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Is There Anything Wrong With “Speciesism”?

Speciesism is a term which was developed in recent philosophical thinking which describes the
discrimination shown to a living being based on the species to which they belong. Just as a racist
allows bias to affect their actions towards someone of another race, a speciesist allows bias to
influence their judgement and consideration when dealing with a being who is of a certain species.1
This can be split into two broad categories: the view that some animals (puppies) have more value
than others (battery hens); that humans are worth inherently more than non-human animals. In this
essay, I will argue against the latter type of speciesism by arguing that non-human animals are
worthy of our moral consideration as moral patients before demonstrating the difficulties of
rejecting such a stance. That animals are worthy of equal moral consideration to humans presents
speciesism as an incorrect position.

To demonstrate the commonly held speciesist views, I will describe a common stance in Western
Philosophy: humans have no direct moral duties to non-humans. The duties we have to animals are
indirect duties to those humans that care for them. This is due to the lack of rationality and intellect
required for moral thinking, leaving animals (that is, non-human animals) unable to be morally
autonomous.2 The argument can be outlined more formally as follows:

P1: A right is a claim that one party may claim against another.
P2: To understand a right we must know what it entails and between which claimants it exists.
P3: Animals cannot make or respond to moral claims.
C1: Therefore, animals do not have rights.

The argument, as Cohen sets out, uses a definition of rights which requires a claim between two
parties. Though I doubt that these claims are necessary, I will argue only against the other premises
to show that his conclusion does not follow given this assumption.

Firstly, the conclusion does not follow given the second premise. Given that knowing the contents
and parties involved in a right is required for it to be understood, and that with animals we do not
know or understand the contents of these claims, one could conclude that we cannot understand
the rights of animals. However, it does not follow that this right does not exist. This is because many
animals would be able to make such a claim were they able to construct moral thought in terms we
understand. As moral agents, however, we can observe and understand the position of other beings
in such a way that we may make these claims on their behalf and see that they are beneficial and
valuable. For the conclusion to follow from P2, there lies the assumption that we as moral agents do
not have the capacity to understand the moral claims that animals would make were they in a
position to do so; instead we should take the speciesist response and simply disregard them.
However, we can make sense of the moral claims that an animal makes and so we should consider
them as our own.

1
Singer, P. 1974. “All Animals are Equal”, Philosophic Exchange, 5(1), Article 6, Available Online
[https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6/], p108
2
Cohen, C. 1986. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, The new England Journal of
Medicine. Available Online [http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf]. p95

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Secondly, I will argue against the idea that animals cannot make moral claims. Certainly, they cannot
formulate arguments and understand concepts of morality, but these are only sufficient, not
necessary to make a moral claim. If you imagine a dog who has been abused by his owner, their
pain, and the physical reaction to the abuse manifestation of the extreme circumstances they have
found themselves in. They are suffering and recognise, through their pain, that they are not in a
normal situation or at equilibrium. Though this is far from a formal claim, it is an external
demonstration of the injustice they have faced and the pain which they feel internally. To disregard
such a claim solely because it is not communicated in the way a moral agent can is an unfair
dismissal of a right we would otherwise accept.

To consider the rights of these animals in the way I have described is to refocus our view of animal
rights in a non-speciesist way by allowing them to be treated as moral patients. A moral patient, as
in the position I have taken previously, is one which falls subject to our actions and should be
considered in our moral judgements.3 We take humans to be moral agents, (they can make informed
moral judgements), as well as moral patients, (they receive moral consideration). The kind of view
taken by people who believe animals have no rights due to their lack of moral capabilities is that
being a moral agent is necessary to be a moral patient.4

This is problematic given that not all humans are moral agents and so to treat them differently to
animals would be speciesist. The fact that we are moral agents simply means we have the capacity
to concern ourselves with moral questions and leaves us to ask who they affect. In cases such as
infants or people with severe brain damage, we allow them the status of moral patients and
continue to care for them - we would not kill and eat the marginal human case who is no more of a
moral agent than an animal. This is regardless of arguments that it is necessary for us to kill animals
to survive – a vegan diet is sufficient for a human to live. It is speciesist to treat these two groups
differently when there is no discernible difference between them aside from their species. That is
not to say that we should kill humans for food or that we should give animals the same rights as
humans – many animals would have more interest in a chew toy than being allowed to vote.
However, if we consider the individual interests of a young child to play with their favourite toy, we
should consider the interests of animals to have open spaces in which to live and enjoy.

