as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

(LGC of 1991).

GR 135962

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of

March 27, 2000

the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan,

panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve

FACTS:

resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a

of the [province, city or municipality] and its

notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune

inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper

Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the

exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the

same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating

Code.

the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner,

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power,

praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction

let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the

enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the

LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the

demolition of the perimeter wall.

MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare

of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a

ISSUE:

development authority and not a political unit of

WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public

government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation

traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an

elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the

HELD:

rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state

which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the

affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with

welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their

powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and

respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power

and police power.

Issue:
WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly
exercise police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any

ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005)

Facts:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O.
Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by
MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally
along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent
addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his
preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint
with application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive
erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating
the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other penalties
on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein
respondent.

HELD:
Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are
the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise
police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and

Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested
clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines
and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall
enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP,
traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom
may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and
requirements as the Authority may impose."

and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In

2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the
billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to
MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the
posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards,
signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center
island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks
refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the
formers billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue:
Whether or not MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or
destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media
installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of
the MRT3.

Ruling:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks
Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.
G.R. No. 179554

December 16, 2009

Facts:
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-leasetransfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit
Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957
(Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to
build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for
25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would
transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks)
entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC.
Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages

That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages

and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority
under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the
MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no
longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned
the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would
transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the
MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date,
MRTCs entering into the contract for advertising services with
Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact,
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court
expressly recognized Trackworks right to install the billboards,
signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract.
The latters right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify
the dismantling of Trackworks billboards, signages and other

advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to

dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. BelAir Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule
that MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing
in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.

agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the

Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila
Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law (esp. PD
1152, Philippine environment Code).

The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation
No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not
apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising
media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of
billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to
public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT
agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the
areas as to which the prohibition applied.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples
collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe
level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about
MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports
Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the
study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis
Dagat project.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate

only to the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the
bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the
agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not
ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizens vs MMDA

Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government

Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by
mandamus. Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as
defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such
duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a
decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very
act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature
and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be

noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and
RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary,
for, as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right
given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code include Cleaning in
General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of
water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of
such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of
the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment,
removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect
its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures
as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note: The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official
discretion nor judgment.

MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby
creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA
recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass transport
system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a
bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA
didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their
terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent
and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the
MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the
implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by
the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the
MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the
power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their
duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct
business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the
Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without due
process of law should they be required to use the common bus
terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8,
2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an
unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the
MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the
power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus
terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of
the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend
that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory
relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders

the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major

thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed
to produce any letter or communication from the Executive
Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down
their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only
an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate
with the MMDA and to make available for use government property
along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the
only relation created by the E.O. is that between
the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
between third persons.
Issues:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes to both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe
for judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on
respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean,
among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or
rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation
of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and
substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement."
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a
law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will

sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been

satisfied by respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding
government and private investment in the development of the
countrys intermodal transportation and communications systems.
It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in
the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as
amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the
cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish
or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the
Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to
set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall
coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and
projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Projectas envisioned
by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as
that (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic

congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court
therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute
authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas, this Court emphasized that public
welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety
and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the
regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the
exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a
public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the
means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede
or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription
against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription
against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised
terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in
line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb) was
empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction,
equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public
interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving
any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require
any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate
any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.

Francisco vs. Fernando

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original
action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and
Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin
respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further
implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme).
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal
basis because the MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila
Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause
because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards
the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and
inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it
exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was valid.

HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a
constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action
will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a
taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements
under either category.
Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax
the standing requirement because of thetranscendental
importance of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to
the standing requirement, the transcendental importance of the
issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. Thus, the party
invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has
not shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.
On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that
all the cities and municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction,
except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking
ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for
pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for
respondents implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to
enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.
After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with
the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper
authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in
Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any
proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

Abbas vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734

Facts:
A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in
Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"
(Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1)
enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2)
declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments
against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts
thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of
R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are

unconstitutional.

region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,

among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.

2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means.

Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in
all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent
units, or both?

1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic

Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such
that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two
provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. There is a
specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the
Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details,
thus:

The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous

region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the
creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the
total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority
in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of
Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the
provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion
in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant
characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the
same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress
has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Held:

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite,
and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The
provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall
not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if
an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of
R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore
be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down

the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas
should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these
constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas
that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the
ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise
of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in
the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict
between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and
the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created
under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain
that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which

makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any

"man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection
by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions
of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of
national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants
exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of
national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom.
This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to
resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the
power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the
Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional
provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government
units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly
applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to
administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these
two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

Chiongbian v Orbos (Executive Secretary)

1995, J. Mendoza

This suit challenges the validity of:

Sec. 13, Art. 29 of RA No. 6734 (the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)
Executive Order No. 429 (Providing for the Reorganization
of Administrative Regions in Mindanao

7.
8.

Facts:
1. Pursuant to Sec. 18, Art X of the Constitution, Congress
passed RA No. 6734
2. RA No. 6734 called for a plebiscite to be held in the
following provinces: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan,
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur; and the
following cities: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa, and
Zamboanga
3. Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous
region: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi
4. The cities and provinces not voting in favor of the
Autonomous Region were under Art XIX, Sec. 13 of the RA
6734:
That only provinces and cities voting favorably in plebiscites shall
be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however,
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge
the existing regions.
5. With this provision, President Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 429, Providing for the Reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
6. Petitioners, members of the Congress, wrote to Corazon
Aquino, contending that theres:
o No law authorizing the President to pick certain
provinces and cities to be restructured to new
administrative regions
o Some of the provinces and cities in the regions did
not even take part in the plebiscite
o The transfer of provinces is an alteration of existing
governmental units or reorganization. The

authority to merge doesnt include the authority to

reorganize.
The inauguration of the New Administrative Region IX went
ahead.
Congress brought the suit for prohibition and certiorari;
petitioner Jaldon brough a suit as resident of Zamboanga
City, taxpayer and citizen of the Republic.

