March 17, 2016

Animal Rights
Joel Feinberg, The rights of animals and unborn generations

Joel Feinberg discusses two basic ethical concepts: right and interest
o Few ethicist tackle topic of rights; difficult topic
Feinbergs main argument: to have a right is to have a claim to something
(happiness, life, safety etc ) and against someone, the recognition of which
could be used to protect ones legal rights or ones moral rights
o The moment you make a claim, you must recognize that that claim
could be used against others
In either case, we appeal to the enlightened conscience
o Enlightened= certain rational centers are opened up
o conscience= moral reasoning
To have a right in the full moral sense of the word, then is to have
enlightened conscience
o Capacity to reason, recognize and claim
Assumptions: there will still be a world 500 years from now that is inhabited
by people much like ourselves, it is psychologically possible to care about our
remote descendants (that many people do care and that we ought to care)

But there is another conceptual way of having rights

There are certain kinds of beings that can have rights (in principle) because
we can meaningfully predicate rights to them (if following a certain logic of
reasoning, we can see that those entities can have rights, this doesnt mean
they have rights)
Such beings have only contingent rights which are always, in some way,
combined with the rights of enlightened conscience
o Contingent means it depends on the rights of enlightened conscience
o Conceptually, we can conceive these entities as having rights but
these rights are never full-fledged
o Recall Laurens discussion of rights of fetuses
o Fetuses CAN have rights depending on how developed fetuses is
o But fetuses dont have them in all circumstances

The rights of seven main groups: individual animals, vegetables, whole species,
human vegetable, fetuses and future generations
1) Individual animals: there are legal rules against cruelty and meaningless
killing of animals, but this does not solve the problem whether individual animals
have rights or not
The law reflect that we have duties regarding animals but not necessarily to
animals. Whats the difference?

I feel certain way regarding an animal= that animal cannot defend itself,
thus Im going to objectify it, treat it a way that is suitable at that time
Some legal writers even argue that animal themselves are not even intended
beneficiaries pf statuses prohibiting cruelty to animals
We are instead concerned with other human beings who readily
identify themselves with a tortured dog
However, how can this be the case since the humans who readily
identify themselves with a tortured dog must believe that animals
deserve protection
Animals are not genuine moral agents, therefore they do not have rights and
duties in the same way that humans do. Why is that?
Why animals cant have duties:
i. Animals are intellectually incompetent, we cannot reason with them
(they have conscience but no rational capacity)
ii. Inflexible and unadaptable to future contingencies
iii. Subject to fits of instinctive passion that they cannot control
iv. They cannot claim their own rights by making a motion, or
appearing in court on their own
v. Cannot make contractual agreements/promises
vi. Cannot be trusted + cannot be blamed for human moral failures
Recall abortion debate: Sharon- _____
Moral rights go hand in hand with idea of duty and responsibility
Common reasons to deny animals rights:
o Animals are intellectually incompetent, we cannot reason with them
(they have conscience but no rational capacity)
o Animals dont understand whether any of their rights have been
violated and they cannot respond adequately to that (lack of
understanding of the very idea of a right)
o Cannot initiate legal proceedings

Feinberg: the ability to under your own rights and set the legal machinery toward
protecting them, are NOT necessary for the possession of rights

If that were the case, incompetent human beings (human vegetables) and
babies would be deprived of rights= problematic
In fact, why cant an animal go to a legal proceeding through an agent that
makes little or no demand upon the principal (and as a principal, they are
totally passive)
o However, an important dissimilarity is that a contract still needs to be
entered and the principal still needs to instruct the agent on certain
things
o On the other hand, incompetent human beings and babies still have
attorneys without their own consent, some attorneys might also
appointed to reluctant defendants
A more sound argument: a being that has rights is one that has interests and
could be represented; one that is capable of being a beneficiary in his own
person

