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United States v. Gady Pichardo Hilario, 449 F.3d 500, 2d Cir. (2006)

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449 F.

3d 500

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,


v.
Gady Pichardo HILARIO, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket No. 05-3972-CR.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.


May 24, 2006.

Jeremy F. Orden (Bernard V. Kleinman, of counsel), New York, NY, for


Defendant-Appellant.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Assistant United States Attorney (Roslynn R.
Mauskopf, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
on the brief; Jo Ann M. Navickas, Assistant United States Attorney, of
counsel), Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
Before SOTOMAYOR, WESLEY, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant Gady Pichardo Hilario appeals from a judgment of the


United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.)
convicting him, upon his guilty plea, of conspiring to import the drug
commonly known as ecstasy into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C.
963 and 960(a)(1), and sentencing him principally to 162 months'
imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a mandatory special
assessment of $100. Hilario argues that his sentence is unreasonable because
the district court improperly denied his downward departure motion seeking
four months' good time credit for the previously discharged, twenty-six-month
sentence he served in Belgium on related charges, and because the court failed
to consider adequately the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). We disagree.

A "district court's decision to depart pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 . . . is


discretionary," and thus we review it for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Fuller, 426 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir.2005). In this case, the district court departed
downward by twenty-six months, the length of Hilario's imprisonment in

Belgium, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.23, which permits departures for


"discharged terms of imprisonment." Hilario argues that because the federal
statute governing good time credit permits the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to
award inmates up to fifty-four days of good time credit at the end of each year
of imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. 3624(b)(1), the district court's downward
departure should have included all of the good time credit Hilario might have
earned had he served his twenty-six-month Belgian sentence in federal prison.
The amount of good time credit earned by a defendant is determined by the
BOP based on a prisoner's behavior while incarcerated in a BOP-controlled
environment. Because Hilario was previously incarcerated in a foreign jail, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a downward departure on
the basis of Hilario's speculative assertion that he would have earned good time
credit in a BOP prison had he served his time in such a facility. Cf. United
States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654-55 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that the district
court did not err in refusing to award good time credit against a prisoner's
federal sentence for time spent in state custody on related charges).
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Hilario further argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the court
failed to consider adequately the 3553(a) factors. "[W]e presume, in the
absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing judge has
faithfully discharged her duty to consider the statutory factors." United States v.
Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir.2006). In this case, the district court
engaged in a thorough discussion of the 3553(a) factors, explaining that
Hilario's sentence reflected, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and circumstances of the defendant, the severity of the
crime, the role played by the defendant, and the need for punishment,
deterrence, and protection of the public.

Hilario argues in particular that the district court did not adequately consider the
need, under 3553(a)(6), to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
similarly situated defendants. He asserts that because his co-defendant might be
transferred pursuant to treaty to Belgium, where "anecdotal evidence and past
experience" suggest that the co-defendant may receive a lesser sentence than he
would for the same conduct in the United States, the district court should have
reduced Hilario's sentence to ensure that it was commensurate with his codefendant's probable sentence under Belgian law. Hilario's counsel made this
argument at sentencing and presents no evidence on appeal that the district
court failed to consider it. See id. at 30-31 (holding that a defendant must
adduce record evidence indicating that a district court has failed to consider the
3553(a) factors in order to overcome the presumption that they were properly
considered). Whether or not "18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6) can support a reduced
sentence designed to eliminate or diminish disparity between the sentences

imposed on co-defendants," id. at 31, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it declined to depart on the basis of Hilario's wholly speculative
argument that a foreign sovereign might sentence his co-defendant to a lesser
sentence than would generally be warranted under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.
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For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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