Petitioners:
1. Section 29 of RA 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing
him to merge existing region and provides no standard for
the exercise of the power delegated; and,
2. The power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
Respondent Solicitor General:
1. The exercise of power is traditionally lodged in the
President (Abbas v Comelec) and as a mere incident of his
power of general supervision over local governments and
control of executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Art
X, Sec. 16 and Art VII, Sec. 17 of Constitution)
2. There is no undue delegation of power but only a grant of
power to fill up or provide the details of the legislation, bec
Congress did not have the facility to provide for them.
3. The grant to the President to merge existing regions is
fairly embraced in the title of the RA No. 6734, because it
is germane to it. Power extends to all regions in Mindanao
as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous
region.
4. PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772, provides that the
President shall have the continuing authority to reorganize
the National Government, guided by the framework of
more effective planning implementation, greater
decentralization, etc. The President may create abolish,
consolidate units of the National Government.
Issues:
1. WON the power to merge administrative regions is
legislative or executive in character (and whether Sec. 23

2.
3.

4.

of Art. 29 is invalid because it contains no standard to

guide the Presidents discretion)
WON the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the
statute
WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even
of regions and provinces that did not take part in the
plebiscite
WON the power granted includes the power to transfer the
regional center of Region XI from Zamboanga to Pagadian

o
o

2.

The constitutional requirement that every bill shall be

passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always
been given a practical rather than a technical construction.
The title is not required to be an index of the content of the
bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to the subject, such as
the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions.

3.

There is a qualification in Sec 13, Art XIX, which states that

the President may by administrative determination merge
the existing regions. While non-assenting provinces are to
remain in their regions, they may nevertheless be
regrouped into contiguous provinces forming other regions
as the exigency of the administration may require.

Held:
1.

Nature of administrative regions and the purpose of their

creations:
o RA 5435 authorizing the President, with the help
of a Commission on Reorganization to reorganize
the different executive departments, bureaus, etc.
o Reorganization Commission submitted an
Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the
country into 11 regions (1969)
o PD No. 1 the Reorganization Plan was approved
and made part of the law of the land (1972)
o PD No. 773 divided Region IX into two grpups
o PD No. 1555 transfer of regional center of Region
IX from Jolo to Zamboanga
The Creation and subsequent reorganization of
administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to the authority granted to him by the law.
The choice of President is logical because the division
intended to facilitate the administration of executive
departments and local governments. It has been
traditionally lodged in the President.
By conferring the President the power to merge
existing regions, Congress merely followed a pattern
set in previous legislation. There is no abdication by
Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the
President the power to merge administrative regions.

Sufficient standard by which President is to be guided in the

exercise of power

Standard can be gathered or implied

Standard can be found in the same policy
underlying grant of power to the President in RA
No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive
Department: to promote simplicity, economy,
efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue
its programs consisted with the national goals for
accelerated social and economic development.

The regrouping is done only on paper and is no more than a

redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of LGUs and insuring efficient delivery of services.
There is no transfer of local governments. It is not even analogous
to redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments.
4.

The reorganization of administrative regions is based on

relevant criteria (EO 429):
o Contiguity of graphical features
o Transportation and communication facilities
o Cultural and language groupings
o Land area and population
o Existing regional centers
o Socio-economic development programs
o Number of provinces and cities

The change of regional center from Pampanga to Pagadian is based

on the power of the President (by virtue of the Executive Order).
The transfer is addressed to the wisdom, not the legality of the
President. The Court cannot interfere.

onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No.
10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections.

G.R. No. 196271

Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus originating

from different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of
R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said
laws.

October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in

representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the
structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA
No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining

order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform
their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term on September 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in
order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage
of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the
"elective and representative" character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs
to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have
assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections

B. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the

provisions of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of
R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the
Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards
this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to
the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether
national or local to once every three years. This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization,
Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs
regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011
based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution
that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the VicePresident have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date
and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as
the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once

every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President
and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local"
election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall
within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to
the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous
regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as
evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local
Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly
within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it
acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused
of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty
nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of
grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is
in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the
whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national
effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity;

out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or
used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner
that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably
accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures
was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who
were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM
during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term
has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and
no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court.
Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three
(3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of
the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until
the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be
interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.

FACTS:
These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs
Decision dated October 18, 2011, where it upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the
second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May
2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-incharge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the
expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM
regional elections with national and local elections?
2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No.
10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections
in ARMM?
5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate
the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative
and executive offices?
6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed
the President's supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
HELD:
The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.
POLITICAL LAW: synchronization of ARMM

Datu Kida, et al. v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.

G.R. No. 196271 : February 28, 2012

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their

objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for
all elective officials from the President down to the municipal
officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet
this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional
mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned

in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization

cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not
covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The
ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the
Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in
mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for
as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what
actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present
but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the
principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged
from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a
dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static.
2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the
schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the
date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for
the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not
change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of
the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however,
it is well-settled that the supermajority vote requirement set forth
in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement
applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an
unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth
in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This
means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions
i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification

through a plebiscite.
3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of
Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional
officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The
petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials
should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the
May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the
Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from
performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective
local officials can occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials
are also local officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective
officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year
term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus,
the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
4. The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has
granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another
date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6
of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been
scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended
because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as
violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In
contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in
furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any
of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP
881.

5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM

regional government from law, it falls under the classification of
presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents
appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of
supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and
the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of
RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined
as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law. This is
distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer
to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged
power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the
President's appointment power includes the power to remove these
officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people. This is
incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices
of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until
they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013
elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President
has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly,
the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
MR DENIED.