I can claim something and make someone represent me= I could argue
that I do have rights
o Feinburg doesnt abandon what is said, he refine the argument to make
it less exclusive
Animals are incapable of interests
o This is why we can objectify animals
Animals are like mere things
o In order to have interests, one has to have conative life: having
conscious wishes, desires and hopes, urges and impulses, aims and
goals, direction of grown, and sense of natural fulfillment
o Like Marquis Future like ours: I have projects and hopes for the future
Animals lack conation
So, the laws against cruelty against animals are laws for us, not for the
animals, because we dont want to encourage cruel behaviour in humans
But animals do have interests in an important sense
o Animals dont have all critierias of conative life (aims and goals etc)
but they do have interests that should not be ignored
Many of the higher animals (ex. Primates) have appetites and conative urges,
rudimentary purpose, the integrated satisfaction of which constitutes their
welfare or their good that is worth protecting
o All their future orientation is very primitive because their conscience is
not as developed as ours
Then animals are among the sorts of beings that can have rights of some sort
(But animals could be treated consistently as pests!)
Ex) pets that have been made beneficiaries and trustees of funds, etc.=
special circumstances/ exceptions. Not all animals can be granted rights on
apar with human rights
o We are the ones that manipulate the rights (ex. we think its alright to
experiment on animals), because we are the ones capable of making
long term goals
But it still is conceptually confusing to talk about animals as moral agents
who have rights and duties
Two reasons for the following conclusion: the sorts of beings who can have
rights are precisely those who have (or can have) interests
o 1. A right holder must be capable of being represented and its is
impossible to represent a being that has no interests
o 2. A right holder must be capable of beneficiary in his own person
(without interests, incapable of being harmed + benefitted)
o

2) Plants: interests are linked to desires, needs and aims, which means that they
presuppose, at least a rudimentary cognitive equipment or cognitive
awareness
Then, plants cannot have interests and so they cannot have rights
Feinburgs conclusion: plants, unlike animals, cannot have rights
However, there is clearly a conceptual confusion when it comes to rights of
vegetables (and animal rights

However, plants are vital objects with inherited biological propensities and we
do say certain conditions are good and bad for plants
o We also say certain plants are good/bad for internal walls of a house
and are capable of feeling some sort of affection for certain plants
First, we often confuse the needs and desires that plants have for sunshine
and nutrients for needs and desires similar to these of higher animals or even
humans. Whats the difference?
The ethical or aesthetical (we beautify the plants) value we ascribe to the
needs of plants is purely human
o We can attached to plant while taking care of it
o We project human features to the plant ex) it likes to listen to classic
music
Second, there is a confusion with the use of language when talking about
plants
We use language metaphorically more often than we think when talking
about plants that are flourishing under someones care
o Plants flourishing under someones care, when given away to
someone else they die this is only because of sunshine and nutrient
given etc.
o We pinch off dead flowers before seeds have formed to encourage the
plant to make new flowers (for more seeds) not the plants own
natural propensity is advanced but is due to interests of the gardener

3) Whole species: compared to individual animals: we run into a paradox

Animal species cannot have beliefs (expectations, wants, desires) that are
associated with interests and therefore, they cannot have rights
Individual animals can have rights but it is implausible to ascribe to them a
right to life on the human model
However, the preservation of a whole species, say the species of Siberian
tigers, might be morally more important (to us) than the preservation of an
individual Siberian tiger
o Thinking Utilitarian: you quantify the good, figure out which group
would benefit ( the siberiant iger, the human?), the consequences,
weight out the good vs. bad
o Recall deontology involves look at the individual while utilitarian look at
groups as a whole
Still, for Feinberg the interests of whole species are human interests
We feel an obligation to protect whole species because we feel we have an
obligation to the future generations
Note: There is an important difference between whole animal species and
corporate entities, for example
We often link corporate interests and rights
Unlike biological species, a corporation/ institution has rules, or bylaws,
because it is composed of human beings that create and administer the rules
o Biological species exclude humans

