Richard R. Miscione v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 284 F.2d 428, 2d Cir. (1960)
Richard R. Miscione v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 284 F.2d 428, 2d Cir. (1960)
Richard R. Miscione v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 284 F.2d 428, 2d Cir. (1960)
2d 428
Randolph J. Seifert, New York City, for appellant; Harry Kalman, New
York City, of counsel.
Conboy, Hewitt, O'Brien & Boardman, New York City, for appellee;
David J. Mountan, Jr., and Thomas V. McMahon, New York City, of
counsel.
Before SWAN, CLERK and MEDINA, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge.
one of the rear cars was open. He walked rapidly, or ran, diagonally toward the
train, then ran alongside it, and when the open door overtook him, he grasped
the left hand rail with his left hand, put his left foot on the step, and swung his
body slightly to grasp the right hand rail with his right hand in which he was
carrying an overnight bag. He says he got his right foot on the step for a second
or two and then slipped off. Several witnesses testified that the train was
moving at five or six miles an hour; one witness estimated its speed at fifteen
miles.
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To the court's charge that the plaintiff was not a passenger at the time of the
occurrence, plaintiff excepted, and this is urged on his appeal as an error. Under
Maryland law the charge was clearly correct. See Damico v. Washington, B. &
A. Electric R. Co., 158 Md. 470, 148 A. 821; Baltimore Traction Co. of
Baltimore City v. State ex rel. Ringgold, 78 Md. 409, 28 A. 397.
Exception was also taken to the court's refusal to charge plaintiff's requests 8
and 9 to the effect that 'if the plaintiff had safely boarded the first step of the
car,' the jury might eliminate from its consideration any question of the
plaintiff's contributory negligence in attempting to board a moving train. There
was no error in refusing the requests. The evidence was conclusive that the
plaintiff had not 'safely' boarded the first step of the car. The New York cases
on which appellant relies are readily distinguishable. Thus, in Distler v. Long
Island R. Co.,151 N.Y. 424, 45 N.E. 937, 35 L.R.A. 762, not only had the
plaintiff 'stepped upon the step leading to the forward platform of the second
car, (and) passed on until one foot was upon the platform and the other was
upon the first step below,' in marked distinction to the plaintiff here, who had,
at best, boarded the first step for an instant, but it was there clear that 'the
danger which attended the boarding of a moving train had been passed' and that
'the direct and proximate cause of his (plaintiff's) injury was the
mismanagement of the train, causing a sudden jerk or lurch which threw the
plaintiff therefrom.' Similarly, plaintiff's invocation here of the doctrine of last
clear chance is without merit. Maryland, like most states, recognizes that
doctrine, but it is not operative unless the defendant failed to use reasonable
care to avoid plaintiff's injury, see 2 Harper & James, Torts 1245, and 'the
defendant's negligence must have been sequential, and not concurrent for the
doctrine to apply,' Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Leasure, 193 Md. 523, 69 A.2d 248,
251. The only act of defendant's employees after plaintiff attempted to board
the train which plaintiff now suggests was negligent was the flagman's failure
to pull the emergency valve. The jury was instructed to determine whether the
flagman exercised reasonable care in pulling the communication cord rather
than the emergency valve (which was farther away) and that they should return
a plaintiff's verdict if they found that the flagman failed to exercise reasonable
care to avoid the accident. Thus the jury, had they so viewed the facts, might
have found for plaintiff under the doctrine of last clear chance. That they did
not do so closes the issue.
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