Ordillo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
FACTS:
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio
cast their votes in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in
Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The
province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as
such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the
abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President
reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the
only province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and
validly constitutes CAR.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting
elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued
February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the

affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional

Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160
declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order
No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and
restrain the respondents from implementing the same and
spending public funds for the purpose
b declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and
other offices to be still in force and effect until another
organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the
voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone, legally and validly constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that region is to be made up
of more than one constituent unit. The term region used
in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language
of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in
the sense it has in common use and that the words used in

constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning

except where technical terms are employed.
b The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions
which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting
the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another
set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the
smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1
and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its
initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding
only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming from
different provinces and cities in the Region, as well as tribal courts
and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec
16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC
would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COA January 29, 1990
Facts:
EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative
powers under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR.
It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the
region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units
as well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing
national and local government projects in the region. The CAR shall
have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body
and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR

and the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist until such time
as the autonomous regional government is established and
organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by
issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe exercise of her legislative
powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the
1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organicact and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue: WON EO 220 is constitutional
RULING:
Yes. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies of the National
Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a
step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It
does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of
an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of
the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily
mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the
interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras". The Constitution
provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous
region composed of an elective executive and legislature and
special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction.
Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an
autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective
of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly,
to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with,
among others, identifying priority projects and development
programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the
Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do
not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are
they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute

the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing

local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the
ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.
Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Ruling:
No. We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution. Thus,
we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No.
220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and
political subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of
E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and
political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger
subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate
juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to
public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power
to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created
primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas. The creation of
administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery
of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of
PD 1, established 11 regions, later increased to 12, with definite
regional centers and required departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices
therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established
pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws,
policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department
or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient
and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate
with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in
the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area;
and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the

operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line
departments and agencies of the National Government but also the
local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional
guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet,
Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio
City) which compose the CAR.
Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of
local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. Local
autonomy is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And while there was
no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress
enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the
Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible
march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not
just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision
in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a
basic structure consisting of an executive department and a
legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. As we
have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into
an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

ALVAREZ VS GUINGONA

FACTS:
1. Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled,
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago
BECAUSE:
- The Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
- The Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual income required under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a
component city.
2. The Act converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent compnent city (to be known as City of Santiago) was
filed in the HOR with Rep. Abaya as principal author.
- Public hearings were conducted by the House committee on Local
Gov. Committee submitted to the a house a favorable report
- HB was passed by HOR on 2nd reading, approved on 3rd reading,
then passed to Senate
3. A counterpart of the HB 8817 was passed - Senate Bill 1243,
filed by the Senate by Vicente Sotto III.Public hearings were
conducted for this too
4. Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second
Reading and was approved on Third Reading. House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President was signed by the
Chief Executive. A great majority voted for conversion of Santiago
into a city.
5. The validity of RA7720 hinges on the following
(I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be
included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion
(II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No.
1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be
said to have originated in the House of Representatives.

HELD: IRA'S ARE TO BE INCLUDED.

SC:
1. Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a
component city because its average annual income for the last two
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the
required annual income of 20 million pesos
- how computed: By dividing the total income of Santiago for
calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the
average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47
based on the 1991 constant prices.
- they also say the certification issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates
Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is not
accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded
from the computation.
- the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or
budgetary aid from the national government and that they
fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
SC: No. Internal Revenue Allotments form PART OF the income of
Local Government Units. [Requirement: for a municipality to be
converted into a component city, it must have an average annual
income of at least 20M for the last two consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the
Department of Finance.]
PRINCPLES: THE IRA VIS A VISA INCOME OF AN LGU AND
PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION
- A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State
which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control
over its own affairs.
- The practical side to development through a decentralized local
government system certainly concerns the matter of financial
resources.
- Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in
every local government unit of
(1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;

(2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such

share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its
territorial boundaries.
FIRST REASON WHY IT FORMS PART: the FUNDS -> these are
generated from:
local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds
- these accrue to the general fund of the local government and are
used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of
spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code
and its implementing rules and regulations.
- For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must
be set aside for local development projects.
- So for purposes of budget preparation, which budget
should reflect the estimates of the income of the local
government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the
national wealth utilization proceeds are considered ITEMS OF
INCOME --> since income is defined in the lgc to be all revenues
and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of
funds of the local government unit.
THEREFORE:
- The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit.
IN THIS CASE:
- For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a
city, the Department of Finance certified that it had an average
annual income of at least 20m Pesos for the last two consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices.
- This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.
SECOND REASON: Section 450 (c) of the LGC provides that "the
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the

general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income." T

- IRAs are a REGULAR, recurring item of income; there's no basis to
classify the same as a SPECIAL fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the lgc that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-ownedor-controlled corporations".
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 is correct when it
defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by
provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the
Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and
other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the
Code, BUT exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other
national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of
fixed assets, and similar others"
- Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with
the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full
respect and should be accorded great weight unless such
construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the
Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.
2. SC SAYS In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance
with Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
- the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill
of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is
untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed
in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed
in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own
admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB
No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was
thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB
No. 1243.
- Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative
process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720.
No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is

perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant

controversy.
- The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate
does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
- TOLENTINO vs Sec of Finance: it is not the law but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives.
Every law, including RA No. 7720, has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality. For RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other
words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court stands on the holding that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is, therefore, inevitable.

release to each of these units its share in the national internal

revenue.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that the aforesaid
AO was purportedly in order to cope with the nations economic
difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation on that said
period. Further, he claims that AO 372 was issued merely as an
exercise of the Presidents power of supervision over LGUs. It
allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it
merely directs local governments to identify measures that will
reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at
least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the
LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares,
because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."

Aquilino Pimentel vs. Aguirre

(G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)

FACTS:
On December, 1997, the President issued AO 372 (Adoption of
Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998). The AO provided
that (a) 10% of the Internal Revenue allotment to LGUs is withheld.
Further it (b) "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25
percent Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Estrada
issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five
percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be
withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that by issuing AO 372, the President exercised
the power of control over LGUs in contravention of law. Moreover,
withholding 10% of the IRA is in contravention of Sec 286 LGC and
of Sec 6 Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic

ISSUES:
1.

WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs

to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent is a valid
exercise of the President's power of general supervision
over local governments.

