence,
(or helps us understand
which range of phenomena best).
. Rather than seeking to understand the worldour highest obligation as scholarswe debate assumptions seemingly without end. What are the fundamental units of world politics? Are
individuals, groups or social collectivities, or organizations rational? Do actors seek power, welfare, justice, or something else? Which matters more, system or unit, structure or agency? Without comparable propositions derived
This makes for a

continuing and lively debate
but it adds little to our understanding of
world politics and nothing at all to practical policymakers Rather than
seeking to understand the complex and often frightening world around us, we
spend far too much of our intellectual time and energy debating
assumptions as if they mattered in absolute terms
from these competing research traditions and assessed against the same patterns of behavior, there is no possible answer to such existential questions.
of course,
. It is here that research traditions tip over from being useful organizing devices to
theologies. Assumptions stop being treated as more or less useful simplifications of a complex reality and become beliefs that are accepted or not as truths. We have left the realm of scholarly inquiry and entered the world of
academic religions. By whatever definition, we have stopped doing science.
Method focus creates bias away from politics and fetishizes

one single element of the research process.
Barkin 07 Samuel Barkin (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida) December 2007 Should
We Discard the "Qualitative" versus "Quantitative" Distinction? International Studies Review Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 753-770
I am not suggesting that getting method right, and doing it well, is not a key part of studying political science. But
too great a focus on method can distract from other key parts of the research
process. A response to the prevalence of quantitative methods that focuses on qualitative methods
as a category risks fetishizing method at the expense of broader issues. Studying
method in the absence of a broader epistemological context can lead to a
commitment to technique without a clear grasp of its uses and limits . Particularly in a
discipline in which (in the United States) quantitative methods courses are often required of graduate students but
qualitative methods courses are not (Schwartz-Shea 2005:389), to discuss critical approaches primarily in the
context of a course on qualitative methods is to allow students who focus on quantitative methods to avoid learning
Too great a focus on method biases our work , and that of our students, toward
empirical analysis and away from theory. It distracts us from the study of politics . One often sees
statistically elegant studies of politically banal questions. And students of political science sometimes put so
much effort into learning techniques of quantitative analysis that they neglect to learn
about politics. Accepting the quantitative focus on method and mapping it onto nonquantitative
approaches risks importing a norm that how you study politics is more important than
what you study.
about it altogether.
XT: Ontology First Bad

Any risk of a link thinking produces bad scholarship.
Lake 11 (David, PhD, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences,
Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean of Social Sciences, and
Director of the Yankelovich Center for Social Science Research at the University of
California, San Diego, Why isms Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic
Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress, International Studies
Quarterly, Volume 55, Issue 2, pages 465480, June 2011)
since their assumptions are typically incomplete, research traditions cannot be

assessed directly
Nonetheless,
scholars often pit traditions against one another in head-to-head
competitions
In turn,
. As they are often underspecified and do not generate deductively valid hypotheses themselves, they cannot be tested on their own terms. Sometimes, since with different auxiliary
assumptions they may predict both a behavior and its opposite, they cannot be tested at all. One can probe the explanatory power of a theory, but usually not of a tradition.
.11 In these battles, since each tradition is incomplete and yields few logically deductive predictions, no empirical evidence can shed any meaningful light on the explanatory power of the
approach or, inversely, broad ranges of behavior may be equally consistent with its assumptions. Without determinate predictions, scholars play a game of heads I win, tails you lose in which their preferred approach is almost
always supported.
Fourth,
we narrow the permitted subject matter of our studies to those topics
periods, and observations that tend to confirm the particular strengths of our tradition. Realists, for instance, tend to focus mainly on security policies of great powers where their assumptions appear to fit slightly better, and then
find evidence for the power of realism. Liberals tend to focus on economic policy where their assumptions appear to fit slightly better, and then find evidence for the power of liberalism. Neoliberal institutionalists study institutions,
which not coincidentally tends to affirm the important role of institutions. Constructivists study changes in norms, and find their approach persuasive. English school scholars often focus on the socialization of polities within the
international system, and find evidence of the power of their approach and so on. This narrowing of empirical focus need not be a conscious strategy but can be a natural by-product of the search for confirming evidence. Having
spent years developing a theory, it is not unreasonable to apply it where it is most likely to fitat least as a first, initial test of plausibility. Journals and book publishers are also notoriously loath to publish null findings, a belief that
need not be true to have a major effect on the choice of research topics by scholars of different traditions.
By narrowing empirical focus

each tradition affirms itself by studying that
which it does best and ignoring subjects that do not conform
its
, however,
to expectations. This produces self-affirming sects that come to
believe in the power of their tradition based on a selective reading of the possible empirical evidence. It is here that research traditions move from the realm of objective social science to theology. Having adopted a tradition, we then
look only for evidence that affirms our prior belief in the rightness of that tradition. Practice becomes not an attempt to falsify theories through ever more demanding tests, but to support theories that were adopted prior to their
confrontation with evidence. In essence, we eschew social science theories that can, in principle, be falsified for beliefs that are largely impervious to evidence.
scholars within each research tradition

We claim that our particular tradition
general approach that can and should be treated as a universal
Fifth,
aspire for their approach to be the scientific paradigm. Rather than accept that our favored tradition is inevitably partial
and limited in scope and domain, we seek intellectual hegemony.
with its unique set of assumptions
is a
or near universal paradigm. I have always found the
phrases I am realist or As a neoliberal institutionalist, I think to be peculiar statements. The only logical construction is that the speaker is asserting that his or her particular tradition is superior to all other known traditions, a
claim that all questions can be answered by theories based on the assumptions of that tradition. Thus, by the third and fourth pathologies, we validate our often incomplete theories through favorable and selective evidence but, by
the fifth, we then assert they are universal and superior toor at least worthy of respect by adherents ofother equally self-validated traditions.
There are, perhaps, strong reasons of self-identification to seek intellectual hegemony. As scholars, much of our self-worth is entwined with our ideas. To vanquish the alternatives, if even in our own minds, validates our contributions
and ourselves. There are also strong professional incentives to win the contest for intellectual hegemony. To establish ones tradition as the tradition promises to put the original adherents at the top of the field. Even if individual
scholars are not so narrowly instrumental, intellectual combat is like an arms race. Each tradition perceives the failure to compete for hegemony as ceding ground to opponents, and thus, each tradition believes it must compete in
expectation that others will compete for dominance. To admit the partial nature of ones theory is to risk being subsumed as a special case within someone elses traditiona lower status. Thus, everyone aspires to hegemony if only
to prevent others from conquering the field. But like arms races, this intellectual competition leaves everyone worse off than if they could simply cooperate, which in this case means admitting the partial nature and limited empirical
evidence for every theory now known in the field.
These five pathologies

divert professional debate from the substance of
world politics to first principles
we do
not seek to assess which approach helps us understand world politics best
We focus instead on the inherent superiority of this or that set of
assumptions
combine to
. Having created academic sects based on incommensurate assumptions and supported by selective evidence,
(or helps us understand
which range of phenomena best).
. Rather than seeking to understand the worldour highest obligation as scholarswe debate assumptions seemingly without end. What are the fundamental units of world politics? Are
individuals, groups or social collectivities, or organizations rational? Do actors seek power, welfare, justice, or something else? Which matters more, system or unit, structure or agency? Without comparable propositions derived
This makes for a

continuing and lively debate
but it adds little to our understanding of
world politics and nothing at all to practical policymakers Rather than
seeking to understand the complex and often frightening world around us, we
spend far too much of our intellectual time and energy debating
from these competing research traditions and assessed against the same patterns of behavior, there is no possible answer to such existential questions.
of course,
assumptions as if they mattered in absolute terms
. It is here that research traditions tip over from being useful organizing devices to
theologies. Assumptions stop being treated as more or less useful simplifications of a complex reality and become beliefs that are accepted or not as truths. We have left the realm of scholarly inquiry and entered the world of
academic religions. By whatever definition, we have stopped doing science.
Xt: method not first

Method focus creates bias away from politics and fetishizes one single
element of the research process.
Barkin 07 Samuel Barkin (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida) December 2007
Should We Discard the "Qualitative" versus "Quantitative" Distinction? International Studies Review Volume 9,
Issue 4, Pages 753-770
I am not suggesting that getting method right, and doing it well, is not a key part of studying political science. But
too great a focus on method can distract from other key parts of the research
process. A response to the prevalence of quantitative methods that focuses on qualitative methods
as a category risks fetishizing method at the expense of broader issues. Studying
method in the absence of a broader epistemological context can lead to a
commitment to technique without a clear grasp of its uses and limits . Particularly in a
discipline in which (in the United States) quantitative methods courses are often required of graduate students but
qualitative methods courses are not (Schwartz-Shea 2005:389), to discuss critical approaches primarily in the
context of a course on qualitative methods is to allow students who focus on quantitative methods to avoid learning
Too great a focus on method biases our work , and that of our students, toward
empirical analysis and away from theory. It distracts us from the study of politics . One often sees
statistically elegant studies of politically banal questions. And students of political science sometimes put so
much effort into learning techniques of quantitative analysis that they neglect to learn
about politics. Accepting the quantitative focus on method and mapping it onto nonquantitative
approaches risks importing a norm that how you study politics is more important than
what you study.
about it altogether.
Perm: Know the System to Beat it

You have to know the system to beat it justifies out focus on
the mechanics of power
Bryant 12 (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy
program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the
Table, https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-thetable/)
We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of military logistics. We are,
after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things
the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to
deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or
ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things . Second, military logistics asks
how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine . In what way should we
deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism , etc? What are the
things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war
machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are
to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target.
What Ive heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military

logistics . Its as if people like to wave their hands and say this is horrible and
unjust! and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act . Yeah,
youre right, it is horrible but saying so doesnt go very far and changing it . Its also as if people are horrified
when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social
functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say youre justifying that
system and saying its a-okay! This misses the point that the entire point is
to map the supply lines of the opposing war machine so you can
strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of
life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are . Youre
preaching to the choir . We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state
based war machine so we can decide how to intervene.
your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or

debunking . Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other peoples beliefs
are incoherent, theyll change and things will be different. But weve noticed a
couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state
based war machines, without things changing too much , and 2) weve noticed that we
might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet
they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didnt matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these
social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological
critique can be successful and still fail to produce change : a) the problem can be one of distribution. The
critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the
message they couldnt receive it because its expressed in the foreign language of academese
which theyve never been substantially exposed to ( academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or
We then look at your actual practices and see that
b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the
discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both.
I dont deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I
merely deny that this is the only causal factor . I dont reject your political aims, but
merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you guys behave like a war machine that believes its sufficient to drop
pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the
opposing forces soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are
other soldiers behind them with guns to their back , that they have obligations to their fellows,
that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things its not to reject your political aims, but to say that
perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, Im objecting to your tendency to use a
hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail ( discursive problems ),
ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take.
This is the basic idea behind what Ive called terraism. Terraism has three components: 1) Cartography or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they
take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) Deconstruction Deconstruction is a practice. It includes
both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more
It is not simply beliefs, signs,

and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also
material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do . Part of
changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those
material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for
people. Finally, 3) there is Terraformation. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all , as it requires the activist to be
something more than a critic , something more than someone who simply denounces
how bad things are , someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and
semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible .
Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good
mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources
are available for building new worlds . Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly
unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible
it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who dont agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who
refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up
the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks , and so we can engage in
literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant.
effective terraformation.
Realism Good
Realists hate war.
Edelstein 10 (2010, David, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Why realists dont go for bombs
and bullets, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/21/why-realists-dont-go-for-bombs-and-bullets/)
Thanks to Steve Walt for inviting me to contribute to his blog while he is away on vacation. I have been a regular reader of Steves blog since it launched, and for my first post, I wanted
to pick up on a motif that I have seen running through Steves posts:
States
Will realists ever again support the use of military force by the United
Followers of this blog will by now have little doubt about how Walt felt about the Iraq War or how he views the prospects for U.S. success in Afghanistan. In fact, throughout the history of
his blog, I can only recall one case in which Walt advocated the use of U.S. military force (and I think the realist credentials in that case are rather dubious).
There is a common perception in the field of political science that realists are warmongering Neanderthals anxious to use military force at the drop of a hat. Attend any meeting (if you must) of the American Political Science
Association or the International Studies Association, and one will find realists derided as the "bombs and bullets
guys" as if we were all direct descendants of Curtis LeMay. What is notable about this and what has been notable about Steves blog is just
how infrequently realists have supported the use of American military
force . Take the U.S. interventions of the post-Cold War period: Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Of those interventions, Afghanistan was the only one
that received anything close to strong support from most realists. Others, most
notably the Iraq War, received vehement opposition from the vast majority
of realists . Even in the case of Afghanistan, realists expressed trepidation about
the prospects for ultimate success despite early victories.
Go back to the Cold War, and realists like Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau were famously
opposed to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Lest one think this is an academic
phenomenon, realist policymakers like Brent Scowcroft were equally critical of the Bush
administrations actions in Iraq, and George F. Kennan was skeptical of the U.S. interventions in both Korea and
Vietnam. Today, should anyone dare to suggest the use of military force in new
contexts such as Iran, they are summarily dismissed by prominent realists. Not a
single (self-proclaimed or attributed) realist I know of has advocated the use of military force
against Iran in response to its apparent development of nuclear weapons, and most are adamantly opposed to it.
From one perspective, this opposition is surprising. It is realists, after all, who so value material power, in particular military capabilities. It is not difficult to understand why so many
would assume that realists are anxious to use military force because realists are anxious to focus on military capabilities as a primary explanatory variable for international politics.
it is precisely because realists have spent so much time studying

military force that they are also so reluctant to use military force . Though realists
themselves are divided on the question, many have concluded that the use of military force is often counterproductive,
But
inviting balancing coalitions that simply make life more difficult. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, using military force to reorder societies is very difficult and unlikely to succeed
except in uncommon circumstances.
Deterrence is empirically successful at checking wars

Moore 04 Director of the Center for Security Law at the University of Virginia, Honorary Editor of the
American Journal of International Law (John Norton, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, page
27-31)
there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external
factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation . In
As so broadly conceived,
my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has
in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that

the war would be won, and won promptly .11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through
led me to believe that
conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World
War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he
believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that [w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing
down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and
shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace.
Calculations in the North Korean attackon South Korea and Husseins attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days.
virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion,
were preceded by what I refer to as a "double deterrence absence." That is, the
potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail
promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also
Indeed,
shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was
begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the
French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the laterrobust NATO
Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical

analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United
alliance and absence of World War III.14
States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this
conducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I,

Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of
these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable
deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence .16 Game
theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate
deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a
book he
reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17Such a
strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of thegame-theoretic work on crisis
bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through
communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence
and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that
the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and
Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant
correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the
arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry
in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and
reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship. Russett and
Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international
organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.21 All of
these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in
the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic
Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as
to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to
the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors
affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously
impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through
foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such
organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their
freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that
aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives,
both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not
surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most
recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by
themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace
so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war
between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war
and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26
indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war
avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines
effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for
assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten
based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to
different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the
chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same
elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation
of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any
effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact,
occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of
+6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's
decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade
South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25
(the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade
Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating
based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile
Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I
scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World
War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4;
Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to
attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic
scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both
exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence
can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I
encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that
developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on
one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.3 The
result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31
Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-
The study concluded that in more than fifty years of

conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making
body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and
yet attacked."32
Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83.
Military deterrence grants ontological security provides the

impetus to avoid violence
Lupovici 08 Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto (Amir, Why the Cold
War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse, http://www.cpsaacsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf )
Since deterrence can become part of the actors identity, it is also involved in the actors will to achieve ontological security,
securing the actors identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is the acquisition of confidence in the
routines of daily lifethe essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that
we have the practical skill to go on in this context. These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains
through the emergence of

the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create
an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect
their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices
are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of
violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence
relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational
actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors identities. Therefore, the
internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more
cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and
maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma , and which lead to
the actors possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus,
mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained
from using violencesuch as MAD (mutual assured destruction)states
not only avoid violence, but ironically,

may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity. In such cases if
actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs
the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and
lead to the creation of long term influences that
preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a
basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the existence of it
may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors identities of
deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of
deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological
(Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect,
the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all
security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them . Exactly for this reason
I argue that Rasmussens (2002: 331-2) assertionaccording to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security
is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical
security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors
identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.
Realism Perm
Realism isnt a dogmatic prescription for action, but a
necessary corrective to the totalitarian influence of ideology
on foreign policy decision-making.
Betts 15 (8/24, Richard, PhD in Government from Harvard, Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace
Studies in the Department of Political Science, the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, and the
director of the International Security Policy Program in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia
University, Realism Is an Attitude, Not a Doctrine, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/realism-attitude-not-doctrine13659?page=show)
There is no realist catechism to dictate choices between compromise and containment in any of these cases
unless evidence of aggressive military intent becomes unambiguous. This is unfortunate, especially in
regard to the principal challenge, China, since realists do not offer a corporate alternative to policies endorsed by liberals or neoconservatives. A
clearer majority of realists tilt in favor of restraint in regard to Iran , since it is a respectable middle
power but not a major one, has no military allies of consequence, has not evinced suicidal behavior so far, faces an overwhelming imbalance of capability
What separates these realists

from more confrontational critics is a clearer focus on the high costs to our own side
of the alternative to restraint, containment and deterrence of a nuclearized Iran:
preventive war. There is barely any disagreement of significance among realists, or between them and any other strategic clique, about how
and is unlikely to think that it could get away with overt military aggression at an acceptable price.
to handle the greater threat of North Korea, an unambiguously aggressive regime against which strong deterrence has been institutionalized over more
than six decades.
there is little point in any effort to pose realism as a coherent prescription for
specific choices today as long as judgments about the nature and intensity of
adversary intentions vary. There will always be a point, however, in reminding
policy makers to apply two realist principles to their analyses as they decide: focus not on
acting against evil, but on which options will result in the least evil outcomes ;
and choose options supportable by the power at hand , not ones whose
success requires adversaries to capitulate because they realize they are in the
wrong.
So
The weakness of liberal and neoconservative criticisms of realism is the conceit that
their ideals Western ideals are the only ideals that can appeal to serious people. As E. H. Carr put it:
When
Woodrow Wilson declared that American principles were the principles of mankind or
Professor Toynbee that the security of the British Empire was the supreme interest of the whole world, they were in effect making the
same claim made by Hitler that their countrymen are the bearers of a higher
ethic.
The neoliberal argument of the harmony of interests...identifies the good of the whole with the security of those in possession.
The worst ideals can prove as potent a motivator as the best . That grim
reality is why realists recommend humility rather than hubris , and empathize
with adversaries even if that sometimes risks mistakes as bad as those of their critics.
IR Scholarship Good
Studying international relations is key to producing good
scholarship remedies the split between the ivory tower and
practical realities
Walt 11 (Stephen, Prof Intl Affairs @ Harvard, International Affairs and the Public Sphere, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/waltinternational-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/)
social scientists would like to believe that their profession contributes to solving
pressing global problems. Indeed, the United States and many other modern societies subsidize
Most
university-based research and teaching on the assumption that scholars will develop useful knowledge about
todays world, communicate that knowledge to their students and to the broader public, and, where appropriate,
offer rigorous, well-informed advice to interested policymakers. There is today no shortage of global problems that
religious conflict within and between states, the

challenge of economic development, terrorism, the management of a fragile world
economy, climate change and other forms of environmental degradation, the origins and impact of great
social scientists should study in depth: ethnic and
power rivalries, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, just to mention a few. In this complex and contentious
one might think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly
valued commodity. Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would
flock to courses that helped them understand the world in which they will live and work, and policymakers
and the broader public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say .
One might also expect scholars of international relations to play a prominent role in
public debates about foreign policy, along with government officials, business interests, representatives of
special interest groups, and other concerned citizens. Social scientists are far from omniscient, but
the rigor of the scientific process and the core values of academia should give
university-based scholars an especially valuable role within the broader public
discourse on world affairs. At its best, academic scholarship privileges creativity, validity,
accuracy, and rigor and places little explicit value on political expediency . The norms and
world,
procedures of the academic profession make it less likely that scholarly work will be tailored to fit pre-conceived
political agendas. When this does occur, the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more likely that
politically motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed. Although we know that scholarly communities
do not always live up to this ideal picture, the existence of these basic norms gives the academic world some
important advantages over think tanks, media pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. Yet the precise
role that academic scholars of international affairs should play is not easy to specify. Indeed, there appear to be two
conflicting ways of thinking about this matter. On the one hand, there is a widespread sense that academic research
on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public
Former policymakers complain that academic writing is either

irrelevant or inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric
scholarly discussion. This tendency helps explain Alexander Georges recollection that policymakers eyes
would glaze as soon as I used the word theory.[1] As Lawrence Mead noted in 2010: Todays political
scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with
method and past literature. Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the
real world. . . . Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting. Inquiry is
becoming obscurantist and ingrown.[2] Within the field of international affairs, this trend has
led to repeated calls to bridge the gap between the ivory tower and the policy
community.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of prominent scholars have recently organized workshops or
discourse about world affairs.
research projects seeking to challenge this cult of irrelevance and deprogram its adherents, although it is not
clear whether these efforts will succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium reflects a similar
concern: how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our collective fate, one that
leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy
disasters? On the other hand, closer engagement with the policy world and more explicit efforts at public outreach
are not without their own pitfalls. Scholars who enter government service or participate in policy debates may
believe that they are speaking truth to power, but they run the risk of being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and
not-so-subtle ways by the same individuals and institutions that they initially hoped to sway. Powerful interests are
all-too-willing to use the prestige associated with academic scholars to advance particular policy goals, and scholars
are hardly immune to temptations that may cloud their judgment or compromise their objectivity. Furthermore,
scholars who embrace the role of a public intellectual may be tempted to sensationalize their findings to attract a
larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on which they have no particular expertise. Instead of
improving the quality of public discourse, such behavior may actually degrade it. The remainder of this essay
explores these themes in greater detail. I begin by discussing the unique contributions that academic scholars could
make to public discourse on world affairsat least in theoryhighlighting their capacity to serve as an authoritative
source of knowledge about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issues (Why Is
Academic Scholarship Valuable?). I then consider why there is a growing gap between university-based scholars and
this trend is due largely to the

professionalization of academic disciplines and the concomitant rise of a quasiacademic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas (Why Is There a Gap between Academia
both the policy world and the public sphere, and suggest that
and the Public Sphere?). Next, I identify some of the pitfalls that scholars face when they become more active
participants in the public sphere (The Pitfalls of Engagement). I conclude by proposing several reforms that could
help the social sciences make a more vital contribution to public understanding and policy formation in the broad
Academics can
make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First,
domain of global affairs (What Is To Be Done?). Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?
although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-
most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas
and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments
mean. If our towns school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves
and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in
Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some
battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or
conceptual understanding to know what is really going on . Even when basic information is
time basis,
readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means.
When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics,
therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in
military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And
that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various
aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of
academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly
an independent academic community is an

essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key
foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many
debate, etc.). Second, and more importantly,
areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.
[5]Much
of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from

government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to
considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments
collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use
secrecy laws to control public access to this information . Government officials can
shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically , or by co-opting sympathetic
journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6]Given these
information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is
hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to
build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] This situation creates few
problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they
alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms

and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand .
Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are
dont. In such cases,
are uniquely positioned to

challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge
and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors
not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they
and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged
scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable
model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United
States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend
reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast,
even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence.
Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more
likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic
discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in
it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to

play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage
directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research
can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and
frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends , and
create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy
instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers
anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they
facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide
recent years. For all of these reasons,
policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are
in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8]
The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic
world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs
and especially the disciplines of political science and historyhave increasingly focused on narrow and arcane
topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address
topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden
prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars
have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to speaking in tongues diminishes their impact on the
public sphere.
Future counterfactual thinking is pedagogically valuable

enables theory testing in contexts with sparse empirical data,
deconstructs preexisting ideological assumptions, and helps
bridge the gap between theory and policy.
Mahnken and Junio 13 (2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National
Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins
Universitys Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy, Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science expected 2013, Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of
Scenario Analysis for International Relations, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374395, September 2013)
This article introduces political scientists to scenarios future counterfactuals and

demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a
wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method
and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new
hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating world views, setting new
research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the
low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader
context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.
Schwartz commented that

social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been
trained to stay away from what if? questions and concentrate on what was?
In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter
(Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and
Scenarioscounterfactual
narratives about the futureare woefully underutilized among political scientists .
The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international
relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate
at which political scientists use scenarios less than 2% of the time is surprising;
the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology,
pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan
teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny.
1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole,
Scenarios also are a common

tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study.
and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004).
This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating
their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy . Rather than constitute mere
speculation regarding an unpredictable future , as critics might suggest, scenarios
assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying
a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach
students to apply theory to policy . In the pages below, a best practices guide is offered to
advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The
article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the
specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs.
Our method of researching and debating scenarios in this

space is uniquely good it captures the benefits of
hypothesizing and avoids the disads of detachment
Mahnken and Junio 13 (2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and
National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic
Studies at The Johns Hopkins Universitys Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy,
Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science
expected 2013, Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,
International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374395, September 2013)
Pedagogy
Scenarios offer many of the same benefits as simulations , recently a hot topic in the
pedagological literature, to teaching in political science (Newkirk and Hamilton 1979; Smith and Boyer
1996; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Simpson and Kaussler 2009; Sasley 2010). Indeed, scenarios are often a
key part of simulation learning. For instance, in a decision-making simulation in which students are
assigned the roles of heads of state, the students are often offered a scenario vignette to respond to with policy
The emphasis of scenarios and simulations in pedagogy, however, is

different. The literature on simulations tends to focus on experiential learning, but
choices.
recent scholarship has cast some doubt on whether or not this kind of learning
improves students' knowledge of core course concepts (Raymond 2010).
Scenarios offer a way to make classroom exercises more explicitly oriented toward
the incorporation of theories. For instance, rather than asking students to take on
the roles of the President, National Security Advisor , etc., the students may be
presented with a vignette and asked to analyze the strategic implications of the
scenario for the United States. Both coauthors of this article have used scenarios in classroom
exercises. Tom Mahnken has taught the use of scenarios for stategic planning at the Naval War College. Tim Junio
used scenario exercises at the University of Pennsylvania. Students in the class International Security, having
been assigned Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence and other core readings on strategy, were asked to evaluate
a scenario in which the United States had committed itself to military action, but was subsequently held hostage by
a foreign power.
In Junio's scenario, a future US President was led to believe that due to an intelligence breakthrough, North Korean
nuclear weapon targets were rendered vulnerable to a US first strike with conventional weapons. The United States
and close allies saw this as an opportunity for regime change and pre-positioned US forces in the region. The US
President then issued an ultimatum to the North Korean regime to vacate the country within 48 hours, akin to the
US threat to Saddam Hussein in 2003, or face a forceful regime change at the hands of the US-led coalition. To the
surprise of US leaders, North Korea's Supreme Leader went on television to announce that an unspecified number of
nuclear warheads had been smuggled into the United States as a contingency against such a situation. The
Supreme Leader then declared that any act of aggression against the North Korean people would be met with
retaliation against the US homeland. Students in the class were asked to first discuss the strategic situation for the
United States. What mistakes had been made to get the United States into that scenario? What issues were at
stake? Then, the students were asked to apply strategic concepts to discuss how the United States might seek to
extricate itself from the situation.
The North Korea's blackmail scenario is an example of an extremely low-probability

event that almost certainly would not justify much further analysis by the
intelligence and defense policy communities, but is extremely useful for
pedagogy. This kind of scenario increases student interest in the material and
forces them to engage with the theories and concepts of the course. Rather than focus
on policy decisions alone, as simulations are likely to do, students are forced to
bring deductive logic to bear to assess the boundaries of the scenario.
util
Util they need an alternative framework No alternative
Greene 10 Joshua Greene Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard
University "The Secret Joke of Kants Soul" published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings,
accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf
What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral

judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise
moral judgments are
driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were
shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural
Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally
coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral
intuitions
anyone who claims to have such a theory
almost
certainly doesn't
, that our
. Moreover,
, or even part of one,
. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.
It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen?
Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole
class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on
the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect
rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here

they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what
deontologists are all about Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition
or that intuition
Rather, deontology is about taking
humanity seriously
This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology.
But this insider's view
may be misleading The problem
is that it
defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively
deontological
Consider the following analogy with religion.
When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often
gets an answer like this: "It's about love
This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many
people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from
other things
that
Instead, I suspect,
Kant and like-minded
. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism.
. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can
share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).
, as I've suggested,
, more specifically,
, though they may appear to be from the inside.
, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of
something larger than oneself."
. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger
than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about
religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they
the standard
deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology
from other approaches to ethics
consequentialists
have respect for persons are against treating
people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures
can share , etc A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from
treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the
decision-making process Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act
according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to
principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests , i.e. that are
may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of
. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that
, as much as anyone else,
impartial
. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes
deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in
If you ask a
deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of
speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get
answers
will be tautological "Because it's murder!" Others will be more
sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means
But
these
answers don't really explain anything
if you give the same people
the trolley case
they'll make the opposite judgment
Talk about rights, respect for persons, and
reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what
we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds
with the cold calculus of consequentialism
there seems to
be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to
powerful moral emotions But, as with many religious people's accounts of
what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the
philosophy in question
search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree.
characteristically deontological
. Some
." "You have to respect people's rights."
, because
occasions)
or the loop case (See above),
. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete,
(on different
, even though their initial
explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases.
, as we know,
AT Root Cause
No root cause of war
Goldstein 01 (2001, Joshua, Professor of International Relations at American University, War and
Gender, p. 412)
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists
one believes that sexism contributes to

war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue
peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that
injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other
way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate
aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars'
outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and
other injustices, So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice
(gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the
levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It
runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important
support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice." Then, if
way to "reverse women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy,
the emphasis on injustice as the main

cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.
allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence,
No root cause of US militarism