Cohen rejects this stance, claiming that all humans, regardless of state are of a “kind” which deserve
special moral consideration simply because those of us who accept and abide by moral rules care
about these people and include them in our moral judgements.5 A similar argument could be used to
justify why we give more moral consideration to our pets than factory animals: those of us who form
a moral community simply care more for these animals and so take our obligations to them into
account. However, this speciesist view is very close to Social Contract Theory which presents
problems in itself. This theory mirrors the way in which our laws function: morality is a set of rules
between moral agents which is supported by the agreement and support of its members.6 Humans

3
Narveson, J. 1986. “A Case Against Animal Rights”, Animal Studies Repository. Available Online
[http://animalstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=acwp_awap]. p195
4
Norcross, A. 2004. “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases”, Philosophical Perspectives.
Availiable Online [http://faculty.smu.edu/jkazez/animal%20rights/norcross-4.pdf] p243
5
Cohen, C. 1986.
6
Julia, D. 2006 “Ethics: The Fundamentals” Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p102

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all have rights because we are part of the contract, while animals lay outside of that as beings who
cannot subscribe to it.

However, this position has serious flaws which have been demonstrated through liberation
movements in recent times.7 When most moral agents agree on some moral rules, minority groups
are easily dismissed since Social Contract Theory says that all beings with rights must be able to
subscribe to the current moral standards, and that these standards are set by the people within it.
An obvious example is that homosexuals were widely believed to be criminals and discrimination
against them was permissible as per the agreement of most moral agents. Nowadays, homophobia is
widely considered incorrect (along with racism, sexism etc) and demonstrates how relying on
Contract Theory can lead to serious moral blunders. Dismissing the existence of speciesism could
easily be one such blunder and is one reason to seriously consider speciesism as a problem. If we
accept that discrimination based on “kind” is not acceptable then it would be speciesist to consider
the moral interests of marginal human cases and not of animals.

I have argued that speciesism is wrong by arguing that a being does not need to be a moral agent to
deserve rights. Animals, along with marginal human cases can all be given the status of moral
patients: beings to whom we give rights in our moral considerations. I then likened the view that
animals cannot have rights due to their moral capacities to social contract theory and argued that
this theory is flawed given that it allows for discrimination of minorities. This leads me to conclude
that animals deserve moral consideration and that it would be wrong to show speciesism towards
them.

7
Singer, P. 1976. “A Utilitarian Defence of Animal Liberation” Animal Rights and Human Obligations Available
Online [http://blogs.nwic.edu/briansblog/files/2015/04/A-Utilitarian-Defense-of-Animal-Liberation.pdf] p74

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Bibliography
Singer, P. 1974. “All Animals are Equal”, Philosophic Exchange, 5(1), Article 6, Available Online
[https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6/]

Cohen, C. 1986. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, The new England Journal
of Medicine. Available Online [http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf]

Narveson, J. 1986. “A Case Against Animal Rights”, Animal Studies Repository. Available Online
[http://animalstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=acwp_awap].

Norcross, A. 2004. “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases”, Philosophical
Perspectives. Availiable Online [http://faculty.smu.edu/jkazez/animal%20rights/norcross-4.pdf]

Julia, D. 2006 “Ethics: The Fundamentals” Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Singer, P. 1976. “A Utilitarian Defence of Animal Liberation” Animal Rights and Human Obligations
Available Online [http://blogs.nwic.edu/briansblog/files/2015/04/A-Utilitarian-Defense-of-Animal-
Liberation.pdf]