4) Dead person: they do and dont have rights since they do and dont have
interests
Strictly speaking, they dont really have rights and interests the way a living
person does
But, it is a moral duty of the promisor to keep his/her word not to defame or
tanish the reputation of the promise (who might happen to be dead)
o Social contract: we need to preserve legacy of the dead, legal
obligation
We give opportunities to people to decide when theyre still alive what will
happen to their body after they pass away, we give them life insurance, we
let them ask for promises that they wish to be carried out/honoured after
they die
o Duties of promisor does not become null after their death because
then there could be no confidence in promises regarding posthumous
arrangements (no use for life insurance).
o However, it is not logically correlated with a promisees right (still, a
morally sensitive promisor is likely to take the promise as a duty and
something owed to the deceased)
The whole practice of honouring wills and testaments, and the like, is thus for
the sake of the living, just as a particular instance of it may be thought to be
for the sake of one who is dead.
We have an interest while alive that some of our interests, such as, the
interest to keep a clean reputation, continue to be served after we are dead.
5) Human vegetables: they do not have interests and therefore, they do not have
rights
Commonly so incompetent that they cannot be assigned duties or be held
responsible for what they do
So long we regard these patients as potentially curable, we may think of
them as human beings with interests in their own restoration
o But what if we think of them as permanently incurable??
In vegetative state, they dont have interests and dont have right; but once
dead, they have the right to not have their reputation tarnished
We think of them as having rights but thats for our sake and not for theirs
Human vegetables are no longer capable of having a good of their own
o No a beneficiary of anyones interests while in vegetative state
6) Fetuses: if we think of fetuses as potential human beings, then we can
meaningfully speak of them as such entities that can have rights
Newborns: They do have the capacity to feel pain this on its own might be
sufficient ground to ascribing both and interest and a right to them.
o They lack traits necessary for the possession of interests but it is clear
that the process to obtain and develop them are in the near future
(develop very quickly)
If we think of fetuses are a threat, then fetuses cant have rights, we can
treat them as objects that can be eradicated

While fetuses and newborns do not have interests, strictly speaking and so,
they do not have rights
But we assume that they will acquire such traits so that they will have
interests and thus, rights
o Ex. they can sue for prenatal injuries after they are born
Sometimes theres a law that a fetus has the unconditional right to be born
o Ex. A jehovas witness refused blood transfusion, the court ordered her
to get the transfusion despite her religion (on the basis that the unborn
child is entitle to the laws protection)
o This is open to argument + decision!
o However, the question of whether a fetus are the kind of beings that
can have right is a conceptual (NOT MORAL) question amenable to only
logical analysis
So, we feel justified in protecting the rights of the unborn, but we shouldnt
forget that those rights are NOT unconditional as is often assumed
o Fetuses are not human beings. Their rights depend on humans around
them
o Same as vegetative state, who do not have interests

7) Future generations: future generations are even more remotely potential than
fetuses
Most would say we have the duty to not make the world unpleasant for the
future generations (that we are morally required to be considerate and that it
is something done for our descendants sakes)
There are proxies that speak on their behalf that are far from being mere
custodians.
Are future generations more remotely potential than foetuses?
o In one sense, yes because a longer time period has to pass. However,
the collective posterity is just as certain to come into existence than a
foetus in the mothers womb.
The problem here is not the temporal remoteness but rather the fact that we
are not certain of who they will be and what kinds of interests they will have
Just like fetuses, future generations have only contingent rights because
they have no present interests
o What if one day there was just a huge collective decision that no one
will have kids anymore? We would not be able to complain on behalf of
the future generations that their future interests which give them a
contingent right of protection have been violated since they will never
come into existence.
But just like fetuses, they are the kinds of things that can have rights
o If we are able to predicting that their futures will be like future like
ours, then they could have rights. But if not, we wont sacrifice our
rights for generation that dont exist yet
Paradoxes of potentiality

The biggest problem with potentiality: leads to a slippery slope

o Can even say nutrient in the soil can be a potential human being
How to avoid the slippery slope?
Introduce such criteria as causal importance and (deviation from) the
normal course of events
o Read the coursepack for more complete info!
As vague as these terms are, they at least provide somewhat of a compass

Causal importance ex. Cement is causally important for the foundation of a building

Without cement, cant have a high rise

Sperm or egg is causally important for a potential human being
Causal importance is relativistic: depends on purposes and interests
o If not a high rise, dont necessarily need cement
o Also depends on the ease or difficulty of providing the missing
elements

Normal course of events; ex. Dehydrated orange juice, when mixed with tap water,
will, under normal circumstances become orange juice

Under normal circumstances, when eggs get fertilized, you can expect a baby
to be formed
On the other hand, an unfertilized ovum will not become an embryo unless
someone intervenes deliberately to make it happen

Conclusion: we best understand the concept of right in terms of the concept of

interest

Interests are defined as conscious desires, needs, hopes, beliefs etc.

o Belief is diff from instinct, belief is rationally justified
Only autonomous humans have present interests and therefore, full-fledged
rights
But there are other things, such as higher animals, dead persons, fetuses and
future generations that can have interests and therefore, at least contingent
rights