Munro 14 (Department of History, Saint Marys University)
John Munro (2014) US foreign policy, intersectional totality and the structure of
empire, Third World Quarterly, 35:9
Debates about US empire have subsided somewhat in the aftermath of the George W Bush presidency but the
issues underlying such debates have not gone away. In arguing that the history of the United States is an imperial
US empire is the expression of an intersectional totality, one

shaped by various vectors of power but reducible to none . To make this case, the article
one, this article proposes that
presents a sketch of US imperial history in order to show how this intersectional totality has evolved over time. Such
an exercise can give useful context to the foreign policy initiatives of the Barack Obama administration, one that
differs from that of its immediate predecessor but is not outside the structure of imperial historys longer duration.
Keywords: US empire; intersectional totality; historical contextualisation
During the presidency of George W Bush, one could hardly turn around in a book store without seeing another new
book about the United States with the word Empire in the title. Given the aggressive unilateralism of that
administration, particularly the Bush Doctrine of preventative war, this effusion of scholarly and popular analyses
of US imperialism was understandable, as was its abatement with the election of Barack Obama. The current
presidents differences from his predecessor in style, self-presentation and themes of emphasis have undoubtedly
led to the relative decline of imperial motifs in commentary about his administration. And, of course, under Obama,
US ground troops have departed (at least for now) from Iraq, the invasion of which in 2003 did so much to intensify
the US empire discussion during the first decade of the twenty-first century.
These changed circumstances have not put an end to the empire debate, with some observers continuing to argue
that the United States is unexceptional in its imperialism, others contending that the US is an empire but decidedly
in decline, still others lamenting that the Obama administration is not imperial enough, and some continuing to
deny that the country is an empire at all.1 Much of this conversation remains focused on US foreign policy, and for
good reason: presidential administrations, and the differences between them, matter. But in arguing that the United
States is an empire, and that it is as important as ever to come to terms with this reality, I will not focus exclusively
on policy here, for two reasons. The first is that we already have some excellent current scholarship that does just
this.2 The second is that, in attempting to describe US empire as more a system than a set of policies, I want to
follow the lead of sociologist James Parisot in attempting to theorize empire as a social totality.3 Instead of
adopting Parisots helpful move of embedding US empire in the totality of global capitalism, however, I aim to
present US empire as an expression of an intersectional totality.4
Economic relations are important,
but not determinative, in coming to terms with our object of study, which I hope to make clear by way of an
historical overview. Although I can only sketch out the course of US empire in the roughest outline here, my broad
brush approach is meant to give historical heft to a theoretical position and to convey a sense that continuing to
the present arrives already

fundamentally shaped by past economic disparity, racial inequality, heteropatriarchal oppression and a deep interrelation between the realms of foreign and
domestic.
think of US history in imperial terms enables us to see how
What and when
US empire lacks one essential or even primary cause , operating at material and
ideological levels in ways that condition one another . It is a structure of power that
stretches beyond homeland territory to dominate other societies and accumulate
unevenly distributed benefits along intersecting axes of inequality . Historically it
developed from European imperialism, then gradually emerged triumphant from the
clash of empires in the Americas and has entailed the development of capitalism,
racism and hetero-patriarchy. It is a category of analysis indispensible to understanding, and perhaps
reconfiguring, the present conjuncture.
The periodisation of US empire is an open question, and a political one. Cold War timelines, while not incorrect in
drawing our attention to already well known projections of US imperial power since 1945, fail to take in the deeprootedness of the phenomenon in question. The decade surrounding the turn of the 20th century is another
reasonable starting point, given the significance of the
overthrow of Reconstruction, the closing of

the frontier, the accelerated development of US capitalism, the Open Door Notes
regarding China, and of course the acquisition of Hawaii, Guam, Cuba, Puerto Rico,
the Philippines and the Panama Canal. But this set of events had as its prerequisite
the annexation of the northern half of Mexico and the imperial practices of
subjugating Indigenous polities and importing enslaved labour . These last two processes
also indicate that 1776 left unbroken a continuity with the policies of the European powers in North America. Such
policies were themselves the product of European and Mediterranean encounters
between peoples, although it was only with the onset of the Atlantic system that the coalescence of the
plantation complex and the power of Europes divisive taxonomies were given systematic expression.5
AT vtl
Individuals determine value
Schwartz 04 Schwartz 2004 Medical Ethics a Case-Based Approach CHAPTER ARCHIVE: A Value to Life:
Who Decides and How? http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/viewchapter.cfm?ID=399
Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has
the idea of quality

involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to
indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes . Hence, quality of life is
difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and
aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would
simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is
still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to
the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that
their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this
possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value
judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our
value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because
case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable
quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to
make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about
whether Katherines choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which
considerations can be used to protect the patients interests.
AT structural violence
Too generalized and cant be solved
Boulding 77 Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source:
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 March 18, 1993)
was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary
philosopher.[1][2] He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics
and social science. He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949
to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at
Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.
Finally, we come to the great Galtung
metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'.
They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors
always imply models and metaphors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the
when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very

dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence
would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low
preserve of the specialist. But
expectations of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim
and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and
The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the
thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some
truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very muc h. Violence,
whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different
phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all
like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else
in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to everything else. There is a very real
problem of the structures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural
violence as he has used it has diverted attention from this problem. Violence in the
behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse
off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can
reducing them to slavery.
rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the
structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of
social science in general. Threshold phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks'
in the systenm rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the
'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we
break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that
it is very difficult to separate them. The diminution of violence involves two possible strategies, or a mixture of the
two; one is Ithe increase in the strength of the system, 'the other is the diminution of the strain. The strength of
systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand lincreasing
strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dynamic in character, such as
arms races, mutually stimulated hostility, changes in relative economic position or political power, which are often
hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a system, and not always the most important
part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the
dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior,
not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between percepti'on and reality can be very large and
what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'by one
unkind commenltator as anything that Galitung doesn't like ) was originally defined as any
unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies
before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by somebody else. The
concept has been expanded to include all 'the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation,
and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong
resistant to change. However,
to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce
violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of violence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related,
though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and certainly not all cultures of violence are poverty
the dynamics lof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity
far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer . While the
metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have
d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer .
cultures. But
AT Security K
No threat inflation
Ravenal 09 (2009, Earl, Professor Emeritus at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the
Department of Government at Georgetown University, What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of
America's Foreign Policy, Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1, 21-75)
Rummaging through the concomitants of imperialism, Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of
threat inflation (in this case, virtual threat invention):
Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For
example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high.
Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare, attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budgetparticularly the procurement of major
weapons systems, such as Virginiaclass submarines aircraft carriers F22 fighters [and] Osprey tiltrotor transport aircraftnot to the systemically derived requirement for
certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no strategic or operational justification; that the American
empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their rogue state sponsors without those goldplated white elephants.
is a threadbare concept that has somehow

taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a threat bank), to the liberal
The underlying notion of the security bureaucracies looking for new enemies
center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged threats as improbable dangers), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and
What is missing from most analysts claims

of threat inflation, however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not
Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies).
merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates).
Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national
security bureaucrats attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational
budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of the militaryindustrial complex; viz.: Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps
In a few places,
what President Eisenhower called the militaryindustrial complex fat and happy. Or, in the same section:
In the nations capital,
vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies routinely take advantage of
crisesto satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects a.k.a. porkfunded by the government. And national security crises, because of
peoples fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)
Thus, bureaucraticpolitics theory, which once made several reputations (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defenseintellectual circles, and
spawned an entire subindustry within the field of international relations, 5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary.
So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, public choice, 6 which can be considered the rightwing analog of the bureaucraticpolitics model, and is a preferred interpretation of
governmental decisionmaking among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:
Publicchoice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop separate interests
from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this
problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.
Bureaucrats are supposedly, at

the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.
There is, in this statement of publicchoice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction:
This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the publics ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b,
2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the national society that
they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the publicignorance and eliteexpertise factors, and especially because the opportunitiesat least for
bureaucrats (a few notable postgovernment lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)for lucrative selfdealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than
they are in some of the contractdispensing and more undertheradarscreen agencies of government, the publicchoice imputation of selfdealing, rather than working toward the
national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the
derivation of foreign policy, that state elites are using rational judgment, in insulation from selfpromoting interest groupsabout what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for
national defense.
Ironically, public choicenot even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretationis not even about public choice, since, like the bureaucraticpolitics model, it
repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly public choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit rentseeking behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions
in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such subrational models actually explain very little of what they purport to
observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the behavior of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But
the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends
merely personal or parochial imperatives.
My treatment of role differs from that of the bureaucraticpolitics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and
specific identification of the roleplaying of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual pulling and hauling process that results in some policy outcome. Even here,
bureaucraticpolitics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their
conception of their job does not legitimate such activity. This is a crucial admission, and one that pointsempiricallyto the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.
Roles (all theorists state) give rise to expectations of performance. My point is that virtually
every governmental role, and especially nationalsecurity roles, and particularly the roles
the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the national interest;

rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment
of parameters, especially external parameters such as threats and the power and capabilities of other nations.
of
Subrational models (such as public choice) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to
the national interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast,
an officials role connects the individual to the (statelevel) process, and moderates the (perhaps
otherwise) selfseeking impulses of the individual . Rolederived behavior tends to be
formalized and codified ; relatively transparent and at least peerreviewed , so as to be consistent with
expectations; surviving the particular individual and transmitted to successors and
ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function
and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious
aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged .
defense decisionmakers attempt to frame the structure of the
problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence . They
make it their business to know where the threats come from . Thus, threats are not
socially constructed (even though, of course, some values are).
My own direct observation suggests that
A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security
planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for
idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed
organizational frameworks. Nonrationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get
filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad
predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the
contingent prediction.
For these reasons, public choice does not have the feel of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decisionmaking. In that structure, obvious, and
rentseeking would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk

of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place
for truly talented rentseekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal
profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrats very selfplacement in these reaches of government testifies either to a sincere commitment to the
even notsoobvious,
national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.
AT State Ks
The State is a fiction, but treating it as ontologically as if

real allows us to productively utilize analysis of state power
to produce change
Hay 14 (Colin, Centre d'etudes europennes, Sciences Po, Neither real nor fictitious but as if real'? A political
ontology of the state, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 65.3)
A final perspective
treats the state
as neither real nor
fictitious, but as belonging to an entirely separate ontological category the as if
real.
The
state
cannot be discerned directly but are only
rendered visible to us as analysts through their effects. They are
conceptual abstractions, but
profoundly ontologically significant in that they are
at least partially generative of the practices and processes which we can directly
observe. This perspective sees the state as as if real but neither real nor purely
fictitious.
For all conceptual abstractions of this kind
are at least partially fictitious in that the category they posit draws
attention to certain dimensions of social and political reality at the expense of
others. They are
conceptual abstractions facilitating analytical parsimony
, in many respects the most alluring,
(and other similar conceptual abstractions)
This stance one might label a genuine (and genuinely ontological) as-if-realism in that it ascribes a distinct ontological status to the category of things (properly) referred to as as if real.
, in such a view, is one such thing. Such referents are complex in that they
, as in the other formulations,
they are
The purely fictitious qualification here is in fact very important.
(the state, patriarchy,
the class structure and so forth)
, in other words,
; and such
analytical parsimony always comes at a price. Thus, the positing of patriarchy as as if real draws attention to what are arguably the defining features of all instances of domestic violence. But it does so by diverting attention at the
This brings us to a crucial difference

between as if realism
and the realism which typically informs (critical)
theories of the state
For as if realists can be very clear about
the
distortions engendered by positing structures like the state
they do not need to make the pretence that such abstractions are
ever capable of capturing the full complexity of social and political
processes and practices
In positing the state as as if real they acknowledge
the partially fictitious character of the abstraction they construct, taking
responsibility for the necessarily distorting depiction of the realities
it
purports, in a suitably stylized manner, to capture and describe.
same time from other features of each such instance which could be (or become) the subject of an alternative analysis.
(in fact in all three of its variants)
(and patriarchy and the class structure).
(inevitable)
, the class structure
and patriarchy;
(the real).
(the real processes and practices)
That, I believe, is a very good reason for commending
as if realism over philosophical realism as an ontological basis for state theory.

As this hopefully serves to make clear, I think that all three variants of the as if realist position set out above are preferable, at least normatively, to the realist alternative (as defended by Bhaskar in Harre and Bhaskar 2005).
Crucially, all agree that the positing of the state as as if real is in no way a relegation of its analytic status or import. That it may not exist (position 1), does not exist (position 2) or exists (only) as as if real (position 3) does not
make it less significant; in fact it merely clarifies its analytical role and its explanatory import.
But this is perhaps not the only advantage of the as if realist position that I have sought to set out. For it can, I contend, resolve without abandoning the concept of the state, the central difficulty of studying the state identified by
Philip Abrams in the late 1970s (in a classic essay published only posthumously in 1988).
Abrams' beautifully, if trenchantly, stated argument is that the very concept of the state (as a distinct and unified entity with a common identity) is not only an abstraction (often a political abstraction) but also, crucially, a distorting
abstraction which prevents us from seeing more clearly the almost inevitable disparity between the idealized representation of the state in such terms and the practices authorized in the name of the state. In the process, as we have
already seen, he differentiates between the distorting and reifying concept of the state (which he rejects and would have us reject), the grubby complexity of the state system (our shared object of analysis) and the idea of the state
in and through which political subjects typically orient their behaviour to generate what I have termed state effects (a process he would have us acknowledge). But his central conviction is that it is the concept of the state which
prevents us from seeing the state system as really it is. As he suggests,
the state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents us from seeing political practice as it is. (1988: 82).
His solution to this problem is simple to dispense with the concept of the state altogether so that we might better see the disparity between the idea of the state to which it gives rise and the practices in and through which the
claim to power which that idea authorizes makes manifest. As he puts it,
the state is, in sum, a bid to elicit support for or tolerance of the insupportable and intolerable by presenting them as something other than themselves. (1988: 76).
if we concede that the state is only ever a

conceptual abstraction, a means to the end of seeing state practices
as linked and connected, and a distorting abstraction at that
then there is no danger that our use of the concept of the state
commits us to perpetrating the mystification Abrams sees as inherent
it
is the pretence that the state is real that perpetrates the mystification we need to
resist.
accepting the as if real character of the state might help contribute to
the demystification of the state
But there is another way, one that is opened up as a possibility by acknowledging the state to be as if real. For
(the practices authorized in the name of
the state)
(one which draws attention to certain features of state
practices at the expense of others),
that
in the appeal to
the concept of the state. Indeed, as soon as we accept the as if real character of the state we are on the way to the demystification of the (problematic) idea of the state that Abrams finds so troubling. For, in Abrams' terms,
To see why
idea that Abrams calls for, we need only explore the implications of the preceding analysis for our understanding of the paradoxical agency and
unity of the state respectively. It is to this task that I now turn.

The problem of state agency
Political ontology is dominated by the structureagency debate (see, for instance, Bates 2006; Cerny 1990; Hay 2002, 2009; McAnulla 2005). It is perhaps hardly surprising then that the ontology of the state has generated its own
variant of the structureagency problem (Smith 2009). This is concerned principally with the seemingly paradoxical place of the state in existing state theory as both agent and structure. As we have already seen, in many
(philosophically) realist treatments of the state (in Marxism perhaps most obviously, but also in much neo-statist and neo-institutionalist writing), the state is a largely structural term. In such a conception, the state is depicted, in
essence, as a site or locus of power investing those with access to the resources it provides with a range of capacities which they would otherwise not possess. This is a conception which arguably has considerable promise and
avoids many of the pitfalls into which much state theory falls. It is a conception to which we will return presently. However, it is important to acknowledge that this is by no means the typical conception of the state, either within state
theory or social and political science more generally.
For, really from its first inception, the concept of the state has more typically been used to refer to agency than structure as in phrases like the state taxes its citizens, the state wages war and the state demands the presentation
of a passport at its border. Such a conception is almost certainly a fiction and it is most definitely a personification and an objectification. As Andrew Vincent puts it, when we speak of the state performing actions we personify it, we
attribute to it a status equivalent to a unique personality an agent or subject which acts (1987: 8). It is difficult not to see this as a simplification, perhaps even a crass simplification, and a distorting simplification at that yet it has
become almost part of the logical grammar of the concept.
To see why this is so, it is perhaps instructive to return to the etymology of the term itself. The concept of the state is derived from the Latin status, meaning literally social status, stature or standing, specifically of an individual
within a community. By the fourteenth century the use of the term to refer to the standing or status (indeed to the stateliness) of rulers, distinguishing and setting them apart from those subject to their rule, was commonplace. The
idea that the state resides in the body of the ruler, indeed that the state and the sovereign are synonymous, makes this a characteristically pre-modern formulation (Marin 1988; Shennan 1974; Skinner 1989). As this suggests, at
this point the state was indeed an agential term, referring to the distinctive traits and characteristics of the sovereign.
The development of a distinctively modern conception of the state would take a further three centuries. A first step was taken by the authors of the so-called mirror-for-princes writings, most famously Machiavelli (1988) in his Il
Principe (The Prince). In this literature, the state (lo stato) now became synonymous not only with the prince himself, but with the character of the political regime, the geographical area over which sovereign authority was claimed
and maintained, and the very institutions of government required to preserve such authority (1988). Here, in effect, the distinction between the state as structure and the state as agent became blurred for the first time.
A second development came with the republican political theory of the Renaissance (see Skinner 1978; Viroli 1992). This movement championed the cause of a self-governing republican regime that might inaugurate a state or
condition of civic liberty. The state was here presented as claiming and enjoying a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and as deriving the authority for this claim not from the power or stature of its ruler(s), but from the
people themselves. The state is referred to for the first time as a distinct apparatus of government and hence as a structure which rulers have a duty to maintain and which will outlast their rule, as opposed to an extension of the
latter's innate authority or, indeed, agency.
The final step came with the rise of the absolutist state in Europe in the seventeenth century. Here, in particular in the writings of Bodin (1576) and Hobbes (1651), the state is eventually conceptualized as truly separate from the
powers of both the ruler and the ruled. Three aspects of this formulation set it apart as a distinctively modern conception of the state: (i) individuals within society are presented as subjects of the state, owing duties and their
allegiance not to the person of a ruler but to the state itself (as an institution or structure); (ii) the authority of the state is singular and absolute; and (iii) the state is regarded as the highest form of authority in all matters of civil
government (Skinner 1989: 90). The state now comes to be seen as a distinct form of authority independent of those who give effect to its power as structure rather than as agency.
Yet this in no sense marks the end of a state theoretical tradition which casts the state as agent. Twentieth century state theory is dominated by such a conception. Until at least the 1980s, the political sociology of the state has been
concerned centrally with characterizing the state in terms of its agency (or at least in terms of the outcomes to which its agency might be seen to give rise). Postwar US political science in particular has been a battleground between
competing input theories of the state (pluralism, elite theory, instrumentalist Marxism, even at the margins, instrumentalist feminism). Such approaches typically paid little or no attention to the state itself (as a distinct institutional
form, configuration or complex providing differential access to a range of capacities and resources). Instead they treated the state as something of a black box an instrument if not of unlimited powers then certainly of very
considerable powers that might be captured by particular interests who might use it to their own specific ends and purposes (see also Smith 2003, 2009).
In a way these various theories of the state might be seen to have used the concept of state agency heuristically with pluralists, elite theorists and the like effectively asking themselves whether the outcomes of state decisionmaking processes were consistent with the idea of a singular state agency. In so far as they convinced themselves that this was indeed the case, they attributed this to the capture of the state by sectional interests and not, of
course, to the workings of any more hard-wired or institutional of logics (such as the structural dependence of the state on capital accumulation). And, of course, they reached very different conclusions (compare Dahl 1961b, 1977
with Domhoff 1987, 1990; Miliband 1969; Mills 1956; and Lukes 1974).
But arguably it is not what these perspectives dispute but what these literatures share that makes them so problematic as theories of the state. Two aspects of this are particularly worthy of attention.
First, as already noted, to attribute any systematicity in the biases discerned in state power solely and exclusivity to the inputs into the political process, such that any pattern exhibited in the distributional asymmetries arising from
state policy is seen as a product of state capture, is nave in the extreme. And it is also the most thorough disavowal of the concept of the state itself. For the state is reduced to something fought over, but with absolutely no bearing
whatsoever either on the outcome of the contest nor on the uses to which state power might be put. The state, in such a conception, becomes an empty vessel about which we need to know precisely nothing in order to comprehend
fully the generation of political outcomes.
Second, and arguably more significantly, the entire debate is couched exclusively in terms of an interest-based and entirely instrumental conception of political behaviour. Political actors all political actors it seems are motivated
solely by the promotion of the sectional interests they are assumed to serve. This, it need hardly be pointed out, is a profoundly limited, bleak and depressing view of human behaviour and it eliminates at a stroke the very
possibility of the state acting more nobly in pursuit of the collective public good (Flinders 2012; Hay 2007a; Stoker 2006). The best that can perhaps be hoped for, as in pluralism, is that the careful choice of democratic rules and
institutional checks and balances might serve to minimize the chances of systematic capture of the state by a particular (and hence dominant) interest and that a diversity of interests capturing different aspects of government
might, in effect, cancel one another out. But the point is that the projection of such a narrowly instrumental set of behavioural/motivational assumptions onto potential candidates for office essentially ensures that we should seek to
make do with as little state as possible.
There is, of course, a serious irony here. For, both in the republican tradition inaugurated by Machiavelli and, indeed, in Hobbes, the very rationale for the existence of the state is couched precisely in terms of its capacity to provide
collective public goods. Indeed, in Hobbes the irony is all the more acute since he derives the very need for the Leviathan in the first place from the inherently undesirability of the nasty, brutish and short life we are all destined to
suffer if the state of nature is allowed to persist unchecked.7 It need hardly be pointed out that the presumption that the state of nature persists is the starting point for instrumentalism's (normative) anti-statism.
As this implies, there is another whole tradition of writing on the state whose lineage can arguably be traced all the way from Machiavelli and Hobbes to much contemporary institutionalism. This, despite Hobbes's derivation of the
need for the state in the first place from the state of nature, is resolutely more open-ended in its account of human agency and it affords a much greater role to the state itself in shaping societal outcomes (for good or ill). It tends to
see the state less as a single agency in itself so much as a set of institutional sites or contexts within which political agency is both authorized (in the name of the state) and enacted/institutionalized by those thereby authorized.
Two elements, in particular, of the potential analytical utility offered by the concept of the state in this conception might usefully be identified and differentiated. Both are concerned with the ability to contextualize political behaviour:
the first relates to the structural and/or institutional contextualization of political actors, the second to the historical contextualization of political behaviour and dynamics. I consider each in turn.
The state as institutional contextualization
Within this broadly institutionalist conception, the state is seen to provide a context within which political actors are embedded and with respect to which they might usefully be situated analytically. The state, in such a conception,
provides (a significant part of) the institutional landscape which political actors must negotiate (see also Duran and Thoenig 1996: esp. 610). This landscape is, in Bob Jessop's terms, strategically selective in that it is more
conducive to certain strategies, and by extension, to the realization of certain goals and preferences, than others (1990: 910; see also Hay 2002: 12731). It provides the unevenly contoured backdrop to political conflict,
contestation and change a strategic terrain with respect to which actors must successfully orient themselves if they are to realize their intentions (whether instrumental or normative).
As this perhaps serves to suggest, within such a framework (a framework elsewhere referred to as the strategicrelational approach see Hay 2002; Jessop 2008) the appeal to the concept of the state tends to draw the political
sociologist's attention to and to sharpen her purchase on the opportunities and, more often than not, the constraints that political actors face in realizing their intentions. A political sociology informed by such an institutionalist
theory of the state is less likely to see political actors in voluntarist terms as free-willed subjects in almost complete control of their destiny able to shape political realities in the image of their preferences and volitions. For, in
contrast to voluntarism and more agent-centred accounts, institutionalists tend to see the ability of actors to realize their intentions as conditional upon often complex strategic choices made in densely structured institutional
contexts which impose their own strategic selectivity (the pattern of opportunities and constraints they present).
Such considerations are important and have the potential to provide a valuable and much-needed corrective to the tendency of an at times behaviouralist-dominated political science mainstream to see actors' preferences alone as
the key to explaining political outcomes. State theory of this latter kind reminds us that the access to political power associated with a landslide electoral triumph does not necessarily bring with it the institutional and/or strategic
capacity to translate such a mandate into lasting social, political and economic change (see, classically, Pierson 1990). If political will and the access to positions of power and influence were all that were required, wholesale political
change would be endemic. That this is not the case suggests the value of institutionally contextualizing abstractions like the state. And these, in turn, encourage a rather more sanguine assessment of political opportunity structures
(Tarrow 1998).
Yet such valuable insights do not come without their own dangers. Institutionalist theories of the state have at times been characterized by a tendency to structuralism. Indeed, this would seem to be the pathology to which they are
most prone. In at least some of their many variants, Marxism, historical and sociological institutionalism, green theory, feminism and even public choice theory, have all legitimately been accused of structuralism. For each has, at
times and in certain forms, appealed to essential and non-negotiable characteristics of the state (its capitalism, its patriarchy, its complicity in the destruction of the natural environment, and so forth) reproduced independently of
political actors. Such essentialism is both fatalistic and apolitical; it does nothing to enhance the analyst's purchase on political reality. Indeed, in a sense it denies that there is a political reality to be interrogated (on politics as the
antithesis of fate, see Gamble 2000; Hay 2007a). Yet whilst structuralism has proved an almost perennial target for critics of state theory, contemporary theories of the state would seem more acutely aware of its dangers than at any
point in the past. Indeed, the recent development of state theory can at least in part be read as a retreat from structuralism.
The state as historical contextualization
If the appeal to the concept or abstraction of the state serves to sensitize political analysts to the need to contextualize political agency and agents institutionally, then no less significant is its role in sensitizing political analysts to
the need to contextualize the present historically. The two are intimately connected.
The characteristic concern of the political scientist with government and the holders of high office tends to be associated with an analytical focus on the present. Within this conventional framework, the determinants of political
outcomes are invariably seen to lie in factors specific to a particular context at a particular point in time typically, the motivations and intentions of the actors immediately involved and their access to positions of power and
influence. This largely ahistorical approach is immediately problematized by appeal to the concept of the state. For whilst governments come and go, the state, understood as an institutional ensemble, persists as it evolves over
time. That evolution is shaped by the intended and unintended consequences of governing strategies and policies. Yet this is a reciprocal relationship. For, at any given point in time, the strategic contexts in which governments find
themselves are in turn a reflection of the strategic capacities and competences of the institutions of the state and the constraints and opportunities these impose. To understand the capacity for governmental autonomy is, then, to
assess the extent of the institutional, structural and strategic legacy inherited from the past. It is, in short, to understand the dynamic relationship between state and governmental power over time.
An example may serve to reinforce the point. If the institutions of the British state in 2010 (when Britain's first ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition government was elected) looked different from those in 1997 (when the first
New Labour administration of Tony Blair took office), then this is likely to have exerted a significant influence on the autonomy of the incoming coalition administration. Yet, as this example perhaps already serves to indicate, there is
a certain danger of structuralism here too. The newly incumbent administration certainly had to grapple with the institutional, political and above all economic legacy of its inheritance in 2010. Yet, in our desire to contextualize
historically we may come to overemphasize the burden the past places on the present (this, in a sense, is part of the bias engendered by the appeal to the conceptual abstraction of the state). In so doing we may inadvertently
absolve contemporary political actors of all responsibility for the consequences of their conduct attributing, say, the absence of a credible growth strategy to the legacy of New Labour and the global financial crisis when it might
more plausibly be attributed to the lack of an animating political and economic conviction shared between the coalition partners. State theory, perhaps especially in its neo-institutionalist form, is possibly rather too predisposed to
see continuity, inertia and, at best, incremental evolution over time (Schmidt 2006). States, like governments, change and, under certain conditions, despite their path dependent nature, they may change surprisingly rapidly. It is
important, then, that historical contextualization does not lead us to an historically undifferentiated account of the endless reproduction of the status quo ante. As this suggests, whilst the appeal to the concept of the state can
certainly heighten our sensitivity to historical dynamics, it need not necessarily do so. An overly structuralist and overly historicized account may dull rather than sharpen our analytical purchase on questions of change over time
(Marsh 2010). Yet, as already noted, contemporary theories of the state are perhaps rather more acutely aware of this danger than their predecessors. Recent developments in the theory of the state are characterized by their
emphasis upon the uneven pace of the state's development over time (see for instance Jessop 2006, 2008; Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004).
The paradoxical unity of the state
This brings us to a consideration of a final set of issues present undoubtedly in the previous sections but thus far in a largely unacknowledged form. They relate to the, again paradoxical, unity of the state (see also Abrams 1988: 79).
The ontological question here is whether the state is a single entity, a question of course very similar to whether it can be seen to exhibit a singular agency. This is another difficult set of issues, but what is again immediately clear is
that in most of the lay discourse of politics, the state is both treated as an agent and as a singular entity as in examples like the state raises taxes considered earlier. But state theorists who have reflected on this issue typically
regard such formulations at best to be a convenient and distorting fiction (see for instance, Abrams 1988; Jessop 2006: 112, 123; see also Foucault 1975). The more one thinks about it, the less the state is credibly conceived as a
singular entity certainly as a singular agency. For if the state is perhaps best understood as an authority (or, better still, an authorizing identity) and an associated set of discourses which legitimates and sanctions certain practices
and certain forms of behaviour whilst constituting specific institutional contexts in which these might take place (Foucault 2004; Mitchell 1991), then it is almost bound to authorize what will turn out to be different and incompatible
things in different contexts. Such practices may well be unified in the sense that they are authorized in the same (or similar) ways and by the same authority (though even that is debatable); but no unity of practice, process or
outcome is in any sense guaranteed by this and it is in fact most unlikely.
There are then at least two rather different dimensions to the problematic and paradoxical unity of the state. The first relates to the question of the boundaries of the state what is in and what is outside the state. As Max Weber
famously notes, there are no activities that states have always performed and (scarcely) any that none have performed (1978[1921]). Similarly, as Philippe Schmitter rather disarmingly puts it, the modern state is an amorphous
complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries performing a variety of not very distinctive functions (1985: 33). The state is, then, an institutional complex; not a single entity but an entity comprised other entities. What these
various institutional contexts have in common is that they, and the social practices to which they give rise, are authorized in the name of the state but potentially very little else. This almost inevitably generates a series of
boundary questions (see also Mitchell 1991). Is the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the (operationally independent) Bank of England a part of the British state and does its nominal and/or practical operational independence
have any legitimate bearing on the answer to that question? It is, of course, very difficult to be definitive neither answer seems in principle wrong and it is perhaps even tempting to see the MPC as both in and outside of the
state in different respects (it would certainly seem wrong to offer an account of it which did not take some cognisance of the mandate for the conduct of monetary policy set by the state in defining the terms of its independence). But
the point is that the MPC is by no means the exception to the rule here most state agencies and many non-state agencies pose precisely the same kinds of boundary question.
This is already a fairly intractable problem in defining and circumscribing the

boundaries of the state. Yet there is arguably a more fundamental problem still. This
relates not so much to the boundaries of the state but to the internal coherence and
consistency of the policies, practices and processes that occur within this
institutional complex. This is likely to remain a problem even if we are able to reach
a consensus on what counts as in and outside of the state . For the degree of
coordination within the state apparatus
is almost bound to be insufficient to
ensure the kind of coherence and consistency that the notion of a unified state
would seem to imply. Different parts of the state do different things in different ways
with different degrees of autonomy to yield
a great variety of contradictory
effects.
, any attempt to impose
some unity or common purpose upon
disaggregated state institutions will almost certainly yield differential results
But this
suggests a way forward. In so far as
the state has a unity it has a dynamic , contested and provisional unity
State projects
may be seen as tendencies
reinforcing the unity of the state ; just as the development over time of
institution-specific practices, habits, conventions and the like might typically be
seen as counter-tendencies to the unification of the state.
the state is
neither singular and unified nor disaggregated and fragmented it is the
constant product of the interaction of tendencies and counter-tendencies
pulling in either direction.
(however defined)
, in all likelihood,
Moreover
or re-impose
some more
coordinating than others (for practical illustrations of which see Hay and Farrall 2011, 2014).
perhaps
(Hay 1999).
conscious attempts to impose a new coherence and reform trajectory upon the state
As this suggests,
Conclusion: towards a political ontology of the state
That in turn suggests a political ontology of the state in three parts. The state is
neither real nor fictitious , but a conceptual abstraction whose value is best
seen as an open analytical question; the state possesses no agency per se though it
serves to define and construct a series of contexts within which political agency is
both authorized
and enacted
and the state is a dynamic institutional
complex whose unity is at best partial and the constantly evolving outcome of
unifying tendencies and dis-unifying counter-tendencies. Conceived of in this way,
the state may not exist but it is a potentially extremely valuable analytical
abstraction.
the key to resolving the difficulty of studying the state
is not the abandonment of the concept of the state to which he
points but
the recognition that the state is in fact a conceptual
abstraction which belongs like patriarchy and the class structure to the
realm of the as if real and not to the real.
(in the name of the state)
As this suggests,
/institutionalized;
identified by Philip
Abrams in the late 1970s
, instead,
The nation state is a productive analytical frame that can

produce change through conflict reinterpretation doesnt
necessitate rejection
Smith, 09 (2009, Anthony D. Smith, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Nationalism and Ethnicity at the London
School of Economics, and is considered one of the founders of the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies,
Ethnosymbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach, p. 41-3)
If the Yugoslav case represents the ultimate consequence of a conflict that could draw on historic ethnic divisions,
in the great majority of cases, there was much greater ethnic unity. This did not
diminish the violence of the conflict, but it did succeed in channelling it towards reform
and/or revolution. Of these cases, the greater number have undergone processes of
reform, and this has meant periodic reinterpretations by successive generations of
the received traditions, memories, values, myth and symbols . This may be achieved by
amendment of the existing national heritage, or through large-scale rejection of its basic values. But, even in the
there is likely to be a search for a new synthesis through one or more

reinterpretations of the nations heritage. In Britain, for example, the imperial heritage and its
latter case,
underpinning values have been largely rejected, yet the idea of Britain as a world leader, at least in moral terms,
remains intact. Empire has now been transmuted into Commonwealth, and the country has become, in its own
eyes, something of a multicultural magnet for immigrants, as well as a self-styled bridge between America and
Europe. France, too, has not completely relinquished her mission civilisatrice, and holds onto great power status
even in and after the Revolution, the legitimacy of

the national community itself has never been in question, nor has its belief in the
grandeur of its destiny been undermined .19
through her force de frappe. In this case, too,
Nevertheless,
no national community has withstood the pressures of change, especially

in the modern age, and as a result much has had to be discarded . At the same time,
as John Hutchinson has shown, earlier ethnic ties and sentiments have been revived and
renewed, albeit in somewhat changed forms, and often through cultural wars, in
order to meet the periodic challenges, material and spiritual, to the community . In
other words, in the face of all kinds of problems, reinterpretation has meant
revival and renewal, as well as alteration and rejection . In particular, large-scale
migration has revitalised the ethnic core at the heart of older nations, and brought rival ethnies into conflict, or
opened up various divisions and debates within the dominant ethnie over the changing composition and
As zones of conflict, nations are well adapted to

incorporating change and resynthesis . Indeed, recurrent debates about national
identity, even if they do not encourage cohesion, help to raise the level of national
consciousness among all participants, as they force all parties to focus on the
significance of national history and the desirability of rival visions of national
destiny. Once again, through the often stark opposition of their formulations, these rival visions
confront the members of national communities with the basic questions of who we
are and what purpose our existence serves .20
multicultural character of the nation.
They need a theory of transition