2.

WON Section 4 of AO 372, which withholds 10 percent

of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of
the President's power of general supervision over local
governments.

HELD:

1.

YES. There are several requisites before the President may

interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore,
any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with the

above requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO
372. At the very least, the respondents did not even try to show
that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable
public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local
governments. Without these requisites, the President has no
authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's
internal revenue allotment.
Although the Supreme Court agrees with the Petitioner that the
requisites were not complied with, it still holds that the Presidents
directive in AO 372 is in conformity with law, and does constitute
interference to local autonomy. There is interference if Section 1
of AO 372 was couched in mandatory or binding language.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 3721 have a rather
commanding tone, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail
upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a
period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well
to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to
help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal

The above Section states that (LGUs must) "identify and implement
measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriation."

sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not
follow such advice.

2.

NO. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is

the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue as mandated by the Constitution. The
Local Government Code. specifies further that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
the national government for whatever purpose.

The use of the term "shall" shows that the provision is imperative.
Therefore, Section 4 of AO 372, which orders the withholding of 10
percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation" in the country clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a
holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often
temporarily. Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by
the national government does not matter. Any retention is
prohibited. Therefore, the President clearly overstepped the
bounds of his lawful authority when he issued Section 4 of AO
372.

DISSENT: Kapunan
On the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the
country. Justice Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372
conforms with the President's role as chief fiscal officer, who
allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the
observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as
the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into
account the constitutional and statutory mandates, citing instances
when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal affairs of
LGUs.

It was a case filed by Hon. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, Governor of

Batangas petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare
as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked (allocated) for each corresponding year the
amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization
Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
It started in 1998 when then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION to facilitate the process of
enhancing the capabilities of local government units in the discharge of
the functions and services devolved to them pursuant to the Local
Government Code. Included in the EO No. 48 is the appointment of the
Oversight Committee authorized to issue the implementing rules and
regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said
fund to the LGUs.
Subject of the case are the resolutions passed by the Oversight
Committee (Chaired by the Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora).
These are the resolutions with numbers OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, and
OCD-99-003.
Further, these OCDs were approved by then Pres.
Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines along with these OCDs as
formulated by the Oversight Committee requires the LGUs to identify
the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit
the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal
before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent
release of corresponding funds.
For the year 2000 and 2001, the same LGSEF of 1999 GAA were
adopted due to failure of Congress to enact general appropriation laws.
The standing point was when Gov. Mandanas received the LGSEF in the
GAA of 1991.
The 5Billion LGESF for 2001 were as follows:
Modified Codal FormulaP3.0Billion
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004

Priority Projects

P1.9 Billion

Capability Building Fund P0.1 Billion, Total = P5Billion

Relevant Background:

Further, the P3.0Billion of the abovementioned LGESF shall be

allocated according to the modified codal formula and be released to

the four levels of LGUs. i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays as follows:

intended to be the default share of the LGUs to do away with the

need to determine annually.

Provinces, 25% -

P0.750Billion

Cities, 25%

0.750

Municipalities, 35%

1.050

Further, the respondent avers that the petition has already been
rendered as moot and academic as it no longer presents a
justifiable controversy because the IRAs of the years 1999, 2000
and 2001 have already been released and therefore, nothing more
to prohibit, aside from the fact that the petition should not have
been filed with the Supreme Court because this court is not a trier
of facts, but, the lower courts of jurisdiction.

Barangays, 15% -

0.450, Total = P3Billion

Resolved Further, the P1.9Billion earmarked for Priority Projects shall

be distributed according to the following criteria:
1.
2.

For projects of the 4th, 5th, and 6th class LGUs, or

Projects in consonance with the Presidents SONA

Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to

the individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking the
reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to
Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution as it
violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 but
otherwise, approved by Pres. Arroyo on January 25, 2002.
The Petitioner Points the Following Issues:
1.
2.

Unconstitutionality and void provisos in the GAAs of 1999,

2000, and 2001.
Unlawful and illegal imposition of conditions issued by the
Oversight Committee requiring project proposals and
documentary requirements prior to the release of LGUs just
share in the IRA is an anathema to the principle of local
autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991 (and that the possible disapproval
by the Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs is a
diminution to then latters share in the IRA).

The petitioner contends the following:

In issue No.1 & 3, the respondent theorized that Section 285 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 which provides for the percentage
sharing of the IRA among the LGUs was not intended to be a fixed
determination of share in the national taxes as the Congress may
enact other laws, including the aforementioned appropriations law
providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 merely

In issue No.2, the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight

Committee are not constitutionally infirm. The respondents stands
that Section 6 of Article X of the Constitution does not specify the
just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local
Government Code of 1991 and that the phrase to be determined
by law in the same provision means that there exists no limitation
on the power of Congress to determine what is the just share of
the LGUs in the national taxes. In effect, the Congress serves as
the arbiter of what should be the just share.

Courts Ruling:
The Court finds the petition to involve a significant legal issue. Issue
No.1 is the crux of the instant controversy as contained in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991 and undoubtedly a legal
question. However, the earmarking of the LGSEF, the promulgation of
the assailed OCD resolutions and the release of the LGSEF to the LGU
following the requirements are not disputed.
Substantive issues stated above, in the course of the argument,
although the supervening events as the IRA including the LGSEF for
1999, 2000 and 2001 had already been released, still, there was a
compelling reason to resolve the substantive issue raised in the instant
petition, whether intended or incidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if grave violation of the Constitution is proved
even where the supervening events had made the cases moot in order
to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
The court held that, the state shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments. (Art. II Sec. 25 of the Constitution). Consistent with the

principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents

power over the LGUs to one of general supervision and has no power
to control

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the

General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed
OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the
mandate of the Constitution. The State policy on local autonomy is
amplified in Section 2 thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward
this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources.
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for
each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA for
the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto,
transgress the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is
part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To
subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing
rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time,
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the
just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them.
The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to
guarantee and promote local autonomy can be gleaned from the
discussion below between Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M.
Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional
provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and
liberty upon which these provisions are based.

Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, et. al. vs. Judge Cader P.

Indar, et. al.
December 21, 2009
SUMMARY
This case stemmed from an election protest by incumbent Mayor
Sampiano against his uncle Ogka. Pending the resolution of the
double proclamation election protest, COMELEC allowed
Sampiano to temporarily assume the duties of a Mayor to prevent
paralysis to the Public Service. However, Ogka wrote to PNB thru
PNBs chief legal counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, to suspend the release
of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the Municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. Atty. Go however allowed the release of
IRA. To prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for
Prohibiton and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On
the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge issued ex parte a TRO
which lasted for 11 days total. SC subjected the judge to
disciplinary fine of 10,000 pesos for violating the Rules of Court.
Ex-parte TROs can only last 72 hours, and a 20-day TRO only after
a summary hearing. The SC also stated that the automatic release
of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper
court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular
local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court
pertaining to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to the
propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while
such rights are still being determined.

FACTS
Administrative case against Judge Cader P. Indar of the RTC Branch
12 of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, by Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano
and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, charging him with
gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
manifest partiality and serious acts of impropriety.
Prior to that, Sampiano filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Annulment of Proclamation with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle
Ogka, and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao
del Sur composed of Vadria Pungginagina and Zenaida Mante. The
Comelec issued an order allowing Sampiano to act, perform and
discharge the duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor "to
prevent paralysis to public service" pending determination and
final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of the
Municipality of Balabagan.

Ogka however filed for an MR of the said COMELEC order and

informed in writing PNBs Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, not
to release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for Municipality of
Balabagan pending the resolution of double proclamation. Go
however directed PNB to release the IRA. Aggrieved, and to
prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton
and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same
day (October 11, 2004), Judge Indar issued ex parte a TRO which
lasted for 11 days total.
Sampianos arguments:
1. The October 11 order is in the nature of a TRO or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. As such prior notice and hearing are
required. He added that a TRO has a limited life of 20 days while a
writ of preliminary injunction is effective only during the pendency
of the case and only after posting the required injunction bond.
This is the ex-parte issuance of the October 11, 2004 order
freezing the IRA of the Municipality of Balabagan "unless ordered
otherwise by the Court."

2. Said Order was issued in violation of Section 286 of the Local

Government Code (LGC), which provides for the automatic release
of the share of the local government unit from the national
government. This is so as not to deprive the officials and
employees of the Municipality of Balabagan from receiving their
hard earned salaries, but the Judge did not heed the said request.
3. Judge has no jurisdiction as the same belongs to COMELEC.
Judge Indars arguments:
1. The October 11, 2004 order DID NOT FREEZE the IRA but merely
HELD or DEFERRED its release to any person. Since said
proclamation was neither annulled nor invalidated by the COMELEC
pending resolution of the petitioner Ogka's Motion for
Reconsideration of the above-mentioned 3 orders. Since petitioner
Ogka was left with no alternative to protect his interest in the IRA
and to prevent irreparable injury, he filed the instant petition with
the prayer for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.
2. The provision on the automatic release of IRA is not a shield or
immunity to the authority of the courts to interfere, interrupt or
suspend its release when there is a legal question presented before
it in order to determine the rights of the parties concerned.
3. His court assumed jurisdiction as it is a petition for prohibition
and injunction and not an enforcement of election laws. While he
considered the said petition as an improper remedy, hence, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the case, he had
nevertheless acted on it since the petition prays for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, both an
auxiliary remedy which concerns the "enforcement of legal right or
a matter that partakes of a question of law" and not the
enforcement of election laws.

ISSUE
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction
2. WON the October 11 order freezing the release of the IRA is
valid.

3. WON the said order partakes of a TRO.

4. WON the Order contravenes the automatic release of funds to
LGUs

HELD
1. YES. RTC has jurisdtion.
2. YES. But Judge violated the Rules when the TRO extended to 11
days, when only a 72-hour TRO is allowed ex-parte.
3. YES. It is obviously one of the prayers prayed for which is
subsequently granted by the judge.
4. NO. This automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury
does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the
release.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby imposed on respondent Judge for the
above-mentioned violation of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.

RATIO
1. The petition prayed, among others, that Go should cease and
desist from ordering PNB-Marawi through its branch manager to
release the IRA for the month of October 2004 and the succeeding
months to Sampiano and Macabato or their agents. The issue here
involves the determination of whether Ogka is entitled to the
issuance of a TRO or an injunction and not the application or
enforcement of election law. Undeniably, RTC has jurisdiction
pursuant to BP 129.
2. Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day
it was filed, and without any hearing and prior notice to herein
complainants. Respondent was allowed by the Rules to issue ex
parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a

hearing to determine the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing

a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent conducted the hearing of the petition on October 14,
2004 or on the third day of the issuance of a TRO ex parte. The
October 11, 2004 Order was lifted in an Order dated October 27,
2004 issued by the latter. Hence, the TRO issued ex parte was
effective for 11 days from October 11, 2004 until October 22, 2004
in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO issued after a summary
hearing can last for a period of 20 days. It is worthy to note that
the said October 11, 2004 Order was subsequently lifted by the
succeeding judge on the ground that the requisites for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction were not present.
3. A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a
TRO or preliminary injunction order. The Order directed PNB's Go
and Disomangcop to hold or defer the release of the IRA to
Sampiano and Macabato while the petition is pending resolution of
the trial court and unless ordered otherwise by the court. This
Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in
respondent's petition for prohibition and injunction.
4. The automatic release of the IRA under Section 286 is a
mandate to the national government through the Department of
Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said
funds from the treasury directly to the local government unit, free
from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government.
However, this automatic release of the IRA from the national
treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or
suspending the release thereof to particular local officials when
there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the
rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the
issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction while such rights are
still being determined. This should be considered an exercise of
judicial functions and judicial prerogatives in the most cautious
manner taking into account the factual and serious circumstances
obtaining between petitioner Ogka and his Uncle Mayor Sampiano
whose family were already at war with each other.
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. and the Province
of Camarines Sur v. Hon. Jesse M. Robredo, in his capacity
as Secretary of DILG

December 10, 2014

disbursements of such funds during the

preceding fiscal year. RA No 984
(Government Procurement Reform Act)
calles for the posting of the Invitation to
Bid, Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed and
Approved Contract in the procuring entitys
premises, in newspapers of general
circulation, the Philippine Govt Electronic
Procurement System and the website of
procuring entity.