Brown 11 (January 2011, Garrett Wallace, PhD, Senior Lecturer in Political Theory and Global Ethics in the
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Bringing the State Back into Cosmopolitanism: The Idea of
Responsible Cosmopolitan States, Political Studies Review, Volume 9, Issue 1, pages 5366)
Cosmopolitanism maintains that we have duties and responsibilities to all human

beings based solely on our humanity alone , without reference to ethnicity, race, gender, culture, nationality, political affiliation,
religion, place of birth, geographical location, state citizenship or other communal particularities (Brown and Held, 2010). In this regard, cosmopolitanism represents the
acknowledgement of some notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity (Lu, 2000, p.
cosmopolitanism's ethical orientation is a concern for global justice

with the expansion of corresponding moral duties which can broaden the scope and
responsibilities of justice to include those beyond state borders . In making these cosmopolitan claims,
many contemporary cosmopolitans have pursued arguments that present the state as an arbitrary
moral factor in our calculations about the scope of justice (Barry, 1998; Beitz, 1975; Caney, 2001; Pogge, 2002). In addition, many cosmopolitans
have argued that the sovereignty of the state has been effectively eroded by the
forces of globalization, which have increasingly rendered states unable to manage their concerns independently of other external factors (Beck, 1999; Cabrera,
245). Furthermore, explicit within
2004; Habermas, 2006; Hayden, 2005). As a result, most cosmopolitans have argued that the effects of globalization and emerging global collective action problems have broadened the
scope and need for global cooperation and that a system of cosmopolitan governance beyond the state has become immediate (Archibugi, 2008; Held, 1995; Macdonald, 2008). Lastly,
cosmopolitans often contend that traditional conceptualizations of the state are

inappropriately insular and that statist defenses regarding the protection of culture, nationality and national patriotism ignore pressing
issues of common humanity and planetary coexistence (Nussbaum, 1995; Tan, 2004; Waldron, 1999).
As it pertains to the realm of moral theory, many of these contemporary cosmopolitan arguments are compelling, consistent, coherent and of immense heuristic value. Nevertheless,
in relation to questions of applied theory, or with reference to what is often called institutional
cosmopolitanism, an approach for how to establish a cosmopolitan political
condition from current circumstances remains underdeveloped . Although cosmopolitans
have successfully applied cosmopolitan principles to examine current global practice, successfully highlighted many existing injustices and created elaborate institutional models at the
there has been less intermediate work done on how to move cosmopolitanism
theory to institutional political practice from our current state-centered system. This
lack of discussion is symbolic of the fact that many cosmopolitans have seen the
state more as an inconvenience to work around than an empirical background
condition that needs to be thoroughly worked in . When surveying the cosmopolitan literature one is often struck
global level,
by the ease with which the state is rendered morally and empirically otiose and by resulting ambiguities about the normative role states could play in creating a cosmopolitan order.
there seems to be an overall neglect regarding the specific roles

states can have in grounding a cosmopolitan condition and what normative
requirements a cosmopolitical state would need to satisfy internally and externally in order to satiate the
moral, legal and institutional demands of cosmopolitanism. As alluded to above, this neglect seemingly stems from the fact that many contemporary
In particular,
cosmopolitans have conflated a moral demand about whether states should be

the principal actors at the global level with whether states are in fact the principal
actors . As a result, many cosmopolitans have conveniently sidestepped important empirical considerations involved with applied theory and have thus inadvertently impugned
the idea that states could be useful cosmopolitan allies. By making this move, however, many cosmopolitan theories unnecessarily leave themselves open to critiques from scholars who
claim that any reasonable move to a cosmopolitan order would have to come from current circumstances. Otherwise, as many critics argue, cosmopolitanism remains a moral orientation
that is more appropriate for hypothetical thought experiments than any real world application (Blake, 2001; Nagel, 2005). As was suggested above, because cosmopolitans have often
cosmopolitan projects fail to outline what

cosmopolitan values a state may still provide, what a normatively responsible cosmopolitan state might actually look like and how
downplayed the normative and empirical significance of the state, many
responsible cosmopolitan states could help ground a cosmopolitan condition. This is not to say that all cosmopolitans have ignored the state altogether (this is important to note and will
be discussed further in the third section), but it does suggest that many have left discussions regarding responsible cosmopolitan states largely unattended and, as a result, greatly
under-theorized.
It is in response to this lacuna that this article seeks to examine some recent cosmopolitan arguments and to see what answers, if any, they have for bridging the gap between
cosmopolitan theory and state practice. The article will briefly map out the recent relationship between cosmopolitanism and the state while also suggesting that cosmopolitans should
reconsider the idea of responsible cosmopolitan states as a means to create stronger links between cosmopolitan theory and contemporary international practice. I use the word
idea of establishing a cosmopolitan

condition based on responsible cosmopolitan states used to be a fairly active
debate in cosmopolitan thought and it is only in the last twenty years that the state has been relegated to varying levels of insignificance. Second, it is my belief that
cosmopolitanism cannot simply contend that the state is morally arbitrary, practically obsolete
and metaphysically non-existent without also losing considerable normative
purchase and applied empirical relevance . Although the structure of the state system has certainly changed and traditional
conceptions of the state are greatly challenged, it is also important to realize that the state is a presently
active force and continues to have a commanding role in world politics .
reconsider in relation to the idea of responsible cosmopolitan states for two reasons. First, the
Consequently, it is important for cosmopolitans to better formulate specific normative criteria about what a responsible cosmopolitan state would look like, how these states can fit within
a moral cosmopolitan framework and how we might be able to move in this direction under current empirical circumstances. In other words, whether we like it or not, we currently live in
it is prudent to engage better with

the state and to offer reasonable ideas about bringing the state back into
cosmopolitanism.
a world largely dominated by states and if cosmopolitan theory is to have greater pertinence, then
Using the state doesnt ethically legitimate it

Mervyn
Frost, U of Kent, 1996, Ethics in Intl Relations, p. 90-1
A first objection which seems inherent in Donelans approach is that utilizing the modern state
domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always
live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider
alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to
the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to
argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political
organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I
have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale
reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the
language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in
justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts
which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any
proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system
will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new
and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks
and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for
notions which have been

developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state . It is not possible to
distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are
imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal,
discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through
with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.
Alt Failsnation state identity is inevitable and key to solving

multiple scenarios for violence and war
Calhoun 7 (Craig, Prof of Social Science at New York University and President of the Social Science Research Council,
Nations Matter: Citizenship, Solidarity and the Cosmopolitcan Dream, p 3-7)
The idea of a nation-state is arguably pernicious. The hyphen ties the notion of a historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together to that of a modern polity with
unprecedented military power and capacity for effective internal administration. It has been a recipe for conflicts both internal and external. Populations straddle borders or move long
distances to new states while retaining allegiances to old nations. Dominant groups demand that governments enforce cultural conformity, challenging both the individual freedom and
the nation-state neither can be nor should be wished away.

it is also the framework in which the modern era produced historys most enduring and
successful experiments in largescale democracy. It continues to shape not just the fact of democracy but diversity in its forms
(as Chapter 7 suggests). It is basic to the rule of law , not only because most law remains a domestic matter of nation-states but because most
international law is literally that: structured by agreements among nation-states. Not least of all, while globalization has produced innumerable paths across state borders,
it has opened these very unevenly and disproportionately to the benefit of those with access to high levels of fluid capital. Conversely, it has made belonging
to a nation-state and having clear rights within a nation-state more, not less, important. The fact that Hannah Arendt observed
more than half a century ago remains true: human rights are secured mainly when they are institutionalized
as civil rights.1 In the 1990s, optimistic after the end of the Cold War, a number of enthusiasts for globalization suggested that sovereign states were obsolete. Money,
the vitality that comes from cultural creativity. And yet,
Source of so many evils,
media, and human migrations all flowed across borders; Why should military and political power maintain borders? States bolstered by nationalist passions and nationalists eager to
gain state power were behind many of the twentieth centurys bloody wars. Surely there was and remains a good prima facie case for hoping nation-states might organize less of
it is one
thing to seek limits on the exercise of state power and another to
contemplate transcending it. It is one thing to encourage a cosmopolitan pluralism of perspectives and another to regard nationalism as
human loyalty, power, and conflict. And of course new reasons for hating abuses of state authority merged with ancient resentments of state power. But
merely a fading inheritance and not a recurrently renewed source of solidarity. It is one thing to seek to advance global civil society and another to imagine democracy can thrive without
effective states. The many evils of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries called forth a widespread indignation and, among many, a determination to act. The idea of human
rights moved to the forefront not only of discussion but of court cases and treaties. Humanitarian interventions were proposed and implemented in a widening range of circumstances.
Ethnic cleansing and genocidal nationalism made the notion that sovereignty should be a barrier to international efforts to do good ring hollow. An international criminal court was
created (if not universally recognized). Indeed for a time there seemed no occupation more virtuous than that of a human rights activist or humanitarian aid worker. Almost
imperceptibly these shifted from volunteer pursuits and accidental careers for physicians and pacifists to new professional roles, complete with academic courses and credentials,
funding from major foundations and national governments, and increasing bureaucracy. And humanitarian action became increasingly intertwined with military interventions, whether for
peacekeeping or regime change. At the same time, protesters challenged the dominance of capitalist corporations over the course of globalization. This was misleadingly termed the
anti-globalization movement. Though there were some campaigners truly bent on enhancing the autonomy of local populations, most were actually proponents of a different sort of
globalization. They objected to environmental depredation, sweatshops, and high prices for necessary drugs but they worked on a global scale and imagined the world in terms of global
connections albeit connections among ordinary people without the powerful mediation of corporations and states. The movement contesting capitalist globalization has not been
theory-driven, but its protagonists have shared a general account of the problems of the world in which the twin centers of power capitalist corporations and nation-states pursue a
logic of self-aggrandizement that neither the natural world nor its human inhabitants can afford. Many have found the language of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri sympathetic: they
represent the heterogeneous multitude of the world who struggled to be free of a seamless and destructive but nearly exhausted empire.2 Something of the same quasi-theory
that states and corporations are both bad and unnecessary has been widespread among human rights activists and humanitarian aid workers. Both groups, of course, saw first hand
the vicious ways in which state elites pursued or held on to power and firms sought or sustained profits. The Sudan is one of the largest scale and longest-lasting examples. Its central
government has seldom cared much for the people of Darfur in its west, the non-Arabs of its south, or for that matter most ordinary Sudanese. But the central government has cared
about holding the country together and defeating any secessionist movements. It cared all the more when oil was discovered in the south as did global corporations seeking to extract
that oil in peace. And it cared all the more when it took on a more pronounced Islamic identity and mission. Despite religious commitment (and partly because of intra-Islamist
struggles), it became a peculiarly bad government, but also one too weak to establish peace or prosperity in the Sudan; it unleashed brutal war and civil violence against and among its
own people. So there were refugees and internally displaced people, rape as a tactic of war, robber militias, and spreading diseases left untreated. The state did not look very good.
Yet by the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were not many left for whom
the fantasy of overcoming the state was not tinged with anxiety . Yes, state power was often overweaning,
often corrupt, and often mobilized in evil ways. But weak states typically failed their citizens and crises in strong
states often unleashed violence and disrupted both lives and livelihoods. Pandemic diseases, global crime,
human rights abuses, and forced migration all revealed the dark side to
globalization yet all seemed to call at least in part for better states, not an end to states. Could outsiders make peace in
Sudan or would that depend on a more representative, honest, and competent Sudanese government? Or in a range of other African countries, could outside interventions contain the
spread of AIDS unless states joined the struggle? And yet, partly because of structural adjustment programs pushed with fiscal good intentions and disastrous human consequences by
the World Bank and others, most African states had neither money nor personnel nor health care systems to address AIDS or for that matter malaria and other diseases.
failed state seemed as problematic as the abusive state.
The
And this was not only an issue in Africa but in different
local configurations around the world. A great buzzword of the 1990s was civil society (see Chapter 4). And indeed, strengthening civil society loose institutions part neither of the
state nor of large-scale projects of capital accumulation has been an important trend in many places. Both local and transnational voluntary organizations have grown and played
crucial roles. Many are religiously inspired and some denominationally organized. Others are secular. All reflect efforts to create social organization on the basis of voluntary relations
among people rather than the coercion of either political authority or capital. And yet, civil society organizations depend on money as well as personal connections. And except where
states are able to regulate such organizations they are largely unaccountable and nontransparent. Civil society without a public sphere is not necessarily democratic.
Civil
society is a hugely valuable complement and sometimes corrective to states and markets, but not a
substitute for either.3 It is no accident that global governance has become almost as ubiquitous a concern in the current decade as global civil society was in the last. But
the issues are not only global; they are also national and local. Intermediate powers and solidarities still matter. Individual sovereign states confront a variety of global flows and
processes against which they are weak and which in turn weaken some of their other capacities. Global currency and equity markets make it hard for individual countries to operate
Global crime is hard to fight with the tools of national legal

systems (and especially their domestic criminal law). Global diseases challenge domestic health care
systems. Yet these challenges faced by contemporary states no more make them irrelevant than the history of abuses of state power makes the stability and public services
states can deliver unimportant. And crucially, most actually existing democracy has been achieved in
and through states.
autonomous fiscal or industrial policies.
Sovereignty is the only way to engage in collective political

action, rejecting it gets all the downsides with no benefits
Brinkerton et al 7 Ed. Christopher J. Brikerton, Philip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch, 2007, Politics
without sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations. University College London Press(UCLP) pg.
14
Rousseaus analysis of the mixed condition blighting eighteenth-century European politics could be justifiably
leveled against todays states system. While we have watched the political substance of sovereignty ebb away,
we now find ourselves in a situation where we still endure of all the worst features
of state sovereignty, and yet derive none of its benefits. The world is still fragmented into
different peoples; the freedom of movement is still impeded by borders and their command as Lenin tersely
put it; militarism still propels states into war with each other; liberties are still
trampled in the name of security. All this is endured without any of the benefits that sovereignty
should impart. If agency is still exercised in all those repressive divisive ways, with the shift from government to
we have lost the ability to formulate a general will that can bend the institutions of
public power to sovereign ends. Sovereignty has been lost, but no more universal form of political
organization has emerged to replace its. As we saw earlier in this essay, what makes the power of
governance,
sovereignty distinct is its rootedness in human agency; it is a force that is only sustained by conscious human will.
Individuals must be able to abstract themselves, look beyond their differences and find the common basis for
For all
its historical imperfections, and however attenuated it may be today, the framework of the
sovereign state remains the best means of organizing and sustaining the process of
politics, in opposition to all that is offered in its place . If at one level the critics of
sovereignty express a rather limited view of politics, at another level, they reflect a
politics that attempts to conceal its own existence. This change, which we label a
politics without sovereignty, is a politics that is at odds with itself. The essential feature of
collective action. The ability to direct oneself only emerges in the self-creative process of acting politically.
politics without sovereignty cannot be logically deduced from the critiquen of sovereignty alone, but made
apparent only through an investigation of the alternatives that constitute it. We conclude with a brief outline of the
rest of the book.
Pure rejection fails we need to make demands on the state

Hallward 2 Peter Hallward, lecturer in the French department at Kings College, 2002, online:
http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm, accessed July 14, 2005
We know that Badious early and unequivocally hostile attitude to the state has considerably evolved. Just how far it
has evolved remains a little unclear. His conception of politics remains resolutely anti-consensual, anti-representative, and thus anti-democratic (in the ordinary sense of the word). A philosophy today is above all
something that enables people to have done with the "democratic" submission to the world as it is (Entretien avec
Alain Badiou, 1999: 2). But he seems more willing, now, to engage with this submission on its own terms. La
Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repre. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of
any political campaign for instance, electoral contests or petition movements that operates as a prisoner of the
It remains an absolute necessity [of politics] not to

have the state as norm. The separation of politics and state is foundational of politics. On the other hand,
however, it is now equally clear that their separation need not lead to the banishment of the
state from the field of political thought (LDP, 6.05.93: 1).24 The OP now conceives itself in
a tense, non-dialectical vis--vis with the state, a stance that rejects an intimate
cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses any antagonistic conception of their
operation, any conception that smacks of classism. There is to no more choice to be made
between the state or revolution; the vis--vis demands the presence of the two
terms and not the annihilation of one of the two (LDP, 11.01.95: 3-4). Indeed, at the height of the
December 95 strikes, the OP recognised that the only contemporary movement of
dstatisation with any real power was the corporate-driven movement of partial
de-statification in the interests of commercial flexibility and financial mobility .
Unsurprisingly, we are against this withdrawal of the state to the profit of capital, through
general, systematic and brutal privatisation. The state is what can sometimes take account of
people and their situations in other registers and by other modalities than those of
profit. The state assures from this point of view the public space and the general
interest. And capital does not incarnate the general interest (LDP, 15.12.96: 11). Coming
parliamentary space (LDP, 19-20.04.96: 2).
from the author of Thorie de la contradiction, these are remarkable words. The next question is whether the very
possibility of such prescription according to the general interest does not itself presuppose that same liberalparliamentary realm upon whose systematic vilification its own critical distance depends. What kind of state can
respond responsibly to political prescriptions, if not one closely responsible to electoral pressure? Badiou maintains
that the old socialist states, as states, were more sensitive to workers strikes than are todays parliamentary
states the great example being the Solidarity campaign in Poland (Letter to the author, 9.12.98).25 But when the
OP ventures into the vexing domain of constitutional reform, it is to propose very explicitly parliamentary
procedures: an end to a separately elected president (and so an end to the possibility of cohabitation); a purely
cosmetic head of state; only one major forum for elections (a legislative chamber of deputies); assurance that the
head of government is always the head of the dominant party; and finally, a guarantee that there is always a
dominant party, thanks to some kind of first-past-the-post electoral system. The whole package is to be softened
with calls for more open government and the rule of law (Proposition de rforme de la Constitution, LDP, 12.02.95:
5-6). The once Maoist Organisation Politique now recommends something almost exactly like the British
Constitution! At this point, the reader has to wonder if the OPs policy of strict non-participation in the state really
stands up. The OP declares with some pride that we never vote, just as in the factories, we keep our distance from
trade unionism (LDP, 12.02.95: 1).26 The OP consistently maintains that its politics of prescription requires a
Once the state has been acknowledged as a

possible figure of the general interest, then surely it matters who governs that
figure. Regarding the central public issues of health and education, the OP maintains, like most mainstream
socialists, that the positive tasks on behalf of all are incumbent upon the state (LDP, 10.11.94: 1).27 That
participation in the state should not replace a prescriptive externality to the state is
obvious enough, but the stern either/or so often proclaimed in the pages of La Distance politique
reads today like a displaced trace of the days when the choice of state or
revolution still figured as a genuine alternative .
politics of non-vote. But why, now, this either/or?
AT Gender Ks
Realism is better than feminist theories of IR.
Murray 97 Professor of Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh [Alastair J. H., Reconstructing
Realism: between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 191-193]
feminism presents an interesting revisioning of international relations, it ultimately suffers from the problem
that, in order to sustain any of its claims, most of all the notion that a distinctively feminist epistemology
is actually necessary, it must establish the existence of a gender bias in i nternational r elations theory which
simply does not exist, and the existence of an 'alternative' feminist position on
international affairs which is simply a fiction. Consequently, in order to salvage her very raison d'tre, Tickner is forced to engage in
some imaginative rewriting of international relations theory. First, in order to lay the basis for the claim that an alternative perspective is actually necessary, conventional
theory is stripped of its positive elements, and an easily discredited caricature ,
centred on realism, erected in its place. Second, in order to conjure up a reason for this
alternative perspective to be a feminist one, the positive elements which have been removed from conventional
theory are then claimed as the exclusive preserve of such perspectives. Yet, however imaginative this
'revisioning' of international relations theory, its inevitable result is a critique which is so riddled with
contradictions that it proves unsustainable, and an alternative epistemology which,
based upon this flawed critique, collapses in the face of the revelation of its inadequacy. The inadequacy of Tickner's critique
of Morgenthau is readily apparent. It draws only on the 'six principles of political realism', perhaps the narrowest, and least representative, statements of Morgenthau's thought,
perpetuating the type of stereotypical representations of realism which have
undermined understanding for so long. As the earlier chapters of this book have sought to demonstrate, realism can in no way be
associated with a 'search for an objective science of international politics based on the model of the natural sciences ...'. Rather, it is deeply aware of the
extent to which international politics is socially constructed , the consequent
importance of understanding human practices rather than explaining material
phenomena, and of using such knowledge not to control or dominate, but to
enhance the mutual understandings by which actors with divergent value systems
relate to one another. Second, it is difficult to view realism as an attempt to construct
international politics as some form of atomised Hobbesian sphere in which amoral behaviour is
'not only permissible but prudent'. Realism simply emphasised that the type of
value homogeneity that characterises much of the western world is not reflected in
relations between states. Indeed, it recognised that this was not always so, regretted the
passing of the European states system in which a measure of community did
prevail, and emphasised that it does not always need to be thus. Ultimately, it strenuously
resisted the claim that international politics was so distinct as to merit a separate
moral standard and insisted that all action be evaluated against the same code. Perhaps
Whilst Tickner's
the only thing that we can grant to Tickner is that Morgenthau does, of course, adopt a set of universal moral principles. Having been erroneously criticised for adopting a contextual
ethic relevant to the sphere of states, it is strange to find him being criticised now for adopting a universal conception of moral principles. Yet the idea that these principles thereby
It is precisely the interaction of power

political and universal ethical imperatives, and the attempt to discern a path
between the two, which concerns it. Regardless of what one thinks of this effort, we do at least identify the moral principles involved and the
way in which they relate to practice. Tickner's female 'contextual' morality is content-less and, until it is
fleshed out, ultimately meaningless as an alternative criterion. Given these problems, the
attempt to establish an alternative, feminist epistemology falls apart. The aim to
provide a 'new' theory of human nature just looks unnecessary when it is noted that the
reduce statecraft to an instrumental, self-interested logic is to miss the entire purpose of realism.
conventional view of the human character derived from realism is in fact simultaneously moral and immoral, 'both
conflictual and cooperative', as Tickner demands. Similarly, the concern to redefine power amounts to little more than a sophisticated word game.
'Mutual enablement' ultimately sounds like some dreadful slogan dreamt up by a management consultant. The fact that realist theorists
define power in terms of the ability to coerce does not mean that they neglect the
ability to persuade as a tool in international politics, only that they define power in more rigorous
terms than feminists, calling each by a different name to avoid confusion. Nor does
it mean that, by doing this, they neglect the ability of international actors to co-operate, or that
they exclude from consideration the co-operative basis upon which power relies or the co-operative objectives to which it tends. If Tickner had read beyond the first chapter of Politics
among Nations, she might have come across phrases such as the balance of power, in which curious things called 'alliances' and 'grand coalitions' co-operatively generate power
towards co-operative ends. Conflict is not perpetual in the realist vision of international relations, and coalition building is ultimately just as essential to the realist account of
it is not surprising that the third strut of this new feminist epistemology, a
broader notion of national security , seems simply unnecessary. Acknowledging the
interdependence of human security in an age of nuclear holocaust and
environmental degeneration would hardly seem to be a preserve of feminism . What of
international politics as it is to feminist accounts. Consequently,
everything that George Kennan has said on this subject over the last forty years? Nor can we accept the notion that we need to redefine conflict resolution to focus more on mutually
beneficial outcomes, when
realism is deeply concerned with the amelioration of difference by
diplomacy. What of the nine points with which Morgenthau concludes Politics among Nations? Nor can we accept the notion that 'maternal thinking' and a female,
contextual morality are required to attempt to confine conflict to non-violent means. A persistent theme of realism is that
humility of self and toleration of others are the foremost moral
imperatives , that conflict should not be permitted to become an ideological war of
absolutes in which all enemies are monsters, all actions are legitimate, and all
peaces are but punitive armistices. One ultimately has to question the need for a
specifically feminist theory of international relations. We currently do not have two radically
opposed standpoints, masculine and feminine, but a unified human standpoint which, with
modifications, serves us reasonably well.
The K perpetuates a hegemonic view of sex and difference

cant influence mainstream IR and only reinforces binary
thinking
Hutchings 11 (3/24/11, Kimberly, Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations at
the London School of Economics, UK, Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the West/Non-West Distinction in Promoting Global
Dialogue in IR, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, sage, DH)
This would seem to be a rather churlish response to work that is dedicated to

opening up our disciplinary horizons. After all, we have to start somewhere with the task of
challenging parochialism and ethnocentrism in thought. However, I think it is worth learning from the
example of other attempts to decentre the discipline by utilising a binary
categorisation as the starting point for challenging the mainstream. The example I
am thinking of is that of feminist IR, which over the last 20 years has sought to
bring in categories such as women or gender to deconstruct mainstream
accounts of how international politics works. As with non-Western IR, anyone
actually involved in doing feminist IR insists that neither women nor gender are
unitary categories, and calls attention to the variety of issues and perspectives
introduced into IR by different forms of feminist work . But from the perspective of mainstream
IR, the power of the traditional binary understanding of sex and gender , regardless of
feminist claims to pluralism, has meant that the game of dialogue remains the
samenessdifference game. Either feminist IR is a different way of doing things in
which case it is not really IR at all or feminist IR is the same way of doing things , in
which case it adds an interesting variable into the explanation of events, but shifts
nothing in terms of underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions. In
terms of disciplinary politics, the continuing hegemony of mainstream
understandings of the nature, point and purpose of dialogue has resulted in an
ongoing ghettoisation of feminist work.
Gender IR k wrong
Caprioli 04 (Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis Mary Caprioli, Dept. of
Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March
2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076.)
The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment of
no single
feminist position exists in international relations. One of the most common feminist
critiques of feminist quantitative research is that scholars cannot simply "add
gender and stir" (Peterson 2002;Steans2003), for gender is not just one of many variables. Yet, gender is
one of many variables when we are discussing international issues, from human
rights to war. As Fred Halliday (1988) has observed, gender is not the core of international relations or
the key to understanding it. Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender
may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not
the only one.260 Such a critique only serves to undermine the feminist argument
against a scientific methodolog y for the social sciences by questioning the
scholarship of those who employ quantitative methodologies. One does not pull variables
both feminist and other types of IR scholarship. As Jan Jindy Pettman (2002) has argued, however,
"out of the air" to put into a model, thereby "adding and stirring." Variables are added to models if a theoretical
Peterson (2002:158) postulates that "as long as IR understands

gender only as an empirical category (for example, how do women in the military
affect the conduct of war?), feminisms appear largely irrelevant to the discipline's
primary questions and inquiry." Yet, little evidence actually supports this contention
unless one is arguing that gender is the only important category of analysis. If researchers cannot add
gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered
analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems
equally biased. Such research would merely be gender-centric based on women
rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those
justification for doing so exists.
that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews
might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive
some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue

that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations .
analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis,
Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and
international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories
of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world. Sylvester (2002a)
has wondered aloud whether feminist research should be focused primarily on

critique, warning that feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting
anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.
The criticisms focus on identity creates a politics of exclusion

that prevents meaningful critique the alt is appropriated by
the right
Jarvis, 2k [DSL, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, February, University of South Carolina
Publishing, pg. 160-162]
Critics of
feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or
an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political
correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy,
excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only
Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations.
feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must
Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity

politics of particular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encouragement, but
only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an
uncontested sovereign hegemony oyer their own self-identification , insuring the group
emanate from a positional (personal) ontology.
discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, ,uu\ standards of argument, appraisal,
and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls lor a "home.steading" does so
"by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be included on our terms" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to
engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics
who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to
"share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to
demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism. 93 Such
stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the
settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or
reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules,
cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens
about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for
tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge
feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse between
postmodern identitiesthe most important of which is gender. 94 Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic
epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in
international theory.'"' Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for intellectual
spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than
the discipline and the intellectualand well establishedspaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the
feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any

criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is
variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white
and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White
males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression , indicating an
strategies employed by male dissidents, then,
ontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the
Legitimacy, in this context, can then be

claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that
particular group has been "silenced." In this same way, self-identification or "self-situation"
context of their related oppression, exploitation, and exclusion.
establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point
from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to
her most recent book, Worldinjj Women, a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a
woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties. 96
Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, "It is important to provide a context for one's
work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self-declaration reveals to the reader that she is a
feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something
called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objectivity.97 Like
self-identification permits entry to intellectual spaces whose sovereign

authority is "policed" as much by marginal subjectivities as they allege of the
territorial markers,
oppressors who "police" the discourse of realism , or who are said to walk the corridors of the
discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If Sylvester's
feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, per-spectivist, and encompassing of a

is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative
perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being .
version of
multiplicity of approaches, in reality it
Gender cant be an overarching theory of conflict