SUMMARY: Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three

memorandum circulars issued by Robredo. The circulars pertain to
full disclosure of local budget and finances and other guidelines
regarding budget. Villafuerte argues that the circulars violate the
principles of local and fiscal autonomy of the LGU. The Court ruled
that the circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in
the law and that the order on public disclosure is consistent with
the policy of promoting good governance through transparency,
accountability and participation.

DOCTRINE: The Constitution is now replete with numerous

provisions directing the adoption of measures to uphold
transparency and accountability in government, with a view of
protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious past. It
commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of information on
all matters relating to official transactions and those involving
public interest.
FACTS:

o
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of
Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of
Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari,
seeking to nullify the three issuances of Robredo for being
unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion:
o

MC No. 2010-83 entitled Full Disclosure of

Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and
Public Offerings, which aims to promote good
governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs.

Legal and Administrative Authority: Section

352 of LGC of 1991 requires the posting
within 30 days from end of each fiscal year
in at least 3 publicly accessible and
conspicuous places in the LGU a summary
of all revenues collected and funds
including the appropriations and

Responsibility of Local Chief Executive: All

Provincial Governors, City Mayors, and
Municipal Myors, are directed to faithfully
comply with the above cited provisions of
laws, and existing national policy, by
posting in conspicuous places within public
buildings in the locality, or in print media of
community or general circulation, and in
their websites2

MC No 2010-138 reiterating that 20% component

of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social,
economic, and environmental outcomes essential
to the attainment of the constitutional objective of
life for all.3

2 CY 2010 Annual Budget, Quarterly Statement of Cash Flows, CY

2009 Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, CY 2010 Trust
Fund (PDAF) Utilization, CY 2010 Special Education Fund
Utilization, CY 2010 20% Component of the IRA Utilization, CY
2010 Gender and Development Fund Utilization, CY 2010
Statement of Debt Service, CY 2010 Annual Procurement Plan or
Procurement List, Items to Bid, Bid Results on Civil Works, and
Goods and Services, Abstract of Bids as Calculated

Administrative expenses such as cash gifts, bonuses, food

allowance, medical assistance, uniforms, supplies, meetings,
communication, water and light, petroleum products, and the
like;Salaries, wages or overtime pay;

MC No 2011-08 directing for the strict adherence

to Section 90 of RA No 10147 of the General
Appropriations Act of 2011.

Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate

the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshired in the
Constitution and the LGC? NO

Legal and Administrative Authority: Section

90 stipulates that the amount
appropriated for the LGUs share in the IRA
shall be used in accordance with Sections
17(g) and 287 of RA No 7160. The annual
budgets of LGUs shall be prepared in
accordance with the forms, procedures,
and schedules prescribed by the
Department of Budget and Management
and those jointly issued with the
Commission on Audit.
Sanctions: Section 60. Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions - An elective local
official may be disciplined, suspended, or
removed from office on: (c) Dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty

2.

Travelling expenses, whether domestic or foreign;

3.

Registration or participation fees in training, seminars,

conferences or conventions;

4.

Construction, repair or refinishing of administrative offices;

5.

Purchase of administrative office furniture, fixtures,

equipment or appliances; and Purchase, maintenance or
repair of motor vehicles or motorcycles, except ambulances.

MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionallyprotected liberties when it restricted the meaning

of development and enumerated activities which
the local government must finance from the 20%
development fund component of the IRA and
provided sanctions for local authorities who shall
use the said component of the fund for the
excluded purposes stated therein.

Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with

that of the local legislative council in enacting its
annual budget and specifying the development
projects that the 20% component of its IRA should
fund.

Court: Petitioners arguments are untenable.

remind LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision for

the IRA through MC No. 2010-138.
o The enumeration in the circular was not meant to restrict
the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It
was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide
them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further
misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed
to be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. LGUs
remain at liberty to map out their development plans based
on their own discretion and utilize their IRAs accordingly,
with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for
development projects.
The local autonomy granted LGU does not completely severe
them from the national government or turn them into
impenetrable states. Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal
autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws.
o

RULING: Petition denied.

Petitioners: assailed issuances interfere with the local and

fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the Constitution and
the LGC.

Answering petitioners claim that the requirement to post other

documents in the issuances went beyond the provisions in LGC
and RA No 9184: It is well to remember that fiscal autonomy
does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the
disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to their
constituency.
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83
and 2011-08, are but implementation of this avowed policy of
the State to make public officials accountable to the people.
They are amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation
designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of
transparency and accountability.
The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83
and 2011-08, are but implementation of this avowed policy of
the State to make public officials accountable to the people.
They are amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation
designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of
transparency and accountability.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its
holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding
accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the
people they are called upon to serve. (ABAKADA GURO Party
List v Purisima)
The Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt
and implement a policy of full disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest and provide the
people with the right to access public information.
Section 352 of the LGC and RA No 9184 are responses to this
call for transparency and both laws establish a system of
transparency in procurement process in government agencies.
The publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans
and procurement plans of LGUs required in the assailed
issuances could not have infringed on the local fiscal autonomy
of LGUs.
o The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the
LGUs in the specification of their priority projects and the
allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are
mere transparency measures.
o Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the
petitioners does not exclude the requirement for the

posting of the additional documents stated in MC Nos.