Mackinnon 2k Catharine A. MacKinnon, J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law @ University of Michigan and Visiting
Professor @ University of Chicago Law School, [Symposium on Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against
Postmodernism, 75 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 687; 2K]
Feminism has also never, to my knowledge, had what is called a "monocausal"

narrative, at least I haven't. We do not say that gender is all there is. We
have never said it explains everything. We have said that gender is big
and pervasive, never not there, that it has a shape and regularities and laws of
motion to it, and that it explains a lot--much otherwise missed, unexplained. It is a
feature of most everything, pervasively denied. That does not mean that
everything reduces to gender, that it is the only regularity or the only
explanation for things, the single cause of everything, or the only thing there. It is
also worth repeating that sexual politics, in feminism, is not an overarching
preexisting general theory that is appealed to in order to understand or
explain, but a constantly provisional analysis in the process of being made
by the social realities that produce(d) it.
Their reliance on gender binaries to explain violence is essentialist and

wrong
Harvis 2k professor of government and IR University of Sydney, 2K (Darryl, Feminist revisions of

international relations, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 162-3)
Critics of
feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist
malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an
unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women
bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from
legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate,
feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional
(personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of particular groups are, of course,
Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations.
welcome to lend support and encouragement, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way,
they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony oyer their own self-identification,

insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters , operative
methodology, ,uu\ standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for
example, when Sylvester calls lor a "home.steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be
this is an ultimatum
that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who
question the merits of identity-based political discourse . Instead, Sylvester calls upon
included on our terms" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue,
International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed
as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical,"
but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist
Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated

sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are
postmodernism.93
to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus
predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic
analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations
Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus

confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies
but accept them as a necessary means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse
between postmodern identitiesthe most important of which is gender.94
Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who
question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in
international theory.'"' Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for
as a "male space."
intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued
from other than the discipline and the intellectualand well establishedspaces of feminist International Relations?
feminist postmodernists too deflect as

illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are
labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of
Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then,
race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to
assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression,
indicating an ontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed
in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, AND exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be
claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been
silenced. In this same way, self-identification or self-situation
establishes ones credentials,

allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the authoritative vantage point
from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory
pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women, a section titled A (personal) politics of location, in which her
identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group
loyalties.96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, It is important to provide a
context for ones work in the often-denied politics of the personal. Accordingly, self-declaration revelas to the
reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to develop your brains and
confess something called sins to always male forever priests, and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic
self-identification permits entry to intellectual spaces

whose sovereign authority is policed as much by marginal subjectivies as hey
allege of the oppressors who police the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the
discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and
malestream theory. If Sylvesters version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant,
perspectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in reality it is as selective, exclusionary,
and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused
of being. Skillful theoretical moves of this nature underscore the adroitness of postmodern feminist theory at
objectivity.97 Like territorial markers,
emasculating many of its logical inconsistencies. In arguing for a feminist postmodernism, for example, Sylvester
employs a double theoretical move that, on the one hand, invokes a kind of epistemological deconstructive anarchy
cum relativism in an attempt to decenter or make insecure fixed research gazes, identities, and concepts (men,
women, security, and nation-state), while on the other hand turning to the lived experiences of women as if
ontologically given and assuming their experiences to be authentic, real, substantive, and authoritative
interpretations of the realities of international relations. Women at the peace camps of Greenham Common or in the
cooperatives of Harare, represent, for Sylvester, the real coal face of international politics, their experiences and
strategies the real politics of relations international. But why should we take the experiences of these women to
be ontologically superior or more insightful than the experiences of other women or other men? As Sylvester admits
elsewhere, Experience is at once always already an interpretation and in need of interpretation. Why, then are
experience-based modes of knowledge more insightful than knowledges derived through other modes of inquiry?98
Such espistemologies are surely crudely positivistic in their singular reliance on osmotic perception of the facts as
they impact upon the personal. If, as Sylvester writes, sceptical inlining draws on substantive everydayness as a
time and site of knowledge, much as does everyday feminist theorizing, and if, as she further notes, it
understands experienceas mobile, indeterminate, hyphenated, [and] homeless, why should this knowledge be
valued as anything other than fleeting subjective perceptions of multiple environmental stimuli whose meaning is
beyond explanation other than as a personal narrative?99 Is this what Sylvester means when she calls for a revisioning and a repainting of the canvases of IR, that we dissipate knowledge into an infinitesimal number of
disparate sites, all equally valid, and let loose with a mlange of visceral perceptions; stories of how each of us
perceive we experience international politics? If this is the case, then Sylvesters version of feminist postmodernity
does not advance our understanding of international politics, leaving untheorized and unexplained the causes of
international relations. Personal narratives do not constitute theoretical discourse, nor indeed an explanation of the
systemic factors that procure international events, process, or the actions of certain actors. We might also extend a
contextualist lens to analyze Sylvesters formulations, much as she insists her epistemogical approach does.
Sylvester, for example, is adamant that we can not really know who women are, since to do so would be to invoke
an essentialist concept, concealing the diversity inherent in this category. Women dont really exist in Sylvesters
estimation since there are black women, white women, Hispanic, disabled, lesbin, poor, rich, middle class, and
for Sylvester, is that to speak of women is to do

violence to the diversity encapsulated in this category and, in its own way, to
silence those women who remain unnamed. Well and good. Yet this same analytical
respect for diversity seems lost with men. Politics and international relations
become the places of men. But which men? All men? Or just white men, or rich,
educated, elite, upper class, hetero-sexual men? To speak of political places as the places
of men ignores the fact that most men, in fact the overwhelming majority of men, are not in
these political places at all, are not decision makers, elite, affluent, or powerful. Much as with Sylvesters
illiterate women, to name but a few. The point,
categories, there are poor, lower class, illiterate, gay, black, and white men, many of whom suffer the vestiges of
hunger, poverty, despair, and disenfranchisement just as much as women. So
why invoke the category
men in such essentialist and ubiquitous ways while cognizant only of the diversity of in the category
women. These are double standards, not erudite theoretical formulations, betraying, dare one say,
sexism toward men by invoking male gender generalizations and crude caricatures. Problems
of this nature, however, are really manifestations of a deeper, underlying ailment endemic to discourses derived
from identity politics. At base, the most elemental question for identity discourse, as Zalewski and Enloe note, is
Who am I?100 The personal becomes the political, evolving a discourse where self-identification, but also ones
identification by others, presupposes multiple identities that are fleeting, overlapping, and changing at any
particular moment in time or place. We have multiple identities, argues V. Spike Peterson, e.g., Canadian,
homemaker, Jewish, Hispanic, socialist.101 And these identities are variously depicted as transient, polymorphic,
interactive, discursive, and never fixed. As Richard
Brown notes, Identity is given neither
institutionally nor biologically. It evolves as one orders continuities on ones conception of oneself.102
Yet, if we accept this, the analytical utility of identity politics seems problematic at best.
Which identity, for example, do we choose from the many that any one subject might
display affinity for? Are we to assume that all identities are of equal importance or that some are more
important than others? How do we know which of these identities might be transient and less consequential to
Why, for example,

should we place gender identity ontologically prior to class, sexual orientation, ethnic
origin, ideological perspective, or national identity? 103 As Zalewski and Enloe ask, Why do we
ones sense of self and, in turn, politically significant to understanding international politics?
consider states to be a major referent? Why not men? Or women?104 But by the same token, why not dogs,
Why is gender more constitutive of global

politics than, say, class, or an identity as a cancer survivor, laborer, or social worker?
Most of all, why is gender essentialized in feminist discourse, reified into the most
preeminent of all identities as the primary lens through which international relations
must be viewed? Perhaps, for example, people understand difference in the context of
identities outside of gender. As Jane Martin notes, How do we know that differencedoes not turn on
being fat or religious or in an abusive relationship?105 The point, perhaps flippantly made, is that identity
shipping magnates, movie stars, or trade regimes?
is such a nebulous concept, its meaning so obtuse and so inherently subjective, that it is near meaningless as a
conduit for understanding global politics if only because it can mean anything to
anybody.
Equating warfare with patriarchy essentializes women and

destroys critique
TICKNER, 2 [J. Ann, professor at the School of International Relations at USC; Feminist Perspectives on
9/11, International Studies Perspectives, 2002: 3]
Given the massive sense of insecurity generated by the first foreign terrorist attack on American civilians at home,
there is something reassuring about our men protecting us from other men. 21 However, even though the war
exceeded all expectations in its swift destruction of the Taliban and al Qaeda networks, and despite increased
the U.S. remains uncertain about its ability to deter

future terrorist attacks. In light of these continued fears, the U.S. Congress
passed the USA Patriot Act, legislation that allows the Attorney General to detain aliens on mere
attention to homeland security,
suspicion and without a hearing. Prior to its passage, the U.S. had already detained more than 1,200 young men
without charge; Arab men have been subject to ethnic, as well as gender, profiling under the excuse that we are at
war. These measures have received strong support from across the political spectrum. Criticism is seen as
Equally disturbing is a political climate, typical of countries at war, that

fosters intolerance of alternative points of view. Illustrations of this intolerance have
unpatriotic.22
been prevalent in media discussion as well as in political discourse. In an article in the New York Times, Edward
Rothstein ~2001! articulated his hope that the attacks of September 11 might challenge the intellectual and ethical
perspectives of postmodernism and postcolonialism thus leading to their rejection. Chastising adherents to these
modes of thought for their extreme cultural relativism and rejection of objectivity and universalism, Rothstein
expressed hope that, as it comes to be realized how closely the 9/11 attacks came to undermining the political and
military authority of the U.S., these ways of thinking will come to be seen as ethically perverse. While the author
feminists are frequently criticized on the same terms ;

women and feminists often get blamed in times of political, economic, and
social uncertainty. Kurths fear of feminists destruction of the social fabric of society is one such example
did not mention feminism,
and the association of patriotism with hegemonic masculinity challenges women, minorities, and aliens to live
up to this standard. It is the case that postcolonialists and feminists have questioned objectivity and universalism;
but they do so because they claim these terms are frequently associated with ways of knowing that are not
objective but based only on the lives of (usually privileged) men. Many feminists are sympathetic with
postcolonialism, a body of knowledge that attempts to uncover the voices of those who have been colonized and
oppressed. It is a form of knowledge-seeking that resonates with attempts to recover knowledge about women. In a
rather different piece, which acknowledged the recognition accorded to women of Afghanistan since 9011, Sarah
Wildman (2001) chastised American feminists on the grounds of irrelevance. Claiming that feminists have an
unprecedented public platform because of the attention focused on women in Afghanistan, Wildman accused them
of squandering their opportunity by refusing to support the war.
Equating what she called feminist
dogma with pacifism, Wildman asserted that there is no logical reason to believe that nonviolent
means always promote feminist ends. Wildman has fallen into the essentialist trap of equating
feminism with peace which I discussed earlier; this has allowed her to dismiss
feminist voices as irrelevant and unpatriotic. The feminists she selected to quote may have voiced
reservations about the war, but feminism encompasses a wide range of opinions many of
which include fighting for justice, particularly gender justice. And feminist voices are
not all Western as is often assumed. In Afghanistan, women have been fighting a
war that began well before September 11, a war against women.
That turns the entire K

Butler,90 professor of rhetoric, Johns Hopkins, 90 (Gender Trouble , Judith, p13)
Feminist critique ought to explore the totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, but also
remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism. The effort to
identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics
the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms . That the tactic
can operate in feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the colonizing gesture is not
primarily or irreducibly masculinist. It can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and heterosexist
subordination, to name but a few. And clearly, listing the varieties of oppression, as I began to do, assumes their
discrete, sequential coexistance along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergences within the social
oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally

related, distributed among planes of originality and derivitaevness.
field. A vertical model is similarly insufficient;
Framing gender as an ontologically superior explanation relies

on violent, totalizing categories that cause their impacts
New 4 (Carline Review of Undoing Gender by Judith Butler)
(http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/article/viewFile/1487/984)
In this book of eleven previously published essays Butler expounds her recent thinking on gender, transgender and
Butler is famous in feminist and poststructuralist circles as the

author of Gender Trouble (1990), Bodies that Matter (1993) and other works advocating the
deconstruction of gender, both as an academic position and a political goal . In this book
sexuality. For readers unfamiliar with her work,
she focuses mainly on the ethical argument for what could be styled, on an analogy with Trotskyism, permanent
deconstruction. In asides and addenda she also discusses the work of other poststructuralist feminists, and in the
last chapter (Can the Other of philosophy speak?), describes her own relationship with philosophy, especially
that of Spinoza and Hegel. The assumption underlying these essays is that most
ontological claims about
gender are excluding and therefore oppressive. The implicit position is that realism is never
fallibilist, but invariably rigid. Butler suggests that every theoretically based taxonomic claim has countless victims
whose lives have been rendered unlivable. Her quest is for all those currently marginalised to be recognised and
afforded livable lives. This requires, she believes, permanent provisionality about gender possibilities and in
particular about what it means to be human. It will be easier to do justice to Butlers argument if we first consider a
crucial ontological disagreement between the feminism of the second wave (1970s and 80s) and that of the
Second wave feminism developed a distinction

between sex and gender which was seen as liberatory at the time. Sex meant biological sexual
cultural turn which has attempted to replace it.
differentiation (bodily dimorphism and distinct, interdependent reproductive capacities); gender meant the
identities, normative attributes and social practices culturally associated with sexual difference.1 Both sex and
For Butler this

distinction is foundationalist and deeply misleading. She explained in Gender Trouble that
gender were understood as real and causally powerful, but they had different ontological status.
sexual difference is only retrospectively binary. The adults who surround the new baby at birth inspect its body
through gendered spectacles. If it does not readily fit their presuppositions about the only two ways of being
Sex is thus naturalised by

gender, produced on the surface of the body as a binary fiction which delimits our idea of
what it is to be human. Since the 1990 publication of Gender Trouble, Butler has revoked its strong
human, they normalise it with knife and hormones, socially exclude itor both.
idealism which verged on radical body-scepticism. Nevertheless, she continues to insist that sexual difference is the
product of a norm, and gender is the normalising apparatus. In this she disagrees not only
(1) theorists of sexual difference who argue on biological grounds but also with (2) structuralists and
with
poststructuralists who argue, following Levi Strauss, that sexual difference is a fundamental
nexus through which language and culture emerge (p. 211). Some of these poststructuralists
(Lacanian and post- Lacanians) consider patriarchy inevitable, while others believe it contestable. As a group, (2)
are preferable in Butlers view since for them sexual difference is, though powerful, ethereal and empty of content:
some of them evacuate sexual difference of every possible semantic meaning (p. 210). They at least are not
essentialist in the old ways, for all they say is that the difference between men and women is culturally constitutive
they do not specify what it is or what it constitutes. Nevertheless, even those among group (2) who believe the
Symbolic and its patriarchal law can be changed are in practice gloomy about how long it will take. Butlers critique
of Lacanian and post-Lacanian conservatism in the essay on Gender regulations is excellent. Compared with
poststructuralist French feminism, Butlers own view is positively sociological. She holds that gender is a form of
social power, a norm, rather than a model that individuals seek to approximate (p. 48). Sexual difference is
among its products, firmly situated in the field of discourse rather than material reality. Further, she distinguishes
the ontological status of this norm from its effects, and describes how it is reproduced through the acts that follow it
and the idealisations reproduced in and by those acts (ibid). While the norm cannot be independent of its
instantiations, it is irreducible to them. Although Butler rejects the physical reality of sexual difference, she is a
realist within the sphere of discourse, and even a believer in emergence. But does Butler really reject the physical
reality of sexual difference? It would be an odd position for one who sees sex change operations for transpeople as
so potentially liberating that it is worth accepting pathologising diagnoses to get access to them. Like many
poststructuralists, she is profoundly ambiguous about the ontological status of the body. I understand her as
meaning that some people have a penis and some a vulva in much the same way as some people have a bigger
nose and some smallerthere are physical differences, but their social salience is entirely contingent and
constructed, and there is no sharp line between male and female reproductive organs any more than there is
between a big and a small nose. She remarksoddly, and surely wronglythat one cannot apprehend sexual
difference outside the racial and ethnic frames by which it is articulated (p. 10). Further, while sexual difference is
real enough within these parameters, it is not necessarily important: other constituting social forces such as the
economic or racial conditions by which one comes into being, the conditions of ones adoption, the sojourn at the
orphanage (p. 10) may have more power to shape the individual. There are two points elided here. Is sexual
difference a human species characteristic, with the usual range of variation and with intelligible cases of incomplete
or different development? My answer to this is yes, despite the existence of a small minority of intersexed people
whose numbers are greatly exaggerated by strong social constructionists. Secondly, is sexual difference always and
inevitably socially and psychologically highly significant? The answer to this is not so clear, and it is a different sort
of question. If in some social contexts other identities and experiences tend to be more salient, this does not
undermine the reality of sexual difference nor show us the extent of its causal powers. Usually, however, Butler
where a person fits, and whether they fit, into the contingent binary of
gender has a tremendous effect on their lives. People who are intersexed are regularly, as
holds that
children, subjected to coercive surgery. People who are transgender are frequently refused the surgery that would
free them from distress. The task of all these movements [intersex, transgender and queer] seems to me to be
about distinguishing among the norms and conventions that permit people to breathe, to desire, to love and to live,
and those norms and conventions that restrict or eviscerate the conditions of life itself (p. 8)
Norms that are
enabling for one group may be destructive for another. Butlers idea is to empower us to
seek change by showing that the normative apparatus of gender is merely conventional, and to expose the ways in
gender regulation treats some people as unreala lack of recognition which, she claims,
is even more devastating in its effects than oppression (p. 30).
which
Gender root cause arguments are hegemonic thats the root

cause of their impacts
Butler 90, professor of rhetoric, Johns Hopkins, 90 (Gender Trouble , Judith, p9)
Whether gender or sex is fixed or free is a function of a discourse which, it will be

suggested, seeks to set certain limits to analysis or to safeguard certain tenets of
humanism as presuppositional to any analysis of gender. The locus of intractability,
whether in sex or gender or in the very meaning of construction, provides a
clue to what cultural possibilities can and cannot become mobilized through any
further analysis. The limits of the discursive analysis of gender presuppose and
preempt the possibilities of imaginable and realizable gender compositions within
culture. This is not to say that any and all gendered possibilities are open, but that
the boundaries of analysis suggest the limits of a discursively conditioned
experience. These limits are always set within the terms of a hegemonic cultural
discourse predicated on binary structures that appear as the language of universal
rationality. Constraint is thus built into what that language constitutes as the
imaginable domain of gender.
at community change
Ballots dont change the debate community
Atchison and Panetta 9 *Director of Debate at Trinity University and **Director of Debate at the University
of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, The Sage Handbook of
Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)
The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition.
Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the
community portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that
they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast
majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in
winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous.
Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their
purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the
community.
However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless
hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have
little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose
because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority
participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition
has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does
not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the
name of community change.
The larger problem with locating the debate as activism perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the
communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about
how the debate community should approach a problem , then the losing debaters become
collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of
argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this
the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change.
Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as
scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it
does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community
problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how
to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem . There is no role
scenario,
for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents
academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This
scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate
community.
If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more
likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate
because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to
win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change
through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash
and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.
the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive
one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins
regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the
method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of
necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a
From our perspective,
competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of
people.
at personal disclosure
The politics of personal investment and disclosure isnt always
possible, and to force people to disclose is both violent to their
identity and dangerous to their livelihoodthey ignore the
privilege of disclosing itself
Vila 05 [Pablo, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, Border Ethnographies,
Ethnography at the Border, Ed. Pablo Vila, p. xxviii-xxxiii]
problems related to the intertwining of the ethnographic account with the

personal experience of the ethnographer do not escape the most important practitioners of the genre,
because "to assert that one is a 'white middle-class woman' or a 'black gay man' or a
'working-class Latina' within one's study of Shakespeare or Santera is only interesting if one is able to draw
At the same time, some of the
deeper connections between one's personal experience and the subject under study" (Behar 1996, 13). Being in
I still consider these

kinds of statements problematic regarding how power works in academia
in particular and in the real world in general. As I pointed out, anytime I attempted
the personal narrative route, I frequently had to abort my narratives because I
constantly encountered things I couldn't say or didn't want to disclose about
total agreement with the points being made by Marcus, Behar, and the like,
myself to make sense of the "affinities between the ethnographer and the subject of study," which Marcus claims
being somehow keenly aware (the

"keen" in Behar's account [1996, 13-14] is quite problematic as well) of what aspects of myself were
the most important filters through which I perceived the world and, more particularly, the
topic being studied, I still couldn't make those connections for basic reasons of
personal and academic survival. Therefore if on the one hand most of the contributors to this
collection were surely motivated in their research by important personal reasons, some of us could not or
did not want to reveal some of them because they were dangerous for our current
career stages, personal lives, prestiges, immigration statuses, or a combination
thereof. I can offer dozens of real or imagined "affinities" that, if disclosed, could be essential to understanding
are behind the "most interesting research proposals." In other words,
not only the motivation of particular research projects but also their most important substantive findings,
if they were revealed, they

would probably have ruined the careers and lives of those involved. If we push the
methodological usages, epistemological presuppositions, and the like. But
argument to its limits, we can more clearly see the problems involved in this kind of position. For instance, what
about the "projection of these affinities from the realm of the more personal to the delineation of more generic
social-cultural problems and issues," or the connection "intellectual and emotional, between the observer and the
observed," for the full-time anthropologist, former member of a Central American guerrilla movement, who decides
to do an ethnography on the Chiapas uprising? If a contributor to this collection were such a former guerrilla
member, wouldn't this type of "affinity" or "connection" have "enlightened" our understanding of the Chiapas
what would have been the case if the

research project were about drug use and commerce on the border; wouldn't the
connection between the personal and the research topic done by the ethnographer who is also
a recreational drug user help us to understand the subject much better? The same can be said about the
insurrection? Let's consider another fictitious possibility:
sociologist who is an alcoholic and alcohol consumption on the border. Of course nobody involved in this collection
a couple of us
have what can be called "still or not-yet-legitimized weird/deviant/not-totally legal
identities considering our career stages," and almost all of us have some identities that , for
is a former Central American guerrilla member, a drug user, or a current alcoholic, but at least
different reasons, we do not want to disclose or connect with our research
agendas.
Obviously the connections are there, and their disclosure would doubtless contribute to understanding our findings,
but for the time being we are not able or willing to come out of the closet with them. If you agree with Behar's
argument, as I do, that the "exposure of the self who is also a spectator has to take us somewhere we couldn't
otherwise go to. It has to be essential to the argument, not a decorative flourish, not exposure for its own sake"
(1996, 14), you really suffer when you read the published research of people you know. Why is this so? Because you
realize that if the ethnographers had made (but cannot for the reasons I am exposing here) the proper connections
between their lives and their work, the research would have had many more layers than it already has. In other
words, you know that such connections are essential for a full understanding of their work, but you also know that
you have to keep those connections private. A couple of examples may suffice to illustrate my point. I was at pains
reading the wonderful ethnography of a Peruvian colleague, who all the time had to use euphemisms (and
sometimes plain lies), or erase the issue altogether from her ethnography, to avoid accounting for the process of
adoption of her son from a poor Peruvian family because the legal papers for the boy had not yet arrived when she
published her work. That is, her son was still living illegally in the United States, and the account of the adoption
process, quite central to the understanding of some aspects of everyday life in the Andean villages of Peru, would
what about the various

ethnographic accounts of female employment in the assembly plants in the Middle
East done by young feminist scholars whom you know are lesbians but, because
they are in the early stages of their academic careers (some of them in very
conservative states and universities), cannot afford to display that identity in their
work? Knowing their sexual orientation, you understand many things about their work better, and you can easily
have revealed that status, something my Peruvian friend could not afford. Or
find the "affinities between the ethnographer and the subject of study" that Marcus claims are behind the "most
those affinities are not open to the public for basic issues
of academic (and sometimes personal) survival. I can advance a dozen different examples in the
same direction, showing how the postmodern claim we are discussing here and advanced by people
such as Marcus, Behar, and the like comes from a particular subject position that, for
obvious reasons of power, cannot see that others cannot follow its steps. In
other words, they are performing the same "God trick" (Haraway 1988) they so fiercely
criticize about the academic "other." Consequently Ruth Behar can claim without any problem that
interesting research proposals," but
"since I have put myself in the ethnographic picture, readers feel they have come to know me. They have poured
their own feelings into their construction of me and in that way come to identify with me, or at least their fictional
image of who I am" (1996, 16), because the "disclosure about herself" is the one she performed in Translated
Woman, in which, for instance, she relates her experience of getting tenure at Michigan with Esperanza's (the
Mexican street peddler) story. In that account, her double persona as both Cuban and Jewish is important to her
epistemological reflection about what kind of story she is telling about Esperanza. But what could have happened
with my fictional Central American former guerrilla member, current drug user, or alcoholic turned anthropologist
(or vice versa) disclosing that part of her or his multiple persona to allow readers to connect their own experiences?
And if "when you write vulnerably, others respond vulnerably" (Behar 1996, 16), can we expect a string of
confessions from other former guerrilla members currently living in the United States, drug users or alcoholics
we are
dealing with something like "mainstream deviant subject positions" or "now
allowed but previously deviant subject positions" from which it is permitted to make
connections between personal lives and research projects versus "still not
allowed subversive/deviant subject positions" from which it is not possible
to do so . . . yet? And this difference between subject positions is not fixed but is
related to stages in the academic careers of those involved, in such a way that
some "subversive/deviant subject positions" can become "mainstream" once the
person moves from one stage to the other (the lesbian scholars in my account are a good example
reading and being moved by my fictitious characters' book? That is the reason why I have claimed that
of this possibility: Janet Smith, assistant professor at Cincinnati State, cannot connect her personal life as Gloria
Anzalda does). Simultaneously, some "deviant nonmainstream subject positions" can become mainstream or are
allowed to come out of the closet when the people who occupy them get enough power in academia to request a
voice (Steve Seidman, the renowned gay professor at SUNYAlbany, can connect his sexual orientation with his
research in a way that John Smith, the still-free drug-using assistant professor at Wyoming State, cannot).
fact, of course, does not escape the advocates of the "subjective connection"
This
perspective, but I still think that they do not fully understand the
consequences of their proposals. Consider the case of Ruth Behar, who totally
acknowledges the dangerous effects of publicly connecting some particular "still today
deviant behaviors" with a research agenda. She quotes the work of Kay Redfield Jamison (1995, 7) in that regard: I
have had many concerns about writing a book that so explicitly describes my own attacks of mania, depression, and
psychosis, as well as my problems acknowledging the need for ongoing medication.... I have no idea what the longterm effects of discussing such issues so openly will be on my personal and professional life but, whatever the
consequences, they are bound to be better than continuing to be silent. I am tired of hiding, tired of misspent and
knotted energies, tired of the hypocrisy, and tired of acting as though I have something to hide. The problem that I
think escapes both Behar and Jamison is that the latter can be "tired" of all those things precisely because she is
"an established professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, who co-authored a standard
medical text on manic-depressive illness" (Behar 1996, 9). My point is that less-established scholars cannot have
the luxury of being tired of the same things that compelled Jamison to reveal her own "deviancy." However, being
aware of the other reasons why Jamison can disclose her "deviancy," that her illness has lately lost much of its
"deviant" character (that is, moved from "still deviant" to "no-more or at least less-deviant behavior"), Behar still
does not realize the implications of her analysis to those other ethnographers who still have some kind of "not yet
out of shame deviant behavior": One of my colleagues, a medical anthropologist, tells me that the main reason
Jamison is able to make herself so vulnerable at this moment in time is because of advances in the field of
biochemistry, which have led to new understandings of the biochemical roots of depression, making it possible to
control the illness through medical supervision and drugs. Science, in other words, has drained the shame out of
depression. (Behar 1996, 11) Either because "science" or the struggles of the bearers of a particular subject
position have "drained the shame out of" a particular illness, behavior, habit, or identity, the question remains the
same: what are the possibilities of using the "existing affinities between the ethnographer and the subject of study"
For
all these reasons, it sounds problematic when Ruth Behar claims that "vulnerability, in
short, is here to stay. Critics can keep dismissing these trends as forms of 'solipsism,' but a lot of us are
going to continue wearing our hearts on our sleeves" (1996, 32), because she can wear her
Jewishness, Cubanness, family history, and the like on her sleeve, something other
ethnographers, bearers of what I have called "not yet allowed subject positions," cannot
do without putting in jeopardy either their careers or even their freedom and their lives. Therefore when
she is talking about "vulnerability," she is talking about a narrow version
of it, namely, the kind of vulnerability that the status quo allows to appear
without major punishment, that is, the vulnerability of settled scholars who have mainstream subject
to improve a research design for ethnographers who "still" have "not yet authorized deviant subject positions"?
positions (deviant or not) and can intertwine them with their ethnographies.
Case Neg
No China Cyberthreat
Cyberthreat from China is a constructed threat
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cyber_threat.html
Inflated Threats and Growing Mistrust. The United States and China have more to
gain than lose through their intensive use of the internet, even as friction in
cyberspace remains both frustrating and inevitable. Threat misperception heightens
the risks of miscalculation in a crisis and of Chinese backlash against competitive
U.S. firms.
The U.S. Advantage. For every type of Chinese cyber threatpolitical, espionage,
and militarythere are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and countervailing U.S.
strengths.
Chinese threats decreasing

Sanger 6/21/16 NYT staff
staffhttp://www.realcleardefense.com/2016/06/21/report_chinese_curb_cyberattacks_on_us_interests_283157.html
Nine months after President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China agreed to a
broad crackdown on cyberespionage aimed at curbing the theft of intellectual
property, the first detailed study of Chinese hacking has found a sharp drop-off
in almost daily raids on Silicon Valley firms, military contractors and other
commercial targets.
Cyberattacks from china decreasing

Crum 16 (Rex, Senior Web Editor, Business for the Mercury News, Chinese cyberattacks are down,
says FireEye report, 6.21.16, http://www.siliconbeat.com/2016/06/21/chinese-cyberattacks-saysfireeye-report/)
Well, the next time a major cyberattack becomes public, we might need to blame someone else other than China.
the number of cyberattacks

launched from China against Silicon Valley tech firms has dropped substantially over the last
year. It was nine months ago that President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at the
White House and said they would launch new efforts to reduce cyberattacks aimed at
stealing intellectual property, particularly that of U.S. tech companies. The iSight study found that that
Thats because a study done by Milpitas-based FireEyes iSight division says
Chinese crackdown on cyberattacks appears to be part of Xis attempts to exert more control over Chinas military,
which itself is widely believed to be the source of most of the electronic intrusions of American tech company
networks and systems. The report mentions a Chinese army group called Unit 61398 as the main culprit of the
hacking attacks, and that the groups member has likely been dispersed to other parts of the Chinese military and
government. While the amount of everyday attacks from China has decreased , iSight said
American companies still see a number of network attacks on a daily basis, with semiconductor and aerospace
companies among those dealing with the highest amount of cyber intrusions.
Squo Solving China

Squo agreements are enough more cooperation will happen
in the status quo to address relations and cyber threats
Blanchard 6/14 (Ben, reporter with Reuters, U.S. sees progress in latest cyber
talks with China, published online 6/14/2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-usa-cyber-idUSKCN0Z00DN)/\MB/\
progress has been made with China on information
sharing about cyber threats, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday during the latest round of cyber
The United States is pleased to see
security talks between the two countries. Cyber security has long been an irritant in relations between China and
China and the United States signed an antihacking accord in September last year, brokered during Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to
Washington, including a pledge that neither country would knowingly carry out hacking for
commercial advantages. The agreement marked an ongoing effort to repair relations after China withdrew
the United States, the world's two largest economies.
from a working group in 2014 in response to the U.S. indictment of five members of its military on charges it hacked
six U.S. companies. Meeting in Beijing, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary Suzanne Spaulding
the focus on the talks was to make sure both sides fulfilled commitments made
by the two presidents. "We look forward to discussing the commitments we made with regards to not
engaging in IP theft of trade secrets and confidential business information," she told reporters. " A key element
of the agreement is information sharing and establishing mechanisms ." She said the two
said
sides had been setting up email addresses to share information. "We are very pleased to have temporary email
addresses and very much appreciate" working to set up permanent addresses, Spaulding said. Chinese Minister of
China highly valued the talks. "We want to bring the discussions
from policies on paper to actual implementation ," Guo said. "Both sides will continue to cooperate
Public Security Guo Shengkun said
on cyber cases. I believe the leadership on both sides places emphasis on the issue and values participation. Xi
Jinping has personally been involved."
Dialogues solve now drops in attack frequency, cooperation,

Chinese military reforms
Collins 6/21 (Katie, London-based reporter for CNet, China's daily cyberattacks
on the US are in decline, says report published online 6/21/16
http://www.cnet.com/news/chinas-daily-cyberattacks-on-the-us-are-in-decline-saysreport/)/\MB/\
A sharp drop-off in the number of cyberattacks on US interests originating in China
has been recorded by security firm FireEye. The group said in a report published Monday that it suspected
the decline is a reflection of work by the US and Chinese governments to rein in the
activities of groups conducting the attack s. At one point such attacks -- many aimed at Silicon Valley
tech companies -- were occurring on an almost daily basis. This is no longer the case, in part thanks to the US
government's plea to China to lay off its cyberspying efforts, which are mainly designed to steal industrial secrets
from successful US businesses.
Chinese military reforms conducted by President Xi Jinping are also
thought by FireEye to have played a key role in the decline of attacks . FireEye reviewed the
activity of 72 groups operating in China or representing Chinese interests, going back three and a half years. It
found that since mid-2014, there has been a steep decline in the number of attacks not
only on the US, but on 25 other countries, including Russia, Japan and several European nations. This predates the
meeting in September 2015 between President Barack Obama and the Chinese leader, who agreed that neither
this was
amongst dramatic
country would "conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property." It seems that
not "a watershed moment," according to FireEye, but rather

changes that had been taking place for years."
"one point
Cyberwar alt causes

Multiple alt causes to cyberwar
Geller 15 (Eric Geller, Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Political Science at Kenyon College,
The global struggle to prevent cyberwar, 9/30/15,
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/cyberwar-international-law-russia-china/)
Anyone who follows news about cyberattacks will recognize the two major
aggressors: Russia and China. But the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic
of China use cyber means to achieve markedly different ends. Whereas hackers in
China allegedly steal economic secrets to prop up its economy, Russias
cyberarmies reportedly focus more on stealing military and diplomatic dataand
then mining it to locate U.S. spies. Russia is even better at that than China, said
Scott Borg, the director of the US. Cyber Consequences Unit, an independent
research group that monitors cyber incidents. They are probably successfully
stealing virtually all our military secrets. While China might be the more popular of
the two national boogeyman right now, Russia operates at a more sophisticated
level. The Russian government, experts say, has the best of both worlds: a loyal
force of hackers on its payroll and cyberattackers-for-hire in the criminal
underworld. These groups earn the right to operate in these countries by
performing services for the countries, or at least services that these countries
perceive as beneficial to them, Borg said. So Russian cybercrime, for instance, is
bringing huge amounts of money into the Russian economy. They also are doing
favors for the Russian government and voluntarily doing things to advance Russian
policies. For evidence of this, look no further than the messages that popped up on
Russian websites urging attacks on Georgian cyber infrastructure as Vladimir Putins
military was gearing up for battle. There are other threats besides China and Russia.
Iran and North Korea maintain sizable electronic armies; the U.S. government
believes that the latter nation played a major role in the devastating Sony hack last
year. And not all cybercriminals operate at the behest of strongman governments
like Putins; many just want to hack into banks and reroute hefty sums of money
into their own coffers. Perhaps the only major global threat that has not yet
mustered a significant cyber presence is the constellation of Islamic terrorist groups
in the Middle East and North Africa. They are growing remarkably adept at
spreading their message on social media, especially on Twitter and Facebook, but
they have not yet demonstrated the capacity to launch attacks like the ones that
struck Sony and OPM.
Attribution problems block solvency

Stratfor 15 (Stratfor Analysis includes individuals from around the world who are highly engaged in global
affairs and frequently quoted in the news media and have all achieved high levels of prestige at Universities, U.S.,
China: Diplomatic Solutions to Cybersecurity Problems, 9/24/15, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/us-chinadiplomatic-solutions-cybersecurity-problems)
Beijing's diplomatic moves during September will not further its efforts to push its
multilateral Internet governance model. And despite China's economic leverage,
Beijing will not push its economic and cybersecurity policies to the point of
damaging ties with Western tech industries, given China's continued dependence on
foreign technologies. However, the United States, even after the Sept. 11 meeting,
will still be challenged in protecting its economic interests from Chinese cyber
espionage. Acts of industrial espionage are particularly difficult for a national
government to counter when the actors are located on foreign soil. Moreover, the
nature of cyber espionage can obfuscate its origins a major issue, since Beijing's
involvement is not needed for Chinese businesses and citizens to commit such acts.
Thus, despite Washington's option to impose sanctions, Beijing knows the White
House would be challenged to continually pursue individual actors. Furthermore, the
U.S. government's limited role in safeguarding its private sector's network
infrastructure means it must continually use foreign policy to get Beijing to
cooperate in limiting China's role in cyber espionage.
No Cyberwar
The impact of a large-scale cyberattack is hugely exaggerated
it wouldnt be devastating and wouldnt spark war
Geller 15 (Eric, writer on technology policy for the Daily Dot, The global struggle to prevent cyberwar
published online 9/30/15 at http://www.dailydot.com/politics/cyberwar-international-law-russia-china/)/\MB/\
For all the uncertainty that exists in the global debate over cyber capabilities and responsibilities,
the threat environment is remarkably stable. Cyber armageddon is possible but very,
very unlikely, said Herbert Lin, a senior cyber policy scholar at Stanford Universitys Center
for International Security and Cooperation. Whats more reasonable to contemplate is a cumulative series of lowto moderate-level attacks that have a cumulative cost on the U.S. in a variety of ways. Technical experts and legal
the idea of a cyber Pearl Harbora devastating sneak attack on U.S.

infrastructure by a powerful state actor that launched a sustained international conflict is wildly overblown.
Right now, Watts said, states bite at one anothers ankles in a way to impede progress or to harass
them, but as for the likelihood of a major cyber war , I would rate it pretty low. Cyber
scholars repeatedly stress that
armageddon may be extremely unlikely, but the many attacks below the level of formal armed conflict have still
extracted a staggering price, in both economic and political terms. Businesses are losing money. Diplomatic
relations are being strained. Accusations are being leveled, often without meeting the traditional standard of proof.
What should the international community do about all of this?
No cyber war or apocalypse cyber attacks arent strategic,

theyre an inferior substitute for terrestrial force
Gartzke 13 (Erik, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and
Professor of Government at the University of Essex, The Myth of Cyberwar, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2
(Fall 2013), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00136)
There is a significant fault, however, in the theme of impending cyber apocalypse: it

is far from clear that conflict over the internet can actually function as war.
Predictions about the nature or significance of cyberwar generally commit a
common fallacy in arguing from opportunity to outcome, rather than considering
whether something that could happen is at all likely, given the motives of those who
are able to act. Cyber pessimism rests heavily on capabilities (means), with little
thought to a companion logic of consequences (ends). Much that could happen in
the world fails to occur, largely because those who can act discern no meaningful
benefit from initiating a given act. Put another way, advocates have yet to work out
how cyberwar enables aggressors to accomplish tasks typically associated with
terrestrial military violence. Absent this logic of consequences, cyberwar is unlikely
to prove as pivotal in world affairs, and for developed nations, in particular, as many
observers seem to believe.
This article assesses the salience of the internet for carrying out functions
commonly identified with terrestrial political violence. War is fundamentally a
political process, as Carl von Clausewitz famously explained.6 States, groups, and
individuals threaten harm to deter or compel, generating influence through the
prospect of damage or loss. Military force can also be exercised to maintain or alter
the balance of power and resist or impose disputed outcomes. The internet is
generally an inferior substitute to terrestrial force in performing the functions of

coercion or conquest. Cyber war is not likely to serve as the anal arbiter of
competition in an anarchical world and so should not be considered in isolation from
more traditional forms of political violence.7 The capacity for internet coercion is
further limited by some of the same factors that make cyberwar appear at first so
intimidating. For threats or demands to prove effective, targets must believe both
that an attack is likely to follow from noncompliance and that the attack is destined
to inflict unacceptable harm. Yet, as I detail here, the need to apprise targets of
internet vulnerabilities to make cyber threats credible contrasts with the secrecy
required to ensure an effective attack.
Given the inherent difficulty of credibly threatening cyberattacks without also
compromising operational effectiveness, it will be tempting for actors to practice
cyberwar rather than engage in coercive threats. Here, too, however, key limitations
exist regarding what can be achieved over the internet. It is one thing for an
opponent to interrupt a countrys infrastructure, communications, or military
coordination and planning. It is another to ensure that the damage inflicted
translates into a lasting shift in the balance of national power or resolve.
Cyberattacks are unlikely to prove particularly potent in grand strategic terms
unless they can impose substantial, durable harm on an adversary. In many,
perhaps most, circumstances, this will occur only if cyberwar is accompanied by
terrestrial military force or other actions designed to capitalize on any temporary
incapacity achieved via the internet. Those initiating cyberattacks must therefore
decide whether they are prepared to exploit the windows of opportunity generated
by internet attacks through other modes of combat. If they are not willing and able
to do so, then in grand strategic terms, there are few compelling reasons to initiate
cyberwar. The need to back up cyber with other modes of conflict in turn suggests
that the chief beneficiaries of cyberwar are less likely to be marginal groups or
rising challengers looking to overturn the existing international order and more
likely to be nation-states that already possess important terrestrial military
advantages. Conceived of in this way, the internet poses no revolution in military
affairs but instead promises simply to extend existing international disparities in
power and influence.
Their impact is paranoia someone could also poison your Corn

flakes, doesnt mean its going to happen
Yet, it is far from clear that the internet is transformational in military terms, let
alone revolutionary. Lacking information about whether developments are radical or
merely incremental, it may make sense to adopt a few guidelines that will help to
determine whether there is cause for panic. A reasonable level of caution is usually
provided by our own common sense. Most readers will lock their doors at night, for
example, and refrain from handling large sums of cash in a dark alley. Imagining
what others could do to injure each of us, however, can quickly descend into
paranoia. It is not reasonable to believe that someone is intent on mischief simply
because it is possible for them to inflict harm.
Even in the safest of societies, individuals, groups, and entire communities are
subject to an enormous variety of potential hazards. Much could be done to impinge
on each of us, even though few of these possibilities are ever exercised, or
experienced, with any regularity. The physical world hosts a multitude of venues for
extremely unlikely accident or disease. A small number of people prefer to remain
indoors rather than risk being struck by lightning or struck down by botchulism. Still,
individuals with these concerns may merit more attention from psychiatric
professionals than from military planners. Being vulnerable will be novel to no one
living in our modern, highly integrated world. Indeed, the capacity to hurt is so
ubiquitous in densely populated portions of the globe that blood would coat the
streets if it were not true that relatively little relationship exists between the
capacity to attack and the actual prospect that one will be invaded, assaulted, or
otherwise done in.37
Just about anything is possible. Someone may have put poison in your Corn flakes at
breakfast. Terrorists may have singled you out for vengeance, or you might just
become one of the unlucky few who are in the wrong place at the wrong time. When
a commuter steps outside to start her car or to catch the bus, it is impossible to be
certain that no truck will jump the curb and that every asteroid will remain in its
usual orbit. And yet, despite endless potential for injury or death, few of us have
chosen to harden our living rooms against cruise missile attack or immersed
ourselves in real-time plots from NASA charting the trajectories of space detritus. In
dealing with known unknowns, we became comfortable with not being protected.
California homeowners typically do not carry earthquake insurance, for example,
even though the big one is an eventuality. We do so because security is
expensive; being indemnified against unlikely events may literally not be worth the
effort. One could buy that bulletproof vest listed on Ebay, but then how often would
it prove fashionable at the office or in the classroom? The probabilities of esoteric
catastrophe are by their nature minute. Unlikely events are unlikely, and so most of
us go about our business, paying little attention to the potential menace from the
skies or, for that matter, from one another.
Governments face similar realities. Many threats are conceivable, but relatively few
actually materialize. A holistic approach to security involves assessing risks, and
then allocating finite resources to address tractable threats, making the largest
improvements in protection or, conversely, the greatest increases in inouence.38
Every dollar spent on national defense must be taken from objectives such as
improving education, building or repairing infrastructure, or paying down the debt.
Only extremely affluent (or paranoid) populations pay the price of pursuing
protection from the most exotic hazards. More to the point, protection is inevitably
incomplete, and comes with its own consequences, including other forms of
insecurity. The risk of attack is never zero, given that a potent defense or deterrent
endangers the security of others.39
Cyberwar fails as its own military strategy cyberwar isnt a

thing
In war, tactics must serve strategy and strategy must serve grand strategy.
Students of cyberwar have yet to explain how the internet can host meaningful
political conflict, precisely because it cannot serve the anal arbiter function that has
for millennia been the purview of physical violence. The tendency among pundits of
cyberwar has been to focus on tactics and possibly strategy, showing that harm is
possible without explaining how the harm generated is likely to shape the product of
political differences. In the absence of this logic of consequences, the internet
becomes an adjunct domain to more traditional forms of warfare. Cyberwar is an
evolving dimension of war and a source of concern, but in grand strategic terms, it
remains a backwater. A failure to focus on grand strategy is an all-too-familiar byproduct of the war on terror, where the objective has been to harm and not be
harmed, rather than to effect meaningful changes to the disposition of world affairs.
It would be absurd to infer that there is no role for the internet in twenty-firstcentury conflict. The internet will be affected by conflict, just as is the case with
every other domain in which individuals, groups, and societies interact. Indeed, the
real message for soldiers and politicians is that cyberwar involves a broadening of
the dimensions of warfare, rather than a narrowing of future conflict. In most cases,
the internet is not a viable, free-standing venue for the pursuit of national interests.
It would be surprising if a country intent on attacking another nation failed to carry
out preparatory or simultaneous attacks of targets defense capabilities via the
internet. It would be even more surprising if an aggressor successfully substituted
cyberwar for conventional, tangible forms of conflict. This is the conceit of Nikolai
Kuryanovich, former member of the Russian Duma: In the very near future, many
conflicts will not take place on the open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the
Internet, fought with the aid of information soldiers.67 Mr. Kuryanovich continues,
[A] small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of the current
armed forces.68 Surely, a country with thousands of soldiers and hundreds of
hackers would be inclined to use both.
By itself cyberwar can achieve neither conquest nor, in most cases, coercion.
Russian military planners obviously understood this in preparing to invade Georgia,
not just with an army of hackers, but with tanks. Indeed, the tanks appear to have
done more for Georgian insecurity than anything accomplished by information
soldiers. The threat of cyberwar cannot deter or compel particularly effectively
either, except possibly in the short term, and only with the consequence that an
attacker will have forfeited the potential to exploit a given set of vulnerabilities in
the future. Cyberwarfare will most often occur as an adjunct to conventional
warfare, or as a stop-gap and largely symbolic effort to express dissatisfaction with
a foreign opponent. It is best to discuss cyberwar in these contexts, not as an

independent, or even alternative form of conflict, but as an extension of the logic
already expressed in combined arms battle. Because in most cases cyberwar cannot
achieve the objectives that have historically prompted nations to commit to tangible
military violence, cyberwar is only warfare in the context of terrestrial forms of
interstate threats or force.
Even the most successful forms of cyberwar (such as cyber espionage) do not
presage much of a transformation. Just as innovations in artillery and small arms
made fighting in close formation untenable, militaries, governments, and societies
will adapt. It would be ludicrous to suggest to modern infantries that the massing of
fires would be best achieved if they stayed in formation while on the march or in the
assault. Contemporary field commanders have become comfortable with the idea
that perimeters are partial or temporary, that air-land battle (and naval warfare for
a longer time) necessarily involves not fronts, but mobility; not frontal attack, but
maneuver. Similar concepts will pervade discussions of cyberwar. Static security is
insecurity. It does not follow, however, that being vulnerable means one will be
attacked, or that there is much that can be done to prevent aggression if it is
initiated. Security in the modern world, terrestrial and cyber, is a function more of
the motives of opponents than of the ability to attack. Nations or groups that strike
through the internet in minor ways may be ubiquitous. Those that threaten critical
national security goals will be rare if for no other reason than that cyberwar is not
really war in grand strategic terms. In this regard, the next Pearl Harbor is much
more likely to occur in Hawaii than in cyberspace.
No risk of cyber war wont be used in place of conventional

warfare and no one can beat the US
No foreign military force is capable of subduing the United States, now or in the
foreseeable future, with or without the assistance of a phenomenally successful
coordinated cyberattack. If cyberwar is unlikely to allow a foreign power to
permanently overtake U.S. or allied capabilities, and if temporary damage is useful
only when practiced in conjunction with more conventional military operations, then
an opponent must plan and evaluate its use of cyberwar in relation to its
complementarity to terrestrial combat, not as a fully independent method of force. If
instead a cyberattack is carried out in which conventional force is either ineffective
or not contemplated, then an attack of this kind fails to serve a meaningful grand
strategic purpose, degrading neither the targets longer-term capabilities nor its
resolve.
Unless cyberwar can substitute for a physical surprise attack, there is no reason to
believe that it will be used in place of conventional modes of warfare. Nor is it clear
why an attacker would choose to strike over the internet, unless a conventional
surprise attack is also planned and when it is expected that the combination of
cyber and terrestrial aggression will yield a decisive advantage to the attacker. If it
is difficult to imagine a particular nation being attacked by traditional methods of
warfare, even with the benefit of surprise, then it is hard to see how that nation
might be fundamentally threatened by warfare conducted over the internet. Indeed,
the connection between internet aggression and traditional forms of military force
imply an unfashionable prediction: cyberwar should be particularly appealing to
capable states confronting weaker opponents. Rather than threatening to overturn
the existing world order, cyberwar may perpetuate or even increase current military
inequality.
Impact from cyberwar is temporary and limited conventional

conflict outweighs
Beyond questions of means and motive, two basic features make cyberwarfare
different from other types of conflict. First, much of the damage contemplated by
cyberwar is in all likelihood temporary. The assumption among many cyber
pessimists that the potential for creating harm is sufficient to make cyberspace a
suitable substitute for, or indeed alternative to, terrestrial conflict is incorrect.
Shutting down power grids, closing airports, or derailing communication could be
tremendously costly, but most damage of this type will be axed quickly and at
comparatively modest investment of tangible resources. Regardless, damage of this
type is sunk. Losses experienced over a given interval cannot be recovered
whatever ones reactions and so should not have much direct impact on subsequent
policy behavior. Harm inflicted over the internet or any other medium will matter
politically when it alters the subsequent balance of power, or when it indicates
enemy capabilities that must be taken into account in future plans. Because
cyberwar does not involve bombing cities or devastating armored columns, the
damage inflicted will have a short-term impact on its targets.47 To accomplish
politically meaningful objectives, cyberattacks must contribute to other aspects of
a more conventional war effort. And to affect the long-term balance of power, for
instance, cyberwar must be joined to other, more traditional, forms of war.
Temporary damage can be useful under two circumstances. First, compromising or
incapacitating networks might give an enemy valuable tactical, or even strategic,
advantages. An opponent that cannot shoot, move, resupply, or communicate will
be easier to defeat. Nonetheless, the advantaged party must still act through some
medium of combat to seize the initiative. Notions that cyberattacks will themselves
prove pivotal in future war are reminiscent of World War I artillery barrages that
cleared enemy trenches but still required the infantry and other arms to achieve a
breakout. Whether an actor can benefit from cyberwar depends almost entirely on
whether the actor is able to combine a cyberattack with some other method
typically kinetic warfare that can convert temporary advantages achieved over
the internet into a lasting effect. In the parlance of war, internet attacks produce a
soft kill that is valuable only when attackers prosecute follow-on attacks with
traditional military force or permanently weaken an enemy in some other way.48
The notion of a devastating surprise attack is a particularly baroque aspect of
cyberwar paranoia, and is certainly frightening to the degree that such scenarios
are accurate. Yet, the idea of a surprise internet attack is misleading and relies on a
fundamental misconception of the role of internet-based aggression. Modern
warfare seldom allows any one element of combat to prove pivotal. Instead, it is the
ability to combine elements into a complex whole that increasingly distinguishes the
adept utilization of force.49
The archetype of modern, combined arms warfare is the blitzkrieg, where the
lethality and decisiveness of conventional military violence is enhanced by actions
designed to disrupt the enemys military and civilian infrastructure. An important
element of blitzkrieg was the use of terror weapons, such as the Ju 87 Stuka dive
bomber, to sow panic, causing enemy populations to flood roads and railways,
thereby crippling transportation grids needed by the defense. Yet, fear is temporary
and in the absence of substance, subsides. The Stukas were effective only as long
as Germany held other military advantages over its enemies. Similarly, unless Stuka
attacks were accompanied by a ground attack or an invasion, their role as terror
weapons was largely redundant. Stukas contributed little to Germanys effort to
subdue Great Britain, for example. Stuka units experienced heavy casualties when
engaged against a sophisticated air defense and were eventually removed from
service in the Battle of Britain. The hubris of Luftwaffe Commander in Chief
Hermann Goring in promising victory while exploiting just one domain (the air) was
precisely that he exaggerated the effectiveness of a new technology in isolation
from other elements of an integrated offense.
There is no reason to believe that cyberwar will be any more useful as an isolated
instrument of coercive foreign policy. An attack that causes temporary harm will
inevitably be followed by countermeasures and heightened vigilance, as has
happened, for example, in Estonia in the aftermath of the 2007 at-tacks. For cyber
aggression to have lasting effects, a virtual attack must be combined with physical
intervention. Knocking out communications or power infrastructure could cause
tremendous disruption, but the ability to quickly recover from such attacks implies
that the consequences for the balance of national power would be negligible. The
need to follow virtual force with physical force to achieve lasting political
consequences suggests that the application of cyberwarfare independent of
conventional forms of warfare will be of tertiary importance in strategic and grand
strategic terms. If one cannot foresee circumstances where the terrestrial use of
force is plausible independent of cyberwar, then cyberwar is also unlikely to
constitute a fundamental threat.
Cyber scenarios exaggerated to get military budget

Lee 5/6/15 Robert Lee is a US Cyber Warfare Operations Officer, and is studying for a PhD in Cyber Security
at King's College London. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32534923
"A lot of my research debunks stories. I can't cite them because they're not true.
There's a general narrative that horrible things are happening all the time: cyberwar, nation states are crumbling. That's not true.
"If you hear, 'There's been some recent research around aviation and planes are
going to be hacked and fall out of the sky,' or, 'People are going to cyber-attack
trains and derail them,' that's not realistic.
"Security companies are ramping up the threat. The military's relabelled a lot
of things 'cyber-warfare' because they want to get the budget from Congress.
Nato and the different alliances ramp up the threat to encourage other countries to
invest in security.
"One of the narratives that gets built around critical infrastructure is that we're
going to have these cascading power failures; someone's going to break in and very
easily take down the power grid. While it's true there's vulnerable infrastructure ,
you can't just take down the entirety of the power grid from a cybercapability.
"[And] we all have the same threat. If the US wants to be able to do that against
Russia, or China wants to do that against the US, they have to accept their own
vulnerability and do things that would impact themselves as well.
"The head of Cyber Command and the head of the National Security Agency say,
'OK, we need to invest in offensive capabilities to be able to secure our critical
infrastructure'. Those capabilities trickle down to fringe groups.
"If you developed a cyber-capability that could take down the Chinese power grid, it
would be nearly identical to the capability you would need to take down the US
power grid. We use the same systems. The hype is forcing us to look into offence,
which is exactly what we should not be doing.
"We actually saw a very concerning case recently, where a company said, 'Iran,
they're attacking the US hundreds of thousands of times a year'. But they
redefined 'attack' : they used ways of describing the events in a way that no-one
else in the security world support. The way they framed it was very dangerous."
Critical infrastructures adequately protected now cyber war

is a sexy myth
Rid 5/6/15 Thomas Rid is professor of security studies at King's College London and the author of Cyber War
Will Not Take Place. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32534923
Bringing down electricity grids, crashing airplanes, things like that just don't
happen. Instead I think we should talk about the attacks that actually happen, that
actually cause a lot of damage. "[The Saudi Aramco attack] essentially turned their
computers into unusable bricks. The oil production was not affected - only the office
environment. "It was sabotage. It's useful to use the word sabotage, because then
we don't talk about violence. These are non-violent attacks, yet they have a huge
effect. And if we talk about war, then we're always waiting for something big and
violent to happen. But effective non-violent sabotage is already happening. "There's
an excess of alarmism already. I don't think we're taking our eyes off the ball by
pointing out that we need a little more nuance. "It shouldn't be underestimated how
difficult it is to develop this capability at scale. Yes, only trying to get into one
specific hospital is not very difficult. But doing it across London is far more difficult.
"Attacking a control system would be like entering a building, finding the secret
engine room, fiddling with the engine, changing its settings - not shutting it down,
but changing its settings - so that the engine does something very specific that you
want it to do. And doing all of that in a way so the operators of the engine don't
recognise what you're doing is actually quite difficult. "What I'm most worried about
is easy attacks against networks, not against the power plants, but against office
environments. What if somebody steals data from the NHS, or some other
company? That's a more realistic scenario. "It's doing basic hygiene. It's like
brushing your teeth in the morning. It's just so much more exciting to talk about
cyber war. The actual conversation that really makes a lot more sense, I'm afraid,
is a far more boring one. And that's ultimately part of the problem."
Solvency
!!!Negotiating a cyber agreement fails just makes relations
worse and attacks more likely
Lieberthal 13 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Chinese Political Theory at Dartmouth
College and Columbia University, Cybersecurity and China, 2/22/13,
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/02/22-cybersecurity-chinalieberthal)
As recent news reports highlight, the U.S. government and cyber security firms are
now naming names as they accuse the Chinese of a wide ranging state-directed
campaign of cyber espionage. Pinpointing who has actually directed such intrusions
and data theft is technically difficult. But there is now convincing evidence that
state-supported players in China are undertaking massive, organized efforts to
penetrate foreign networks and steal information of commercial, diplomatic and
security value to various Chinese interests. These activities are increasing tensions
in U.S.-China relations and warrant serious diplomatic efforts to address. But there
are no quick fixes in this arena, and it is especially important therefore to be clear
about what can and cannot be accomplished through negotiations. Put simply what
could American negotiators feasibly accomplish if the Chinese side is willing to
engage in serious, sincere talks to reach agreements on cyber space norms and
activities? The following answers assume that Beijing will insist that the U.S. and the
other major advanced industrial countries hold themselves to any rules that are
negotiated. Espionage Americans are alarmed and infuriated by Chinese intrusions
into our defense, intelligence, and diplomatic networks and by Beijings acquisition
of information on how to penetrate (and potentially attack) the systems that control
our critical infrastructure such as power plants, the electrical grid, dams, and
financial services networks. All of this falls under into the category of espionage
acquiring nonpublic information that can give one state an advantage over another.
But nobody has ever figured out a way to stop states from engaging in espionage
wherever they are able to do so, and the new cyber realm is unlikely to prove an
exception to this. Information on American cyber espionage is largely classified, but
it is unrealistic to assume that the United States as a matter of principle does not
exploit these opportunities on a large scale, including against China. It is, moreover,
hard to imagine that the relevant Washington agencies would agree to negotiate
limitations with China on what information the U.S. government will be allowed to
gather in the future. Even if we did so, our allies would almost certainly not go
along. There are a lot of ways to try to render a foreign powers espionage efforts
ineffective or even counterproductive. But establishing self-limiting rules of the road
is almost certainly not among them. Commercial Data The U.S. would have much
less trouble advocating a multilateral agreement to prohibit the use of governmentsponsored cyber intrusions to steal data (proprietary technology, negotiating
strategies, bid prices, etc.) to provide to the countrys corporations or other profitmaking bodies a competitive advantage. The U.S. government does not engage in
such activity itself. But even here, there are constraints. For example, the United
States has repeatedly identified foreign firms, including in China, that have engaged
in nuclear proliferation or other activities that violate U.N. sanctions or American
law. Undoubtedly, the U.S. government has at times learned of these activities
through cyber intrusions into corporate networks abroad. In addition, the French
government is widely reputed to engage in corporate cyber espionage to benefit
French companies, and this may also be the case for some other American allies.
Differentiating intrusions for legitimate security purposes from those for commercial
competitive advantage may prove very difficult in practice. Beijing may thus have a
lot of company in opposing any agreement to prohibit intrusions for commercial
gain. Warfare Cyber warfare means using cyber weapons to disrupt another
countrys security capabilities and/or inflict direct harm on its people. It may be
possible to identify certain types of cyber attacks that by common agreement are
prohibited and would warrant severe retaliation (the 21st century equivalent of the
post WWI agreement to prohibit the use of poison gas as a weapon of war). Applying
already-accepted international principles such as those prohibiting targeting
civilians and requiring efforts to minimize noncombatant casualties from an attack
may prove feasible in the cyber realm. Negotiations aimed at reaching such
agreements can also increase understanding of redlines that various countries have
and the rationales behind them. This in itself can potentially reduce the risk of cyber
attacks that escalate into major conflict. But any blanket effort to restrict the use of
cyber weapons to achieve military objectives is almost certainly a reach too far. The
United States, for example, reportedly worked with Israel to employ cyber weapons
(most notably the Stuxnet virus) to disrupt Irans nuclear program. All advanced
militaries, including Chinas PLA, moreover, have developed and deployed various
offensive and defensive electronic warfare capabilities. Various militaries will have
strong views on what types of capabilities, if any, they feel they can sacrifice in the
context of multilateral negotiations to constrain cyber warfare capabilities and
actions. Criminal Activity Utilization of cyber space in criminal activity comes in all
shapes and sizes such as fraud, identity theft, bank account raids, child
pornography, money laundering, gun running, and a vast array of other endeavors.
Criminality is an arena that may well hold the most promise for reaching meaningful
and enforceable multilateral agreements, as many (but by no means all) types of
crimes are recognized as such by all major governments. Negotiations may progress
most effectively if they begin with clear-cut shared concerns (such as child
pornography) and then move on to more complex issues only as mutual trust is
created and understanding develops as to feasible international enforcement
measures. In sum, Chinese activities rightly produce anger and frustration in the
U.S. and elsewhere, but figuring out what the United States itself is prepared to put
on the table and what types of agreements to seek with China and others requires
cool-headed calculations of what is feasible. Simplistic ideas of demanding that the
Chinese curtail the full array of their obnoxious and offensive behavior will raise the
temperature but will also fall far short of producing constructive outcomes,
especially given that the U.S. government would not itself accept many of the
restrictions on conduct that many feel we should require of Beijing.
Negotiating cyber agreement is impossible verification,

attribution and technical detail
Goldsmith 9/21/15 Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, cofounder of Lawfare, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and co-chair of its Working
Group on National Security, Technology, and Law. He teaches and writes about national security law, presidential
power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to
Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003-2004, and
Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002-2003. https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-get-too-excitedabout-us-china-arms-control-agreement-cyber
Second is the problem of verification. Sanger quotes my Kennedy School colleague

Joe Nye, who says that the agreement in question could create some selfrestraint, but then asked: how do you verify it, and what is its value if it cant be
verified? Answers: You cant, and not much. We have basically two means of
verifying an agreement: (1) verification procedures established by the agreement;
(2) unilateral intelligence-gathering techniques. As for the former, dont expect
China or the United States to open up their cyber-operations facilities for inspection
any time soon. As for the latter, verifying cyber-operations is enormously more
complex than verifying weapons and related military limitations for kinetic activities.
Cyber-operations have decentralized launch-points, are embedded in trillions of
communications, and often defy attribution. The United States has in the last few
years bragged about its enhanced attribution capabilities, but DNI Clapper recently
spoke in more modest terms about USG attribution capabilities (for example, about
the OPM hack) on account of unauthorized disclosures and foreign defensive
improvements [that] have cost us some technical accesses. The United States
would have to have a very high degree of confidence in its unilateral intelligencegathering and attribution capabilities before entering into any limitation on its
offensive weapons. (The problem is especially tricky because the agreement, to the
extent that it aims to limit exploits that might be precursors to attacks, might limit
the means of verifying the introduction of exploits that are precursors to attacks; or
at the very least it will be hard to distinguish the two types of exploit in an
agreement.)
If you want to understand the hurdles against a real cyber-arms control agreement,
compare any such agreement to the Iran Deal. Marvel at the extraordinary
technical detail of the Iran Deal, note that a real cyber arms agreement would likely
be much more technical (and indeed that for many of the most obvious terms we
cannot imagine what a concrete agreement looks like right now), realize that
verification and attribution are generally easier in nuclear than cyber, contemplate
how Cybercommand would warm to the types of inspection and verification regimes
that would be needed for China to monitor U.S. compliance with any cyber deal, and
then imagine gathering 67 votes in the Senate for the deal without airtight
verification and attribution regimes (and yes, a cyber deal, unlike the unusual Iran
Deal, would need to go to the Senate).
Not going to happen any time soon.
China has no incentive to say yes

xii Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace relationship. 2 This implies that a
workaround for Chinas refusal to negotiate might exist, something that may help
explain President Xis offer to accept U.S. formulations on norms targeting
cyberspace during the September 2015 summit meeting. The Chinese we talked to
rarely bothered to make even a pro forma denial that China conducts cyber
espionage in general or eco - nomically motivated cyber espionage in particular.
Chinese interviewees believe that the United States has militarized cyberspace
and they are determined not to be left too far behind in what they view as a
competition (albeit one they regret taking place). The Chinese see cybersecurity
talks as a way to appease U.S. irri - tation more than to achieve anything specific. In
contrast, the United States places a much higher emphasis on using such dialogues
to resolve cybersecurity issues. The Chinese do not appear to have a well-formed
set of demands not even a diminution of U.S. cyber espionage that they would
be willing to trade for any significant cessation of economically motivated cyber
espionage (much less all categories of cyber espionage). Thus, it is difficult to see
such cyber espionage as falling within the cyber trade space. The Chinese do not
accept the U.S. proposition that a country has a right to unilaterally respond to
cyberattacks qua the Law of Armed Conflict. One idea we mooted was for both
countries to abjure attacks on each others critical infrastructure. There was
considerable receptivity to this proposal, even when coupled with the proviso that
both sides would also have to abjure cyber espionage on such targets. The sticking
point was attribution. The United States believes it can catch China cheating and
would like some process by which cheating, once discov - ered, is acknowledged so
that some consequences (other than merely reputational ones) would follow. China
believes it cannot catch the cheating by the United States and is apprehensive of
any agreement that would put them at a corresponding disadvantage. Thus, any
seri - ous agreement would need a process that both sides could trust and/or some
way to increase Chinas confidence it is own attribution capabili - ties. This is a very
difficult challenge but not, in our opinion, an abso - lutely hopeless one, provided
that both sides were to agree to work on it in good faith. Were the United States and
China to do so, we provide an initial set of thoughts that could be explored about
how to move forward in this area. It is not clear, however, that China wants to get to
yes on the issuei.e., truly resolve it by establishing mutually agreed- upon and
respected norms with respect to targeting in cyberspaceso much as it wants
simply to get away from the issue. If that assessment is correct, then the United
States is not likely to see its recently negoti - ated agreement with China on
cyberspace lead to lasting changes in Chinese actions in cyberspace.
Cant solve China only cares about switching Internet

governance
Worryingly, as of May 2015, our Chinese interlocutors did not tend to see direct,
bilateral talks with the United States on cybersecurity as a way to achieve much
regarding specific norms or limita - tions on cyberspace activities. Instead, Chinas
approach to the issue of cybersecurity appears in many respects to be focused first
and foremost on attempting to articulate and defend a set of values and propos als for the international governance of cyberspace that would redefine cybersecurity
away from issues of concern to the United States, such as EMCE and applying the
LOAC to cyberspace. In articulating its posi - tions and submitting proposals on
cybersecurity to the UN, China has argued for redefining cybersecurity with an eye
toward such issues as cyber sovereignty and moving the management of the
Internet out of the hands of the United States and the West and into a more Chinafriendly setting, such as the UN.
China will never stop can only defend

Costello 6/18/15
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/06/18/chinas_irregular_warfare_in_the_cyber_domain_108094.html
John Costello is a US Navy veteran with years of experience in the intelligence, defense, and China communities.
The Skinny on Cyber Warfare
This is not warfare in the strictest or traditional sense. The cyber domain is fluid.
Network reconfigurations, security updates, and anti-virus software destroy
vulnerabilities that enable access to would-be hackers - and in CNO, access is
everything. It takes a constant work to maintain or reconstitute accesses necessary
for a cyber-attack in the event of war. To use an analogy, in the 1950s to the
1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a near-constant
submarine, strategic bomber, and ballistic missile readiness so that in the event of
war their assets would be in the most advantageous position. In all scenarios, they
would be ready for first-strike or immediate retaliation. Intelligence preparation and
logistical mobilization in peace-time are there for the inevitability of war, with the
earnest hope it never happens.
PLA hacking, espionage, and reconnaissance on military, government, and critical

information is an intelligence preparation of the battlefield. It is a strategic
deployment of assets as a reserve in case of war. The sustained attacks felt by DOD
and U.S. government networks are a manifestation of a larger strategy of
preparation and perpetual mobilization. It is not the opening stage of warfare, nor
are we in an open cyber war with China. In general, the PLA is doing what all
militaries do: hoping for the best while preparing for the worst. While this is
intolerable to some degree, these targets are fair game.
Efforts to deter this particular type of cyber espionage are likely to fail. Only
unilateral action such as strengthening defense, mitigating avenues of access, and
intelligence counter-espionage campaigns will serve to reduce the volume and
impact of this type of cyber-warfare. To use another analogy, your opponent is
always going to try to get the ball downfield, youre not going to scare
him into not playing . The best you can do is to build the best defensive
line you can , anticipate where hes running or throwing and prevent him from
getting in your end-zone.
Ext: China says No

China will say no no incentive
Harold, Libicki, Cevallos 16
(Scott Warren HaroldPh.D., M.A. in political science, Columbia