2010-83 and 2011-08. The additional requirement for the
posting of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and
procurement plans are well-within the contemplation of
Section 352 of the LGC considering they are documents
necessary for an accurate presentation of a summary of
appropriations and disbursements that an LGU is required
to publish.
o The supervisory powers of the President are broad enough
to embrace the power to require the publication of certain
documents as a mechanism of transparency. The President,
by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and
planning agency of the government, primarily responsible
for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs for the entire country. (Pimentel v Aguirre)
The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of
dictatorship and abuse of power, is now replete with
numerous provisions directing the adoption of
measures to uphold transparency and accountability in
government, with a view of protecting the nation from
repeating its atrocious past. It commands the strict
adherence to full disclosure of information on all
matters relating to official transactions and those
involving public interest. (Section 28, Article II and
Section 7, Article III)
The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of
promoting good governance through transparency,
accountability and participation. The action of the respondent
is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as
alter ego of the President.

The power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who

hailed the public official to office through the democratic process of
election. He must not frown upon accountability checks which aim
to show how well he is performing his delegated power. For, it is
through these mechanisms of transparency and accountability that
he is able to prove to his constituency that he is worthy of the
continued privilege.

Pursuant to the assailed Circular, the DND sought to audit VFP. The
VFP complained about the alleged broadness of the scope of the
management audit and requested its suspension. This was denied.
VFP argued that it is a private non-government organization. To
support its argument, it contended: (1) that it does not possess the
elements of a public office, particularly the possession/delegation
of a portion of sovereign power of government; (2) that its funds
are not public funds because it receives no government funds as
its funds come from membership dues, and the lease rentals; (3)
that it retains its essential character as a private, civilian
federation of veterans voluntarily formed by the veterans
themselves where membership is voluntary and is governed by the
Labor Code and SSS law; (4) that the Administrative Code of 1987
does not provide that the VFP is an attached agency; and (5) that
the DBM declared that the VFP is a non-government organization
and issued a certificate that the VFP has not been a direct recipient
of any funds released by the DBM.
ISSUES:
Central Issue: Whether or not the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines is a private corporation.

THE VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

Hon. ANGELO T. REYES; and Hon. EDGARDO E. BATENGA
G. R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006

FACTS:
The Veterans Federation of the Philippines was created under Rep.
Act No. 2640. The DND Secretary issued the assailed DND
Department Circular No. 04 entitled, "Further Implementing the
Provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 2640.

Whether or not the challenged department circular passed

in the valid exercise of the respondent Secretarys "control
and supervision."

Whether or not the challenged department circular validly

lay standards classifying the VFP, an essentially civilian
organization, within the ambit of statutes only applying to
government entities.

Whether or not the department circular unduly encroached

on the prerogatives of VFPs governing body.

RULING:
The Court ruled the following: (1) assailed DND
Department Circular No. 04 does not supplant nor modify and is,
on the contrary, perfectly in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640;
and (2) that VFP is a public corporation. As such, it can be
placed under the control and supervision of the Secretary of

National Defense, who consequently has the power to conduct an

extensive management audit of VFP.
The functions of the VFP are executive functions
The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government is "[t]he most important characteristic" in
determining whether a position is a public office or not.
In several cases, the Court has dealt with this issue which deals
with activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign functions.
It upheld the public sovereign nature of operations needed either
to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic sentiments
and love of country.
In the case at bar, the functions of the VFP fall within the category
of sovereign functions. The protection of the interests of war
veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also
intended to reward patriotism.
The functions of the VFP are executive functions to provide
immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of
assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns,
their surviving spouses and orphans.
VFP funds are public funds
The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to
the VFP by the DBM does not prove that it is a private corporation.
Assuming that the DBM believed that the VFP is a private
corporation, it is an accepted principle that the erroneous
application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent
correct application of the law.
The funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever source are public
funds, and can be used only for public purposes. As the Court
ruled in Republic v. COCOFED, "(e)ven if the money is allocated for
a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in
character." There is nothing wrong, whether legally or morally,
from raising revenues through non-traditional methods.
Membership of the VFP is not the individual
membership of the affiliate organizations

VFP claims that the Secretary of National Defense "historically did

not indulge in the direct or micromanagement of the VFP. This
reliance of petitioner on what has "historically" been done is
erroneous, since laws are not repealed by disuse, custom, or
practice to the contrary.
Neither is the civilian nature of VFP relevant because the
Constitution does not contain any prohibition against the grant of
control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National Defense
over a civilian organization.
The Administrative Code did not
repeal or modify RA 2640
The Administrative Code, by giving definitions of the various
entities covered by it, acknowledges that its enumeration is not
exclusive. The Administrative Code could not be said to have
repealed nor enormously modified RA 2640 by implication, as such
repeal or enormous modification by implication is not favored in
statutory construction.
DBM opinion is not persuasive
VFPs claim that the supposed declaration of the DBM that
petitioner is a non-government organization is not persuasive,
since DBM is not a quasi-judicial agency. The persuasiveness of the
DBM opinion has, however, been overcome by all the previous
explanations we have laid so far.
The fate of Department Circular No. 04
The Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former to that of the latter." The power of
supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties."
Since the Court has also previously determined that VFP funds are
public funds, there is likewise no reason to declare this provision
invalid. Having in their possession public funds, the officers of the

VFP, especially its fiscal officers, must indeed share in the fiscal
responsibility to the greatest extent.
FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN
G.R. No. L-55963, February 27, 1991

Petitioners: Spouses Jose Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla

Respondents: Hon. Inocencio D. Maliaman and National Irrigation
Administration (NIA)

FACTS
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring
National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency
performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA
was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco
Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla,
caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIAs driver employee
Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the
amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for
hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages;
P8,000 as exemplary damages, and attorneys fees of 20% of the
total award.
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however,
that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions,
but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its
driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have
filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990.
NIA believes this bases this on:
PD 552 amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which
created the NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation

System v. Angat River Workers Union

Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat
System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because
the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was
intended to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit
or pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat
River system is a government entity exercising proprietary
functions.
The Angat dissenting opinion:
Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He
argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same
would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and
his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the
status of regular employee and could not be removed except for
valid cause.
The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor
Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came
into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.
ISSUE
Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby
opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the
damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent
HELD:
YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The
former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as
compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional.
The National Irrigation Administration was not created for
purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA
was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at

promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function"
corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but
these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the
agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by
the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created
which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . .
which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act.
It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and
shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct
of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis).

Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:

(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from
all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration,
such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover
the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover
the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the
extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or
portions thereof expended for the construction and/or
rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall
accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2
hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred
liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised
thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens
except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be
removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the
property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation
Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .

The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in
court.
It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to
be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): . . .
and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly
necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above
powers and objectives, including the power to establish and
maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of
a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation

Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency
of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused
by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit

(2011) [Vital Role of the Youth]
Petition: petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26,

1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R.
No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is

one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort
committed by its employees, is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing governmental
functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees
only when it acts through a special agent.

DOCTRINE:
An institution that molds and prepares the youth to become model
citizens and outstanding leaders of the country through lessons in
patriotism, civic consciousness and moral values, ultimately
redounds to the benefit of public welfare and the state. The
aforementioned functions are undeniably sovereign functions
enshrined under the Art. II- Sec. 13 of the Constitution
FACTS:
-The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act
No. 111 dated October 31, 1936, and whose functions relate to the
fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the
general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth.
-On Aug 19, 1999, COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 "Defining the
Commission's policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of

the Philippines" which provides for the conduction of an annual

financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Phil. and the expression of
an opinion on the fairness of their financial statements. The BSP
shall also be classified among the government corporations
belonging to the Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research
Sector.
- The COA resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public
corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111 and is a
government-controlled corporation. The COA Resolution also cited
its constitutional mandate under Section 2 (1), Article IX (D).
-On Nov. 26, 1999, the BSP National President Jejomar Binay
sought reconsideration of the resolution stating that the BSP is not
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction because it is not a unit of
the government. Moreover, RA 7278 virtually eliminated the
"substantial government participation" in the National Executive
Board and that the BSP is not as a government instrumentality
under the 1987 Administrative Code which provides that
instrumentality refers to "any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law.
-On July 3, 2000, Director Sunico, Corporate Audit Officer of the
COA, furnished the BSP with a copy of the Memorandum that
opined that the substantial government participation is only one
(1) of the three (3) grounds relied upon by the Court in the
resolution of the case. Other considerations include the character
of the BSP's purposes and functions which has a public aspect and
the statutory designation of the BSP as a "public corporation". On
the argument that BSP is not "a government instrumentality" and
"agency" of the government, the Supreme Court has elucidated
this matter in the BSP vs NLRC case when it declared that BSP is
both a "government-controlled corporation with an original charter"
and as an "instrumentality" of the Government.
-Upon the BSP's request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30)
days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before
the COA.

ISSUES: W/N the BSP is a public corporation and is subject to

COAs audit jurisdiction.

PROVISIONS:
-Commonwealth Act No. 111 (Boy Scout Charter), or An Act
to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes: Section
3.The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote, through
organization, and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of
boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in
scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance,
and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common
use by boy scouts.
-Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that
COA shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters

-ART II- Section 13 of the Constitution. The State recognizes

the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social wellbeing. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Article 44 of the Civil Code:

The following are juridical persons:
(1)The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins
as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3)Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical

personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,

partner or member

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

RULING + RATIO: Yes. BSP is a public corporation and its funds

are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.

Dissenting Opinion relevant to the issue: (Carpio)

The BSP is a public corporation whose functions relate to the

fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the
general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The
functions of the BSP include, among others, the teaching to the
youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, are
undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under the Constitution.
Any attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be
incomprehensible since no less than the law which created it had
designated it as a public corporation and its statutory mandate
embraces performance of sovereign functions. The manner of
creation and the purpose for which the BSP was created
indubitably prove that it is a government agency.

Moreover, there are three classes of juridical persons under Article

44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under
Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification.

According to Carpio, the public purpose of the BSP is not

determinative of status. The BSP performs functions which may
be classified as public in character, in the sense that it promotes
"virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement
of the moral spirit and fiber of our youth." However, this fact alone
does not automatically make the BSP a GOCC. The fact that a
certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest
does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a
public corporation, incorporated solely for the public good.
Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the
corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is that
almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the
interest, good, or convenience of the public.
-The true criterion to determine whether a corporation is public or
private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to
the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latter's
own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its
governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public;
otherwise, it is private.

The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows

that it was created in order to implement a State policy declared in
Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution.

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a

public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within
the class of "public corporations" defined by paragraph 2, Article
44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it.

Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

vs Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 169752
September 25, 2007

Facts:

PSPCA was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No.

1285 by the Philippine Commission in order to enforce laws relating
to the cruelty inflicted upon animals and for the protection of and
to perform all things which may tend to alleviate the suffering of
animals and promote their welfare.

PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19, 1905. Laws,

generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided. There are a few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided;
(2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws
interpreting others.

In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1)
power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws and (2) share
50% of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts pursuant
to the violations of related laws.

None of the exceptions apply in the instant case.

However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled the said powers.

President Quezon then issued Executive Order No. 63 directing the
Commission of Public Safety, Provost Marshal General as head of
the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, Mayors of
chartered cities and every municipal president to detail and
organize special officers to watch, capture, and prosecute
offenders of criminal-cruelty laws.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the Commission on
Audit visited petitioners office to conduct a survey. PSPCA
demurred on the ground that it was a private entity and not under
the CoAs jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution.

Issue:
WON the PSPCA is subject to CoAs Audit Authority.

Held:
No.
The charter test cannot be applied. It is predicated on the legal
regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since
the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the
1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to

The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law
doesnt necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. At the time
PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable
law and no proscription similar to the charter test can be found
therein. There was no restriction on the legislature to create
private corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA
148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not a
government agency.
PSPCAs charter shows that it is not subject to control or
supervision by any agency of the State. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined
voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may exercise powers
generally accorded to private corporations.
PSPCAs employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the
latters initiative and not through the GSIS.
The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest
does not make the entity a public corporation. They may be
considered quasi-public corporations which areprivate corporations
that render public service, supply public wants and pursue other
exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a
corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the
relation of the corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by
the latters own agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.