University; B.A. in international relations, Michigan State University, Martin C. Libicki Ph.D. in economics, University
of California, Berkeley; M.A. in city and regional planning, University of California, Berkeley; S.B. in mathematics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Astrid Stuth Cevallos M.PHIL in international relations, Oxford University; A.B.
in East Asian studies, Princeton University, Getting to yes with china in cyberspace
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/RAND_RR1335.pdf)
In the years since these studies were published, however, the relations between the
two countries have only worsened over the cyber issue. As China cyber specialist
Amy Chang argued, the two nations continue to face substantial obstacles in
developing cooperative efforts and improving mutual understanding on the issue of
cyberspace, to the point that relations have devolved to near-complete distrust of
each others motives, actions, and agendas, affecting other facets of the bilateral
relationship. Chang further points out that Chinas network security policies are
motivated . . . by the Chinese Communist Partys goal of maintaining its own
governing power . . . [by ensuring] domestic stability, territorial integrity,
modernization, and economic growth, while simultaneously preparing for the
possibility of militarized cyber conflict in the future.6 Similarly, cyber specialist
James Lewis has noted that political differences, competition for regional influence,
and a general desire to undermine the U.S. position in Asia are characteristic of
Chinese policy toward cybersecurity, and these hamper the prospects of U.S.- China
cooperation.7 Chang agrees, noting that there currently exist few incentives for
China to cooperate meaningfully with more developed nations on curbing
intellectual property theft [or] cybercrime.8
China empirically rejects dialogue offers

Weitz 5/8/14 http://www.hudson.org/research/10279-u-s-china-security-transparency-highlightsdivergences Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson
Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as
well as U.S. foreign and defense policies. Dr. Weitz is also an Expert at Wikistrat and a non-resident Adjunct Senior
Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
Another noticeable gap was the Chinese disinterest in accepting the U.S.
offer for a more comprehensive dialogue on cyber security. In a joint press
conference with Defense Minister Gen. Chang, Hagel said that he emphasized in
our meetings this morning the need for both the United States and China to be
more open with each other about our capabilities and our intentions in this critically
important domain [of cybersecurity]. Echoing the more general U.S. view regarding
military transparency, Hagel said Greater openness about cyber reduces the risks
that misunderstanding and misperception could lead to miscalculation. More
transparency will strengthen China-U.S. relations (U.S. Department of Defense,
April 8). Before the trip, a U.S. delegation had provide China with a compressive
briefing on U.S. cyber defense policies in the hope, thus far unrealized, that China
would shed more light on its own cyber defense doctrine and practices (New York
Daily News, April 7). The last few years have seen a welcome Chinese effort to
become more transparent in its defense activities and capabilities, but the NSA
scandal and other developments have limited mutual openness in the cyber domain
(Cyber Transparency for Thee, But Not For Me, China Brief, April 18).
Chinese commentators applauded the tough public stance taken by Chinese leaders
in these public exchanges. To take one example, one editorial in a party-run
newspaper observed Although it seems very rare for China to respond so strongly
and openly to Hagels remarks, in fact, it makes sense. Because Hagels many
remarks about [the United States], Japan and China, which distorted facts and
deviated from consensus, have touched Chinas core interests and contributed to
some countries arrogance, bringing threats to peace and stability in Asian-Pacific
region(Guangming Daily, April 13). Some writers also acknowledged Chinas
selective transparency in which the Chinese deliberately reveal new capabilities
at opportune or embarrassing moments, a practice that could serve as a deterrence
(China Military Online, May 5). In his speech at the WPNS, General Fan said No
country should expect China to swallow the bitter pill of our sovereignty, national
security or development interests being compromised (Reuters, April 23).
Solvency: AT Norms enough

Norms dont solve need a hard agreement which is
impossible
Goldsmith 9/21/15 Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, cofounder of Lawfare, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and co-chair of its Working
Group on National Security, Technology, and Law. He teaches and writes about national security law, presidential
power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to
Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003-2004, and
Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002-2003. https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-get-too-excitedabout-us-china-arms-control-agreement-cyber
Some will argue that even if we cannot generate real cyber arms control
agreements, consensus on softer norms is still useful. James Lewis captured this
view well when he once wrote: agreements could increase stability and reduce the
risks of miscalculation or escalation by focusing on several specific areas:
confidence-building and transparency measures, such as increased transparency in
doctrine; creation of norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace; and
expansion of common understandings on the application of international law to
cyber conflicts, or development of assurances on the use of cyberattacks. Maybe.
But I still adhere what I once wrote in response to this: in the absence of decent
verification, we cannot be confident that transparency measures are in fact
transparent, or that revealed doctrine is actual doctrine. Nor can norms get much
purchase in a world without serious attribution and verification; anonymity is a
norm destroyer.
TF Slow
US-China process will be super slow
Yet any meaningful agreements over cyberspace will not be easy to negotiate. The
trends in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, as well as inside Chinese society more
broadly, are not positive at present. While Chinas willingness to negotiate over
these issues could conceiv - ably change substantially in the future if the country
were to develop a stronger domestic constituency favoring the protection of
intellectual property rights and a more independent and professional legal system,
it is hard to see signs of such a development at present. Indeed, given the current
realities of China, where all court judges are appointed by the CPC, new lawyers are
asked to swear allegiance to the CPC, 3 and rights-defense lawyers [ weiquan lushi ]
are arrested en masse, 4 the pros - pects of any such broad-ranging, meaningful,
and lasting agreement appear slim in the near to middle term. Should China and the
United States decide that they both want to negotiate norms over behavior in
cyberspace in the future, the research findings presented above might provide
some insights in how to do so
Process of building cybernorms is super slow

This pattern of gradual norm-building via soft law instruments and

transnational legal-regulatory networks is likely to hold with respect to the
governance of attributing cyber attacks. Just as attempts to develop rules around
the use of nuclear weapons was not a static process and required an extended
period of learning (Freedman 1981; Tannenwald 2007), attempts to govern the
cyber realm are likely to develop via various forms of soft law prior to hard,
institutionalized and multilateral treaties. Joseph Nye draws this parallel and states
that: Governments learn slowly from knowledge, study and experience, and
learning occurs internationally when new knowledge gradually redefines the content
of national interests and leads to new policies. For example, the United States and
the Soviet Union took decades to learn how to adapt and respond to the prior
revolution in military affairs nuclear technology after 1945 (Nye 2011, 19). There
are reasons to expect that such learning and norm development will be even more
difficult in the cyber case than it was in the nuclear era; for example, barriers to
entry are far lower in the cyber case, and these capabilities have already
proliferated far beyond the very small group of exclusively state actors that possess
nuclear weapons. Creating shared knowledge among a much larger, and much more
organizationally heterogeneous, number of players is likely to be extremely difficult.
Equivalent norm building empirically takes decades

Costello 6/18/15
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/06/18/chinas_irregular_warfare_in_the_cyber_domain_108094.html
John Costello is a US Navy veteran with years of experience in the intelligence, defense, and China communities.
n Internet Paris Declaration?
By the 1860s, maritime privateering had worn out its welcome and utility for the
major powers of Europe. After the Treaty of Paris was signed and ended the
Crimean War, the major signatories turned their attention to privateering and its
role in warfare. A few weeks later, they signed what is known as the Paris
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, and formally abolished privateering as a
practice. Still, privateering, or commerce warfare in general, would not be
eradicated for another century. Despite The Hague Convention in 1907 and the
London Naval Conference in 1909, the practice still continued in some degree both
in and out of wartime.
It was a good step, though. Despite the United States refusal to sign the
declaration, it promised to abide by the spirit, if not the letter of the declaration. A
half century would go by and the United States itself would become a power player
in the naval domain. Only then, when it was a legitimate stakeholder in the system
a backer, a patron, and guarantor of the dominion of the sea did it see or feel the
need to set down international laws governing the wider maritime realm. Another
half century would pass before that idea would become a reality. Only the Second
World War and the era of international order that followed created a system that
institutionalized rules and laws governing the sea.
Naval and Cyber Domain Analogues
Still, though, lessons can be learned from the naval domain. China now plays the
part of the new-to-the-table power player and, certainly, seeks to change the world
order to terms more favorable to its interests. The Naval domain went through
three distinct phases in the modern era, and the global information infrastructure
will likely walk down a similar road. Before the modern concept of a state or nation
took on its modern relevance, the idea of sovereignty in the sea was simply a
notional one. Next the domain evolved to having Nation-States standing Navies
with irregular forces almost at constant war with one another, and the idea of
sovereignty took hold. The idea that sea control was inseparable from national
power, the Mahan imperative, was paramount. Finally, the modern concept of what
the maritime domain should be finally arrived. With powerful guarantors and
international agreements, the naval domain matured to become seen as something
that is fundamentally universal.
The irregular warfare deployed by China in the cyber domain is evidence of the
internets youthfulness. We like to think that technology and the realities of our
world move at a snails pace, and our laws, treaties, and customs keep pace even
as we struggle to understand and adapt to them. That is not the case. The cyber
domain, being intermixed with state power, information power, military dominance,
and wealth has become a critical entity in international affairs even as it changes
and morphs constantly. Actions there have real consequences. Even as the
privateer may have been a useful tool in the naval domains early days, its time
came and went. Cyber theft and cyber commercial raiding have no place in todays
internet governance, but until the internet matures as an international entity
there will be no protection for it as a universal domain.
Disads Neg
Politics Link
Chinese cyberespionage key to election softline emphasizes
Clintons track record and email scandals relative to Trump
Navarro 5/13/16 http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/are-we-exaggerating-chinas-cyber-threat/ Peter
Navarro is a professor of Economics and Public Policy at The Paul Merage School of Business, University of
California-Irvine.
For all the talk about terrorism on the campaign trail, cyber security issues in one
form or another are likely to be prominent in the 2016 presidential election.
State-sponsored cyber espionage inflicts significant damage on the American

economy. And just which nation is most actively engaged against the United States?
According to the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,

Americas largest trading partner China accounts for as much as 70% of the
losses the United States incurs.
What American citizens should find most disturbing about Chinas role in what
amounts to a global IP theft ring is the outsized role its government plays.
A watershed report by Mandiant reveals a military force of more than 100,000 cyber
spies under the firm control of the Peoples Liberation Army and under the clear
direction of the Chinese Communist Party.
This state-sponsored cyber theft bureaucracy exists despite repeated denials by top
government officials that China is even involved in such activities.
Stealing blueprints of American businesses
While the military may run Chinas cyber espionage programs, the Peoples
Liberation Army nonetheless works hand-in-glove with civilian bureaucrats in charge
of advancing Chinas industrial policy goals.
On any given day, Chinas military and civilian hackers seek to steal the obligatory
blueprints and proprietary manufacturing processes of American businesses large
and small.
Chinas cyber spies will also vacuum up everything from emails, contact lists, and
test results to pricing information and partnership agreements.
Sometimes such acts of IP theft can destroy most or all of the value of individual
companies. A case in point noted by the IP Commission is American
Superconductor: When it had its wind-energy software code stolen by a major
customer in China, it lost not only that customer, but also 90% of its stock value.
The military front
Of course, its not just the American economy under relentless cyber attack. On the
military front, defense agencies like the Pentagon and National Nuclear Security
Administration (which is in charge of Americas nuclear weapons stockpile) each
report up to 10 million probes a day. 10 million a day!
Here again, China is at the epicenter of the attacks. As documented in

Crouching Tiger: What Chinas Militarism Means for the World, the Peoples
Liberation Army has stolen the designs for virtually every major US weapons
system.
This list includes the F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighters America relies on to
establish air dominance in theater; critical missile defense systems like the Navys
Aegis and the Armys THAAD; vital combat aircraft like the F/A-18 fighter, the V-22
Osprey, and Black Hawk helicopter; and virtually the entire family of American
drones.
Many U.S. weapons systems have also been severely compromised by what the U.S.
Armed Services Committee has described as a flood of counterfeit parts. Here,
again and like a very broken record and relationship the main culprit is China.
In tracking over 100 cases of suspect counterfeit parts back through the supply
chain, this Committee found China responsible for over 70% of the problem.
Still a third major form of cyber threat now being refined by China, along with other
nations like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, involves attacking the industrial control
systems of critical infrastructure such as electricity grids, water purification plants,
air traffic control, subways, and telecommunications.
The twin goals here are to paralyze the American economy by crippling our
infrastructure and to sow chaos among our population and thereby weaken our
will to fight.
Cybersecurity: Clinton vs.Trump
So how do Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump the presumed Democratic and
Republican presidential nominees stack up on this critical issue? Of the two,
Clinton gets the lower marks to date.
As Secretary of State, she did virtually nothing to advance a strong US policy on

state-sponsored cyber attacks.
There is also her embarrassingly nave approach to her own cyber security she
routinely used a private email server vulnerable to hacking and sent dozens of
emails during various trips to two of the biggest state-sponsored hackers in the
world, China and Russia.
As for Trump, he has vowed to adopt a zero tolerance policy for Chinese hackers in
particular: Says Trump: If China wants to trade with America, they must agree to
stop stealing and to play by the rules.
Given Trumps rhetorical track record, his zero tolerance enforcement actions might
include stiff trade sanctions for hacker countries, the banning of any foreign
enterprise that engages in any form of espionage (cyber or otherwise), and the
abrogation of any trade deal that fails to provide for adequate IP protection.
Election demands harsher response to Chinese cyber intrusion

Sen 8/20/15
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/08/20/hitting_back_after_china_cyber_attack_108391.html Ashish
Kumar Sen is a staff writer at the Atlantic Council.
Responding to China
The United States could try and deter China from conducting cyber attacks by
making two arguments: one, since China keeps getting caught, the information it
collects is less valuable as the victims know they have been targeted, and two, you
cant end up on the front of the Washington Post, Knake.
If the New York Times is talking that is going to force the United States to respond
and get tough and we are going into an election season and I guarantee you over
the next eighteen months every presidential candidate is going to say that they
need to forcibly respond to China over the OPM breach, he added.
The intrusion at OPM occurred last December, but was only detected in April.
Lotrionte made the case for a strong US response to Chinese cyber attacks.
Short of escalating the conflict, the Obama administration should issue a formal
protest, impose sanctions, freeze assets, stop business ties, and expel officials from
the United States, she said.
XI Bad Shell
Unique Link Attribution of cyberattacks helps Xis broader

strategy of anti-corruption gain traction and credibility
Goldsmith 6/21 (Jack, Professor at Harvard Law School, Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University, U.S. Attribution of Chinas Cyber-Theft
Aids Xis Centralization and Anti-Corruption Efforts published online 6/21/16
https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-attribution-chinas-cyber-theft-aids-xiscentralization-and-anti-corruption-efforts)/\MB/\
The Reasons for the Drop. The report shows that most of the drop-off in China-based cybertheft occurred before the
Obama-Xi agreement last Fall. It attributes the drop-off primarily to Xis sweeping changes impacting its use of
network operations, especially his efforts to centralize and emphasize military and government elements
engaged in cyber activity, and his anti-corruption campaign cracking down on the illegitimate use of state
resources. It also gives supporting roles to increasing U.S. exposure of Chinas state-sponsored commercial cybertheft, dating back to a May 2013 Pentagon report (and similar private reports at the time), and including the U.S.
indictments of five PLA officers in May 2014 and enhanced threats of U.S. sanctions during the same period. Putting
reforms of Chinas cybertheft practices are grounded

primarily in Xis efforts to centralize cyberoperations and stamp out corruption , and
that U.S. exposure efforts aided Xi in these efforts. In other words, the changes are less
about the U.S. imposing or threatening hefty costs on a unitary China (the costs and
threatened costs have not in fact been hefty), and more about the U.S. making transparent
corrupt state-sponsored activities to Chinas government, and thus aiding Chinas
government (as embodied in Xis regime) in furthering its interests. This plausible mechanism of
all of this together, it appears that
influence is consistent with what I took to be the most interesting elements of John Carlins remarks at Harvard last
December, when he explained (around 38:40) that one reason why the indictments of the PLA officers might
change Chinas cyber-theft behavior is that China is a big complicated country and that in China (as in the U.S.,
he implied) disclosure of intelligence activity caused a lot of internal changes, discussion, and debate and it may
not be that everyone in the government over there knew exactly what everyone was doing or had thought about
the consequences of what they were doing before it was named and exposed. The report thus helps us better
U.S. exposure of China-based cyber-theft serves Xis interests in

clamping down on criminal and unauthorized use of [Chinas] state resources. This is
less a story of coercion than it is of cooperation between the United States government
and Xi to serve Xis military centralization and anti-corruption efforts .* What we dont
understand how
know is how much state-sponsored commercial theft Xi is willing to tolerate (or able to eliminate), or how the
government-related China-groups will morph along Chinas very fuzzy public-private sector line to avoid detection
from both Chinas government and the U.S. government, or to operate in a way outside Chinas government that Xi
does not care about. Recall that last falls U.S.-China cyber deal, China agreed only not to conduct or knowingly
support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of bringing commercial advantage.
That devastates the Chinese economy fear of colleagues,

investor hesitance, jailing of key industry leaders
Barnato 15 (Katy, reporter on international business with CNBC, How Chinas
anti-corruption drive is hurting growth published online 12/4/15 at
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/04/how-chinas-anti-corruption-drive-is-hurtinggrowth.html)/\MB/\
Chinese authorities' anti-corruption campaign has knocked between 1 percent and

1.5 percent off the country's gross domestic product (GDP) annually over the past two
years and continues to hit the economy, BNP Paribas has said. President Xi Jinping launched a
high-profile crackdown on bribery and extravagance among officials shortly after
taking power in 2012, which has proved popular with the Chinese public . However, the
campaign has impaired spending in the country, hitting both consumption and
investment, Chi Lo, China senior economist at BNP Paribas said. "To my surprise, investment is still down," Lo
said at a conference in London on Wednesday. Gift-giving previously a major practice among Chinese
corporations and officials is down and companies have stopped giving awards, which could be seen as
investment projects by local governments have been hit .

"Even if these people are clean and we have our doubts they don't know if their
counterparts are," Lo said, explaining why regional governments were wary of launching projects. Corruption
"kickbacks," Lo added. In addition,
regularly tops polls tracking the Chinese populace's greatest concerns. In September, 84 percent said that corrupt
officials were a big problem in a survey by the Pew Research Center. 44 percent thought corruption was a very big
problem. The Chinese Communist Party updated its rules for members in October in light of the graft crackdown.
The updated, stricter, version explicitly forbids extravagant eating and drinking, playing golf and "improper sexual
The crackdown has also impacted

foreign companies in China like GlaxoSmithKline. Last year the U.K. pharmaceutical
giant was fined nearly $500 million by China after its local subsidiary was found
guilty of bribery. Five of the company's managers received suspended prison sentences.
relationships," according to Xinhua, China's official news agency.
Chinese soft economic landing is key to preventing a global

depression the global economy depends on China
Subramanian 16 (Arvind, Chief Economic Adviser at Indias finance ministry,
The Risks of Chinas Failure and Success published online 4/14/2016
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-risk-global-deflationimbalances-by-arvind-subramanian-2016-04) /\MB/\
A failure scenario would be unique in post-World War II history. Because Chinas economy is so large, the
consequences would reverberate worldwide. But, unlike in 2008, when the US dollar appreciated, allowing emerging
the renminbi would likely depreciate should Chinas economy

experience a serious downturn, spreading deflation far and wide . Other currencies might
depreciate as well, some as a result of deliberate policy. Consequently, a China failure scenario could
resemble the events of the 1930s, characterized by competitive devaluation and plummeting real
markets to revive quickly,
economic activity. But what if China succeeds in its current transition to a consumption-based economic model?
When the Chinese current-account surplus reached 10% of GDP in 2007, saving exceeded 50% of GDP and
investment surpassed 40% of GDP. These numbers seemed far too high to be dynamically efficient or welfare
enhancing. As a result, a consensus rapidly emerged: Saving and investment should be reduced and brought into
better balance. Investment should be reined in by imposing greater financial discipline on wayward public
enterprises, while the social safety net should be strengthened, so that households would not have to save so much
to meet the costs of having children and growing old. Fast forward a decade, and what do we see? The government
has built safety nets, and the current-account surplus has receded, exactly as hoped. Last year, the surplus
amounted to less than 3% of GDP, a fraction of its 2007 level. But this hardly validates the theory. About half of the
reduction in the current-account surplus has occurred because investment has actually increased as a share of GDP.
Meanwhile, there has been some decline in national saving, by perhaps 3.5 percentage points of GDP compared to
2007 (according to IMF estimates, as official data end in 2013). But this reduction is quite modest compared to the
15-percentage-point increase that occurred during 2000-2007. Even more striking, all of this modest reduction in
saving seems to have come from the corporate sector; household saving is roughly the same, relative to GDP, as it
was in 2007. In other words, what went up during the boom has failed to come down . This is a
real puzzle, and resolving it is important not only for Chinas future, but for that of the world. There are two broad
possibilities.
It could be that the theory is basically correct, but needs more time to show results. In that case,
the decline in saving could match

the envisaged decline in investment, keeping the current-account surplus low. But what happens if
the theory is wrong, or incomplete? For example, the beneficial effects of safety nets on saving may have
been overestimated. Or those effects may be offset by the negative effects of population aging. Over the
as long as Chinas rulers continue to strengthen social safety nets,
next 15 years, the Chinese population aged 60 and above will increase by two-thirds. These aging workers might
now be saving as much as they possibly can, to build up a financial cushion for impending retirement. If some
version of this scenario is realized, the household saving rate may continue to decline only gradually. In the
meantime, the government would be closing unprofitable plants, which might boost corporate saving. As a result,
overall saving could remain high, even as investment falls sharply, causing the current-account surplus to surge
As China slowed, so would global

growth, and the remaining demand would be redistributed toward China , aggravating
other countries already-severe shortfalls. This would be very different from the previous episode of global
again. This would not be a pleasant prospect for the world economy.
imbalances when large Chinese current-account surpluses were at least offset to some extent by rapid Chinese
whereas a hard economic landing for China could spur global deflation,
avoiding that outcome could mean the return of global imbalances . These are the stark
growth. In short,
possibilities that leaders need to ponder as they gather gloomily at the IMF in Washington.
Independently, there is a linear relationship between Chinese

economic failure and the likelihood for Chinese lashout which
draws the US in and sparks global war SCS, Taiwan, ECS are
all flashpoints
Carpenter 15 (Ted Galen, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Ph.D in diplomatic
history from UT, Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War? published online
9/6/15 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war13784?page=1)/\MB/\
Chinas leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable . The implicit bargain that has been in
place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge
the Communist Partys dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the
people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Partys
position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by
breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its
part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might
refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on
the need to preserve

and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic
troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three
areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to
war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad
territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its
claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have
brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines,
which have rival territorial claims, and with the worlds leading maritime power, the United States,
export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However,
which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that
The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation . Chinese leaders

have already stressed the countrys alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it
will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers . Such arguments are
pass through it.
designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the countrys long period of weakness and
second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is

rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese
humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A
leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification , relying in large
measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has
also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of
independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed
confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chens old party, the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwans next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan
Strait would be extremely serious, since the U nited States has obligated itself to
consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a grave breach of the peace of East Asia. Yet
there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the
Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more
third possible arena for crisis is

the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are
under Japanese control. From Chinas perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial
Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger
political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The
against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which
is touted in China as the Chinese Peoples War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World AntiFascist War. Recalling Japans invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various
Anger at Japan over

the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced antiJapanese riots in Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles.
There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance
on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance . All of
this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with
China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership
that likely feels beleaguered by the countrys economic woes. The last thing we should do
is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a
foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation
and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.
commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances.
Xi Bad Link Extension

Advancing dialogue with US is a huge win for Xi
Lee 14 * Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; J.D., Stanford Law School;
L.L.M., Harvard Law School. Part of this Article was presented in the Internet Law Seminar at the University of
Vienna on June 17, 2014. I am grateful to seminar participants for their feedback and to Rachel Jui-Ching Lee for her
great research assistance Summer, 2014 UMKC Law Review 82 UMKC L. Rev. 951 LENGTH: 8978 words ARTICLE:
THE RED STORM IN UNCHARTED WATERS: CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
Even though Xi and Obama ended the Rancho Mirage summit without
acknowledging the 2011 "International Code of Conduct for Information Security,"
this essay argues that the 2011 proposal may be an ideal starting point for the two
main cyber powers to begin bilateral dialogue on cyber-security issues. Although the
U.S. government is disappointed with most of the content in the proposal, there
remain some positive signals one can read from it. First, China agrees that
international rules for cyber-security concerns are desirable, and it recognizes "the
need to prevent the potential use of information and communication technologies
for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international
stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure
within States, to the detriment of their security." n95 Most important, the 2011
proposal can be read positively insofar as China, a political and cyber superpower,
appears willing to facilitate international cooperation in setting new rules for cyber
security. If the United States can recognize the preliminary efforts of China and their
value, it will be much easier for the two nations to positively engage in bilateral
discussions. On the other hand, it will be a great opportunity for the Xi
administration to demonstrate that as a great power in the world, China is
playing an indispensable and responsible role in setting the new global order.
Cybersecurity K
Cyber-Securitization K
Their desire for cyber security is part of a process of
hypersecuritization that forgoes rationality in favor of threat
constructions that justifies state projections of impossible
scenarios onto the public consciousness which creates the
conditions for endless political intervention
Hansen and Nissenbaum 9 (Lene, University of Copenhagen; Helen, University of New York,
Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School published in International Studies Quarterly (2009)
53, 11551175)/\MB/\
The first concept, hypersecuritization, has been introduced by Buzan (2004:172) to describe an expansion of
securitization beyond a normal level of threats and dangers by defining a tendency both to exaggerate threats
and to resort to excessive countermeasures. This definition has an objectivist ring to it in that to identify
exaggerated threats implies that there are real threats that are not exaggerated. Moreover, the question of
whether a securitization is seen as exaggerating concerns the degree to which it is successful (unsuccessful
securitizations are seen as exaggerating) and is not part of the grammatical specificities of sectors. Thus we
suggest to drop the exaggerated from the definition of hypersecuritization and to apply it to the cyber sector to
cyber security discourse hinges on multi-dimensional

cyber disaster scenarios that pack a long list of severe threats into a monumental
cascading sequence and the fact that neither of these scenarios has so far taken place. All
securitizations do of course have an element of the hypothetical in that they
constitute threats that must be countered, and thus mobilize an if-then logic, but what
distinguishes hypersecuritizations from mere securitization is their instantaneity and
interlocking effects (Denning 1999:xiii). This combination draws critically from the
securitization of the network (Deibert 2002), yet the power of hypersecuritization stems
not only from a securitization of the network itself, but from how a
damaged network would cause societal, financial, and military breakdown hence bringing in all other referent objects and sectors. Securitizations always mobilize the
specter of the future to some extent, but most nevertheless articulate the past as a
legitimating reference that underscores the gravity of the situation. Looking to the Cold War, the logic of
identify the striking manner in which
nuclear deterrence relied upon projections of a nuclear exchange that had not taken place, yet there were the
Cyber
securitizations on the other hand have no similar history of founding incidents to base
themselves on but try to conjure historical analogies such as electronic Pearl Harbors
(Bendrath 2003:50).7 The combination of cascading disasters and the absence of a prior
incident of that magnitude creates a crucial ambiguity within cyber security
discourse. The extreme reliance on the future and the enormity of the threats claimed at stake makes the
devastations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be used as a yard- stick for what nuclear war would imply.
discourse susceptible to charges of exaggeration, yet the scale of the potential catastrophe simultaneously raises
Turning the absence of prior incidences in

the opposite direction, the difficulty of saying that it could not happen
also creates a powerful space for the projection of the (im)possible . The
the stakes attached to ignoring the warnings.8
hypersecuritization of the entire network in cyber security creates an obvious resemblance to environmental
security discourse where the fate of the planet is claimed at stake. Both discourses also emphasize irreversibility:
once a species is extinct or a digital system gone, they can never be recreated in full. Yet, there are also crucial
differences between the two discourses. First, the speed of the threat scenarios differ with
cyber security
gaining its power from the instantaneity of the cascading effects whereas environmental
security usually allows for a gradual accumulation of threats and dangers until a certain threshold may be reached
and events accelerate.
This establishes different modalities of urgency and hence different
spaces for political intervention.9 Second, there is a crucial difference in terms of the
possibility of visualizing threats, and hence for how securitizing actors communicate to
their audiences (Williams 2003). The digital, networked character of cyber securityand
the absence of prior disastersis hard to represent through images , whereas
environmental security discourse may mobilize for example endangered and extinct species as well as melting ice
caps and forests devastated by acid rain or clear-cutting.
They construct cyberspace as a dark, mystical environment

that must be cleansed via new technological solutions that
results in technological utopianism which demands further
securitization
53, 11551175)/\MB/\
The strong emphasis on the hypothetical in cyber securitizations create a particular space for technical, expert
discourse. As Nissenbaum (2005:72) points out, the knowledge required to master the field of computer security is
The breathtaking
pace at which new technologies and hence methods of attacks are introduced
(Denning 1999:xvi) further adds to the legitimacy granted to experts and the epistemic
authority which computer and information scientists hold allow them the privileged
role as those who have the authority to speak about the unknown . In the case of cyber
security, experts have been capable of defying Huysmans (2006:9) description of the invisible
role of most security experts as they have transcended their specific scientific
locations to speak to the broader public in a move that is both facilitated by and
works to support cyber securitizations claimed by politicians and the media . As in most
academic fields, computer scientists have disagreed on the likelihood of different forms
of attacks, and since the field is also cloaked in military or business secrecy, the
normal follower of these debates learns that much is withheld or simply not
known, and estimates of damage strategically either wildly exaggerated or understated
(Nissenbaum 2005:72). These fluctuations also facilitate a coupling of radical threats with
techno-utopian solutions.11 The National Strategy (2003:35) for instance couples a series of
daunting and often not available to the broader public, including Security Studies scholars.
securitizations with an exuberant faith in the development of highly secure, trust-worthy, and resilient computer
systems. In the future, working with a computer, the Internet, or any other cyber system may become as
dependable as turning on the lights or the water. Leaving aside that for the majority of the worlds poor, and even
for the impoverished American, turning on the light or water may not be entirely dependable, this echoes a
technological utopianism that sidesteps the systemic, inherent ontological

insecurity that computer scientists consistently emphasize . It also invokes an
inherent tension between disaster and utopia as the future of cyber security . The
constitution of expert authority in cyber technifications invokes furthermore the tenuous relationship between
good knowledge and bad knowledge, between the computer scientist and the hacker. The hacker, argues
Nissenbaum (2004), has undergone a critical shift in Western policy and media discourse, moving from a previous
subject position as geeky, apolitical, and driven by the boyish challenge of breaking the codes to one of thieves,
vandals, and even terrorists.12 Although hackers as well as others speaking on behalf of hacktivistathe use
of hacking for dissident, normatively desirable purposeshave tried to reclaim the term (Deibert 2003), both official
and dissident discourse converge in their underscoring of the general securitization of the cyber sector insofar as
past political hacker naivety is no longer possible. The privileged role allocated to computer and information
scientists within cyber security discourse is in part a product of the logic of securitization itself: if cyber security is
so crucial it should not be left to amateurs. Computer scientists and engineers are however not only experts, but
Technifications
are, as securitizations, speech acts that do something rather than
merely describe, and they construct an issue as reliant upon technical,
expert knowledge, but they also simultaneously presuppose a politically
and normatively neutral agenda that technology serves . The mobilization of
technification within a logic of securitization is thus one that allows for a particular
constitution of epistemic authority and political legitimacy (Huysmans 2006:69). It
constructs the technical as a domain requiring an expertise that the public (and
most politicians) do not have and this in turn allows experts to become
securitizing actors while distinguishing themselves from the politicking of politicians
and other political actors. Cyber security discourses simultaneous securitization and technification
technical ones and to constitute cyber security as their domain is to technify cyber security.
work to prevent it from being politicized in that it is precisely through rational, technical discourse that
The technical and the securitized should

therefore not be seen as opposed realms or disjunct discursive modalities , but as
securitization may hide its own political roots.13
deployable in complex, interlocking ways; not least by those securitizing actors who seek to depoliticize their
discourses threat and enemy constructions through linkages to neutral technologies. A securitization by contrast
inevitably draws public attention to what is done in the name of security and this provides a more direct point of
critical engagement for those wishing to challenge these practices than if these were constituted as technical. The
Copenhagen School has stated desecuritization, the movement of an issue out of the realm of security and into the
realm of the politicized as the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as threats
against which we have countermeasures but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the
ordinary public sphere (Buzan et al. 1998:29). Taking the concept of technification to recent debates over whether
and when desecuritization is political and normatively desirable (Williams 2003; Elbe 2006; Huysmans 2006:124
44), we can add that one should be careful to distinguish a technification that depoliticizes a securitized issue,
thereby taking it out of the realm of the political, from a proper desecuritization that allows for contestations and
Technifications play a crucial role in legitimating cyber

securitizations, on their own as well as in supporting hypersecuritizations and in
speaking with authority to the public about the significance of its everyday
practices. Expert knowledge is obviously not exclusive to the cyber sector and a significant nodal point in
hence political debate.
environmental security debates is, for instance, discussions of the scientific reliability of predictions about global
warming, resource depletion, and population growth. Military security discourse is likewise concerned with the
technicalities of surveillance, SDI, and remotely controlled bombings. Yet, if technifications are not exclusive to the
cyber sector, they have been able to take on a more privileged position than in any other security sector.
Comparing it to the public debates over environmental security, in the case of the latter, the audience is expected
to know more and the repeated contestation of environmental evidence makes for a public view of (some)
environmental actors as political ones rather than apolitical, objective experts. This is not to say that computer
security is objectively more technical or less political than environmental science, but simply that the socially
constituted audience-expert subject positions differ and that these differenceopen to historical change
themselvesare important for how securitizations are legitimated or challenged.
The tangential relation of disaster to cyberspace locks in

militarization, serial policy failure, and misallocation of
resources
Lawson 11 (Sean, Ph.D. Department of Communication University of Utah, George Mason University,
BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History published January 2011)/\MB/\
a disaster framing portends cybersecurity planning dominated by the same

command and control [C2] model rooted in flawed assumptions of inevitable panic and
social collapse that has increasingly dominated official U.S. disaster planning
(Quarantelli, 2008: 897). The result has been ever more centralized, hierarchical, and
Next,
bureaucratic disaster responses that increasingly rely upon the military to restore
order and official control first and foremost (Quarantelli, 2008: 895896; Alexander, 2006; Lakoff,
2006). The result can be a form of government paternalism in which officials panic about the
possibility of panic and then take actions that exacerbate the situation by not only
failing to provide victims with the help they need, but also preventing them from
effectively helping themselves (Dynes, 2006; Clarke & Chess, 2009: 9991001). This phenomenon was
on display in the official response to Hurricane Katrina (Clarke & Chess, 2009: 10031004). In the realm of
cybersecurity, there are already provisions for the militarys USCYBERCOM to provide assistance to the Department
of Homeland Security in the event of a domestic cyber emergency (Ackerman, 2010). Reminiscent of self-imposed
blackouts during WWII, Senator Joseph Liebermans proposal for a so-called Internet kill switch, which would give
the president the authority to cut U.S. Internet connections to the rest of the world in the event of a large-scale
cyberattack,5 is the ultimate expression of the desire to regain control by developing the means to destroy that
The war/disaster framing at the heart of cyber-doom scenarios and

much of contemporary U.S. cybersecurity discourse risks focusing policy on the
narrowest and least likely portion of the overall cybersecurity challenge i.e. acts of
cyberwar leading to economic, social, or civilizational collapse while potentially diverting attention
and resources away from making preparations to prevent or mitigate the effects of
more realistic but perhaps less dramatic scenarios. But, there are a number of principles that can
which we fear to lose.
guide the formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy that can help us to avoid these pitfalls.
Their conception of cyberspace as in need of regulation

constructs the internet as insecure and creates global races
towards cyber militarization that locks in tension and turns
the case
Cavelty 13 (Miriam Dunn, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout:
Threat Representations with an Impact in the Cyber-Security Discourse International Studies Review (2013) 15,
105122)/\MB/\
The lawlessness of cyberspace, in which hacking data wizards strive and prosper, emerges as one
of the prime threat representations in this debate . This space is depicted as anarchic
and out of control, or rather, in need of new rules and control . Threats are represented as
disembodied: Laws of nature, especially physics, do not apply in this special space/place; there are no linear
distances, no bodies, no physical co-presences. Hackers are represented by symbols, and their actions
unfold their effects through this space/place anywhere instantaneously . As a result,
clever opponents can hide behind the anonymity provided by the technical realm .
The attribution problem, which refers to the difficulty of identifying those
initially responsible for a cyber-attack and their motivating factors, is a
key in solidifying the threat representation . Attacks and exploits that seemingly benefit
states might well be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. At the same time, the
challenges of clearly identifying perpetrators give state actors convenient plausible
deniability and the ability to officially distance themselves from attacks (Deibert and
Rohozinski 2009:12). In addition, the cui bono logic (to whose benefit?) is hardly ever sufficient for justifying
political action. There is an additional aspect of threat representation in this cluster. The threat has a voice of its
own, so that the image of the hacker is not only a result of branding from the outside but also a result of how this
threat represents itself. Over the past years, multifaceted activities of hacker collectives and activists such as
Anonymous and LulzSec have added yet another twist to the cyber-threat story. Particularly, the name Anonymous
has become associated with highly mediatized computer break-ins and subsequent release of sensitive information
as part of a (new) form of global protest. Anonymous and other hacktivism groups cleverly use the same
catchphrases governments use to depict them as threats for governments and other high-ranking establishments.
Beyond its slogan (We are Anonymous. We are Legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us), its use of
Guy Fawkes masks, and its orientation toward issues of censorship, information freedom, and anonymous speech,
the movement resists straightforward definition and classification. Shrouded in deliberate mystery in a time
obsessed with control and surveillance, it purports to have no leaders, no hierarchical structure, nor any
geographical epicenter. This elusiveness as a graspable actor feeds right off and into the fears about digital foes as
sketched above. Ocean metaphors used by hacker groups to talk about the Inter- net11with clear allusions to
piracy and buccaneeringreinforce fears in government circles that control over digital data is impossible,
particularly once it has been stolen. But it is not only nonstate actors that form their own image of strength in the
Chinese authorities have stated repeatedly that they

consider cyberspace a strategic domain, and that they hope that mastering it will
equalize the existing military imbalance between China and the United States more
quickly. Recently, the United States, Israel, Britain, and Germany have made subtle shows of
cyber-capabilities, likely designed to serve as deter- rents . They are informing wouldbe attackers that they have the capability to issue frightening reprisals both in the
cyber-domain and, if necessary, kinetically: Most prominently, the White Houses International Strategy
digital realm; states do the same.
for Cyberspace of 2011 states that the United States reserves the right to retaliate to hostile acts in cyberspace
Fears and unpredictability created through the attribution problem

lets the cyber-debate run parallel to general strategic geopolitical debates, in which
cyberspace has emerged as an additional domain for conflict . In military circles, cyberspace is depicted as a battlefield (or rather, battlespace) on which a covert war can be
fought or, depending on the persons belief, is already being fought (Clarke 2010). Most references to a cyber(ed)
with military force.
battlefield are literal references to an actual battlefield. Military terms like cyber-weapons, cyber-capabilities, cyberoffense, cyber-defense, and cyber-deterrence suggest that cyberspace can and should be handled as an operational
domain of warfare like land, sea, air, and outer space; and cyberspace has been officially recognized as a new
domain in US military doctrine (Lynn 2010). While opinions about what a war in cyberspace will look like differ
considerably among experts, a particular threat representation is responsible for how governments all over the
world are rhetorically and practically arming up for cyber-battle.
Their impacts reflect the states desires to map politicized

dangers onto the lives of citizens and decide how best to save
those it deems valuable the impact is exclusion and
totalitarianism
53, 11551175)/\MB/\
securitizing
actors, including private organizations and businesses, mobilize normal individuals
experiences in two ways: to secure the individuals partnership and compliance in
protecting network security, and to make hypersecuritization scenarios more plausible by
linking elements of the disaster scenario to experiences familiar from everyday life.10 Everyday security
practices do not reinstall a de-collectivized concept of individual security, but
underscore that the acceptance of public security discourses may be facilitated by a
resonance with an audiences lived, concrete experiences . The concept of audience is only
The second grammar of cyber security, everyday security practices, points to the way in which
briefly defined by Buzan et al. (1998:41) as those the securitizing act attempts to convince and Thierry Balzacq
has in a further development of the concept suggested that the success of securitization is highly contingent upon
the securitizing actors ability to identify with the audiences feelings, needs, and interests, and that the speaker
has to tune hisher language to the audiences experience (Balzacq 2005:184). Audiences do not exist out there
security discourses draw boundaries around the

we on whose behalf they claim to speak, and the yous who are
simultaneously addressed by the linking of fears and threats to feelings,
needs and interests . As Althussers concept of interpellation underscores, subject positions are
simultaneously constituted and individuals are called upon to identify with these.
Yet, although the audience is discursively constituted, securitizing actors are not at
liberty to construct independently of institutionalized subject formations . Although
but are constituted in discourse, and
elements of everyday securizations may be found in other sectors as well, they come out particularly strikingly in
the case of cyber security. There is for example a marked difference between Cold War military securitizations of
nuclear Holocaust which implied the obliteration of everyday life, and the securitizations of everyday digital life with
its dangers of credit card fraud, identity theft, and email scamming. Those few who do not own or have computers
at work are nevertheless subjected to the consequences of digitization. For example, on June 45, 2007 20,000
Danes did not receive their medication due to a server breakdown at the Danish Medicines Agency which routes all
prescriptions from doctors to pharmacies. Even the sector with closest resemblance, the environmental one, still is
unable to conjure and capitalize on a similar sense of immediate individual danger and experience (depleting the
ozone layer while accumulating frequent flyer miles as opposed to downloading software that inadvertently
provides outsider access to ones Internet banking)and thus responsibilities. These experiences of threats are not,
as the Copenhagen School might have it, cases of individual security or crime, but are constituted as threats to
Cyber securitizations of everyday life are distinct

furthermore in their constitution of the individual not only as a responsible
partner in fighting insecurity, but also as a liability or indeed a threat . Hence
both public and private actors mobilize expert positions and rhetoric
constituting its audience as one who should be concerned with its
security . Adopting a simultaneously educational and securitizing discourse, OnGuard Online, set up by the
the network and hence to society.
Federal Trade Commission, warns for instance that through peer-to-peer file sharing You may download material
that is protected by the copyright laws and find yourself mired in legal issues. You may download a virus or facilitate
a security breach. Or you may unwittingly download pornography labeled as something else (OnGuard 2008).
The constitution of the digital as a dangerous space and the ordinary individual
as an ambiguous partner and a potential threat is supported by medical metaphors
like viruses and infected computers that underscore the need for caution
and protection. As in discourses of epidemics and contagion, cyber insecurities are generated by
individuals who behave irresponsibly thus compromising the health of the whole. The National Strategy (2003:11)
proclaims that Each American who depends on cyberspace, the network of information networks, must secure
the part that they own or for which they are responsible; and FBI officials have suggested driver licenses for
computer-owners (The Economist 2007a). A particular concern stems from the fact that computers may be infected
with software that allows them to be used by attackers to route emails or launch denial of service attacks with no
Connecting everyday security practices with hyper cascading

scenarios, it is this inadvertent or careless behavior within a networked system that
move cyber security out of the realm of corporate security or consumer trust
and into the modality of proper nationalsocietal security. Moreover, there is a further link
between hypersecuritizations and everyday practices in that the claim about the possibilities of
disasters happening may be substantiated by the reference to individuals everyday
experiences: the looting of Western banks by Russians in RANDs scenarios described above may seem much
immediate effect to the owner.
more credible if ones own credit card has been abused online. The challenges generated by the securitization of
digital everyday life for governmental authorities as well as private businesses are thus quite significant.
Neither wishes the broader public to become so petrified that it evacuates the digital, but they simultaneously
install an individual moral responsibility that may easily move the subject from
helpless to careless to dangerous. The broad institutional support behind initiatives such as OnGuard
Online, which is set up by the Federal Trade Commission and a long series of partners, including the Department of
Homeland Security, the National Consumers League, and a series of other nonprofit nongovernmental organizations
may furthermore be one that makes resistance difficult. Linking back to the critical argument of securitization
theory, namely that security
provides governments with the discursive and

political legitimacy to adopt radical measures , the question becomes at which
point and how these strategies, and their harmonious constitution of state-society
relations, can become contested.
The alternative is a rejection of their totalizing claims in favor

of an empirical approach to policymaking you should reject
their over-reliance on hypothetical scenarios and demand
empirical evidence for their impacts
Lawson 11 (Sean, Ph.D. Department of Communication University of Utah, George Mason University,
BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History published January 2011)/\MB/\
The first step to formulating and evaluating prospective cybersecurity policies more effectively is to strive for
clearer definitions of the problems to be addressed. James Lewis (2010: 1) has argued that Pronouncements
that we are in a cyber war or face cyber terror conflate problems and make effective
response more difficult. Instead, he advocates that we disaggregate the different types of
cyber-threatsincluding cyberspace-enabled economic espionage, political and military espionage, crime, and
cyberwar or cyberterrorso that each particular threat can be addressed in the most
appropriate and effective manner. There is no one- size-fits-all solution . Myriam
Dunn Cavelty (2007: 144), who has written the most comprehensive history of U.S. cybersecurity policy, goes even
further. She urges us to take the complexity of contemporary cybersecurity problems seriously, not by reducing all
challenges to cyberwar and thinking in terms of hysterical doomsday scenarios, but instead by focusing on a
far broader range of potentially dangerous occurrences involving cyber-means and targets, including failure due to
For effective response,

complex problems like contemporary cybersecurity challenges require us first and
foremost to acknowledge their complexity and to work towards the clearest, most
precise definitions possible, even when absolute clarity and precision are
unattainable. Seek Guidance from Empirical Research The formulation and evaluation of
cybersecurity policy needs to be guided whenever possible by empirical research
and rely less on hypothetical scenarios. In the case of early airpower theory, reliance upon
unchallenged assumptions and hypothetical scenarios in the face of contradictory
empirical evidence had disastrous results. By relying too heavily on hypothetical,
cyber-doom scenarios, current cybersecurity planning is open to the same criticism
that has been leveled against contemporary disaster planning, which is that it is
organized to deal with predicted vulnerabilities rather than to mobilize social
capital to deal with actual threats (Dynes, 2006). Additionally, we should follow the recommendations
human error, technical problems, and market failure apart from malicious attacks.
of both James Lewis and Jeffrey Carr, who note that while empirical research of a technical nature is crucial, the
formulation and evaluation of cybersecurity policy requires knowledge of relevant non- technical matters like the
geopolitical, economic, legal, and other aspects of cybersecurity (Carr, 2009; Lewis, 2009). One goal of this essay
has been to demonstrate the value of research conducted in the humanities and social sciences, in particular the
experts
and policy makers alike need to be critical and reflexive about cybersecurity claims ,
constantly asking if what they are saying or hearing is based on empirical evidence
or merely the reflection of long- held anxieties about technology and recycled
assumptions about infrastructural and social fragility .
history of technology, military history, and disaster sociology, to the analysis of cyber-threats. Finally,
Counterplans Neg
Track 2 CP TEXT
increase its track two meetings with the Peoples Republic of
China on negotiations about cyber transparency and
Track 2 CP Evidence
Track two solves better through incremental approach

he last proposition we put to our Chinese interlocutorsthat the United States

might consider sharing insights into attribution if China agreed to common
evidentiary standards and credibly commit - ted to prosecuting those found to have
violated thesewas the tricki - est. Such an agreement would require some
mutually approved method of determining when one or the other side had violated
its part of the bargain in ways that would have the guilty party admit that it erred.
As argued above, the current relative weakness of Chinese attribution capabilities,
combined with the high levels of mutual strategic mistrust, suggests that having
each side accept the others prima facie evidence would not work. This suggests
that what may be needed for progress is the construction of a bilateral, multilateral,
or international cyber- dispute resolution mechanism, supplemented perhaps by
U.S. efforts to help China improve its own attribution capabilities. Such an
agreement will not come easily; it carries with it politi - cal and potential policy risks
and may also not gain Chinas buy-in. In an environment as troubled by issues of
mutual mistrust as the current U.S.-China relationship is, it would be challenging to
muster enough U.S. political support for such a step. For their part, many of Chinas
actors are likely to be suspicious of any U.S. efforts to shape Chinese views of or
capabilities in the cyber domain. Yet, such an approach may be an idea that is
worth exploring further in Track Two dialogues and conducting further
research on to more completely assess all of its practical, technological, and
political implications, and to further flesh out where the main sources of opposition
are likely to stem from and how they might be reduced.
Track Two solves

-Increase track two cyberdiplomacy efforts: In addition, track two diplomacy

efforts like this conference are critical. Academics, journalists and researchers
conversing and brainstorming about ways to find areas of agreement in the cyber
domain are helpful in trying to find new and innovative paths that may not be on
policymakers agendas. For example, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies has been helping to organize bilateral talks with key Chinese leaders.17
Track 2 negotiations generate more progress in cyber

discussion and solve bureaucratic distrust but expansion key
to solve
Austin & Gady 12 (Greg and Franz-Stefan, 10/18/2012, CYBER Detente BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA: SHAPING THE AGENDA, Dr. Greg Austin previously served as VP of Worldwide Security Initiative
and is Professorial Fellow at the EastWest Institute, Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor with The Diplomat and
Senior Fellow at EastWest Institute, https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/ideas-files/detente.pdf)
Thus, in real terms, the scope for a cyber detente between the United States and China is from the outset quite
this detente, both China

and the United States have been quietly supportive of modest efforts in Track 2
diplomacy (and its variant Track 1.5)14 to stimulate some progress . A number of Track 2
significantly limited by larger geopolitical constraints. Nevertheless, to execute
processes to address these issues have been underway. In 2009, the EastWest Institute (EWI) convened its first
meetings between interested parties in the United States and China. Based on its consultations, it concluded then
the best way forward was to work on a number of civil (non-military) issues: after
beginning with spam, it is tackling topics that are progressively more sensitive and
difficult.15 At the same time, in a number of its private meetings since 2009, EWI raised more
sensitive military issues, most often in the context of possible new multilateral
arrangements (codes of conduct) in cyberspace . In February 2012, the Brookings Institution
published an analysis of the results of its Track 2 work.16 The meetings brought together public and
private sector leaders from the two countries , with military officials included on the U.S. side. The
that
report published as a result of the meetings is not an official record but rather reflections by its authors. They
observed the political realities that determined the type of agenda that could be set: Both countries want to
protect their prerogatives for developing cyber capabilities for espionage or military purposes. The two countries
Bureaucratic mechanisms for

setting cyber policy in both countries are fragmented and weakly coordinated.
Private sector actors are significant players in setting cyber policy in both countries.
The authors concluded that the scale of Track 2 so far was simply inadequate
relative to the scale of the challenge .18 They called for expansion of the
pool of people engaged in this work who could be trusted by both
governments. They proposed a heavy initial focus on cyber crime; supported by an airing of different views on
have different views concerning freedom of information in cyberspace.
the norms governing cyberspace. They suggested a review of models of cooperation not limited to arms control;
instead, it would also include public health, ecosystems, global financial regimes, crime-fighting and counterterrorism.19 They also called for bilateral discussion of the red lines for action in cyber activities that might
provoke escalation and suggested that some effort be made to remove the riskier actions from the policy menu of
the two states.
Track II solves best through mutual understanding and

information sharing
Reveron et al 12 (Derek, Ph.D., April 2012, Professor of National Security Affairs and the EMC
Informationist Chair at the US Naval War College, holds MA in political science and Ph.D. in public policy analysis
from the University of Illinois at Chicago, China and Cybersecurity: Political, Economic, and Strategic Dimensions
Report from Workshops held at the University of California, San Diego;
https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Faculty/Derek-Reveron/Documents/China-and-Cybersecurity-Workshop-Reportfinal.aspx)
Resolving uncertainties should be a priority to reduce potentials for misperception,

and to thereby dampen spirals of mistrust. First, there is uncertainty about what
types of capabilities exist or are emerging in which organizations. Second, there is
uncertainty about what these capabilities might actually be useful for in the broader
strategic and political context. Track II dialogues among scholars, scientists, and
industry offer a promising avenue to 1) improve mutual understanding of the key
technical, economic, and strategic challenges in this area; 2) clarify national and
industrial perspectives; and 3) share ideas on how to improve domestic and global
management of cyberspace. We are impressed with the open frontier of
researchable topics regarding China and information security, both in terms of
availability of open-source data in Chinese and interest among all parties in gaining
a better understanding of it. We look forward to ongoing future discussions and
collaborative resear
Economic Engagement CP Shell

increase its ECONOMIC engagement with the Peoples Republic
of China on negotiations about cyber transparency and
Cybersecurity should be pursued through an ECONOMIC not

DIPLOMATIC frame solves better by transforming the
rhetorical frame AND bringing better institutional competence
to bear
Laporte-Oshiro and Shires 16 (Catherine Laporte-Oshiro and James Shires,
Catherine Laporte-Oshiro is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at University
College, University of Oxford, James Shires is a Ph.D. candidate in international
relations at Christ Church College, University of Oxford, Negotiating Order in
Cyberspace: Choosing Economic Governance Over Security Spirals, 2/16/16,
http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/LaporteOshiro_Shires_NegotiatingOrderCyberspace_Feb16.pdf)
The choice is clear. We now briefly explain how the institutional instinct toward
national security raises the barriers against transatlantic cooperation, and then turn
to the promising alternative: the international trade framework. We therefore move
from diagnosing the underlying disorder behind the recent cyber agreements to
specific policy recommendations for going beyond this disorder. The main barrier to
cooperation in the security arena is a lack of international institutional competence.
In Europe, the main vehicle for international cooperation is the EU, which does not
include national security issues in its remit. While there is extensive European and
transatlantic security co-operation on some national security issues whether
through formal organizations such as Europol and Interpol, or through multilateral
relationships between relevant domestic agencies this co-operation focuses on
issues such as terrorism and organized crime, or peacekeeping interventions.
Hostile state activity is much more difficult to incorporate into such formats. A
potential vehicle for transatlantic cyber cooperation is through the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO). At first glance, this seems promising: the NATO cybersecurity center has produced influential. 4 works on international law in cyberspace
the Tallinn manual and has recently incorporated cybersecurity into its
Emerging Security Challenges. However, NATOs focus, understandably, is on
largescale cyber-attacks like those attributed to Russia in Georgia and Estonia
rather than lower-level, but more common, hostile cyber-activity. More
problematically, there is another institutional arrangement highly influential in
cyber-security, known as Five Eyes, which only includes the United States, U.K.,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The prominence of the Five Eyes in cyber-
security and the sensitivity of the sources and techniques informing their
perspective on those issues means that panEuropean cooperation on economic
cyber activity is unlikely as long as it falls primarily in the security sphere. As well as
institutional barriers to cooperation in security, there are more pervasive problems.
Treating cyber intrusions as a national security issue inflates the risks by placing
them in the same realm as war and terrorism. This leads to a rhetorical security
spiral up the risk scale. For example, in a recent speech at the U.K. signals
intelligence agency, GCHQ, U.K. Chancellor George Osborne elided economic theft,
where the U.K.s starting point must be that every British company is a target,
and more serious security issues, by immediately talking about the self-proclaimed
Islamic State groups attempts to build deadly infrastructure-destroying
capabilities.10 This non-sequitur was only logical due to the speechs location,
because such agencies have a responsibility to consider and plan for worst-case
scenarios, including cyberterrorism. Furthermore, given that the problem of statebacked cyber theft, by definition, has a state at the other end, the primacy of
security organizations also creates a different kind of spiral due to the signals it
sends out. In the case of the United States and China, the involvement of the
Peoples Liberation Army and the Department of Defense Cyber Command on each
side suggests to the other that the worst-case scenario the transformation of
economic theft into potentially destructive activity is more likely to be the case.
Osbornes well-publicized visit to GCHQ also sends the same signal. More widely,
the twin roles of GCHQ and the NSA in both information assurance (defensive
activity) and intelligence collection, as well as their symbiotic relationship with the
military, reinforces a security spiral on both sides. To be clear, we do not want to
suggest that there is no role for NATO, the Five Eyes, or other security organizations
in cyber-security. Rather, our argument is that in order to meaningfully distinguish
between state-backed economic theft in cyberspace and myriad other cybersecurity issues, and in order to create Europe-wide and transatlantic cooperation on
the former, their primacy must be reduced. What, then, is the alternative? Amidst
the language of war that clouds cyber issues today, we are forgetting that we have
a far superior frame for handling them: trade. The international trade regime is
arguably the most advanced form of global governance and has a proven track
record of promoting prosperity and de-escalating tensions. Through a network of
bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral agreements, with the World Trade
Organization at the center, states have committed themselves to increasingly fair
and open markets, lawful resolution of trade conflicts, and strong enforcement
measures. This is not to say that the system is perfect or that all issues have been
put to rest far from it. However, it is a strong framework for constructive
negotiation, thereby preventing security spirals and their economic equivalent,
trade wars. The trade framing has worked in the past for issues intimately
connected to todays cyber-espionage, such as intellectual property (IP). In the
1990s, IP protections in China were scarce and, even when they did exist, rarely
enforced. Like economic cyber espionage today, IP infringements at the time
weakened the competitive position of U.S. and European countries, economies, and,
ultimately perhaps, militaries. The path of a security spiral was available, but
instead the United States, along with European allies, turned to trade negotiators.
Although the problem is not solved, huge strides were made, including a series of IP
agreements throughout the 1990s, culminating in Chinas WTO accession in

2001.11 The trade framing transforms the landscape of actors and interests.
Economic issues tend to be more positive in sum than security, and economic
officials act accordingly, producing positive instead of negative spirals. Indeed, in
the 1990s, liberal Chinese officials like Premier Zhu Rongji were looking for foreign
allies and even a bit of pressure to use as leverage against conservative rivals in
order to push through economic reforms.12 Thus, trade negotiations, with their
combination of market-access carrots and sanction sticks, can be very effective at
dealing with non-competitive behavior and preventing escalation.
Hardline CP
Hardline CP Shell
The United States federal government should, through the
Treasury, substantially increase sanctions on the Peoples
Republic of China for cyberespionage and offensive cyber
operations.
Only a sanctions-based response to breaking cybernorms can
get the job done the aff is too soft on China. The CP restores
UNIQUENESS
Bobrow 15 (Adam Bobrow, Founder and CEO of Foresight Resilience Strategies and a senior fellow with the
GW Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, US-China cyber agreement: Is it enough of a good thing? published
9/30/2015 at http://www.securityinsights.org/2015/09/us-china-cyber-agreement-is-it-enough-of-a-good-thing/)
Last week on this blog, I suggested that the Chinese government had likely outmaneuvered the U.S. government on the question of cybertheft in advance of
President Xis State Visit. Following meetings between Presidents Obama and Xi on
Thursday and Friday of last week, the White House released a Fact Sheet affirming a
common position on cybertheft as well as creating (another) high-level dialogue on
cyber issues and the creation of a hotline for cyber-related incidents. The good
news? There was more agreed to than had been hinted at in reporting before the
event. One commentator suggested that it was a game changer. The bad news?
Agreement to state a principle of behavior is still favoring talk over action. Chinas
acceptance of the norm is not inconsistent with Chinese protestations of innocence
on cybertheft. Looked at in that light, the Administration may have paid a real
price by agreeing not to sanction Chinese individuals and entities under
the Presidents April 2015 Executive Order (EO) in exchange for a commitment
to a norm China insists it follows anyway . The bottom line on whether to
perceive this agreed language as progress or not depends on whether cybertheft is
degrading American economic competitiveness by the second or cybertheft is one
among a collection of cyber-related problems that can be resolved through
deliberative international processes. The Obama Administration has consistently
maintained that Chinese cybertheft represents an urgent national security problem
as it degrades U.S. economic competitiveness and, undermines future U.S. growth .
Accepting this premise, the U.S. government should have acted by announcing
sanctions rather than settling for a statement that did not break new ground. If the
White House had decided merely to delay sanctions until after the Xi visit, it would
have been elevating diplomatic niceties over tough messaging; sanctions in
October, however, would have gotten the job done . Chinese support of a norm
against cybertheft without careful definition of the terms, a verification mechanism,
or any penalties for violating those words does not . A long-term goal of achieving
agreement on norms of behavior in cyberspace presumes that the problem is not
urgent and can be addressed best through an international process that will lead to
some eventual multilateral agreement. (The President, in his remarks to The

Business Roundtable earlier this month suggested both that the situation is urgent
and that a drawn-out multilateral process provided the most effective way of
achieving results, a logically inconsistent position.) If the long-term trumps the
short-term, the results of getting Chinese buy-in on a norm of behavior proscribing
cybertheft is a success on which the U.S. can build. The rhetoric from the
Administration, however, does not support that conclusion. Allow me to add one
caveat: One commentator has suggested that sanctions will still happen and that
the Administration only agreed to change the potential targets: Expect them to
come but to target companies not Chinese officials. This information is not part of
what the White House released following the visit so it is not possible to verify the
extent to which the Administration agreed to defer santions. If sanctions will still
happen, there is a stronger argument that this is a win-win outcome with actions as
well as diplomatic words in the offing. I have a hard time believing that a Chinese
envoy and a Chinese President agreed to make the statements on cybertheft in
exchange for limited or unspecified forbearance related to sanctions. The proof
should come in the next few weeks as we watch to see whether the U.S. Treasury
imposes sanctions or not.
Solves the aff BETTER ONLY threats lead to an effective

cybernegotiation
with China in Cyberspac
The global salience of U.S.-China relations and the potential for quar - rels over
cyberspace to play an increasingly disruptive role in the rela - tionship make it
desirable for the two countries to come to some terms over each others behavior in
cyberspace. In the course of our inter - views in China in May 2015, most of our
interlocutors did not appear to see any agreement with the United States as
plausible, likely, or even particularly necessary. While the United States appeared to
see the two countries relationship in cyberspace as untenable, Chinese
interviewees in contrast did not seem to see any urgent need to make changes. As
a consequence, the September 2015 U.S.-China cybersecurity agreement may have
caught our interlocutors as much by surprise as it appeared to catch most of the
community that is watching U.S.-China relations (including the authors). As of midFebruary 2016 it remains to be seen whether or not the agreement on cyberspace
reached at the Xi-Obama summit has effectively resolved the EMCE issue. 1 Our
first conclusion is that, if the United States is determined to adopt a negotiationbased approach that addresses the entire range of Chinese cyber espionage,
success is unlikely to take place any time soon, unless the costs to China of refusing
to negotiate over the cyber issue can be increased (beyond simply the threat of a
canceled or failed summit meeting). This could potentially be accomplished through
linking this issue more directly to the broader health of the overall relationship
through representations to China at the highest levels or to the use of other levers,
such as the threat of economic sanctions or retaliation. However, there is no
guarantee that a strategy based solely on imposing costs on China for its
conduct, sponsorship, or willing - ness to condone cyber espionage will have the
desired effect of reducing Chinese cyber espionage or creating norms on
what targets are out of bounds for cyber espionage. This means that a continued
effort to resolve differences and establish norms through dialogue and nego - tiation
is highly desirable, even if such an approach may need to be backed up by the
threat of cost imposition.
Deterrence: Uniqueness
Cyber- Deterrence strategy now
Haddick 8/9/15 http://theweek.com/articles/572567/why-china-are-headed-toward-escalating-cyber-war
Robert Haddick is an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command. He writes here in a personal
capacity. His book Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific, is now out from Naval Institute
Press.
The upcoming summit between Obama and Xi may be the last chance to prevent
China's slide from competitor to adversary. That chance is slim. China seems
committed to both its cyber espionage program and its territorial expansion in East
Asia on its "blue soil." We can now see in retrospect that America's longstanding, bipartisan policy of forbearance toward China has accelerated
the slide and therefore should be seen as totally discredited.
Judging by media reporting, the Obama administration seems to have endorsed the
principle of deterrence, enforced through punishment, to protect U.S. interests in
cyberspace. What remains unknown is how much punishment, and in what forms,
the United States will have to deliver in order to establish deterrence. Chinese
leaders are likely to presume they possess significant comparative advantages in
the cyber domain, which means that retaliation and escalating cyber duels are
possible. Applying deterrence theory to the cyber domain presents far more
questions than answers. This does not mean that deterrence is not the right
approach for the U.S. government to take. But once on this course we should expect
some surprising departures from past experiences. Finally, we should not be
surprised if "cyber non-combatants" suffer some collateral damage once hostile
network packets start flying in all directions.
Deterrence link
WEAK agreements incentivize Chinese attacks its worse than
no agreement
Steinberg 9/27/15 [Joseph, CEO of SecureMySocial,10 Issues With the China-US Cybersecurity
Agreement, Inc, http://www.inc.com/joseph-steinberg/why-the-china-us-cybersecurity-agreement-will-fail.html]
While, at first glance, this pact may seem like a big victory for the United States-some experts estimate that over 80% of all information thefts targeting American
businesses currently emanate from China--it actually appears to be more political
posturing than a substantive agreement, and, in fact, in some ways may
aggravate matters. While it may provide some hope that the ball of change has
begun to roll, China still has a strong incentive to hack American people,
businesses, and the government, and the present agreement seems to do little to
change that situation.
Here are ten problems with the agreement:
1. The agreement as explained by the White House prohibits hacking for commercial
advantage, but other forms of hacking, including government on government
spying, are allowed. Considering the recently discovered massive breach of the
Office of Personnel Management--which led to millions of Americans having their
private details and fingerprints stolen, and which many in the government believe
was perpetrated by China--an agreement not addressing inter-governmental spying
is severely deficient. The Chinese government could literally steal every American
citizen's tax returns from the IRS and use the information within them for all sorts of
nefarious purposes without violating the current agreement. (It is true that the US
and many of its allies cyber-spy on one another, but, that is a separate issue with
risk levels of a different magnitude.)
2. The agreement does not define any standards. What is considered hacking, and
what is considered acceptable activity? What constitutes an attack? What is
considered commercial--especially considering that the 12 largest Chinese
companies are owned by its government? Is it acceptable for a business or
government to counter-attack against a commercial party attacking it--when
perhaps that party has been infected by malware and is the unwilling agent of
someone else? Most international agreements use internationally-accepted or
mutually-agreed-upon understandings of terms, standards, and the like. In the world
of "cyber" these clarifications do not yet exist, and, without them, any agreement is
subject to misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and abuse.
3. Based on the text of the Presidential statement, the agreement does not prohibit
hacking individuals or businesses for purposes other than commercial gain. Taking
out a public utility or financial network in order to inflict political harm? Using
people's personal data or photos in order to blackmail them into spying for China?
Both might be perfectly acceptable under this agreement. Furthermore, if Chinese

agents were caught hacking an American cybersecurity business, defense
contractor, or supplier of equipment don't you think they'll find a way to explain
their actions as having governmental purposes?
4. Even if it were more comprehensive, the agreement is essentially unenforceable.
There are no "inspections" or any other clear methods of implementing a "trust, but
verify" strategy. One cannot simply prevent a country from launching cyberattacks
by inspecting facilities as would be done to verify that a nation is not building
nuclear weapons or the like. Hackers can be anywhere; it is a lot easier for them to
hide--even in plain sight--than to hide thousands of centrifuges and a nuclear
reactor. Chinese hackers don't even need to be in China in order to carry out their
attacks. Furthermore, much as Iran sponsors terror through proxies--Hezbollah and
the like--China could easily hack through third parties; it is often impossible to
determine who is paying a hacker to carry out attacks, or if an attack is emanating
from its true source or has been routed through another party.
5. Contrary to the perception that many people develop from fictional stories,
experts often cannot identify with certainty the source of a professionally-executed
cyberattack; to this day, experts disagree as to who carried out various high profile
breaches. Furthermore, even when the culprit of an attack is identified, that party
often has a great deal of plausible deniability. As Stewart Draper, Director of Insider
Threats for Securonix, noted: "China has always denied involvement in data theft by
its government, or encouraging Chinese companies to perform espionage."
Practically speaking, should the need arise, how is the United States going to
substantiate any perceived violations by China?
6. In order to verify that the parties are honoring their commitments, the US and
China are supposed to "establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting
cybercrime and related issues" and "this mechanism will be used to review the
timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and assistance with
respect to malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either side" In other
words, the determination of whether the Chinese are adhering to the agreement will
be a subjective decision based on conversations and communications; no objective
metrics have been established by the agreement. This deficiency in the agreement
is serious--as one of the arguments that has been made for supporting an
agreement with China, as noted by Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar at
Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and Senior Fellow at
the Atlantic Council, has been that if China violates the agreement the United States
"will be in a much stronger position to respond to Beijing over its commercial
espionage" (perhaps by levying sanctions and/or gaining international support for
sanctions). If there is no objective way to measure compliance, why would anyone
support a US contention that China has violated the agreement? Measuring the
number of arrests made by China at the request of the US, and calculating how
much cooperation was received when aid was requested, are also poor methods to
determine compliance; the US's primary need is not for China to arrest hackers, but
to curtail the hacking. Under this agreement China can arrest hackers who are
identified by the United States, and appear to be compliant, but simultaneously
continue to tolerate or actively carry out attacks through other parties. Also, keep in
mind that the most dangerous and damaging attacks are often those that have not
been identified, and, therefore, for which no requests for assistance or arrests have
been made.
7. Even if China desired to deliver on its promises, it is not clear that the country
has the resources to do so. Chinese hackers are believed to commonly hack
businesses within China, making one wonder whether the nation's government truly
has the capability to curtail hacking. Furthermore, as Ken Westin, Senior Security
Analyst at Tripwire noted, the Chinese government has "taken a stance of complete
innocence when it comes to cyber war and espionage to the point of claiming
naivety." This deal is "sort of like having two parties agree to not hit each other in
the face, but one of the parties says he cannot agree because he doesn't have the
ability to punch."
8. There is nothing in this agreement that addresses Chinese censorship or abuse of
human rights. While some might argue that those are not issues related to hacking,
a government that shuts off access to portions of the Internet that allow free
communication is essentially no different than a party that executes denial-ofservice attacks. And human rights cannot be left off the table.
9. The agreement states that two nations will not "conduct or knowingly support
cyber-enabled theft." The term knowingly is troublesome. It is not hard to imagine
that if the Chinese government were caught violating the agreement in the future
its officials would simply deny knowing about the offending hacking. Seem
implausible? Consider how many American politicians from both major parties have
denied knowledge of inappropriate actions despite overwhelming evidence that
they either knew or should have known? Classified emails on a personal server? A
bridge illegally blocked? Why would the Chinese act any differently?
10. The agreement does nothing to address the reasons that China has been able to
hack us all along - several of which I discussed in an article that I wrote four years
ago. While some might argue that the US is better off with a bad deal or a partial
deal than with no deal, and that any reduction of hacking is better than the present
situation, or that the agreement is simply a framework for moving forward, I am not
so sure. By announcing this agreement, the US government has granted some
level of de-facto legitimization to activities that it should not be willing to
tolerate. Consider what the reaction of the government would have been had
Chinese agents been found to have physically broken into the Office of Personnel
Management and stolen millions of physical files. Why should hacking be treated
dramatically differently? Also, this agreement may dis-incent various
politicians from pursuing a stronger, clearer, more comprehensive
agreement that addresses the ten issues raised above, or from leveling
comprehensive sanctions should the need arise.
Of course, the Chinese have every right to be suspicious of our own government as
well; the NSA spying scandal and various other cyber-incidents such as the Stuxnet
attack against Iran's nuclear program clarified that the US is not a passive
bystander when it comes to cyber-spying and cyberattacks. We dont, however,
have a history of allowing corporations to hack their competitors.
Deterrence: Cyber war Good

Cyberwar improves military operation and unlikely to escalate
Libicki 14 (Martin, Senior Management Scientist, Professor, RAND Graduate School, Is Cyberwar
Good for Peace? 9.1.14, http://www.observatoire-fic.com/author/martinlibicki/)
In which universe is violent conflict war, if you will more likely ? In recent years, two scholars who agree on little
else, Tomas Rid and John Arquilla, have put forward the case that the second universe, todays is less likely to be
Cyberwar, in effect,
is good for peace. Both scholars pivot their argument over Stuxnet, a piece of malware that was
responsible for the destruction of roughly a thousand centrifuges in Irans uraniumenrichment facility, Natanz. Had the means of cyberwar not been available , they argue,
there is a serious likelihood that Israel or even the United States would have tried to
destroy Natanz using air raids. Such air raids would likely have produced casualties.
Furthermore, the use of violence might have begotten violence in return more likely
terrorism (given Irans modus operandi) than open war, but the latter could not have been ruled out. Thus, the
existence of Stuxnet allowed the problem created by Irans desire to enrich uranium (in order to
making nuclear weapons) to be dealt with in a nonviolent way . To the extent that Stuxnet is
warlike than the first universe, where cyberwar is impossible or at least inconsequential.[1]
archetypical, cyberwar is good for peace. This paper argues that the case that cyberwar is good for peace is by no
means so clear, something that can be demonstrated by a more rounded analysis of what cyberwar does and what
another attack on the (supposed) nuclear

facility being constructed in Syria with North Korean help. [2] In 2007, Israeli jets destroyed
this facility (Operation Orchard). According to Richard Clarke (and others), the air strike was aided by
a cyberattack on Syrias air defense system which essentially erased radar images
of incoming aircraft allowing all the aircraft to make it back safely .[3] Now suppose that a
the alternatives to cyberwar really are. To start, consider
cyberattack really was employed (other accounts say that more conventional electronic warfare was used[4]).
without the confidence that cyberwar would have disabled the

radar, the raids planners would have been deemed it too costly in terms of lost
aircraft and pilots and hence called it off. In the first universe, where the tools of cyberwar were unavailable, no
Further suppose that,
raid would have taken place, no destruction would have ensued, and no casualties (Operation Orchard left one to
two dozen dead) would have resulted. In that calculus, the cyberwar capabilities lead to more rather than less
example suggests
that the picture is a little more complicated than the notion that cyberwar allows nonviolent means
to replace violent means. A full analysis must ask (1) what choices are available with and without
violence. Had Syria retaliated, a further cycle of violence might have commenced. This
cyberwar, (2) what responses are likely to a cyberwar attack, and (3) what does the threat of cyberwar say for the
likelihood of conflict, qua stability. Such analyses also have to be sensitive to different contexts. What may hold for
a conflict among comparably strong countries may not hold for a conflict among countries, one of which is clearly
stronger than the other. Furthermore, the possibility of operational cyberwar (used against an opponents military
forces) may lead to different answers than the possibility of strategic cyberwar (used against an opponents
infrastructure and society, usually away from the battlefield). But first: why does this question matter ? Normally,
comparing the world as it is to a counterfactual world in which something had not taken place is a completely
academic exercise. Un-invention never takes place (even if people do walk away from some technologies nuclear
power comes to mind). Weapons control is oft pursued and only occasionally succeeds (chemical and biological
Although people
worry about cyberattacks, the fact that they are not heinous and, indeed, have yet to hurt
anyone directly coupled with the technical difficulties of enforcing arms control on virtual instruments of war
weapons provide the best example, but such weapons have low military utility, anyway).
suggests that they are unlikely to be banned. Norms against certain uses of cyberwar may have better chances, but
they may also be worth less in terms of assurance.
Deterrence CP
Direct deterrence solves better
nilateral and bilateral steps offer the most immediate path for preventing and
mitigating risks of ambiguity. Diverse interests and challenges that inhibit
verification limit the likelihood and effectiveness of a comprehensive international
agreement in the near term. The United States has two broad sets of policy
options.
The United States could enhance deterrence by strengthening defenses, building

and supporting more resilient networks, and bolstering the capacity and credibility
of U.S. retaliatory threats.
Improve cyber defenses, elevate the role of the private sector, and support
research. Government agencies and the private sector, which owns and operates
the majority of critical networks on which the United States relies, should be
encouraged to build and operate better defenses. Congress has considered several
competing pieces of legislation to establish a legal framework that would encourage
sharing of best practices and vulnerabilities between the public and private sectors.
The disclosure of significant cybersecurity failures would expand awareness of
threats and successful defenses, reduce duplicative efforts, improve the quality of
cybersecurity products, and support market mechanisms to develop network
security, such as the cybersecurity insurance market.
Intensify testing of national cyber defenses. The Department of Homeland
Security, the intelligence community, and relevant state, local, and private actors
could expand national training exercises to clarify responsibilities and demonstrate
capabilities, such as the CyberStorm series. Cyber exercises can showcase
resiliency and improve incident response, and should include disaster-response
operators to simulate health and safety issues that could accompany a major
attack.
Improve real and perceived attribution. A credible retaliatory threat will depend
on perceptions of U.S. attribution capabilities. To showcase this capability, U.S.
officials could expand intelligence collection against potential adversary cyber
programs and increase public or government-to-government disclosures of
intrusions. Intelligence, defense, and law enforcement officials could develop
standards of attribution confidence that can be used to recommend levers of
national power, including judicial, economic, diplomatic, intelligence, and military
tools, as well as network actions, such as slowing or blocking Internet traffic to and
from U.S. and allied networks. Modeled on legal burdens of proof, these standards
could shorten the time it takes for U.S. agencies to recommend response options.
U.S. officials could also support efforts to reduce anonymity on the Internet,
including adjustments to the design, distribution, and authentication of Internet
protocol (IP) addresses, but such reforms would come at too great a cost to free
expression.
Clearly define and enhance the role of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center (CTIIC) to ensure effective planning, coordination, and assignment of cyber
operations. Congress can enhance U.S. cyber posture by codifying CTIICs role in
integrating intelligence for the director of national intelligence and serving as an
interagency forum to coordinate roles and responsibilities. The special assistant to
the president and cybersecurity coordinator essentially serves as an interagency
coordinator, but his or her portfolio is expansive and staff is small. An enhanced
CTIIC, on the other hand, could ensure united efforts and report operational issues
directly to the White House; these measures could improve operational awareness
and guard against inadvertent escalation.
Promote greater public clarity on U.S. cyber strategy and doctrine. Uncertainty
over what amounts to a use of force in cyberspace can weaken deterrence if
potential adversaries misperceive thresholds for retaliation. National security
officials can reduce risks of miscalculation by more clearly defining how the United
States perceives use of force, armed attacks, aggression, and activity below
those thresholds. Some uncertainty is unavoidable to ensure flexibility in the
context of an attack, but more clarity would promote stability by shaping
expectations of behavior.
Make good on (and use of) retaliatory threats. U.S. deterrence rests on credible
assurances that the United States will retaliate strongly against perpetratorsboth
in and outside of cyberspace. When responsibility can be established, the White
House could inflict costs on the offender that also have a deterrent effect on other
potential adversaries. This could include an expanded offensive cyber capacity that
provides policymakers with a wider range of options, but because operations in
cyberspace may be noticed only by adversary network operators, they will likely
have greater effect as part of a broader campaign that includes responses outside
of the cyber domain, including use of the recently announced sanctioning authority
targeting malicious cyber actors.
Prospects for a comprehensive international solution to the risks posed by ambiguity

in cyberspace are limited at this time, and some technical fixes that would aid
attribution by limiting anonymity online would come with too great a social cost.
Instead, a strategy that focuses on fortifying U.S. networks, building a more
credible deterrent, and demonstrating responsible state practice offers the best
path forward.
The United States should improve the security and resilience of its networks and
fortify the credibility of retaliatory capacity.
Congress should pass legislation that facilitates real-time information sharing

within and between the private and public sectors. Implementation of this
information-sharing program is expected to cost $20 million over five years,
according to the Congressional Budget Office.
Congress should build on the February 2015 executive order designed to promote
information sharing among private actors by offering tax incentives or grants to
companies that join and support the work of information-sharing and analysis
organizationssector- or region-specific hubs that facilitate the exchange of cyberthreat data and cybersecurity best practices.
Congress should help reduce critical vulnerabilities by expanding support for the
new National Cybersecurity Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC); creating or incentivizing bug bounty programs for critical systems;
adjusting criminal and civil laws, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, to enable and encourage responsible security
research; and mandating robust cybersecurity requirements as a condition for
federal-procurement eligibility to drive the commercial market for secure products.
The Department of Defense (DOD) should expand efforts to improve cyber
defense capabilities, information-assurance responsibilities, and research and
development. DOD officials estimate this to cost $5.5 billion annually. Joint training
exercises in the combatant commands ($456 million requested by DOD for 2016)
should include cyber threats that could impede global access and operations to
improve DOD mission resilience, support the development of best practices to share
with critical infrastructure operators, and generate data to help avoid costly
adjustments to hardware, firmware, and other fixes in later development stages.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should expand signals
and human intelligence collection against potential adversary cyber programs, as
well as accelerate the intelligence communitys production and release of
actionable cybersecurity information to vital information network and critical
infrastructure operators. U.S. intelligence officials should also identify, in advance,
types of classified data that could be shared publicly in the event of an incident to
avoid a lengthy interagency declassification process that would delay a timely
public attribution.
When possible and appropriate, DOD officials should highlight U.S. involvement in
offensive cyber operations against states, terrorist groups, and other illicit actors to
fortify the credibility of U.S. retaliatory capacity among potential adversaries.
Greater transparency into offensive cyber operations, as well as the doctrine
underlying them, would also reinforce emerging norms in cyberspace by
demonstrating responsible state practice and supporting U.S. efforts to overcome
the skepticism of its commitments to shared interests and values in cyberspace that
emerged in the wake of unauthorized disclosures of U.S. cyber activity.
Non-response ensures escalation only deterrence works

Haddick 8/9/15 http://theweek.com/articles/572567/why-china-are-headed-toward-escalating-cyber-war
Robert Haddick is an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command. He writes here in a personal
capacity. His book Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific, is now out from Naval Institute
Press.
The Obama administration now faces a critical decision on two flashpoints

created by Chinese aggression. The first is how the United States government will
respond to the cyber intrusion into the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
database, an attack that resulted in the theft of over 20 million government
personnel records. The administration has reached a series of conclusions regarding
the OPM hack that represents a significant departure from past practices. The
National Security Agency is confident that the Chinese government is responsible
for the OPM hack. After the magnitude and audacity of the OPM hack became clear,
the U.S. government decided to go beyond defensive cyber software and computer
hygiene to defend against cyber challenges. Deterrence, created by a punishing
response to this intrusion, will now be the U.S. government's approach to such
cyber attacks. As a result, President Obama is "clearly seeking leverage, [and] has
asked his staff to come up with a more creative set of responses."
In the wake of the OPM data breach, establishing cyber deterrence with China will
require inflicting punishment on their decision-makers in a way that harms their
interests (in order to demonstrate that it is possible to do so), and promising more
to come if these decision-makers don't change their behavior. And that will likely
require much sterner measures than the diplomatic protests and Justice
Department indictments that have thus far had no discernible effect. Critics of
retaliation will protest that a response will only result in an escalating cyber war
between the two countries, with the United States more exposed to the damage
that would bring. But the boxing match is already underway , with China punching
and the U.S. playing the punching bag . Ignoring the blows will not stop the
pain they are inflicting.
Visible deterrence strategy key to prevent US-China

cyberescalation
Glitch News 9/30/15 http://www.glitch.news/2015-09-30-cyber-relationship-between-u-s-china-saidto-be-at-breaking-point.html
Countries have historically used technology to spy on each other, but the advent of
the cyber age is testing government-to-government relationships in a way that goes
beyond simple espionage and could lead to disastrous consequences, say experts.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the relationship between the United States
and China. As reported by the U.K.s V3 web site, Beijings incessant hacking of U.S.
corporate, government and military entities marks a dangerous escalation of a
new kind of warfare that has the potential to spiral out of control and could spark
devastating conventional responses, as well as cyber responses in kind.
NT3
A secret NSA map published by NBC News in July lays bare the gravity of the
situation: Chinese hackers have targeted hundreds of U.S. businesses, government
facilities and military databases successfully in recent years, resulting in untold
damage to both corporate and national security.
As NBC News reported:
The map uses red dots to mark more than 600 corporate, private or government
Victims of Chinese Cyber Espionage that were attacked over a five-year period,
with clusters in Americas industrial centers. The entire Northeast Corridor from
Washington to Boston is blanketed in red, as is Californias Silicon Valley, with other
concentrations in Dallas, Miami, Chicago, Seattle, L.A. and Detroit. The highest
number of attacks was in California, which had almost 50.
Stolen information includes intellectual property and military secrets as well as

data about the countrys critical infrastructure like telecommunications, electric
grids, dams and the Internet backbone.
[P]rizes that China pilfered during its intrusions included everything from
specifications for hybrid cars to formulas for pharmaceutical products to details
about U.S. military and civilian air traffic control systems, intelligence sources told
NBC News.
The map was prepared as part of an NSA briefing by the agencys Threat Operations
Center (NTOC) in February 2014, so its safe to assume that further intrusions have
occurred since. The briefing focused on Chinas interest in Google and defense
contractors such as Lockheed Martin, as well as U.S. air traffic control systems.
The briefing listed documents and data that Chinese government hackers have
exfiltrated that is, stolen from American corporate, government and military
networks. It also listed the number and origin of Chinas exploitations and attacks.
The map suggests that NSA has been able to monitor and assess the Chinese
cyber espionage operations, and knows which specific companies, government
agencies and computer networks are being targeted, NBC News reported.
One of the most highly publicized hacks in recent months has been the years-long
Chinese breach of computer systems belonging to the Office of Personnel
Management. As one official told Business Insider, This is deep. The data goes back
to 1985. This means that they potentially have information about retirees, and they
could know what they did after leaving government.
The official added, Access to information from OPMs computers, such as

birthdates, Social Security numbers, and bank information, could help hackers test
potential passwords to other sites, including those containing information about
critical weapons systems.
The U.S. has not sat idly by as China and other nations including Russia and Iran
have gained access to American systems. According to former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden, the U.S. government hacked into Chinese mobile phone
companies to collect text messages and spied on the Tsinghua University, one of
Chinas biggest research institutions.
The university also manages one of Chinas six major Internet backbone networks
the China Education and Research Network (CERNET), from where millions of
Chinese citizens could be mined for data. CERNET was one of Chinas first Internet
backbone networks and has since evolved into the worlds biggest national research
hub.
And, The New York Times reported in July, the Obama administration has decided to
retaliate against China for its massive OPM hack, in which data on 20 million current
and former U.S. government employees was stolen.
One of the conclusions weve reached is that we need to be a bit more public about
our responses, and one reason is deterrence, one senior administration official
involved in the debate, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal
White House plans, told the Times. We need to disrupt and deter what our
adversaries are doing in cyberspace, and that means you need a full range of tools
to tailor a response.
And Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has said that the sophistication
of hacking aimed at the United States would worsen until such time as we create
both the substance and psychology of deterrence.
Were already maxxed out on diplomacy need aggressive

response
Corrin 10/27/15 http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/cyber/2015/10/27/is-better-defense-theanswer-to-the-china-cyber-threat/74689802/ Amber Corrin is the editor of C4ISR & Networks, where she covers all
things defense IT, including cybersecurity, command and control, intelligence, cloud computing and more. Prior to
joining Gannett Government Media, she covered defense IT, intelligence and national security at Federal Computer
Week. Amber is a graduate of West Virginia University.
While the U.S. and China in September reached a "common understanding" to stem
China's ongoing cyber theft of U.S. intellectual property, the deal focused on
economic interests and left unaddressed the onslaught of attacks on the
government, many of which are attributed to China.
That may not come as a surprise: Cyber is just one part of the delicate and fraught
diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and China. That's one reason why the
former director of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command says the
government should instead focus on shoring up its cyber defense.
In both government espionage and economic theft, " our first step should be to
fix our defense . I think what the White House and others are doing is as much as
you can do diplomatically," retired GEN Keith Alexander said in an interview with
C4ISR & Networks. "But I think that's a tough thing for China in a couple of ways.
They have huge economic problems. How do they fuel their economy? It takes
intellectual property, and if we leave ours completely out there in the open, people
are going to steal it."
MISC CPS
Dealerting CP vs russia
Dealerting solves US-Russia cyber risk
While there are numerous measures in place to guard against the unauthorised use
of US and Russian nuclear weapons during peacetime and periods of strategic
stability, such as Permissive Action Links, dual phenomenology, sophisticated
encryption for communications,8 and other various safety features,9 these tensions
become particularly acute during a crisis where time pressures and perceived
incentives may change.10 Complete trust in the dependability of these protective
measures may also naturally reduce over time as components age and new
vulnerabilities and glitches that can be exploited are discovered. In this way, while
indirect outsider interference (such as spoofing early warning or sending false
commands) is likely to be manageable in times of relative stability and peace, in
crisis situations, cyber terrorists would only need their interference to be
believable for a short period of time to have considerable implications, perhaps
even leading to miscalculation and nuclear use (Fritz 2009). Given the possibility
that certain actors wanting to cause mass destruction, equipped with the right tools,
might have both the intention and the capability to target nuclear weapons and
associated systems, logic would suggest that de-alerting US and Russian nuclear
forces, expediting nuclear cuts, and hardening nuclear facilities against cyberattack
are all pressing priorities. Ultimately, as General James Cartwright has said, Taking
US and Russian missiles off high alert could keep a possible cyber attack from
starting a nuclear war (quoted in Burns 2015).
Middle power CP: Attribution

Middle power best situated to promulgate attribution norms
With respect to the procedural mechanics of attribution, several desirable design

features can be identified. First, attribution should be done on the basis of technical
best practices for determining the point of origin for Internet traffic. Second, state
and non-state actors seeking to attribute cyber attacks should bear in mind the
ease of concealment either by technical means or by the employment of armslength proxy agents. Accordingly, attribution should be made only after attempts to
engage appropriate authorities in the apparent country of origin. Where such
authorities react cooperatively and in good faith, this should be prominently noted
when attribution is made. Ideally, in such situations, joint statements of attribution
could be made. The creation and application of attribution standards and practices
will require responsible global leadership. Political scientists and international
relations scholars suggest that global norms are actively built by agents who have
strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Canada, Australia and Korea are well positioned to
act cooperatively as global leaders developing norms for both the procedures and
consequences of publicly attributing cyber attacks for the following reasons. All
three countries can find common ground for the development of these norms
through their shared dialogue on the importance of international trade for economic
growth and domestic economic policies that reflect these views. Cyber attacks can
have large impacts on a countrys ability to fairly and effectively compete in global
markets (for example, see Manyika et al. 2014; Centre for Strategic and
International Studies 2013). Non-attribution of these kinds of cyber attacks could
further encourage this behaviour, as states or other actors would face no
consequences for their bad practices. However, hasty or aggressive public
attribution could also affect a countrys ability to gain from trade by affecting its
ability to bargain in future trade negotiations. Accusations that are not supported by
convincing technical data and not made according to proper legal procedure can
damage diplomatic relations. Thus, states risk negative diplomatic consequences
and losing gains from trade when both hasty public attribution and non-attribution
are made. As advanced industrial democracies with digitally connected economies,
Australia, Canada and Korea have particular interests in the health of the digital
economy. They also share a basic commitment to the maintenance of a rules-based
international order. n deciding when and how to attribute cyber attacks, normsguiding states, firms and other actors are of little use if the underlying technical and
legal capacities for attribution remain weak. There is certainly much to be done in
this area. However, there are good reasons to conclude that Canada, Australia and
Korea can take the lead on enhancing the capacity to accurately attribute cyber
attacks. All three countries possess digitally connected economies with significant
pools of relevant human capital. Such steps complement and coincide with
measures that can augment capacities to defend against (and repair damage
resulting from) cyber attacks. We focus here on what we believe to be one of the
most promising avenues for cooperation on capacity building: strengthening CERTs.
12
Middle power coalition best to promote restraint in cyber

attribution
While there is a need for rule making both about the procedures and
consequences of public attribution and for various kinds of capacity-building and
coordination measures, there is also a need for a commitment to restraint when
publicly attributing cyber attacks. The widespread consistent exercise of such
restraint in the face of what are likely to be increasingly common and perhaps
increasingly disruptive incidents will take political will and statesmanship. This is the
final way in which we conclude that Canada, Korea and Australia can show
leadership. They can do so with the goal of forging a shared vision of the need for
restraint in attribution in light of recent events and emerging trends. Such a vision
must be predicated on relevant norms from other areas of international law and the
broader regime complex for cyber governance (Nye 2014). A constructive
discussion of the issues should begin with a shared understanding of what we have
identified as the central dilemma in attributing cyber attacks: that careless
attribution can be counter-productive and destabilizing, damaging important
political, cultural and economic relationships; and that, on the other hand, lack of
attribution can create a permissive environment in which cyber attacks are seen as
low-cost and perhaps even as acceptable behaviour. Norms on cyber security and
conflict are a global matter. However, given that cyber security issues are relatively
new, multilateral institutions and other forms of international cooperation within this
policy domain have not yet matured. The literature on constructive powers can be
used to explain and describe how countries develop norms in these nascent policy
spaces (Hampson and Heinbecker 2011). Constructive powers can act as norm
entrepreneurs in the development of global norms on cyber attacks and attribution.
As Simon Palamar discusses in his contribution to this volume, one characteristic of
constructive powers is their ability to shape the world in ways that explicitly take
the preferences and interests of others into account. The development of norms on
public attribution aligns with the preferences of other states given the political,
economic and social consequences of both hasty and non-attribution. As
constructive powers, Canada, Australia and Korea are well positioned to begin a
productive dialogue both domestically and in concert with each other and to
frame this critical conversation from its earliest stages, creating conditions for
ongoing conversation and institutional learning.
Middle powers uniquely suited to developing cyberlaw

internationally for attribution
Ensuring the success of international efforts to build responsible norms for state
conduct in cyberspace will require patient, careful work over a long period of time.
Canada, Korea and Australia have the required resources (including positive
international reputations) to play leading roles in this work both at the regional and
global levels. As digitally connected economies, they also have clear interests in a
positive outcome. In the nuclear era, such learning processes involved the creation
of forums and study groups bringing together policy makers, military leaders and
academics. Much of this activity took place at the national level, and it is likely that
governments will engage on similar crash-course-learning programs as cyber issues
become more prominent in contemporary international politics. However, given the
greater reach and density of transnational networks among policy makers, there
may be scope for international analogues to these processes. Transnational learning
processes may (at least initially) take place at less official levels and involve more
prominent roles for academics and other non-state actors, but may nevertheless
play an important role in encouraging the improvement and dissemination of best
practices for attributing cyber attacks and for ensuring responsible state conduct in
cyberspace more generally. Providing resources to facilitate such processes is an
inexpensive proposition with potentially large benefits and could be a priority for
cooperation in both the short and long term.
Multilateral CP
Multilateral consultation on internet rules of the road crucial
Meyer Summer 15
The quest for a global consensus on norms of responsible state behavior in

cyberspace needs to be purposefully taken up. The international community can ill
afford to leave the security of cyberspace to the self - proclaimed cyber warriors.
The previous official recognition that such norms are desirable require sustained
follow - up. Concerned capitals will have to invest considerable political and
diplomatic energy in any effort to forge agreements around such norms. While
bilateral consultations and regional arrangements can help, the universal character
of cyberspace points to a need for norms that will be global rather than particular in
nature. This suggests eventually a dedicated multilateral process under UN
auspices. It is time for states to move from airing broad principles to initiating a
more focused diplomatic process to negotiate the content of the new norms.
Preserving cyberspace for peaceful purposes on behalf of humanity requires
proactive work to forge some common arrangements to govern state actions.
Although states will have to step up to the plate to address this challenge, the
private sector as well as civil society, as the chief stakeholders of cyberspace,
cannot afford to be idle on this issue and will need to press their governments to
take early and appropriate action if the benign character of cyberspace is to be
preserved.

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China Cyber

Contention One: Status quo cyber-diplomacy fails

proxies to conduct cyber espionage. As a recent investigation in the Wall Street

Despite signals toward cyber rules of the road, the US hasnt

consensus on norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The statement

Contention Two: US-China War

Diplomatic failures pushing us to the brink of full-scale USChinese cyberwar

Cyber-negotation failures create multiple unique scenarios for

Cyberscalation from Asian flashpoints is a UNIQUELY probably

Most likely internal link to Asian war

Traditionally, Chinas primary strategic interests, influence, and military

**Risk of MISCALCULATION and INADVERTENT ESCALATION

Goes nuclear most probable escalation scenario

the centre of the global economy no longer

Contention Three: Global Road Rules

Cyber anarchy sparks US-Russian nuclear conflict

nuclear firing chain; or in a worst-case scenario even cause a nuclear explosion or

States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or

nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional

Independent of escalation, cyberwar could be worse than

Contention Four: Multistakeholder model

Needing a Western Response Whatever the diplomatic strategy Beijing and

and measures that would constitute an alternative to the SinoRussian proposed

US diplomatic vacuum is filled by Chinese and Russian

US diplomatic failures drive Russia and China to cooperate

Much like Russia

In order to create this norm of cyber-sovereignty,

Russian attendees echoed the concerns brought forward by Chinese

The closeness of China and Russias cybersecurity relationship is

The fear for and the opposition to

This determines the larger struggle between a

Abandoning the multistakeholder model wrecks global growth,

Contention Five: Rules of the Road solve Cyberwar

Intensified negotiation of rules of the road and attribution

Although the summit statement on cyber-enabled intellectual property the t was an

Us-China cooperation on Internet norms spills over globally,

Inherency Ext: At 15 Cyber Agreement Solves

Squo negotiations, but not enough to solve the risk

nations relationship in cyberspace . In the absence of a set of fully fleshed-out

Agreements a good step but cant solve

In the aftermath of recent cyberattacks attributed to Chinas government and

Currrent negotiation progress is painfully slow

Cyberagreement insufficient even if its a good step

Cyberagreement leaves military on the table

that CISOs shouldnt take

too much comfort in the pact for quite a while

Cyberagreement only economic INCREASE risk of national

NU Ext disad link now

Global Cyberwar risk increasing

Multiple scenarios for escalatory cyberwar ambiguity key

Cyberattacks are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of

High risk of cyberwar now undeveloped rules of the road

Cyberwars ambiguity raises escalation risks

Due to the difficulty of determining whether certain activity is intended for

Ambiguity also arises in the case of wormsself-replicating malware that seeks

Indicators of activity with the potential to create or exacerbate an international

Tactical warning indicators resemble traditional conflicts, such as changes in the

Third, U.S. officials ability to respond swiftly and effectively to cyberattacks is

Cyberwar increasing will escalate to full war